smoke and flame billowed from jet boat · and smarter way. the rescue coordination centre nz is...

ISSUE FoUrAprIl 2007

FIRE down belowSmoke and flame billowed from jet boat

over-reliance on GPS reSultS in GroundinG

GPS gets it wrong

11

Fire down belowSmokeandflamebillowedfromjetboat.

13

GPS gets it wrongOver-relianceonGPSresultsingrounding.

7

Man overboard in heavy seas

Anoiltanker’sdeckhandissweptintoheavyseas.

5

Autopilot with no lookout

Afishingvesselonautopilotalmostcollideswithanchoredrecreationalvessel.

Front cover photo courtesy of the Otago Daily Times

Contents

6 Alcohol involved in man overboard

10 See and be seen

12 Poor lookout and speed almost kill

14 No pre-determined track

15 Loss of control in 65 knot gusts

17 Collision with bridge

Regulars

3 Introduction

4 Guesteditorial:Shipping – a risky adventure

AprIl 2007 ISSUE FoUr

16

Overconfidence causes night-time collision

Watertaximotoredintoanchoredvessel.

10

What will catch your fall?

Aseamansuffersseriousspinalinjuriesonacargoship.

LOOKOUT!Introduction

Welcome to issue #4 of Lookout! – our quarterly safety newsletter. I cannot help but think of the period of change that Maritime New Zealand (MNZ) is experiencing at present – a pace of change that is here to stay.

WeareupgradingourITcapability–allowingustooperateinabetterandsmarterway.TheRescueCoordinationCentreNZisimplementingnewsoftwarethatwillassistinsearchplanning,andourWellingtonofficehasrelocatedprovidingamoreefficientandcohesiveenvironment.

ItisinterestingtoobservethechangesinmaritimeactivityontheNewZealandcoastastheindustryrespondstochangesintheinternationalmarket.ItisclearthattransportingmoregoodsaroundtheNewZealandcoastbyshipinsteadofsendingbyroadorrailisnowbeingseenasaviableandsensiblealternative.

MNZcontinuestoassesshowgoodorbadourcommunicationis,soIdonotmindreceivingfeedbackonwhatwedowellandwhatwe“coulddobetter.”Thatispartofbeinga“learningorganisation,”particularlyaschangeisgoingtobewithusforawhile.

Tomoveahead,togrowandsurviveinthecurrentenvironmentweallneedtoadaptandIaimtoensurethatMNZdoesjustthat.Myoverallobjectiveistoencouragevoluntarycomplianceforsafety,securityandenvironmentalprotectionratherthancompliancebyregulation.

Iplantobeoutoftheofficeonedaypermonth,sothatIcanmeetwithMNZstaffandlocaloperatorsaspartofknowingwhatishappeningoutthere.AnysuggestionsastopeopleIshouldmeetorthingsIcouldlearnaboutwouldbegratefullyreceived.

Enjoythisissue–keepsafeandhaveagreatquarter.

catherine taylorDirectorofMaritimeNewZealand

LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 �

LOOKOUT!Guesteditorial

in 1969 jack Hutchings went to sea as a deck cadet, leaving behind a small farming village in South west england. for the next 30 years he stayed at sea before taking up a shore job.

Ispent2�yearsonchemicaltankerscarryingeverythingfromliquidphosphorustothesocalledeasychemsliketolueneandxylene,whichaccountsforthetwitchingandthefearofloudbangsandobtainingamongotherthingsaClass1(Deck)CertificateofCompetencyortousolderones,aMasterForeignGoing. Thelastnineyearsofmysea-goingcareerwasasMaster.ThesmallestshipIwasMasterofwas56metreslong,thelargest280metreslong–thedifferenceindeadweightbeing900tonnesto150,000tonnes. In1997thefamilycameouttoNewZealand,andin2000IcameashoretoworkfortheformerMSAasManager,ShipSafetyInspections.Istayedtherefornearlyfiveyears,thenspenteightmonthsinChristchurchastheRegionalHarbourmasterwithEnvironmentCanterbury,eventuallyendingupwithStraitShippinginNovember2005. MyofficialtitleatStraitisMarineManager.MymainfunctionistoprovidealinkbetweentheMastersofourvesselsandtheseniormanagement.Mymost

importanttaskistoensureourvesselsareoperatedinasafeandefficientmanner. Incarryingoutthistask,Ihavetobalancetheneedsoftheofficeandtheneedtoengagewiththeships’staffonaregularbasis.Iattempttospendatleastonedayamonthonboardoneofourvessels.IalsotryandvisitthevesselsatleastonceaweekwhentheyareinWellington. Theotherbalancingactistheneedforequipmenttobemaintainedtoaveryhighstandardbyonboardstaffonourvesselsthatworkona24/7basiswheretheroutestheyplyaremostlypilotagewaters.Thismeansthatstaffworka12-hourday,muchofwhichisspenteitherloading,dischargingoronwatch,givingverylittletimefortasksoutsideoftheseduties.Wedoattempttogiveourvesselsatleasta12-hourlayoveronaweeklybasissothatroutinemaintenancecanbecarriedout. RiskmanagementisamajortaskIundertake.Wheneverashipputstoseatherearerisks.Thisiswhyinthemarineinsuranceworldshippingisdescribedasanadventure. ManyoftherisksthatareencounteredonourvesselshavebeenmitigatedthroughourSafetyManagementSystem,andtheprovisionofinternalpublicationssuchasrouteguides.Toensurethatourvesselsaresailedinthesafestmannerpossible,thecompanyhasimplementedapeerreviewprocesswheretheBridgeStaffareauditedandreviewedonaregularbutrandombasisforcompliance

withbestpracticeinregardtobridgeresourcemanagementandwithcompanyoperationalinstructions.Ourvesselsundergoanannualinternalauditoftheircompliancewiththecompany’ssafetymanagementsystem. MaybebecauseofmybackgroundIhavealsobecomethemainpointofcontactwithMaritimeNZ,whichusuallyisapleasantexperience,thoughoccasionallyfrustratingasoneforgetsthatthingsdon’thappenatonceingovernmentagencies. ThelifeatseahasdefinitelybecomesafersinceIoriginallywenttosea.AstatisticquotedwhenIwassittingformyMatesTicketinthelate70swasthatanyoneovertheageof25atseashouldhavebeeninvolvedinatleastoneseriousaccident.Theremusthavebeensomeaccident-pronepeopleoutthereasIdon’tthinkthatstatisticholdsgoodnow. Alongwiththesaferenvironmenthascomeadramaticincreaseinthebureaucracyonboardships.Whetheronehasdriventheotherisdebatable.Ipersonallythinkthatthesaferenvironmentisaresultoftheaverageageofseafarersincreasing.Peoplebecomefarmoreriskadverseoncetheysettledownandhavefamilycommitmentsandofcoursewithageofficiallycomeswisdom.Thoughthispartofagingseemstohaveescapedme!

jack HutchingsMarineManager,StraitShipping

ShIPPInG – a risky adventure

LOOKOUT!APRIL20074

LOOkOUT!POInts

1.Thefishingvessel’sskipperbreachedtwoimportantmaritimerules.Hefailedtokeepaproperlookoutandhewastravellingtoofasttotakeactiontoavoidacollision.Whenhefirstnoticedtherecreationalvessel,theskippershouldhavedeterminedwhetherornotitwason

asteadybearingwithaconsequentriskofcollision.Heshouldalsohavecalledadeckhandtotakeoverthelookoutwhileheworkedondeck.

2.Theskipperwasalsoinbreachoflocalbylawsbyoperatingonautopilotwithinharbourlimits.

3.Heshouldhaveensuredtherewasacrewmemberonthebridgereadytorespondimmediatelytoanyneedtosloworstopthevessel.

4.Iftheskipperoftherecreationalvesselhadnotreleasedhisanchorwarpandgonefullasterntherewouldhavebeenacollision.

Autopilot with no lookouta 15 metre fishing vessel on autopilot almost motored into an anchored recreational vessel. the fishing vessel’s skipper was distracted with equipment maintenance.

Therecreationalvessel’sskipperhadanchoredhisvesselwithinharbourlimitstoenjoysomefishing.Henoticedafishingvesselthatappearedtobeheadingdirectlytowardhim,andcouldmakeoutapersonbentoveronitsforedeck. Asthefishingvesseldrewclose,theskipperoftheanchoredrecreationalvesselrealisedcollisionwasimminentandorderedhiscrewtoweighanchor.

Hesoonsawtherewouldnotbeenoughtimeandinsteadorderedtheanchorwarpbereleasedandappliedfullasternpower.Acollisionwasnarrowlyavoidedwiththefishingvesselpassingwithinthreetofivemetres. Theskipperofthefishingvesselsaidhefirstnotedtherecreationalvesselonhisportbowatadistanceofabouthalfamile.Ashisvesselapproached,hethoughttherecreationalvesselwasunderwayandbearing20degreesonhisportbow.Heleftthevesselonautopilot,

makingabout6knots,andstartedgreasingbearingsonasurfacelonglinedrumontheportsideinfrontofthewheelhouse. Momentslater,hewenttothesideofthevesselandsawananchorwarpinthewaterdirectlyacrossthevessel’spath.Runningtothewheelhouse,theskippertooktheengineoutofgearandcoastedoverthewarp.Onlythendidtheskipperseethesmallervesselabout15to20metresoffhisstarboardside.

Viewthefullreportonlineat:www.maritimenz.govt.nz

a colliSion waS narrowly avoided witH tHe fiSHinG veSSel PaSSinG witHin tHree to five metreS.

ShIPPInG – a risky adventure

The RecReaTional vessel. The Fishing vessel.

LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 5

sleeping in cabin heRe

sliding dooR

1.Theaccidentwasnotwitnessed,however,thepostmortemfoundthemanhaddiedfromdrowninginassociationwithischemicheartdiseaseandacuteorchronicalcoholabuse.

LOOkOUT!POInts

tHe man’S recovered body SHowed a blood alcoHol level of almoSt five timeS tHe leGal drivinG limit.

Alcohol involved in man overboard

Theman’srecoveredbodyshowedabloodalcohollevelofalmostfivetimesthelegaldrivinglimit. Hehadspenttheeveningwiththreefriendsandhiswifeatayachtclub,andthepartyhadreturnedtotheirmotorlaunchviawatertaxi.Afterafewmoredrinks,thegrouphadgonetobed.Theman’swifewaswokenabouttwohourslaterbythesoundofbottlesrattlingatthesternofthevessel,andassumeditwasthesoundofherhusbandgoingtothetoilet.Whenhehadnotreturnedaboutfiveminuteslatershewenttocheckonhim,buthewasnotonboard,norvisiblebytorchinthesurroundingwaters.

Therestofthepartyjoinedthesearchusingtorchesandcallingout,buttonoavail.Almosttwohourslatertheman’sbodywasfoundcloseintoshore,inaboutonemetreofwater.


a man drowned early on new year’s morning after an evening of drinking and celebrating with friends.

LOOKOUT!APRIL20076

LOOkOUT!POInts

Man overboard in heavy seasan oil tanker’s deckhand was swept into heavy seas while trying to unlash the base of the accommodation ladder from a lashing point on the hull plating as the vessel departed a harbour. Thedecisiontoraisetheaccommodationladderhadbeenleftlatebecausethepilothadoriginallyplannedtoreturntoshoreoncethevesselhadbeenmanoeuvredoutoftheharbour.Onceunderwaythough,thepilotdecidedthiswouldbeunsafe,becauseofthehighseasandthathewouldremainonboarduntilthenextport. Thedeckhandhaddescendedtheladdertounlashthebasemanytimesbeforeandworenolifejacketorsafetyharness.Hisprogressdowntheladderwasnotmonitored,althoughanothercrewmemberhadsaidtheythoughttheweatherconditionsweretoodangerousatthattime. Shortlyafterthedeckhandhadbegunhisdescent,aloudbangwasheard.

Rushingtothetopoftheaccommodationladder,asecondcrewmemberwasnotabletoseethedeckhandandguessedhehadbeensweptintothesea.Afterthrowingalifebuoywithalightintothewater,thecrewmembercouldjustmake

outthedeckhandabout50to100metresasternofthevessel. Onfindingthephonetothebridgeengaged,thecrewmemberstoodshoutingandgesticulatingatthetopoftheaccommodationladderuntilhewasnoticedbythepilot.Themanoverboardalarmwassoundedandtheengineslowed. Asthevesselwasstillintheharbourchannel,therewasnoroomfortheshiptoturnaround.TheMasterputouta

MAYDAYcallonVHFchannel16andthelocalpilotboatarrivedabouttenminuteslater.Withinafurther15minutesahelicopterhadjoinedthesearch. The2�yearolddeckhandwasneverfound.


gangway and lashing poinT. combinaTion accommodaTion laddeR and piloT laddeR.

1.Theship’smanualstatedthatadeckofficershouldsuperviseeveryraisingorloweringoftheaccommodationladder.Nonewaspresentonthisoccasion,andtheMaritimeNewZealandinvestigationshowedthiswasnotunusual.Becausethedeckhand’sdescentwasnotmonitored,crewwerealertedtohisfallonlybyaloudbang.

2.Althoughthecompanyhadrecentlyinstalledproceduresrequiringcrewtoweara“flotationdevice”whenworkingoverthesideofthevessel,nolifejacketshadbeenprovidedforthistask.Therewasnorequirementthatasafetyharnessbeworn.

3.Theaccommodationladderwasvisiblefromthestarboardbridgewing,

however,noneofthebridgeteamhadcheckedthatitwassafetoraisetheladderbeforetheorderwasgiven.

4.Thedelayindecidingtoraisetheladdermeantthedeckhandwasorderedtooperateoverthesideofthevesselinexposedanddangerousconditions.

tHe crew member could juSt make out tHe deckHand about 50 to 100 metreS aStern of tHe veSSel.

lashing poinT

LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 7

Knowing more about how and why accidents happen means more can be done to prevent them.

Call our 24hr accident line to report all accidents 0508 222 433

LOOKOUT!APRIL20078

HElp US to prevent

accidents

1.Thefishingvessel’sskippersaidhedidnotannouncethenavigationallightfailureviaVHFradiobecausehewascarryingoutasensitiverepossession.However,thesafetyofhisownvesselandthosearoundhimwascompromisedbecauseofthis.

2.Thefishingvesselhadnootherexperiencedcrewmemberonboard.Giventhatthiswastheskipper’sfirsttimeonboardthevessel,asecondexperiencedcrewmemberwouldhaveprovidedadditionalassistance,particularlywhendealingwithunexpectedevents.

3.Thefishingvesselimpededtheprogressofbothferries.Localbylawsrequiredthattheskipperkeepoutoftheirwaybecausetheywereover500grosstonnes.

LOOkOUT!POInts

two ferries were forced to reduce speed and alter course to maintain a safe distance from a fishing vessel whose navigational lights had failed. Thefishingvesselwasbeingrepossessedandtheskipperwasmanningitforthefirsttime.Theonlyotherpersononboardwasarepossessionagent. Theskipperwastakingthevesselfromasecludedbaytoabusynearbyport,frequentedbypassengerferries.Enroute,thevessel’snavigationallightsfailedtwice,butwererepairedbytheskipper,whowasabletoreplacethefuses.Whenthelightsfailedathirdtime,theskipperagainreplacedthefuse,

butthelightsfailedagainimmediately.Theskipperturnedonallavailabledecklights,butcontinuedthepassage.HedidnotbroadcastawarningoverVHFtoothervessels. Atthistime,oneferrywasleavingtheportwhileanotherwasinbound.Thefishingvesselwasbetweenthetwo. BothferryMasterswereawareofavesseldisplayingonlywhitelights.Theywereforcedtoslowconsiderablyandacquirethevesselonradarinordertodeterminewhichdirectionitwastaking. Thefishingvesselcontinuedtoapproachtheoutboundferry.Theferry’sMastersoundedfiveshortblasts,whichthefishingvessel’sskipperlatersaidhedidnothear.Bothvesselswenthardtostarboardtoavoidacollision,andtheyeventually

passedwithinabout�00metresofeachother.Theoutboundferrythencontinuedoutoftheportwithoutfurtherincident.Meanwhile,theinboundferry,whichwasfollowingthefishingvessel,wasforcedtoreducespeedtoestablishasubstantialsafefollowingdistanceoutofconcernatthefishingvessel’serraticbehaviour.


What will catch your fall?a seaman suffered serious spinal injuries after falling about four metres to the deck of a cargo ship. Theseamanwaspartofagangsecuringportablestanchionsinpreparationforloadinglogs.Donningasafetyharness,theseamanclimbedafixedstanchionladdercarryingashackleandtheendofariggingwire.Afellowcrewmemberstood

belowfeedingouttheriggingwireastheseamanclimbedtheladder. Whenhewasaboutfourmetresuptheladder,theseamansuddenlyslippedoff,hittingthebottomofthestanchion,andthenthedeckbelow.Hehadnotattachedhissafetylinetotheladderbeforehefell. Anambulancewascalledandtheseamanwashospitalisedwithseriousspinalinjuries.Hewasadvisednottoreturntoworkforthreemonths.

log sTanchions aT The poRT side oF no. 2 haTch.

See and be seen botH veSSelS were

Put Hard to Starboard to avoid a colliSion

LOOkOUT!POInts

1.Althoughthefixedstanchionladderswereingoodcondition,theirrungswerewetwithmorningdew,andslippery.

2.Theseamanwascarryingashackleandtheendofariggingwirewhileclimbingtheladder.Threepointsofcontact(suchasbothhandsandonefoot)shouldbemaintainedonladdersatalltimes.

3.Theseamanshouldhavegivenhisfullattentiontoclimbinguntilhereachedthepointwhereheplannedtoworkandthesafetylinewasattached.

LOOKOUT!APRIL200710

Smoke and flame billowed from a commercial jet boat during pre-trip river checks.

Carryingoutchecksbeforethenextscheduledpassengertrip,thedriverhadnoticedthestarboardenginerevolutioncounterwasreadingabout200revolutionslow.Heturnedbothenginesonandofftoseeiftheywouldresetspontaneously.Whenthelowreadingcontinued,thedriverreturnedtheboattothejettyandcontactedboththecompany’soperationsmanagerandtechnicianforhelp.Whilewaitingforthemtoarrive,thedriverrefuelledinpreparationforthenexttrip. Arrivingatthejetty,theoperationsmanagerandtechnicianboardedthe

jetboatwiththedriverandstartedtheenginesinsuccession.Withinsecondstheyhearda“backfire”soundinsidetheenginebay,andthensawsmokeandflamesbehindtherearseats. Theyactivatedthefixedfirefightingsystem,andlessthan�0secondslaterliftedthehatchtotheenginebaytodischargeafireextinguisherattheflames.Thefirewasextinguishedbriefly,butthenreignitedandthecrewwereforcedtoclimbbackontothejettytoavoidthesmokeandfumes. TheFireServicemanagedtoextinguishthefire,buttheboatsankduetotheamountofwaterusedtofightthefire.Itwaslaterrecoveredtoallowforathoroughsafetyinspection.Therewerenoinjuriesresultingfromthefire.


LOOkOUT!POInts

1.Thedaybeforetheincident,anotherdriverhadnoticedthatthejetboat’sstarboardenginewasnotfiringcorrectly.Theworkshopforemanhaddecidedthesparkplugsneededtobereplacedduetoleaderosion,whichhadbeenanongoingproblemsincethecompanyhadswitchedtousing100octaneAVGAS.Theinvestigationfoundthataloosesparkpluglead,oneendofwhichhadfallenintotheenginebilgespace,hadignitedthefirewhentheengineswerestarted.

2.Fuelhadbeenregularlyspillingoverthesideofthejetboatduringrefuelling,whichhadbeennotedas“blowback”and“slowfillingproblems”.Duetothedesignofthefillingsystem,anyspillagewouldrunbetweenthefillerhousingandtheinsideofthehull,andthenintotheenginebay.Thehoseclampconnectingthefillerhosetothefueltankwasalsothewrongsize,andwasheldonlylooselyinposition.Thefueltank’scapwasalsoleakingaroundthesecuringscrews.

3.Thefixedfirefightingsystemfailedtofullydischargeintotheenginecompartmentbecauseithadbeenmountedatanincorrectangle.Inopeningtheenginebayhatchandaiminganextinguisherattheflames,thecrewhadallowedoxygenbackintotheenginebay,feedingthefire,andhadalsoblowntheflamesforwardunderthefueltank,whichcontainedthecollectedspilledfuelinthebilgespace.

Fire down below

witHin SecondS tHey Heard a “backfire” Sound inSide tHe enGine bay

The vessel on FiRe. oTago daily Times phoTo.

LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 11

LOOkOUT!POInts

1.TheskipperbrokelocalbylawsandMaritimeRulesbytravellingfasterthan5knotswithin200metresofshoreandshowedpoorseamanship.Thevessel’sspeeddidnotallowtheskippertimetoproperlydetermineitsposition.

2.Theskipperalsodidnotkeepaproperlookoutinnavigatingbyeyealone.AsthevesselwasequippedwithGPS,heoroneofhiscrewshouldhavebeenmonitoringit.

3.Anincreasingnumberofrecreationalvesselsaregroundingatnightathighspeed.Onthisandsomeotheroccasions

personsonboardhavebeenseriouslyinjured.Failuretokeepaproperlookoutonahighspeedvesselendangersthesafetyofnotonlythecrew,butothermariners.InthiscasetheskipperofthevesselwasseverelycensuredbyMaritimeNewZealand.

a skipper would have drowned if not for the determination of his crew to rescue him after he grounded his recreational vessel at speed onto a reef at night.

Theskipperwastravellingat25knotsandnavigatingbyeyeonaverydarknight.Heandhiscrewoftwowereallexperiencedrecreationalboaters,andwerereturningfromadivingtrip. Theskipperwaslookingaheadthroughaviewingopeninginthevessel’scanopy.Hewassearchingforakayakthatheknewfrequentlyfishedoffanearbyreef.Thevessel’sGPSwasswitchedon,butwasnotbeingmonitored.

Theskipperlostawarenessofhowclosehewastothereefandthevesselgroundedatspeed.Asitrolledtostarboardandcapsized,allthreeonboardweretrappedunderthehull. Thetwocrewmemberssoonswam

clearofthehullandpoppeduptothesurface,buttheskipperdidnot.Hiscrewimmediatelybegandivingunderthehullinsearchofhim,butafterabouttwominutestheyhadstillnotlocatedtheskipper.Thecrewconsideredawidersearch,butdecidedtodiveunderthehullonemoretime.Onthisfinaldive,theyfoundtheskipperandhauledhimtothesurface.

Hewasnotbreathing,andafterdragginghimontoarock,thecrewmanagedtoadministersuccessfulCPR.Theskippersufferedsevenbrokenribs,abrokenshoulder,lacerationstohisfaceanddamagetohislungs.Onecrewmemberalsorequiredstichestohisface. Thevesselwasaconstructiveloss.


Poor lookout and speed almost kill

aS it rolled to Starboard… all tHree on board were traPPed under tHe Hull.

The vessel. The vessel’s canopy. The ciRcle shows The secTion The skippeR was looking ThRough.

LOOKOUT!APRIL200712

LOOkOUT!POInts

waTeR ingRess

one blade missing

damaged hull and pRopelloR.

GPS gets it wrongover-reliance on GPS caused an otherwise experienced and prudent skipper to ground a passenger boat on rocks. Theskipperandcrewwerereturningfromanevening’sfishingincalmconditions.Asnightfell,theskippermotoredhomerelyingmainlyonhisGPS,butwithacrewmemberpostedatthebowasanadditionallookout. Theskipperknewthesectionofthecoastwell,includingthepositionofsomehazardousrocks.HeusedtheGPSfrequentlyandwasconfidentinthereadingsitgave.

Justastheskipperwasabouttoconsulthispapercharttoconfirmasuspicionthatheneededtobefurtheroffshore,thelookoutatthebowcalledoutthattherewasbrokenwaterahead. About10secondslater,thevessel’shullandportpropellergroundoverthetopofarock.Thebilgealarmandautomaticpumpsactivatedimmediately,andinspectionshowedthevesselwastakingonwateraroundadrivelegsealthathadbeenshuntedasternonimpact.

Fortunately,pumpscontrolledthewateringresslongenoughforthevesseltobebeachedonanearbyisland. Thevesselwaslaterfoundtohavesufferedextensiveporthulldamageandalostpropellerblade.


1.OverrelianceonGPSdataisbadnavigationalpractice,especiallywhileoperatingclosetothecoast.Thedayaftertheaccidenttheskippernotedtheunitpositionedthevesseloveranislandeventhoughtheywerewellclear.Themanufacturer’sagentforthe

GPScheckedtheunitanddeterminedtherewasnocrosstrackerror.Also,thepositionoftherocksasdisplayedonthechartplottercorrespondedwiththeirpositionontheofficialpaperchart.

GPSderivedpositionsoftenaremoreaccuratethanthepositionsforcharted

data.NavigatorsshouldbeawareofallthefactorsthatmayaffecttheuseofGPSpositions.Prudentmarinersshouldpasschartedhazards,suchasshoalsorisolateddangerswithutmostcautionandatasafedistance,nomatterwhatnavigationalmethodisused.

He uSed tHe GPS frequently and waS confident in tHe readinGS it Gave.

tHe lookout at tHe bow called out tHat tHere waS broken water aHead.

LOOKOUT!APRIL2007 1�

LOOkOUT!POInts

a yacht with an inoperable mainsail rolled twice in breakers after it came too close to the shore while attempting to reach the nearest port for repairs. the mast was lost and the yacht’s life raft was damaged during inflation. Theaccidentoccurredatnightinviolentseas,closetoaleeshore.Theyachtwasstruckbyalargebreakingwavethatcausedittobroachandcapsizebeforereturningtotheupright.Thevesselwaspartlyflooded,andthemotorhadstoppedrunning. AMAYDAYmessagewassentadvisingthattheyachtwassinking.Beforethemessagewascompletedasecondwavestruck,causingtheyachttoroll�60°.Inthecourseofthis,themastwaslostandwithittheyacht’sVHFcommunication.Also,theliferafthadbrokenloosefromits

locationonthedeckandbecameinflated.Ashortwhilelaterthecanopywastornoffandtheraftstartedtodeflatewhilestilltetheredtotheyacht. Twoofthecrewmanagedtoclimbonboardtheliferaftandhaulitclosetotheyacht,intendingtoholditthereuntiltheremainingcrewmemberandtheskipperclimbedin.Severallargewavesthenbrokeoverthedeckoftheyacht,sweepingtheskipperandthecrewmemberintothesea.Atthesametimetheliferaftcapsized.Thethreecrewmemberswereabletoswimbacktowardtheliferaftandclamberonboard,buttheskipperwaslostintheheavyseas. Thedamagedliferaftwasdeflatingrapidly,andasitwasdriventowardsthecoast,itservedonlyasanobjectforthe

crewtoclingto.Thecrewbegantosufferhypothermiainthe12degreewater.Theywereeventuallywasheduponarockyshoreline. Thecrewfiredahandheldflarefromtheliferaft’semergencybag.ItwasspottedbythesearchandrescuehelicopterthathadbeentaskedbytheRescueCoordinationCentreNZfollowingtheyacht’sMAYDAYcall.Aboutanhourlater,thehelicopterlocatedtheskipper’sbody,washeduponrocksabout100metresfromtheliferaft. Thesurvivorsweretakentohospitalandtreatedformildhypothermia.Theyachtwasdeclaredaconstructiveloss.


1.Theskipperhadjustpurchasedtheyachtandthiswasarelocationvoyage.Thoroughpreparationsandsafetycheckshadbeenmadepriortodeparture.However,enroutethemainhalyardhadwrappedaroundtheradarscanneronthemast,renderingthemainsailinoperable.Theworkingjibhadalsobeendamagedandwasfurled.Theroughseastatemeantthecrewcouldneitherreplacethejibnorascendthemasttofreethehalyard.Itwasbecauseoftheseriggingproblemsthattheskipperdecidedtoheadforaportofrefuge.

2.Asthevesselhadjustbeenpurchased,noneofthecrewhadexperienceinherhandling.Thisisasituationcommontomanydeliveryvoyages.

3.Duetosevereseasicknessforsomesixhoursbeforetheaccident,theskipperhadbeenunabletomonitortheyacht’strack.Althoughtwoofthecrewwereexperiencednavigators,theyachtwasmuchclosertothecoastatthetimeoftheaccidentthantheskipperhadintended.ItisalsopossiblethatthecrewmembernavigatingduringthefinalstagesofthejourneymayhavebeenfollowinganincorrectlyenteredGPSwaypoint.Theroughseasalsomadeitdifficulttoholdasteadycourse,withthecompassvaryingasmuchas40degreesduetothemovementofthevessel.

4.Thenavigatorswerebothplottingtheyacht’spositionregularly,butthiswasmoretodeterminethevessel’spositionthantoensureshewasfollowinga

steady,pre-determinedcourse.Failingtoplanacoursethatwouldkeepthevesselclearofthecoastwasakeyfactorinthisaccident.

5.Thecoastwheretheaccidentoccurredischaracterisedbyshallowwaters.Inheavyseasbreakersareencounteredwelloffshore.

6.Keepingwelloffshoretoavoiddangerouscoastalseasisoftenasaferoptionprovidedthevesseliscapableofsafelydoingso.Skippersmayfindthisanunpopulardecisionwithcrewthatareseasickandtiredbutthesafetyofthevesselandcrewshouldalwaysbeparamountindeterminingwhatactiontotake.

tHe accident occurred at niGHt in violent SeaS, cloSe to a lee SHore.

No pre-determined track

LOOKOUT!APRIL200714

1.Theowningcompanyhadnooperatinglimitsforstrongwinds.Becauseofthenatureofthesurroundingterrain,whichcreatedlocalisedandvariedwindconditions,ithaddeterminedthateachskippershouldmakethisdecisionbasedontheforecastandtheactualconditionsfoundatthetime,aswellasusualoperatingdeterminants.Immediatelyfollowingtheincidents,thecompany

madethedecisiontoinstallaninterimoperatinglimitof45knotsonthevessel.

2.Thevessel’sdirectionalcontrolwasquestionedfollowingthetwoincidents.Inparticular,itsskipperspointedoutthatthevesselhandledquitedifferentlytoasistership.Thecompanydecidedtotrialusingadditionalballastandpositivetrimtoincreaselateralresistance,andto

commissionanavalarchitecttoexaminetheresults.

3.Afterthetrials,thecompanyfittedakeelbartothevesselthatwasthesamedepthasthatusedonthesistervessel.Thisthenactedasa‘spoiler’tobreakupthelateralflowofwaterunderthehull.

an enclosed water vessel with 130 passengers on board slewed out of control for about 1500 metres after being struck on the starboard quarter by a 65 knot wind gust.

Duringthethreetofourminutesthatthevesselslewedoutofcontrol,theskipperdisplayedthevessel’sNotUnderCommandlightstoalertotherpassengervesselsintheareathathecouldnotcontrolthevessel.Theskipperwasabletoregaincontrolonlyasthewindabated.Heheadedstraightbacktoportandthepassengersweresafelydisembarked.

However,theincidentwasnotisolated.Twomonthslaterthesamevesselwasstruckbya70knotgustinotherwise20to�0knotwinds.Thistimetheguststrucktheportsideofthevessel,againcausingthevesseltoslewoutofcontrol.Therewereseveralotherpassengervesselsnearby,buttheskippermanagedtoregaincontrolandavoidcollision. Thecompanycommissioneditsownsafetyreportintotheincidents,aswellasanavalarchitect’sreport.


Loss of control in 65 knot gusts

diagRam oF The incidenT dRawn by The skippeR oF The vessel aT The Time oF The incidenT (The diagram does noT necessarily accuraTely reflecT The acTual Times and disTances).

durinG tHe tHree to four minuteS tHat tHe veSSel Slewed out of control, tHe SkiPPer diSPlayed tHe veSSel’S not under command liGHtS

LOOkOUT!POInts

No pre-determined track


LOOkOUT!POInts

1.Thereisdisagreementastowhetherornottherecreationalvesselwasdisplayinganallroundwhitelightasisrequiredforvesselsofitssizeatanchor.Theskipperofthewatertaxihadradaronboard,buthadleftitinstandbymode.Althoughheknewtheareaverywell,usuallypassingthroughonadailybasis,hehadbeenawayforaweekprecedingtheaccident,andsowasunawarethatanewvesselwasnowatanchor.Hislookoutwasobviouslydegradedbyhisover-confidence.

2.Theskipperwastravellingatabout15knotswhenthecollisionoccurred.ThisiswellinexcessofboththesafespeedrequiredbytheMaritimeRulesandthelocalbylawrestrictionof5knots.

the skipper of a water taxi motored straight into the port quarter of an anchored recreational vessel in a quiet bay at night. Therecreationalvesselwasextensivelydamaged,andeventuallysankinshallowwater. Theskipperofthewatertaxihaddeliveredsomefueltoafriend’syacht,mooredinanearbybayandwasreturninghome.Heknewtheareawell,includingthepositionoftwoanchoredvesselsthatwereoftenunlitatnight,andkepthissearchlightstrainedonthemtoensurehewouldnotcollide.Ashispassageprogressed,theskipperincreasedhisspeed.

Justasthevesselreachedabout15knots,theskipperwassuddenlythrownfromhischair.Standingup,herealisedhehadcollidedwithanothervessel. Theskippersteppedoutontotheothervesseltocheckforanycasualties,butfounditwasatanchorandunmanned. Hemanuallyweighedtheanchoroftherecreationalvessel,andtowedittoshallowwater,whereitcontinuedtotakeonwaterandeventuallysettledonanevenkeel.


RecReaTional vessel aFTeR salvage. RecReaTional vessel submeRged. juSt aS tHe veSSel

reacHed about 15 knotS, tHe SkiPPer waS Suddenly tHrown from HiS cHair.

Overconfidence causes night-time collision

LOOKOUT!APRIL200716

1.Thiswasthethirdtimeinsevenyearsthatvesselshadcollidedwiththebridgewhilstdepartingthewharfinstrongwinds.ThecompanyhadnowindoperatinglimitsinplaceandreliedinsteaduponMasters’discretion.DocumentedguidelineswouldhaveassistedtheMasterwiththisdecision.

2.TheMasterwasawarethatthetughadalowbollardpull.GiventheweatherconditionstheMastershouldnothaveattemptedthedeparture.

3.TheChiefOfficershouldhavechallengedtheMaster’sdecision.GoodBridgeResourceManagementisintendedtocreateanenvironmentwherechallengesofthisnaturearewelcomed.

4.ThevesselwasequippedwithaBeckerrudder.It’sflaphadbeentemporarilyweldedintopositionfollowingaproblemwiththebearings.Thismeanttherudderwasnotfullyfunctional,adefinitemanoeuvringdisadvantage.TheMasterwasawareofthislimitationandshouldhavefactoreditmoreheavilyintohisdecisiontodepart.

LOOkOUT!POInts

Collision with bridgea container vessel collided with a harbour bridge during a botched wharf departure, in strong winds and a flooding tide.

Thevesselwasberthedwithitsportsideagainstthewharf.Owingtotheprevailingconditions,theMasterorderedatug,anddevisedaplanforthetugtofirstpullfromthesternofthevesselto

clearitfromitsberth,andtothenpullfromthestarboardbowtoswingthevessel’sbowtostarboard.However,windconditionsmeantthevesselcouldbarelytravelastern,evenatfullpowerandusingthetug.Realisingthis,theMasterdecidedtoaborttheplanandtobringthevesselbackalongsidetheberth. However,beforehecoulddoso,thewindcaughttheportsideofthesternandswungthevessel’ssterntostarboard.Thestarboardquartercollidedwiththebridge,andthestarboardbowhitamooringdolphin.Thetugmanaged

toremainclear,butcoulddolittletoassistasitwastrappedinanareaofclearwaterbetweentheberth,thevesselandthebridge. Althoughthevesselsufferedminordamagetohershellplating,nowateringresswasfound,andoverthefollowingfourhours,theturningtideallowedthe

vesseltobemanoeuvredbacktothewharftoberthonitsstarboardside.


wind conditionS meant tHe veSSel could barely travel aStern, even at full Power and uSinG tHe tuG.

haRbouR bRidge

Tidal diamond ‘c’

Tug ‘conTained’ in This coRneR

mooRing dolphin

vesselOverconfidence causes night-time collision


SafetybulletinsMaritimeNZpublishesSafetyBulletinsasameansofcommunicatingandencouragingdialogueonavarietyofsafetyissuesandtheproposalsrelatingtothese.Thebulletinsarepublishedasandwhenrequired,andaredirectedtothosesectorsdirectlyinvolved.Theyarealsoavailabletothewidermaritimeindustryviaourwebsite.Wewelcomeanycommentyoumayhaveontherecommendationsorcontentingeneral.

From 1 January to 15 March 2007, there were four fatalities – one in the commercial sector and three in the recreational sector.04

From 1 January to 15 March 2007 MARITIME FATALITIES 2007

disclaimer: All care and diligence has been used in extracting, analysing and compiling this information, however, Maritime New Zealand gives no warranty that the information provided is without error.

copyright maritime new Zealand 2007: Parts of this document may be reproduced, provided acknowledgement is made to this publication and Maritime New Zealand as source. IS

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Imagine being at sea on your fishing vessel at night in bad weather. Water is being shipped on deck and it is dark. Can you be absolutely sure that the sliding covers on your freeing ports have not slipped down and are stopping the water escaping off the deck?ArecentreviewofMaritime rule part 40D Design, Construction and Equipment – Fishing Shipshashighlightedthataconsiderablenumberoffishingvesselshaveblockedfreeingports.Thefreeing

portsarebeingblockedbyslidingcovers,locksonhingedcovers,orothermeans.

Theaccumulationofwateronthedeckreducesstabilityandexposestheshipandthecrewtoconsiderablerisk.

Itisacceptabletohavecoversonfreeingports,aslongastheyarearrangedinsuchawaythattheydonotpreventtherapidescapeofwaterfromthedeck.

MaritimeNZhasinvitedagroupofsurveyorsandmembersofFishSAFE/FederationofCommercialFishermentohelprevisitrulepart40D.

Theworkinggroup’sobjectiveistoproduceaclearinterpretationoftherule.Theywillevaluateeachapplicablerule(�1intotal)andthenrecommendifeachruleisvalid,orwhetheramendmentsshouldbeconsidered.

MNZsaysitneedstobettereducatefishermenonwhycompliancewiththeruleissoimportant.Tokickstarttheeducationprocess,asafetybulletinonfreeingportcovershasbeenproducedandcirculated.

Formoreinformationabouttheworkinggroup,oracopyofthesafetybulletin,pleasecontactJessieFillmoreon0508 22 55 22oremailJessieat:jessie.fillmore@maritimenz.govt.nzorforacopyofthebulletingototheMNZwebsite:http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/publications/safety_bulletins/sb_issue7.pdf.

FeedbackYour feedback and ideas on Lookout! are very welcome.Ifyou’dlikeaparticulartopiccoveredinournextedition,thenpleasecontactthepublicationsteambyemail:[email protected] 22 55 22.

New location for MNZ WellingtonOurWellingtonofficehasmoved.Wearenowlocatedat:Level10,OptimationHouse,1GreyStreet,Wellington6011

Ourpostaladdressandallcontactnumbersandemailsarethesame:POBox27006,Wellington6141Tel:0508225522(04-47�0111) Fax:04-494126�.

SAFETYBULLETIN–ISSUE7,2007

freeing Port covers on fishing vessels

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