‘Smart Law’ for Intelligence!Adam D.M. Svendsen, PhD1

Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies (CIFS/IFF), Denmarkorcid.org/0000-0002-0684-9967

June, 2015

Abstract

The purpose of this brief article is to argue that intelligence continues to need to experience a better configu-ration of the law, including that status being sustained over time. Conceptualised similarly to that of ‘Smart Power’, appropriately balancing ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ forms and approaches, the configuration of law sought is ref-erenced in this article as finding constantly adaptable ‘Smart Law’. The article concludes that both human in-telligence (HUMINT) and especially much larger scaled technical intelligence (TECHINT) work would further benefit from the adoption of more sophisticated legal approaches. Without increasingly tolerant and more ac-commodating ‘smart(er)’ forms of law figuring with regard to intelligence and its closely related enterprises, such as acutely demanding surveillance work, wider situations will quickly unravel, will spiral more out of con-trol, and command ability will be more stymied, with resulting detrimental portent for all concerned into the future, wherever they precisely sit or stand.

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1 Adam D.M. Svendsen, PhD (Warwick, UK) is an intelligence and defence strategist, educator and researcher, and a Consultant at the Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies (CIFS), Denmark.He has been a Visiting Scholar at the Center for Peace and Security Studies (CPASS), Georgetown University, has held a post-doctoral fellowship based in the Centre for Military Studies (CMS), Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, and he has worked at Chatham House on the International Security Programme and at IISS, London.He has also worked as a Strategic Intelligence consultant, trained at European defence and emergency planning colleges, lectured at senior/advanced level at the Royal Danish Defence College (FAK), and taught at the University of Nottingham.Together with work cited in testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK Parliament, he has multi-sector award-winning media and communication experience, including authoring several peer-reviewed publications, such as the three books: Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-Ameri-can Security Relations after 9/11 (London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010 [Pbk 2012]); Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence and The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method out of Mayhem, both (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) - See more at: http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0684-9967 / http://twitter.com/intstrategist.

1. Introduction

While at the end of May into June 2015, the United States Senate has done battle over extension-to-adjustment of US spying provisions, by focusing on Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act and instead introducing the USA Freedom Act - relating, inter alia, to the US National Security Agency (NSA)’s surveillance programmes and to some of the Fe-deral Bureau of Investigation (FBI)’s legal tools - and as other countries across the world look at further refining and adjusting their surveillance programmes, now is a suitable time to offer some salient observations in the form of more commen-tary about the theme of ‘intelligence and the law’2. Inevitably, due to its sheer complexity and inten-sity, not all of the different dimensions of this im-portant topic can be covered within this brief artic-le. However, at least some beginning insights and frameworks for further consideration can be provi-ded.

Over time, greater degrees of intelligence ‘regula-tion’ have been witnessed across the world, and they have been growing in their significance. Albeit not without several tensions being present that continually require their addressing, this trend has

ocurred as varying bodies of law continue to make further noteworthy inroads into intelligence do-mains of activity and its closely associated work - concerning both human (relating to human intelli-gence or HUMINT) and technical (relating to tech-nical intelligence or TECHINT) areas.3

Today, early Twenty-First Century government surveillance efforts have been most notably and uncomfortably drawn to wider public attention, par-ticularly after Edward Snowden’s continuing, not-always-well-judged so-called ‘revelations’ from June 2013 onwards (insofar as we can adequately assess them).4

In this brief article, the case is advanced that intel-ligence continues to need to experience - as well as have sustained through greater maintenance over time - a better configuration of the law. This is referenced as finding improved conditions of con-stantly adaptable ‘Smart Law’.

Forming the main focus of this article, realising those types of overall ‘Smart Law’ balances both in and with regard to intelligence enterprises (opera-tions and/or missions) are arguably perhaps most pressing and controversial in the TECHINT do-main, given the size and scale of its activities. This is particularly pressing while ‘Big Data’-related

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2 D. Volz, ‘Exasperated White House Pushes Senate To Pass Surveillance Reform Bill’, National Journal/Defense One (26 May 2015); E. Nakashima, ‘White House: Congress playing “national security Russian roulette” in Patriot Act debate’, The Washington Post (27 May 2015); S. Harris, ‘The Patriot Act May Be Dead Forever’, The Daily Beast (28 May 2015); S. Harris, ‘It’s NSA 1, Rand Paul 0 as the Senate Passes Patriot Act Reform’, Daily Beast (2 June 2015); F. Kiefer, ‘USA Freedom Act: one small step for privacy’ and M. Teplinsky, ‘Opinion: How USA Freedom is a victory for American spy agencies’, CSM Passcode (2-3 June 2015). For other countries, see, e.g., R. Cellan-Jones, ‘The government’s data law - an attack on encryption?’, BBC News (27 May 2015); ‘Canada lawmakers vote to ramp up spy agency powers’, AFP (7 May 2015); ‘French parliament approves new surveillance rules’, BBC News (5 May 2015); L. Hin-nant and K. Dilanian, ‘For U.S. allies, paradigm shift in intelligence collection’, AP (20 May 2015).

3 For recent intelligence and law-related developments, see, for instance, A.D.M. Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation: Fashioning Method out of Mayhem (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.23-36; see also, e.g., A.D.M. Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.32-34, p.147.

4 See, e.g., A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Buffeted not Busted: The UKUSA “Five-Eyes” after Snowden’, e-ir.info (8 January 2014), via: <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/01/08/buffeted-not-busted-the-ukusa-five-eyes-after-snowden/>; B. Wittes, ‘A quick read of the Post’s latest NSA story’, Lawfare Blog (6 July 2014); see also further references to Snowden throughout A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice: Enhancing “macro” to “micro” systems thinking via “System of Systems” dynamics’, Defence Studies (2015); S. Shane, ‘Snowden Sees Some Victories, From a Dis-tance’, The New York Times (19 May 2015); J. Angwin, et al., ’New Snowden Documents Reveal Secret Memos Expanding Spying’, ProPublica/The New York Times (4 June 2015); E.J. Snowden, ‘Opinion: Edward Snowden: The World Says No toSurveillance’, The New York Times (4 June 2015); R. Ratcliffe, ‘Snowden: balance of power has shifted as people defy government surveillance’, The Guard-ian (5 June 2015).

work is striven during our contemporary globalised ‘Cyber era’, involving especially signals intelligen-ce (SIGINT) and communications intelligence (COMINT).5 No easy answers are forthcoming.

2. Changing the relationship dynamic

In the intelligence and law relationships, operating conditions of vis-à-vis, rather than so much versus, are constantly sought in engagements between the two entities. This is as well as remarking that - most ideally - conditions of harmony, rather than interactions being so adversarial, should be conti-nuously sustained in a striving and suitably ac-commodating, and updating, manner into the futu-re.

For instance, as is well-known, when thinking in ‘rule of law’ terms, maintaining at least some es-sential secrecy in exchanges is not necessarily or always mutually incompatible with other areas, such as the failure to uphold privacy concerns. Differing considerations vary widely.6

For helping understanding for those who possess a strong international relations (IR) background - such as the author of this piece - as a quick entry-point, law can be conceptualised similarly to that of ‘power’. In the multitude of forms it takes, power (a highly familiar IR concept) can be seen as sit-ting on a spectrum ranging from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’, with - again most ideally - ‘Smart Power’ arrange-ments emerging in deals struck overall.7 Law can also be seen as sitting on similar ‘hard-soft’ spec-

trums, particularly in its international dimensions, as well as varying in its overlapping ‘structured-ness’. 8

When hard-soft or structured-unstructured conti-nuums are well-balanced, or balances are most optimally forged in ‘semi-structured’ manners (as far as is realistically possible via processes such as through thorough negotiation), conditions of ‘Smart Law’ can - at least begin to - emerge for their further, future navigation. (Conversely, ‘Dumb Law’ speaks considerably more to the occasions when forms of ‘hard’ and ‘soft law’ figure in their most extreme, mutually-exclusive, overly-structu-red and/or overly-unstructured variants).

Arguably, those conditions of ‘Smart Law’ also need to be found and be (better) realised in intelli-gence domains. This work is necessitated so that greatest benefits in terms of systemic ‘effects and outcomes’ and strategic ‘ends’ can be reaped in overarching defence and security enterprises - such as pertaining to overall situations of ‘mission accomplishment’ in the form of successfully attai-ning ‘Public Safety’ and/or the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (‘R2P’). The core rationale of engaging in all of these closely interlinked activities in the first place.9

With strong reference to the TECHINT world, as already seen due to its sheer ‘industrial’ size and scale and involving especially SIGINT and CO-MINT, if ‘Smart Law’ approaches are lacking and if either ‘hard’ and/or ‘soft law’ approaches overly figure in arrangements, a major technical question

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5 Svendsen, ‘Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice’, p.8; see also S.M. Beaghley, ‘Commentary: The USA Freedom Act: The Definition of a Com-promise’, The Hill/RAND blog (29 May 2015).

6 See, e.g., as discussed in Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence, p.13.

7 On ‘hard power’, see, for example, M. O’Hanlon and K.M. Campbell, Hard Power (New York: Basic Books, 2006); on ‘soft power’, see, especially, J.S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004) and his ‘The War on Soft Power’, Foreign Policy (12 April 2011); R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Jr., ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, Foreign Affairs, 77, 5 (September/October 1998); C.S. Gray, ‘Hard Power and Soft Power’, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ (April 2012); ‘American “Smart Power”: Diplomacy and Development Are the Vanguard’, State.gov (28 April 2011); see also as discussed in Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence, p.21.

8 See, e.g., K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, International Organization, 54, 3 (Summer 2000), pp.421–456; ‘KeyText: When Might Soft Law Be Preferable to Hard Law?’; ‘KeyText: When Are States Likely to Prefer Hard Law over Soft Law?’; ‘KeyText: Three Things Distinguish Hard from Soft Law’; ‘KeyText: Three Benefits of Hard Law in International Relations’; ‘Hard Law Makes States More Credible’, titles via: https://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=68 (accessed: March 2015); see also ‘Soft law’ in M. Dixon, Textbook on International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013 [7ed.]), p.52.

9 A.D.M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11 (London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010), p.173; see also D. Obeidallah, ‘Americans to NSA: Lie to Us Some More, Please’, Daily Beast (4 June 2015).

soon surfaces, notably: how do you engage in suf-ficiently robust Big Data analysis and assessment/estimation work - that is, the type of work closely associated with effective-levels of modern, ‘hori-zontal’-type surveillance - if you do not have your computers, etc., doing suitably ‘large-N’ (large number/sample), semi-structured and defined ‘bulk’ scanning and processing - for instance, of telephone/Internet-traffic metadata or at least aspects of those sources - due to those approa-ches and methods instead being ruled out and/or being alternatively more overly circumscribed, at least from the outset, by ‘hard(er)’ forms of law? 10

Also another question soon surfaces: how can the proverbial ‘needle in a needlestack’, or even so-called ‘unknown-unknowns’, even hope to be best ‘discovered’ during searches - or at least more helpfully be turned into found ‘known-unknowns’ for further investigative follow-up through their subsequent extended examination and exploration - if one does not allow the requisite technology at least the possibility to realise its potential most fully and examine, parse or sift the whole ‘stack’ (or pool) of available data from the start? Or, to put this multiple challenge another way around: how can there then be opportunities for the ‘data speak for itself’, if it is overly controlled and regulated too soon in overarching processes and enterprises?11

Approaches do have to be suitably tailored. This is with continuing to boast sufficient room so that they can evolve and change over time, simulta-neously taking into account the all-too-familiar challenges and attendant dangers of ‘data-glut’ and ‘data-overload’, as well as technology at least

potentially operating beyond our human capabiliti-es and defined operational parameters, such as reflecting the contemporary major worries with sophisticated artificial intelligence (AI) systems.12

Many core paradoxes are encountered. Relying to greater extents on ‘hard(er)’ legal tools requiring varying degrees of compliance, such as the em-ployment of more, deeper and broader-ranging subpoenas - representative of the use of ‘vertical surveillance’ approaches - are arguably overall far more invasive of important concerns, for instance, privacy. This is because those legal tools essenti-ally reach further, for example, covering more ‘le-vels’ of experience and activity, and they drill-down more precisely into and are more specifically con-cerned about the ‘content of content’, ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’ it in its entirety to obtain overall ‘meaning’.13

That last example is rather than instead pursuing a differently organised ‘soft(er) law’-based filtering/targeting strategy which is (i) much more focused on ‘skimming surfaces’ or on mid-/high(er)-ranging levels of activity, as well as finding more readily anonymisable ‘patterns’ that relate to, for example, ‘data-flows’ - namely, concerning ‘which entity/-ies doing what activity/-ies are communicating to which entity/-ies doing what activity/-ies (other/sa-me/similar)’, and ‘where-to-where’, and so forth along equally comparative and comparable in-structive axes; and (ii) when deploying Big Data-related algorithms, which are more concerned about (merely) ‘scanning’, ‘identifying’, ‘isolating’, ‘extracting’, and then ‘grouping’/‘clustering’/‘clas-

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10 See, e.g., C. Pham, ‘Effectiveness of Metadata Information and Tools Applied to National Security’, Library Philosophy and Practice e-journal (27 February 2014); S. Frankel, ‘TECHNOLOGY: Data Scientists Don’t Scale’, Harvard Business Review (June 2015); see also S. Chesterman, ‘Privacy and Surveillance in the Age of Terror’, Survival, 52, 5 (2010); S. Chesterman, One Nation Under Surveillance (Oxford: OUP, 2011); S. Landau, Surveillance or Security?: The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2011); D. Lyon, Surveillance Studies (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); D. Francis, ‘The NSA Isn’t Likely to Miss Its Illegal Bulk Phone Collection Program’, Foreign Policy (7 May 2015); P. Tucker, ‘What the End of Bulk Metadata Collection Would Mean for Intelligence Collection’, Defense One (13 May 2015); S. Harris, ‘“Big Win” for Big Brother: NSA Celebrates the Bill That’s Designed to Cuff Them’, Daily Beast (14 May 2015).

11 V. Mayer-Scho ̈nberger and K. Cukier, Big data: a revolution that will transform how we live, work and think (London: John Murray, 2013), p.14, and their ‘The rise of Big Data: how it’s changing the way we think about the world’, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2013), pp.28–40.

12 ‘Rise of the machines: Artificial intelligence scares people—excessively so’, The Economist (9 May 2015); A. Barr, ‘Google Touts Machine-Learning Prow-ess to Shareholders’, Wall Street Journal (3 June 2015); D. Hernandez, ‘The new Google Photos app is disturbingly good at data-mining your photos’, Fu-sion (4 June 2015).

13 For ‘reach’ concepts, including conditions of ‘overreach’ and ‘under-reach’, and for ‘levels’ of activity and experience, etc., see as introduced and discussed throughout Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence and Svendsen, The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation.

sifying’ - for example, for ‘knowledge-generation’ purposes.At least, this is for the purposes of highlighting and flagging-up which ‘entities’ to focus on, fuse, or target further in later investigative contexts, as ob-tained from the content in a ‘tip’ and ‘lead’ sugge-sting manner, with suitably positioned and drawn ‘privacy buffer(s)’ also in place.14

As Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier remind us about engaging in Big Data enterprises, discove-red patterns or ‘[C]orrelations may not tell us pre-cisely why something is happening, but they alert us that it is happening ... Big data is about what, not why.’15

Fashioning ‘Smart Law’ nexus(es) with regard to intelligence is no matter how much uncertainty continues to abound in intelligence-related do-mains, including the uncertainty that can be readily anticipated to be prolonged into the short-, mid-, to long-ranging futures.16 The conditions of ‘Smart Law’ when prevailing in relation to intelligence ad-ditionally allow for more effective, agreeable, ade-quately flexible, and suitably updatable, ongoing issue-to-threat management solutions to be fas-hioned by policy- and other decision-makers. At least aspects of more advanced and sophisticated processes, such as ‘proportionalisation’, can si-multaneously be more readily proposed and then attained, thereby addressing potential conditions of ‘overreach’ and under-reach’.17

3. Further insights

As scholar Christine Jojarth has usefully noted - such as in her 2009 book: Crime, War, and Global Trafficking: Designing International Cooperation - when it comes to notably ‘legalism’ and ‘legalisa-tion’ trends and processes, issue-problem-risk-ha-zard- up to threat responding institutions can be

... arranged on a spectrum ranging from soft law (low levels of legaliza-tion) to hard law (high levels of legali-zation). Moving along this continuum from soft to hard law involves a trade-off between flexibility, found at the lower end of the spectrum, and credi-bility, which, in con trast, is facilitated by high degrees of legalization.18

With the conclusion from her study resonating most strongly along the lines that ‘a low level of legalisation is [(suggested as)] the best design solution for institutions dealing with poorly under-stood problems…’, such as, for example, for those institutions, and the problems they encounter, en-gaging in intelligence enterprises (operations and missions) - however precisely those entities and activities might be drawn or scaled.19

As underlined elsewhere, associated with, for in-stance, ‘soft systems’ and their methodologies in intelligence areas: ‘Key to note … is that the “soft-ness” beneficially offers malleable potential for allowing sufficient scope and room for manoeuvre, such as seen above and intended with the adop-tion of more “soft law” mechanisms.’20

Smart(er), less restrictive or limiting, weighed ap-proaches for ways forward, which can additionally move along (up or down) the ‘soft-hard’ spectrum over time according to calculations relating to ne-cessity principles, are the most attractive.

Agility and flexibility remain watchwords for intelli-gence work and all of its functions, with much sympathetic calibration of the law in those contexts becoming increasingly important. Empowered and guided by law (answering the ‘what can be done?’ questions), rather than being so hindered by it (co-vering the ‘what cannot be done’ considerations),

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14 For design of a proposed ‘privacy buffer’ for use in intelligence-gathering contexts, see as outlined in A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Advancing “Defence-in-depth”: Intelligence and Systems Dynamics’, Defense & Security Analysis (2015), p.10; for examples of Big Data-sift sense-making tools, e.g., M. Nedrich, ‘Mean Shift Clustering Overview’, Atomic Object (26 May 2015).

15 See as quoted in Svendsen, ‘Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice’, p.8.

16 T. Fingar, Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); see also W. Agrell and G.F. Treverton, National Intelligence and Science: Beyond the great divide in Analysis and Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

17 See also, e.g., K. Alexander and G. Stone, ‘Opinion: An ex-NSA chief and ACLU adviser can agree on surveillance reform. Why can't Congress?’, CSM Passcode (23 May 2015). More widely, see the lengthy discussion on the ‘proportionalisation process’ as presented throughout A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Strategy and disproportionality in contemporary conflicts’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33, 3 (June 2010), pp.367-399.

18 C. Jojarth, Crime, War, and Global Trafficking: Designing International Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.14; see also as cited and discussed in Svendsen, ‘Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice’, p.4.

19 Jojarth, Crime, War, and Global Trafficking, p.272 [emphasis added]; M. Schlanger, ‘The problem with legalism in the surveillance state’, Just Security (7 November 2014); Svendsen, ‘Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice’, p.4.

20 Ibid., p.8.

those above intelligence qualities, with suitably configured and implemented operational parame-ters, have to be maintained - including even (at least potential) ‘privacy-by-design’-leaning concepts.21

Suitably targeted legal subpoenas, finitely sculpted with regard to both quantitative (volume/their number) and qualitative (refined quality) criteria, also emerge as being the most advisable to adopt for extended follow-up (see above).

Most certain and clear is that neglected, ‘unfette-red’ and/or ‘poorly-balanced’ approaches of any description must be avoided as far as is entirely feasible. For instance, following the suitably proac-tively calibrated and configured approaches, as outlined above, are increasingly necessary so that any ‘tips’ and ‘leads’ discovered during the course of investigations can be followed-up and acted upon most effectively, using the most appropriate legal and operational tools.

Otherwise, less efficient toolboxes and toolsets are more likely to be selected, and more shortfalls are more likely to be manifested and encountered in experiences and in critical areas such as targe-ting. This is both in a counter-productive and de-trimental manner, especially if options and choices are ruled out too early or too quickly, and if the prevailing ‘solutions’ enacted are adopted in a less-considered or less-balanced way.22

4. Conclusions

Through pursuing ‘Smart Law’-related initiatives in relation to intelligence, beneficial qualities, such as the above-referenced ‘Flexibility and agility factors can thus be captured, retained and then expres-sed in a range of intelligence enterprises and their closely associated domains beyond, such as in multifunctional and special operations contexts.’23

This line of work has already been seen as being especially helpful when the so-called ‘intelligence methodology’ is conceptualised as being more about greater reflective and reflexive ‘wait and watch’ actions - rather than so much pursuing the

termed ‘security/law enforcement methodology’, which is instead seen as consisting of more ‘kine-tic’ and fast-enacted ‘see and strike’ activities. Now following the much-reformed FBI’s approach to-wards, for example, counter-terrorism work, emer-ges as key. Especially this is where the FBI mantra of ‘assess, evaluate, monitor, and – if required – disrupt’ tends to run more prevalently today.24

Without increasingly tolerant and more accommo-dating - but by no means permissive (removing confusion) - ‘smart(er)’ forms of law figuring with regard to intelligence and its closely related enter-prises, such as acutely pressing surveillance work, situations will quickly unravel and will spiral more out of control, with resulting detrimental portent for all. Recall, for example, dangerously-narrow and overly-rigid ‘one-percent-doctrine’ modes of thin-king claimed as viable alternative approaches.25

Again, that last scenario cannot be afforded by any involved participants, no matter where they might precisely sit or stand on these highly com-plex subjects.

Both HUMINT and especially much larger scaled TECHINT work would further benefit from the adoption of more sophisticated legal approaches. Ultimately, traveling along paths of constant im-provement, intelligence continues to require well-grounded ‘Smart Law’ approaches to be both furt-her and better implemented into the fast-advan-cing future. A greater degree of cleverness should not be denied particularly when so much is at sta-ke.

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21 On ‘privacy-by-design’ in law contexts, see D. Krebs, '“Privacy by Design”: Nice-to-Have or a Necessary Principle of Data Protection Law?’, JIPITEC, 4 (2013); W. Ashford, ‘EU data protection regulation will drive privacy by design, says KuppingerCole’, ComputerWeekly.com (27 April 2015); see again the ‘privacy-buffer’ concept introduced in Svendsen, ‘Advancing “Defence-in-depth”: Intelligence and Systems Dynamics’, p.10.

22 Svendsen, ‘Contemporary intelligence innovation in practice’, p.4 and pp.8-9.

23 Ibid., p.8; see also A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Sharpening SOF tools, their strategic use and direction: Optimising the command of special operations amid wider contemporary defence transformation and military cuts’, Defence Studies, 14, 3 (2014), pp.284-309; Svendsen, ‘Advancing “Defence-in-depth”: Intelligence and Systems Dynamics’.

24 See as quoted in A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Change: Addressing US domestic counter-terrorism intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 27, 3 (June 2012), p.396 (emphasis added); see also related discussion in A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Re-fashioning risk: Comparing UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism’, Defence Studies, 10, 3 (September 2010), pp.307-335.

25 Svendsen, Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence, pp.129-132.