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SkepticisminLatinAmerica

PlínioJunqueiraSmith(UNIFESP)

OtávioBueno(UniversityofMiami)AbstractWe examine the development and impact of the study of philosophical skepticism throughout LatinAmerica, highlighting some significant trends and important contributions made to this venerabletraditionbyanumberofLatinAmericanphilosophers.

1. Introduction2. HistoricalBackground3. Olaso’sroleinthestudyofskepticism4. Porchat’sneo-Pyrrhonism5. Reactionstoneo-Pyrrhonism6. Contemporaryskepticism7. Historyofmodernskepticism8. Historyofancientskepticism9. Skepticismandliterature

1.IntroductionIt may not be a mere coincidence that in 1991 Oswaldo Porchat, a leading Brazilianphilosopher, and in 1994 Robert J. Fogelin coined the word “neo-Pyrrhonism” todescribe their respective philosophical positions. That coincidence reflects both theincreasingsignificanceofthescholarshiponskepticism,inLatinAmericanandinAnglo-Americanphilosophy,andamoresympatheticattitudetowardthisvenerabletradition.

TowriteaboutskepticisminLatinAmericaismoredifficultthanonemayexpect.First, the phenomena to be described are complex and multifarious. Interest inskepticism iswidespread in this part of theworld, and by nomeans confined to onecountry or to a small group of philosophers. On the one hand, the significance ofskepticism in the philosophy of each country seems to varywildly; on the other, thehistory of studies on skepticism in each country has its own internal development,despite many connections among the various countries involved. Second, interest inskepticism is so recent in LatinAmerica that not enough timehas elapsed to providesomeperspectiveon the issue. It isperhapsstill toosoon togiveanentirelybalancedviewofskepticismintheregion.Butwewillattemptourbesttoachievethat.

AninterestingfeatureoftheLatinAmericanwayofapproachingskepticismisbynottakingitjustastheembodimentofanopponenttoberefuted.Attheveryleast,thereisnotawidespreadprejudiceagainstskepticism.Onthecontrary,manyLatinAmericanphilosophershavestrongsympathyfortheskepticalproposal,andeventhosewhoarenot skeptics themselves do not think that if the assumption of a philosophical thesisleads to skepticism, this constitutes a kind of reductio ad absurdum of the initialassumption.Skepticismis,formanyLatinAmericanphilosophers,atleastaprimafacietenable position. That does not mean, of course, that the majority of those LatinAmericanphilosopherswhodealwithskepticismareskeptics,butwedofindmanythatconsider themselves as such. Even for thosewho are not skeptics, the significance of

SkepticisminLatinAmerica 2

philosophical skepticism is undeniable, and Latin American philosophers have madeeffortstounderstandcarefullyitsmeaningandhistoricalrole.

ThebestwaytointroduceskepticisminLatinAmericaisnottoexplainwhatgoeson in each country, but to report what Latin American philosophers have saidconcerning those topics that caught their attention. However, we will begin bypresentingabriefhistoricalbackgroundandthethoughtofthetwofoundingfathersofLatin American work on skepticism: Oswaldo Porchat (Brazil) and Ezequiel de Olaso(Argentina).Specialcaremustbetakenwiththeirwork,becausetogethertheysetthestageforaproperunderstandingofwhathappensinallotherLatinAmericancountries.We will then examine what Latin American philosophers have been doing both incontemporaryskepticismandinthehistoryofthisphilosophicaltradition.Oursisnotanexhaustiveaccount,andbeingselective, it isunabletoaccommodateeveryproposalinthe field.Wehope,however, togivea fair ideaofwhathashappenedand iscurrentlytakingplace,inordertosituatethereaderandpromptadditionalresearchinthearea.

2.HistoricalBackgroundContemporary studies of skepticism began in Latin America thanks to the works ofOswaldo Porchat and Ezequiel de Olaso, a distinguished Argentinian historian ofphilosophy. Due to their works, skepticism has attracted a significant, althoughsomewhatscattered,amountofattentioninLatinAmerica.Bothwerealreadyinterestedinskepticismbeforetheymetforthefirsttime.In1968,Porchatgaveafamouslecture,publishedinthefollowingyear,inwhichhecalledattentiontoabasicskepticalproblemthat every philosopher should try to overcome: the problem of the conflict ofphilosophies (roughly, the fact that philosophical doctrines often disagree on theiranswers to any given philosophical question). Given his B.A. in classics and his Ph.D.dissertationonAristotle’sconceptionofscience,itisnotsurprisingthatPorchatcametoknowancientskepticismverywell.Hisperspectivewasphilosophical,andheidentifiedhisownphilosophicalexperiencewiththatoftheancientskeptics. Inthesameyearof1969, Olaso defended his Ph.D. dissertation on “Leibniz and the Ancient Skeptics” atByrn Mawr College (Pennsylvania), in which he showed that Leibniz had a deepknowledge of Greek skepticism, whose Modes he clearly identified in the Cartesianarguments.Thus,onecansaythatskepticisminLatinAmericanbeganintheendofthe1960’s.

In1975,invitedbyPorchat,OlasowenttoBrazilwherehebecameaprofessoratthe State University of Campinas (UNICAMP) until 1977. This fact had a profoundinfluenceonthedevelopmentofthestudiesofskepticisminbothcountriesandeveninother Latin American countries. Their mutual collaboration proved very fruitful.Philosophers interested on skepticism soon got in touch, for they organized seminalconferences on the topic (1986, in Campinas, Brazil; in 1992, in Buenos Aires,Argentina).Throughouttheyears,manyotherconferencesonskepticismwereheld(inBrazil,Argentina,andMexico)inwhichphilosophersfrommanycountriestookpartandcollectivebooksonskepticismappeared.

Porchat’s and Olaso’s influence was huge. They were the founding fathers ofskepticism in Latin America. One can speak of a second generation thatwas in touchfrom the 1990’s onwards because they paved the way first. Philosophers in Brazil,Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia have been collaborating in the last twenty yearsbecausetheybothinauguratedafriendly,collaborativewayofdoingphilosophythathasbeen preserved by their followers. ThoughOlaso, Porchat and some of their disciples


were in touch with many philosophers from other countries and had a far-reachinginfluence,thereisnosingle,integratedexplanationforthatwidespreadinterest.

There is no doubt that skepticism flourished in Brazil like in no other LatinAmericancountry. It isperhapsnotamiss tosay thatPorchat’sneo-Pyrrhonism is themost important achievement of Latin American skepticism, providing material forfurther systematic discussions. In Brazil, an important group of philosophers aroundPorchatwasorganizedthroughoutthecountryinthe1980’s,andtheyweredevotednotonly to understand the history of skepticism but also to discuss contemporaryskepticism, bydeveloping it and criticizing it. The groupheld conferences every year,sometimestwiceayear,andmanybooks,individualmonographsandeditedcollections,werepublished.Moreover,Porchatwasprofessorandsupervisorofanumberofyoungphilosophers,likePlínioJunqueiraSmith,RobertoBolzaniFilho,LuizAntonioAlvesEva,MarcosNascimentoBulcão,andVitorHirschbruchSchvartz,aswellasareferencetoallother philosophers studying skepticism, like Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho, PauloFrancisco Estrella Faria, José Raimundo Maia Neto, Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira,WaldomiroJosédaSilvaFilho,andOtávioBueno,amongothers.Evenphilosopherswhowerenotprimarilyinterestedinskepticismfoundthegroup’swayofdoingphilosophyquite attractive, suchasCiceroRomãoAraújo,RenatoLessa, andPaulo JonasdeLimaPiva.Infact,thegrouphasalwayssystematicallyinvitednon-skepticalphilosopherstoenrichitsdiscussions.Asaresult,astimewentby,thegroupgrewlargerandlarger.

Argentina,Mexico,andColombiahavealsoshownalotof interestinskepticismwith many important contributions to it, albeit perhaps not as systematically as inBrazil. InArgentina,workonskepticismremainedat firstsomewhatconfinedtoOlasoandtosomehistoriansofmodernphilosophyaroundhim,amongthemFernandoBahr.Later, there has been a growing interest in Argentina, this time from philosophersbelonging to the analytic tradition, who were (and still are) also in touch with theBraziliangroup.Amongthem,wecannote:EduardoBarrio,EleonoraOrlando,SamuelCabanchik, FedericoPenelas, EleonoraCresto, andGlenda Satne.More recently,DiegoMachucahasgivenanewimpulsetothestudyofancientskepticism.

InMexico, there isalsoadeep interest inskepticism.Historyofskepticismwasnot neglected, as we can be seen from the works of Laura Benítez and José AntonioRobles,amongothers,bothofwhomworkedwithOlaso(andPopkin).Theirfocusisonmodern skepticism. Some Mexican philosophers, working within a Kantian tradition,suchasPedroStepanenko,EfraínLazos, IsabelCabrera,and JorgeOrnelas, focusedontranscendentalargumentsasweaponsagainstskepticism.Others,likeArmandoCíntora,workoncontemporaryskepticisminconnectiontoquestionssuchasdisjunctivismandperception. Finally, skepticism and its connections to fallibilism and skeptical orepistemicconcepts,suchasdoubtandcertainty,wereamajor themeofsomeMexicanphilosophers,likeCarlosPeredaandGuillermoHurtado.

Therehasalsobeen some interest in skepticism inmanyother countries,mostnotably in Colombia. Usually, this interest is combinedwith a classic author, such asDescartes,Hume,orKant,orwithananalyticphilosopher,likeWittgensteinorDennett.Morerecently,aninterestinancientskepticismhasalsoarisen.InothercountriessuchasPeru,ChileandUruguay, the interest inskeptical issues ismorescattered.Nomorethan a minor or incidental interest in either the history of skepticism or in currentepistemologicalquestionsthatbearontheskepticalchallengeisfound.


3.Olaso’sroleinthestudyofskepticismThestudyanddiffusionofskepticisminArgentinaandinothercountriessuchasBrazilandMexicoowesagreatdealtoEzequieldeOlaso.WhenOlasodied,Porchatnotedthat,despitenotbeingaskeptichimself,Olaso“wasindeedthefatherofBrazilianskepticism”(Porchat1997).Buthisleadershipandinfluencewasvast,asPopkintestified:“Ezequielde Olaso was one of the most prominent historians of philosophy. He contributedenormously toarousing interest inawiderangeof topics in thehistoryofphilosophythroughhiswritings,histeachingsandhislecturesinLatinAmerica,NorthAmericaandEurope”(Popkin1997).

Olaso taught in many universities both in Argentina and elsewhere. His Ph.D.dissertation has not beenpublished, butmanypapers resulted from it. Olasowrote anumberofimportantpapersonskepticism,bothancientandmodern.Heexploredmanyauthorsinthe17thand18thcenturies:Hume,BenitoJerónimoFeijóo,Rousseau,Hobbes,andLeibniz.ThesedevelopmentsweresummarizedinOlaso1994.ManyofhispapersarededicatedtoHume’sskepticism.OlasoarguedthatHumewasanAcademicskeptic,not a Pyrrhonist, as Popkin had supposed. More importantly, his study of certainEnlightenment authorsmade Popkin revise his interpretation that, apart fromHume,therewasnointerestatallinskepticismduringthe18thcentury.

Olaso’sworkwasnotlimitedtothepresenceofskepticisminmodernphilosophy.He also devoted his efforts to interpret certain concepts of the main lexicon ofskepticism.Hewasnotonlyinterestedinskepticismfromahistoricalpointofview,butalsofromaphilosophicalperspective:hearguedvigorouslyagainstthecoherenceoftheskepticalpositionin“Zétesis”(Olaso1983)adetailedpaperonancientPyrrhonism, inwhichhedisplayedbothanaccurateunderstandingof thisphilosophical stanceandahighly critical attitude toward the Pyrrhonian conception of investigation. Hisassessment of the concept of zétesis was very influential. Olaso interpreted it as aninquiry whose goal was suspension of judgment, which defined Pyrrhonism, andcontrasted it to theopen inquiry ledbyAcademicandmodernskeptics,whosegoal istruth. Among his contributions, one finds also the distinction between the concept ofdoubt,orsuspensionofthemind,andtheconceptofepokhé,orsuspensionofjudgment,whichwouldbe theproperattitudeofa skeptic,because it isbeyonddoubt itself andtries to overcome it. Thesenew interpretationswerepart of his debatewith scholarslikeNaess,Chisholm,Mates,Fredeand,ofcourse,Porchatinordertofindanacceptableformofcontemporaryskepticism.BasedonOrtegayGasset’sdistinctionbetweenbeliefand knowledge, he proposed new accounts ofMoore’s notions of common sense andcertainty (Olaso 1975) and the critical analysis carried out by Wittgenstein (Olaso1999).

Olaso’sworkonskepticismopeneduptwomaindirectionsthatwerefollowedbymanyphilosophers,whetherunderhisdirectinfluenceornot.First,skepticismemergedasanepistemologicalproblemand, inthe lightof the linguisticturn,hesetthetaskofreinterpreting and making sense of this philosophical stance. Second, he initiated ascholarly investigationof thehistoryof skepticism;particularlyofmodernskepticism,butalsobothversionsofitsancientform.

4.Porchat’sneo-PyrrhonismItisnowtimetopresentinsomedetailPorchat’sneo-Pyrrhonism,foritisarguablythemostimportantcontributiontoLatinAmericanskepticism.Hisseminalpaper,“OnWhatAppears”,waspublishedin1991,layingthefoundationsandtheoutlineofhisskeptical


stance.Later,inanumberofpapers,heexploredthemainideasfurther,correctedminorpoints,developednewaspects,andwrotesomeintroductoryandaccessibletexts.

One of the merits of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism is that it provides a general,articulated philosophical stance that one can adopt. Skepticism is not, as is usuallypresented inepistemologicalcircles,ameredoubton thisor that topic thatshouldbesuperseded, that is, it is not amethodological doubt or an expedient to strengthen adogmaticposition.Formostphilosophersconcernedwithskepticism,thecoherenceandintelligibilityoftheskepticalpositionisnotreallyimportant.Anydoubt,howevercrazy,maybeuseful, if it allows thephilosopher to learnsomethingaboutanargument.ButPorchatdoesnotthinkso.Forhim,skepticismisthoughtofasanarticulated,plausiblestanceproposedbysomephilosophers.Porchat’sneo-Pyrrhonismisnotevenconfinedto a broad epistemological doctrine, since it is meant to be a general philosophicalattitude,whichincludesepistemologicalaspects,butisnotrestrictedtothem.

One should also emphasize that his neo-Pyrrhonism has to be sharplydistinguished from Cartesian skepticism. Porchat makes it clear that neo-Pyrrhonianaporiai are a different sort of argument from Cartesian doubts. In particular, neo-Pyrrhonismisnotcommittedtomentalism(thedoctrinethatonecanconceivethemind,anditsrepresentations,asindependentfromthebody)anddoesnotitinviteanysortofsolipsism.Thus,mostofthecriticismsleveledagainstCartesianskepticismdonotapplytoneo-Pyrrhonism.

Neo-Pyrrhonism has two parts: one negative, and the other positive. The twomost important concepts of the negative part are diaphonía (the conflict among thevariousphilosophicaldoctrines)andepokhé(thesuspensionofjudgment).ForPorchat,ataraxía, or tranquillityofmind, isnotanessential ingredientofPyrrhonismand it ismore of historical interest. Given the conflict of philosophies, Porchat draws theskeptical conclusion: being genuinely unable to choose between the variousphilosophical views, he suspends his judgment. He argues vigorously that thedisagreementbetweenphilosophies isundecidable.Notevenhisprevious“philosophyof the commonviewof theworld” (Porchat 1975, 1976) is able to solve or avoid theconflict. The conflict involves the dogmatismnot only of philosophers of the commonviewoftheworld,butalsoofordinarypeople.However,notallphilosophiesarepartofthe conflict, since somephilosophiesarenotdogmatic: theydonot intend todescribetheultimatenatureofthings.

Porchatdistinguishesbetweentwokindsofskepticalarguments:dialecticalandempirical.This isasignificantcontributionofPorchat’sneo-Pyrrhonismtoskepticism.Let us consider, first, dialectical arguments. Themode ofdiaphonía, in Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism,isthecrucialone.But,ofcourse,PorchatalsoconsiderstheothermodesofAgrippa as important skeptical weapons against dogmatism. More importantly, herecognizes that for ancient Pyrrhonism the skeptical method of antinomies (arguingboth pro and con with equal persuasiveness) is indispensable against the dogmaticclaim that some doctrines and arguments are felt stronger than others. That is, themethod is indispensable to neutralize that dogmatic experience of unbalancedarguments,bymakingstronger theweakerarguments.Byarguingonbothsidesofanissue,theskepticexperiencesthemasbeingequallystrong.Whydotheyseemequallypowerfulintheskeptic’sintellectualexperience?Forthefollowingreason:anycriterionproposedtodecidetheissuewillitselfbepartofthedispute,anddisagreementaboutitre-emerges.Skepticsdonotcommitthemselvestothesedialecticalarguments.Theyjustuse what dogmatists admit against dogmatism. Their whole point is to inducesuspensionofjudgmentindogmatistswhilestillmaintainingtheirownepokhé.


There is, however, another route toward suspension of judgment. Skeptics canemployargumentstheyareabletoendorse,whichleadtotheconclusionthatoneoughtto suspend judgment. As skeptics (Pyrrhonists) live their ordinary life like everyoneelse, they can also reason like everyone else. They can search for the conjunction ofphenomenaintheworld,establishempiricalcorrelations,andinferthepresenceoffirefrom the fact of smoke or the occurrence of a wound from the presence of a scar.Empiricalreasoningleadsusfromonephenomenontoanother.Couldn’t itbethecasethatsuchempiricalarguments leadtosuspensionof judgment?Theseargumentshaveas premises what is apparent, and they do not indicate a conclusion beyond thephenomena, since epokhé, their conclusion, is an intellectual experience. According toPorchat, Aenesidemus’ Modes are empirical, not dialectical, arguments in support ofepokhé.

Withregardtothepositivepart,neo-Pyrrhonismpresentsadetailedaccountofthe crucial notion of phainómenon. Porchat thought, in an earlier phase, thatphainómenon was to be identified with, or assimilated to, phantasía (Porchat, 1985,1986). That explains why he once construed that notion as implying some form ofmentalism:whatappearswasconceivedofasamentalrepresentation.Helaterrejectedthat identification (Porchat, 1991). On his new explanation, phainómenon is bestaccounted for by another crucial notion: bíos, or common life. After all, says SextusEmpiricus,whatappears isbíos.Thus,Sextus’explanationof theskeptical standardofactionisalsoanexplanationofthenotionofphainómenon.Bypayingcloseattentiontothe fourfoldeverydayobservances,onemayunderstandbetterwhat thephainómenonis.Atthesametime,commonlifeistobeunderstoodaswhatisapparent(whatappearstothosewholiveit),notasarealityinitself.

According to Porchat, phenomena are a kind of residue from suspension ofjudgment; they are what is left after we have suspended judgment about dogmaticdiscourse.Andoncedogmatismisleftbehind,lifeiswhatisleftforus.Thephenomenaimposethemselvestous,anditisnotuptoustoacceptthemornot.Onecouldsaythatphenomenon iswhat is “given” tous, but that ismisleading, for inone sense it is not“given”atall.Atfirst,Porchatassertedthatlanguageisakindofconstitutiveingredientof the phenomena and language permeates all our experience (Porchat 1991); later,perhaps to avoid some Kantian or idealist connotation, he preferred to talk of anassociation between what appears and language (Porchat 1995, 2013). Thus,phenomenaareimpregnatedbylanguage,notgiventous.

One importantcommentPorchatmakesconcerningphenomena is that theyarealways relative to someone. In fact, they may be personal or public. Something mayappeartosomeoneortomorethanoneperson,maybeeventoallofus.Forinstance,itmay appear to you right now that your are reading this article; and itmay appear tomanyofusthatBrasiliaisthecapitalofBrazil;anditmayappeartoallofusthattherearetreesintheworld.Hereitcanbenotedthatthereisnosolipsistictendencyinneo-Pyrrhonism,sincemanypeopleinfactsharemostphenomena.Thatsolipsismisnotaninherent tendency in neo-Pyrrhonism can already be seen due to the connectionsbetweenthephenomenaandcommonlife.Afterall,what isapparenttousareobjectsandeventsintheworld,partofthelifeallofuslive.

Anotherremarkisthatphenomenaaresensibleorintellectual.Whensomethingappears to thesenses, suchas theperceptionofa table in frontofyou, it isasensiblephenomenon; when it appears to the intellect, such as a law, it is an intellectualphenomenon. For Porchat, there is no sharp line between these two kinds ofphenomena.Asensiblephenomenonalsohassomeintellectualaspect:whenyouseea


tableinfrontofyou,theveryideaofatableincludesinitsomethingthatgoesbeyondwhatispresentinyoursensorymodalities.However,althoughPorchatdoesnotdevelopthisideaexplicitly,mostintellectualphenomenaseemtohaveareferencetosomethingsensible,oratleasttohavesomethingsensibleinitsorigin.Therefore,manyphenomenaaretypicallyofonekind,alwaysincludingbothasensibleandanintellectualaspect inthem. Very recently, however, Porchat dropped that doctrine, and he now prefers todistinguishbetweentwokindsofphenomena(Porchat2013).

Porchat’s interpretation of Pyrrhonism seems closer to Frede’s (1997) than toBurnyeat’s(1980).Itseemsthat,forhimjustlikeforFrede,skepticshavemanybeliefsinordinarylife,butarenotcommittedtophilosophicalbeliefs(beliefsaboutthetruthofvarious philosophical views about the world). His neo-Pyrrhonism, therefore, wouldseem to be an urbane form of skepticism (cf. Barnes 1992). However, the verydistinctionatthebasisof thatdisputebetweenFredeandBurnyeatpresupposeswhatPorchat rejects: a contrast between philosophers and ordinary people. From a neo-Pyrrhonist point of view, both are typically, though not always, dogmatists: mostphilosophersaredogmatistsandsoareordinaryfolk;dogmaticphilosophersonlytendtobemorerefinedinsomeoftheirconceptions.

The crucial distinction is that between dogmatism and non-dogmatism.Sometimes,ordinarypeoplearenotdogmatic,andneitheraresomephilosophers,suchtheskeptics (Pyrrhonists).ForPorchat,manycontemporaryphilosophersareskepticsorhaveaskepticaltendencywithoutknowingit(Porchat,2001).Thus,whatmattersforaneo-Pyrrhonistisnotwhethertheskeptichasnobeliefswhatsoeveroronlyordinarybeliefs,butwhetherhehasdogmaticbeliefs(concerningádela)ornon-dogmaticbeliefs(concerningwhatappears,thatis,theworldorbíos).Fredewouldhavemissedthepointconcerning the scope of epokhé for not having understood properly the notion ofphainómenon(Porchat,1991).

Accordingly,thebasicneo-Pyrrhoniandistinctionisthatbetweenthephenomenaandwhat is said about the phenomena. Dogmatic discourse isabout the phenomena.Whendogmatistssay“rosesarered”theymean“rosesarereallyred”,andtheyhaveatheorytoexplainwhatthatallegedrealityconsists in.Thus, theyareno longertalkingabout theworld, but about a further reality posited by their theory. No one disputeswhetheraroseappearsred,butwhetheritisinfactred.Notalldiscourse,however,isabout the phenomena and some merely expresses the phenomena. Such is ordinarylanguageindailylife,andsuchisalsotheuseoflanguagebyneo-Pyrrhonists:theyuselanguage to expresswhat appears to them (or tous, if thephenomenon is a commonone),butnottostatehowthingsreallyare.Inthissense,“rosesarered”expresseshowrosesappeartous;andinthissense,neo-Pyrrhonistsmayevensayitistruethatrosesareredandthatweknowit.Therefore,neo-Pyrrhonismisnot,inonesenseoftheword,aformofrelativism,sinceitacceptsanobjectiveknowledgeabouttheworld.

TwootherPyrrhonianconceptsareupdatedbytheneo-Pyrrhonistinthepositivepart:haíresis and zétesis. According to Porchat, neo-Pyrrhonists have a doctrine or “askepticalviewof theworld”.Thisskepticalviewof theworld isanelaborationofhowthings appear to neo-Pyrrhonists. Skeptical discourse should be understood as anexpression of phenomena. Thus, neo-Pyrrhonists may articulate explicitly their ownviewof theworld. Sincemost phenomena are common, especially those that concernphilosophical issues,neo-Pyrrhonistswill try tomakeexplicitourwaysof thinking,atleastastheyseethem.However,eachskepticwillhavehisorherownskepticalviewoftheworld,sincethisviewdependsalsoonthecircumstancesinwhichtheylive.


Lastly, it should be noted that neo-Pyrrhonists are empiricists, but theirempiricism is improved by current philosophy of science. For instance, they mayendorse the hypothetic-deductive method. For them, we can explore the worldempirically, and in their skeptical view of the world they may incorporate scientificresults. For instance,we think that the earthmoves, andwe no longer think that theearth is at the center of the universe. Scientific results may and do have importantimpactsonourviewoftheworld,includingontheneo-Pyrrhonists’.Porchatwentasfarastodistinguishbetweenaphilosophicalrealismandascientificrealism(Porchat1991,1994), asserting that neo-Pyrrhonists need not be instrumentalists, but could holdscientific realism, although not, of course, philosophical realism. If there is objectiveknowledge of the common world, it seems that the sciences can improve on thatknowledgebeingguidedbyanexperimentalmethodsuchasthehypothetic-deductive.Neo-Pyrrhonianzétesis isnotonlyaphilosophical inquiry todestroydogmatism,as inthecaseofSextus,butalsoanempiricalexplorationoftheworldofphenomena.

5.Reactionstoneo-PyrrhonismNeo-PyrrhonismprovokedalotofdifferentreactionsinBrazilandelsewhere.Sinceitisimpossibletoreviewthemallhere,ourpurposewillbetogiveafairideaofthem.

The first important reaction came from philosophers concernedwith scientificknowledge. Hilan Bensusan and Paulo Souza (1994) thought that Pyrrhonismwas anoutdatedphilosophy.Inthefaceofcontemporaryscience,Pyrrhonismwouldnolongerbe a viable alternative, for it had not the adequate concepts to explain that science.Therefore,thefactthatsciencehasevolvedinunforeseeablewaysisanobjectiontoneo-Pyrrhonism.LuizHenriquedeAraújoDutra(1993,1995,1996,1997b),alsocriticizingPorchat’s conceptionof science, came toproposeanother skepticalposition,whichhecalled “alethic skepticism”. Dutra thought that the metaphysical notion of truth isindispensable to scientific research. Both held that modern science establishesscientifical theories thatcannotbedoubtedbytheneo-Pyrrhonist.OtávioBuenohasamoresympatheticproposaltowardskepticismanddevelopsaneo-PyrrhonistapproachtocontemporarysciencebycombiningitwithvanFraassen’sview(Bueno2015).Neo-Pyrrhonianempiricismemphasizesthenotionofempiricaladequacy.

Asecondkindofresponsewasgivenbythosewhowanttodeveloporimproveon basic features of neo-Pyrrhonism. Some, such as Plínio Junqueira Smith, tried topurifyneo-Pyrrhonismfromwhatstilllookedlikeadogmaticnotion(Smith1995).Forinstance,theideathatdogmatismisadiseaseandthattheskeptic(Pyrrhonist)offersabetter way of life by curing dogmatists of their disease may be mere prejudice.Therefore,theskepticalideaoftherapyisperhapsdogmatic.Thenotionofcommonlifeasusedbytheneo-PyrrhonistalsoseemstobeaninheritanceofPorchat’s“philosophyofthecommonviewoftheworld”(Porchat1975,1976).Theskepticalviewoftheworldhasanundeniablepersonalaspect.WaldomiroJosédaSilvaFilhoexplored,ontheonehand,skepticaldifficulties incommon lifeneglectedby theneo-Pyrrhonist (SilvaFilho2015) and, on the other, difficulties in self-knowledge, thereby trying to extend neo-PyrrhonismtosubjectsnottoucheduponbyPorchat(SilvaFilho2007,2008).

Another important discussion intended to correct and improve on neo-Pyrrhonism concerns the neo-Pyrrhonist view on truth. Porchat developed in animportantpaperaskepticaldoctrineoftruth(Porchat1995).AccordingtoPorchat,oncetheyhavedivorcedfromametaphysicalnotionofreality,neo-Pyrrhonistscandefendacorrespondencetheoryoftruth:whatwesayandwhatappearswouldbecorrelatedinourexperience;itappearsthatthereisalinkbetweenwhatwesayandwhatappearsto


us.EduardoBarrio(2000),however,thinksthattheonlyalternativetoaneo-Pyrrhonistis to adopt a deflationist theory of truth, like the redundancy theory, and that anycorrespondence theory would imply dogmatism. Plínio Junqueira Smith (2008),identifyingsomemisunderstanding in thedebate, triedtoshowthat thetwopositionswerenotreallyinconflict.BothPorchatandBarriowouldofferasimilarneo-Pyrrhonianaccountoftruth.

An unexpected and important development of neo-Pyrrhonism came fromphilosopherswhowerealsoconcernedwithpoliticalphilosophy.Theywereinterestedinknowingwhatwouldbe the skeptical (Pyrrhonian)proposal inpolitics.Porchat (inconversation) has always been very clear on this issue, for he holds that the skepticcouldhaveanypoliticaldoctrine,includingaradicalone:fromextremerighttoextremeleft.Afterall,skepticismwouldnotexcludeanycontentofphainomena.Butmostthinkthat not all alternatives are accessible to a skeptical position. Renato Lessa (1995)argues that the neo-Pyrrhonist would be a liberal; Paulo Jonas de Lima Piva (2002)thinkshecouldbeasocialdemocratorasocialist;CiceroRomãoAraújo(2007,2008)connectsthenotionofskepticismwiththenotionofcitizenship.Thisdebateopenedupanewlineofresearchconcerningskepticism.

Veryrecently,aninternalcriticismofneo-Pyrrhonismemergedanditdeservestobementioned.VitorHirschbruchSchvartz(2015)andDiegoMachuca(2013)argueforarusticversionofneo-Pyrrhonism,accordingtowhichPyrrhonistsholdnobeliefs,anddonotstopshortofall theconsequences thatoneshouldderive fromthe forceof theskeptical attack on dogmatism. A truly skeptical position would destroy all beliefs,whetherordinaryorphilosophical.Accordingly,SchvartzandMachucasee themselvesas rustic neo-Pyrrhonists, and do not accept Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism with its non-dogmaticbeliefs.

But there havebeenmany external criticismswhose intention is to reject neo-Pyrrhonism. Roberto Bolzani Filho developed an incisive criticism of Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism. Bolzani (1996, 2003) identified a sort of “naturalized reason” or somedogmatic presuppositions in the idea of a “healthy philosophy” in Porchat’s thinking.Onecouldapplytoskepticismthesamekindofargumentthattheskepticusesagainstother philosophies. In the end, skepticism would be part of the conflict amongphilosophies it tries to avoid. Bolzani also attempted to show that, despite Porchat’sintention,neo-Pyrrhonismisanoutdatedwayofphilosophizing.RobertoHoráciodeSáPereira (2003) presented a Kantian answer to Porchat’s neo-Pyrrhonism.He raised anumber of difficulties to understand Porchat’s conception of phenomena, and arguedthatanacceptablesolutionwouldcomeonly froma transcendentalphilosophy.Thesetwo criticisms, if sound, shouldmake one reconsider neo-Pyrrhonism.More recently,Pereira(2015)cametodefendnaiverealismagainstPyrrhonism.

6.ContemporaryskepticismJust as in many other parts of the world, contemporary skepticism in Latin Americadeals with epistemological issues within analytic theory of knowledge. Many anti-skeptical strategies, such as contextualism and externalism, deserve close scrutiny byLatin American philosophers. Also the transcendental strategy has captured theattentionofmanyphilosophers interested inskepticism.Butcontemporaryskepticismis not confined to epistemology alone and it engages with, more broadly, analyticphilosophy as a whole. Analytic worries about language and, more specifically, thenotionofmeaninghaveledtothedevelopmentofanewformofskepticism,knownas


meaningskepticism.Wewillreviewsomeofthediscussionsonthesetopics,beginningwiththeconnectionsbetweenskepticismandanalyticphilosophy.

Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho (Brazil) developed some skeptical conceptsusingAustin’spragmatistviewoflanguage,andhealsoidentifiedmanycommonideasbetween Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism (Souza Filho 1988, 1996a, 1996b). Thus,MarcondeswasarticulatingPyrrhonism further ina similar spirit asPorchat.Anothergroundbreakingworkon skepticismderived from the linguistic turn is thatof SamuelCabanchik(Argentina).Cabanchikwasinterestedinthepossibilityofalinguisticformofskepticismorskepticismaboutmeaningnotonly inWittgenstein,butalso inAristotleand Francisco Sanchez. His main focus, however, was Wittgenstein, about whom hewrotetwobooks(2003,2010)andmanypapers(1990,2008a,2008b).

Marcondes’andCabanchik’sconcernwithanalyticphilosophyanditsrelationtoskepticismwastrulyaguidetootherphilosophers.Theconnectionsbetweenskepticismand thephilosophyof the laterWittgensteinhavebeenhighlightedbymany scholars.PlínioJunqueiraSmith(1994)triedtoshowthestrongaffinitiesbetweenWittgenstein’slater philosophy and ancient Pyrrhonism, to which Paulo Roberto Margutti (Brazil)(1996a) offered a criticism. In the same spirit, GuadalupeReinoso (Argentina) (2006,2008, 2009) calls our attention to the value of skepticism in both Sextus andWittgenstein as an ars vivendi: their criticism of language’s bewitchment, anti-theoreticalperspective,andconceptionofphilosophyasatherapy.MagdalenaHolguín(Colombia) (1997) and R. Meléndez (Colombia) (2014) also analyze the relationsbetweenskepticismandWittgenstein.PamelaLastres(Peru)(2011)hasrecentlybeendoing some promising work on Wittgenstein and Moore, but also on Pyrrhonianskepticism.ItisalsoworthnotingthatOscarNudler(Argentina)(2009)hasdevelopedwhathecallsa“philosophyofthelimits”,inspiredbothbyWittgesnteinandtheSocraticawarenessofourignorance,which,althoughnotproperlyskeptic,isadoctrineatleastcloselyassociatedwithskepticism.

More recently, Glenda Satne (Argentina) (2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2008) alsopursuedalineofresearchbasedonanalytictheoriesofmeaningand,morespecifically,on meaning skepticism. She has been busy with skeptical arguments derived fromcontemporary semantics, such asQuine’s argument from the indeterminacy of radicaltranslation, Putnam’s model-theoretic argument, Dummett’s argument from themanifestation of linguistic knowledge and, above all, Kripke’s (or Kripkenstein’s)skeptical arguments.Meaning skepticismwasalso the subjectof averywell informedbook by Silvio Mota Pinto (Brazil/Mexico) (2009, 2014), and Efraín Lazos (Mexico)(2002)publishedinterestingpapersonWittgenstein,Kripke,andmeaningskepticismaswell.

Thus,theconnectionbetweenskepticismandanalyticphilosophybecameatopicto be further explored by Latin American philosophers. Porchat had argued thatcontemporary analytic philosophywas to a good extent skepticalwithout knowing it.Accordingtohim,manyanalyticphilosophersdon’tunderstandverywellwhatskepticshad said and what they call a skeptic does not correspond to skepticism, properlyunderstood. If they had the appropriate knowledge of the history of skepticism, theywouldperhapsacknowledgetheskepticalorientationoftheirdoctrines. It isnotclear,however,thatthatisthecaseinanalyticphilosophy.Onedebatethathasreceivedsomeattentionishowfarthisorthatanalyticphilosopherisclosetoskepticism.Forinstance,againstPorchat’sopinionaboutQuine,MarcosNascimentoBulcão(Brazil)wroteabookonQuine’snaturalisticrealism,denyingthatheisaskeptic(Bulcão2008).However,theperceptionofaskepticalQuinestillpersistsinsomeplaces.


Davidsonisanotheranalyticphilosopherwhoseconnectionstoskepticismhavebeen assessed by Latin American philosophers. Eleonora Orlando (Argentina) (2000)wroteapapercriticizingDavidson,forhisconceptionoflanguagewouldendup,despitehisintentions,intoakindofsemanticskepticism.CristianBarturén(Peru),ontheotherhand, is interested on Davidson’s critique of global Skepticism. Otávio Bueno(Brazil/USA)criticizedthewayinwhichDavidsontriestorespondtoskepticism(Bueno2005).WaldomiroJosédaSilvaFilhoandPlínioJunqueiraSmith(Brazil)(2005)editedabook in which they wrote on the relations between Davidson’s philosophy andskepticism.

TherelationbetweenP.F.Strawsonandskepticismhasalsobeenassessedbyanumber of Latin American scholars on contemporary skepticism or on analyticphilosophy.PerhapsthemostimportantcontributioncomesfromaMexicangroup.Wewilltalkmoreaboutthembelow,whenwediscusstranscendentalargumentsasananti-skeptical strategy. Sergio Sanchez (Argentina) (2006), Marco Franciotti (2009) andPlínioJunqueiraSmith(Brazil)(2015)havealsodonesomeworkinthistopic.

Other analytic philosophers engaged with the issue further. To give but oneexample,MiguelÁngelFernández(Mexico)(2014)criticizedtheincoherenceoftheanti-skeptical epistemologyofbelief attributiondevelopedbyCrispinWright.According toFernández,Wrightintendstocombinetwodesideratainasingleanti-skepticalstrategy,towit,aconcessiveelementtotheskeptic,ontheonehand,andarescueelement,ontheother.However,heargues,thatcombinationisimpossible.

Perhapsoneshouldnotethatcontemporaryskepticismwasalsodevelopedalongotherphilosophicaltraditions,notonlyofananalyticorientation.UndertheinfluenceofWittgenstein,butalsoofStanleyCavell,MarioGensollem(Mexico)(2006)exploredtheroleofskepticismnotonlyinphilosophy,butalsoincommonlife.HecametoembracetheCavellianthesisthatphilosophicalskepticismisthebestexpressionoftheintrinsicfinitudeofhumannature.SergioSánchez(Argentina)(2006)calledattentionnotonlytoStrawson’sbut also toHeidegger’s assessmentof skeptical arguments. JônadasTechio(Brazil)(2012)alsoinvestigated,fromaCavellianandHeideggerianpointsofview,theimportanceofphilosophicalskepticism.

Skepticalworriesareusuallylinkedtoepistemologicalissues.WefindinMexicoagroupofphilosopherswhohaveaverystrongconnectiontoskepticism.Theygoasfarasproposingnewformsofskepticism.ArmandoCíntora(Mexico)(2010), forinstance,holds a Pyrrhonian position in philosophy of science. According to Cíntora, amethodological Pyrrhonism would be of great help to liberate scientists from thedogmasthatkeepthemcaptivewhentheytry todeveloptheirscientificresearch. JustlikeinSextus’case,CíntoraarguesthatthiskindofmethodologicalPyrrhonismisnotanepistemicparalysis:Pyrrhonianscientistscanpracticescience,sincetheyareawareofthe non-dogmatic (temporal) character of their ontological, methodological andsemantic principles. Such acknowledgement will keep them safe from a dogmaticoutlook.

JorgeOrnelas(Mexico)(2012,2013a,2014a,2014c),ayoungermemberofthatgroup, focused on the main anti-skeptical strategies in contemporary philosophy(contextualism, belief-attribution epistemology, dogmatism, transcendental approach,externalism, etc.). Ornelas tried to show that none of these strategies succeed ordislodge the traditional skeptical challenge, chiefly because they lack a satisfactorydiagnosisofthemotivationsbehindtheskepticalproblematic.Therefore,theyfallpreyto a double error: not only do they fail to eradicate the basic motivations behindskepticism, but also they pay no attention to the fact that the traditional skeptical


problematicemergesonlyfortheoriesandconceptsofknowledgethatdonotthreatenordinaryknowledgeattributions.

FallibilismandskepticismwerethetopicsofsomepaperswrittenbyGuillermoHurtado(Mexico).Hurtado(2002a)holdsthat,althoughthesetwopositionsarecloselyrelated, onemust keep them apart; he rejects fallibilism because it is revisionist. Notmuchlater,hearguesinfavorofusingmorefine-grainedepistemicterms.AccordingtoHurtado(2005),oneshoulddistinguishvarioussensesof“doubt”,introducethenotionof “suspicion”, and accept various degrees of certainty.His basic idea is to enrich thevocabularyofepistemology,includingmoresophisticatedskepticalterms.

Many, of course, reject the skeptical position. Paulo Francisco Estrella Faria(Brazil) (2007, 2012), for instance, argued against skepticism. In fact, he thinks,skepticismiscommittedtoakindofidealism,eveninthecaseofPorchatanddespitehisexplicitrejectionofthisphilosophicalview.AccordingtoFaria,anyassertionimpliesaclaimtoabsolutetruthand,ifskepticsassertanything,astheydoinordinarylife,thentheyare committed towhat theywould ratheravoid.The skepticviewof language is,therefore, untenable, and there is a type of pragmatic contradiction in the skeptic’sposition. That criticism has been endorsed by RobertoHorácio de Sá Pereira (Brazil)(2003,2015).

TheworksofEleonoraCresto(Argentina)andAlejandroMiroli(Argentina)alsodistance themselves from the skeptical position. Cresto (1996, 1997) focusedon anti-skepticalstrategiesthatarisefromnaturalisticpositions,whetheralongWittgensteinianlines or followingF.Dretske andother reliabilists.Miroli (2007, 2008, 2010), in turn,dealt with scientific skepticism, addressing both general cases and socially importantones.HealsoexaminedDretske’srelevantalternativesargument,andtriedtodeterminewhichkindsofalternativesoneshouldexcludeandwhichonecanneglectinknowledgeattributions.

Several additional epistemological strategies were put under close scrutiny byLatinAmericanepistemologists.Hereareafewofthem.DianaHoyos(Colombia)(2006)works on contemporary theory of knowledge, linking the concepts of epistemicresponsibility, Gettier examples and skepticism. Jorge Gregorio Posada (Colombia)(2007) has responded to her work. Ignacio Ávila (Colombia) (2003) confrontsDavidson’s thesis that most of our beliefs are true with the corresponding skepticalchallenge. Another popular anti-skeptical strategy is contextualism. Flávio Williges(Brazil) devoted his Ph.D. dissertation to that subject, from which resulted a paper(Williges 2003), and André Joffily Abath (Brazil) (2013) uses contextualism to refuteCartesianskepticism.

Among the anti-skeptical strategies, the one that invokes transcendentalconsiderationsdeservesspecialmention.AgroupofphilosophersinMexicoisthemostdistinguishedoneconcerning thisKantian-Strawsonian-inspiredanswer to skepticism.PedroStepanenko(Mexico)exploredtheanti-skepticalpotentialoftheKantianconceptofthesyntheticunityofapperceptioninmanypapers(2001,2002a,2006,2007,2008).According to his interpretation, this unity should be considered as the unity of ourmental states that is possible only through the inferential relations to their contents.This unity makes possible the self-consciousness that any argumentative practicerequires.Ifwecouldsuspendjudgmentwithrespecttoanysubject,wewouldrenouncetoestablish inferentialrelationsamongthecontentsofourmentalstates; in thatcase,therewouldbenoconsciousnessunity,norknowledgeofourmentalstates.

InthatsameKantiangroup,theworksofEfraínLazos(México)areoutstanding.Lazos(2002,2014)wasabletocombineKantianandWittgensteiniananti-skepticismto


producenewperspectivesontheskepticalchallenge.Morerecently,LazosappealledtoatranscendentalstrategybasedontheworksofBarryStroudtoshowtheanti-skepticalforce of transcedental arguments. Isabel Cabrera (Mexico) (1999) edited a book ontranscendental arguments, in which the force and limits of such arguments as toolsagainstskepticismareassessed.Cabrera(2002)alsoworkedouttherelationsbetweenBuddhism and skepticism. In particular, she showed that both in Buddhism and inHumeanskepticism there is anattackon thenotionof substance, and that the lackofcommitment to substances in one’s understanding of the world has a therapeuticfunction,namely,toavoidsuffering.

The so-called Agrippan trilemma is an important argument for contemporaryskepticism.SomeLatinAmericanphilosophershavetriedtoanswerthisdeep,difficultskeptical challenge. José de Teresa (Mexico) (2000, 2013, 2014) developed an anti-skepticalstrategyinspiredinPlato’sdialectic.AccordingtodeTeresa,Plato’sstrategyiseffective against the trilemma presented by the skeptic, because it escapes the threealternativesunderconsideration.

Among the Agrippan modes, however, the most important for Latin Americanskepticism seems to be diaphonía or disagreement. We saw how important it is toPorchat’sneo-Pyrrhonism(1968,1991,1993).Someeffortshaverecentlybeenmadetocompare the skeptical, Agrippan mode of diaphonía to contemporary reflections ondisagreement.OfparticularimportanceisDiegoMachuca’s(Argentina)(2013)ideathatdiaphonía is different from disagreement. Machuca accuses contemporaryepistemologists who defend that disagreement leads to suspension of judgment ofdogmatism.AccordingtoMachuca,theybasetheirargumentsondogmatistprinciplestoreach suspension of judgment. It also deserves to be noted Otávio Bueno’s (Brazil)defenseofdiaphoníafromrecentattacks,suchasBarnes’criticism(Bueno2013).Buenooffers an interpretation of diaphonía free from the problems that arise from faultyinterpretations.Perhapsthis isanothertopic inwhichonemaydiscoversomeoriginalcontributionsfromLatinAmericanskepticism.

7.HistoryofmodernskepticismThehistoryofskepticismhasalsoattractedtheattentionofmanyscholarsthroughoutLatinAmerica.As inmostplaces, historical investigation tended to concentrate in themodern period, mostly on Cartesian and Humean skepticism, though many otherauthors, such as Montaigne, Bacon, Bayle, and Kant, were also on the spot. AlthoughBrazilianscholarshiphasperhapsmademorecontributions,oneshouldnotneglectthehugeandwidespreadinterestinmodernskepticismthroughoutLatinAmerica.

Themost importantwork on the history of skepticism is arguably that of JoséRaimundo Maia Neto (Brazil), who worked with Popkin. Maia Neto got interested inskepticism through his contact with Danilo Marcondes and, some time later, withPorchat’s works. His main contribution is that Academic skepticism played a moreimportantroleinmodernskepticismthanPopkin’sinterpretationrecognizes(MaiaNeto1997a, 2005, 2013a). According to Maia Neto, Popkin emphasized the importance ofPyrrhonismformodernphilosophy,butneglectedthefactthatAcademicskepticismwasalso widely known and used by many philosophers. In order to defend thisinterpretation, Maia Neto wrote a number of papers on philosophers like Montaigne(MaiaNeto2004,2012),PierreCharron(MaiaNeto2014),Descartes(MaiaNeto2001),Gassendi(MaiaNeto1997b)andPierre-DanielHuet(MaiaNeto2008a,2008b).Infact,he explored the whole modern skepticism from Montaigne onwards, with importanttextsonPascal(MaiaNeto1995),Bayle(MaiaNeto1996),andHume(MaiaNeto1991).


Another important contribution is that of LuizAntonioAlvesEva (Brazil),whohasstudiedingreatdetailMontaigne’sEssays,publishingtwobooks(2004,2007b)andanumberofpapersinBrazilandelsewhere(2001a,2012,2013).StillinBrazil,RenatoLessa(Brazil)(1995,2003)andPlínioJunqueiraSmith(Brazil)(2012a)havealsodonesome work on Montaigne’s skepticism. Lessa is interested in the relations betweenskepticismandpolitics,showingthatskeptics,byacknowledgingtheroleofhabit,wouldberealistsinpolitics.SmithdiscussesEva’sinterpretation.WhileEvainsistsmoreontheaffinities between Montaigne and ancient skeptics, Smith tries to uncover moredifferences.InArgentina,therehasalsobeensomeworkonMontaigne’sskepticism.Inaddition to Fernando Bahr (Argentina), to whom we shall return, Soledad Croce(Argentina)(2006,2007),forinstance,haspublishedmanypapersonwhatshetakesasthepracticalskepticismofMontaigne.

Luiz Eva (Brazil) (2006, 2008, 2011) also focused on the relations betweenFrancisBaconandskepticism.HeproposedsomecarefulinterpretationsoftheTheoryof the Idols and skeptical arguments stemming from ancient Pyrrhonism and fromMontaigne and Sanchez. He showed not only the skeptical origins of most Baconianidols,butalsohowtheirstructurechangedtheskepticalModes,therebyrevealingwhatisproperlynewinBacon.SilviaManzo(Argentina)(2009)wroteonthesamesubject,holding a balanced view, in which there is a double attitude in light of the skepticalthreat. More recently, she returned to that topic (Manzo forthcoming), providing areconstructionofFrancisBacon’sreceptionofAcademicskepticism.ShedealswiththeassessmentofancientskepticismthroughoutBacon’swritingsandarguesthathe,ontheonehand, approvedof the stateofdoubt and the suspensionof judgmentand,on theotherhand,rejectedthenotionofacatalepsia.Plínio JunqueiraSmith(Brazil)(2012b),referring to both scholars, showed that Bacon’s main focus is on the propositions“nothingisknown”and“nothingcanbeknown”,towhichhedevotedcarefulattention.According to Smith, Bacon used skeptical weapons to reject the whole traditionalphilosophy (including skepticism), not only to criticize dogmatism, therebydistancinghimselffromit.

Danilo Marcondes (Brazil) (2009, 2012) has been doing original, importantresearch on the ancient Modes and the discovery of the NewWorld. This discoveryoffered not onlymanymore examples of the same kind of diversity Europeanswerefamiliarwith, but alsoof adifferent,more radical kind, strengthening the forceof theskepticalModes.That isavastandrich literaturenotyetexploredbyscholarson thehistoryofskepticism.

Asexpected,Cartesianskepticism isoneof themainobjectsofstudy. Inalmostevery country we find scholars trying to understand its sources, the nature of itsarguments, their force and persuasiveness. One decisive contribution, already notedabove, is thatofPorchat,whocreditedDescartes’smethodologicaluseof skepticismaspecial place in the philosophy. In Porchat’s view of the 1980s (Porchat 1985, 1986),therewasastrongaffinitybetweenancientskepticismandCartesiandoubt,sothatonecouldspeakproperlyofa skeptic-Cartesianmodel.Theproblemof theexternalworldbecame, thereby, a crucial issue for those concernedwith skepticism, because it wasthoughtofasaskepticalproblem.Followinghislead,manyotherphilosophersinBrazil,likePauloFranciscoEstrellaFaria(2007),LuizEva(2001b,2013b),AlexandreNoronhaMachado(2007a),FlávioWilliges(2007),amongothers,wrotepapersonthetopic.

In Mexico, concern with Cartesian skepticism was once the dominant focus ofresearchonskepticism.Onereasonforthispredominanceistheconnectionbetweenthegroup of Laura Benítez (Mexico) and José Antonio Robles (Mexico) with Ezequiel de


Olaso and Richard Popkin. This group was strongly oriented toward the work ofDescartes andmodern science. Consequently, Cartesian skepticism ormethodologicalskepticism was an important subject to them. Many members of the group shared,perhapsimplicitly,thebeliefthattheCartesiananti-skepticalstrategywassuccessfultoavoiddisastrousskepticalconsequences.Benítez(1987),forinstance,hasdevotedmanyofherworks toCartesianstudies,andexploredthepositivemethodologicalaspectsofCartesianskepticismtoreachplaincertainty,aswellastherelevanceofskepticismfordiscussionsconcerningthenatureofhumanknowledge.

Somethingsimilarcanbesaidabout thesituation inColombia,where JeanPaulMargot (2003) and Adolfo León Gómez (2002) gave a lot of attention to Cartesianskepticism. Also very important are the contributions of Mauricio Zuluaga, who hasexaminedcontemporaryinterpretationsofCartesianskepticism,especiallythosebasedontheclosureprinciple(Zuluaga2012),theAgrippanTrilemma(Zuluaga2005)andtherelations between Pyrrhonism and Cartesian skepticism (Zuluaga 2014). Zuluagapublishedan importantbookthatemerged fromhisPh.D.dissertation(Zuluaga2007)and, withMargot, edited a collection (Margot and Zuluaga 2012), in which one findsmany papers onmodern skepticism, including onMontaigne, featuring scholars fromColombiaandelsewhere.

In Peru we also find some interest in the relation between Descartes andskepticism.JorgeSecada(2000)hasdoneworkonDescartesandSuarez,butfocusedonDescarteswithregardtoskepticism.HumbertoQuispe(1996)hasalsodoneresearchonthistopic,mainlyundertheinfluenceofJorgeSecada.

Frenchskepticismofthe17thCenturywasgivensomeattention,althoughnotasmuchasonewouldlike.BesidesthealreadynotedcontributionbyJoséRaimundoMaiaNeto(Brazil),theworksofFlávioFontenelleLoque(Brazil)(2012)andFernandoBahr(Argentina) deserve to be highlighted. Loque’s book is on the relation betweenskepticismandreligion,morespecificallyontheverynotionofaChristianskepticism.HedevotedattentionnotonlytoMontaigneandPierreCharron,butalsotoFrançoisdelaMotheLeVayer.Bahr(1999,2000a,2000b,2001,2002,2004,2010)focusedmainlyonPierreBayle,whoseskepticalargumentstouchonthreemainpoints:theproblemofevil,thefoundationsofreligiousbeliefandciviltolerance.ThesetopicsledBahrtostudyboththe18thCentury,whereheexaminestheinfluenceofBayleonHume(thatwasthetopicofhisPh.D.),andtothefirsthalfofthe17thCentury,wherehefocusedhisattentionon therelationbetweenLaMotheLeVayerandDescartes.SébastienCharles (Québec,Canada)(forthcominga,forthcomingb)hasalsobeenworkingrecentlyonsomeFrenchskeptics,namelySimonFoucherandPierre-DanielHuet.Hishistoricalresearchfollowsthe current trendof erudition, discovering andexploring lessknown figures, butwhowereveryimportantattheirtime.

Berkeley’sreactiontoskepticismorhisallegedskepticismdidnotgounnoticed,despite not having received enough attention. One exception is José Antonio Robles(Mexico). Robles (1996) shows that the Berkeleyan skeptical thesis that rejects theexistenceofamaterialsubstancehas importantconsequences,suchastherejectionofmanyothersubsidiaryproblems:matter’sindivisibilityandtheideaofanextendedGod.Jaimir Conte (Brazil) (2008) also explored the connections between Berkeley andskepticism inan importantpaper.SébastienCharles (Québec,Canada) (2003)wroteabook on the early reception of Berkeley’s immaterialism in France. At that time,Berkeleywasconsideredthegreatestskeptic,untilKantpronouncedHumetobeevengreater.Charlesshows,withplentyoferudition,howthisimageofBerkeleywascreatedinFrance.


Not much attention was given to skepticism in the 18th Century Frenchmaterialist philosophy. However, Paulo Jonas de Lima Piva (Brazil) (2007, 2008a,2008b)hasdonesomeworkfocusingespeciallyonDiderot.SébastienCharles(Québec,Canada)(2007)calledattentiontosomeclandestineskepticalmanuscriptsaswellastomanylessknownskepticsoftheperiod,notonlyinFrance,butalsoinGermany.Charles(2012) and Rodrigo Brandão (2008) explored the relations between Voltaire andskepticism.

An important contribution to understand Hume’s skepticism was provided byPlínio Junqueira Smith,who published a book (1995) on that topic andmany papers(2007,2011a,2011b).HismainideaisthatthedebatebetweenHume’sskepticismandHume’s naturalism presupposes a false dichotomy. What commentators call Hume’snaturalismiswhatHumehimselfcalledhisskepticism.Moreover,commentatorstendtothink of skepticism as a mere negative doctrine, not paying enough attention to itspositive side. He also devotedmuch effort to show howHume’smitigated skepticismwasconnectedtoancientskepticism,inbothitsforms,andtomodernskepticism.Oneshouldalsonote theworksofLiviaGuimarães(Brazil) (1996,2008)whohasdevotedhercareertothestudyofHume’sthought,notonlyhisskepticism,butalsomanyotheraspects of the philosophy of the greatest modern skeptic. Humean scholarship hasincreasedsomuchinBrazilthatitisnotpossibletogiveafairsurveyofitsstatusinalimitedspace.

Interest in Hume’s skepticism is not confined to Brazil. Lisandro Aguirre(Argentina) (2007, 2008, 2010a, 2010b), for instance, has publishedmany papers onHume.Hismainpoint isthatHumefollowsPyrrhonismpreciselywhenhethinksheisavoidingit,i.e.,whenHumeissavedbynature,hethinksheisnotaPyrrhonian,butinfact thatwouldbe thehallmarkofaPyrrhonist.HumeanskepticalargumentsarealsostudiedinColombia,forinstancebyCatalinaGonzalez2010,2011).Humeanskepticismwas perhaps what generated Peruvian interest in modern skepticism. Although JuanBautistaFerroPorcile(Peru)wasmainlyconcernedwith logic,he lecturedextensivelyonmodernphilosophy,especiallyintheempiricisttraditionandintheHumeanbranchofskepticism,onwhichhepublishedaninfluentialpaper.

The relations between Kant and skepticism attracted much attention in LatinAmerica,mostofallinMexico.Wehavealreadyseenthatagroupofphilosophers,mostnotably Pedro Stepanenko (2002a, 2006, 2007), Efraín Lazos (2014), Isabel Cabrera(1999), and Jorge Ornelas (2005), combined historical scholarship with systematicworries, producing a number of publications on transcendental arguments andskepticism, discussing the works of Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson and Barry Stroud,among others, from a Kantian point of view. Stepanenko, in particular, was morehistorically orientated. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira (2003) and Marco Franciotti(1994,1995),inBrazil,followsasimilarpath.InColombia,AlejandroRosas(Colombia)(1990)openedup this fieldof researchwithan influentialpaper.Following thispath,Catalina González (Colombia) (2010) developed a historical study of the relationsbetweenKantandhisancientskepticalsources.

Morerecently,stillinMexico,Ornelas(2014c,2015)developedaninterpretationof Kantian anti-skepticism, according to which the “Refutation of Idealism” is notrelevant, as is commonly assumed, but the “Fourth Paralogism” is. Plínio JunqueiraSmith(2008a), inBrazil,holdsasimilarview,whileat thesametimeofferingawiderinterpretation.According toSmith,Kantresponded to threedifferentkindsofmodernskepticism: Cartesian skepticism concerning the external world (which Kant came torecognize,inthesecondeditionoftheCritiqueofPureReason,asanidealistproblem,not


askepticalone);Bayleanskepticismandtheantinomies,andHumeanskepticismontheobjectivevalidityofthecategories.

LuisEduardoHoyos(Colombia)(2001)hasalreadypublishedhisimportantbookEl escepticismo y la filosofía trascendental in which he assesses the argumentativepotentialofthetranscendentalargumentagainstHumeanskepticismasreceivedinthephilosophical German scene of the 18th Century.Hoyosworksmotivated a number ofColombianphilosopherstodevotetheirattentiontothesubjectandtheperiod.IgnacioÁvila (Colombia) (1996) explored this same vein, while Carlos Patarroyo (Colombia)sides with the Kantian position against Humean skepticism. Catalina González(Colombia) (2011) worked out the distinction between Academic skepticism andPyrrhonisminKant.

AsmanyscholarshaveperceivedthefundamentalimportanceofKanttomodernskepticism (and vice-versa), it should not come as a surprise that many others alsoperceivedwhatisnowcalledpost-Kantianskepticism.Perhapsthefirstimportantstudyon the topic is that of Luis EduardoHoyos (Colombia) (1995),whenhe publishes hisPh.D.dissertation,followedbytwopapers(Hoyos1998,1999),towhichRaúlMeléndez(Colombia) (2000) replied. Interest in post-Kantian skepticism is spreading around.Eduardo Brandão (Brazil) (2013) devotes his attention to skepticism in philosopherssuch as G. E. Schulze, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Fichte. Ricardo Cattaneo (Argentina)(2010a,2010b)focusesbothondiscussionsonskepticisminKantianandpost-Kantianphilosophy(Jacobi,Schulze)andontheinterpretationandassimilationofskepticisminHegel and German Idealism. Luiz Fernando Barrère Martin (Brazil) (2007a, 2007b,2011) has written his Ph.D. dissertation and published some papers on Hegel andskepticism.

Sergio Sánchez (Argentina) is an important reference for studies concerningskepticism in the 19th and 20th Century. Sánchez (2010) focused on the presence ofskepticisminNietzsche,especiallytheinfluenceofSextusandCicero.Inhispapers,oneimportanttopicisthatofNietzsche’sanalysisofbeliefanditsrelationtoskepticism.InconnectionwithNietzsche,KathiaHanza(Peru)(2011)hasexploreddifferentsidesofskepticism. The works of Rogério Lopes (Brazil) (2006, 2012) on Nietzsche andskepticism, very similar in spirit to those of Sánchez and Hanza, also deserve to bementioned.

8.HistoryofancientskepticismAncientskepticismhasalsoattractedalotofattention,though,likeinalmostallplaces,it has received less attention thanmodern skepticism. Roberto Bolzani Filho (Brazil)published a book (Bolzani 2013) and anumberof papers on the topic (Bolzani 1990,1998,2000,2005).HisbookonAcademicskepticismandPyrrhonismisverycarefullywritten, well informed, and presents a detailed account of the relationship betweenthesetwoformsofancientskepticism.VitorHirshchbruchSchvartz(2012)defendsanurbaneinterpretationofSextusEmpiricus.Recentscholarshipisimproving,asisshownbytheworksofRodrigoPintodeBrito(Brazil)(2014)onSextus.

Morerecently,studiesonancientskepticismgrewthankstotheworksofDiegoMachuca(Argentina)(2006a,2006b,2009,2013).HisPh.D.dissertationwasonSextus’ethics. Afterwards, he has published many papers and reviews, as well as organizedevents.Hehasalsoeditedanumberofimportantcollectionsonthehistoryofskepticism(2011a,2011b,2013).It isfairtosaythatnoonegavemoreimpulsetoimproveLatinAmerican scholarship on ancient skepticism than he did. With Duncan Pritchard,MachucaistheeditoroftheInternationalJournalfortheStudyofSkepticism.Thus,both


for his personal papers and books and for his involvement in organizing research,Machucaisaleadingfigureinancientskepticism.

Colombiahasalsogiven itscontribution to the field. InCuadernosdeFilosofíayLetras, we find not only the first book of the Esbozos Pirrónicos of Sextus EmpiricustranslatedbythephilologistandHellenist JorgePáramo(1989),butalsomanypapersby scholars such as Popkin, Giorgio Tonelli, Porchat and Olaso, together with anexamination of the importance of philosophical skepticism by Carlos B. Gutiérrez(Colombia)(1989).

Somescatteredcontributionsshouldbenoted.Ornelas(Mexico)(2013b,2014d)read Sextus’ works carefully, and found theoretical resources that can help with theengagementwithcontemporaryepistemological issues.Plínio JunqueiraSmith(Brazil)wrote apaperonataraxía andmetriopátheia, trying to elucidate those two importantPyrrhonianconcepts(Smith1996).

StudiesonthehistoryofskepticismbeforethemodernperiodarenotrestrictedtoPyrrhonismandAcademicskepticism.ItshouldnotgounmentionedMaurícioPagottoMarsola’spaper(Brazil)(2007)onPlotinusandskepticism,forthisisaveryunexpectedaspectofPlotinus’philosophy.InconnectiontotheoriginsofMedievalPhilosophy,andespeciallyAugustineandDescartes,LuisBacigalupo(Peru)(1999)hasalsodonesomeresearch. Rodrigo Pinto de Brito (Brazil) (2015) has been working on the impact ofskepticisminChristianthought.

One should alsopay attention toMauricioBeuchot (Mexico) (1996, 2003)whodevoted two papers to skepticism in the Middle Age. His point is that skepticismattracted some attention even before Renaissance. According to him, many medievalauthors developed skeptical positions. Among them, Augustine’s Platonic Christianityappealed to Academic skepticism in its theory of illumination, in which Augustineemphasized the fallibility of human knowledge; Averroes’ theory of double truth,accordingtowhichtherearetwokindsoftruth(truthsforscienceandtruthsforfaith)similarly has a skeptical tone, and thosewho thought that God could perhaps fool uswereconsideringskepticalargument(Ockham,PedroLombardo,TomásdeAquinoandBuenaventura, among others). Beuchot also remembers that Nicolás d’Autrecourt, aFrenchmonk (1300-1350 aproximately), active in the University of Paris, anticipatedHumeanskepticismconcerningcausality.

9.SkepticismandliteraturePerhapsitshouldalsobementionedsomeotherstudiesonthehistoryofskepticism.Ontheonehand,therearesomeliterarystudies.MachadodeAssis,oneofthebestBrazilianwriters,hasbeen seenasa skepticbymanypeople.One reason is thatMachado readand used extensively Montaigne’s skepticism. José Raimundo de Maia Neto (1994)publishedabookonthetopic.ThenoveltyofhisbookisthatitwasthefirstdiscussiononMachado’s skepticism based on the history of skepticism. Paulo Roberto MarguttiPinto (2007) and Bernardo Gustavo Krause (2007a) discussed Maia Neto’sinterpretation,andMaiaNetorepliedtothem.KrauseisaBraziliannovelistaswellasaprofessor of literature who published many books and papers on skepticism andliterature(Krause2004),onMachado(Krause2006)andotherwriterssuchasthewell-knownBrazilianpoetCarlosDrummonddeAndrade(Krause2007b).Ontheotherhand,PauloRobertoMarguttiPintohasbeenstudyingthehistoryofBrazilianphilosophy, inwhichheseesanimportantroleforskepticismlongbeforePorchatbroughtittocenterstage. In Pinto (2010), he argues for the influence of Francisco Sanches on Braziliancolonialthought.OneofthereasonsforPorchat’ssuccessisthatitseemsthatBrazilian


thought has always had, at least in some places, a tendency towards skepticism.MachadodeAssiswouldnotbeanexception.

AcknowledgementsWeare grateful to FernandoBahr (Argentina), José TomásAlvarado (Chile),MauricioZuluaga(Colombia),JorgeOrnelas(Mexico),PabloQuintanilla(Peru),andCarlosCaorsi(Uruguay)fortheirfeedbackonthisentry.

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