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8/14/2019 Small Wars Journal - SOF, COIN, And the Question of Host Nation Viability_ an Interview With Dick Couch - 2013-07-01

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SOF, COIN, and the Question of Host Nation

Viability: An Interview with Dick CouchByRobert TollastJournal Article |Jul 1 2013 - 1:30am

Few writers have a better knowledge of special operations over the past 40 years than Dick Couch, who

graduated from Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) in 1969 and served in Vietnam with SEAL

Team One. Couch went on to work with the CIA, and following his government service, he has published

some 17 fiction and nonfiction books including NY Times bestsellerAct of Valor.More recently, Couch

has been embedded with MARSOC and his book on MARSOC training,Always Faithful, Always Forward

will be on the shelves in 2014.

The Sheriff of Ramadiwas released in 2008 and charts Couchs experience embedded with US Navy

SEALs, Marines and soldiers during the battle for Iraqs most contested town, where he witnessed

firsthand the transition to carefully orchestrated, population focused counterinsurgency, culminating with

the Anbar Awakening, and the routing of al-Qaeda.

However, in the absence of national level political reconciliation (and with persisting violence in Syria)

the Awakening movement is under immense pressure to resist the Iraqi government. Some tribal leadersremain loyalto Maliki. A number of others recently held a meeting to re-affirm their rejectionof al-

Qaeda, despite considerable anger at the government and sympathy for the Syrian rebels. For some the

talk is now of a federal solution, or at most the right to defend themselves against what they see as an

aggressive ISF, while others are already mobilisedfor war. This being Iraq, far more complex political

and religious forces are also at play and a good overview of the shifting dynamic can be found here. What

is clear is that a distinctly Sunni nationalism and a resurgent al-Qaeda are once again rocking the streets of

Iraqi towns, and the fact that this is happening should bring attention back to the problem of strategy (or

lack of it) in counterinsurgency campaigns.

As in Vietnam, the US had clearly achieved significant tactical success in Iraq by the time of withdrawal,

but such success is all too often an orphan in the absence of a realistic strategy. As Iraq appears tounravel (this is contestedby some experts) it is only right to continue the debate about counterinsurgency,

the appropriate application of landpower and the expanding role of Special Operations in the US military.

For anyone interested in these questions, I highly recommend The Sheriff of Ramadi as a thoroughly

detailed, blow by blow account of the dramatic events in al-Anbar prior to the surge. Couchs most

recent published work is Sua Sponte: The Forging of a Modern American Ranger

RT: We often hear about inter-service rivalry and challenges of getting different branches of the armed

forces to work together efficiently. In The Sheriff of Ramadi what comes across is quite a deep level of

cooperation and pulling together against the challenge. What do you think enabled this level of

camaraderie in Ramadi? Perhaps it was the extent of the crisis before the 2006 Awakening...
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DC: There are usually two elements that precede this kind of cooperation. One is necessity. When there's

a need the troops on the ground will always share and help, especially in a joint environment. The other is

leadership. Both were present in Ramadi. The SEAL task unit commanders played their role well.

RT:Historically, the US (and most other countries) have been pretty bad at determining what the nextwar or security crisis will be, or how it will be fought. Perhaps even if we had a good notion of the threat,

politicians would choose a different priority. A looming nightmare could involve regime collapse in North

Korea. That could present the ultimate hybrid war, defined by defense analyst Frank Hoffman as a

blend of the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular war." (Vietnam

arguably presented such a multi dimensional challenge.) In somefuture scenario, aid is dropped to

starving North Koreans as US and ROK forces scramble to secure North Korea's borders and secure

WMDs. Fanatical North Koreans may thwart such efforts, fighting both conventionally and using

insurgent tactics. South Koreans would no doubt be central (and invaluable) to the effort, but may find

themselves strangers in the backward and isolated DPRK. Meanwhile, North Korean units may also

rapidly defect or leave the fight, providing vital intelligence but also other challenges, so US/ROK forces

would have to prepared for this as well. If this war happened any time prior to 6 years ago, the Marineswould have been going in in the absence of MARSOC. What advantages would having MARSOC bring to

such a multi faceted crisis?

DC: Not sure I can answer this question or that SOF could play a role if Korea begins to unravel. With

28,000 US soldiers in play, there is little call for indirect action. China has been and always will be the

decider in this one. There might be a role for the 75th Rangers to capture WMD sites, but the situation

you described would be one of mass casualties. The role of SOF/MARSOC going forward is to run in

front of open conflict, and if Korea gets out of hand, it will be a US/China joint problem.

RT:At the end of The Sheriff of Ramadi, one of your conclusions is thus: dont forget, this was a bottom

up victory, both politically and militarily. Is there anything you think that, specifically, the SEALs

brought to the process of a bottom up victory that the conventional forces really benefitted from?

DC: Ramadi was one of the few times that the SEALs went into the streets and fought side-by-side with

conventional troops. They played a role in setting up the combat outposts and they exposed themselves to

danger time and again serving as a QRF when needed. And when the SEALs were in trouble, the Army

sent armor to support them. This all made them brothers. The Americans made the streets safe and the

tribes/tribal police kept them safe. Security became a tribal victory and an American victory, and with

security on the streets, there was room for political stability.

RT: In The Sheriff of Ramadi, you highlight the conclusion of numerous scholars of Iraqi history:

attempts to obtain a strong localized understanding of the war in al-Anbar were not properly resourced

early in the war and a conventional approach became dominant, before counterinsurgency skills had to berediscovered, or thoroughly overhauled by adaptive and forward thinking men like Sean Macfarland. This

seems relevant to your point about greater future coordination between embassies, country teams,

geographic combatant commanders and TSOCs. A wider deployment of SOF around the world, working

with local allies strikes me as having two key advantages for US policy: 1) Gradual build up of relevant

regional knowledge and greater information about emerging/ongoing regional problems to meet

emerging threats with the most appropriate response. 2) Greater understanding of the regional human

domain to reduce chance of strategic surprise. Both of those points, and problems in Ramadi, relate

to a lack of understanding of the human domain. Since SOF have a strong focus on UW, FID etc.their

expanded role could actually help prevent the conventional quagmires seen in Ramadi, (or perhaps even

Hue for that matter.) Do you agree?


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DC: Well have to see how all his plays out after were out of Afghanistanwhat our role and overseas

posture will be. One thing I hope will play out is how we choose to become involved in issues around the

world. We must first be able to understand what is going on. Is this a tribal, al-Qaeda-influenced,

religious, smuggling, banditry, or drug-related problem? Do we have host-nation and popular support? Is

this in our national interest? And if we do become involved, do we sufficiently understand the problem tofix it? America has a knack for becoming involved in good causes that we simply do not understand or

lack the ability to resolve.

SOF, working closely with the country teams, GCCs, and TSOCs may be able to help. We may even be

able to avert a crisis. But we must move carefully and use our resources judiciously. And theres always

the possibility that things will not go as planned.

RT: In The Sheriff of Ramadi, you tell the story of the late Travis Patriquin, a crucial player in the war of

tribal engagement in al-Anbar. Patriquin knew that the US needed to adapt to the environment, not simply

target the enemy. He was highly culturally attuned, something he demonstrated in Afghanistan as well as

Iraq. There is now greater emphasis on cultural training in the US armed forces, and MARSOC have this

in Phase 4 of their training programme, in addition to language training.

In a perfect world, the future of small wars will be fought by armies of Patriquins, men who can engage

with and adapt to the situation on the ground. We saw this approach in Vietnam with SEAL and Green

Beret deployments very early on, until the war (as John Naglhighlighted) became largely

conventionalized, going from Marine to conscript deployments, while trying to build the ARVN in a US

army image. It gives me some hope that there is a greater will for future US overseas operations to have a

major SOF component and be supportive of HN forces in largely indirect efforts. But that depends on

the US not crumbling to mission creep and sending in large army units where they might do more harm

than good. SOF will still of course need conventional force support, and we saw this in Ramadi where an

impressive interoperability developed, but it strikes me that the future is keeping small wars small while

preparing for another big one, while avoiding what you have called medium sized wars in

developing countries (eg. Iraq, Vietnam.) Do you agree?

DC: Thats a big chunk of ground to coverVietnam to Ramadibut yes, I believe that we must move to

the indirect, choose those situations where there is host-nation, partner-force participation, and the

requirements are manageable, ie, small. If theres not the buy in by the host nation to put their people in

the field, then we should have no interest in deploying teams to train them. I think we have to stand away

from unilateral engagements unless there is a clear threat to our vital national interests or our security.

The training currently being done at MARSOC in the area of FID and UW training is essential to the

future employment of SOF.

RT: When you left Vietnam, the South Vietnamese army had recently launched a major offensive intoLaos, inflicting heavy casualties on the Communists but also suffering heavy losses themselves (Lam Son

719.) The following spring the NVA launched a 14 division offensive so disastrous that Generals such as

Tran Van Traseriously doubted the wisdom of ever again launching a conventional attack on the south,

worrying that the war was lost. By this point some RVNAF units were proving themselves to be quite

combat proficient and willing to fight, while the VC insurgency wasbarely functionaland little more

than anuisancein many parts of the country. In some ways, it was a similar situation to Iraq as America

prepared to depart: parts of the insurgency had been rallied to the government side, AQI were decimated

and violence was at all time lows, with proficient ISF launching unilateral operations.

As in Vietnam, to some this looked like victory, or at least a face saving situation. In both wars, the Big

Army went in, disaster was looming within a few years and then a change of command and a changed

approach brought huge dividends. But crucially, in both wars America left the Host Nation afflicted with

corruption, unrepresentative leadership (that were militarily incompetent) and political instability. Maliki


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is fumbling progress, like Thieu before him. In both wars the political part of the equation could not be

sustained, despite the skill and foresight of US forces in turning the war around. So my point is: whats

the point in perfecting COIN if the Host Nation Govt. simply messes up the results? Perhaps these were

just the wrong wars and we should really stick to what truly are small wars, as demonstrated by SF

success in central and south America

DC: I agree. Our involvement has to be scalable but small, sustained, and well-resourced, but above all,

there has to be a willing, reasonably stable government in place. And when we go, we have to be

prepared to stay for a while; there has to be the commitment and the resources to see it through. Columbia

and the southern Philippines are places where this approach has had some measured success. But they

have to be willing to do it; we can only help. As for SOF going forward, they will have to work as closely

with the embassy/country team as they will with the geographic combatant commanders and their T-

SOCs. That said, well never have allthe information and we may never understand what may and may

not work. And the results may not turn out to be what we had in mind when we first went there, as

happened in Mali.

Dick Couch was born in Mississippi and raised in Southern Indiana. He graduated from the United States

Naval Academy in 1967. His first tour of duty was aboard the naval destroyer USS Mansfield DD728. He

graduated from Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) Class 45 in 1969, and was the class

Honorman. He graduated first in his class at the Navy Underwater Swimmers School and the Army Free

Fall (HALO) School. As Whiskey Platoon Commander with SEAL Team One inVietnam, he led one of the

few successful prisoner of war rescue operations of that conflict.

Following his release from active duty in the U.S. Navy, he served as a maritime and paramilitary case

officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. In 1997, he retired from the Naval Reserve with the rank of

Captain. At that time, he held the senior command billet in the SEAL reserve community.

He and his wife, Julia, live in Idaho.He is a frequent lecturer at Special Operations ComponentCommands and at the service academies.

About the Author

Robert Tollast

Robert Tollast is an occasional contributor to The Small Wars Journal. He writes

Mesopotamia Monthly, a monthly Iraq update for the Global Politics journal, as

well as having written for the Defence Management Journal. He lives and works

in London.

Available online at : http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sof-coin-and-the-question-of-host-

nation-viability-an-interview-with-dick-couch

Links:

{1} http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/robert-tollast

{2} http://www.usni.org/store/books/history/sheriff-ramadi

{3} http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/20/world/middleeast/fading-hopes-of-unity-in-iraq-as-sectarian-

tensions-rise.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

{4} http://al-shorfa.com/en_GB/articles/meii/newsbriefs/2013/06/06/newsbrief-01{5} http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/04/awakening_threatens_to_turn_on.php
http://smallwarsjournal.com/author/robert-tollasthttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sof-coin-and-the-question-of-host-nation-viability-an-interview-with-dick-couchhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sof-coin-and-the-question-of-host-nation-viability-an-interview-with-dick-couchhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sof-coin-and-the-question-of-host-nation-viability-an-interview-with-dick-couchhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sof-coin-and-the-question-of-host-nation-viability-an-interview-with-dick-couchhttp://smallwarsjournal.com/author/robert-tollasthttp://smallwarsjournal.com/author/robert-tollast


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{6} http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/understanding-iraqs-protest-movements.html

{7}

https://www.infinityjournal.com/article/73/Vietnam_and_After_Failure_in_the_Vietnam_War_and_the__Enduring_Defects

{8} http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/how-iraq-can-pull-back-from-the-brink#full

{9} http://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/sua-sponte-dick-couch/1110780302?ean=9780425253601{10} http://abcnews.go.com/International/us-wargames-north-korean-regime-collapse-invasion-

secure/story?id=18822930

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http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=BVbg4UFhdvgC&pg=PA162&lpg=PA162&dq=john+nagl+conventiona

7ngu95gUARqHYjP-LE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=A-

6wUYbEKMngPKL4gMAG&ved=0CD8Q6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=john%20nagl%20conventionalization%20of

{12} http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/Vietnam.pdf

{13} http://www.library.vanderbilt.edu/central/Brush/Vietnamese-Marine-Corps.htm

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{16} http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/socoms-goal-pre-empt-wars

{17} http://smallwarsjournal.com/comment/reply/14174#comment-form

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