8February2018

GlobalPowerCompetitionQuestion(R6.2):IntheeventthattheUS/Coalitionischallengedbyanotherglobalpower[Russiaforthepurposes of this response], what are the second and third order effects in the USCENTCOM area ofresponsibility?ContributorsMr. Edward Chow, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Frederick Kagan, AmericanEnterprise Institute; Mr. Vern Liebl, Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning, USMCUniversity; Dr. SpencerMeredith III, National Defense University; Dr. Abdulaziz Sager, Gulf ResearchCenter;Mr.Mubin Shaikh, Independent Consultant;Ms. Katherine Zimmerman, American EnterpriseInstitute

ExecutiveSummaryAliJafri,NSIInc.AsRussiacontinuestochallengeUnitedStates’powerand influencearoundtheworld, itsactivities inCENTCOM’sareaofresponsibility(AOR)representausefullenswithwhichtoviewthisconflict.InIraqand Syria, both Russia and the United States (and its Coalition) have been drawn into this layeredconflicttochallengeordefendthestatusquowithvaryingdegreesofsuccessandimpact.WhileexpertsquestionwhetherRussiacanchallengetheUnitedStatesglobally,itcanlikelyoperateonthemarginsofUnited States interests,with a series of surgical and lower-level policy decisions. To that point, somerespondents,includingEdwardChowoftheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudiesandVernLiebloftheCenterforAdvancedOperationalCultureLearningatMarineCorpsUniversity,arguethattheydonot consider Russia a true peer and challenger of US global influence. Instead of global dominance,Russia is seeking to “marginalize US power and influence in regions they deem important to theirinterests” (Chow). Contributors agreed, though, that Russia is well positioned to capitalize onopportunitiesforgrowthandinfluenceintheMiddleEast.ThisreportlooksatRussia’sinterests,actions,andlikelihoodofsuccessinchallengingUSglobalinfluencethroughtheseconflicts.ConditionsFavoringIncreasedRussianInfluenceInordertobetterunderstandtheopportunitiesavailabletoRussiainCENTCOM’sAOR,expertsprovidedcontext on the current situation in the region. Dr. Spencer Meredith III of the National DefenseUniversity’s College of International and Security Affairs took note of how Russian opportunism hastaken advantage of an environment that allows them to exert outsized influence on events in theCENTCOM AOR. Mr. Liebl noted that Russia is “winning” in the information operations domain,particularlyastheyhavewidelypublicizedsuccessfulhumanitarian initiatives,specifically theeffective

SMA Reach-back Report

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missions by Russian Explosive Ordinance Detail (EOD) teams that have benefitted Syrian citizens.According to Dr. Abdulaziz Sager of the Gulf Research Center, this along with other recent Russianactivitieshasaffordedthemgreatercredibilityamongmorestatesintheregion.ThisisreinforcedbythesuccessfulcontinuationofanarrativethatpaintstheUnitedStatesasaregionaldestabilizer(Meredith).In Liebl’s estimation, this success has beenmade possible by US forfeiture of the regional narrativespace,whichisaccompaniedbywaningAmericaninfluence,waveringcommitments,andrelinquishingleadership.This environment of waning influence has also been influenced by what is seen as waveringcommitmentonthepartofdomesticpolicymakersintheUnitedStatesaccordingtobothDr.FrederickKaganandMs.KatherineZimmermanoftheAmericanEnterpriseInstitute.TheyconcedethepossibilitythatdomesticpublicopinioncouldswingtowardswantingtopartnerwithRussiainsteadofcounteringtheminthearea.ExpertshavealsoarguedthattheUShasabandoneditsleadershiproleintheMiddleEast.Specifically,innegotiationsrelatedtoSyria,Libya,andYemen,Dr.KaganandMs.Zimmermannotethat the United States has not been leading the process. The current environment of sliding USleadershipandsubsequentRussianusurpationcouldhaveconsequencesstretchingacrossanumberofdomains.EffectsofRussiaAchievingitsObjectivesintheMiddleEastonUSStrategyandInterestsMilitaryMr.ChowarguesthattheRussianmilitaryseekstodiminishUSmilitarycapabilities intheregion.Thiswouldbeachievedbymaintainingtheircurrentbases,butalsobyexpandingtheiroperationalfootprintinto Iran, among other states (Chow). Any actions aligned towards this objective could threaten USassets and limitUS freedomofmovement—an interest that theUnited Stateswould seek to protect(Kagan,Zimmerman).Russiahasworkedtobeperceivedasareliablepartner,whichmightmakestatesin the regionmore willing to allow Russia to base facilities and operations within their jurisdictions,accordingtoDr.Sager.Additionally,Russiaislikelytobolsterarmssalestoregionalactors(Sager,Kagan,Zimmerman).Dr.SagernotesthatthecostdifferencebetweenRussianandAmericansystems,aswellasthe lack of strings attached to Russian purchases privileges the Russian Federation in this arena.Additionally, skepticismbyGulf States of theUnited States’ commitment to the region has led somecountries in the region to hedge their bets and seek deepened relationships with Russia (Kagan,Zimmerman).EnergyAprimaryarena inwhichRussia iswellpositioned tocapitalizeon fluid regionaldynamics is inglobalenergymarkets.BothChow’sandtheKagan-ZimmermanresponsessuggestedthatRussiawouldseektodevelopcloserrelationswithSaudiArabia(andotheroilproducingstates).SuchaRussianmovecoulddecreaseUS leverage inSaudiArabia (Kagan,Zimmerman).Additionally,whilethismaycomplicateUSeconomic interests, itmayalsoproduceanopportunityfortheUnitedStatestoworkwithother largeoil-consumingstates,suchasChinaandIndiainacontextthatreflectsthecommonintereststhatthesestates share (Chow). LookingbeyondSaudiArabia, increasedRussianactivity inother regionalenergymarkets (such as Libya) could imperil certain European energy markets, such as Italy (Kagan,Zimmerman). The competitive regional energy landscape has prevented such Russian activities frombecominganinevitability,buttheydoremainapossibility.BoththeSouthStreamandthe(planned)TurkStreampipelinesalsorepresentamajorinflectionpointintheregion’spowerdynamics.IfRussiaistocapitalizeonthemarketaccessthattheTurkStreampipeline

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would provide, it could decide tomitigate theUS-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in order toappeaseTurkishPresidentRecepTayyipErdogan(Meredith).Similarly,theTurkStreampipelineoffersanopportunityforRussiatostrengthenitshandintheregion.ThispipelineprovidesanalternativeroutetoEuropeanmarkets that circumventsUkraine, andanypolitical pitfalls therein. It alsoopensup a newfrontofmarketvulnerabilityfortheEuropeanUnion,whowillbesubjecttoafickleRussiaasanenergygatekeeper,althoughUSLNGcanmitigatethis(Meredith).ThispipelinewouldhavethedualimpactofdeepeningRusso-Turkishrelations,whilealsomotivatingIrantoseekacloserrelationshipwithRussiatodeepen their energypartnership (Meredith).A renewedRusso-Turkish relationship couldalsopromptthosecountriestosupporteachotherinprojectsawayfromthisregion.InternationalDiplomacyRussia stands tomake internationaldiplomaticgains in thenewenvironmentdiscussedabove. In theaftermathof the Iraqi state’s campaign againstDa’esh, there remain opportunities for Russia to helpstabilizepoliticalandsecurityeventsinthecountry(Chow).Additionally,throughinitiativessupportinginternationalnegotiations,Russia couldcreatealternative fora that runparallel to theUnitedNationsand other Western-oriented organizations (Kagan, Zimmerman). Indeed the diplomatic vacuummentionedbyDr.KaganandMs.ZimmermanservesasaninducementtoRussianbehaviorinthisarenaandpersistsdespitelocalwarinessofRussianinvolvementandregionalstates’lackofconvictionoftheviability and benefits of a long-term relationship with Russia. Additionally, Russia may also beconstrained by limited diplomatic resources that would prevent them from involvement in a largenumber of different initiatives (Kagan, Zimmerman). Russia may also seek to seize the mantle ofcombatingglobalterrorismandfightingglobaljihadistmovements(Chow).ThisalsoreflectsconcurrentdomesticRussianprioritiesinChechnyaandelsewhere(Liebl).Thecurrentsituation intheCENTCOMAORalsoprovideschallengesandopportunities forRussiaas itconsiders its bilateral relationships there. Egypt has allowed Russianmilitary aircraft to use Egyptianbasesandairspace.WhilethisrepresentsanopportunityforRussia,itispartofalongstandingEgyptianstrategyofplaying theUnitedStatesand theRussians (andpreviously theUSSR)againstoneanother(Liebl). In Syria,Russian interests include thepreservationof theAssad regime.To thatend, theyareleading peace talks on their terms (Liebl). Complicating a potential US response is the notion thatRussianactivitieshavebeenmoreeffectiveinSyriathanthoseundertakenbytheUnitedStates(Sager).SimilartotheEgyptianstrategyofbalancingRussianandAmericaninterestsagainsteachother,Iraqisplayingasimilargame(Liebl). Indeed,Russiahastheabilitytoplayasignificantpart inreconstructioneffortsinIraq,arolethattheywilllikelyrelish(Kagan,Zimmerman).The burgeoning Russo-Turkish relationship has been mentioned earlier in the context of energycooperation.Despitehistoricalcompetitionbetweenthosetwoentities,thecurrentfraughtrelationshipbetween Turkey and the United States presents an opportunity for Russia to move in (Kagan,Zimmerman). This potential rapprochementwill embolden Turkey (andperhaps even Iran) to subdueKurdishself-determinationefforts(Meredith).Iran’sstandingdistrustofthecurrentUSAdministrationisa potential opening for further improving relations with Russia buttressed by Russian and Iranianconvergent interests in containing the opium trade in Afghanistan (Liebl). If Russia does indeedchallenge theUnited States’ strategic imperatives, Iran could be drawn in aswell, prompting a likelyresponse from Gulf countries wary of increased Iranian activity in the neighborhood, according toregionalexpertMubinShaikh.

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ConclusionAccording to Dr. Meredith and Dr. Sager, Russia will be one of several—if not the leading—actorsshapinganddefining theoutcomeof conflicts in thecentralMiddleEast.TheseeffortswillensureanenduringRussianpresenceintheregionintermsofmilitaryoperationsandeconomictrade(Meredith).WhiletheUScandolittletohaltRussia’sexpandinginfluenceintheregion,theUScouldattempttoatthevery least,maintain, ifnot increase, its influence, resulting inaperiodof“enduringcompetition.”Even maintaining its current level of influence is challenging though, given Russian advances in theregion.Dr.Meredithargues,“ThelossofUSreputationintheregionis inevitable”inpartbecausethenatural,historical(andconflicting)interestsofregionalactorsarereemerging—theynolongerneedorwant theUS to set the terms, the conditions for success, ormost of all, constrain their independentactions.This is inpartdue to the“success”ofUS regional capacitybuildingeffortsover theyears, asmuchas theirown initiative.Dr.Meredith concludes thatRussia’s likelyentrenchmentand success intheMiddle Eastwill result in the return of the “’great game’ of power politicswith fluid allegiances,amidstfixedinterests,allcenteredonrelativegainsinazero-suminternationalenvironment.”

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ExpertContributions

Mr.EdwardChow

CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS)Request:Pleaselistanddescribewhatyoufeelarethetop3-5Russianinterests intheCentralRegionover the next 18-24 month period, what actions would be necessary to satisfy these interests, thelikelihoodofeachoftheseactionsoccurring,themainconstraintsandenablerstotheseactions,andtheUSoptionsforcounteringthem.Response:

RussianInterest

WhatactionswouldbestservethisinterestintheCentralRegionoverthenext18-24months?

WhatarepossiblecompetingUSinterests?

Howlikelyisitthattheactionlistedincolumn2wouldbesuccessful?0%indicatesthatthedesiredoutcomewillneverbeachieved;100%indicatestheoutcomewilloccurwithcertainty

Whatarethemainconstraintsorenablerstoachievingeachaction?

Whatoptions(diplomatic,military,economic,etc.)doestheUShaveforcounteringtheseactionsoralliances?

Interest1.DiminishUSpre-eminentpositionintheregion.

Cooperatewithregionalpowers,suchasTurkey,Iran,andEgypt,andseparatethemfromUSorbit.

USneedstorebuildfrayedrelationswithregionalpowers,includingre-establishingworkingrelationshipwithIran.

=70% UShasbeendoingaprettygoodjob,acrossrecentadministrations,inhelpingRussiaachieveitsobjective.

USmustrebuildrelationswithregionalpowers.

Interest2.IncreaseRussianinfluencein

WorkwithSaudiArabiaandotherGulfArab

USowneconomicinterestsandthoseofour

=60% AlliancewithAraboilproducersisoneoftemporary

WorkwithemergingpowerslikeChinaandIndia,

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themostimportantoilregionoftheworld.

countriesonmattersofcommoninterest,suchastheOPEC/non-OPECagreementonoilproductioncuts.

closestalliesandtradingpartnersliewithoilconsumers,notoilproducers.

conveniencetobothsidesandisunlikelytolast.

whoseinterestsarealsothoseofoilimporters,ratherthanseeingtheirexpandinginfluenceintheregionasathreattoourinterests.

Interest3.ReduceUSmilitarycapabilityintheregionandcounteritifpossible.

MaintainmilitaryinstallationsinSyriaandextendregionalassetsintoplaceslikeIran.

GreaterRussianmilitaryfootprintintheregionmakesUSmilitaryassetsmorevulnerableandincreasesthechanceofunintendedconflict.

=50% MuchdependsonhowastuteUSisinmaintainingcooperationwithregionalpartners.

Stopsellingadvancedweaponrytopartnersintheregionwhosesecurityvulnerabilityismoreinternalthanexternal.Insteadhelpthemestablishmorerepresentativegovernmentsovertimewhichcareforwelfareofpopulation.

Interest4.ContainradicalIslamtoprotectRussianhomeland.

Workasmuchaspossiblewithregionalpartners,includingrevivingSoviet-erarelationswithKurdishmovementsandusingSovietdiasporainIsrael.

RussianinteresttocontainradicalIslamtoplacesoutsideofRussiaisnotnecessarilycompatiblewithUSinteresttoeliminateradicalIslam’simpactworldwide.

=20% AnimplodingIraqwillwreakhavocintheregionandbeyond.

StabilizingIraq,whichincludesre-establishingafunctioningeconomyoutsidetheoilsector.

Interest5.Seizeleadershiponanti-terrorismfromUS.

Workwithemergingpowersoutsidetheregion,suchasChinaand

USshouldbeworkingmorewithemergingpowerssuchasChinaandIndia,which

=10% FailureofUStomanagerelationshipswithregionalpowers,includingIran,andwith

Seekcommongroundwithregionalpowers,includingIran.Renewefforts

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India,oncommoninterests,includingreducingUSpre-eminence.

areinterestedinstabilityintheregion,thanRussiawhichwantstoupsetthestatusquo,includingUSpre-eminence.

emergingpowers.

toresolveIsrael-Palestineconflict.

Pleasefeelfreetocontributeanyadditionalcomments,analysis,insights,orreferencesbelow.“TheUShaslongheldapositionastheglobalsuperpower,thoughisnowbeingconfrontedbycompetitors,suchasRussia,whoseektochallengeUSpre-eminenceandbecomeUS-peergreatpowers.”Idonotagreewiththisstatement.Nonear-peercompetitorhassuchaspirationintheshorttomediumterm.Therearecountries,however,whichseektomarginalizeUSpowerandinfluenceinregionstheydeemimportanttotheirinterests.IbelievethisisRussia’spositioninthisregion.

8February2018

Dr.FrederickKaganandMs.KatherineZimmerman

AmericanEnterpriseInstitute

Request:Pleaselistanddescribewhatyoufeelarethetop3-5Russianinterests intheCentralRegionover the next 18-24 month period, what actions would be necessary to satisfy these interests, thelikelihoodofeachoftheseactionsoccurring,themainconstraintsandenablerstotheseactions,andtheUSoptionsforcounteringthem.Response:RussianInterest

WhatactionswouldbestservethisinterestintheCentralRegionoverthenext18-24months?

WhatarepossiblecompetingUSinterests?

Howlikelyisitthattheactionlistedincolumn2wouldbesuccessful?0%indicatesthatthedesiredoutcomewillneverbeachieved;100%indicatestheoutcomewilloccurwithcertainty

Whatarethemainconstraintsorenablerstoachievingeachaction?

Whatoptions(diplomatic,military,economic,etc.)doestheUShaveforcounteringtheseactionsoralliances?

StrengthenRussianeconomy

Russiawillpursuethedevelopmentofoilfields,naturalgaspipelines,andotherenergydealsinregion.ItwillseektocoordinatewithSaudiArabiatoinfluenceOPECproductionlevelsinordertopreventthecollapseofthepriceofoil.

Itwillalsoseek

LeverageoverSaudiArabiadecreases.RussianandSaudiArabiancooperationmayincreaseastheymakeconcessiontoeachotherinordertoensuretheotherworkstowardkeepingthepriceofoilup.

StabilityofUSpartnersthreatened.

Russiawillincreaseitsinvestmentcontractsandmilitarysalesintheregionhasahighprobability—90%chanceofoccurringinthenext18-24months.

Constraint:RussianeconomicinvestmentintheregionrequiresRussiancompaniestooutbidothersforspecificdeals.CompetitioncouldpreventRussiafromsecuringtheenergydealsitseeks.

Enabler:Perception

Diplomatic:TheUScouldconveyitsstayingpowerintheregiontoGulfStateandotherpartners.

Military:TheUScouldoffertrainingandassistancetopartnergovernmentstoout-competeRussianadvances.TheUShasalreadysteppedup

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toincreasearmssalestotheregion,includingtoGulfStates(suchastheS-400systemtoSaudiArabiaandTurkey)andnewtankstoIraq.Armssales,alongwithoil,aretheonlytwomajorwaysRussiacanobtaincashfromabroad.

RussiancompanieswillalsoseektosecurereconstructionbidsinIraq,Syria,andpossiblyYemen.

Russianpurchaseofoilandofoilinfrastructure(suchasinLibya)createstheabilityforRussiatopotentiallythreatenEuropeanoil-importingnationslikeItaly.

RobustnessofUSinfluenceintheregionquestioned.TheopennessofGulfStatestowardthepurchaseofadvancedRussianweaponryindicatesthattheyarehedgingtheirbetsagainsttheirrelationshipwiththeU.S.andU.S.willingnesstoremainactiveintheregion.

amongGulfStatesthattheUSislessreliablethanbeforehasdrivensometohedgebetswithRussia.

foreignmilitarysalesandcoulddomore.

Economic:TheUScouldimposeadditionalsanctionsagainstRussiaandcouldseektoencourageEUpartnerstofollowsuit.Itcouldexpandand/orenforcecurrentsanctionsregimesagainstIran,whichcouldconstrainIran’sbuyingpoweroverthemediumterm.

ErodecapabilityandwillingnessofUSandEuropetoactpoliticallyor

Russiawillpursuetheexpansionofitsmilitarybasingfootprintintheregionandthemovementofadditional

USfreedomofmovementthreatenedalongwithfreedomofnavigationthroughmaritime

Russiawillsecureadditionalbasinginregion—40%probabilityovernext18-24months.

Russiawill

Constraint:Russiandiplomaticresourcesseemtobelimited,placingconstraintsonRussia’sability

Diplomatic:TheUScouldtaketheleadinnegotiationsregardingtheconflictsinSyria,Libya,andYemen

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militarilyagainstRussia

capabilitiestomilitarybasesorientedondenyingtheUSandEuropefreedomofmovement.ItwilldosobycontinuingtoincorporateIraqintoitsalternativesecurityinfrastructure,existenttodaywithIranandtheSyrianregimeandprovidemilitaryassistanceandtrainingtotheIraqiSecurityForces.RussiacouldapplytheblueprintitdevelopedinSyriatotheYemencrisisinordertosecureaccesstomilitarybasinginAdenoralHudaydahportcitiesasanalternativetobasinginEastAfrica.

RussiawillundermineUNprocessesandparalyzethedevelopmentofdiplomaticorpoliticalactionsbytheUSandEurope

chokepoints.

USinfluenceandleverageoverMENApartnersdecreased.

USpositionasgloballeaderweakenedasRussiacooptsinternationalprocesses.

expandcurrentmilitarybasingintheregion—90%probabilityoverthenext18-24months.

Russiawilldevelopanadditionalcompetingdiplomaticchannelforconflictresolutionintheregion—50%probabilityoverthenext18-24months.RussiaseemstoinvestinsuchachannelopportunisticallyinYemen,whichisthelikelyplaceforittoinjectitselfasanalternativetoaUNchannel.

toinvestheavilyinresolvingmultipleconflictsatonce.

Russialikelyseekstoexpandmilitarybasingwithoutrequirementstoinvestsignificantlyinthedefenseofitsforceposture,whichmeansitmustrelyonalocalpartner.

RegionalpartnersarewaryofRussianinvolvementandthelong-termbenefitofworkingwithRussia.

Enabler:DiplomaticvacuumscreatespaceforopportunisticeffortsbyRussia.

Risk-aversionwithinUSdecision-makingcirclestopushingbackorraisingthecostof

ratherthanobservingtheactionsofothers.TheUScouldalsoaccelerateeffortstoformaregionalbloctocontainIranianmaligninfluence,offeringsecurityguaranteestosomeGulfstates,inreturnfortheirrefusaltojoinwithorsupportRussianeffortscountertoUSinterests.

Military:TheUScoulddeployadditionalassetstotheCENTCOMAORtodemonstrateitswillingnessandabilitytooffsetandovercomeRussiandeployments(particularlyA2ADsystems).TheUScould(andshould)maintainaforcepackageintheaterclearlyabletodestroytheRussianpositionsintheregionasa

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byprovidingalternativeforumsforpoliticalnegotiationsandpresentingconclusionsfromtheseforumsasthewayforwardtowardpeace.US,UK,andFrenchunwillingnesstocompelaRussianvetoontheUNSCwillconstrainpotentialUNactionsintheregion.

RussianinvolvementincentivesPutintocontinueeffortstoexpandbackintooldSoviet-erabasingandrelationships.

deterrenttoRussianadventurism.

DecreaseAmericaninfluenceintheregion

RussiawillcontinuetodeepenitsrelationshipswithTurkey(andalsoIran),whichwillcontinuetostraintheUS-Turkishbilateralrelationship.

RussiawillseektoconvincetheUSandUSpartnersthatitcouldbeakeybrokeragainstterrorismandalsoIranintheregioninordertodiscourageUSactions.

ThestrainedrelationshipwithTurkeycompeteswithNATOtreatyobligationstothecountry.

TheMiddleEastisanareaofvitalnationalsecurityconcernfortheUS—Russia'seffortstoexpelusfromtheregionwouldhavedevastatingconsequencesfortheUS.

TheRusso-Turkishrelationshipwillcontinuetodeepen—70%probabilityinthenext18-24months.Convergentinterestsremainmoresalientthanthepointsofdivergenceforthemoment.Interestsdivergefundamentally,however,makingthisrelationshipunlikelytoendureoverthelongterm.

RussiawillsuccessfullypresentitselfasreliableUS

Constraint:USpublicopinioncouldshiftsignificantlytoaffectthepositionofUSdecision-makersonpartneringwithRussiaintheregion.

FundamentalinterestdivergencewithTurkeywillpreventtheestablishmentofanenduringRusso-Turkishpartnership.

RegionalpartnersseekmoreUS

Stopthepolicyofretrenchment,committolong-termengagementintheregion,takealeadingroleinconflictswithvitalimplicationsfortheUS(Iraq,Syria,Yemen,e.g.),anddemonstrateawillingnesstostanduptoRussianeffortstoexpanditsfootprintandconstrainours.IncreaseeconomicpressureonRussia(whichhasan

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partnerinregionagainstterrorismandIran—50%probabilityinnext18-24months.Russia’ssuccessinconvincingkeydecision-makersthatUSandRussianinterestsconvergeoverthepastyearindicatethattheUScouldaccepttheRussianrole.

TheUSappearswillingtodisengagefromtheregion,possiblyaccomplishingRussia'sobjectivesforit.

engagement,notless,andwillnotpreferRussiaasapartneriftheUSoffersthemachoice.

Enabler:USretrenchmentpolicies.

economythesizeofItaly'sanddependsontwoexports)andIraninordertogenerateasmuchfrictionaspossibleinthatrelationship.StrengthenrelationshipswithGulfstates.BepreparedtodestroyRussianA2ADsystemsasrequired.

Please feel free to contribute any additional comments, analysis, insights, or references below.Many of the insights provided above are derived from the September 2017 Critical Threats Project-Institute for the Study of War Syria Intelligence Estimate and Forecast. The PDF is available:https://www.criticalthreats.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-Syrian-Theater-September-2017.pdf.

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Mr.VernieLiebl

CenterforAdvancedOperationalCultureLearningMarineCorpsUniversityvliebl@prosol1.com

Question: In the event that the U.S./Coalition is challenged by another global power, what are thesecondandthirdordereffectsintheUSCENTCOMareaofresponsibility?Amplification:ConsidertherangeofintereststhatRussiahasintheCentralRegion1overthenext18-24monthsandhowtheseinterestsmaycomeintoconflictwiththoseoftheUS.Whatactionsorallianceswouldenabletheachievementoftheseinterests,howlikelyarethey,andwhatarethemainenablersorconstraintstotheachievementoftheseactions/alliances?WhatoptionsdoestheUShavetocounter?Request:Pleaselistanddescribewhatyoufeelarethetop3-5Russianinterests intheCentralRegionover the next 18-24 month period, what actions would be necessary to satisfy these interests, thelikelihoodofeachoftheseactionsoccurring,themainconstraintsandenablerstotheseactions,andtheUSoptionsforcounteringthem.Response:RussianInterest#1

PrestigeandglobalsuccessversusU.S.viaMiddleEastcentricactions

Presence,influenceand/ordominanceinIraq,Syria,Pakistan,Turkey,Afghanistan,Iran,SaudiArabiaetal

Theprovidedinstructionsareincompatiblewithprovidingtheinsightandresponsesthatneedtobeprovided,thereforelooktothe“additional”section

Mostoftheconstraints/enablersarespecifictoeachcountry,withsomeoverlaponspecificconstraints(suchastheIslamicState

Whatoptions(diplomatic,military,economic,etc.)doestheUShaveforcounteringtheseactionsoralliances?

Pleasefeelfreetocontributeanyadditionalcomments,analysis,insights,orreferencesbelow.Response:The provided spread sheet is incompatible with properly responding to the question posed (R6.2),thereforemyobservationswillbehere.

1TheCENTCOMAreaofResponsibilityisquitelarge.Forthepurposesofthiseffort,theCentralRegionwillrefertotheLevantandtheGulf.

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First,thequestionimpliesthattheU.S./CoalitionisprimarilychallengedbyRussiaintheCENTCOMAOR,whichisclearlywhatthefocusisdesiredtobe.However,thefirstthingtobedelineatedis–IsRussiaaglobalsuperpower?True,theyhavepossiblypervasiveinfluenceinSyriabuthavelittleinIraq.RussiaisonthevergeofbeingalloweduseofEgyptianairfieldsandairspaceasGeneralSisi,currentleaderofEgypt,istryingtooff-setaU.S.strategicpresenceintheregionaswellasanover-relianceontheU.S.formilitaryequipmentandsupport (the lack of U.S. support in combatingMorsi and theMuslim Brothers is a prime driver forEgypt).RussianinterestsinTurkeyareinthenatureofweakening/embarrassingtheU.S.,NATOandtheEU, as well as circumventing the Ukraine for the export of natural gas. Russia is an enabler of Iran,generallyinitsmilitaryventuresinSyria,IraqandYemen;specificallyinencouragingtheIraniannuclearprogram.However, there is likelyapointatwhichRussiawill stop thatbenignenablingand focusonforcing Iran into a nuclear stasis (meaning Russia is likely willing to ‘allow’ Iran to become a ‘minor’nuclearpower,enoughtodeteranyU.S.amphibiouspotentials,butnotenoughtophysicallythreatentheRussianheartland).NoneoftheRussianefforts inanyoftheabove listedcountriesmakesRussiaaglobalsuperpower,asnearlyallareeitherneartheRussianperiphery(example:Turkey)orareinareasoftraditionalRussianinterests(example:theLevant–meaningMediterraneanTurkeyandSyria).ContextneedstobegiventoRussianefforts(andaccomplishments) inregardstoTurkeyandSyrianeedstobeviewedinlightofthe 325+ year’s long effort to obtain ice-free/warmwater ports for Russia. Russian naval squadronswere intheMediterraneanfightingOttomannaval forces in1768-1770, fighting intheMediterraneanagainst Napoleonic forces from 1798-1807 and then homeporting a Russian naval squadron inMaltafrom1827-1833.From1958to1991theSovietNavyoperatedthe5thEskadraintheMediterranean(see“TheSovietPresence in theMediterranean”byGordonMcCormick,Oct1987, theRANDCorporation,SantaMonica, CA). Russia re-established the 5th Eskadra in Tartus Syria in 2013, where they remaintoday.ThenavalbaseofTartus,establishedin1983specificallyforthe5thEskadra,wasre-occupiedbytheRussiansin2000,afteranineyearabsencewheninNov1999,thenRussianPrimeMinisterVladimirPutin announced that Russian Navy operations would be extended and that Tartus would be re-activated.InJanuary2017,RussiaandSyriasignedanagreementextendingRussiancontrolofTartus(andtheairbaseatHmeimimnearLatakia)for49years,withanoptionforafurther25yearsbeyondthat.Includedin the agreement was Syrian granting of Russian extraterritorial control in those base areas andacknowledgementthatRussiannavalcombatantscouldincludethosethatwerenuclear-poweredwithnoreferraltotheSyriangovernment.Clearly,allofthecurrentandrecentRussianactionsinSyriaarecompatiblewiththelongRussianstrategyofoperatingintheEasternMediterraneanandtheLevant.Asaprefatory‘bottomlineupfront’–Russianefforts,accomplishmentsandfailureswithintheLevantandassociatedareas(Turkey,Syria,Iraq,Lebanon,Iran,Cyprus,etc)arepartoflong-termRussiandrivestartbyTsarPetertheGreat.Andtoexplainwhyacontinentallandpowershouldhavesuchacounter-intuitive long-termeffort,oneneeds tounderstand theview fromMoscow.Moscowand theRussianheartlandhasfewlandbarrierstoinvasion,fromeast,westorsouth,thusthereisaneedtoestablishdefensesasfarforwardaspossible inordertogivegreaterdepthforsecurity.Apartofthat istofindstrategically defensible ‘points’ out on that defensive periphery.Once thosepoints are fortified, theybecomecriticalterrain,whichrequiresafurtherextensiontofindotherdefensiveoutlierstoprotectthenowestablisheddefensivepoints,zonesand/orboundaries.Thusfortificationsbasedonariverneedtohave a defensive screen beyond that river,whichmeans expansion to get those defensive screening

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locations.Once those are taken, held anddeveloped, those defensive points now themselves need adefensivescreen,requiringfurtherexpansion.So, inregardstotheLevantandMiddleEast, todefendthe Russian heartland means acquiring the Ukraine, the Crimea and the Caucasus. Once those areobtainedorworkedintothedefensivesystem,toprotectthemtheBlackSeaandtheCaspianSeaneedto be developed as a naval defense. To protect those requires advancement to the Balkans, theAnatolian Plateau, the eastern Mediterranean and into the mountains south of the Caucasus (theZagros, the Elbruz, the Armenian Highlands, the Taurus, etc). There is an inexorable historicalinevitabilitytothis,anddespiterealandpotentialreverses,retreats,defeatsanddiversions,aslongasthere is a Russia this policywill likely be pursued. That it conflicts with other historical and nationalnarratives is expected, so what is occurring within the identified region is nothing new or to beunexpected. Even thepresence and interests of a contesting external ‘imperial’ power (or to use theCENTCOM term – global superpower), in this instance the U.S. (think also Great Britain, France, theOttomans,theMongols,theUmayyad’s,etc),iswithinthehistoricalnormsfortheregion.Withthatcontextinmind,astatebystatereviewinbrief,someofitnotedearlier,isinorder.Egypt–Sincethemid-1970s,theU.S.hasprovidedEgyptwithmorethan$70billioninaid,muchof itmilitary,inordertokeeptheSoviets/Russiansout,allowtheU.S.touseEgyptianairandseabases,toconduct exercises (such as theBright Star series) and to prevent a resumptionof conflictwith Israel.However, theObamaadministration is viewedas having retreated from the relationship (temporarilysuspendingmilitary aid to Egypt in 2013) and responsibilities , something further aggravated by theTrump administration seeming to continue the U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East (or at least anoticeableattenuationinitscommitmentsthere).WithanappearanceofRussianmilitaryeffectivenessinSyriaagainstIslamistforceswhichalsopresentathreattoEgyptiansocietyaswellasawillingnesstoadhere to stated commitments, Egypt has, at least preliminarily as of 30 November 2017, agreed toallow Russianmilitary aircraft to use its air bases and its airspace. Such an action clearly raises U.S.concernsoveroperationalsecurityofthemovementsofU.S.aircraft,navalcraftandmilitarypersonnelin the EasternMediterranean, as well as requiring the necessity of airspace coordination. The 2017Egyptian/Russianagreement,whenincludingthe2014Egyptianpurchaseof$3.5billion inaircraftandarms, the 2016 joint paratrooper and anti-terrorism training exercises in Egypt, and a tentativeagreement tobuildRussiannuclearpower facilities inEgypt, indicates thatU.S. influence inandwithEgypt is inperil.ThatEgypt isskillfulexploitinga longhistorical trend (sincethe1950s)ofplayingtheU.S. and Russia/USSR off against each other for its own gain is not in dispute. So seeing this assomething new by the Russians is fallacious. A re-engagement by the U.S. and recognition thatdiversification of military arms sources isn’t necessarily a zero-sum situation will likely greatly easeEgyptian‘game-playing’.Syria–RussiaisentrenchedinSyria,isbothdefendingandpromotingtheAsadregime,whichshowstothose in the region a loyalty to treaty obligations and a toughness to execute necessary militaryoperationstoensureregimevictory.Russiannavalinfantryandparatroopersprovidetrainingand,whennecessary, on the ground combat punch, to Syrian Arab Army forces, Hezbollah, Iranian Hashd units(many manned by Iraqis) and Syrian Hashd/militia forces. Russian aircraft have been effective inproviding combat air support and logistical support when needed. Russian elements have providedmediatingservicesbetweenthenumerousandvariedcombatelementswithinSyriamentionedabove.IthurtsRussianotatallthatastheEasternOrthodoxnationwithaPatriarchandamajorityinterestofChristian‘territory’inJerusalem(TheChurchoftheHolySepulcher,forexample),thattheyalsoprovidetrainingandassistancetoSyriaHashdforcesliketheumbrellagroup‘GuardiansoftheDawn’(affiliatedwiththeSyrianArabAirForceIntelligenceDirectorateandcomposedofsuchsmallergroupsastheLions

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oftheCherubim["Usudal-Cherubim"]whooftencallthemselvesMujahideenoftheCross,theLionsoftheValley["Usudal-Wadi"],theInterventionRegimentandtheLionsofDwel’a["UsudDwel’a"]).Russiahasprovidednotonlymilitarysupportbutalsoeconomicaid,specificallyinoilproductsandfoodstuffs(augmentedbyChinaandothernations)andisacounter-balancetothemassiveIranianpresenceandpenetrationwithinSyria.RussiaisamajorparticipantinthenumerouspeacetalkeffortsconcerningSyriasince2012,andasof2015,hasbecomeaguarantor(alongwithTurkeyandIran)oftheresultsoftheAstanaseriesofpeacetalks.Extensive,continuinganddeepRussianpoliticalanddiplomaticeffortsto bring peace to Syria (despite failure due to the fractiousness of the combatant parties and non-parties)hasgreatlyenhancedRussia’sregionalreputationandhasledtothedisplacementoftheU.S.inthe role of ‘peace-maker’ by Russia (the U.S. is now frequently viewed as part of the problem, as asupport/creatorofISIS,asuninterestedinpeaceinordertosellweaponsandbeahegemonicimperialpower, as a bumbling player increasing problems, or as an anti-Islamic nation supporting ZionistoccupiersinPalestine;actually,anyofahostofanti-U.S.themes).AndperceptionsofU.S.effectiveness inSyriawerenothelpedwhenitwasreportedinJuly2017, inameeting between U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson and UN Secretary General Guterres; that TillersonbelievedthatthefateofSyriaanditsleaderwasnowuptoRussia.BLUF–RussiahasdefeatedtheU.S.inSyria,leavingtheU.S.totryandpick-upwhatpiecesitcanthroughtheisolatedKurdsandtheirSyrianDemocraticForces,whichisnotanablepartnerinbringingpeacetoSyria.ThattheU.S.isnotamajorplayerinSyria,andpotentiallywitharecedingroleinmuchoftheLevant,isepitomizedbytheRussia-Syria-Iran-Iraq(RSIIcoalition),alsoreferredtoas4+1(inwhichthe"plusone"referstoHezbollah).The‘4+1’ isa joint intelligence-sharingcooperation formedasaconsequenceofanagreement reachedatthe endof September 2015betweenRussia, Iran, Iraq and Syria to "help and cooperate in collectinginformation about the terrorist Daesh group"with a view to combatting the advances of the group,accordingtothestatementissuedbytheIraqiJointOperationsCommand.Still,RussiaisnotonlyprotectingitsinvestmentofportandairbasesinSyria(asapreviouslyelucidated‘forward defense buffer’) but is also engaged in ‘zachistki’ (clean-up) operations against IslamistChechengroupsaffiliatedwithCaucasus Islamistorganizationswhoareeither linkedwithAlQaedaorremainIslamicState-inspired.ThesetargetedgroupscontinuetotrainandthensendsuicideattackerstoRussia,inrevengeforRussianactionsinChechnya,Dagestan,Ingushetia,etc).ThisisalsoanintegralpartofRussianhelping create the4+1, aswithin the founding statements for thisorganizationwasasentencestating"theincreasingconcernfromRussiaaboutthousandsofRussianterroristscommittingcriminalactswithinISIS”.Iraq–RussialostahugeamountofinfluenceandprestigeinIraqwhenSaddamHusseinwasdefeatedintheKuwaitWar in 1991. ImpotenceofRussian interventionefforts and clearly displayedU.S.militarypowerbasicallyshutRussiaoutofIraqupuntilfairlyrecently.RussiansuccessinSyriafrom2015tothepresent, and Russian “co-belligerence” with Iran against the Islamic State has reinvigorated Russia’sreputation,specificallyits‘fightingreputation’anditsdiplomaticstatus/capability.RussiadidentertainmeetingsandinfluenceeffortswithformerPrimeMinister(2006-2014)andcurrentVicePresident(oneofthree)Nurial-Maliki,however,thateffortappearstobeadeadendwiththecreditingofvictoryoverISIStocurrentPrimeMinisterHaideral-Abadi.MalikiwasintentonrunningforPrimeMinisteragainin2018,with the backing of Iran and Russia, but that is not likely to happen now. However, the IraqiOctober re-occupation of Kirkuk and the resulting near self-destruction of the Kurdistan RegionalGovernment (KRG) into itsdivisive componentpartsof theKurdistanDemocraticParty (KDP)and thePatrioticUnionofKurdistan(PUK)hasgivenRussiaanopening.ThePUK,whichhassomesupportfromIran and has apparently reached accommodation with the Baghdad government, has become the

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slightly dominate political entity in the KRG, while the previously politically dominate KDP has lostterritory,prestigeanditslongtimeleader,andisinahostilestand-offwithboththePUK,theBaghdadgovernmentforces,Iranandtoalesserdegree,withTurkey.RussiahasofferedtosignanoildealwiththeKDP(nottheKRGorBaghdad),whichwillalsomeaneasingtensionswithTurkey.An isolatedandweakened KDP, desperately attempting to cling to its U.S. support which seems to be increasinglyephemeral (from theirperspective),makes thisRussian lifelineappear tobeapotentialmiracle. If anagreementissigned,thisisadirectchallengetoU.S.supportforandfromtheKDP.AnylesseningofU.S.influence likely will lessen U.S. ‘lily-pad’ capacity, which will then have an adverse impact on U.S.operationsinSyria.Thus,aswithEgypt,theKurdsarelearningtoplaythegameofplayingtheRussiansoffagainsttheAmericansforKurdishmaterialgain.Turkey – While a member of NATO and a historical foe of Russia, several factors are militating forRussian/Turkishcooperation,at leastshort-term.First,Turkey’svaluetoNATOhasdecreasedbecauseofthedisappearanceoftheSovietthreattoEurope.Aswell,EuropeanUnionreluctancetograntTurkeyfullmembershipwithintheEU,therisingtideofIslamismwithinTurkey(asareplacingofKemalismbyErdoganism)andangerwith theU.S. support to variousKurdish groups in Syria and Iraqhas led toaselective rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. Russia, contrary to an initial Turkish stancedemandingthedeposingofBasharAsad,supportedAsad,leadingtoseveretensionwhenRussianforcesbegan amilitary intervention in Syria in 2015. Then, the 24November 2015 Turkish Air Force shoot-down of a Russian Air Force Su-24 operating in Syria and the ensuing hostile stand-off, led to thebreaking of diplomatic relations and potential military conflict. However, after a series of militaryconfrontations,primarilyintheBlackSeaandtheDardanelles,RussiabrokethetensionsinApril2016byunexpectedlyagreeingtobuildmonumentshonoringthefallensoldiersofthe1877-1878Russo-TurkishWar. Turkey reciprocated. In June2016Russian sanctionson theTurkish tourism industrywere liftedand the followingmonthdiplomatic relationswere restored,withproposals to cooperate in the fightagainstDaeshandanexpressedintentiontoimproveties.SincethenRussianandTurkishrelationshavebeen reasonablewarm inaneffort toavoid friction,ofwhich there isplenty inSyria.Russian-Turkishinterests inthemovementofnaturalgascoincide(withRussiacircumventingbuildingpipelinesacrossUkrainianterritory).GazpromisbuildingtheTurkstreampipelineacrosstheBlackSeathroughTurkishterritory,theactualconstructionbeingcontractedouttotheSwissAllseasGroup.ThisdevelopmenthasledtheU.S.toimposeselectedeconomicsanctionsonRussia,whichhasledtoacoolingofalreadyrockyU.S.-Russianrelations.ForTurkey,thisisaplusastheyreceivethebenefitofRussianaidwhiletheU.S.imposesnopenaltyuponthemsoastoretainaccesstoU.S.bases inTurkey.Diplomatically,Turkey isengaged in a diplomatic rowwith Germany over Turkish and/orMuslim refugees/emigrant laborers,whichtheU.S.hasbeenunabletomediatebutwithRussiaprovidingsubtlesupportandencouragementtoTurkeyinordertodisruptbothNATOandtheEU.RussiaisalsofavoringTurkeyinordertosupporttheRussianpresenceonCyprus(approximately4,000Russiancitizensthere,availabilityofneutralportsforRussiancivilianandmilitarynavalvessels,andextensiveRussian financialassets inCypriotbanks),specifically in the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). This effort is a Russianexploitation of the naturally divisive Cyprus issue, aggravating relations between Greece and Turkey,bothNATOallies.So, Russian efforts with Turkey are basically designed to disrupt NATO, Europe and regional U.S.influence, yet it must be remembered that Russia and Turkey are essentially regional competitors(historically,certainlyso)anddonotseeeyetoeyeonnumerous items.Russianactions inSyriahavederailed Turkish efforts to depose the Asad regime. Russian military presence has deterred decisiveTurkishmilitaryactionagainsttheKurdishEfrinenclave,forcingtheTurkishtoemploylessthanreliableregionalproxiesoftheTurkishFreeSyrianArmy(madeupofatleast39“groups”and10“alliedgroups”

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suchastheFreeIdlibArmy,theSultanMuradDivision,theShemLegion,the51stBrigadeandtheManbijBrigade[alliedgroupunderAhraral-Sham],andonlyabletoachievepartialsatisfactionofTurkishgoals.TheRussiansupport totheKurdsof theDemocraticUnionParty (PYD), inmanywaysonlypartialandmoreoffuturepromises,notonlyrestrainstheTurksbutalsoforcestheU.S.toincreasesupporttothePYD, which is ultimately unsustainable due to its geographic isolation as it is surrounded by hostilecountries. Russian support to Hezbollah and warm relations with Iranian elements such as the IRGCoperatingwithinSyria(atthebehestoftheSyrianDamascusregime)putsTurkeyinadilemma,asQatarandtheMuslimBrothers,bothsupportersoftheErdogangovernment,ardentlydesireTurkishmilitaryeffortstosuppressnotonlyIslamicStateforces,butalsoAlQaeda-relatedentities(seeHayatTahriral-ShemandAhrar al-Shem, for example) in addition to combating the Shia forceswithin Syria. So, anycurrent Russian-Turkish cooperation is temporary, as the historical competition for advantage, be iteconomic,geographicormilitary,willcontinue.Iran – Russia and Iran share a distrust of theU.S. and in the post-ColdWarworld have been drawntogetherasameans tocombatwhat theyseeas intrusiveU.S. imperialefforts to isolate them in theMiddleEast,bothmilitarilyandviaeconomicanddiplomaticsanctions.EventsinSyriahavedrawnthemcloser, as both desire to preserve the Asad regime, although for ultimately opposing reasons (RussiawantstosustainSyrianstate institutionswhileIranwouldliketocreateaShiareligious-politicalentitytightly linked to Iran),which theU.S. still apparentlywants todepose (openlyexpressedbyPresidentObama,notcounteredbyPresidentTrump).RussiahasextensiveeconomiclinkswithIran,regardlessofahistoryofregionalcompetitionandRussianheavy-handednesswhichwouldseemtomilitateagainstanycooperationbeyondsuperficially.ThelongU.S.presenceinAfghanistan,withitspotentialregionalimplications as a U.S.military lily-pad, unites Russia and Iran regionally. Themassive opium (heroin)problemoriginatingoutofAfghanistanhasalsounitedRussiaandIraninanefforttostoptheinfluxintotheir respective countries (80% of global opium production sources out of Afghanistan, with Russiahaving ~3million addicts and Iran ~2million addicts from this flow). Both countries have establisheddirect links totheonlyorganizationwithinAfghanistanthatseemstobeabletocontrolanddecreasethe flow, the Taliban, which has undercut the legitimacy of the U.S.-supported government ofAfghanistan. Finally, Russia is not discouraging Iranian efforts to build a nuclear deterrent, which isclearly antithetical toU.S. foreign policy, both short-term and long-term. That Russia does not do soencouragescountriesintheArabianPeninsulatopotentiallydistancethemselvesfromtheU.S.andseekRussian mediation to dissuade any Iranian future nuclear potential to be used against them, whichundercutsU.S.regionalrelations.General–Russianmaneuversandactionswithinthe“Central”regionasdefinedbytheoriginalquestionare consistent with historical Russian activities within the region, despite a temporary Russianwithdrawalfrom1991to1999duetoSovietmilitarycollapseandeconomicretrenchment.Noneofthisshould be viewed in a superpower rivalry, a la the ColdWar,which from the tenor of the questionsseemstobehowthequestionseemstobe framed.This isRussiadoingwhatRussiahasalwaysdoneandnotaimedspecificallyattheU.S.,wejusthappentobethenewglobal/imperialpowermuchasitwastheBritishEmpirebeforeus,ortheFrenchortheOttomans,etc).However,withregardstoSyria,Russiaisworkingafewavenueswhicharegreatlybenefitingthembothdomestically and internationally. First, Russia is minimizing its risking of ethnically Slavic troops byemployingmercenarygroupsandnationalistforces.The”WagnerGroup”,apseudo-mercenaryRussianorganization first employed as “little green men” in the Crimea and the Ukraine, is present in Syria(roughly2,500men)andarethemostnoted“Russian”forcesengagedincombat.Also, intheRussianhuntforCaucasus-basedIslamistgroupsoperatinginIdliband/orAleppoGovernoratesofSyria,Russia

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hasemployedaChechenloyalistbattalioncalledtheKadyrovtsy(thesewerereplacedbyanIngushMPbattalion,andsoon).Finally,RussianEODandengineeringspecialistshaveextensivelypublicizedtheirhumanitarian efforts at disarming the numerous IEDs and unexploded ordnance, which has creatednoticeable regional sympathy for theRussianefforts tohelpandprotect theaverageSyrian. TheU.S.doeslittletocombatthismediaeffortbyRussia,cedingtheregionalIObattlefieldtotheRussians.

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Dr.SpencerMeredithIII

NationalDefenseUniversityCollegeofInternationalandSecurityAffairs

Part A Request:Pleaselistanddescribewhatyoufeelarethetop3-5Russianinterests intheCentralRegionover the next 18-24 month period, what actions would be necessary to satisfy these interests, thelikelihoodofeachoftheseactionsoccurring,themainconstraintsandenablerstotheseactions,andtheUSoptionsforcounteringthem.Response: RussianInterest

WhatactionswouldbestservethisinterestintheCentralRegionoverthenext18-24months?

WhatarepossiblecompetingUSinterests?

Howlikelyisitthattheactionlistedincolumn2wouldbesuccessful?0%indicatesthatthedesiredoutcomewillneverbeachieved;100%indicatestheoutcomewilloccurwithcertainty

Whatarethemainconstraintsorenablerstoachievingeachaction?

Whatoptions(diplomatic,military,economic,etc.)doestheUShaveforcounteringtheseactionsoralliances?

Maintainprimaryroledefiningthenatureofdebatesandoutcomes;oneamongseveralbutdefinitelynotlessthantheUS=diplomaticinitiative,setconditionsfor

Opportunismaboveall–lettheUStaketheinitiativewithKurds,maintainstronginfluenceonAssadandTurkey,keepIraninKremlin’sorbit=stiflingUSinitiativesbeforethey

SDFneedstosurvive,UScansacrificesomebutcannotpushTurkeytoohard.EUrelationshipcriticaltopressureErdogan,butthiswillnotovercomehisdomestic

85% Constraint:RussianrelianceonPMCsallowsfortimetomuckaround,butalsocomesatacost–parentsstillhaveinfluenceinRussianpublicnarrative(smallbutcouldgrow);normalinternalKremlinpolitics,buttheseare

Limitedvis-à-visRussiadirectly,moresuccessfulengagingobliquelywithEUandmakingclearSDFisaredlineforUSinregionDownsideisSDFrolebecomes“toobigtofail”andfailsanyway

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successintheregion,militarypresence,economictradeas“showpiece”

gaintraction,butalsolettingtheUSexpendenergy(time,money,reputationaboveall)inwhatRussiawillshowtobefutile“destabilizing”efforts

imperatives,neithercanUSassumeEUagreementongoalsandmethodstoachievethem

weakcomparedtoenablingfactorsEnabler:ChinapushingintoCARwithOBORincentivizesRussiatokeepitsgoalofopportunismratherthandeclaredredlines–“stayaplayer,don’triskovercommitting”,whichstillmayoccurbutwiththegoalofspoilingUSefforts,notbecauseofinherentinterests

–SDFhasmoreagainstitthanforit;bigbrothercannotabandonbutneithercanitguaranteesuccess,letaloneitssurvivalKeyisstrategiccommunication–“goalissurvivalofeffective,responsivegovernanceinregionandrightnowSDFisoneofthebestchancesforthatlong-term”

Southstreampipeline

CrushingSDFtosatisfyErdogan

MoreEUinterestsforpipeline,unlessUScanloosenandspeedupLNGalternatives;SDFneedstosurvive

50% Constraint–USsupportforSDFEnabler–SDFself-failure;IraqforcesKurdstoescalatebasedonexistentialthreats(redefiningin-groupawayfromnationallinestowardsstrictethnicityàreallybadb/cofworseningeffectonTurkishescalation

US-Iraq:conditioningassistanceonredefiningstrategicgoalstoincludeexistingKurdishidentity,acceptingnotfullorevenappearanceofmoreindependence*ProblemisIraqobviouslyneedsUSlessthan5yearsago–successagainstISISandIran’sinfluencemakeUSconditionalitylessinfluential

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Part B For each interest you previously listed in Part A,whatwould be the impact of Russian success onUSinterestintheregion?Inotherwords,whatarethesecondandthirdordereffectsofRussiaachievingitsobjectivesintheMiddleEastonUSstrategyandinterests?PleasesubmityourresponseinaWorddocumentnomorethan3pages.Russianeffortstomaintainaprimaryroledefiningthenatureofdebatesandoutcomesintheregionhasahighlikelihoodofsuccess.Russiawillcontinuetopursuebeingone(ifnottheleading)amongseveraldetermining state actors, and definitely not less than theUS givenMoscow’s ego-politics. Russiawillcontinuetotakethediplomaticinitiativetosetconditionsforsuccessintheregion–evenifthatmeansletting other partners take the lead at times. Efforts will continue to include an enduring militarypresence and economic trade as showpieces of Russian great power. Both sellwell domestically andfurtherjustifytheanti-USjingoismthatdefinestheKremlin’sstrategiccommunication.ThereislittletheUScandotostop/blunt/detertheintentionsandactionsthattheKremlinpursuesinthatregard.TheUSdoes not currently have the capital to “sour theRussianmilk” forwould-be consumers.However, byholding toa core setof strategic goals (survivalofproto-democratic states/non-states like SDF)whileensuringtheUSalsomaintainsthestrategicinitiative(exploringnewpartnershipsifSDFfailsorfallsbythewayside),thelikelyoutcomeswillbeanenduringcompetition,ratherthanoutrightousteroftheUSasadominantactorintheregion.EnduringcompetitionhasseveralbenefitsfortheUSgivenitsgreatercapacity for the “long-fight” compared to the chances of Russia overextending its more limitedresources (certainly in terms ofDIME, butmostly regarding its defensible reputation as the onewhosticks a finger in Washington’s eye). Russia can also shift away from the ME with little risk havingachieved(andproclaimedassuch)several“successpoints”alongtheway.However,thiscourseisalsoprecariousfortheUSanditsallies/partnersas2nd/3rdordereffectsforagreaterRussiansuccesswouldinclude:

• TighterRussian-Turkishrelationsthatfurtherdelegitimizethelatter’serstwhileEUaspirations–complicatingtheNATOrelationshipfurther,giventhepotentialforpro-RussiansentimentinatleasttwootherNATOmembers(Bulgaria,Hungary);

• ViabilityofanyrealistichopeforKurdishfunctionalautonomyasTurkeywouldgrowbolder intryingtostrangleitinitscrib;

• IncreasingIranianinfluencetobolsterIraqisuppressionofKurdishautonomydownthenottoodistant road, as well as Assad’s relations with Lebanon, recognizing that Turkish and Iranianinterestsdonotalign–thisplaysinRussia’sfavorasbothsidesplayoffeachotherforMoscow’sattentions/graft (Russianmilitary support to Iraq– inpartnershipwith Iran– remainsaviablenextstep)

• Greater resonance of the “US =GreatDestabilizer / Russia = Fixer ofUS failures” narrative –RussiahasalongerhistoryofinternationalrelationsthantheUS,ithasabidinginterestsintheregionwhiletheUSistransient.

In the end, the loss of US reputation in the region is inevitable given that true political natures areemerging after two-plus decades of idealistic naiveté by the US that forced otherwiserealist/pragmatic/aggressive regional players to mask their intentions with the verbiage of Westernnorms.TheynolongerneedorwanttheUStosettheterms,theconditionsforsuccess,ormostofall,constraintheirindependentactions.Thisisinpartduetothe“success”ofUSregionalcapacitybuildingeffortsovertheyears,asmuchastheirowninitiative.Russia’ssuccesswillrevealevenmoreofthislong,

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historic,groundedself-interest intheregion.Theresultwillbeareturntothe“greatgame”ofpowerpolitics with fluid allegiances, amidst fixed interests, all centered on relative gains in a zero-suminternational environment. The US needs tomaintain its principles as a Democratic Great Power, asmuchasengagingthestatecraftnecessarytonavigatethatfluiditytoachieveitscorestrategicgoals.The reimaginedsouthstreampipeline (TurkStream)accomplishes threeprimarygoals forRussia (with2nd/3rdordereffects):

• Reduces Russian strategic vulnerability by decreasing reliance on Ukrainian pipelines – lessrevenue for Ukraine thereby increasing its chance of state failure or perceived failure as thecountryrelieson“backchannel”gassupplieswiththeconcomitantchargesofcorruption;thisalsoreduces/removesleveragepiecefromfutureMinsknegotiations;

• MaintainsEUstrategicvulnerability• Deepens Turkish connections, increasing Turkey’s role to support Russia in other diplomatic

areas (further afield from the ME); incentivizes Iranian moves closer to Russia to maintain“specialconnection”beyondnuclearsupports

• USLNGhasachancetoreducethefirstandsecond,butexternalitiesaregreaterforUSsupplythanRussiansuccessinthiseffort.

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Dr.AbdulazizSager

GulfResearchCenter

Part A Request: In the event that the U.S./Coalition is challenged by another global power, what are thesecondandthirdordereffectsintheUSCENTCOMareaofresponsibility?Response: The only global powerwith the ability to challenge theUnited States is Russia. There areregionalpowersthatplayarolebuttheycannotbeconsideredglobalpowers.Russiahasproventobeefficient in Syria, in fact farmore efficient that theUnited States. Theyhave further underlined theirreliability by stickling closely to their allies and not abandoning them in the time of need. This hasheightenedRussiancredibility intheregionatthesametimethattheuncertaintyaboutUSpolicyhasledtohighlevelofdisillusionmentaboutUSobjectives.ItisthereforeofimmenseimportancethattheUSestablishapolicythatchangesthe imageof theUSasotherwisethesecondandthirdorderofUSCENTCOM’sresponsibilitywillalsobenegativelyimpacted.

Part B For each interest you previously listed in Part A,whatwould be the impact of Russian success onUSinterestintheregion?Inotherwords,whatarethesecondandthirdordereffectsofRussiaachievingitsobjectivesintheMiddleEastonUSstrategyandinterests?FromtheGulfandregionalMiddleEasternperspective, theSyrianexperienceanddevelopmentsoverthepast3yearshaveshownthatRussiaisamorereliableallythantheUnitedStates.Formanyintheregion,theRussianmilitary interventiononbehalf (and/ortorescue)theSyrianregimehas ledtotheviewofRussiabeingacrediblepotentialally.Asaresult,RussiaisnowabletoprojecteffectivepowerintotheMiddleEastandthisabilityisgrowing.OnedirectimpactisthepossibilitythatmanyMiddleEasterncountrieswillnowreadytograntmilitaryfacilitiestotheRussianmilitary.ThishasadirectimpactontheprojectionofUSmilitarypowerandontheinfluencethattheUScanspreadintotheregionevenwithsomeofitsallies.ComparedtoRussia’sdeterminedactionandreadinesstoact,theUnitedStatesisseenashesitant,unsureandnothavingaconcertedstrategyasfarastheregionasawholeisconcerned.ThebottomlineisthatMoscowappearstohaveamorestableandclearcutpoliticalattitudetowardsthemainissuesintheregion.TheirpositionlooksfirmandsteadyandthisinturninspiresmoretrustinRussiathantheUS.The above does not only have implications for US power projection and influence but it could evenimpactUSweapons andmilitary sales. Russianmilitary technology, for example the S400 air defensesystem,isnowseemassuperiortotheUS’ssystemsinadditiontobeingsignificantlylessexpensiveandcomingwithlittlepoliticalconstrainsattached.ThismakesRussianmilitarysalesarealalternative.

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Mr.MubinShaikh

IndependentConsultantRequest: In the event that theU.S./Coalition is challenged by Russia,what are the second and thirdordereffectsintheUSCENTCOMareaofresponsibility?Response:Cause1yieldsEffect1:RussiamilitarilychallengestheU.S.andcoalition.Effect1becomesCause2,whichyieldsEffect2:RussianchallengecausesU.S.torespondmilitarilywhichdrawsinIran.Effect2 becomes Cause3 yields Effect3: Iran mobilizes against the U.S. and becomes cause for GCCCoalitiontomobilizeagainstIran.

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Biographies

Mr.EdwardChow

Edward Chow, a senior fellow in the Energy and National SecurityProgram at CSIS, is an international energy expert with more than 35years of industry experience. He has worked in Asia, theMiddle East,Africa, South America, Europe, Russia, and the Caspian region. He hasdeveloped government policy and business strategy, as well assuccessfully negotiated complex, multibillion-dollar, internationalbusinessventures.Hespecializesinoilandgasinvestmentsinemergingeconomies. He has advised governments, international financialinstitutions, major oil companies, and leading multinationalcorporations.

Chow spent 20 years with Chevron Corporation in U.S. and overseas assignments. He was head ofinternational external affairs at headquarters in California. He played a leading role in negotiatinginternationalcommercialagreements.WhilehewasChevron’sprincipalinternationalrepresentativeinWashington,heworkedcloselywith theWhiteHouse,CapitolHill, federaldepartmentsandagencies,foreign governments, international financial institutions, and the foreign policy community oninternationaleconomicpolicyaffectingworldwideenergyinvestments.Between1989and1991,hewasbasedinBeijingasChevron’scountrymanagerforChina.ChowisagraduateofOhioUniversitywithabachelor’sdegreeineconomicsandamaster’sdegreeininternationalaffairs.Hehaspublishedarticlesin leading academic and foreign policy journals on global energy developments, spoken on energy atinternational conferences, universities, and think tanks in the United States, Europe, and Asia, andappearedonmajorinternationalmedia.

Dr.FrederickKaganDr. Frederick W. Kaganis the Christopher DeMuth Chair and director of theCriticalThreatsProjectatAEI.In2009,heservedinKabul,Afghanistan,aspartofGeneralStanleyMcChrystal'sstrategicassessmentteam,andhereturnedtoAfghanistan in 2010, 2011, and 2012 to conduct research for Generals DavidPetraeus and John Allen. In July 2011, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffAdmiralMikeMullenawardedhimtheDistinguishedPublicServiceAward,thehighest honor theChairman canpresent to civilianswhodonotwork for theDepartment of Defense. He is coauthor of the reportDefining Success inAfghanistan(AEIandtheInstitutefortheStudyofWar,2010)andauthoroftheseries of reportsChoosing Victory(AEI), which recommended and monitoredtheUSmilitary surge in Iraq.Hismost recentbook isLessons fora LongWar:How America Can Win on New Battlefields(AEI Press, 2010, with Thomas Donnelly). Previously anassociate professor ofmilitary history atWest Point,Dr. Kagan is a contributing editor at theWeeklyStandardand has written forForeign Affairs, theWall Street Journal, theWashington Post, theLosAngelesTimes,andotherperiodicals.

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Mr.VernieLieblVERNIELIEBL,M.A.,M.S.

MiddleEastDeskOfficer

MarineCorpsCenterforAdvancedOperationalCultureLearningvliebl@prosol1.com

703-432-1743

VernieLieblisananalystcurrentlysittingastheMiddleEastDeskOfficerintheCenterforAdvancedOperationalCultureLearning(CAOCL).MrLieblretiredfromtheMarineCorpsandhasabackgroundinintelligence,specificallyfocusedontheMiddleEastandSouthAsia.PriortojoiningCAOCL,Mr.LieblworkedwiththeJointImprovisedExplosivesDeviceDefeatOrganizationasaCulturalSME,andbeforethatwithBoozAllenHamiltonasaStrategicIslamicNarrativeAnalyst.HehasalsopublishedextensivelyontopicsrangingfromtheCaliphatetoVichyFrenchcampaignsinWW2.MrLieblhasaBachelor’sdegreeinpoliticalsciencefromUniversityofOregon,aMaster’sdegreeinIslamicHistoryfromtheUniversityofUtah,andasecondMaster’sdegreeinNationalSecurityandStrategicStudiesfromtheNavalWarCollege(wherehegraduatedwith“HighestDistinction”andfocusedonIslamicEconomics).

Areas of Interest: • Culture and History of Middle East • Culture and History of South Asia • Culture and History of Islam

Degrees: • M.A. National Security and Strategic

Studies • M.S. History • B.A. Political Science

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Dr.SpencerMeredithDr.SpencerB.MeredithIIIisaprofessorofnationalsecuritystrategyatthe US National Defense University.With a doctorate in GovernmentandForeignAffairsfromtheUniversityofVirginia,andtwodecadesofresearch and work on post-Soviet regions and the Middle East, hisexpertisebridges scholarlyandpractitioner communities.To thatend,he has published widely on strategic topics related to democraticdevelopment, conflict resolution, and special operations. He is aFulbrightScholarandaregularadvisorandcontributortoseveralDoDand interagency projects, including multiple Joint Staff StrategicMultilayer Assessments, intelligence community workshops, and JSOCefforts supporting the joint warfighter in the areas of governance,humanfactorsofconflict,andinfluenceoperations.

Dr.AbdulazizSagerASaudiexpertonGulfpoliticsandstrategicissues,Dr.AbdulazizSageristhe founder and Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, a global thinktank based in Jeddah with a well-established worldwide network ofpartners and offices in both the Gulf region and Europe.Inthiscapacity,Dr.Sagerhasauthoredandeditednumerouspublicationsincluding Combating Violence & Terrorism in the Kingdom of SaudiArabia, The GCC’s Political & Economic Strategy towards Post-War IraqandReformsinSaudiArabia:ChallengesandFeasibleSolutions.Heisalsoafrequentcontributortomajorinternationalmediachannelsandappears regularly on Al-Arabiya Television, France 24 and the BBC. Inadditiontohisacademicactivities,Dr.Sagerisactivelyengagedintrack-twoandmediationmeeting.Forexample,hehaschairedandmoderatedtheSyrianoppositionmeetingsinRiyadhinDecember2015andNovember2017.InadditiontohisworkwiththeGulfResearchCenter,Dr.SagerisPresidentofSagerGroupHoldingintheKingdomofSaudiArabia,which isactive in the fieldsof information technology,aviation servicesand investments. Furthermore, he holds numerous other appointments including on the MakkahProvinceCouncil,AdvisoryBoardof theArabThought Foundation,GenevaCentre for theDemocraticControlofArmedForces, FacultyofEconomicsandAdministrationatKingAbdulazizUniversity, SaudiMinistryofEducation,GenevaCenterforSecurityPolicyandGermanOrientFoundation.Dr.SagerhasalsosatontheadvisorygroupfortheUNDPArabHumanDevelopmentReport,andparticipatesintheThinkTankLeadersForumoftheWorldEconomicForumandtheCouncilofCouncilsoftheCouncilonForeignRelations.Dr.SagerholdsaPh.DinPoliticsandInternationalRelationsfromLancasterUniversityandanM.A.fromthe University of Kent, United Kingdom and a Bachelor Degree from the Faculty of Economics andAdministrationofKingAbdulazizUniversity.

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Mr.MubinShaikhBorn and raised in Canada, Mubin Shaikh grew up with twoconflictingandcompetingcultures.Attheageof19,hewenttoIndia andPakistanwherehehada chanceencounterwith theTaliban before their takeover of Afghanistan in 1995. Shaikhbecame fully radicalized as a supporter of the global Jihadistculture, recruiting others but the 9/11 attacks forced to himreconsider his views. He spent 2 years in Syria, continuing hisstudyofArabicand IslamicStudiesandwent throughaperiodoffullderadicalization.

ReturningtoCanadain2004,hewasrecruitedbytheCanadianSecurityIntelligenceService(CSIS)andworkedseveralCLASSIFIEDinfiltrationoperationsontheinternet,inchat-protectedforumsandonthegroundwithhumannetworks.Inlate2005,oneofthoseintelligencefilesmovedtotheRoyalCanadianMountedPolice(RCMP), IntegratedNationalSecurityEnforcementTeam(INSET)for investigation.The"Toronto18"terrorismcaseresulted intheconvictionof11aspiringviolentextremistsaftertestifyingover4years,in5legalhearingsattheOntarioSuperiorCourtofJustice.Shaikh has since obtained a Master of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (MPICT) and isconsideredanSME(SubjectMatterExpert)innationalsecurityandcounterterrorism,andradicalization& deradicalization to the United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, NATO, DefenseIntelligence Agency (DIA), CENTCOM, various special operations forces, the FBI and others. He hasappeared onmultiple U.S., British and Canadianmedia outlets as a commentator and is extensivelyinvolved with the ISIS social media and Foreign Fighter (including Returnees and rehabilitation) file.Shaikhisalsoco-authoroftheacclaimedbook,UndercoverJihadi.

Ms.KatherineZimmermanKatherine Zimmerman is a research fellowatAEI and the researchmanagerfor AEI’s Critical Threats Project. She is the senior analyst focusing on theglobalalQaedanetworkandalsocoverstheSalafi-jihadimovement,aswellasrelatedtrendsintheMiddleEastandAfrica.ShespecializesinalQaedaintheArabianPeninsulaandYemen,aswellasalShabaabinSomaliaandalQaedaintheSahel.Heranalyseshavebeenwidelypublished,includinginCNN.com,FoxNews.com,TheHill,TheHuffingtonPost,TheWallStreetJournal,andTheWashington Post. She helped create and now manages CTP’s open-sourceintelligenceteamof15staffandinternsastheycollectandanalyzethousandsof documents from local media in Arabic and other languages. Ms.Zimmerman has testified before Congress about the threats to US nationalsecurity interests emanating from al Qaeda and its network. She has alsobriefed members of Congress, congressional staff, and US military, diplomatic, and intelligencecommunitypersonnelatmanyechelonswithintheUnitedStatesandinEurope.

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Mr.AliJafriAli Jafriprovides research support on issues of national security, armed groups,and human security in the defense and intelligence communities. He previouslyserved as amember of amulti-disciplinary team of analysts, technologists, anddatascientiststaskedwithhelpingbringinnovativepracticestocustomersintheintelligencecommunity.PriortojoiningNSI,heworkedatGeorgetownUniversity,conductingresearchonemergingthreats,focusingonpoliticalinstabilityinSouthAsia. He is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at TuftsUniversity,wherehecompletedaMastersinLawandDiplomacy.