sizing up · 2016. 5. 14. · scale fisheries, and coastal and inland fishing communities. some of...

SAMUDRA Dossier

Sizing UpProperty Rights and Fisheries Management:a collection of articles from SAMUDRA Report

International Collective in Support of Fishworkers27 College Road, Chennai 600 006, India

Sizing UpProperty Rights and Fisheries Management:a collection of articles from SAMUDRA Report

SAMUDRA Dossier

Published byInternational Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF)27 College Road, Chennai 600 006, IndiaTel: +91 44 2827 5303 Fax: +91 44 2825 4457 Email: [email protected]: http://www.icsf.net

March 2007

Edited byKG Kumar

Designed bySatish Babu

Printed atSri Venkatesa Printing HouseChennai 600 026, India

Copyright © ICSF 2007

ISBN 81-902957-6-4

While ICSF reserves all rights for this publication, any portion of it may be freely copied anddistributed, provided appropriate credit is given. Any commercial use of this material is prohibitedwithout prior permission. ICSF would appreciate receiving a copy of any publication that uses thispublication as a source.

The opinions and positions expressed in this publication are those of the authors concerned and donot necessarily represent the official views of ICSF.

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Contents

Preface .................................................................................. v

1. Feudalism at sea .................................................................... 1

2. Coastal resources for whom? ................................................ 5

3. Flipped on its head? ............................................................ 10

4. Up against trawling ............................................................. 12

5. Redistributing wealth .......................................................... 16

6. Maori power ....................................................................... 18

7. The twilight zone ................................................................ 23

8. Naturally ours ..................................................................... 26

9. Jammed in Jambudwip ........................................................ 30

10. Hijacked by neoliberal economics ....................................... 34

11. Towards artisanal fishing zones .......................................... 41

12. The Holy Grail .................................................................... 42

13. Frustrating private agreements ............................................ 49

14. The power of co-management ............................................. 51

15. Go for it .............................................................................. 53

16. Shifting gear? ...................................................................... 56

17. Important yet marginalized ................................................. 65

18. Empowering co-management .............................................. 70

19. A meaningful beginning ...................................................... 75

20. Who’s sharing the fish? ....................................................... 78

21. No one-size-fits-all approach .............................................. 82

22. Fishing rights vs human rights? .......................................... 83

23. Opening the tragedy? .......................................................... 87

24. The litmus test ..................................................................... 92

25. Fulfilled, healthy, secure? ................................................... 94

26. Private rights tragedy .......................................................... 97

iii

Preface

Are fishing rights good, bad, necessary? Ichiro Nomura, Assistant Director Generalof the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) asserts inSAMUDRA Report No 44, the triannual publication of the International Collective inSupport of Fishworkers (ICSF) (see pg. 82): “The FAO Secretariat has moved, beyonda doubt, on the matter of whether fishing rights are good or not. They are absolutelynecessary and fundamental to the sustainability of the world’s fisheries resources”.This begs questions such as: Are fishery resources better conserved under a rights-based regime? What are the pros and cons of fishing rights in different parts of theworld? What are the elements to look for in a fishing-rights regime, particularly inthe context of developing countries? Do small-scale fishing communities benefit fromdifferent forms of fishing rights?

This dossier, a compilation of articles from various issues of SAMUDRA Report since1996, seeks answers to these questions. It examines some of the approaches and typesof fishing rights in the geographic contexts of Africa, Asia, North America (Canada),Europe and Latin America. Ranging from topics like artisanal fishing zones in Indiaand Peru to individual transferable quota (ITQ) regimes in Iceland, New Zealand andCanada, most of these articles are written primarily from the perspective of small-scale fisheries, and coastal and inland fishing communities.

Some of the articles reflect the genuine apprehensions of small-scale fishingcommunities about ‘distributional inequities’, about exclusion and marginalizationfrom the introduction of property rights that valorize capital over labour andcommunity interests. Acquisitions of ITQs by corporations, argues Parzival Copes inhis article (see pg. 5), would “destroy the viability of many smaller communities thatdo not have the financial resources to compete for the purchase of quotas and licenses.”

Einar Eythorssson, in an article on Iceland (see pg. 1), while not denying that thereare economic benefits from ITQs, raises the question of “who is enjoying these benefits,at what cost to whom?” Considering incidents of ‘high grading’, ‘quota busting’,‘price dumping’ and ‘data fouling’ in countries that have adopted an ITQ-basedfisheries management system, some of the articles in this dossier question whetheror not a rights-based regime is the best bet for better conservation of fisheries resources.

There are also articles that show how some disadvantaged coastal communities have,in fact, benefited from the introduction of property rights in fishing. Matthew Hooper,in an article on ITQs in New Zealand (see pg. 18), for example, claims, drawing uponthe experience of the Maori peoples, “how a system based on well-defined propertyrights allows the rights of indigenous communities to be recognized and providedfor…”

There is broad agreement, on the one hand, about a rights-based approach to fishing,including the introduction of artisanal and trawl-free zones in coastal fishing, aquarianreforms in inland fishing, fishing rights in reservoir fishing, transferable quotas inlarge-scale fishing, reallocation of rights in commercial fishing, or assertion oftraditional rights in marine fishing. There is some support to adopting fishing-rightsregimes in consultation with fishing communities and in implementing these regimesin a participatory manner. In this context, the role of fishers’ movements has beenhighlighted.

On the other hand, from a perspective of labour, gender and human rights, there arefears about some forms of fishing-rights regimes being inequitable, and about thesocially insensitive manner in which some of these regimes are defined, adopted and

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practised. The underlying narrow economic worldview of these regimes has beencritically examined.

What emerges very clear from the debate is that the last word is yet to be spoken onfishing-rights regimes and their scope, especially in the small-scale fisheries of theworld.

At the end of the day, questions still remain, and more unresolved questions are onlyround the corner. How can fishing-rights regimes be an improvement overconventional fisheries management? How practical would it be to integrate theprinciple of irreversible ‘exclusion’, at tremendous social costs, into decisionsregarding who can fish? In small-scale fisheries, are property rights necessarily thebest way to determine how access amongst small-scale fishers will be allocated? Howcould they protect the autonomy of small-scale fishing communities and preventalienation of access to fisheries resources to large corporations? How could they notend up marginalizing fishworkers? How could they protect and improve upontraditional rights? It appears that greater adaptive space and flexibility of fishing-rights regimes would perhaps significantly help fishery stakeholders, particularly inthe developing world, adopt such regimes.

Or should we, as Menakhem Ben-Yami argues in his characteristically blunt style(see pg. 34), treat all ponderings over fishing rights as hyperbole and continue withconventional input-control measures in conjunction with small-scale fisheries thatemploy “less capital-intensive and technologically and operationally sophisticatedfishing methods”?

These are questions that will especially trouble policymakers and fishworkerorganizations from developing countries—and it is for them that this dossier isprimarily meant. Although most of the articles in it are drawn from the experience ofmarine fisheries in industrialized countries, they are relevant to developing countriesand will help them make “an informed judgement about the social costs and benefits”,as well as the “moral and legal foundation” of the debate. After all, the pressure ondeveloping countries to adopt fishing-rights regimes is based on the experience ofrich countries.

We hope this dossier helps readers understand the vicissitudes of some of the fishing-rights regimes in the world. It draws attention to the importance of designing suchregimes—if deemed necessary—to deliver conservation and management benefitsto small-scale fisheries by demonstrating sufficient sensitivity toward the economicand social needs of coastal and inland fishing communities.

Sebastian MathewProgramme Adviser, ICSF

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1Sizing Up: Property Rights and Fisheries Management

SAMUDRA Dossier

During the past decade, fish resourcemanagement by a system ofindividual transferable quotas or ITQs

has been strongly promoted as a solution tothe problems of ineffective management andeconomic inefficiency in the fisheries. TheITQ model is attractive to resource managersfor a number of reasons. First, it leaves thedifficult problem of distributing fishing quotasfairly and equitably among fishermen andfishing communities to the marketmechanism, making life easier for themanagers. Second, it leaves the problem ofgetting rid of excess fleet capacity to themarket and thus removes the strain of buy-back programmes and compensations fromgovernment budgets. Third, it promises amore efficient fisheries industry in the future,which, in turn, will create a flow of taxrevenues and even resource rentals into thegovernments’ coffers.

To fishermen, or owners of fishing vessels,to be more specific, the system may also lookquite attractive. Unsuccessful fishermen cansell their quotas to their more expansionistcolleagues, thus receiving a fair compensationfor leaving the industry. Those who want toexpand, or need additional quota to fullyutilize the capacity of their vessels, can buyit at a market price.

The aggregate result should be aneconomically sound fisheries industry, withimproved job security and solid foundationsfor community development. This is, in short,the story told by the promoters of the ITQ

system. The Republic of Iceland was oneof the first States to introduce ITQs as anoverall management system in its marinefisheries. Those who are considering ITQs

as a management option should, for thatreason, be interested in studying the Icelandiccase. Are there lessons to be learnt from theIcelandic experience?

From 1984 to 1990, fishing quotas for codand other demersal species were allocatedto fishing vessels according to catch recordsfor 1980-83. Quotas could not be divided orremoved permanently from vessels, exceptif a vessel was wrecked or sold abroad. Quotatransfers that meant a reduction of total quotaholdings within a municipality had to beauthorized by municipal councils and localtrade unions. Market transfers of quota shareswere relatively rare during this period. Quotaleasing, which means that a part of an annualquota held by one boat is caught by another,was allowed from the start, and developedslowly and without much controversy until1993.

By January 1991, the system was liberalized.Quota shares were allocated permanently,without any time limits. Quotas becamedivisible. They could be separated fromvessels and transferred freely, as independentcommodities, but only to other vessel owners.

While the 1990 fisheries law, in practice,allowed for a semi-privatization of the fishingrights in Icelandic waters, it also defined fishresources as public property. According tothe law, the fishing rights defined anddistributed under the law are not privateproperty rights.

Confusing statusThis somewhat confusing legal status of thequota shares evoked complicated debatesover the issues of taxation, depreciation and

Feudalism at seaEinar Eythorsson

Iceland’s experience with individual transferable quotas is aneye-opener to the problems and prospects of fisheries management by quotas

This article is byEinar Eythorsson, anIcelandic socialscientist, then withFinnmark College,Abo, Norway. Thisarticle first appearedin SAMUDRA ReportNo. 22, April 1999

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2 Sizing Up: Property Rights and Fisheries Management

SAMUDRA Dossier

the use of quota shares as collateral. How isit possible for a private person to buy or sellsomething which is public property? Wouldsuch a thing be liable to taxation? Shouldbanks accept public property as collateral forprivate loans?

Initially, investment in quota shares wasconsidered as expenditure, and quota holdingswere not treated as capital, which meant thatthey could not be used as bank collateral. In1993, the Icelandic Supreme Court, however,found that quota holdings should be treatedas private capital, and that they could bedepreciated by the same rate as forcopyrights—20 per cent annually. At first, thecollateral problem was solved by mutualagreements between banks and indebted boatowners to ensure that quota shares andvessels could not be separated withoutconsulting the bank. In the long run, thissituation became very unpractical (fishingvessels representing minor market valuewithout quota shares) and quota shares wereeventually allowed as collateral.

The generous depreciation rate for quotashares is also being removed, as it has led toa reduction in tax payments from the fishingindustry. The official status of quota sharesas public property, while they are treated asprivate property for all practical purposes, cannot be upheld in the long run. This wasillustrated by a Supreme Court decision inDecember 1998, which is detailed later on inthis article.

As the ITQ system, in theory at least, shouldstrengthen the foundations of the fishingindustry, it should mean more secure andeven better paid jobs at sea. On the basis ofsuch future prospects, the Icelandic Unionof Deckhands (SS) was basically positive tothe introduction of ITQs. The Union ofSkippers and Mates (FFS) was moresceptical, and soon became explicitlynegative. Since the liberalization of the ITQ

system in 1991, there has been a series ofbitter conflicts between vessel owners andcrewmen, resulting in repeated strikes andlockouts in the industry. The reason is found

mainly in the changing dynamics in thefisheries industry under ITQs, especially theimplications of a growing leasing market forannual quotas.

The term ‘quota leasing’ covers differenttypes of transactions to transfer rights to catcha certain amount of a certain fish species inthe current year from one vessel to another.One form of transaction is an equal exchangeof species—the rights to catch one speciesare paid for by the rights to catch another,based on an exchange rate between differentspecies. A second form is leasing quotadirectly, which means that the right to catcha certain amount of fish is paid for in money,at a market price derived from supply anddemand.

A third variety, which became increasinglycommon during 1992-93, is contract fishing,or what is often referred to among fishermenas ‘fishing for others’. Fishing contracts are,in many cases, signed between vesselowners with small quota holdings andvertically integrated fishing/processingcompanies with large quota holdings. Thevessels are then obliged to deliver theircatches to the company. They receive a fixedprice for the catch.

In 1993, this price was about half the marketprice in the case of cod fishing, the remaining50 per cent being indirect payment for theleasing of quota from the company. Theincome of crew members is a fixedpercentage of the price received for thecatch, as defined by the share system. Thepractice of contract fishing outlined abovemeans that the income of a crew on a vesselfishing under such a contract is bound to besubstantially lower than the income of a similarcrew on a similar vessel with sufficient quotaholdings belonging to the vessel.

As contract fishing became morewidespread, more crewmen experienced adrop in their income. According to theirunions, there were several incidents of leasingcontracts being arranged for the sole purposeof reducing the labour costs in the fisheries,

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SAMUDRA Dossier

a practice often referred to as ‘quota-profiteering’ (kvotabrask).

Feudal systemThe system of contract fishing is oftenreferred to as a feudal system of ‘sea lords’and ‘tenants’. Under the ITQ system, quotaholdings are being concentrated in fewer andbigger companies, while there is a substantialfleet of fishing vessels with insufficient quotaholdings for a year-round operation. In somecases, vessels have been stripped of theirquota, and sold cheaply to fishermen whointend to make a living by leased quotas.These boats, the so-called ‘eunuchs’,contribute to the high demand for leasedquota and a high leasing price. In thissituation, vertically integrated processorcompanies can, in fact, ask for bids from idlevessels, in order to have ‘their fish’ broughthome at the lowest possible cost.

This, in short, was the background of thefishermen’s strike in January 1994 andrepeated strikes in the following years. Theunions wanted to abolish the system of quotaleasing, or even remove the entire ITQ

system. The result has been a partial returnto a system of negotiated minimum prices,and a special committee to resolve conflictsregarding prices and shares. There is agrowing opinion that the share system shouldbe reformed or even abolished to avoid theeffects of ITQs upon the income ofcrewmen. The fact that the holders of quotashares also hold the strongest negotiatingpower in the industry has now been realizedby the unions—despite the strikes, they havenot achieved any fundamental change of theITQ system.

After eight years of experience with the ITQ

system, the controversies within the industryand in Icelandic politics are as strong as ever.Repeated polls among the Icelandicpopulation show that most of the public isopposed to the system. It is, however,uncertain how, or if, the implementation ofITQs can be reversed without a massiveeconomic loss. Quota shares are consideredas private property for all practical purposes,

and they represent a major capital value,relative to the national economy of Iceland.Companies with big quota holdings havestrengthened their position, and quite a fewof them have made investments in fisheriesenterprises abroad. It is thus hard to imaginehow the quota-capital could be returned tothe public. In any case, the present ownersof quota shares would claim full economiccompensation from the government if theirquota assets were to be confiscated.

However, it seems that we have not yet seenthe end of the ITQ story in Iceland. InDecember 1998 the Icelandic Supreme Courtreached a verdict in a case raised by afisherman who had been denied a fishinglicence and a catch quota. The denial wasbased on the fact that the fisherman inquestion had not been an owner of an activefishing vessel in the early 1980s, the period inwhich ‘fishing experience’ was converted intofishing rights.

Equal rightsConsidering the Icelandic constitution, whichclaims equal employment rights for everycitizen and the Fisheries Law of 1990, whichdefines the fish resources as public property,the Supreme Court found the denial unlawfuland unconstitutional. In short, the Court foundthat by implementing the ITQ system, thegovernment had given away exclusive rightsto the publicly owned Icelandic fish resourcesto a group of people who happened to be theowners of active fishing vessels at a certainpoint of time. Such an act could not be justifiedby the need to preserve the resources or bythe best public interest.

So far, the Icelandic government hasresponded by making a minor change in thefisheries legislation. Any owner of a fishingvessel is now free to apply for a licence, whichprovides the opportunity to catch some quiterare fish species that are not managed underthe ITQ system. However, catch quota forany of the major commercial species muststill be bought or leased from the presentowners. Provided that there are limitedemployment alternatives for fishermen, this

...by implementingthe ITQ system,the governmenthad given awayexclusive rights tothe publicly ownedIcelandic fishresources to agroup of peoplewho happened tobe the owners ofactive fishingvessels at a certainpoint of time

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SAMUDRA Dossier

change will probably only increase thedemand for annual quota on leasing contracts,as more vessels with little or no quota canenter the market. This, in turn, may cause afurther increase in leasing prices and,consequently, a downwards pressure uponthe income of crewmen. Meanwhile, thecapital value of quota shares will climb furtherupwards.

I have chosen to dwell upon some of theproblematic issues involved in fisheriesmanagement by ITQs. I will not argue thatthere are no economic benefits from ITQs. Iwill rather ask who is enjoying these benefits,and at what cost to whom. Judging from theIcelandic experience, there seems to be littledoubt that ITQ systems have majorimplications for the distribution of income,wealth and power. By learning from theexperience of Iceland and other States thathave implemented ITQs, it should be possibleto make an informed judgement about thesocial costs and benefits of the system, aswell as its moral and legal foundation.

Judging from theIcelandicexperience, thereseems to be littledoubt that ITQsystems havemajor implicationsfor the distributionof income, wealthand power

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Since the beginning of civilization,fisherfolk of coastal communities havelaid claim to adjacent coastal

resources. Their perceived rights to local fishstocks derive from the sustained use theyhave made of them. The importance of theserights has been intensified by the evolvedeconomic dependence of coastal people ontheir fishery resources. However, it isbecoming increasingly clear that coastalcommunities will be able to maintain theirprerogatives of priority access to adjacentfish resources only by a vigorous collectivedefence of these resources as their commonproperty.

Typically, most inshore fish resources havelent themselves well to harvesting by locallybased small-scale fishermen. Their traditionalrights to adjacent fish stocks are nowthreatened by two significant developments.One is the growth in power and ambition ofindustrial corporations in the fisheries sector.Such corporations have naturally dominatedoffshore and distant-water fishing operations,because of their ready ability to access thelarge-scale technology and financing neededfor such operations. Now, in their drive forgreater market share and enhanced securityof raw material supplies, they are alsoseeking to increase their direct access toresource-rich coastal fisheries.

The second threatening development is thecurrent drive for formalization of accessrights to fish resources in a mannercompatible with contemporary Westernnotions of corporate and individual privateproperty. This is increasingly taking the formof attempts to ‘privatize’ the fisheries by

commercializing ownership rights throughtransferable shares in the fish harvest. Suchrights are referred to as ‘individualtransferable quotas’ (ITQs). An underlyingobjective of most promoters of ITQs is toensure the dominance of market forces inarranging access to the fisheries, by allowingunfettered transferability and accumulation ofquotas at unrestrained market prices. Thishas the effect of monetizing access rights athigh capital values, thereby favouringcorporations and wealthy investors. Usingtheir financial power, they are able to bid upthe price of quotas and buy up access rightsto large shares of the harvest, either byoutright quota ownership or by control throughtied loans to individual operators.

The complexity and high cost of managingITQ systems have made their application inthe coastal fisheries of most developingcountries impractical at this time. Here thecorporate fisheries sector is more likely toimpact the small-boat inshore fisheriesthrough the incursions of larger companyvessels into inshore waters or through theirdepletion of stocks that migrate between theinshore and the offshore.

The usual procedure in introducing an ITQ

regime is to give a free allocation of perpetualquotas to the owners of currently operatingfishing vessels, with the proviso that they (andfuture owners) have the right to sell these atany price obtainable in the market. The valueof a set of quota holdings, even of a small-boat operator, in many fisheries may now runto tens of thousands of US dollars and, in somefisheries, may amount to well in excess of amillion dollars.

Coastal resources for whom?Parzival Copes

As powerful forces seek to industrialize and privatize the world’s fishresources, it is time to counter the moves to dispossess coastal fisherfolk

This article is asummary of anextended paper byParzival Copes,which formed thekeynote address atthe founding meetingof the World Forumof Fish Harvestersand Fishworkers inNew Delhi, on 18November 1997.This article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 23, September1999

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Such prices constitute a strong incentive forestablished fishermen to sell out if they arein an ITQ fishery, particularly if they are closeto retirement. If they are in a fishery withouttransferable rights, they may be persuadedto have their fishery converted to an ITQ

system, so that they may also make a windfallgain when they retire.

ITQ systems are very difficult to dismantle,both for fiscal and political reasons. Oncethe rights have been traded, the new ownerswould claim full compensation for the rightsthey had bought if the government decidedthat the ITQ or transferable licence regimewas not working well and should beabandoned. The fiscal burden might beinsupportably high and the politicalembarrassment would be great. Transferablerights programmes are, therefore, almostirreversible.

With ITQ systems, it is difficult for crewmembers on small boats to become, in time,vessel owner-operators, as has been part ofthe life-cycle pattern in so many fishingcommunities. The inequitable give-away oftransferable rights to particular individualswho happen to be boatowners at the righttime will tend to confine access to the fisheryto a more select group and their heirs, andthereby create or sharpen class divisions infishing communities. A further importantsocial and economic concern is that of thegeographical concentration of fishery accessprivileges. This may be achieved through theacquisition or control of ITQs by corporations,which then locate the fishing vessels theyown or control at their base of operations inparticular larger centres. This is liable, in time,to destroy the viability of many smallercommunities that do not have the financialresources to compete for the purchase ofquotas and licences, but that would haveremained economically viable if they hadcontinued to have access to their accustomedresource base. This represents a loss ofsocial capital invested in infrastructure andof private capital invested by the inhabitants,who may also find their lives disrupted andtheir circumstances much reduced.

It is important to recognize clearly the intrinsicnature of a government’s move to install anITQ regime, starting with a free gift ofmarketable access rights to selectedindividuals. It is basically the expropriationwithout compensation of a community’sresource base. This may end up withalienation of the resource from thecommunity, and its actual or prospectivetransfer into the hands of outside corporateor entrepreneurial interests, which maydecide to exploit the resource from a distantbase. The direct financial value of thisconfiscation may be measured by thecapitalized value of the quota holdingsrepresenting the alienated resource.

Privatization of rightsIn summary, what does the move to‘privatization’ of fishing rights in the form ofITQs and transferable licences really meanfor coastal communities that have beenhistorically dependent on their local fisherybase?

It may mean the ‘enclosure’ of their fisherycommons by the authority of a distantgovernment; the confiscation of a fisheryresource to which they have had a long-established traditional right; the rupture of acommunity’s social fabric and the sharpeningof class and wealth distinctions, with theassignment of windfall gains to some and theloss of access to a master-fisherman’s careerfor others; the prospect of alienation of a vitalcommunity resource base to wealthier outsideinterests; and, finally, the possible decline andeventual abandonment of the communityitself.

ITQs are frequently promoted as a device to‘privatize’ the fishery. It is asserted that theywould abolish the common-property natureof fish stocks, and bring about privateownership of the fishery, with the efficiencyadvantages that attach to such ownership.This vision is wrong. The notion that ITQswill remove the common-property nature offish stocks and make the fishery ‘just like’other industries is utterly unrealistic. It needsto be realized that fish in the ocean are

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SAMUDRA Dossier

fugitive and can not be segregated, identifiedand assigned to different owners. Theecology that nurtures them is the seamlessmulti-use ocean environment that is commonfor fishing, recreation, transportation andmany other purposes. Fish stocks and theocean environment that produces them, bytheir very nature, are common-use andcommon-property resources. They can notbe divided into self-contained and separatelymanaged units to which comprehensivelyspecified private property rights may beattached.

For privatization of the fishery to besubstantially complete and to meet the testof economic efficiency, it would be requiredto give every fishing enterprise exclusiveproperty rights to, and exclusive control over,a particular identified set of fish, along witha particular ecology that produces those fish,in the same way that a farmer owns andcontrols specific animals and all theproductive facilities of the farm necessaryto raise and bring those animals to market. Itis patently impossible to operate in such afashion in the marine fisheries, because ofthe physically determined common-usenature of the resource.

ITQs do not give property rights to the fishstocks, but only privileged access rights to apool of fish that quota holders continue toexploit in common. It has been demonstratedthat ITQs will often help to rationalize fishingcapacity. On the other hand, as shown above,they will also frequently result in distributionalinequities. Of further concern is the fact that,in many cases, they are demonstrated to bedamaging to fisheries conservation.

In ITQ fisheries, the total allowable catch(TAC) needs to be set firmly at the beginningof a season or fishing period, as participantsneed to know in advance what their quota(share of the TAC) is. The credibility of thesystem depends on honouring the set quotas,but sound management requires constantmonitoring of stocks, with in-season changesin TACs and fishery closures, according toobserved stock conditions. The inflexible

TACs of ITQ systems lead to harmfuloverfishing if they are set too high, or wastefulunderfishing if they are set too low.

ITQ systems are notorious for cheating(‘quota busting’), with participants taking, butfailing to report, catches in excess of quota.Enforcement of quotas is difficult, expensiveand, in many fisheries, impossible to achieve.Where enforcement of quotas is reasonablysuccessful, a different problem arises, thatof `high-grading’. In order to maximizeincome from their (quantitative) quotas,fishers are induced to throw away fish thathave a lower value per pound, which oftenmeans a significant part of their otherwisesaleable catch will be discarded and go towaste. Even worse is the practice of ‘price-dumping’ in some ITQ fisheries, where theentire catch of a trip is discarded if, on theway back to port, it is found that the day’smarket price is low.

Forbidden practicesAll three of the foregoing practices are usuallyforbidden in ITQ fisheries, and so perpetratorsdo not report their transgressions. This leadsto ‘data fouling’, with catch mortality beingunder-reported and managers not knowing thefull impact of fishing on stocks. The result isinferior stock estimation and greater hazardsin setting unreliable quotas at the beginningof the fishing season.

Adding to the problems are mixed-stockfisheries, where it is impossible for vesseloperators to catch different species in thesame proportions as the quotas given for thosespecies. This also may result in discarding tomatch catches with quotas, or to quota bustingto hide overages.

There is ample evidence to indicate that ITQ

systems often can not be reconciled withsound fisheries management and are basicallyincompatible with the precautionary approachthat is now the international standard forresponsible fisheries management. Whilesmall-scale fishing communities may feelparticularly threatened by the damaging socialimpacts of ITQs, they may find that some of

ITQs do not giveproperty rights tothe fish stocks, butonly privilegedaccess rights to apool of fish thatquota holderscontinue to exploitin common

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SAMUDRA Dossier

their most effective arguments refer to theadverse conservation impacts of ITQs. Thisalso provides a strong basis for alliance withsocially sensitive environmental groups.

In the industrialized countries, small-scale,owner-operated vessels fishing in coastalwaters have some important naturaladvantages over the corporate fisheriessector. Smaller vessels are generallyeffective in targeting inshore stocks, andeconomical in operation close to their localbase. With short times at sea and a goodholding facility, they can deliver a high-quality,fresh product. The owner-operator of a smallboat is greatly motivated to run his vesselefficiently and maintain it carefully.

Provided the small-scale fishery isrationalized to yield attractive revenues perboat and to operate subsidy-free, it is in aposition to impress sensitive governmentswith the social advantages of its relativelyhigh labour intensity, its favourable lifestyle,and its economic and social underpinning ofsmaller coastal communities.

The populations of many fishing communitieshave grown, while advancing technology hasreduced employment opportunities in thefishery, even if partially offset by the greaterrange of fisheries now pursued. To remaineconomically healthy, the small-boat sectormust accept the need to keep fishing capacityin balance with available harvests. This willprobably require occasional reductions in fleetsize by buy-back, in order to offset likelyadvances in fleet productivity.

Developing countriesThe plight of small-scale fishing communitiesin developing countries is often a dauntingone. Where population densities are high,open access to the fishery has frequentlyattracted large numbers of impoverished,landless workers.

Fishing communities have often become theabode of ‘the poorest of the poor’. Intensepopulation pressure, in combination with a

lack of government capacity to manage thefisheries and a lack of effective local authorityto impose a conservationist discipline, easilyleads to overfishing.

In several countries, the desperate need forimmediate daily income has caused fishersto engage in ‘Malthusian overfishing’,employing destructive techniques usingdynamite, poison and ultra-small-mesh nets.

In developing countries, the immediate threatto small-scale fisheries often comes from theencroachment on inshore fish stocks byindustrial fishing operations. These have oftenbeen encouraged by governments anxious topromote industrialization and to developexport industries for high-value species, suchas shrimp.

In addition, industrial fisheries andaquaculture operations have been allowed toencroach upon the grounds of small-scalefishers. Lack of fishery managementrestrictions on these operations often leadsto depletion of wild stocks and diseaseoutbreaks in aquaculture.

On the other hand, in some countries,governments have recognized the needs ofvulnerable coastal communities, and havemoved to protect coastal fisheries byprohibiting larger vessels from fishing nearto shore, though enforcement has frequentlybeen ineffective.

The immediate priority of threatened small-scale coastal fishing populations in developingcountries has to be the vigorous assertion anddefence of traditional rights to adjacentresources, culminating in legal recognition ofthose rights. No less important, however, isthe long-term need to achieve a reform ofcoastal fisheries that will help to banishdamaging fishing practices and produce largersustainable yields. Experience suggests thatcommunity-based co-managementapproaches may have the best prospects forsuccess. A full solution to the coastal fisheriesproblem in developing countries will require

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SAMUDRA Dossier

the provision of job opportunities outside thefishery to draw off surplus labour from thefishery.

Political fashionSmall-scale fishing communities in developedcountries have become the victims of thecurrent political fashion for ‘privatization’. Itis being applied to the fishing industryincorrectly, in the mistaken belief that thecommon-use and common-propertycharacteristics of marine resources can besuppressed.

The device of the ITQ is being used to thisend, on the erroneous assumption thatfugitive marine resources can be divided,packaged and assigned to private owners ineffectively the same fashion as immobile andcaptive terrestrial resources.

In some places, much damage has alreadybeen done in alienating fishery resourcesfrom small-scale fish harvesters and indiverting fish catches from smaller, fishery-dependent communities to larger, industrialcentres. Meanwhile, in developing countries,small-scale fish harvesters in many placesare losing resources to encroaching industrialfishing and aquaculture operations. Thealready precarious livelihood of largenumbers of fishery-dependent workers andtheir families is at stake.

Behind the current campaign for‘privatization’ of fisheries lies the reality ofan assault on the traditional common-property resource rights of vulnerablefishery-dependent populations. Given theclearly adverse impacts of privatizationdevices such as ITQs, both on social equityand on resource conservation, a strong basisexists for joint action in defence of common-property marine fish resources by groupsrepresenting small-scale fish harvesters andenvironmentalists, both in developing and inindustrialized countries. Considering theextensive and near-irreversible damage thatis being inflicted by so-called fisheriesprivatization, there is no time to lose inmounting the defence.

The immediatepriority ofthreatened small-scale coastalfishing populationsin developingcountries has to bethe vigorousassertion anddefence oftraditional rightsto adjacentresources,culminating inlegal recognitionof those rights

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The native peoples of Canadarepresent approximately five per centof the country’s population. They live

along the three ocean coasts of the countryas well as inland, and have been on thecontinent for thousands of years. During the17th and 18th centuries, the then Britishcolonial power entered into various treatieswith them, sometimes for purposes of peaceand friendship, and sometimes to guaranteeterritory and trade.

One such treaty was agreed to in 1760between the British Governor Lawrence andthe M’ikmaq peoples who fished and huntedin the regions of eastern Canada borderingthe Atlantic. The treaty itself generally fellinto disuse but was used in defence of aM’ikmaq fisherman, Donald Marshall Jr.,who was charged with fishing in a closedarea, using unregulated gear.

The case found its way through Canada’sjudicial system right up to the Supreme Court.On 17 September 1999, Supreme Courtacquitted Marshall on the basis that the treatygave him a right to fish and trade such fishin order to earn a moderate livelihood forhimself and his family. The court decisionmade it explicit that the treaty right could beregulated and subject to catch limits thatprovided for a moderate livelihood. However,some M’ikmaq people believed they now hada recognized right to fish when and wherethey so chose, and began placing lobster trapsinto areas where the lobster season wasclosed.

As the M’ikmaq built up their fishingpresence in closed lobster areas, commercialfishermen who rely on the same lobster area

for their livelihood grew increasingly angryas the Government Department of Fisheriesmade no attempts to restrain the out-of-season fishing.

The situation exploded on 3 October whenfishermen in the Miramichi Bay off the coastof New Brunswick sent out 100 boats thatproceeded to haul up native lobster traps,removed the meshing, returned the lobstersto the water and sank the disabled traps.

Native persons responded by taking over thegovernment wharf at Burnt Church on theMiramichi, burning two fishermen’s trucksand bringing in what they refer to as their‘warrior society’. Native and non-nativepeople were driven into direct and violentconflict with one another, and similar situationsthreatened to break out in other coastal areas.

The Marshall Case was now preoccupyingthe media and the political leaders of thecountry. The decision of the Supreme Courtjudges was questioned widely, and two of theseven judges also dissented. The Premier ofNewfoundland, Brian Tobin, blasted thejudges for not understanding the nature ofthe fishery and for not providing a period oftime for the implications of the decision to beproperly managed and implemented. Theentire commercial fishing sector in EasternCanada was protesting, calling for amoratorium and political intervention. Theyfelt the fishery as they knew it was beingundermined.

Restrictive regimeThe reader not familiar with Canada mustremember that there are 50,000 fishermenin Atlantic Canada fishing under a very

Flipped on its head?Michael Belliveau

A Canadian Supreme Court ruling on the traditional fishingrights of the M’ikmaq threatens relations with commercial fishermen

This article is by thelate MichaelBelliveau, anerstwhile Member ofICSF and formerlyExecutive Secretary,MFU. This articlefirst appeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 24, December1999

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SAMUDRA Dossier

restrictive fisheries management regime. Thelobster fishery is particularly sensitivebecause the species is widely dispersed ininshore waters along a very large coastline.It is a fishery broken down by zones (lobsteris a sedentary species seldom moving beyond25 km of its habitat), and each of 44 zoneshas a specified season that is rigidly enforced.

Licences are limited, and their total numberfrozen. This limited entry has led, over time,to licences acquiring a value and beingconsidered as quasi-property. If you hadinvested $100,000 in a lobster licence, youmight get a little anxious if you saw a fewnative fishermen fishing out of season,apparently authorized by the Supreme Courtto do so, and catching with each trap tentimes as many lobsters as the commercialfishermen catch in season.

The M’ikmaq people, for their part, havehistorically been marginalized into a reservesystem (although they also have full rightsas Canadian citizens), where rates ofunemployment are astronomical, levels ofeducation low, and standards of living belowthe poverty line. They believe their fishingrights have been denied them under themodern fisheries management regime.

In total numbers, the M’ikmaq pose noserious threat to commercial fishermen,except in localized areas where there aresignificant numbers of natives adjacent to thelobster grounds that are fully subscribed to.

However, if their treaty right is a ‘blankcheque’ to fish whenever, wherever andhowever, then the commercial fishery, as weknow it, has been flipped on its head. Butthe Supreme Court has made it clear that itis not a ‘blank cheque’, but a limited right toa moderate livelihood and, indeed, it is a‘communal’ right and not an individual rightas such.

The obligation is on the M’ikmaq as a peopleto exercise the right in accordance withregulations. The Government of Canada hasappointed a Chief Negotiator who has until

15 April 2000 to arrive at interim fishing plansthat accommodate the new treaty rights. Untilsuch fishing plans are tied down, inshorefishermen remain extremely anxious, and thesocial climate in fishing areas where nativesand non-natives live in the same broadercommunities remains tense.

The Maritime Fishermen’s Union (MFU) hasbeen at the centre of the controversy sinceour inshore fishermen are based in all of theareas where there are significant numbersof coastal M’ikmaq.

The MFU recognizes the Supreme Courtdecision has been a breakthrough for theM’ikmaq. We believe their new rights canbe accommodated within the presentfisheries management system. Theaccommodation can be done by means of avoluntary licence retirement programme.

We believe strongly that the accommodationshould not be on the backs of fishermen butshould be shouldered by the society as a wholethrough their government.

As we write, it seems the Federal Cabinetwill recognize this principle and allocate theappropriate monies to make the adjustments.In the meantime, we want to find ways ofmaking the peace between commercialfishermen and First-Nation peoples.

Licences arelimited, and theirtotal numberfrozen. This limitedentry has led, overtime, to licencesacquiring a valueand beingconsidered asquasi-property

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SAMUDRA Dossier

After the New Order government ofSuharto came into power in 1966, anew phase in Indonesia’s

development was initiated. This wasarticulated in the Trilogy Pembangunan (theThree Basic Principles of Development) thataimed to achieve a certain level ofdevelopment. At the same time, the NewOrder also took some steps to maintainnational stability, based on the assumption thatdevelopment targets could only be achievedif national stability was guaranteed.

One of the strategies adopted for this was tomaintain the community’s focus ondevelopment efforts. Another was to keepthe community away from political activities,including the activities of political parties. Atthe same time, political parties were notallowed to make contact with communities,especially in rural areas.

The New Order also established people’sorganizations, such as HimpunanKerukunan Tani Indonesia (HKTI)/Indonesian Farmer BrotherhoodOrganization) and Himpunan NelayanSeluruh Indonesia (HNSI)/IndonesiaFishermen’s Organization). These wereactually linked to the ruling political party.Fishworkers were allowed to join only HNSI

and farmers, only HKTI. Members of theseorganizations were obliged to vote for theruling party.

Any attempt to establish a new independentorganization would be branded as acommunist initiative by the government. Inpractice, this system blocked the aspirationsof local people and made it difficult for themto engage in any political activity, except

during the public elections, once every fiveyears.

To accelerate the country’s development, thegovernment emphasized the modernization ofevery sector. In fisheries, the emphasis wason substituting traditional fishing equipmentwith modern craft and gear, in order toimprove the income of fishers.

As part of this drive, traditional fishers wereencouraged to replace traditional gear withtrawls, known in Indonesia as pukatharimau. Credit incentives were provided forthis. Trawls were seen as having severaladvantages, particularly greater efficiency,which made possible higher levels of fishproduction with minimal human resources.Due to these various benefits, the trawl soonbecame the gear of choice in themodernization drive.

However, this policy did not take into accountthe fact that traditional fishermen lacked theknowledge and training needed to operatetrawls. Moreover, they could not afford topurchase the highly priced trawls, despitecredit incentives. As a result, the policyactually benefited the professionals within thesector, and did little to improve the situationof traditional fishermen. More often than not,trawls were owned by investors, who usedskilled labour to operate the gear.

For the traditional sector, several negativeimpacts resulted. With the use of trawls, largecatches became possible. But their use alsodestroyed the coastal environment andimportant spawning and breeding grounds.Most of the trawlers operated in the samecoastal waters used by traditional fishermen,

Up against trawlingTries Zamansyah

The traditional fishermen of North Sumatra haveunited to battle the threats posed by trawling

This piece is by TriesZamansyah,Secretary General ofthe Sarekat NelayanSumatera Utara(SNSU), NorthSumatra, Indonesia.This article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 25, April 2000

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SAMUDRA Dossier

their ‘customary sea’, and competed directlywith them.

Public propertyThis affected both the catches and the incomeof the traditional fishermen. Significantly, theconcept of the ‘customary sea’ vanishedwhen the Government of Indonesia declaredthe sea as ‘public property’, as stated inMinistry of Agriculture Decree No.607/KPTS/

UM/9/1976.

Forced to respond to the protests of traditionalfishers, the Government implemented a trawlban in 1980, through Presidential DecreeNo.39/1980. The use of trawls was bannedin all Indonesian territory, except in Irian Jayaand Maluku, by Presidential Decree No.12/1982).

This ban was also supported by a Decree ofthe Indonesian Supreme Court (No. 8/1988).Despite this, in practice, the ban has not beenoperational. Vessels using trawls continue tooperate in Indonesian territory, especially inthe North Sumatra region. This situation hasforced the traditional fishers of NorthSumatra to undertake various actions.

It is also significant that, until now, the HNSI

has failed to solve the problems resulting fromcontinued trawling activities and has not beenable to work towards the implementation ofthe ban. On the contrary, there is a tendencyfor the HNSI to favour the trawler ownersand to even protect and provide cover to theiroperations.

There are several reasons that make itdifficult to implement the trawl ban. The banon trawling, under the Presidential DecreeNo. 39/1980, was not supported by effectivemonitoring and enforcement at the regionallevel.

Other government policies have supportedthe continuation of trawling activities. Forinstance, a fisheries regulation of 4 July 1996supports the purchase of foreign boats byinvestors. This, in effect, means theprocurement of trawlers. This has occurredin Belawan, where there are at present 144

modern fishing boats using trawl-like gear,named otherwise to get past the law.

There is no policy that specifically protectstraditional fishers, their gear and theircustomary area of operation, from theoperation of modern fishing gear such astrawls. Although there is a Fishery Law thatacknowledges the rights of these traditionalfishers to their customary sea, this regulationis not operational.

The Regional Government Offices that issuepermits to fish often do not take into accounttheir impacts on the traditional sector or, forthat matter, on the coastal environment. Infact, they tend to favour the interests of theinvestors.

The institutions that are meant to implementthe trawl ban, such as the marine force, thepolice and the fisheries department, oftenhave overlapping responsibilities. Collusiontends to occur between trawl owners andgovernment officials. For example, trawls thathave been confiscated by traditional fishersand handed over to the authorities, arereleased the very next day.

This situation has angered traditionalfishermen. And, not surprisingly, they havetaken several actions, such as burning oftrawlers. They feel that they cannot dependon the official system to take care of theirinterests.

The resentment of traditional fishermentowards trawler owners is further aggravatedby the fact that they have established a three-tier marketing network of intermediarymiddlemen that controls fish prices. The priceat which the consumer finally purchases thefish is very high. Since traditional fishermencan only sell their fish to the first middleman,they get a very low price.

They have no other option but to go alongwith this system; if not, they run the risk ofnot being able to sell their catch at all. Anyeffort to establish an alternative marketingstructure is soon destroyed by the marketingnetwork controlled by owners and investors.

There is no policythat specificallyprotectstraditional fishers,their gear andtheir customaryarea of operation,from the operationof modern fishinggear such astrawls

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The Fish Auction House that was supposedto have functioned as the place for fishermento auction their catches has become part ofthe owner-controlled marketing system. Thesituation is similar in fishermen’s co-operatives.

Several meetings were held by fishworkersbetween 1993 and 1998 to discuss thissituation. Fishermen and a number of publicfigures in North Sumatra participated in thesemeetings. It became evident that to deal withthese problems, traditional fishermen in NorthSumatra must establish an independentorganization managed by the fishersthemselves.

Independent organizationFinally, on 14 July 1998, in Medan, anindependent fishermen’s organization wasformed, called the Sarekat NelayanSumatera Utara (SNSU) or North SumatranFishers’ Union.

About 900 traditional fishermen from threeregions in North Sumatra (Langkat, Asahanand Deli Serdang) participated in this event.SNSU aims primarily to draw the attention ofthe government to the long-neglectedproblems of traditional fishermen—forinstance, the problems caused by trawlingand other similar operations, and their impactson traditional fishermen and on the coastalenvironment.

The SNSU declaration was presented to theGovernor of North Sumatra and to the Headof the Provincial Fishery Department inNorth Sumatra. This led to a dialoguebetween fishermen and the Governor. TheGovernor promised that the problem oftrawling would be resolved within a year.

But this promise was never fulfilled. In fact,the number of trawlers operating in the areahas increased, even as conflicts between thetrawlers and traditional boats have risen.

Along the Sialang Buah coast, in the districtof Mengkudu in the Deli Serdang region alone,51 fishermen were injured between 1993 and

1998. Of these, 31 fishermen lost their livesas a result of injuries from clashes betweenthe traditional boats and trawlers at sea.There have been several other such incidentsin regions such as Langkat, Asahan andBelawan. However, there are no officialrecords of these incidents.

As an organization founded by fishermen,SNSU actively promotes the interests oftraditional fishermen by putting pressure onthe Provincial Governor of North Sumatra,the President of Indonesia, and agencies suchas the Office of the Attorney General, theDistrict Military Office of Bukit Barisan,Lantamal I Belawan, Provincial FisheryDepartment in North Sumatra, and DistrictOfficers (Muspika) in coastal areas, etc.

A number of activities have been undertakento draw attention to the problems oftraditional fishermen, such as delegations,demonstrations, presentations, and even thedirect arrests of trawlers.

The SNSU aims to create unity among fishersin North Sumatra and to support them in theirstruggle for social, cultural, economic andlegal justice, as citizens of Indonesia. Morespecifically, it aims to:

develop economic activities for allmembers through the formation offishermen’s co-operatives;

improve the social welfare of all members;

train members through educationalactivities;

defend the interests of members throughadvocacy; and

establish fishermen’s groups in everydistrict along the coast of North Sumatra.

In order to achieve these objectives, SNSU

has developed various programmes. Thesecan be broadly classified as Advocacy,Community Economic Development, HumanResource Development, and Networking.

The SNSU aims tocreate unity amongfishers in NorthSumatra and tosupport them intheir struggle forsocial, cultural,economic and legaljustice, as citizensof Indonesia

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The present era of reform in Indonesia, wherefreedom to organize and express one’s viewsis part of the democratization process, hasprovided a good opportunity for traditionalfishermen to articulate their concerns. It ishoped that the establishment of the OceanExploration and Fishery Department willpromote the welfare of traditional fishermenin Indonesia and particularly in NorthSumatra. Hopefully, the mistakes of the past,when the traditional fishery sector wasignored, will not be repeated.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Redistributing wealthFrancis Christy

The use of individual transferable quotas as a resourcemanagement measure must not be summarily dismissed

Parzival Copes’ arguments against theuse of individual transferable quotas(ITQs) for the management of fisheries

(“Coastal resources for whom?”, SAMUDRA

Report No. 23, September 1999) are notparticularly helpful to those responsible formaking decisions on the formulation ofmanagement measures. Although ITQs willnot work in many situations, they,nevertheless, provide an important tool whichshould not be rejected for the wrong reasons.

It is abundantly evident that overfishing isbecoming more severe and more pervasivethroughout the world and that it affects small-scale fisheries as much as it does large-scalefisheries. The basic problem is that the supplyof fish stocks is limited and yet the demandfor fish products is growing. This leads torising prices and, in the absence of effectivecontrols, increased fishing effort. The resultis the depletion of stocks as well as theexcessive use of capital and labour.

Better management of fisheries is essential.Management measures can deal either solelywith the biological aspects or with bothbiological and economic aspects. In the past,many of the measures dealt only with thebiological yield, ignoring the economicconsequences. These kinds of measuresincluded total catch limits, closed seasons,closed areas, mesh size controls and othersdesigned to restore stocks to their maximumsustainable yields (MSY). These werefrequently adopted because they presumablyaffected all fishermen equally and did notchange the distribution of wealth (apresumption that was often wrong).

Although such measures may be desirablein conjunction with other measures, they donot always achieve their objective of restoringthe stocks. Moreover, they do nothing toprevent excessive fishing effort or conflictamong competing users. The difficulty is thatmeasures that prevent excessive fishing effortor that deal with conflict, require decisionson the distribution of wealth.

This can not be avoided. As Copes haspointed out, an ITQ system provides individualquotas to some fishermen but not to others.What he did not point out, however, is that asystem limiting fishing effort directly, bygranting licences to some of the fishermen,also distributes wealth.

He states that “to remain economicallyhealthy, the small-boat sector must acceptthe need to keep fishing capacity in balancewith available harvests. This will probablyrequire occasional reductions in fleet size bybuy-back, in order to offset likely advancesin fleet productivity.”

Copes has failed to note that the provision ofterritorial rights to a community of fishermen(which he advocates and which I agree maygenerally be desirable) provides wealth tothat community and excludes fishermen whoare not members of the community. Copesstates that “typically, most inshore fishresources have lent themselves well toharvesting by locally based small-scalefishermen.” While this may currently be truein certain situations, it is becoming less andless valid, and is unlikely to continue into thefuture.

This response hasbeen sent in byFrancis Christy,Senior ResearchOfficer, IMARIBA,Washington DC, US.This article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 25, April 2000

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SAMUDRA Dossier

It is clear that eventually, as population growsand demand increases, decisions on thedistribution of wealth will have to be made.Even the exclusion of large-scale fishingvessels from the waters used by small-scalefishermen will not preclude the eventualnecessity for determining how access withinthe group of small-scale users will beallocated. Since this is at present necessaryin many situations and will be increasinglynecessary in the future, it is desirable toexamine all the various techniques forcontrolling access, including the use ofITQs.

Managementmeasures can dealeither solely withthe biologicalaspects or withboth biologicaland economicaspects

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The management of fisheries throughthe use of property rights is oftenperceived as being anathema to the

recognition of indigenous fishing rights.Experience in New Zealand suggests that theopposite may, in fact, be the case. Not onlyare indigenous fishing rights compatible witha property rights approach to fisheriesmanagement, such an approach can be usedto settle claims involving indigenous fishingrights, to preserve those rights for futuregenerations, and to integrate such rightswithin a wider fisheries managementframework.

Throughout the world, State management offisheries using regulatory instruments has leftindigenous communities subject to the valuesand aspirations of the dominant culture asrepresented by the government of the day.No matter how liberal, democratic andegalitarian the State may be, the final resultis likely to further erode the ability ofindigenous communities to manage, harvest,and use natural resources in ways that areconsistent with their cultural needs. Aproperty rights-based system can provide arobust mechanism for ensuring thesustainable utilization of fisheries, whileproviding for indigenous rights holders torealize their often divergent social andeconomic aspirations.

Indigenous communities traditionally havetheir own internal regulatory mechanisms formanagement of their fishing activity. Suchregulatory mechanisms are integral to thenature of their fishing rights.

Recognizing and providing for indigenous andcoastal community fishing rights requires

empowering the communities concerned touse those mechanisms, and integrating themwithin the wider fisheries managementframework. In fully exploited, multiple-userfisheries, a system based on well-definedproperty rights allows the rights of indigenouscommunities to be recognized and providedfor, relative to the rights of other groups.

In New Zealand, the introduction of aproperty rights system for fisheries not onlygave rise to the largest indigenous rights claimin the country’s history, it also provided themeans for that claim to be settled and forindigenous rights to be recognized andprovided for within the wider legislativeframework. Maori fishing rights have beenrecognized by a combination of propertyrights instruments, vested in tribal or sub-tribalcommunities rather than individuals. It is upto those communities to decide how theymanage those rights.

As the indigenous people of New Zealand,Maori held customary fishing rights underBritish common law. These rights wereguaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi, signedbetween the British monarchy and Maorichiefs in 1840. Customary fishing wasexempted from the rules and regulations infisheries legislation made after the signing ofthe Treaty. However, the exact nature ofthese rights was never defined.

Slow negationAs a result, Maori fishing rights were slowlynegated by the egalitarian principles of thedominant European settler society—one lawfor all. The statutory provisions protectingMaori customary fishing rights wereworthless, unable to define the nature of

Maori powerMatthew Hooper

The Maori fisheries settlement is a world leaderin terms of resource transfer to indigenous people

This article byMatthew Hooper, aSenior Policy Analystat the Ministry ofFisheries in NewZealand, is based ona paper co-authoredwith Terry Lynch,presented at theFishRights99Conference in Perth,Australia. Thisarticle first appearedin SAMUDRA ReportNo. 26, August 2000

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SAMUDRA Dossier

those rights, and then protect them fromencroachment by the activities of otherfishers. The Treaty of Waitangi was regardedas a legal nullity by the courts until the 1980s.

In the mid-1980s, the government in NewZealand moved to introduce a quotamanagement system based on individualtransferable quota (ITQ) for majorcommercial fish stocks. It was this move tocreate an artificial property right to take fish,and then allocate that right to existingcommercial fishers, that drove Maori to seekan injunction against the government, sayingthat their customary fishing rights had notbeen taken into account.

The task of defining the nature of Maoricustomary fishing rights then fell to thecourts. In an important test case in 1986, aMaori individual was found not guilty oftaking undersized shellfish on the groundsthat he was exercising a customary fishingright. He had fished in accordance withcustomary practices by obtaining permissionfrom the kaitiaki, or guardian, of the tangatawhenua from the area where the fishingoccurred, and acted in accordance with theinstructions of the kaitiaki.

The concept of tangata whenua, or ‘peopleof the land’, is crucial to the definition ofMaori customary fishing rights. Tangatawhenua are the iwi (tribe) or hapu (sub-tribe) that hold customary authority over aparticular area. Rather than being generalMaori rights, customary rights belong totangata whenua and can only be exercisedwithin their area. The full nature and extentof customary fishing rights was elucidatedby the Waitangi Tribunal as a result ofextensive research into tribal claims tofisheries.

The Waitangi Tribunal is a permanentcommission of inquiry, set up in 1975 toinvestigate claims regarding breaches of theTreaty of Waitangi. Maori customary fishingrights were found to have both a commercialand a non-commercial component (based onevidence that Maori were trading seafoodwidely, prior to the signing of the Treaty of

Waitangi). The fisheries they exploited wereextensive, and the methods to catch fish werehighly advanced, compared to those of theirEuropean counterparts.

The Tribunal also ascribed a developmentalcomponent to the customary right, givingMaori a right to a share of the deep-seafisheries off the coast of New Zealand, evenif they were not being fished at the time theTreaty was signed.

Customary rightsMost importantly, Maori customary fishingrights pertained not only to the use of fisheries,but also to the management of the resource.While fishing practices differed among thedifferent tribes, customary fisheries hadalways been actively managed by kaitiaki.Traditionally, fishing outside the rules set bythe kaitiaki could subject the fisher to severepenalties. In 1986, the High Court placed aninjunction on the Crown, preventing it fromproceeding with the introduction of the quotamanagement system.

The Court advised the Ministry of Fisheriesthat the aims of the Crown in introducing thequota system were commendable. At thetime, the Waitangi Tribunal observed that theITQ right had much in common with the rightsguaranteed to Maori under the Treaty ofWaitangi—it guaranteed access, it wasperpetual, and it provided opportunities forautonomous management. The problem wasthat indigenous rights had not been recognizedor provided for in the allocation of commercialfishing quota.

An interim settlement of Maori fisheriesclaims was negotiated in 1989, and full andfinal settlement signed and legislated for in1992. The principal effect of the settlementon the customary fishing rights of Maori wasto split the commercial and non-commercialcomponents of those rights.

This distinction was necessary toaccommodate the settlement within thebroader fisheries management framework,which was by then based on the use of ITQ

for commercial fisheries, while non-

It was this move tocreate an artificialproperty right totake fish, and thenallocate that rightto existingcommercialfishers, that droveMaori to seek aninjunction againstthe government,saying that theircustomary fishingrights had notbeen taken intoaccount

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SAMUDRA Dossier

commercial fishing continued to be managedby regulation.

The commercial rights of Maori wererecognized through the provision of assetscomprising quota, shares and cash. The 1989interim settlement provided for 10 per centof all existing ITQ to be bought back fromfishers and provided to Maori. The 1992Settlement centred on the Crown’s provisionto Maori of NZ$150 mn to purchase a half-share of Sealord Products Ltd. Sealord is thelargest commercial fishing company in NewZealand, owning over 20 per cent of allcommercial fish quota. In addition, the Crownhas an ongoing obligation to allocate 20 percent of quota for fish species newlyintroduced to the quota management systemto Maori.

The Settlement legislation established theTreaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission,previously the Maori Fisheries Commission,to manage the commercial settlement assetson behalf of Maori. The quota held by theCommission is no different from other ITQ

generated under the quota managementsystem. The Commission currently leasesquota to tribes on an annual basis. In time,the quota will be allocated to the beneficiariesof the settlement, giving them all the benefitsand obligations associated with quotaownership.

The settlement is a world leader in terms ofresource transfer to indigenous people. Whileother settlements have addressed claims toindividual fisheries, no other country hastransferred close to 30 per cent of its totalcommercial fishing industry to its indigenouspeople. Maori are the single largest player inthe rock lobster and paua fishery, and oneof the top two players in the snapper fishery.In conjunction with managing these assets,the Commission has become one of the bestinformed and articulate participants in theNew Zealand fishing industry, providingvaluable advice both to government and toindustry bodies.

The Commission also invests in the future ofthe Maori fishing industry, spending aroundNZ$1 mn annually on its scholarshipprogramme, training up to 300 young Maoria year. The programme focuses on threeareas: business management, studies directlyrelated to fisheries, and a highly successfulseafood processing course. The Commissionoffers up to nine NZ$15,000-per-yearscholarships to study at the AustralianMaritime College and the University ofTasmania.

The non-commercial component of thecustomary right was provided for throughregulations that devolve the management ofnon-commercial customary fishing tokaitiaki appointed by the tangata whenua.The regulatory framework provides aneffective way of recognizing and providingfor the traditional fisheries managementpractices of Maori. The framework is highlyflexible about the way tangata whenuamanage their fishing activity, but prescriptivein terms of mandate issues, recording ofcatch, and accountability mechanisms.

Mandated representativesTangata whenua must establish mandatedrepresentatives for their area before they canactively manage their non-commercial fishingactivity. The regulations provide for tangatawhenua to appoint kaitiaki who areresponsible for managing customary fishingin their area. Disputes over who should bekaitiaki or over tribal boundaries must beresolved by tangata whenua.

Kaitiaki manage customary fishing throughan authorization system which requires themto specify the exact nature of the fishingactivity that is being authorized, includingspecies, quantities, areas, size limits, methods,purpose for which the fish will be used, andinstructions for the disposal of any bycatch.Each of these factors is at the discretion ofthe kaitiaki, who must act within the boundsof sustainability and with due regard for theenvironment.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Regulations also provide for theestablishment of areas known as mataitaireserves over traditional fishing grounds.Mataitai reserves are a form of territorialuse right.

There is no commercial fishing permittedwithin these reserves and all non-commercialfishers, including recreational fishers, mustact in accordance with bylaws made by thekaitiaki when fishing within the reserve area.

Fishers must report back their actual catchesto the kaitiaki, who record the informationfor fisheries management and compliancepurposes. Kaitiaki must report quarterly tothe Ministry of Fisheries on how many ofeach species were taken out of eachmanagement area within their traditionalboundaries. The information generated bythe regulations is then used to set sustainabilitymeasures, and provides a powerful tool fortangata whenua to participate in widerfisheries management processes.

After setting the total allowable catch (TAC)for a fishery, the Ministry of Fisheries mustshare the TAC amongst the three extractivefishing sectors—customary non-commercial,recreational, and commercial. The customarynon-commercial needs of Maori have a defacto priority in this process—the needs ofMaori are provided for first, to the extentthat they are not commercial. In the smalltoheroa shellfish fishery, this has resulted inthe entire TAC being set aside for customarynon-commercial needs.

Individual customary fishers are accountableto the kaitiaki who authorize their activity.Kaitiaki are primarily accountable to thetangata whenua who appoint them, and tothe Ministry of Fisheries, for the sustainablemanagement of fisheries and for themaintenance of effective records for bothmanagement and compliance purposes. TheState is still ultimately responsible for theoverall sustainability of fisheries and for theprovision of assistance to kaitiaki to enablethe effective operation of the customaryfishing regulations.

As a result of the 1992 Treaty settlement,Maori now own around 40 per cent of NewZealand’s commercial fish quota. Taking jointventures into account, Maori have a controllinginterest in more than 60 per cent of NewZealand’s commercial fishing industry.However, the commercial assets of Maoricontinue to be managed by the Treaty ofWaitangi Fisheries Commission on behalf ofall Maori, and have yet to be allocated to tribesand/or any other beneficiaries identified underthe terms of the settlement.

While many tribes are benefiting from theannual leasing of quota by the Commissionat discounted rates, they will not haveautonomous control over the management oftheir commercial fishing activity untilallocation has occurred. The commercialinterests and objectives of Maori may differfrom tribe to tribe. They may also be differentfrom the interests of other commercial fishersin their area. ITQ allocation will allow thedifferent priorities and interests of tribalgroups to be realized within the sameframework, while minimizing the opportunityor need for the State to interfere with thoseinterests.

Distribution inequitiesProperty-rights instruments such as ITQ areoften given a number of negative associations.These include the privatization of what areseen to be collective rights, inequities in thedistribution of rights, alienation of traditionalfishers from their livelihoods, and even thedemise of coastal communities. However, asfar as the indigenous fishing rights in NewZealand are concerned, all of these occurredto some degree before the introduction ofITQ. Ironically, it has been the introduction ofITQ and other property-rights instruments thathave provided a means of addressing theseissues.

The introduction of the quota managementsystem meant that the Crown was able tobuy back rights from existing commercialfishers and re-allocate them to Maori. Thiswas meant to compensate them for theattenuation of their rights over the previous

The customarynon-commercialneeds of Maorihave a de factopriority in thisprocess—the needsof Maori areprovided for first,to the extent thatthey are notcommercial

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SAMUDRA Dossier

140 years. (Obviously, if the initial allocationof ITQ had taken Maori rights into account,no buy-back would have been necessary.)The Settlement legislation ensures that theITQ provided to Maori remains undercollective ownership until such time asallocation occurs.

The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commissionhas been working on criteria for tribes to beeligible to receive settlement assets. One suchcriteria is that tribal bodies must haveconstitutional arrangements in place to ensurethat the collective commercial fishing rightsof a tribe, as represented by its share of quotaand cash, are not alienated from the tribewithout the necessary level of accountabilitybeing present. Once allocation has occurred,then the tribes can manage their commercialfishing activity the way that suits them,incorporating whatever combination ofeconomic and social objectives they desire.

Tangata whenua are now regaining controlof their customary non-commercial fishingactivity. Customary fishing regulations arenow in place and are being implemented bytribes and sub-tribes around the country. Theprimary hurdle facing tribes seeking to utilizethe new management framework is thedetermination of mandate over areas, and theresolution of disputes with neighbouringgroups over boundaries and kaitiakiappointments.

Customary non-commercial fishing rights,while not represented by ITQ, are stillconsidered property rights within NewZealand’s fisheries management framework.Fishers must fish within the rules and limitsspecified by the kaitiaki for the area, andmust report back on what they actuallycaught. The Ministry of Fisheries must thenmake an allowance for the extent ofcustomary needs when allocating the totalallowable catch (TAC) for any fishery. Theproportion of the TAC set aside for customarynon-commercial take is effectively the

property right associated with customary non-commercial fishing.

Management controlThe aim of all tribal groups must be to regaincontrol over the management of all theirfishing activity, both commercial and non-commercial. Once quota has been allocated,and kaitiaki have been appointed, tangatawhenua will be in a position to manage theirfisheries in a more holistic manner.Importantly, the well-defined rights oftangata whenua will ensure that there isalways fish available for everything fromcommercial purposes on marae (meetingground) to personal consumption.

The current direction of fisheriesmanagement in New Zealand foresees thedevolution of management responsibilities tostakeholder groups, and stakeholderparticipation in the development ofmanagement plans for key fisheries and/orareas. As a result of the indigenous fisheriessettlement, Maori are well placed to takeadvantage of the opportunities offered bysuch an environment. With well-defined rightsfirmly secured, Maori are destined to be atthe centre of co-operative managementinitiatives in the future.

The aim of alltribal groups mustbe to regain controlover themanagement of alltheir fishingactivity, bothcommercial andnon-commercial

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SAMUDRA Dossier

One of the suggestions made toprotect the livelihoods of small-scalefishermen throughout the world is

the installation of special artisanal fishingzones. Such zones would make inshorefishing areas off-limit to industrial fishermenand, correspondingly, reserve them for small-scale operators. The experiences of zoning,in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu from the1970s onward point out potential hazards aswell as conditions necessary for the successof such arrangements.

At the onset of the so-called ‘BlueRevolution’ in the early 1960s, Tamil Naduhad thousands of marine fishermen, operatingfrom small hamlets along its 1000-km longcoastline. These fishermen generallyconfined their operations to an innermost seaarea, which roughly coincided with thecontours of the continental shelf. Seasonalmigration took them up and down the coast,but rarely farther than 10 km from shore.

The government’s promotion of trawlingtechnology drastically changed the seasidepanorama. By the late 1960s, harbour centresberthing small trawlers had developed allalong the coast, and conflicts between trawlerand artisanal fishermen were rampant. Themain problem was that trawlers venturedinshore to catch high-value shrimp. Not onlydid they intrude on grounds that artisanalfishermen considered theirs, but the trawlersalso caused extensive damage to artisanalfishing gear.

These confrontations resulted in majorunrest. The State government, anxious tokeep the peace, constituted committees toinvestigate and settle whatever incidents

came to its attention. At the same time, itstarted to explore available policy choices.One of its core options was the physicalseparation of the antagonists through theinstallation of distinct fishing zones.

As the government of Tamil Nadu exertedstrong control over access to trawlingtechnology in the first phase ofmodernization—most trawler fishermendepended on the government loans andconstruction schemes for their vessels—itfirst tried out this lever. Around 1968, theFisheries Department included a clause in itscontract, stating that recipients of trawlinggear could only fish outside a limit of threenautical miles. This clause is important as itconstituted the first, albeit indirect, mentionof an official artisanal fishing zone in TamilNadu. However noble its intent, the measurefailed to stem the flow of the ‘pink gold rush’.As trawlers did not bear registration marks,violators of the clause could not easily beidentified. Moreover, the clause’s foundationswere shaky, such as in the case of a transferof ownership. Could the new trawler ownerbe held to the original terms of agreement?The Fisheries Department had its doubts andrarely seems to have pursued the matter.

In 1978, after serious riots between artisanaland trawler fishermen rocked Tamil Nadu’scapital, Madras (now Chennai), the Stategovernment decided to formulate legislationbased on the distinction of fishing zones.

Long-drawn processRealizing, however, that law-making is a long-drawn process and that immediate action wasbeing expected, the government immediatelyissued an executive Government Order (GO

The twilight zoneMaarten Bavinck

The experiences of zoning for small-scale fishermenin Tamil Nadu, India, reveal both potential and hazards

This article is byMaarten Bavinck ofthe Centre forMaritime Research(MARE), Universityof Amsterdam, TheNetherlands. Thisarticle first appearedin SAMUDRA ReportNo. 27, December2000

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SAMUDRA Dossier

881 of 1978). Alongside other measures suchas time zoning, GO 881 prohibited trawlingactivities within a 3-mile inshore zone. Forthe first time, the government also madeattempts to mark this zone by means of aseries of ‘country buoys’. As the namesuggests, however, these markers were soelementary that the first storm washed themaway.

Trawler fishermen straightaway challengedGO 881 in court. It was not the 3-mile rulewhich incurred most of their wrath, however;it was time-zoning. According to the order,time-zoning implied that trawler fishermenremain in port during the night, only to bereleased at 6 a.m. Not only would this denythem the best fishing moments (night-fishingpurportedly being more productive thanfishing in daytime), it also closed off fishinggrounds that could not be reached in a day’svoyage. Most seriously, time-zoning stood agreat chance of being enforced, as itinvolved no more than installing a chainacross the harbour mouth.

In response to the appeals, the High Courtof Chennai imposed a stay order suspendingGO 881’s main clauses for several years. Theorder was finally superseded by the TamilNadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983.This Act continued along earlier lines,decreeing the introduction of geographicalfishing zones as well as time-zoningarrangements for trawler fishermen. It toowas greeted by a flurry of court cases fromdisquieted trawler owners.

Interestingly, one of the plaintants argued thatif trawler fishermen were to be relegatedoutside the 3-mile zone, artisanal fishermenshould be obliged to stay within. Although thiswas contrary to the import of the Act, whichdid not make any mention of a mandatoryzone for artisanal fishermen, the district courtjudge who was handling the case feltotherwise. According to his decree, artisanalfishermen not only enjoyed a preferentialright to a separate inshore zone, it was alsotheir duty to confine their operations to this

area. This, of course, artisanal fishermenprotested against.

As in the case of GO 881, courts pronouncedstay orders on the Act of 1983, and it wasonly toward the end of the decade that thevarious legal objections were definitelyrefuted by the Supreme Court of India.During all this time, the State governmentwas unable to enact any of its fishingregulations.

By 1995, the situation had fundamentallychanged. Although time-zoning was still incold storage, the Fisheries Department wasnow free to implement other sections of the1983 Act. The 3-mile rule was its showpieceregulation. Any beachside visitor, however,could tell that it was poorly observed. In fact,trawler fishermen regularly encroached oninshore waters, and conflicts with artisanalfishermen persisted. It is instructive toconsider why the 3-mile rule was, and is, sobadly implemented by the State government.

One of the basic factors is a lack of politicalwill. This is related to the fact that trawlerfishermen wield considerable clout in TamilNadu, whereas the movement of artisanalfishermen has lost force since the 1970s.Fisheries Department officers charged withenforcement thus receive insufficient backingto undertake sensitive missions, such as theapprehension of trawlers. Another reason isfound in the Act’s motivation, which isprimarily of a social nature. Like similarlegislation in other parts of the world, its maingoal was the resolution of social conflict, notthe management of depleting marineresources. Once overt conflicts died down,government attention was once againdiverted.

The character of coastal fisheries and theset-up of fisheries management also posedformidable barriers to the enforcement of anartisanal fishing zone. Where does one findthe resources to install an infrastructurecapable of guarding a 1000-km longcoastline? And how does one establish

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SAMUDRA Dossier

encroachments, if the artisanal fishing zoneis unmarked and participants lack advancedpositioning technology?

In 1995, the Fisheries Department in northernTamil Nadu owned only one small speedboatand a small crew to patrol 400 km of shore.This boat was slow and frequently out oforder. In addition, officers generally lack sealegs and are reluctant to set out to sea, fearingmolestation and other unpleasantness. Theprevailing reality, therefore, is that patrollingseldom occurs, and fishermen are left tosettle any problems that arise amongstthemselves.

This directs attention to the management set-up. In spite of the fact that fishermen alongthe Coromandel Coast of India have a longand rich tradition of resource management,their institutions do not enjoy any officialrecognition. As it is, the State government isthe sole authority for fisheries regulation andenforcement with regard to inshore waters.There is, however, a mismatch betweengovernmental capacities and the sweep offisheries legislation. Under presentcircumstances, the 3-mile rule in Tamil Nadumainly has a token value.

The idea of artisanal fishing zones derivesits charm from its comprehensiveness as wellas its simplicity. It ventures a simple andapparently effective solution to the problemsof artisanal fisherfolk. Developments inTamil Nadu, however, indicate potentialobstacles and potholes.

Unenforceable ruleAn important question is whether it is worthstriving for an artisanal fishing zone if therule can not be enforced. Many inshorefishing zones are heavily contested, andindustrial fishing interests do not give up theirstakes without a fight. Political support isimperative to achieve any success.

It also helps if a proposal stands a real chanceof being implemented. Declaring an artisanalzone many kilometres in length and badly

marked does not contribute to its realization,particularly if staffing and resources aremeagre. Co-management arrangements ofgovernment, together with fishermen, mightform a solution, provided fishermen are alsogiven official enforcement authority. To myknowledge, however, this has not been triedout seriously at a more than local level inAfrica, Asia or Latin America. Manygovernments are wary of decentralization andthe loss of power it implies, and will not readilyconcede far-reaching co-managementarrangements.

This does not deny the potential value ofartisanal fishing zones as an instrument offisheries management. It does suggest,however, that the scheme should be welldesigned and tested.

The Tamil Nadu experience finally makesclear that the successful enactment of anymeasure to defend the interests of artisanalfishermen requires concerted and enduringeffort. The proclamation of GO 881 and theTamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Actof 1983 was directly related to the activitiesof the artisanal fishermen’s movement inIndia. This movement, starting in Tamil Naduand in Goa, soon developed into a potentnationwide force. The decline of the samemovement in Tamil Nadu after the 1970s,likewise, constitutes one of the main reasonsfor the non-implementation of availablelegislation. To achieve success, politicalmomentum must clearly be maintained overa long time period. For many fishermen’smovements, this is a huge challenge.

An importantquestion iswhether it is worthstriving for anartisanal fishingzone if the rule cannot be enforced

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SAMUDRA Dossier

In the Kesla block of HoshangabadDistrict in Madhya Pradesh, India, theadivasis (indigenous forest and tribal

people) have constantly faced displacementand consequent deprivation of their resourcebase. The last 15-20 years have seen tribalstruggles seeking resettlement and resolutionof other issues relating to land, water andforest rights. Around five years ago, they gottheir first taste of success in the form offishing and marketing rights in the reservoirdam at Tawa, which is a tributary of theNarmada river. An ordnance testing rangehad displaced people earlier, and the Tawadam also contributes to continuingdisplacements of the same people. Hence,the permission for fishing and marketing rightsfor the displaced persons of Tawa in 1996was indeed a welcome step by thegovernment of Madhya Pradesh.

Earlier, in 1994, the oustees of Bargi dam(another dam on the Narmada) in Jabalpursucceeded in the entrepreneurial ventureentrusted to them by the government. In1996, the government had accepted inprinciple the rights of the adivasis to naturalresources. Encouraged by this, thegovernment granted fishing and marketingrights to the Tawa Vistapit Adivasi MatsyaUtpadan Evam Vipnan Sahkari Sangh(briefly known as Tawa Matsya Sangh) fora period of five years.

The adivasis were initially apprehensiveabout the prospects of fishing in such a largereservoir and of marketing their catch. But,with the strong support of Kisan AdivasiSangathan, the last five years have been quitea fruitful experience of collective action.

Today, 36 fish co-operative societies areactive in various villages. Three affiliatedsocieties and about 12,000 to 13,000 fisherfolkhave joined hands to form a federation thatruns the whole show. Uninitiated in the waysof business co-operatives and officialcorrespondence, these people did have a hardtime in the beginning. But the success of theirforerunner, the Bargi fish co-operative,encouraged the Tawa fisherfolk to persistwith their efforts. Today, they are adept athandling all affairs concerned with theirbusiness, be it techniques of fish culture, fishcatching, identifying fish species, businessaccounting or negotiating with traders in citieslike Calcutta or Nagpur. The revenuecollected by the government in the form ofroyalty through the Sangh has shown asteady increase.

Prior to the Sangh’s involvement, thegovernment had laid down a target of 45tonnes of fish production for three months in1996-97. But the Sangh more than doubledthe target to reach 93. 33 tonnes. Productionhas been increasing and 327.18 tonnes of fishwere produced in 2000-2001. Earlier, the FishDevelopment Corporation (FDC) hadproduced only 131, 146, 89 and 84 tonnes offish, respectively, for the four years 1990-94. During this period, each year the FDC

and the contractors had hired 140 fisherfolk,most of whom were outsiders. On the otherhand, the Matsya Sangh engages as manyas 477 fisherfolk and all are local, tribal,displaced people.

Regular incomeOne great achievement is that the people havebeen able to acquire a regular job and

Naturally oursYogesh Diwan and Yemuna Sunny

The displaced indigenous people of the Tawa dam area in Indiaare fighting to retain their rights over water, forest and land

This article, writtenby Yogesh Diwanand Yemuna Sunny,first appeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 30, April 2001

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SAMUDRA Dossier

reasonable income. Today, each person earnsaround Rs. 90-100 (around US$2) daily.Besides, 20 per cent of the catch goes to thefisherfolk who can either consume or sellthem at their own prices. They are alsoentitled to bonus and other facilities. Apartfrom a fulltime employment for 10 months ayear, the fisherfolk also get dole of Rs1 perkg during the closed season (15 June to 15August).

This arrangement ensures a token salaryduring the period of joblessness and alsosafeguards against clandestine fishing. TheSangh paid nearly Rs2,450,000 during 1997-98 towards dole alone, apart fromRs3,044,000 as a whole year’s remuneration.Earlier, the FDC and the contractors jointlyused to disburse an average of Rs6,820,000towards remuneration. The maximumamount paid by them towards wages wasRs1,120,000 during 1994-95, whereas theSangh made a record payment ofRs1,109,000 in just the first three months,reaching Rs 4,746,000 in 2000-2001.

Similarly, the fisherfolk worked for 267 daysin a year, as against 221 for the contractorshired by FDC. Apart from fishing, otherassignments like transport, packing, sales,collection of fish seeds, boatbuilding andmaintenance of office accounts are alsomanaged by the local people, including plentyof women as well.

It is evident that the fish produced on such alarge scale can not be consumed by the localmarket alone. So the Sangh began marketingin the bigger cities like Calcutta, Nagpur,Lucknow and Bhopal, where it had mixedexperiences. It faced ups and downs on saleprices. Also, at times, the consignments gotspoilt before they could be sold andoccasionally, the Sangh had to pay highercartage too. Although the Sangh tried totransport the consignments in insulated vans,its main thrust continued to be the local andnearby markets.

The Sangh also tried to help the fisherfolk tobuy boats and fishing nets by arranging for

loans on easy terms. Many societies benefitedfrom this arrangement. The preference forlocally built boats and wholesale purchase offishing nets from Mumbai proved to be cost-effective.

But the inaction of the government machineryis proving to be a hindrance for the Sangh.Constant vigilance had resulted in theapprehension of many poachers. But due tothe laxity of the police and the administration,the criminals got away unpunished.Subsequently, the Sangh announced prizes fornabbing fish poachers. This brought down theincidents of poaching and nowadays theft isgreatly under control.

Seedlings collectedDespite a lack of experience, the Sangh tookupon itself the task of collecting fish seedlings,as the government and FDC had abdicatedtheir responsibility in this regard. During 1997-98, nearly 2,613,000 seedlings were collectedand released in the Tawa reservoir, whichincreased to 3,219,000 in 2000-2001.

This was, however, lower than the target of3,600,000. The seedlings had to be collectedfrom various places. The Sangh was alsohandicapped by a paucity of funds andabsence of hatchery and nursery facilities.Hence, it had decided to earmark aboutRs50,000-Rs100,000 from fish sale everymonth towards the purchase of costlyseedlings. It also promoted fish culture andencouraged local people to breed fishseedlings in small natural ponds. This ensuresa substantial reduction in both expenditure ontransportation and the death rate of fish

The Sangh made a net profit of Rs29,400,000in 2000-2001. In contrast, under thecontractors and the FDC, there wererecurrent losses year after year. Between1991 and 1994, the losses were to the tune ofRs25,500,000, Rs47,100,000 andRs34,200,000 a year, respectively. Thus, theTawa experiment had not only benefited thedisplaced people but also made a substantialcontribution of Rs1,570,000 to the publicexchequer in 2000-2001 by way of royalty at

The Tawaexperiment hadnot only benefitedthe displacedpeople but alsomade a substantialcontribution to thepublic exchequer

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SAMUDRA Dossier

the rate of Rs6 per kg. of fish. Within a periodof five years, Rs6,737,000 of royalty hadbeen paid (see Table 1).

Table 1: Royalty Paidby Tawa Matsya Sangh

Ye a r Roya lty (Rs m n)1996-97 0.451997-98 1.181998-99 1.651999-00 1.892000-01 1.57Total 6.74

Source: Annual Report, 2000-2001,Tawa Matsya Sangh

But ironically, despite having contributed somuch in royalty, the government has not seenit fit to provide the area with facilities likeroads, water, lighting, education, etc. TheSangh also questions the wisdom of havingto pay royalty, especially as the contributorsare displaced people for whom thegovernment had denied even survivalnecessities in the name of development (readthe dam). Even otherwise, the attitude of theadministration has not been one of goodwillor support. On the issue of the need toconstruct an ice factory, the governmentwithheld the funds that were sanctioned bythe Central government for the purpose.Further, the Sangh is not being allowed touse the government reservoir at Powarkheda(a nearby village), which is currently lyingidle, for the breeding of fish seedlings.

23 December 2001 marks the completion ofthe five-year period of Tawa Matsya Sangh’sright to fishing and marketing granted by thegovernment. As yet, the Madhya Pradeshgovernment has not taken any decision onits renewal. The irony of this hesitation isparticularly striking, since the State is in thethick of a campaign on decentralization, tribalself-rule and people’s participation. TheTawa experiment is a very sinceredemonstration of all these three parameters.Yet, there seems to be a nexus amongst thebureaucracy, Matsya Maha Sangh (which

takes the place of the earlier Nigam orCorporation, now a State-level co-operativeof the government) and local politicians andcontractors to override the collective effortsof the people. Their attempt is to take awaymarketing rights from the hands of the TawaMatsya Sangh.

Hence, the primary societies may getconfined to fishing rights only. The marketingrights are being sought by the Matsya MahaSangh of the Madhya Pradesh government.An official committee set up to look into thefunctioning of the Tawa Sangh and torecommend to the government a futurecourse of action has not done its job. It hasnot consulted the federation officially; on thecontrary, it has been giving it the coldshoulder.

Comparative performanceOn 19 November 2001, in response to aquestion raised on this issue in the MadhyaPradesh State Assembly, a comparativepicture of the performance of the TawaMatsya Sangh and the earlier one of theNigam (through contractors) was presented(see Table 2). The Matsya Sangh is wayahead in all indices of performance. This veryclearly establishes the efficiency andsustainability of the Tawa experiment.

It is worthwhile here to recall the experiencesof the Bargi co-operative (the forerunnersof Tawa Matsya Sangh) at a similar junctureof functioning. The Chief Minister hadassured the co-operative of renewal of itscontract. But the instruction finally issuedmentioned only fishing rights for primarysocieties. The marketing rights remained withthe government (Matsya Maha Sangh). Thisimplies that the status of the fisherfolk inBargi would henceforth be that of wageearners only.

When the Chief Minister was againapproached, he expressed surprise over suchan outcome and the order was changed. Butthe Maha Sangh had already startedfunctioning with the earlier order and hadsigned an agreement with a contractor. The

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matter was taken to court and a stay orderobtained. Ironically, the government has notmade any clear stand on the issue.

Tawa Matsya Sangh and Kisan AdivasiSangathan envisage a distinct possibility of arepetition of the Bargi-type treatment in Tawatoo. Hence, they are engaged in trying topressure the government to take a sensibledecision. Efforts are on to push the matterthrough a campaign by people’s organizations(of the region and outside), the media,intellectuals and experts. The Sangh and theSangathan firmly stand by the view that theirhard-earned rights over the natural resources,along with the creative and collective effortsof the past few years, can not be simply takenaway. With the slogan of “people’s rights overwater, forest and land”, they have geared upto continue their struggle.

Table 2: Comparative Performance of FDC and Tawa Matsya Sangh

The Sangh and theSangathan firmlystand by the viewthat their hard-earned rights overthe naturalresources, alongwith the creativeand collectiveefforts of the pastfew years, can notbe simply takenaway

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SAMUDRA Dossier

In the South 24-Parganas District of theState of West Bengal in India is the 20-sq km island of Jambudwip. Located

about 10 km offshore in the southwest cornerof the Sundarbans at the mouth of riverHooghly in the Bay of Bengal, the island canbe reached in 45 minutes from the Frasergunjfishing harbour by bhut bhuti, a smallpowered country craft.

Jambudwip has been used as a site forfisheries camps at least since 1955, accordingto Bikash Raychoudhury’s Moon and Net(published by the Anthropological Survey ofIndia in 1980). Behundi jal or stake-netfishery is a traditional activity in differentparts of the Sundarbans delta, on both theIndian and Bangladesh sides.

The largest stake-net fishing operation in theSundarbans is based in Jambudwip. It is theJalia Kaibartha community from theChittagong hills that mainly practices behundijal fishery in the marine waters of theSundarbans. After India attainedindependence in 1947, the members of thishighly enterprising fishing community settleddown in places like Kakdwip, Namkhana,Sagar and Pathar Pratima in West Bengal,and Champaran in Bihar.

However, this traditional source of livelihoodand sustenance is now under serious threat.The Central Empowered Committee (CEC),has said that the seasonal “occupation” ofthe Jambudwip island by fishermen and thefish-drying activity was a non-forest activitythat cannot be permitted under the Forest(Conservation) Act, 1980, without priorapproval of the central government. (The CEC

was constituted by the Supreme Court of

India by a Notification on 20 June 2002 toprovide relief against any action taken by theCentral/State Governments or any otherauthority regarding, inter alia, deforestationand encroachments, and the implementationof legal instruments for forest conservation.)It has directed the West Bengal governmentto remove all traces of encroachment onJambudwip island by 31 March 2003.

While the Fisheries Department of WestBengal under Minister Kiranmoy Nandastrongly defends the fishermen’s claim to theseasonal use of the island, the ForestDepartment is bitterly opposed. Thefishermen are now living in the shadow ofuncertainty. Will their two-generations oldfishery be treated as an activity eligible forregularization or will they be summarilyevicted?

It was on 29 May 1943 that, under aNotification of the Government of WestBengal, Jambudwip became reserved forestas part of the protected forests in theNamkhana Division. As a result, no activitywas allowed on the island, except thosepermitted by the Forest Department. Fromat least 1968 onwards, fishermen have beenissued permits to use the island to collectfirewood and to launch boats into the maincreek.

Since 1989, Jambudwip has been part of theBuffer Zone of the Sundarbans BiosphereReserve, where ecologically sound practices,including fisheries, are permitted (unlike theCore Area of a Biosphere Reserve, which issecurely protected for conserving biologicaldiversity). Jambudwip is, however, locatedoutside the Sundarbans Tiger Reserve.

Jammed in JambudwipSebastian Mathew

The traditional stake-net fishers of the ecologically sensitive Jambudwipisland in West Bengal, India, face a likely ban of their seasonal fisheries

This article is bySebastian Mathew,Programme Adviserof ICSF. This articlefirst appeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 34, March 2003

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The CEC visited Jambudwip on December2002, in response to an application from theExecutive Director, Wildlife ProtectionSociety of India, seeking suitable reliefagainst alleged encroachment anddestruction of mangroves by fishermen.

The CEC’s report of 24 December 2002directed the West Bengal government toremove all traces of encroachment onJambudwip by 31 March 2003. However, theCEC observed that the proposal for fish dryingon the island could still be considered, butonly after obtaining clearance from theMinistry of Home Affairs and the Ministryof External Affairs for the fishermeninvolved, since some Bangladeshis werealleged to be involved illegally in the island’sfisheries.

The CEC denouement followed a series ofevents consequent to the Supreme Courtorder of 12 December 1996 on the issue offorest encroachment. Further to its Order of23 November 2001 restraining the CentralGovernment from regularizing allencroachments, the Ministry of Environmentand Forests (MoEF) wrote to all States andUnion Territories on 3 May 2002 to regularizeonly eligible encroachments before 1980 andto evict all other encroachments by 30September 2002. The Forest Department,soon after receiving this letter from the MoEF,ordered the Jambudwip fishermen not to usethe island and to remove their fishingimplements from their makeshift sheds.

Subsequently, the Department set fire to thesheds and fishing implements in July-August2002. The torching of bamboo-and-reedsheds and fishing implements is particularlyintriguing since there was a Ministerialmeeting held between the Fisheries and theForest Departments on 9 August 2002. Atthis meeting, a decision was made, asreported in the press, to regularize theseasonal use of a demarcated area ofJambudwip for fish drying by fishermenholding identity cards issued by the FisheriesDepartment.

A subsequent letter dated 30 October 2002from the MoEF even made provision for settingup district-level committees or commissionsto settle disputed claims of eligibleencroachments. But no such initiative wastaken in the case of Jambudwip. The letteralso revealed a softening of the MoEF’sposition; the earlier rigid stand on “summaryeviction” by 30 September gave way to“showing progress on the eviction of ineligibleencroachments”.

Entry blockedThe West Bengal forest authorities, however,hardened their stand on Jambudwip. Theyerected concrete pillars at the mouth of thecreek—the lifeblood of the fishermen andtheir fisheries— allegedly to block the entryof fishing vessels into the creek. On 12November 2002, for the first time in the historyof Jambudwip, ten fishermen drowned at seaduring a cyclone, as they were unable to seekshelter in the creek.

Soon after the drowning incident, the NationalFishworkers’ Forum (NFF), India, launchedan agitation on 18 November 2002 againstpreventing seasonal fisheries camps andblocking entry of fishing vessels into the creekin Jambudwip. Subsequently, the PrincipalSecretary of Fisheries, West Bengal, informedthe CEC that the West Bengal StateGovernment had decided to permit fishingactivity in Jambudwip on the ground that ithas been continuing for almost 50 years.

The fishermen resumed fishing but they werestill prevented from landing their catch inJambudwip. On 25 November 2002, afterremoving a few of the concrete pillars erectedby the West Bengal Forest Department, thefishermen entered the creek and sat in theirfishing vessels in peaceful protest againstbeing denied access to the island.

On 26 November 2002, the Chief Secretaryof West Bengal wrote to the CEC requestingit to agree to the State Government proposalto allow the fishermen to resume fish-dryingactivities up to February 2003 as an interim

The West Bengalforest authorities,however, hardenedtheir stand onJambudwip. Theyerected concretepillars at themouth of thecreek—thelifeblood of thefishermen andtheir fisheries—allegedly to blockthe entry of fishingvessels into thecreek

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SAMUDRA Dossier

measure and to await a formal proposal onthe issue from the State Government. Theletter also contained viable proposals for long-term solutions to the vexing issue, such asallowing the seasonal fishery in a fenced areaalong the seaboard of Jambudwip, with fullprotection to mangroves beyond the fencedarea.

Although it indirectly makes provisions forresuming fish-drying activities for the 2002-03 season, the report of the CEC hangs like aDamocles sword on the future of theJambudwip fishery. As we go to press, thereis still uncertainty if the fishermen couldresume their fishery from the year 2003-04.About 3,000 fishworkers live on the islandduring the season, staying in makeshift shedsof bamboo and reed, repairing fishing nets,sorting, drying and storing fish, while about3,500 fishermen engage in behundi jalfishing in the adjacent sea. What makesbehundi jal fisheries possible is the uniquedelta ecosystem and the community’s in-depth understanding of the inter-relationshipsbetween the lunar cycle, oceanic currentsand the migratory behaviour of fish, inconjunction with the dynamics of bottomtopography of the sea, including the patternof sedimentation and soil quality. The fisheryis marked by simultaneous capture, transportand processing activities, with different setsof people involved round-the-clock as oneunit under one bahardar, or fleet operator.

In actual practice, it is like setting up twocamps: one on land and the other at sea, sincethe fishermen who fish do not return to theisland until the end of the season, unless thereis a cyclone or some accident. The fishingground is connected to the fish-drying yardsby fish transport vessels that operate daily,sometimes twice a day.

The island—especially the creek during hightide—is not only useful for unloading fish andloading victuals for the fishermen staying onthe fishing ground, it is also beneficial as arefuge from cyclones. Drinking water andfirewood are also available on the island.Easy access to sufficient quantities of

firewood was a long-term requirement notonly for cooking, but, more importantly, forboiling hemp fishing nets in natural dyes tomake them invisible to fish in the thick mudThese days though, firewood is used only forcooking since everyone has switched to nylonnets, which do not require any dyeing.

In the behundi jal fishery, a series of bagnets are fixed in the black, sticky mud in theseabed undulations called khari at a distanceof about 25 nautical miles from Jambudwip.The khari has a combination of disintegratedmangrove wood and mud, and is an importantsource of food for bottom-feeder fish.Aggregation of benthic fish attracts other fishthat predate on them. Both prey and predatorfish become quarry for the fishermen.

Bag net designEach fishing unit has about 20 bag nets. Thebag net has an average length of 75 ft andhas a 60-ft mouth. Ropes, corresponding tothe water column depth, bind wings of bagnet on either side of its mouth to metal stakesdriven into the mud. The knots are ingeniouslytied so that the mouth of the net always facesthe water current, in both high and low tide.

The net is designed in such a manner that astrong current would take it to the bottom ofthe channel, while a weaker current wouldkeep it at the midwater level. In the absenceof a current, the net would float on thesurface. Two hardy bamboo poles are tiedvertically to the mouth of the net, 20 ft apart,to keep it open. The nets are fixed at depthsof 12 to 15 fathoms. The high opening of thebag net, in synchrony with the currents, allowsboth demersal and midwater species to becaught.

In each of the khari, five nets are fixed in arow, as a cluster. Often, different khari arechosen to deploy the nets. Unlike the trawlnet, which furrows the seabed, the stationarybag nets do not cause any damage to theseabed. The fish are emptied every six hours,at the time of the equilibrium between thehigh and low tides, when there are nocurrents, and when the mouth of the net floats

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SAMUDRA Dossier

on the surface of the sea. Fish are emptiedfrom the cod-end of the net; doa—theBengali word for emptying the cod-end—can be translated as ‘milking’ the net. Eachunit catches about 400 tonnes of fish in asingle season. Two-thirds of the catchcomprise species like Bombay duck,ribbonfish, anchovies, silver belly and wolfherring that are dried for human consumptionand poultry feed. The remainder one-thirdcomprises high-value species like shrimp,jewfish, catfish, Indian salmon, eels and rays,which are sold fresh. It is estimated that eachunit catches fish worth Rs4 mn (approx.US$80,000) in a good season. Putting all theunits together, Jambudwip produces about16,000 tonnes of fish worth Rs168 mn(approx. US$3.4 mn) in a five-month-longfishing season.

According to Dr L K Banerjee, Retired JointDirector, Botanical Survey of India, who hasworked on the mangroves of Sundarbans forthe past 30 years, Jambudwip has successivestages of vegetation, comprising mainlyAvicennia species of mangroves, and speciesof grass like Porteraesia coarctata andPhoenix paludosa. The species diversity onthe island is not that significant. However,the satellite imageries of Jambudwip for theperiod 1981 to 2001 from the NationalRemote Sensing Agency (NRSA) furnishedto the CEC by the Forest Department as“irrefutable proof” of mangrove destructionshow dense mangrove vegetation coverageexcept in areas that are allegedly cleared bythe fishermen. Moreover, since higher-resolution satellite images clearly showingdeforestation to the detail that the NRSA

images are claiming to portray have beenproduced in India only from 1998, theauthenticity of the images as irrefutable prooffor the period prior to 1998 needs to beindependently verified scientifically.

Even if there is felling of mangroves on theJambudwip island for firewood by thefishworkers, it is not an impossible situationto salvage since the Avicennia species ofmangroves found on the island can besuccessfully regenerated. There are several

examples from India as well as other partsof the world. Moreover, the fishworkers areready to move from firewood to liquefiedpetroleum gas for cooking purposes.

There are about 10,000 people dependent onthe stake-net fishery today, as against a coupleof hundreds 35 years ago. Instead ofextinguishing the fishery, what is required isto recognize its salient aspects and mitigatenegative impacts through better coastal areamanagement, treating the island and thefishing ground within one framework. TheFisheries and Forest Departments have todevelop mechanisms to collaborate with thefishermen to achieve this goal.

“I gave commands; Then all smiles stoppedtogether”, the poet Robert Browning madethe Count say in My Last Duchess. In thecase of Jambudwip, it is high time to retractthe command and bring back the smiles ofthe fishermen of the island.

What makesbehundi jal fisheriespossible is theunique deltaecosystem and thecommunity’s in-depthunderstanding ofthe inter-relationshipsbetween the lunarcycle, oceaniccurrents and themigratorybehaviour of fish,in conjunctionwith the dynamicsof bottomtopography of thesea, including thepattern ofsedimentation andsoil quality

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In the beginning, fish were aplenty andthere were no rules upon the face of thedeep, and the spirit of free access moved

upon the waters. And the fishermen saw thatit was good and fished as many fishes asthey needed to feed their families and theirneighbours. But people were multiplying andreplenishing the earth, and more and morefishermen had to catch more and more fishto meet the demand of the ever-growinghumanity. And governments said: let therebe management, so that there would alwaysbe enough fish left in the seas to procreate.And they limited the gear, the vessels, theseasons, and the fishing areas, and they calledit ‘input regulation’. But, the fishermen keptfishing and their fleets kept growing, and thegovernments saw that it was bad. So theymade licences, and their scientist thought upthe maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and thetotal allowable catches (TACs). But thefishermen kept competing, and over-capitalizing, and the fish became scarce. Andthe economists said unto the governments:let there be property rights. And they spawnedindividual transferable quotas (ITQs). Andthey believed that it is good and said unto thefishermen: Behold, rights’ privatization is yoursalvation. And the governments sent the ITQsupon waters to replenish the seas and subdueall fisheries.

And it was good! This is more or less thegospel, which prevails throughout fisheriesadministrations in many countries. It makessome people richer and they become itsdevoted believers and supporters, while themany made poorer—or afraid to becomeso—its adamant opponents. And theconsequences in almost every single case aremore or less gradual concentration of fishing

rights in fewer and fewer hands, often enoughin the hands of major corporate interests, atthe expense of small-scale, family- andskipper-owned fishing enterprises that operateone or two small or even medium-sizedfishing vessels, each.

Fisheries management is supposed to lookafter the health of the fish resources exploitedby fishermen. This requires knowledge offishery biology and ecology, populationdynamics, and historical data of the fisheryand of environmental and associated stockfluctuations in its area. As fisheriesmanagement can only manage people, itentails negotiations, legislation, technologyand enforcement. There is a whole catalogueof management systems and technical andadministrative methods that managers canuse to try to achieve their targets. The politicalattitude of the powers in charge determinesthe choice of the system and the manner inwhich it is applied through licensing, quotasallocation, or limits set on effort. The systemchosen influences, through allocating benefitsto the different stakeholders, the distributionof the benefits derived from the resource.For example, allocating fishing rights to a largenumber of small-scale fishermen would callfor different management methods thanallocating them to a large company.

Traditional knowledgeOld-type management by tribal andcommunity leaders and local fisherfolk’sorganizations based on traditional knowledgeof the resource and traditional justice, is nowalmost totally extinct. It has been replacedthroughout most of the world by bureaucraticand technocratic mechanisms heavilyinfluenced by political and economic

Hijacked by neoliberal economicsMenakhem Ben-Yami

A fashionable neoclassical political-economic ideologyhas taken over the management of many fisheries

This article is byMenakhem Ben-Yami, FisheriesManagement andDevelopmentAdviser, Israel, Thisarticle first appearedin SAMUDRA ReportNo. 35, July 2003

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SAMUDRA Dossier

considerations that, while interested in fishas marketable merchandise and a source ofprofits to the operators, have only little to dowith safeguarding the resource as a sourceof income to fishing people. Fisheriesmanagement has thus become a power playover benefits from the resource.Stakeholders are many, starting with fishingpeople and local interests in fishingcommunities, through recreational fishermen,environmental lobbies and coastaldevelopment interests, and ending withpowerful corporations and market forces,whether local, national or multinational.

Neoclassical economics invaded themanagement of various commons andnational resources as an extension of aparadigm dominant—though very much atissue—in the industrialized world. Its gospelis being spread over the world and its political,financial and academic institutions by troopsof disciplined economists, rewarded fordevotion, and punished for dissent. So, whatis this neoliberal or neoclassical teaching ineconomics that has also impinged onfisheries? And on what basis are its devotedadherents preaching that theirs is the onlyway society can take to utilize its fishresources in a feasible and efficient manner?

The old ‘classical’ economic teachingintroduced the belief in the ‘invisible hand’driven by self-interest guiding rationalindividual decisions eventually into anoptimum economy, in which free-marketforces take care of all aspects of peoples’lives. An implied outcome of such ‘free play’is that any financial profit derived from acommon, fully, partly or quasi-privatizedresource would somehow trickle down andredistribute itself all over the society.

But this is a myth and a fallacious contention,if not an outright lie. It is common knowledgethat, in most of the world’s countries, a bigshare of such benefits indeed trickles down,but to various investments abroad, and toimported luxury products and services. The‘trickle-down’ theory can approach the realsituation only in a few rich countries, where

profits feel secure and investments promisefurther accumulation of capital.

Recently, more and more economists andother social scientists have started castingdoubts on the neoclassical gospel, nicknamedby some as ‘autistic economics’. Awardingthe 2002 Nobel Price in economics to twoprofessors, one of them a psychologist, whorefuted the theory that, as a rule, individualsmake rational economic decisions, reflectedthis growing criticism. Economic determinisminherent in the neoliberal theory does not work;the markets’ reaction to prices, the prices’reaction to the dynamics of supply anddemand, and peoples’ reactions and economicactivities do not fit that theory’s assumptions.Hence, its weakness in economic analysis andforecasting.

Some economists and other social scientistsargue that, contrary to its pretense to ascientific, objective approach, neoclassicaleconomics is, in fact, a social-politicalnarrative and a methodology used by globaleconomic and political interests toconcentrate power in the hands of corporatenational and multinational institutions. Thus,individual businessmen and small andmedium-scale private enterprises, not tospeak of wage earners, are losing theirinfluence on socioeconomic decision makingto powerful commercial-industrial centres andtheir collaborators in governments. Thistransfer of power is promoted, legislated, andexecuted through democratic processesoccurring within the existing legal frameworkwith the help of well-financed journalistic andmedia campaigns and more or less biasedscientific publications, with the neoclassicaleconomic narrative serving as a tool forachieving the explicit goals and hiddenagendas of its promoters. Thus, the ‘invisiblehand’ has been transformed from the sum ofthe multitude of individual decisions into thesum of the political and economic decisionsof powerful interests.

Profit maximizationNeoclassical economics is supposed to aimat and produce maximization of social and

Fisheriesmanagement hasthus become apower play overbenefits from theresource.Stakeholders aremany, startingwith fishing peopleand local interestsin fishingcommunities,throughrecreationalfishermen,environmentallobbies andcoastaldevelopmentinterests, andending withpowerfulcorporations andmarket forces,whether local,national ormultinational

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SAMUDRA Dossier

national benefits, which, in fact, are dollar-equivalent measures of how economistsvalue goods and services (including non-market goods and services). It preachesmaximization of profits or rents often attainedat the expense of heavy social costs. Thebig question is how these costs and benefitsare defined and calculated; since social costsare very difficult to estimate, any portrayalof economics as an absolute, scientificmethodology is simply fallacious, and honesteconomists admit that they cannot adequatelycalculate all social benefits and all socialcosts.

It is obvious that losses incurred throughforfeiture of alternative actions, and due tovarious social and other external costs, manyof which cannot be evaluated in terms ofdollars and cents, are a part and parcel ofany economy. As long as we do not take intoaccount all the costs and benefits fromproduction and market fluctuations, variousmanagement steps, social, economic andcultural dislocations of people and theirramifications affecting coastal communities,as well as other ‘externalities’ difficult toexpress in monetary terms, we are unable tocalculate the true net social costs andbenefits.

Also, many people associate the term ‘socialbenefits’ with how national resources aredistributed across society. They ask, forexample, how many people make a livingfrom a certain resource. A ‘less efficient’small-scale fishery that employs many morepeople than an ‘efficient’ big-owner fleet,may feed less monies to the ‘national purse’,but, as a rule, is directly and effectively morebeneficial to people and their communities.Only an in depth analysis can establish whichoption would produce truer benefits andvalues. Thus, it is quite consequential whodefines national and social benefits, and how.

For example, calculation of net nationalbenefits for an industrial shrimp fishery in anon-industrial country must include adeduction of the costs of all imports, such asexpatriate manpower, fuel and lubricants,

vessels, deck and propulsion machinery,processing and refrigeration equipment, andfishing gear, as well as insurance andmaintenance costs incurred in foreign-currency. In some cases, the only net benefitsfrom an industrial shrimp fishery in suchcountries are the revenues from licence feesand the employment of nationals, while themajor share of the revenues as well as theproduct itself goes abroad.

Policy costsTherefore, responsible economic theory musttake into account also values that are non-financial/commercial, and the diverseperipheral socioeconomic, political andcultural costs, as well as the taxpayer’s moneyspent on dealing with human problemsresulting from management decisions. Onlythen would the society and its governmentsbe informed of the true costs of any policyproposition, before their natural resources gettransferred into the hands of a few.Nowadays, however, such transfer isfacilitated by governments’ obsession withprivatization as a panacea for all maladies ofthe economy.

The neoliberal gospel preaches thatpractically nothing can work efficiently, if itis not somebody’s private or corporateproperty. The massive ideological privatizationpractised in some countries has embracedalso such natural resources as water, forestsand various energy sources as well as publictransport. Even economically viable, andefficiently run national resources often fallvictim to the privatization Moloch. Howwrong this ideology can be has been recentlywell illustrated by a whole series of flops ofsome mammoth privatized and corporatecompanies, due to both, mismanagement andcorruption, as well as by the ratherdisappointing results of the privatization ofthe British railway system. Swissair, PanAm,Enron and other recent bankrupt giants werenot run by governments.

One consequence of the domination ofneoclassical economics is the rather obscurestruggle between free enterprise and

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SAMUDRA Dossier

corporate interests. In the past, theconception of capitalism and free marketsused to emphasize private initiative.Nowadays, however, it isn’t necessarily so.Neoclassical economics is leading to a regimein which major businesses and corporationsare gradually displacing smaller-scaleenterprises and businessmen, while beingindifferent towards the social conditions ofworking people, whose role it reduces toselling their work power on the market. It is‘happy’ when supply of labour exceedsdemand, because unemployment depresseswages and improves profits.

Some time ago, after the demise of the Sovietsystem, one would think that free enterprisehad won. One is not so sure nowadays. Likethe Soviet monopolistic concerns, some ofthe giant companies of the ‘capitalist’ worldare run by financial bureaucracies supportedby ideological economists, who seem toconsider small and family-owned enterprisesa noise and a nuisance in their concept of‘economically efficient’ world.

The invasion of fisheries by neoclassicaleconomics has been a logical consequenceto its domination of the global, and manynational, economies. Like many historicalinvasions, it was partly invited from insidethe fisheries by large-scale interests and theirproxies in the management mechanisms,who gave it a friendly reception. Once in, itseems to be here to stay, especially in all thosecountries where, for various reasons, it is notmet with strong opposition.

What brought this ideology into the fisheriesis its claim that privatization is the mostefficient, if not the only, mode of exploiting aresource. This, even if the resource belongsto the whole nation, as is the case with water,forests and, for that matter, fish in the sea.

When, following the Second World War, thespiralling growth of fisheries brought aboutthe need for management, it was initiallybased on so-called ‘input control’. This impliesregulation of fishing effort through suchmeans as limited access, fishing time and

areas, as well as other regulations that try tofollow the biological characteristics of thespecies involved. In some countries thismanagement system still works well enough;in others it has been deemed, rightly orwrongly, inadequate. Fish population dynamicsmodels have been used to estimate thebiomass of fish populations and, consequently,the fixing of TACs. In some fisheries this ledto highly competitive ‘gold rush’ fishingoperations and investment in excessivelystrong and fast vessels. The next step wasdividing the TAC into quotas that wereallocated to vessels, usually, according to theirfishing history. And this was the momentwhen the neoliberal economists stepped inwith a new pattern: marketable fishing quotas(ITQs).

Property rightsThey introduced the rather axiomatic theorythat property rights are a must in fisheriesfor maximum benefit and efficiency, spelledout in financial terms and rational exploitationof the resource. Since property rights arecharacterized by (i) security, or quality of title;(ii) exclusivity; (iii) permanence; and (iv)transferability, their application in fisheriesboils down to ITQs. Thus, mere ‘fishing rights’have become ‘private property rights’. Tradein fishing rights eventually must hit the weakerstakeholder by allocating individual quotas toosmall to pay a vessel owner’s way out of thered, on the one hand, and by pricing licencesand quota entitlements above the value of his/her fishing boat and gear, on the other.

A licence gone from a fishing community isgone forever, together with all the associatedjobs, services and income. If it were not forsocial opposition, a worldwide adoption ofITQs would have proceeded faster.

Since marketable quota systems favour thefinancially stronger, they invariably lead to agradual displacement of small-scale individualor family-owned fishing enterprises, and,sooner or later, to the concentration of fishingrights in the hands of a few, either specializedfishing companies, or large holdingcorporations for whom fishing may be only

The invasion offisheries byneoclassicaleconomics hasbeen a logicalconsequence to itsdomination of theglobal, and manynational,economies. Likemany historicalinvasions, it waspartly invited frominside the fisheriesby large-scaleinterests and theirproxies in themanagementmechanisms, whogave it a friendlyreception

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one branch of a multifarious business. Suchconcentration would eventually occur evenwhere there are legislative attempts atstipulating acquisition of quota by somemaximum values. Hence, there is a growingconcern of ‘privatization by stealth’.

It is incredible that managers introducing thissystem into small-scale or mixed fisherieswould be unaware that its social, economicand political ramifications favour large-scalebusiness at the expense of local fisheries andprocessing industries, and small-scaleoperators, and threaten the survival of thesmall-scale fishing sector. ITQs tend todepress artisanal fishers and effectivelyexclude part-time participants in localfisheries, and favour the owners, whiledisregarding crew members. Hence, theselection of ITQ for such fisheries mustreflect the political and social attitudes of therespective governments.

Green non-governmental organizations(NGOs) have willy-nilly contributed to theprivatization trend. Although some of them,for example, Greenpeace, have joinedprotests against ITQs, there have been NGOswith often exaggerated and sometimes evenfallacious alarmist publications on the stateof fishery resources, painting the fishermenas the main culprits, which fueled theneoclassical economists’ fires. ITQ advocateshave claimed that privatization based onmarketable fishing quotas would maintain fishstocks at sustainable levels.

Gold rushTheir main argument was: “If fishing interestsare allowed to invest in a permanent shareof the TAC, so that they’d be sure of theirrelative share in the landings of the respectivespecies from a given area, they wouldn’tneed to apply the ‘gold-rush’ mode ofoperation, and would be interested inmaintaining the resource in an everlastinglysustainable condition.” On the other hand,ITQs are a rather peculiar sort of propertyrights: one pays, sometimes quite heavily, forthe right to catch a certain amount of fish;one never knows whether one will be able to

get it and at what operational cost, and onedoesn’t really control the resource anddoesn’t know whether by observing the rulesand sticking to the quota, one is not made asucker by others.

Hence, the potential well-intendedstewardship over the resources by quota-owners is, in fact, more than often frustratedby high grading, fish dumping and quotabusting. While ITQs indeed mitigated the‘gold-rush’ fishing, and their contribution tostock conservation might have happened ina few fisheries, it has been proved so only ina couple of them. At the same time, failureshave been reported and documented.

The ITQ system would be socially andnationally justifiable where the resource istechnically not accessible to small- andmedium-scale operators based in coastalfishing communities, and where exploitationof the resource requires large-scale industrialfishing vessels and fleet logistics.

But where large numbers of small-scaleoperators traditionally exploit inshore andcoastal resources, most of them considermarketable quotas socially and alsoeconomically wrong. Harvesting methodsthat are most efficient in financial terms areoften the ones with the worst collateral(including environmental) impact, while lesscapital-intensive and technologically andoperationally sophisticated fishing methodsnormally allow wider and much moreequitable access to benefits from the fishery,with less negative environmental and socialimpacts.

In Third World countries, for example, coastalfisheries operate under many stresses, themain one being invasion of larger-scalefisheries into waters and stocks accessibleto, and fishable by, small-scale fishermen,often with official government support orhigh-circles’ well-paid ‘closing of the eye’.

But, in such areas, large-scale operations areless efficient than small-scale fishing. Theyconsume several times more fuel per tonne

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SAMUDRA Dossier

of marketable fish than the small-boat fishery;capital investment in gear and vessels ishigher; and they produce fewer truenational benefits.

The same fish stock that can be fully andprofitably exploited by 10 trawlers mannedby 100 people, if allocated exclusively tocoastal fisherfolk using nets, pots and hooks-and-lines, may provide a living to manyhundreds, or maybe thousands of them, nevermind how low their calculated profits aregoing to be.

In many areas, both recreational and small-scale commercial fisheries form thebackbone of coastal communities whoseeconomies revolve around fishing. It causesmoney to flow to equipment and bait, foodand fuel suppliers, boatyards, and a varietyof commercial and technical services indocks, harbours and marinas, as well as thosesectors of the tourist industry that are centredon fishing communities.

Hidden agendasNo doubt, management decisions dependfirst of all on the prevailing policy objectives.Different governments and the powers thatinfluence them may have different, above-board and hidden agendas. Hence,worldwide, there is no consensus on theobjectives of fisheries management. Somegovernments may believe that safeguardingthe well-being of communities where fisheryis an important contributor to the local and,thus, national economy is an important goal.‘Safeguarding the well-being’ means creatingand maintaining conditions that would enablethe fishing industry to get an adequate returnon investment, and fishing people, sufficienttake-home incomes.

It also may mean that in certain specialcircumstances, the State may have tointervene to help a community over atemporary hardship, as it would do forfarmers hit by a drought year, or an industrialcommunity hit by an earthquake. Isn’t thatwhat governments are for: collecting taxes,providing services, and helping in trouble?

But some governments, as well as mostglobal, transnational and intergovernmentalfinancial institutions are driven by theneoclassical ideology, especially when itcomes to economic relations with developingnations. Undeniably, some of the conditionsof economic co-operation and assistanceimposed by those institutions stem from theirwish to protect their investments frommisconduct, corruption and mismanagement.But, only too often, under the hypocriticalpretext of securing free markets andeconomic liberalization, their conditions aresimply a tool of protectionism. And here wecome to fisheries subsidies. The UnitedStates, the European Union (EU) and someother developed countries, in view of theheavy overcapitalization of their fishing fleets,came to the quite appropriate decision to stopsubsidizing the construction of fishing vessels.They want, however, to have their newpolicies ‘globalized’ to cover also thedeveloping world.

A number of developing countries too havehad, for many years, large national fleets, andthey should not subsidize overcapacity as well.Any international agreement involving fisherysubsidies should take into account small-scalefishermen, who have to compete for the localfish resources with large-scale fishing fleetsallowed to fish or poach on their native,traditional fishing grounds. Such fleets aresubsidized, almost as a rule, whether directlyor in a roundabout manner, as are the EU

payments for access to fishing grounds ofThird World nations. Small-scale fisherfolkoperating under such conditions deservesupport both on the part of their ownrespective governments, as well as theinternational community. Would it be too muchto ask the EU, and individual governments ofcountries whose fleets are out to exploitcoastal fish stocks of their own or othercountries, as well as the governments whoallow such fleets into their coastal waters, togive them a fighting chance?

Fisherfolk in the small-and medium-scalesectors both, owners and hired hands, whodo not want to be dislocated from their

Any internationalagreementinvolving fisherysubsidies shouldtake into accountsmall-scalefishermen, whohave to competefor the local fishresources withlarge-scale fishingfleets allowed tofish or poach ontheir native,traditional fishinggrounds

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SAMUDRA Dossier

traditional fisheries by management systemsbased on marketable fishing rights, shouldrecognize that their main adversaries are thestandard bearers of neoclassical economicsin national and transnational financialinstitutions and corporations, and their proxiesin fisheries management. It is very difficultto resist such powerful interests in democraticsocieties without joining forces. For thispurpose, provincial, national and regionalfishermen’s associations should organizeunder common umbrellas. Also, internationalassociations of fishing people should createa joint worldwide umbrella that would notaffect their individual structure and character,but would enable them to board theglobalization train in weight and force.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The struggle by artisanal fishers in Peruhas been in the news of late. Theyare demanding that the integrity of the

five-mile artisanal fishing zone be maintained,in the face of recent moves to open up‘windows of penetration’ to allow large-scaleindustrial fishing in the southern part of thecountry (see The Holy Grail, pg. 42).

Starting in the 1970s, several countriesaround the world have established artisanalfishing zones. In many cases, the declarationof such zones was a response by States tothe growing conflicts between the large-scaleand the artisanal sectors, as in India andIndonesia. Faced with increasing and unequalcompetition from the technologically efficientlarge-scale sector, artisanal fishworkers inmany countries expressly demanded theestablishment of these zones.

That such zones can play an important rolefrom a social perspective is undeniable.Millions of people in the developing worlddepend on fisheries for a livelihood, and amajority of them fish in coastal and nearshorewaters. Their livelihoods, as well as thefisheries resource base, are known to bedirectly and indirectly jeopardized by theactivities of industrial and large-scale fleetsusing destructive gear, such as bottom trawls,in coastal waters.

From a fisheries management perspectivetoo, the logic for the establishment of artisanalzones, where only selective fishing gear andtechniques are permitted, is incontestable.Coastal and inter-tidal areas are known tobe highly fragile, productive and importantas spawning and breeding grounds. As such,a regulation that allows only selective andresponsible fishing in such zones, in

combination with other managementmeasures, could be very effective.

These issues are to be discussed at aworkshop that the International Collective inSupport of Fishworkers (ICSF) is organizingearly next year, titled Sustaining Fisheriesand Livelihoods in Latin America: TheImperative of Secure Access Rights forArtisanal Fishworkers.

In deciding on measures that could supportthe small-scale and artisanal sector, thechanging context and the dynamism withinthis sector must also be kept in mind. It wouldbe inappropriate to see the artisanal zone asa ‘box’ within which the small-scale sector isconfined. The small-scale sector, in manyparts of the world, as in the Philippines,Senegal, India, Sri Lanka, Peru and Chile, hasconvincingly demonstrated its ability toharvest highly migratory resources, such astuna and shark, in a sustainable manner, indeeper waters within the exclusive economiczones (EEZs). To the extent that small-scalefisheries for such species is technologicallyand environmentally efficient, and leads tosocially desirable outcomes such as greateremployment and equitable distribution ofincome, it must be supported through specificpolicy measures.

Recognizing the artisanal zone is an importantfirst step towards recognizing and supportingthe artisanal and small-scale sector. Thestruggles of artisanal and small-scalefishworkers for maintaining the integrity ofthe artisanal zone, as in Peru, can not but bebacked. By demonstrating enough politicalwill, States can design and implementfisheries management measures that meet thegoals of both equity and sustainability.

Towards artisanal fishing zonesRecognizing the artisanal zone is an important first step towardsrecognizing and supporting the artisanal and small-scale sector

Millions of peoplein the developingworld depend onfisheries for alivelihood, and amajority of themfish in coastal andnearshore waters.

This editorialcomment firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo.39, November2004

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SAMUDRA Dossier

In several Latin American countries, thecomplementary objectives of securingartisanal fishing rights and conserving

marine resources are enshrined in law. Thus‘artisanal fishing zones’ have come to berecognized as special kinds of marinereserves, where small-scale fishing is allowedto take place without interference fromlarger-scale activities. Intensive, non-selective and destructive fishing activities(often referred to as ‘industrial fishing’, andgeared to the production of fishmeal) arebanned from these close-to-shore zones. Therecognition of reserved artisanal fishing zoneshas, in many cases, come after long and hard-won (and ongoing) struggles, particularly inthe two neighbouring Southern Conecountries of Chile and Peru. Here ‘exclusiveartisanal zones’ have been established withina boundary of five nautical miles from theshoreline.

Despite these advances, artisanal fishingzones are subject to continuing incursions,both legal and illegal, by industrial and large-scale fishing operations. Clashes are alsoincreasingly prevalent between artisanalfishing communities and aquacultureenterprises. Again, aquaculture enterprisesmay operate both legally (through beinggranted concessions) or illegally. In someLatin American countries, aquacultureenterprises have been set up illegally followingviolent (often armed) seizure of land and theintimidation of local communities throughkillings and torture.

In addition, it is an unfortunate fact of lifethat some government functionaries are notimpartial actors in the decision- and law-making processes. In many countries, the

investment sector (for intensive aquacultureand industrial fisheries) often carries morepolitical clout than small-scale fisheries.Worse still, high-ranking government officialsmay also be the captains of those veryindustries seeking to gain access toconservation areas reserved for artisanalfishing.

In Chile, Ecoceanos News of 15 October2004 reports that allegations of ‘illegalenrichment’ have resulted in a SpecialParliamentary Commission being set up toinvestigate the ‘black market’ in aquacultureconcessions. Aquaculture concessions areallocated free of charge, and with no timelimit set. The only requirement is the paymentof a nominal annual charge of between60,000 and 120,000 pesos (approximatelyUS$100-200). The owner is then free to leaseor sell these freely acquired concessions.Ecoceanos reports that in some regions suchconcessions may sell for as much as US$1mn.

In August 2001, the Chilean FisheriesSubsecretary, Daniel Albaran, resigned amidallegations of corruption and professionalmisconduct. Albarran was, at the same time,the chairman of several aquacultureenterprises and Fisheries Subsecretary. In hispublic function, he was responsible forapproving large numbers of aquacultureconcessions. In business, he had an interestin how concessions were allocated. He maywell come under the scrutiny of theParliamentary Commission.

Aquaculture concessionsLikewise, in Peru, the handing out ofaquaculture concessions in traditional fishing

The Holy GrailBrian O’Riordan

This article examines the background to the changes now beingproposed for the status of the artisanal fishing zone in Peru

This article has beencompiled by BrianO’Riordan, based oncorrespondence withvarious organizations,and news items andofficial documentsavailable on theInternet. This articlefirst appeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 39, November2004

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SAMUDRA Dossier

areas, in both the coastal areas and inlandwaters, has been strongly criticized. Therehave been fierce conflicts between artisanalfishermen and aquaculture enterprises overissues of access rights in several fishingcommunities along the coast—Chimbote,Samanco, Casma, Callao, Pisco and Ilo.

Given a situation of increasing insecurity, andfaced with growing threats to their livelihoodrights from competing interests, artisanalfishworkers from Chile and Peru haverecently committed themselves to establishingan International Commission in Defence ofthe Five-Mile Zone. The commission wasestablished earlier this year during the SecondBi-national Peru-Chile Artisanal Fishermen’sMeeting that took place in the northernChilean city of Arica, from 1-2 July 2004.Then, in September 2004, in the Port of Ilo,Peru, the commission organized anInternational Forum on Artisanal Fishing towiden the network and to articulate moreclearly the demands of artisanal fishworkers.In parallel, non-governmental organizationsin the Southern Cone region, from Chile,Argentina and Uruguay, met in July 2004 toset up a Southern Cone Coalition to promotesustainable fisheries and social equity in theregion.

In 1992, an area was legally reserved forartisanal fishing in the nearshore waters ofPeru through Supreme Decree D.S. 017-92.This established the zone adjacent to thecoast: “comprising the area between zero andfive nautical miles, as a conservation zonefor the flora and fauna that exist there”.“Carrying out fishing activities for direct orindirect human consumption with purse-seines, and with other methods, gear andfishing devices that modify the biologicalconditions of the marine environment” isbanned. The decree was passed due to “theserious interference of industrial fishing fleetsand fleets fishing for direct humanconsumption in zones declared as theexclusive reserve for the operation ofartisanal fishing vessels.” It recognizes theimportance of this zone for “upwelling andthe breeding of the principal fisheryresources that sustain the fishery for direct

human consumption”, and the need to“establish measures conducive for itsprotection”.

In 1995, another Supreme Decree modifiedsome of these conditions, and clarified thatthe ban on purse-seining refers only toindustrial fishing, and not to artisanal fishing.It also clarified that the 0-5 nautical mile zoneis reserved for artisanal fishing and, as such,that artisanal purse-seines may be used in thezone, so long as they comply with the criteriaset by the Ministry of Fisheries.

Fierce conflictsBut the permission granted to artisanal purse-seining activities in the five-mile zone has ledto fierce conflicts in the northern region ofTumbes. Thus, in August 2004, the PeruvianMinistry of Production was forced to call inthe navy to establish control measures on theactivities of the so-called vikingos chicos(little vikings) and bolichitos (mini-purse-seines) in the sea around Tumbes.

The 1995 modification also makes the banconditional on the technical opinion of Peru’sMarine Institute (IMARPE). And here lies thebone of contention for artisanal fishermen inthe south of the country, notably those fromthe port town of Ilo. In February 2001, IMARPE

published a technical report, titled TheProblematic of the Five-mile in the Southof Peru and Technical Alternatives for ItsManagement. The report observes that, inthe south of the country, the distribution andconcentration of the main fishery resourcesare localized in the zone 10 miles from thecoast. This is due to climatic andoceanographic factors, and the presence ofa very narrow continental shelf. In thissouthern region, the shelf width averages fivenautical miles, but ranges from a maximumof 13 nautical miles to less than two(compared to 70 nautical miles in the northernregion around Chimbote).

IMARPE notes that the concentration offishery resources becomes more pronouncedin summer (between December and March),especially in the five-mile zone. Its reportprovides an overview of oceanographic

There have beenfierce conflictsbetween artisanalfishermen andaquacultureenterprises overissues of accessrights in severalfishingcommunities alongthe coast

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SAMUDRA Dossier

conditions in the southern region, anddescribes the spawning behaviour of thePeruvian anchovy. Known locally asanchoveta (Engraulis ringens), it is themain species targeted by industrial fishingactivities supplying the fishmeal processors.The report then goes on to describe theactivities of both the industrial and artisanalfishery in the south of the country.

In Peru, some 700 marine species are legallyclassified according to whether they aredestined for direct human consumption (some150 species) or for industrial purposes (twoor three main species, including anchovy/anchoveta—Engraulis ringens and Anchoanasus—and sardine). In fact, it has recentlybecome national government policy tomobilize supplies of fish (scad, locally calledjurel, and mackerel, caballa) to address theproblems of widespread malnutrition amongstthe low-income segments of the Peruvianpopulation.

This has been enshrined in law throughSupreme Decree D.S. 021-2004, whichestablishes special conditions for the catchof industrial fishmeal vessels to be used forhuman consumption. But FIUPAP is highlycritical of this, pointing out that the industrialsector targeting these resources is alreadyshowing overcapacity. Rather, priority shouldbe given to developing the artisanal sectorand providing market support to ensure thatfishermen obtain a fair price, and low-incomeconsumers an affordable food.

IMARPE’s 2001 report documents thesignificant increase in fishmeal processingcapacity since 1997 in the south of thecountry, and the resulting increase in fishingeffort for anchovy, particularly in the summer.In the period 1990-95, the industrial fleetoperating out of the port of Ilo remained moreor less constant, reaching a maximum of 85vessels in 1992. By 2000, vessel numbers hadincreased to 165, with a peak of activity inthe summer months.

In the period 1991-92, more than 60 per centof the southern industrial fish catch (for

fishmeal) was taken within five miles of thecoast. During the summer months between1993 and 1997, this rose to 80 per cent. Thereport also notes that, in most years, anchovyrepresents more than 80 per cent of theindustrial catch. It refers to an additional 10species caught by the industrial fleetclassified as species for human consumption,but claims that industrial fishing activities havehad little impact on the mainstay species ofthe artisanal sector.

In a subsequent report on artisanal fishing inthe zone 16°S - 18°20’S, IMARPE states thatover the period 1996-2002, 65 per cent ofthe artisanal fishing fleet’s activities werecarried out in the 0-1.5 mile zone, and 99.5per cent within the 2-5 mile zone. Theseobservations have been hotly contested bythe artisanal sector. They claim that part ofthe sector has been forced to retreat inshoreto avoid interference from the industrialsector.

New sectorAlso, in the last few years, a new deep-seasector has developed, and artisanal fishingboats range as far out as 150 miles to catchperico (Coryphaena spp) and sharks(Tiburon diamante and Tiburon azul).

The IMARPE study only looked at activitiesin the five-mile zone, and not outside it. Assuch, it provides an incomplete picture. Also,it only looks at interference between sectors,and not into sustainability issues. The Ilofishermen, therefore, contest the validity ofthe report and its use for policydecisionmaking.

The IMARPE report states that “due to thegreater concentration of fishery resources inthe coastal zone in the summer months, theapplication of a seasonal exception is justifiedin this period, that would allow for lessinterference with artisanal fishing. As thereis a much smaller artisanal fleet South of 18°s(that is, up to the Chilean border), free fishingshould be allowed in this area during thisperiod.” The report goes on: “One measurethat could be applied is that when industrial

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SAMUDRA Dossier

fishing vessels fish inside the five-mile zoneand catch fish classified as being for humanconsumption, these could be given to theartisanal fishermen,” with the caveat that “solong as catch controls are improved for thebycatch of fish for direct humanconsumption. This would also requireimproving the port infrastructure (the artisanalfishing quays) and establishing marketingchannels.”

For the artisanal fishermen, the conclusionsand recommendations provide starkprospects. According to IMARPE, theapplicability of the five-mile zone law in thesouth of the country is not in line with theseasonal oceanographic variations andchanges in species abundance.

They, therefore, recommend that “during thesummer, there should be a seasonal exceptionto the five-mile law”. This would involveallowing the industrial fleet to fish within threemiles of the coast in a belt of about 120 miles(16°S to 17°59’S). From 18°S to the Chileanborder, industrial vessels would be allowedto fish freely right up to the coast. “In allcases, bycatch of species for humanconsumption should be handed over to theartisanal fishing community.”

In December 2003, these recommendationsfound their way into Peruvian fisheries law.Supreme Decree No 037-2003 calls for aspecial fisheries regime to be established foranchovy in the southern region, from 16°s toPeru’s border with Chile. It proposes thatlarger-scale purse-seiners be allowed accessto specified areas (so-called ‘penetrationwindows’) within the artisanal five-mile zone.

The law also establishes that a special, non-Statal, financing mechanism(FONDEMPASUR) be set up for thedevelopment and modernization of theartisanal fishing sector in the southern region.This is to be financed by a levy placed oneach metric tonne of fish landed by licensedindustrial fishing operations.

The law also specifies that all fish caughtother than anchovy should be handed over tothe authorities at the nearest artisanal fishlanding quay, or to the most representativeorganization of artisanal fishermen.Permission is also given to the owners ofartisanal fishing vessels to catch anchovy, and,under exceptional circumstances, sell it forhuman consumption.

In effect, the industrial sector is required toset up a compensation fund in exchange forbeing given these ‘windows of penetration’,and is being ordered to do the artisanalfishermen’s work of catching fish for humanconsumption.

This decree is more or less exactly what theindustrial fishing sector had been lobbying for.It is strongly backed by the southern fishmealproducers organization, APROSUR, whichclaims that in 2003, due to the lack ofnationwide access to the five-mile zone, someUS$ 95 mn worth of foreign exchange frompotential fishmeal exports was lost to thenation, and further, that in the southern region,a potential US$17.33 mn and 4,000 jobs werelost due to fishmeal plant closures. They saythat the IMARPE report completely vindicatestheir claims.

Coastal fishing“The (artisanal zone) decree applies to thewhole coast without taking into account thedifference in the nature of the coastline inthe south and the north. While in Chimbote,the shelf extends to 70 miles, in Ilo, it hardlyreaches 3.5 miles. This means that the(southern) industrial fishing has to bepredominantly coastal,” they say.

They claim that reserving the five-mile zonefor artisanal fishing makes their industry lesscompetitive than Chile’s. “The anchovy thatis not caught by the Peruvian fleet is caughtby the Chilean industrial vessels,” they say.APROSUR and the National Society of FishingVessel Owners (SONAPE) have been activelyorganizing demonstrations and other lobbying

Applicability of thefive-mile zone lawin the south of thecountry is not inline with theseasonaloceanographicvariations andchanges in speciesabundance

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SAMUDRA Dossier

efforts to raise public awareness andinfluence the political processes in theirfavour. The artisanal fishermen of Ilo havestrongly challenged both the IMARPE findingsand the claims of the industrial fishing sector.They accuse the Minister of Production,Javier Reátegui Roselló, of being both judgeand jury, given his personal interests in thefishmeal industry. In their view, allowing‘windows of penetration’ for the industrialfishery in the south is tantamount to ruiningthe fishery.

According to them, the anchovy and otherfishery resources of the south represent anatural resource bank. It is of majorimportance as a feeding and spawning area,which is disrupted and harmfully transformedby industrial fishing activities.

They claim that “measures like makingexceptions to closed seasons in the south ormaking penetration windows in the borderarea for the industrial fishery are irrational,and undermine the sustainability of the fisheryby not guaranteeing any resource or incomefor tomorrow.”

They report that there are around 1,500organized artisanal fishermen based aroundthe port of Ilo. The main organization is theSindicato nico de Pescadores Civiles delPuerto de Ilo Artesanales-Buzos (SUPABCPI),which is a member of the national artisanalfishermen’s federation, FIUPAP. They claimthat there are a similar number of unorganizedfishermen in the region as well.

Artisanal fishing activities around Ilo, whichare all aimed at producing food for humanconsumption, are diverse: mini-purse-seines(bolichito), gill-nets, high-seas fishing, launch(pintero) fishing, line fishing, shellfishgathering, and diving using both compressorsand aqualung.

Over the last 10 years, these activities haveundergone considerable change. Forexample, there are very few launches(pintero) and gill-nets (cortineros) today.The artisanal fishers claim that the root cause

of these changes is the impact of industrialfishing.

On the one hand, the inshore sector has beenincreasingly pushed toward the shore to findareas inaccessible to industrial fishing vessels.This has resulted in localized overfishing anda particular demise of the shellfish resources.

In response, closed seasons have beenestablished, although no seasonal bans on thesale of closed-season species have beenapplied. This has tended to encourage illegalfishing. Traditional fishing areas have alsobeen designated as areas for aquacultureconcessions, putting further pressure onfishermen and resources in the increasinglyrestricted areas where they can fish.

On the other hand, an offshore artisanalfishing sector has developed in the last fewyears. Due to interference from the industrialsector, artisanal fishermen have beenextending their range of operations to as farout as 150 miles, according to Ilo fishermen.But conditions are very harsh, with fishermenspending more than two weeks away fromtheir families, and working in extremelydangerous and exposed conditions. Not onlyare there significant investment costs to bemade in navigation equipment and fishinggear, but, with dramatically increasing fuelprices, this fishery is also becoming aneconomic struggle, particularly as fishing tripsmay clock up distances of 700 miles.

Since its introduction, the December 2003Supreme Decree has been hamstrung by theextreme polarization of the situation. InJanuary 2004, the Ilo fishermen initiated a‘Peruvian Five-Mile Zone DefenceCommittee’, supported by fishermen fromArequipa, Ilo and Tacna. This was followedup by a number of strikes in the south, aimedat disrupting fishing and related activities.

These local activities took on nationalsignificance when, at the end of March 2004,FIUPAP called for an indefinite nationalartisanal fishermen’s strike starting on 5 April.This was scheduled to coincide with the start

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SAMUDRA Dossier

of the Holy Week, a time when manyPeruvian families traditionally eat fish.Subsequently, FIUPAP asked the Food andAgriculture Organization of the UnitedNations (FAO) to intervene formally in theprocess, claiming that Article 6.18 of the FAO

Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheriessupported their claims for a five-mile zone,and was a just cause for complaint.

On 1 April 2004, the Ministry of Productionsuspended the implementation of the newaccess regime for three months. At the sametime, an Enquiry Commission was establishedto evaluate the proposed new fisheries

regime, and to report within 75 days. This‘temporary suspension’ has since beenrenewed twice—on 1 July for 90 days, andthen, most recently, on 4 October 2004 for afurther 90 days, up to January 2005. The mostrecent suspension came four days after thefirst International Forum on Artisanal Fishing,and was considered a victory.

But although a battle may have been won,the ‘windows of penetration’ law still posesa very clear and present danger. It is only amatter of time—three short months beforethe current suspension expires. In themeantime, the government and industrial

The first International Forum on Artisanal Fishingconvened by the International Defence Committee ofthe Five-Mile Zone, meeting from 29 to 30 September2004 in Ilo, Peru, declares that:

The conservation of marine biodiversity and theprotection of fishery resources are fundamental inassuring a supply of indispensable food for humanity,as well as in assuring the livelihoods of the communitiesthat depend on fishing.

The coastal zone within five nautical miles is pre-requisite to the conservation of resources, providingan area for spawning, growing and nutrient upwelling,and, for these reasons, it should neither be subject tointensive fishing activities nor used as a dump for theindustrial wastes that destroy it.

For these reasons, industrial fishing activities shouldbe excluded from this zone, which should be usedexclusively for artisanal fishing with selective and non-destructive fishing gear. Under no circumstances shouldindustrial fishing be allowed in this zone through’windows of penetration’.

In order to ensure its own ustainability, the industrialfishing sector should try to overcome its dependenceon fishing for fishmeal, and target a greater variety ofspecies for producing value-added products, followingthe principles of responsible fisheries and with greaterbenefits for the fishing communities.

In order to ensure the sustainable management offishery resources and the marine environment, as well

as the full participation of fishermen in decisions thataffect them, we demand that the FAO Code of Conductfor Responsible Fisheries be turned into anInternational Treaty with the force of law.

The application of individual transferable quota systemsfragments and divides artisanal fishing communities,depriving them of their rights and transforming theminto a low-cost workforce for the industrial sector, dueto which we reject their implementation.

In the case of Peru, we demand the lifting of Decree037 that establishes ‘windows of penetration’ and theaspects of the fisheries law that allow these kinds ofrules; in the case of Chile, we demand the lifting of theregime of ‘windows of penetration’ in the north of thecountry and an end to the quota system; in Mexico,we demand that Rule 002 that prohibits trawling in thefive-mile zone be respected; and with regard toArgentina, Uruguay and Brazil, we express ourconcerns and reject the development of an anchovyfishery for fishmeal, which threatens the ecosystems ofthe region.

We call for the Second Forum of the InternationalCommission for the Defence of the Five-Mile Zone tobe implemented on the 29 and 30 September 2005 inSinaloa, Mexico.

Also, and on the invitation of the Chilean delegation,we have decided to meet again during 20-22November in Valparaiso, Chile, where the Congressof the National Confederation of Artisanal Fishermenwill be held.

Final Statement of the Ilo Forum

The conservationof marinebiodiversity andthe protection offishery resourcesare fundamental inassuring a supplyof indispensablefood for humanity,as well as inassuring thelivelihoods of thecommunities thatdepend on fishing

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SAMUDRA Dossier

sectors are gathering information to supporttheir case to lift the five-mile zone restrictionsin the south. Nevertheless, the artisanalfishermen of Peru continue to protest, toorganize themselves in readiness for the nextonslaught, and to widen their support base indefence of their sacrosanct five-mile zone—a zone that is fast becoming the Holy Grailof artisanal fishermen throughout LatinAmerica, and a banner under which they areuniting to defend their rights. They will needall the strength and support they can musterif they are to prevail in the unequal powerstruggle with the mighty industrial fisherylobby, which have influential friends in highplaces.

...the artisanalfishermen of Perucontinue to protest,to organizethemselves inreadiness for thenext onslaught,and to widen theirsupport base indefence of theirsacrosanct five-mile zone—a zonethat is fastbecoming the HolyGrail of artisanalfishermenthroughout LatinAmerica

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Defenders of Canada’s inshorefisheries policies got a major boostin April when a court decided that

the Department of Fisheries and Oceans(DFO) could effectively frustrate privateagreements designed to undermine itspolicies.

The case, reported in the December 2004issue of SAMUDRA Report, involves twofishermen who had entered into a privatecontract or trust agreement to transfer theright to use a fishing licence that one of theparties was not eligible to hold.

In recent years, these private agreementshave become increasingly widespread as fishprocessors, wealthy inshore fishermen andother investors attempt to purchase licencesfrom retiring inshore fishermen, particularlyin the lucrative crab and lobster fisheries. Theagreements often contravene two importantgovernment policies designed to keep fishinglicences in the hands of individual workingfishermen in coastal communities.

The owner-operator policy states thatlicences for species fished from vessels ofless than 19.8 m LOA (length overall) will onlybe issued to individual, independentfishermen who must fish the licencepersonally.

Moreover, a qualified individual can only holdone licence per species, that is, while anindividual can hold a portfolio of inshorelicences (crab, lobster, scallops, mackerel),he or she can only hold one licence perspecies. The fleet separation policy statesthat corporations, in particular fish-processing

companies, cannot hold inshore licences,making it impossible for them to verticallyintegrate fish-harvesting and fish-processingoperations in fisheries like lobster and crab.With the collapse of the groundfish resourceand the increasing values for shellfish species,these inshore licences have become more andmore valuable and sought after. Over the last10 years, ineligible investors have been usingtrust agreements to accumulate these licencesand, by the same token, turn the licenceholders into their employees.

For years, the DFO ignored the problem,claiming it was powerless to act in privateagreements. As the practice became moreand more blatant, fishermen’s organizations,especially the Canadian Council ofProfessional Fish Harvesters (CCPFH), thenational organization representing independentowner-operators, pressured the federalgovernment to enforce its policies.

In 2002, the DFO’s Gulf region finally actedin the case of five snow crab licences foundto be tainted by trust agreements. The DFO

suspended the licences and ordered thelicence-holders to extricate themselves fromthe agreements. In one of these cases, theholder of the trust agreement decided toignore the government’s action and asked thecourts to enforce the agreement.

After several years of legal wrangling, thecase finally came to trial. Lawyers for theplaintiff, the holder of the trust agreement,called a series of witnesses, including thelawyer who crafted the trust agreement, aformer provincial cabinet Minister turnedlobbyist and a lower-level DFO official, all of

Frustrating private agreementsMarc Allain

The Canadian court battle over owner-operator policyin inshore fisheries has resulted in a significant ruling

This article waswritten by MarcAllain, Senior PolicyAdviser to theCanadian Council ofProfessional FishHarvesters. Thisarticle first appearedin SAMUDRA ReportNo. 41, July 2005

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SAMUDRA Dossier

whom downplayed the importance and eventhe existence of the government’s owner-operator policy.

Defence counterThe defence countered with testimony fromthe DFO official responsible for fisheriesmanagement decisions in the Gulf Region,who explained in detail the nature of thegovernment’s policies and how it had appliedthem in this case.

The CCPFH, which received intervener statusin the case, also presented a brief to the courtthat strongly supported the government’spolicies and actions.

Citing an abundance of case law, CCPFH’slawyer argued that Canada’s Fisheries Lawgrants the Minister of Fisheries absolutediscretion in the granting of fishing licencesand that the Minister has the right to adoptpolicies to guide his discretion and the rightto delegate his officials to apply these policies.

On 11 April 2005, the judge ruled that thecontract could not be completed because theDFO exercised its ministerial discretion insuch a way that the transfer of the fishinglicence became impossible. In legal terms,the judge ruled that the contract was‘frustrated’. Unfortunately, the judge did notoffer an opinion on the validity of the DFO’sactions by stating that he did not have thejurisdiction to rule on this question.

The ruling, however, is very significantbecause a court has now determined thatprivate trust agreements involving fishinglicences can be made inexecutable by theDFO actions. This supports the position of theCCPFH. For the last six years, CCPFH has beenurging the government to use its power tothwart agreements purposely designed tocircumvent public policy.

The court ruling increases the pressure onthe Minister of Fisheries to act, since it isnow clearly within his power to protect theintegrity of the public policy and the inshorelicensing system. The Minister has appointed

an official to report on what measures wouldbe required to solidify the policy frameworkand committed himself to protect the policy.The report is expected in early June.

What remains to be seen is how theDepartment will deal with violators of thepolicy, especially those fleets in the provinceof Nova Scotia, which, although they remainnominally owner-operator, have comecompletely under processor control throughthe use of trust agreements. Meanwhile, thelegal battle between the two fishermen toclarify the strength of the government’sfisheries policy will drag on as the plaintiffhas decided to appeal the judge’s decision.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Co-management, intended as acollaborative and participatoryarrangement between governments

and resource users to share the responsibilityfor resource management, is increasinglybeing put forward as a framework for themanagement of fisheries resources, partlyalso due to the perceived failure, or inability,of centralized fisheries management regimes.

Co-management arrangements may be moreeffective in a context where property rightsare well defined. As pointed out by SveinJentoft (see pg 57), co-managementarrangements in situations where communityproperty rights are established andrecognized, are likely to be more effective,as they enable communities to controlaccess, to sanction, and to exclude others.However, the co-management frameworkalso has relevance in fisheries where propertyrights are not defined, undoubtedly a morecommon situation in fisheries across theworld where governance structures are stillpoor. The advantage of co-management isthat it enables governments and fishery geargroups to adopt and develop meaningfulfisheries management measures that canminimize costs and that can also expectrealization of management goals in areasonable time frame. At least, it is one wayto develop appropriate fisheries managementmeasures that can engender ownershipamong all user groups even in the absenceof property rights.

To the extent that co-management recognizesthe significance of the participation ofresource users at all stages of resourcemanagement, it is important. However,experience from various parts of the worldindicates that often the governmentcommitment to participation of actual usersremains on paper. The article from South

Africa (see pg 60), for example, points outthat all too often, brief consultation takes theplace of genuine local involvement indecisionmaking in the co-management ofresources, in this case in the management ofmarine protected areas (MPAs).

Co-management of fisheries resources needsto ensure genuine involvement of geargroups, and consultation with theirrepresentatives. Particularly where traditionalinstitutions for management and conflict-resolution exist, it would be essential torecognize them and ensure their integrationwithin co-management arrangements.

Co-management efforts will also need torecognize the fact of large power differentialsbetween various stakeholders in the co-management process, and, in the interests ofequity, will need to take steps to prioritize theconcerns and participation of those lowerdown in the power hierarchy—small-scalefishing communities, and, particularly, thewomen in these communities. Conversely, itwould be imperative to work towardsdeveloping the capacity of communities toengage with co-management.

Co-management should not mean pushing allcosts on to local communities, as is happeningin certain situations. Some costs, such as, forexample, the costs of effective enforcementand keeping in check encroachments by theindustrial/large-scale/mechanized fleet, shouldbe borne by the State. The need is not for‘less’ State, but for a more effective,accountable and responsive State.

And finally, in the context of so many donor-supported co-management projects workingin specific locations with communities, thereis a risk of a fragmented approach toresource management. It makes little sense

The power of co-managementCo-management of fisheries resources needs to ensure genuineinvolvement of gear groups, and consultation with their representatives

The advantage ofco-management isthat it enablesgovernments andfishery geargroups to adoptand developmeaningfulfisheriesmanagementmeasures

This editorialcomment firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo.42, November2005

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SAMUDRA Dossier

if communities and local governments wereto manage adjacent areas, while rampantfishing by the large-scale/industrial/mechanized fleet continues unchecked justoutside the managed areas. Co-managementarrangements must be developed at thelarger level, taking into account the naturalmanagement unit, with both small-scale andlarge-scale fisheries being viewed throughthe same lens, as it were.

Co-managementarrangements mustbe developed atthe larger level,taking intoaccount thenaturalmanagement unit,with both small-scale and large-scale fisheriesbeing viewedthrough the samelens, as it were

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SAMUDRA Dossier

This article attempts to bridge twoseparate but potentially overlappingdiscourses in fisheries management—

that on property rights and the other on co-management. The property rights discourseis concerned with access rules, economicefficiency and rent production. The co-management discourse is predominantlyfocused on decision-making, stakeholderinvolvement and participatory democracy.

However, the two discourses tend toconverge on one important issue—power. Inthe first instance, property rights entail thepower to exclude someone from access tofisheries resources. In the latter instance, co-management is about the power to definethe rules of access: who should decide onfisheries management regulations, amongother things. Usually, a property right alsoinvolves the power to make the rules. Thuswe would assume that one is a preconditionfor the other; that, for instance, a co-management regime would have to rely on,and preside over, a property right. Orconversely, that co-management comes witha particular property right. In this article, Iargue that neither has to be the case. First, Ishall say something on property rights. Then,I shall define what co-management is. Finally,I shall discuss how they might possiblyconnect in improving fisheries managementfor the benefit of artisanal fisheries.

The important thing to stress about a propertyright is that it is essentially a social relation.It establishes the position of the holder ofsome good vis-à-vis the position of othercontenders for the same good. A propertyholder can lawfully deny others the possibilityto enjoy the good or the benefits that stream

from it. In other words, the key relation ofproperty is not between the rights holder andthe thing itself, but between people: the ownerand the non-owner.

Provided that the rights holder can effectivelydeny the access and use of others, he or sheis also the holder of power. No wonder thatKarl Marx saw property rights as structuringthe relations among social classes, and turningclass into an instrument of power andexploitation, and as a source of inequity.Similarly, Pierre Proudhon, the 19th centuryFrench anarchist, famously claimed:“Property is theft.” This is also why theproperty rights issue makes fisheriesmanagement systems so controversial andwhy artisanal fishers protest againstprivatization.

Undoubtedly, property rights do serve apurpose in fisheries management. Theabsence of property rights places some riskson the resources. But property comes inmany forms. A private individual may possessa property right, and so may States andcommunities. The question is what differentproperty rights are able to deliver to fisheriesmanagement. The State is said to have onlythumbs and no fingers. Therefore, it is notable to sufficiently use the power that propertyvests in it, to manage diversity and complexityand situations that require a lot of detailedlocal knowledge and fine-tuned managementmechanisms.

Transferable quotasPrivate property, on the other hand, leavescommunities at risk as it induces individualsto care more about themselves than theirfellow community members and the places

Go for itSvein Jentoft

Property rights and co-management could connectto improve the management of artisanal fisheries

This article by SveinJentoft of MAREMA/Centre for MarineResourceManagement,Norwegian Collegeof Fisheries Science,University ofTromsø, Norway, isbased on apresentation at anICSF-CeDePescaworkshop. Thisarticle first appearedin SAMUDRA ReportNo. 42, November2005

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SAMUDRA Dossier

they come from. Thus, in many parts of theworld, individual transferable quota (ITQ)systems have proven to concentrate fishingrights, and hence fishing capacity, in thehands of the few, while communities andartisanal fishers have been stripped of theiraccess to fisheries resources.

Property rights vested in communities are analternative that has been largely neglected inmodern fisheries management theory andpractice. Instead, fisheries management hasbeen arranged as a relationship between theState and the individual, with no institutionalmediating link in between, such as thecommunity. In this system, the individual isplaced passively at the receiving end of themanagement chain, giving the State the roleof patron. This system also has its ideologicalunderpinnings, emphasizing the supremacy ofthe market and the inferiority of thecommunity.

It is important to stress that there exists arange of property rights types and that Stateor private property is not the only remedy tothe problems involved with open access. Letme also emphasize, because it is relevant toco-management, that open-access systemscome in many forms, and that they do nothave to imply a rule-less fishery. Furthermore,managers rarely find themselves in a situationwhere they can simply make a choicebetween one property-rights system oranother as if they are displayed on a shelfwhen entering a store. In real life, property-rights reform implies that you move from oneform to another. You always carry baggage,and you never start with a clean slate; gettingrid of an old system can be as difficult asimplementing a new one.

We can think of a number of reasons for this;one is that after a while property rights, asinstitutions in general, acquire a status ofobjective reality—they become like nature.We take them for granted and can notimagine how life and society would have beenwithout them. Another reason is that propertyrights, as Proudhon hinted at, always producewinners and losers. It is in the interest of

winners and generally also in their power tokeep the system as it is. Thus, property-rightsreforms are constantly imbued with socialconflict, as history has shown time and again.

I believe that we need more research intothe issue of property-rights reform. We knowfairly well how property-rights systems workin fisheries: what their problems and benefitsare, what they do and do not do. Much lessattention has been paid to how one movesfrom one system to another, and under whatconditions system changes occur.

Community propertyLet me suggest, for instance, that it is mucheasier to move from State and commonproperty to private property, than the otherway around. It is not for nothing that privateproperty is written into the constitutions ofmany countries while community property isnot. It is also for this reason that it seemslike privatization of fish resources—as withinan ITQ system—is an irreversible process.Once quota rights are privatized, there is noway back. They produce what socialscientists call ‘path dependency’.

The moral is that property-rights reformshould not come easily and as a quick fix.They do change social relations drastically,and thus have an impact on how society—inour case, the fishery—works. They haveimplications that are not always easy toforesee: for instance, on power structures,settlement patterns and social values. You riskempowering distinguished social groups thatare already enjoying power. So don’t dosomething that you may later regret.

Co-management can be defined as acollaborative and participatory process ofregulatory decision-making betweenrepresentatives of user-groups, governmentagencies, research institutions and otherstakeholders. Power sharing and partnershipare essential elements. Co-management vestsauthority over, and responsibility for,regulatory functions outside the realms ofgovernment, for instance, in user-organizations or fisheries co-operatives at the

Property rightsvested incommunities arean alternative thathas been largelyneglected inmodern fisheriesmanagementtheory andpractice

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SAMUDRA Dossier

national, regional, and/or community level.Co-management does not leave decision-making to the vagaries of the market, butdraws heavily, but not entirely, on the forcesand capacities of civil society. If we think ofthe relationships of fisheries management asa triangle, with the State at the top, the marketat bottom left, and civil society at bottom right,co-management would be placed right in themiddle.

I believe community-(or common-property)rights is particularly effective as a co-management tool. Communal or ‘collective’property rights vested in the co-managementinstitution provide the authority with an extrastick. It allows the co-management systemto control access; it gives the right to sanctionand, ultimately, to exclude. A system thatenjoys this power would ceteris paribus bemore effective than one that does not havethis leverage. A co-management systemoperating within a State property, privateproperty or open-access system wouldnormally have no right to sanction byexclusion. It can only rely on persuasion andmoral condemnation.

Exit alternativeThus, a co-management system that isunderpinned by one of these three property-rights types is vulnerable to free riding, asmembers would always have an exitalternative. If members do not like thecollective decision, they can simply opt out,go solo. In a co-management system residingover a communal property right, however,people would have to use their voice toexpress their dissatisfaction. If they shouldthen choose not to abide by the rules set bythe co-management authority, they risk beingpenalized, not only through moralcondemnation, but also by losing access.

It should be noted that this does not meanthat co-management can not work in less-than ideal circumstances. In many countries,we see co-management systems operatewell on property rights other than communalones. If co-management could not functionin less-than-ideal circumstances, it would

hardly be much to strive for. It would thenonly work in exceptional cases.

Since co-management can functionregardless of the form of property right, thereis no reason to wait for a property-rightsrestructuring to launch a management reform.The former is usually a more difficultundertaking than the latter, as it tends toprovoke power. Comparatively speaking, co-management takes an administrative reformthat, in many instances, does not need morethan marginal reorganization of administrativeboundaries, redistribution of managementfunctions, and readjustments of proceduralroutines. Property-rights reform is moreconsequential since it changes basic socialrelations in lasting ways, as mentioned above.Hence, it tends to be more controversial andconflictive.

Co-management reforms and property-rightsreforms could certainly be mutuallyreinforcing, and should, if possible, beintegrated as part of the same process. Yet,they do not have to happen in concert. Onereform could run independent of the other.Co-management could be initiated andimplemented in the short run, while theproperty-rights transformation could be aproject for the longer term. If you should meetobstacles in implementing the latter, it doesnot mean that you can not succeed in theformer. So here is my advice for artisanalfisheries: if you want co-management, go forit. You don’t have to wait for the revolution.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The African National Congress (ANC)contested the April 1994 elections inSouth Africa on the basis of a vision

of ‘a better life for all’, to be achievedthrough its people-centred Reconstructionand Development Programme (RDP) policyframework. This created expectations thatmany in the ‘marginalized’ fishingcommunities would secure their own fishingrights and small businesses. It was hoped thatthe revised fisheries policy would deliver onthese expectations, while, at the same time,maintain an internationally competitive fishingindustry.

Due to pressure from established economicinterests, in 1996 the new government shiftedits macroeconomic policy to a ‘homegrown’structural adjustment programme called theGrowth, Employment and Redistribution(Gear). The new framework abandoned thekey principles and policies of the RDP, andinstead adopted neoliberal economicprinciples, including privatization, subsidyremoval and downsizing of the public sector;and encouragement of small blackentrepreneurs.

Gear was aimed at achieving equity andredistribution through economic growth andjob creation. The authors of Gear imaginedpoverty alleviation would be achieved throughthe ‘trickle-down’ effect of a new group ofentrepreneurs who would establish labour-intensive small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs).

This was in direct contrast to the RDP’sapproach of redistributing wealth throughinterventionist State policies based on socialistideology. The shift to Gear resulted in large

numbers of bona fide fishers being excludedfrom the formal allocation process becausethey could not demonstrate theirentrepreneurship through being able tocomplete application forms and engage inrelated bureaucratic procedures without help.

In order to understand how thetransformation process was supposed tocontribute to poverty alleviation, one needsto understand the capital-accumulation/wealth-generation and safety-net functionsof enterprise development and job creation.In this article, we will use the concepts ofpoverty, vulnerability and entrepreneurship tolook at the contribution (or failure) of fisheriesto the improvement of the livelihoods ofcoastal communities, including the proposedmechanism of co-management.

The shift in macroeconomic policy was animportant factor in relation to ‘transformation’of the fisheries sector in that the focus fortransforming the sector moved from re-allocation of access rights to one of promotingblack economic empowerment (BEE). BEE

was focused mainly on addressing racial andgender imbalances within the industry.

It took the form of offering ownership ofshares in established enterprises to historicallydisadvantaged individuals (HDIs) organizedin empowerment groups and/or labour unions,transferring technical and management skillsto HDIs, and promoting HDI employees topositions of management decisionmaking.

New fishing rightsThe focus was not on the vulnerability of theworkers within the existing establishedcompanies under BEE schemes, and new

Shifting gear?Moenieba Isaacs, Mafaniso Hara and Jesper Raakjær Nielsen

Not enough progress has been made in reallocating quotas topreviously disadvantaged groups in the South African fishery industry

This article, byMoenieba Isaacs,Programme for Landand Agarian Studies(PLAAS), Universityof the Western Cape,Mafaniso Hara,PLAAS, and JesperRaakjær Nielsen,Institute for FisheriesManagement andCoastal CommunityDevelopment,Denmark, was firstpublished in PolicyBrief, No. 16,August 2005. Thisarticle appeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 42, November2005

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SAMUDRA Dossier

rights holders and the SMMEs that wereestablished after achieving access to fishingrights.

‘Transformation’ is not defined in the MarineLiving Resources Act (MLRA) of 1998 or inany other legislative or policy document. Thevision of the government’s new policy isprobably what was meant by ̀ transformation’in the Act:

the marine resources are a national assetand part of the heritage of the people of SouthAfrica, present and future, and should bemanaged and developed for the benefit ofthe country as a whole, especially thosecommunities whose livelihoods depended onthese resources; and that the allocation ofthe resources would be made on an equitablebasis, with a view to ensuring the long-termsustainability of the resources and theirhealthy condition for present and futuregenerations.

Two approaches to transformation werebeing used: the broadening of access rightsto new rights holders (individuals andcompanies) through State intervention(external transformation); and market-ledchange within State BEE policy (internaltransformation). The Department ofEnvironmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT),a branch of Marine and Coastal Management(MCM), was given the responsibility forexternal transformation.

The new Constitution with its ‘Bill of Rights’and the new fisheries policy paved the wayfor new entrants to the sector, but MCM

struggled with managing and administeringthe process.

A complicating factor was that the sectorwas already oversubscribed—making spacefor new entrants would have required cuttingexisting allocations. Internal transformationwas to take place through market-basedreforms within companies through change inownership, giving workers more benefits andshare schemes, assisting in theempowerment of new rights holders, and soon.

This market-based intervention had an impacton the extent of State intervention from thestart, leaving little room for a morecommunity-based empowerment option fortransformation in the industry. Theresponsibility of the State through MCM is toensure that equity and redistribution areachieved without endangering the economicstability of the industry and sustainability ofthe resource.

From the very beginning, it was clear thatthe goals of transformation would be inconflict with the principles of resourcemanagement since meeting the expectationsof the many potential new entrants would notbe in line with the limited room for expansionthat sustainable resource managemententailed.

Adding to this was the fear among theestablished companies that allowing too manynew entrants could create chaos and resultin economic instability in the industry. Severalfactors impeded—or were used to block orslow—transformation, especially by thosealready in the industry.

The following were the constraints totransformation in the early years:

Unwilling sellers, unwilling buyers: As amatter of principle, HDIs and HDI groupswere unwilling to ‘buy’ fishing rights that theyfelt they had been dispossessed of underapartheid. There were expectations thatgovernment would put this travesty right bysimply taking these rights back fromestablished companies and redistributing themto HDIs after the advent of democracy. Theestablished companies were equally unwillingto share, sell or give up their fishing rights,arguing that they had spent decades buildingup their companies.

Foot-dragging tactics: Establishedcompanies used foot-dragging tactics to delayredistribution by employing leading lawyersto find loopholes in the new fisheries policyand to litigate on all large-scale cuts in theirquota allocations. Many courts ruled in favour

The responsibilityof the Statethrough MCM is toensure that equityand redistributionare achievedwithoutendangering theeconomic stabilityof the industry andsustainability ofthe resource

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SAMUDRA Dossier

of the established industry, hinderinggovernment from taking large portions oftheir quota allocations to accommodate newentrants to the industry.

Court challenges on administrativegrounds: Numerous allocations by theformer Quota Board under the old SeaFisheries Act were successfully challengedin court on administrative grounds from 1993,following the promulgation of the 1993 QuotaBoard guidelines. The constitutionalentrenchment of the right to justadministrative action reinforced the strengthof administrative remedies, as evidenced bythe number of court cases after 1996. Forexample, the first quota allocations madeunder the MLRA were successfully challengedand set aside for reconsideration on variousadministrative grounds.

Alliances between large companies andlabour unions to oppose transformation:Established companies were able to securethe support of their largely black labour unionsto oppose transformation using the slogan “Acut in our quota allocations will result in a cutin jobs”. The unions (especially the Food andAllied Workers’ Union—FAWU) traded theirsupport for maintaining existing quotaallocations for better working conditions andimproved benefits for their members (pensionfunds, shareholding schemes, medical aid, andimproved health and safety).

The irony was that FAWU is an affiliate ofthe Congress of South African Trade Unions(Cosatu), one of three partners in the rulingANC Alliance. The alliance between unionsand employers against redistribution of fishingrights further marginalized poor bona fidefishers who had expected fishing rights afterapartheid.

Constitutional protection of propertyrights: The Constitution provides that nobodymay be deprived of property except in termsof law of general application (the ‘propertyclause’). This, together with the government’scommitment to support market forces,effectively gave established companies a vetoagainst the reform of the fishing industry.

Most established companies claim to haveimplemented internal changes that meet therequirements provided by DEAT guidelines.The established industry quickly respondedto internal transformation requirements.

For example, Oceana Fishing Group sold halfof its equity to a black empowermentconsortium, while Premier Fishing sharesownership with Sekunjalo, and Pamodzi/Foodcorp owns Marine Products.

Allowing a larger degree of black ownershipstrategically put such companies in positionsof strength for maintaining or even increasingtheir quota holdings, since most of theseempowerment groups had good politicalconnections.

Companies like Sea Harvest and Irvin &Johnson started on a fairly small scale,offering limited shareholding ownership foremployees at favourable prices. Althoughemployee shareholding constituted a smallpercentage of the total stock, the symboliceffect was considered important. Theestablished companies wasted no time inbringing in HDI leaders in an attempt totransform the leadership structures of theircompanies.

Within the labour unions, this was regardedas a window-dressing exercise, since someof these individuals were given the privilegesof power but not the right to make crucialdecisions.

The major dilemma that faced many newentrants was the lack of infrastructure(vessels, processing facilities and marketingnetworks) and business knowhow. A possible,seemingly obvious, solution to this dilemmawas the formation of joint ventures andbusiness partnerships as promoted by the newfisheries law (the MLRA).

In spite of all this, most new entrants complainthat there has been no change in the powerdynamics in the industry as a whole or withinindividual companies. Since establishedcompanies own most of the infrastructure,they retain control of fishing, processing and

The alliancebetween unionsand employersagainstredistribution offishing rightsfurthermarginalized poorbona fide fisherswho had expectedfishing rights afterapartheid

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SAMUDRA Dossier

marketing operations, even where newentrants have entered into joint ventures withthem.

The prices charged for these services makeit very difficult for new entrants to succeed.Established companies recoup theirtransaction costs through reduced prices forfish from new entrants or inflated costs fortheir services. The top management of mostcompanies remains largely white. Whereblacks have been given top positions, theirability to make management decisions isfrequently constrained or absent. Most‘internal transformation’ appears to bewindow dressing.

The lack of infrastructure and businessknowhow among new entrants and the lackof real black ownership and power withinestablished companies leave black workersand entrepreneurs vulnerable to manipulationand exploitation. Eventually, everyone,including the established companies, had toaccept that some re-allocation of rights wasunavoidable. MCM’s major indicator oftransformation has been quantitative—thatis, the number of new individuals (mostlyHDIs) or HDI fishing companies that havebeen granted access rights. MCM’s statedachievements after 10 years of‘transformation’ are, for example, in theabalone, West Coast rock lobster, smallpelagic and deep-sea hake fisheries.

Commercial allocationIn the abalone fishery, the number of rightsholders increased from five in 1992 to 271 in2002. The five original quota-holdingcompanies retained 49.5 per cent of the totalcommercial allocation, while original abalonedivers received 17.5 per cent. The 228 newentrants under the limited commercialcategory got the remaining 33 per cent inallocations of 202 quotas of 430 kg and 26quotas of 200 kg. Individuals held 95 per centof the limited commercial allocations.

A total of 87.5 per cent of the companiesholding commercial abalone quotas wereclassified as SMMEs. According to DEAT, 90

per cent of the global abalone total allowablecatch (TAC) was allocated to SMMEs in 2002.

In the West Coast rock lobster fishery thenumber of rights holders increased from 39in 1992 to 745 in 2002. While the top 10companies held 57 per cent of the quota in1992, this had been reduced to 36 per cent in2002. Ninety per cent of right holders wereclassified as SMMEs and 66 per cent of thesecompanies were HDI-owned. In 2003, afurther 274 individuals were awarded limitedcommercial fishing rights in the east of CapeHangklip area. In the limited commercialsector, the allocations ranged from 200 kg to1.5 tonnes (average: 712 kg).

A total of 91.5 per cent of the limitedcommercial quota was awarded to HDI orHDI-owned micro-enterprises. Thus, 70 percent of the global TAC was HDI-controlled.Whereas there were only 12 rights holders inthe small pelagics sector in 1990, by 2002,the number had grown to 91 sardine and 70anchovy rights holders. About 85 per cent ofthese were considered to be SMMEs.Furthermore, 73 per cent of the rights holderswere HDIs and these held 75 per cent of thepelagic TAC. Most of these got 0.3 per centof the TAC as their annual quota for theduration of the medium-term rights.

This means the access of HDI rights holdersto the pelagic sector had increased tenfold(from 7 per cent to 70 per cent) over the 10years 1992–2002. Despite this, the establishedcompanies have maintained their allocation(in terms of volume) of anchovy and sardinedue to the increase in TAC. While only 21predominantly white-owned companies hadrights to exploit deep-sea hake in 1992, thenumber of rights holders had increased to 56by 2000. The top five companies held 92 percent of the TAC in 1992.

This had been reduced to less than 74 percent by 2002. Furthermore, governmentclaims that the large companies had beencompelled to transform in terms of theirownership and management structures. Inaddition, 42 per cent of companies in the

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SAMUDRA Dossier

sector were classified as SMMEs, and 74 percent of rights holders were deemed to bemajority HDI-owned and managed by 2002.According to DEAT, HDI shareholding in thesector had increased from 0.5 per cent in1992 to 25 per cent in 2002.

These reported results need to be comparedto the extent of internal transformation thattook place within the established companies,that is, the link between HDI ownership andquota allocation. External transformation isdirectly linked to internal transformation andit is situated in the need to maintain stabilityand efficiency within the fishing industry.

A consequence of the direct link betweeninternal and external transformation meansthat there was very little TAC left for MCM

to allocate to the new entrants. The industry’slong-term economic viability could have beencompromised by the short-term political goalof MCM—that is, to show the extent to whichit has allocated rights to new entrants.

Impressive as these figures would appear,they do not describe the realities on theground. The guidelines for award of medium-term rights outlined the objectives andassessment principles for re-allocation offishing rights as being: “ability of applicantsto invest in the industry and to demonstratethat they would be actively involved andcommitted to the industry”; “pastperformance and capacity to harvest andprocess the resource”; “potential forsignificant impact on local communityeconomies and development”; and “thedegree of risk of new entrants becomingpaper quota holders”.

Categoric commitmentDEAT categorically stated that while thedepartment was committed to bringing in newentrants into the industry, the potential of suchnew entrants to enter, participate in and sharethe risks of the industry had to be examinedin the light of the degree of their knowledge,experience, their fishing plans and businessacumen.

It was further stated that where joint ventureshad been entered into, these had to be capableof validly empowering the rights holders.

In reality, most new entrants are finding itvery difficult to establish themselves in theindustry. A number of reasons have been putforward for the problems they areencountering:

• the quotas that they receive are too smallto set up, establish and operateeconomically viable fishing businesses;

• banks do not accept fishing quotas ascollateral for loans, making it difficult toraise investment capital;

• new entrants lack the technical andmanagerial skills to survive in the industryand no assistance is being provided in thisregard; and

• it is very difficult for new fishingcompanies to compete with, or break into,the monopolistic business systems andstructures that established largecompanies have created and fiercelyguard in order to maintain theircompetitive advantage.

In view of the foregoing, the new entrantshave adopted four main survival strategies:

• entering into joint-venture agreementsinvolving catching or processing ormarketing with established companies;

• pooling their quotas with other rightsholders and jointly obtaining a vessel toexploit the pooled quota;

• selling their fishing rights outright tosomeone (usually an establishedcompany) with the ability to make use ofthe quota as their own (such rights holdersare referred to as ‘paper quota holders’);and

In reality, most newentrants arefinding it verydifficult toestablishthemselves in theindustry

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SAMUDRA Dossier

• acquiring fishing rights for several species(if they own a vessel) in order to createan economically viable quota ‘package’.

Active participationSince the first three strategies are the mostcommon, the number of rights holdersactively taking part in fishing operations isactually at least 50 per cent lower than theofficial number of rights holders. One analysissuggests that approximately 25 of the 51 newanchovy fishing rights holders sold their quotato vessel owners or processing companies.This accounted for about 25 per cent of theTAC.

In deep-sea hake trawling, the 53 rightsholders have been consolidated into less than20 operational clusters through joint-ventureagreements. Joint-venture arrangementswere being used by both sides for their ownbenefit.

For new entrants, this would demonstratethat they were actively involved in theindustry, while, for the established companies,joint ventures provide increased raw materialfor processing. If the motivation for jointventures was the transfer of skills inmanagement and operations, it has rarelybeen successful—most new entrants are notgaining any skills that would enable them tostand on their own as independent and thrivingcompanies.

As pointed out earlier, government’s policygoal was to award rights to new (mainlyblack) entrepreneurs. In turn, these couldform viable fishing businesses in rural coastalareas and so contribute towards povertyalleviation by creating jobs. Little progresshas been made so far.

Apart from the lack of skills transfer, anothermajor stumbling block has been that the sizesof quotas that have been awarded to mostnew entrants do not meet the criteria of beingminimum viable quotas (MVQ). For example,most new entrants in the abalone and WestCoast rock lobster fisheries were awarded

quotas under the ‘limited commercial’category.

Under this category, the maximum size ofindividual quotas is 430 kg (minimum 200 kg)for abalone and 1.5 tonnes (minimum 200 kg)for West Coast rock lobster.

The rights holders point out that these quotasare fished up within a month or two. Sinceone fisher could not apply to fish for morethan one species, there was no other sourceof livelihood as soon as the annual quota hadbeen exhausted.

In the small pelagics, most new entrants gotquotas equivalent to 0.3 per cent of the TAC.In an industry based on high-volume, low-profit economics, such quota sizes are hardlybig enough as basis for investment and futureplanning.

MVQs were seen as being necessary ifgovernment intended to eliminate ‘paperquotas’. The pooling of quotas by some newentrants could be seen as an attempt to createMVQs. But most new entrants were veryunwilling to pool quotas.

As entrepreneurs, they would prefer to go italone, but they face enormous constraintssuch as lack of capital, infrastructure, supportsystems and skills. An economic sectoralstudy of the industry concluded that poolingof resources (as most new entrants wereforced to do) went against that grain ofentrepreneurship that is usually based ontaking business risks.

By allowing too many rights holders into theindustry and spreading the cake too thinwithout any support systems, the governmenthad set up the new entrants for failure. As aresult, the majority of new entrants have beenforced, de facto, to become paper quotaholders or have been forced to makeinvestments that were not based on firmbusiness calculations, but rather todemonstrate activity with their quotas in orderto qualify for the next round of quota

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SAMUDRA Dossier

allocation. The non-viable quotas made newentrants vulnerable and easy targets forexploitation by those in more powerfulpositions.

External transformation primarily focused onallocating fishing rights to establishedindustries and to SMMEs. In the process, alarge number of bona fide fishers had fallenby the side, as they could not get into eitherof these groups.

Interim reliefIn the 1990s, the government had attemptedto include this group through various interimrelief measures, such as the communityquotas of 1993, subsistence permits to fishersin the Western Cape in 2001, the EasternCape and KwaZulu-Natal, and linefish interimrelief measures in 2003. The abolishment ofthe subsistence sector for abalone and WestCoast rock lobster and institutionalization ofthe ‘limited commercial’ category in theWestern Cape resulted in most members ofthis group being excluded.

In a province where livelihoods from the seahas been extremely important historically andculturally, this is proving absolutely debilitatingfor such coastal communities. It is thiscategory of bona fide fishers (who had beenexcluded through the formal processes) thatare currently in litigation with governmentover their rights to a livelihood from fishing.

The basis of the litigation is that governmentshould recognize and protect their historicaland cultural rights (and entitlement) to alivelihood from fishing (with an option to selltheir catch), as provided for under theConstitution.

Additionally, they argue that thetransformation process that favouredcommercial enterprises has so far beenunsuccessful in job creation in theircommunities. They propose that a two-milezone should be allocated exclusively forcoastal communities for livelihood purposes.Most of those who are supposedly benefitingfrom internal transformation efforts in

established companies describe the changesthat have taken place as ‘cosmetic’ and mere‘window dressing’. The externaltransformation efforts of the State aimed atincreasing the numbers of new entrants tothe fishing industry. However, since most ofthe beneficiaries have been allocatedeconomically unviable quotas, the result hasbeen a multiplicity of ‘paper quota holders’who usually sell their rights to the establishedcompanies. Both internal and externaltransformation can thus largely be labelledas cosmetic.

The lack of clear transformation objectivesin government and its inability to providedirection for transformation for theestablished companies gave the companiescarte blanche to restructure their enterprisesthe way they chose to. Many have, therefore,merely tinkered with their existing profiles inorder to create the impression that they havechanged.

The lack of real change within establishedcompanies can be attributed to the lack ofpolitical will on the part of the State to forcethrough real changes using quotas asleverage. The introduction of neoliberalmacroeconomic policy enhanced the positionof established companies by providing themwith the argument that their ability to changethe way they do business was limited becausestability is vital for them to remaininternationally competitive in the age ofglobalization.

Assessment neededA future direction for fisheries in South Africamust be based on an assessment of howeffectively internal and externaltransformation processes have addressedpoverty, job creation and entrepreneurship.Government’s policy for poverty alleviationhas been through promotion of SMMEs thatcould new create jobs. This has not beenmuch of a success.

With regard to the workers within theestablished companies, the process ofnegotiation between labour unions and

Externaltransformationprimarily focusedon allocatingfishing rights toestablishedindustries and toSMMEs. In theprocess, a largenumber of bonafide fishers hadfallen by the side,as they could notget into either ofthese groups

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SAMUDRA Dossier

established companies, which started in 1995to improve working conditions and securejobs for workers, seems to have run itscourse.

According to FAWU, many permanent jobsare being lost in the fishing industry.Established companies have followed thetrend towards casual, temporary and contractemployment. Women engaged in processingfish have been most affected by‘casualization’ in the industry.

A number of interventions are necessary inorder for genuine transformation to occurand the fishing industry to contribute towardspoverty alleviation. Many of the newoperators in the industry did not have anyaccess to credit (other than the value of thequota when sold). Government interventionis necessary to support new entrants inbecoming more competitive and visible in theindustry through providing access toaffordable sources of capital.

There is an urgent need to establish training,especially in entrepreneurial skills. If the aimis to level the playing field, MCM has aresponsibility to provide training, in co-operation with non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) and other interestedparties. Training should be a requirement forall successful new applicants. The establishedindustry should be made to share in thisresponsibility.

One way of addressing the training needs ofthe new entrants is the introduction of aresource fee for leasing a fishing right, whichcan be used for capacity-buildingprogrammes for new entrants. A resourcefee is a means by which society can benefitfrom giving the fishing industry the privilegeof using a limited national resource. Sincemost of the marine resources in South Africahave been utilized to the maximum capacity,only a few can be given commercial fishingrights.

Such a tax could be used for generaldevelopment projects like education, health

and housing, and the provision of welfare,especially in fishing communities thatunsuccessfully applied for fishing rights.

It is clear from the experience of the last 10years that there is a definite need forinstitutional support to new entrants.Interestingly, such an approach was used inthe 1940s by the government of the time. TheFishing Industry Development Corporation(FIDC) was established to, among other things,establish rivals to Irvin & Johnson in the deep-sea hake trawl fishery by granting fishingrights to a limited number of rights holders inorder to enable them to develop verticallyintegrated, economically viable companies.

What later became Sea Harvest onlymaterialized because the FIDC was able tosupport skills development and providecapital. Similar human and financial supportis needed for emerging companies to be ableto ably compete with established companies.

Although a verification unit was establishedfor the technical vetting and verification ofapplications for medium-term rights, itappears that no unit has been in placethereafter to audit progress in internaltransformation in established companies andensure new entrants are genuinely engagingin the industry. Such a unit is supposed to havebeen vital for vetting this progress as part ofthe process for awarding the proposed long-term rights from 2006.

In order to avoid having the kind of ‘fox inthe henhouse’ situation that led to the Enronscandal in the United States, it is importantthat the verification unit is completelyindependent. An independent verification unitmust have the ability to audit internaltransformation within companies, jointventures, as well as ‘paper quota holders’ ina credible and transparent manner.

Bona fide fishersThe inshore resources could have largelybeen left aside for bona fide fishers.Government could have used this as abargaining chip against the arguments of the

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SAMUDRA Dossier

established companies for maintaining theirrights in the commercial sector.

This would have gone a long way in providinga source of livelihoods and so contributetowards poverty alleviation for these fishersand their communities. Regarding capital-intensive fisheries, government could havefollowed the advice from the Access RightsTechnical Committee and acknowledged thatit would be very difficult to transform thesefisheries.

Instead, these fisheries could have been seenas a generator of funds for the developmentof coastal communities or society at large byimposing a special levy on fishing rights, likethe resource tax charged in Namibia.

Established companies would most likelyhave argued that they already pay tax onprofit and a levy on fishing rights would thusbe unfair. It is clear, though, that, under themedium-term rights, established companieswere willing to buy and pay for fishing rightsunder many different arrangements. Byinstitutionalizing transformation through, forexample, a Trust Development Fund, thetransaction costs for the established industryto acquire access rights would have beensubstantially lower.

In South Africa, as elsewhere in the world,fisheries co-management has become afrequently used term to refer to involvementof fishers and fishing communities in orderto improve their livelihoods in a consultative/collaborative manner. However, as with theconcept of transformation, there is no cleardefinition of co-management in a SouthAfrican context, even though it appears tobe seen as a panacea by government andacademia for the sustainable utilization offisheries resources and the economicdevelopment of fishing communities.

Experiences so far with fisheries co-management in South Africa indicate that theexisting co-management arrangements haveprimarily focused on management of the fishresources rather than being a mechanism for

facilitating economic development withinfishing communities.

Livelihoods issueExcept for KwaZulu-Natal, the governmenthas generally not taken its responsibility forcollaborative management seriously. Inaddition, one can not expect poor communitiesand individuals to buy into the concept if theycan not see that it would improve theirlivelihoods. Thus, it will be important thatpoverty-reduction strategies are embeddedin co-management arrangements.

The government’s intention for theredistribution of fishing rights was for fishresources to contribute towards povertyalleviation in coastal communities. Allocatingfishing rights to new entrants was anecessary step to start addressing the legacyof apartheid’s economic and socialdeprivation of black communities.

The shift to Gear meant that government’spoverty-alleviation approach focused onpoverty prevention (through SMMEs) andpoverty reduction (through job creation). Itenvisaged giving fishing rights toentrepreneurs within fishing communities whocould start businesses using their rights,thereby creating jobs within thesecommunities. While rights would act toreduce poverty for the rights holders andentrepreneurs, the creation of jobs wouldprevent poverty for a few. It is clear, though,that the market solution (Gear) has beeninsufficient in effective transformation andcontributing towards poverty alleviation incoastal communities. It is imperative, at leastfor the time being, that government shouldstill play an interventionist role in order tocontribute to poverty alleviation.

There is no cleardefinition of co-management in aSouth Africancontext, eventhough it appearsto be seen as apanacea bygovernment andacademia for thesustainableutilization offisheries resourcesand the economicdevelopment offishingcommunities

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Fishing in Norway is—and has been—a highly gendered activity, with only afew women working on fishing boats.

The total number of Norwegianfisherwomen—and men—has decreasedenormously after the cod moratorium in 1989and the introduction of the quota system in1990. The table overleaf illustrates thisdecline.

According to the table, women fishers inNorway registered as full-time fishers havedecreased by almost 50 per cent in the lastfive years, while the number of female part-time fishers seems to be more stable, thoughwith certain variations. The table also showsthat between 1988 and 1998, the number offemale fishers was relatively stable, whilethe number of men fishers decreasedthroughout the whole period, but at a greaterrate after 1990. Such a marked decrease sayssomething about the changing fishing industry.In the following sections of this article, I shallgo further into why there are so few womenin fishing and relate the phenomenon to theregulation of the Norwegian fisheries. Finally,I shall also try to comment on men’schanging situation, and point to some socialand cultural changes that fishing communitiesmight face.

Following the moratorium and the first yearsof the quota system, Norway had the largestnumber of registered female fishers since thegendered registration started. The registeredfemale fishers work on big factory shipsfilleting fish as well as on boats that areconsidered ‘small’ in a Norwegian fisherycontext. In Finnmark, one of the most fishing-dependent areas of Norway, I know of onlyone woman, who is skipper on her own boat

of 14.98 m length and has her own crew. Itshould, however, be mentioned thatthroughout Norwegian history, women havebeen engaged in shore-based activities aswives, daughters, relatives and neighbours,without having been officially registered asfishers. Even today, women function as suchshore or ground crew, carrying out work thathas helped develop an efficient fishery.

It should also be mentioned that only a smallnumber of women have formal ownership inboats. As of August 2004, only 181 womenhad more than 50 per cent of ownership sharesin fishing boats, while 296 women had lessthan 50 per cent. In the municipality ofNordkapp, close to very good cod grounds,only one woman has been registered as soleproprietor of a boat (5.1 m long), while someare registered as shareholders and part-owners in the companies that own fishingboats. Considering that there are 8,184registered fishing boats of various sizes in thewhole of Norway, the number of femaleowners seems very small indeed.

Norwegian fisheries are heavily governed bydifferent laws and regulations like the RawFish Act, the Participation Act and the Act ofFishing in Salt Water, to mention a few. Inorder to be registered as a fisher, one has tosend in an application to the Directorate ofFishery. To be accepted as a registered full-time fisher, one has to earn 60 per cent ofone’s income from fisheries, and spend atleast 20 weeks in a year fishing.

Different criteriaThe criteria for the part-time fishers aredifferent. They can show earnings fromshore-based work and spend less time at sea.

Important yet marginalizedSiri Gerrard

Why there are so few registered women fishers inNorway and what the consequences might be

This article, by SiriGerrard ([email protected]) of theUniversity ofTromsø, is based oninformation collectedfor the projectSustainable CoastalCulture, financed bythe NorwegianResearch Counciland the Universityof Tromsø. Thisarticle first ap-peared in SAMUDRA

Report No. 42,November 2005

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In order to buy a fishing boat with a quota,one has to have been an active registeredfisher for at least a year. In addition to theseregulations, there are also specific rules forbuying and selling boats with a quota,depending on the region where one lives.

Eva Munk-Madsen argued some years agothat a resource that was common propertyand open to ‘everybody’, has, with the quotasystem, become closed for most women—in her view, about half of the fisherypopulation. In view of the low numbers ofregistered women fishers and boatowners,and the fact that women in 1994 owned 192of 16,216 units of quotas, Munk-Madsenconcluded that quotas have become “men’sformal property right”. Since Munk-Madsenpresented her work, even fewer women havebeen registered, and, consequently, fewerwomen have formal rights to the quotas.There are several examples of widows whohave had to sell their boats with the quotaeven when they wanted to keep them andstart fishing—because they were not entitledas ‘fishers’, according to the Norwegian lawsthat regulate fishing. This has been the caseeven if the woman had performed substantialunpaid work related to fishing and to theupkeep of the boat. Instances of divorces alsoillustrate the imbalance between women andmen as far as quotas and other type of capitalinvestments are concerned. As few women

have the right to quotas in Norway, they areeffectively a marginalized group inNorwegian fisheries, with little access to thewealth that the resources in the fisheriesmight represent.

Why are there so few registered women inNorwegian fisheries? This is a question I haveoften asked since Norway is a countryfamous for its policies of gender equality. Iwill explore some possible explanations. Firstof all, it is important to remember that themajority of women in fisher families have,for ages, performed work on shore,connected to, and important for, the fishingboats. However, this work has, in most cases,not been registered or officially recognized,neither by fisheries officials nor byemployment authorities. It has not beenconsidered as a type of work that qualifiesfor membership in fishermen’s unions orresource policy-making institutions. Fisheryinstitutions beyond the community level, andfisheries policymaking have, in this way,remained the domain of men.

Recent years have seen more examples ofwomen who are active in fish harvesting andworking together with their husbands. Someof them are registered fishers and enjoy aformal status. Some are also active membersof the Norwegian Fishermen’s Union.However, neither do the policies of unions

Women % Men % Women % Men

1983 182 0.64 22,273 78.69 106 0.37 5,74

1988 575 1.95 21,473 72.69 102 0.35 7,20

1990 554 2.01 19,921 72.39 112 0.41 6,93

1993 572 2.26 18,500 73.21 105 0.42 6,21

1998 530 2.49 14,611 68.60 166 0.78 5,99

2003 283 1.64 12,957 75.31 130 0.76 2,83

2004 281 1.80 12,396 79.53 114 0.73 2,79

Year

Full-time Part-time

TableFull- and Part-time Women and Men Fishers in Norway, 1983–2004

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SAMUDRA Dossier

and associations focus on questions relevantfor women, nor do they recognize thatwomen have contributed to the productionin fisheries.

White papersThis neglect is also mirrored in public whitepapers on fisheries. Fishery questions are alsoleft out in most Norwegian white papers ongender equality. A contrasting example is a2004 white paper from the Sami Parliament,where women’s participation in fishery andfishery politics is heavily emphasized.

The quota system has not made it easy forthe majority of women and men inNorwegian fisheries. Even though only a fewwomen were fishing before the quota systemwas launched, they could, under certainconditions, continue to own their boat or rentit out if their husbands passed away. This isalmost impossible today since a widowseldom has the right to the quota. And,obviously, a boat without fishing rights has alow value. Today even a very old boat witha quota can be sold at a very good price.

Thus, it is not only fish in the market that is acommodity, but fish rights through the quotasystem are also now a part of the market. Ifwe examine the quota system—at least, theway it is applied in Norway—we will find itconsists of a complicated arrangement ofdecisions, practices, rules and regulations atso many levels as to make it difficult to get acomprehensive overview. For most people,the quota system appears to result from arather complicated and faceless powerprocess.

Fishery politics and quota questions are stillthe men’s domain since there are few womenin the institutions that make the mostimportant decisions. The Norwegian RussianFishery Commission that decides upon thetotal allowable catch (TAC) of cod in theBarents Sea is an example where the genderbalance is very uneven. In 2004, four womenand 24 men from Norway and the samenumber of women and men from Russia metto negotiate the TAC for the cod stock in theBarents Sea. A national-level example is the

committee that advises on the size of thequotas. This committee has always had aheavy deficit of women.

Both these important committees have appliedfor exemptions from the gender equality Actthat mandates 40 per cent women’sparticipation in public committees. They arguethat the fishery organizations have fewwomen as members. Representatives fromthe Ministry of Fisheries also claim that fewwomen are interested in, and seen as eligiblefor, such posts.

Such a view reflects the Ministry’s attitudeson who ought to be considered as experts infishing and who should hold special offices.The net result is that women have littleinfluence when quota questions are discussedat the political level. Some have tried toinfluence the policy, for example, in thecommittee that advises the Ministry regardingfish stocks. Fisheries and resourcemanagement policies are arenas where somemen still have the power to define the agenda.The quota system and the debate about thissystem can, therefore, be looked upon as astrong symbol of men’s maintenance of thepower in fishery policy and the hegemony ofsome men. Some say that women’s positionin fishery policymaking only reflects theirposition in society at large. This might havebeen the case if only the number of registeredwomen is taken into consideration. However,if we also consider the number of womenwho work alongside men, often their spouses,I would rather say that Norwegian fisherypolicy is facing a democratic deficit.

It should, however, be mentioned that eventhough little attention has been given towomen in relation to resource questions,women’s positions have, once in a while, beenput on the fishery policy agenda. In the 1970sand 1980s, students and researchers, alongwith members of the Fisherwomen’sAssociation, raised questions about womenin fisheries, in fishing communities andwomen’s influence on fishery politics. TheFisherwomen’s Association also emphasizedlocal welfare and cultural questions. Theassociation was among those that put safety

...it is important toremember that themajority of womenin fisher familieshave, for ages,performed workon shore,connected to, andimportant for, thefishing boats.However, thiswork has, in mostcases, not beenregistered orofficiallyrecognized, neitherby fisheriesofficials nor by

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SAMUDRA Dossier

at sea on the political agenda. Coastal womenfrom Srya in Finnmark went on the barricadesin 1989 after the moratorium was declaredand tried to influence policymaking. Womenfrom the environmental association and theSami Parliament have been among those whohave tried to influence the national committeediscussing quotas.

Women’s projectsSome of the 1980s’ activities resulted in thefishing industry’s Committee for Women.This Committee put women in coastalcommunities and women in the differentsectors of fisheries on the fisheries agendaand tried to support women and women’sprojects in different ways. However, it wasnot considered a policymaking institution andhad little influence on the resourcemanagement policy. The committee lasteduntil 2000, when the Minister of Fisheries cutoff financial support.

In recent years, women in the Lofoten areahave tried to give more attention to theimportance of coastal fisheries, through themass media and by circulating petitions.Women parliament members drew attentionto resource policy matters, just as theircounterparts in the Sami Parliament haddone. The gender-oriented white papermentioned earlier was a result of their work.In spite of such efforts, the women’s situation,the challenges in fisheries and fishingcommunities and the lack of recruitment inmany of the fishery districts are topics thatseem to be very difficult to get on to thepolitical agenda in the new millennium.

To be sure, there have been several changesin the men’s situation as well. In onecommunity in Finnmark, there are about 20boats, 20 local and some non-local registeredfishers, of whom three are women. All thefishers are over 30 years old. The majorityare more than 40. Four owners or enterprisesown half the boats and quotas. The numberof quotas exceeds the number of boats usedin the daily fishery. This is possible due tothe new arrangements that have beenadopted which states that one can transfer

for a limited period one quota from one boatto another boat within the same length class(for example, within the group of boats oflength 10 to 15 m). Two of the owners haveorganized themselves into private limitedcompanies, while two others have individualor sole enterprises, the traditional ownershipmodel in this area. We can see aconcentration of ownership of boats andquotas and a change in the ownership pattern:Some fishers are trying to succeed in thefishery by getting more quotas, others managewith one boat and one quota, and yet othersare leaving the fishery. The ‘deficit’ ofyoungsters entering the fishery is quiteobvious and the number going into the fisheryfrom this area is smaller than ever before.For the young ones, the fishery industry seemsto be a closed industry.

Loose connectionsToday, more and more women in the coastalareas of Norway seem to have only a looseconnection with fishing, fisher’s work andprocessing in general, compared to thesituation years ago when women contributedwith an enormous amount of work. Today,they can be their husbands’ consultants andshare the financial burdens of the household.The majority of women are employed outsidethe fishing sector, for example, in teaching,or in other public-and private-sector jobs,since fishery work has been so heavilydownscaled in Norway.

Young women and men are moving awayfrom fishing villages. Youngsters and womenin fishing and fishery-related activities seemto be the main losers in the fishing industry.

But there are also other considerations to betaken into account. When women leavefisheries, fishing-related households seem toweaken or disappear. When fishing-relatedhouseholds weaken or disappear, fishery asa way of life for women, men and childrenseems to weaken. When this happens, thepopulation in the fishing villages decreases.These tendencies also have consequencesfor men—especially for those who are notwilling to compete for more and more

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SAMUDRA Dossier

quotas—and for the young women and menwho, in future, would like to go into fishingand fisheries and live in fishing communities.

Unless we all succeed in changing themarket-oriented resource policies and themale hegemony in the majority of fisheryinstitutions, the entire fishery-dependentpopulation—women, the majority of men, andthe future generations—will all be losers.

Today, more andmore women inthe coastal areasof Norway seemto have only aloose connectionwith fishing,fisher’s work andprocessing ingeneral, comparedto the situationyears ago whenwomencontributed withan enormousamount of work

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The workshop on “FishingCommunities and SustainableDevelopment in Eastern and

Southern Africa (ESA): The Role of Small-scale Fisheries” was organized by theInternational Collective in Support ofFishworkers (ICSF) in collaboration with theWestern Indian Ocean Marine ScienceAssociation (WIOMSA), the MasifundiseDevelopment Trust and the Coalition for FairFisheries Arrangements (CFFA). It was heldat Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 14 to 17March 2006.

Among the various issues discussed,considerable interest focused on co-management in fisheries. Simeao Lopes ofthe Institute for the Development of Small-scale Fisheries (IDPPE), Mozambique, saidfishing contributes to the country’semployment, food security and foreignexchange. The sector is organized into theindustrial, semi-industrial and artisanalfisheries. Private and joint-venture companiesengage in industrial fisheries, especially forshrimp resources in the Sofala bank. Thesemi-industrial fishing vessels are mainlyMozamibque-based trawlers that targetshrimp. They also include handlines as wellas freshwater fishing platforms for kapenta.The artisanal fisheries are spread along theseaboard and the inland waters, employingabout 130,000 in canoe fishing and fishprocessing. There are about 11,000 artisanalfishing vessels, only 3 per cent of which aremotorized. Beach-seines, gill-nets andhandlines are the popular artisanal fishinggear.

The development of co-management inMozambique began, Lopes said, with the

structural adjustment programme (SAP) in thepost-Second World War era, as demandsincreased on Africa to democratize andimplement SAPs, from its traditional Westerndonors, led by the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), whostressed resource management based uponparticipatory approaches, devolution ofauthority and decentralization of powers.Thus, by the early 1990s, user participationhad become almost a given requirement fordonor-funded development projects inMozambique.

Within the fisheries sector, studies wereconducted to evaluate fisheries programmesand projects implemented during the previoustwo decades so as to draw lessons andpropose appropriate future interventions. AFisheries Master Plan (FMP) was developedand approved by the Mozambicangovernment in 1994. The process ofelaboration of the FMP involved many centralfisheries institutions, fishing communities andother stakeholders, Lopes said.

The FMP laid out the priorities and strategiesfor development to be pursued in thesubsequent years. With regard to themanagement of small-scale fisheries, the FMP

emphasized the involvement of fishermen insetting and enforcing management regimes.It was from the FMP that co-managementapproaches were formally declared as partof the general new strategic interventions forfisheries management and development.

Better analysesA subsequent evaluation underscored theimportance of more careful andcomprehensive analyses and discussions, and

Empowering co-managementSebastian Mathew

The issue of co-management came up for detailed discussion atthe ESA Fish Workshop organized by ICSF at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

This report has beenfiled by SebastianMathew([email protected]),Programme Adviser,ICSF. This article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 43, March 2006

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SAMUDRA Dossier

the development of more active participationof beneficiaries. Pilot measures for user-sensitization began in the late-1990s. Severalco-management committees were since setup in the marine coastal areas of the countryto improve the efficacy of fisheriesmanagement through developing a sense ofownership of management programmesamongst active fishers.

However, Lopes identified several constraintsto realizing co-management goals inMozambique. Firstly, the State acts as thecustodian of all natural resources, includingmarine resources. Through the Ministry ofFisheries’ directorates and autonomousinstitutes, the State has the right to managemarine resources for the benefit of thepeople. In artisanal fisheries, the users(coastal communities) have the right to usefisheries resources; however, they do nothave the right to participate in planning forthe use nor the right to legally act, individuallyor collectively, in respect of management ofthe fishery resource. This is a seriousconstraint to the goal of better resourcemanagement.

Secondly, there are restrictive meaningsassociated with the concept of participation.Thus, for example, as far as fishingcommunities and their traditional leadershipare concerned, participation does not applyto the crew on board fishing vessels. Itapplies only to those who have the politicaland economic power to take strategicdecisions, to the local elite, the traditional andreligious leaders and other individuals whoare willing to offer their services on behalfof others. These people may not be the mostappropriate to deal with issues related tofisheries co-management. There could thusbe conflicts between participatorydemocracy as demanded by the main donors,and effective fisheries management.However, to guarantee the success of co-management, the government shouldunderstand these socio-cultural aspects (astraditional leaders are still respected by themajority of rural people), and ensure that allrelevant institutions, individuals or interestgroups, which are considered legitimate by

different members of fishing communities, areengaged in the process, Lopes added.

Thirdly, the government has not been able toempower fishing communities (legally,through economic incentives or throughcapacity building) to cope with resourcemanagement responsibilities. Neither hasthere been an effort to use local knowledgein decision-making processes or to explain thecriteria used to make some managementdecisions. As long as there is poorunderstanding of fisheries managementamongst the fishermen, there might beunwillingness to comply with fisheriesregulations.

Local knowledgeIt is important to integrate traditional/localauthorities, as well as local knowledge, intoco-management as a means to connectpolitical and scientific objectives of thegovernment to the community. For the fishingcommunity, it could be a way to reach fullcontrol of their marine resources through thedevolution of power and responsibilities fromgovernment, Lopes observed.

The pressures on the coastal fishing resourcesin Mozambique result, among other things,from the overall unhealthy economic situationin the country, he added. To raise enoughincome for subsistence, fishing communitiesare putting pressure on the resource byincreasing fishing effort through the use ofinappropriate fishing gear like fine-meshednets in beach-seines that target small pelagicfish. Open access to fisheries resourcesfurther complicates the matter, resulting inserious threats both to the resource and tothe economic development of fishingcommunities.

The fishermen themselves say that the catchrates from the nearshore waters havedeclined, and the average size of commercialfish species have decreased. The fallingproductivity of fishing units indicates the needto manage the fishery and exercise cautionin promoting any increase in fishing effort.Co-management arrangements should be ableto reconcile conservation with the subsistence

In artisanalfisheries, the users(coastalcommunities) havethe right to usefisheries resources;however, they donot have the rightto participate inplanning for theuse nor the rightto legally act,individually orcollectively, inrespect ofmanagement ofthe fisheryresource

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SAMUDRA Dossier

or livelihood interests of fishing communities.The competition for the marine coastalresources of Mozambique is becomingincreasingly evident, with both artisanalfishing communities and tourism relying onthe resources for livelihoods anddevelopment. At present, the Government ofMozambique (GoM) is encouraging tourismas a way to rapidly develop the economy,Lopes said. As part of this process, the GoMhas delegated the management responsibilityof some areas of the coastal zone to privatetourism developers.

Artisanal fishing communities are concernedabout the use of, and access to, the samecoastal resources, leading to conflicts wherefishing communities have been displacedfrom their traditional living and fishinggrounds. These are more evident wheretourism interests are promoting thepreservation of marine coastal resources astheir primary asset, which contrasts with theextractive value of the coastal fisheryresource, as perceived by the fishingcommunities.

On the one hand, the GoM is supporting thedevelopment of co-management in theartisanal fisheries sector without thelegislative framework that can delegateresource management responsibilities to thecommunities. On the other, it is providing thelegislative framework for delegating resourcemanagement concessions to private tourismdevelopers without the co-managementinstitutional framework that would considerthe needs of all resource users. In bothinstances, the result of partial regulation andcontrol over each resource user group risksoverexploitation of marine coastal resources.

Co-management is seen by the GoM as ameans to better control fisheries activities(especially the fishing effort and conflicts ofinterest) through sharing or decentralizationof some responsibilities to the localinstitutions. But the communities view thearrangement as a step to achieve full controlover the fishery resources through thedevolution of power and authority to the localinstitutions.

However, the GoM may not be able, or evenwilling, to devolve the authority, as that wouldrequire some changes to the country’sconstitution. Sufficient financial capacitywould also be needed to ensure appropriatecollective organizations among thecommunities. Lopes raised the followingquestions in the light of the experience ofMozambique with co-management: (i) Whatare the different approaches of differentplayers in co-management and what is theirunderstanding of ‘sustainable development’?(ii) How could balance between conservationobjectives of governments and the livelihoodneeds of fishing communities be establishedwhile implementing co-managementprogrammes? (iii) Could co-managementachieve the objectives of all players, giventhat the outcome might not always be exactlythe same and may often be contradictory innature? (iv) How could participatory andtraditional elements work together? (v) Areco-management institutions willing, or able,to use multiple sources of knowledge inmanagement decisionmaking? (vi) Whatcould be the implications of the two models—decentralization and devolution—for fisheriesco-management arrangements? (vii) Whatare the impacts of participatory developmentapproaches on the traditional and (new)economic power structures in a co-managedresource environment?

In the discussion that followed Lopes’presentation, it was observed that co-management basically referred to sharedmanagement responsibility between thegovernment and the community. It was notedthat it is important to have an understandingof what definition to use in the ESA context.It was further observed that the participationof women in co-management initiatives ispoor.

Friday Njaya of the Fisheries Department ofMalawi spoke about the status ofparticipatory fishery management (PFM) inMalawi lakes. PFM was introduced in LakeMalawi at the behest of international agenciesin the 1990s in response to declining lakefishery resources and intensifying conflictsbetween small-scale and commercial

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SAMUDRA Dossier

fisheries. Historically, there were traditionalcontrols over fisheries resources in some partsof Lake Malawi and Lake Chiuta, and usercommittees and associations called beachvillage committees (BVCs) were formed toestablish PFM in all the lakes.

The composition of the BVCs varied from laketo lake. While some were associations ofchiefs, others had mixed composition. Theissue of devolution of fisheries responsibilitiesto local district assemblies is still anoutstanding one. BVCs have to be redefinedto allow for the participation of allrepresentatives of different fishing activities.Formal bye-laws are yet to be developed foreffective devolution of fishery managementpowers.

There are doubts whether or not PFM couldwork in Lake Malawi, which is a large waterbody supporting small-scale, semi-industrialand commercial fisheries, including trawling.The fishing communities along Lake Malawiare multi-ethnic. There are problems insuccessfully imposing access regulation onfishing, in demarcating boundaries and inenforcing fishery regulations, Njaya said.

Yet, despite difficulties, it is possible to setup ‘broadbased co-management’ in LakeMalawi, with the participation of stakeholderssuch as the police, magistrates, chiefs, naturalresourcesbased government departmentsand the district assembly. There is a movenow to introduce a closed season fortrawlers. In smaller lakes such as LakeChiuta, PFM structures are usefulmechanisms to resolve transboundaryconflicts between Malawi and Mozambique.Njaya said co-management should be basedon local conditions, and defined anddeveloped in a contextual manner. It isimportant to make a policy distinctionbetween the rural poor and the village elitein co-management programmes. Thereshould be clarity on the introduction ofproperty rights or access regulation regimes.Sufficient caution should be exercised whileapplying theories in practice. Implementationof a co-management initiative is a learning

process and it evolves with time, Njayaconcluded.

Mafaniso Hara of the University of WesternCape, South Africa, gave a presentation onthe implications for coastal communities ofco-management perspectives andexperiences in the ESA region. The objectivesof fisheries management mainly involve threeaspects: setting management objectives;defining and providing the knowledge basefor management decisions; andimplementation of management decisions.Historically, fishery management decisionshave been top-down. The fisheries resourceshave been treated as State property, and theobjectives of fisheries management havemainly been confined to conservation offishery resources, relying on biologicalsciences. The implementation of fisherymanagement was through policing measures.

Conventional regimesCo-management of fishery resources wasproposed in light of the failure of conventionalfishery management regimes to preventoverexploitation of fishery resources. It is alsoproposed as an effective mechanism to breakthe barriers between fishery administratorsand user communities—a legacy of the top-down approach through democraticdecentralization, Hara said.

Co-management of fishery resources mostlyas short-term, externally funded projects—was led by government line agencies throughthe creation of ‘user’ representativeorganizations (‘democratically’ electedcommittees). The process has sometimeslacked flexibility because of specific donorrequirements.

The experiences with co-management in theESA region have so far been mixed. The mostcommon types of co-management have been‘instructive’ or ‘consultative’. Hara discussedseveral critical aspects of co-management asit is currently practised in the region. Firstly,there are conflicting objectives betweenconservation of fishery resources andsocioeconomic development of fishing

The objectives offisheriesmanagementmainly involvethree aspects:settingmanagementobjectives;defining andproviding theknowledge basefor managementdecisions; andimplementation ofmanagementdecisions

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SAMUDRA Dossier

communities. The government approach hasusually been instrumental; it co-opts usersinto the management process to achieve thesame old conservation objectives withoutreally accepting alternative knowledge, ideasand views from them. By and large,governments do not perceive co-management as a means of introducing moredemocratic principles of fisheriesmanagement, but as a means to betterachieve the government’s originalconservation objectives.

Secondly, co-management has beenproposed as a way to deal with open-accessproblems. The introduction of access rightshas been with the idea of enabling effortcontrol. However, such measures often clashwith historical fishing practices. Enforcingaccess control was particularly problematicin areas lacking alternative economicopportunities.

Thirdly, centralized co-management systemsare favoured that rely on the government’snatural scientists. Very few inputs from usersare incorporated into such systems. Usually,only tasks that the governments have failedto implement, or are costly, are left to theuser groups. The local communities areusually not legally empowered. Theirnegotiating position in relation to thegovernment is still weak. The governmentsare also reluctant to devolve real power andgenuine authority to user groups.

Fourthly, co-management usually requirescustomary sources of power held bytraditional leaders for effective application ofsanctions. There is thus a need to involvetraditional authority. The traditional authoritiesor local elites often capture power to offsetany challenge to their authority that could cropup from co-management programmes.

Fifthly, while the governments may lackappropriate skills and capacity to undertakeco-management, communities might not havethe economic, social and political incentivesor capacity to undertake some responsibilitiesrequired under co-management.

Finally, the definition of ‘user community’ and‘stakeholders’ can be evolving and dynamicin a temporal and spatial sense. Existingmechanisms cannot define the users anddecide on how to represent them in co-management structures. There is also theproblem of lack, or low degree, of downwardaccountability of representativeorganizations. However, tacit threats ofgovernments to revoke powers and authorityforce upward accountability.

Hara had the following recommendations for“efficient, equitable and sustainable fisheriesmanagement” in the ESA region. Firstly, co-management models should acknowledgeand integrate the role of poverty incommunity/individual decisions, andoccupational and geographic mobility incommunity/individual livelihoods. The role offishing in the community’s livelihood interestsshould be better understood.

The community should know the status offishery resources and be better informedabout alternative sources of livelihoods thatcould possibly combine with fishing. In thiscontext, how far occupational and geographicmobility could help improve socioeconomicstatus is important, Hara added.

Secondly, there is a need for “empoweringco-management” by fully involving users insetting up management objectives, inintegrating `user knowledge’ into formalscience and in the implementation ofmanagement decisions.

And finally, it is important to improve the abilityof communities to agitate. They shouldchallenge formal science (includinginternational conventions) using their localknowledge to balance conservation with localsocioeconomic concerns. They should agitatefor enabling legislation and improvement inthe attitude of governments to their concerns.They should agitate for better information andbetter organization of co-managementstructures with improved human and financialresources, Hara concluded.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The main objective of this document isto make a modest attempt to highlightthe challenges which are emerging

with the current phase of Cambodia’saquarian reforms—the most importantcomponent of which is the current transitionfrom fishing lots to community fisheries. Thechallenges include the realms of institutionaland policy reform, local action, innovation andresearch. We contextualize our effort bycommencing with an assessment of theimportance of the aquatic resources and byproviding a brief historical background to thereforms. This is followed by an examinationof the changes in the access and propertyrights and the system changes which havebeen brought about as a result of the reform.

How some of the transitional changes canbe assessed and the manner in which theefforts at community fisheries can be mademore economically and socially viable arealso addressed. We deal with the complexissue of social identity and the aspirations forcreating a new sense of community. The newrole of women, the importance of creatingnetworks and closer collaboration withCambodia’s local governance structures andvibrant civil society organizations are alsohighlighted. The reforms have created newlegal realms of local ‘micro’ ecosystem spaceand resource governance.

But this should not detract from the need foran understanding of the larger ‘global’context—be it in relation to the ecosystemdynamics or governance priorities. Wesuggest that research and developmentpriorities must be re-oriented to considerways of dealing with the vast number of new

and evolving ‘local realities’ and yet, link themup contemporaneously to the big ‘globalpicture’. We end with a fewrecommendations addressed to differentactors involved in the process of aquarianreforms. There is a call for a new missionand greater collaboration by researchinstitutions; new methodologies for datacollection; greater participation with localgovernance structures; an exit strategy foraid agencies and the need for setting up anational institute for co-managementapplications and training.

Developing countries have been recentlychallenged by many opportunities andproblems pertaining to their efforts to facilitateeconomic growth and promote humandevelopment. Providing a growing populationwith the entitlements and capabilities neededto meet rising aspirations in a globalized,market-dominated economy is often adaunting task before policymakers andpoliticians. Tapping into the renewable naturalresources in a country—its real wealth—isoften the ‘fallback option’ which both theState and the people adopt when crisis brewsin the other sectors of the economy. Themarket-oriented option of converting naturalresources to wealth often ends up in whateconomist Herman Daly recently referred toas the tragedy of artificial or self-inflictedscarcity. This approach generally leads toprivate riches for a few and exclusion fromthe public wealth for the many.

Under pressureRecognizing the pitfalls of such an approach,but often under pressure from the people andcivil society, States have increasingly resorted

A meaningful beginningJohn Kurien, So Nam and Mao Sam Onn

The following is from a document published by the Inland FisheriesResearch and Development Institute (IFReDI), Cambodia

This excerpt is fromCambodia’sAquarian Reforms:The EmergingChallenges forPolicy andResearch by JohnKurien, Fellow,Centre forDevelopmentStudies, India, SoNam, Deputy-Chief,Fisheries Domainand ExtensionDivision, and MaoSam Onn, Deputy-Chief,Administration andPersonnel Divisionand Assistant of theDG, Department ofFisheries, PhnomPenh, Cambodia.This article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 43, March 2006

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SAMUDRA Dossier

to measures to open up the terrain ofrenewable natural resources to communitieswho depend on them for a livelihood. Doingso without the appropriate institutionalarrangements to modulate the use andmanagement of these resources has oftenled to the tragedy of open access.

Finding the ‘middle-path’—wherein bothefficiency and equity considerations can beadequately met within their social, culturaland political frameworks—has been on theagenda of many developing countries.

Cambodia is pictured in international percapita income comparisons to be one of thepoorest countries in the world. There iscertainly much truth in this statistic. However,viewed from the perspective of availabilityof per capita natural resource—land, aquaticresources, particularly fish, and forests—itis certainly one of the richest countries inAsia. Converting this latter statistical averageinto equitable access and well-being for themajority is indeed the greatest challengebefore the State and the people of Cambodia.The challenges to achieve this goal withrespect to the most valuable aquatic resourceof the country—the fish in its inland waters—are the focus of this document.

We term the efforts at aquatic resourcemanagement which have been unfolding inCambodia as ‘aquarian reforms’. We adoptthe term ‘aquarian reforms’ rather than‘fishery reforms’ for a variety of reasons.The reforms have a historical context. In thepast, government intervention in the sectorwas focused on gathering revenue rather thanmanaging fish production or promoting locallivelihoods. In the current phase, the attentionof the reforms is focused on the institutionalchanges which are being made—contemporaneously by the State from aboveand the communities from below. Thesereforms are meant to empower people torelate collectively to the country’s rivers,lakes, floodplains and the fishery resourcestherein. In future, the reforms will play a rolein conditioning the technological choices andorganizational decisions that people make in

order to obtain sustainable gains from theircollective action. In brief, we are concernedwith a dynamic process of transformation.The focus is not merely on fish but on thewhole aquatic terrain and the evolving mannerin which people relate and intervene in it. Ourcontention is that the ecological andsocioeconomic initial conditions have adefinite bearing on these evolvingcircumstances. The present course and thefuture trajectory of the new institutionalchanges sought to be introduced need to beenvisioned with this perspective. Aquarianreforms cover this entire canvass.

Good scholarshipAn excellent body of scholarship alreadyexists about these reforms written before thesub-decree of community fisheriesmanagement was formally approved. Ourefforts build upon that corpus of informationand on recent (late 2005) discussions withfishery officials and researchers and fieldvisits to several provinces for firsthandinformation from the women and men in thevillages most impacted by these reforms. Thedocument primarily addresses the variousactors associated with the aquarian reformsin Cambodia. It seeks to provide them withsome guideposts on the range of issues thatmay arise if the reforms are to be taken totheir logical conclusions.

The community access to resources, ifmanaged well and strengthened, can yieldsignificant familial and societal changes thatsustain resources and foster conviviallivelihoods.

More than mere poverty alleviation, it cancontribute significantly to enhancement of thecapabilities and entitlements of the ruralmasses in Cambodia. Combined withenlightened advice and support from researchand development agencies, local control overresources can lead to greater care and nurtureof the unique aquatic ecosystem ofCambodia.

During our visits to community fisheries wewere informed about the greater livelihood

These reforms aremeant to empowerpeople to relatecollectively to thecountry’s rivers,lakes, floodplainsand the fisheryresources therein

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SAMUDRA Dossier

opportunities available for men and theincreased employment and income-earningopportunities for women.

People spoke about the manner in which theavailability of greater money income wasutilized to keep children healthier andeducated. They spoke about reduceddomestic violence.

The greater control over local naturalresources also leads to reduction in ‘push-pull’ migration of men in search of work.These factors taken together can yieldintergenerational reduction in infant mortality,family size, enhancement of educationallevels and greater gender justice.

Such positive socioeconomic anddemographic changes will create differentoccupational expectations in the nextgeneration. This can yield reduced populationpressure on the aquatic resources in the not-too-distant future.

Coupled with changes in the access right toaquatic resources, if there is a general revivalof economic growth and employmentopportunities in the country, this can result inthe new generation opting for other gainfuloccupations.

These opportunities can arise in small andmedium village enterprises dealing withaquatic resource processing, which can berural-based, urban-or export-market-oriented, and yielding higher incomes.

Greater economic democracy is a necessarycondition for raising human dignity andcreating stable political democracy andpeace. This will have far-reachingimplications for the future of the country.

Aquarian reforms in Cambodia have a longhistory. The earlier phases were measurestaken with considerations aimed at efficiencyand maximum rent extraction, and temperedin accordance with some sociopoliticalconsiderations.

The current phase is anchored in the contextof the country’s recent voyage towardsgreater democratization and integration intothe global economy. It is part of thegovernment’s Rectangular Strategy which isintended to “firmly and steadily buildCambodian society by strengthening peace,stability and social order, entrenchingdemocracy and promoting respect for humanrights and dignity.”

These are indeed laudable objectives. Thecurrent move towards community fisheriesshould be seen as an important commitmenttowards achieving these goals. Beingsimultaneously a top-down and bottom-upapproach, it is only natural that there will bedoubts and anxieties about the sense and theviability of the whole enterprise, both on thepart of the government and the people.

There is no need to concentrate excessivelyon the organizational form of the reforms. Thedebate is not about whether the inland fish ofCambodia are better harvested through largefishing lots or small community fisheriesorganizations.

Complete reformsAquarian reforms are complete only whenthose who directly relate to the aquaticresource through their labour, to give valueand meaning to it, are assured the freedomand given their rightful rewards for doing soon a sustainable basis. On this count, ameaningful beginning has been made inCambodia. But there will be many challengesahead and a long way to go.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Fremantle, Australia, the site of theSharing the Fish Conference 2006,was not exactly temperate between 26

February and 2 March 2006, with Celsiustemperatures in the mid- to high-30s.Nonetheless, the intellectual climate of theconference was distinctly Northern. Inretrospect, perhaps this should not have beena surprise, given that it was hosted andsupported by various Australian fisheriesagencies and the New Zealand Ministry ofFisheries. However, the lack of representationfrom the South was still a shock, consideringthat the theme of the conference—allocationissues in fisheries management—is ofenormous global importance currently, andalso considering that the Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations (FAO) co-hosted the conference.

As someone with experience of primaryfisheries research in both the South (India)and the North (Canada)—sufficient to havegenerated an international perspective—Ioffer this review from the perspective of themajority of world fishers, whose interests andconcerns were largely left out of theconference, which was, nonetheless, astimulating and thought-provokingexperience.

Sharing the Fish 2006 was an expensiveevent. Conference fees were AUD700(US$500). For those who wished to stay inthe hotel where the conference was held,room rates were another AUD175 (US$125)a night. Such rates allowed the conferencecommittee to hire a professional eventmanagement company to run the event , andthus it was extremely well organized. Thedownside, of course, was that ordinary

participants from other parts of the world,not already dissuaded from attending by thehigh cost of travel, would have had to thinktwice about participating because of the highfees.

There was thus a paucity of representationfrom the most important fishing regions ofthe world and even a surprisingly smallnumber of academic participants, particularlyfrom the non-economic social sciences. Icounted only three of this last group, alongwith the economists, lawyers and biologistswho made up the academics at theconference, although there may have beenseveral more than were immediatelyapparent. The character of the conferencewas thus professional and corporate. Tables1 and 2 give a breakdown of conferenceparticipants by region of origin and by work.

Table 1. Origin of Speakers

Country SpeakersAustralia 61New Zealand 15United States 11Northern Europe 8Canada 7Africa 4South Pacific 3Southeast Asia 3Asia 2Latin America 1FAO 1

The allocation theme of Sharing the Fish2006 was divided into three subtopics:“allocation across jurisdictions” (26 papers);

Who’s sharing the fish?Derek Johnson

This is a reaction to the ‘temperate minority’-worldview on the allocationof fishing rights that dominated the Sharing the Fish Conference 2006

This review is byDerek Johnson ofthe Centre forMaritime Research(MARE), Amsterdam,The Netherlands.This article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 43, March 2006

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SAMUDRA Dossier

“allocation across sectors” (51 papers); and“allocation within sectors” (25 papers).Thirteen papers did not fit into thesecategories. The three conference subtopicswere further divided. The “allocation acrossjurisdictions” subtopic included “high seas,regional and national cases”. “Allocationacross sectors” included “extractive vs. non-extractive uses”; “allocation betweencommercial and recreational sectors”;“indigenous, recreational and commercialallocation”; and a number of more conceptualpapers grouped under the headings of“temporal and spatial systems of allocation”and “approaches to the allocation problem”.“Allocations within sectors” included“recreational allocation” and “allocation andreallocation within the commercial sector”.

Table 2. Speaker Affiliations

Affiliation SpeakersGovernment 62Academic 27NGO 13Private Sector 11Other 3

The notion of “sector” was debatable, in thesense that the indigenous sector overlapswith the commercial and that some papersdid not fit into either the “allocation acrosssectors” or the “allocation within sectors”subtopics. On the whole, however, the logicof the division was clear and as consistentas possible under the messy circumstancesthat characterize fisheries.

A final distinctive element of the conferencewas the large number of keynote and invitedspeakers, who numbered 22 out of the total116 speakers. In combination with theeffective use of daily rapporteurs andconference overview speakers on the lastday, this innovation gave the conference anadmirable coherence and sense of purpose.

Allocation can be seen as the implementationchallenge of assigning rights to fish. In thissense, Sharing the Fish 2006 built directly

on the foundation laid by its predecessor, theFish Rights 1999 conference. Whetherdeliberate or not, the selection of keynotespeakers for Sharing the Fish 2006 fosteredthe impression that individual transferablequotas (ITQs) are the ideal path to allocation.Two of the three conference keynotespeakers, Peter Pearse and Gary Libecap,purveyed this point of view along with RagnarArnason, one of the invited speakers for theconference.

The argument for ITQs is well known andwas clearly presented by these threespeakers. When quota rights can be assignedsuch that they are secure, transferable andpermanent, they result in fisheries that areecologically sustainable because quotaholders gain the incentive to care for theresource that they now own. Ecologicalconsiderations, previously externalities, arenow internalized under ITQ systems.

Of most interest in relationship to thisperspective, and perhaps in dissonance withthe intentions of the conference organizers,several strong voices pointed to the limitationsof the ITQ approach. The most forcefulcritique came from the invited speaker andrepresentative of the International Collectivein Support of Fishworkers (ICSF), ChandrikaSharma, whose staunch advocacy of thesmall-scale fisher perspective came like a cryin the wilderness. Sharma pointed out that avery small minority of the world’s fishers aresubject to ITQs and wondered why such ahigh-profile conference was devoting somuch attention to an issue of relevance onlyto a small proportion of the globe. As she andmembers of the small South Africandelegation to the conference noted, ITQsthreaten the livelihood basis of small-scalefishers. Moeniba Isaacs and Andrew Johnstonshowed in their presentations how artisanalfishers in South Africa have been badlydivided, and had their ability to make a livingfrom fishing undermined by the recent SouthAfrican legislation that has based all SouthAfrican fisheries on ITQs. The inequity ofITQs was echoed by Frank Alcock and thetwo end-of-conference overview speakers,

When quota rightscan be assignedsuch that they aresecure,transferable andpermanent, theyresult in fisheriesthat areecologicallysustainablebecause quotaholders gain theincentive to carefor the resourcethat they now own

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Susan Hanna and Ray Hilborn, who affirmedthe challenge to equity that ITQs representeven in countries of the North.

Weak defenceThe three proponents of ITQs seemed unableto defend themselves against thesechallenges, saying that while ITQs mightincrease inequity, the broader environmentaland social benefits they brought were worthit. Pearse succinctly encapsulated thisresponse by stating that it is the end, not themeans that is important, a statement Ipersonally found highly problematic as it goesagainst the increasing emphasis on processand social justice that has informed theoriesof co-management and fisheries governancein recent years. I was also troubled by theamiable reasonableness of the ITQ

proponents, which softened an otherwiseharsh message.

The lack of sufficient participation bydelegates representing the world’s mostpopulous fishing regions meant that theconference did not adequately discussallocation and rights-based approachesappropriate to the majority of the world’sfisheries, which are highly complex, diverseand rapidly changing. The invited speakerMahfuzzudin Ahmed did list allocationalternatives for tropical fisheries but at a levelof generality that sparked little debate. ITQsare clearly of little relevance in most complexdeveloping country fisheries. What is thecutting edge in community-based quotas?How can allocation be worked out betweensemi-industrial fleets and small-scalesubsectors with thousands of units? While Ican see the real advantages of introducingITQs for semi-industrial fisheries indeveloping countries for capacity reductionand sustainability, how could such ITQs co-exist with other forms of rights for the small-scale subsector that would have to beextremely well protected? How do wemanage large and complex fisheries that arealso data-poor and in regions wheregovernance is weak? How can fishers beprotected when coastal tourism, industrialdevelopment and oil exploration move into

traditional fishing grounds? It is not enoughto leave such questions to the very end ofthe deliberations, for the conferenceoverview speakers; and it makes me wonderwhy the FAO was not able to put suchquestions more forcibly on to the agenda ofthe conference.

Despite these concerns about theconference, within the confines of the largelyantipodal group of papers at the conference,there were many that provided examples ofchallenges—and creative solutions—similarto those encountered in the fisheries of theSouth. The Maori case in New Zealand, forexample, as introduced by the invited speakerAlison Thom, shows that strong communitiescan participate in an ITQ process and comeout ahead.

Equity implicationsIt would be interesting, nonetheless, to see amore disinterested presentation of thatprocess, and to hear about the equityimplications of sharing quota for thecommunities. The Alaskan native quotaallocation case would be another example toconsider. There are surely lessons from manyof the other papers presented at theconference that may be helpful for themajority-world fisheries. One example wasthe paper presented by Claire Anderson,which discussed the development of a moretransparent instrument for inter-sectorallocation by the Queensland government.

If the debate over the applicability and equityof ITQs bumped along mostly in thebackground during the conference, two topicscreated a buzz during the event. The first ofthese followed the presentation of RosemaryRayfuse, who talked about allocation acrossjurisdictions. She argued that the principle offreedom of the high seas has now beensufficiently constrained by internationalagreements that it should be withdrawn.

In effect, obligations under international law,particularly when regional marine fisheriesorganizations are involved, have created asituation where there are now legal

The lack ofsufficientparticipation bydelegatesrepresenting theworld’s mostpopulous fishingregions meant thatthe conference didnot adequatelydiscuss allocationand rights-basedapproachesappropriate to themajority of theworld’s fisheries,which are highlycomplex, diverseand rapidlychanging

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SAMUDRA Dossier

instruments to control access and allocatefish stocks on the high seas. Theseinstruments are still far from perfect, andillegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU)fishing persists to the degree that someobservers, such as another invited speaker,Gordon Munro, are pessimistic about theirever being controlled.

The increasing concern of internationalorganizations like Greenpeace, representedat the conference by Alistair Graham, for theprotection of deep-sea mounts may be arecognition that the time may have come foreffective restrictions on such sensitive areas.The question that arises, however, is whetherso much effort on the part of internationalorganizations should be invested inenvironmental areas that are marginal to thelivelihoods of the world’s fishers. In termsof social benefit, it would seem a better useof resources to focus on threats to thetropical coastal waters where most of theworld’s fishers and marine biodiversity co-exist.

The second topic that stimulated considerableinterest at Sharing the Fish Conference2006 was triggered by an example given byPearse, and relates to ITQs and allocationacross sectors. Pearse stated that theCanadian Minister of Fisheries has recentlygiven an ITQ share to the recreational fisherysector for halibut on Canada’s Pacific coast.This arrangement satisfied the commercialhalibut sector, which had been increasinglyconcerned about the growing share of fishcaught by the recreational sector. Theadvantage for the commercial sector wasthat, in future, any further growth in therecreational catch would have to bepurchased from them, and they would thusget a fair market rate instead of the gradualerosion of their quota as had been occurring.The buzz at the conference revolved aroundthe innovation of giving a transferable quotato a disparate group of unorganizedrecreational fishers who would have littlechoice but to become organized in order toadminister their new right. This experimentclearly stimulated the minority-world

fisheries managers present, all of whom facelarge and growing demand from recreationalstakeholders. It is less relevant for places likeIndia, where recreational fishing is virtuallynonexistent. Nonetheless, it does raise aninteresting comparison with small-scalesectors in majority-world fisheries, which alsohave large numbers of diverse stakeholderswho often lack effective institutional meansfor negotiating their rights.

As these points demonstrate, the Sharing theFish Conference 2006 was a stimulatingforum. Clearly, however, it would bepreferable, in future, to seek much greaterparticipation from the majority areas of thefisheries world. If that is not possible, then itwould be wise to indicate more clearly thatsuch a conference is geared primarilytowards the interests of the fisheries of theNorth, a small minority in global terms. It wouldbe a pity if this were the outcome, however,as Sharing the Fish Conference 2006 andits predecessor FishRights99 have beenimportant milestones on the path to improvingfisheries management.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

I refer to Derek Johnson’s article, “Whois Sharing the Fish?”, in SAMUDRA ReportNo 43 (March 2006), discussing the

Sharing the Fish 2006 Conference thatwas held in Australia last February and towhich the Food and Agriculture Organizationof the United Nations (FAO) gave technicalsupport. While the tone of the article is positiveregarding the conference, and its outcome insupporting better-managed fisheries, I wouldlike to emphasize a few points:

The FAO Secretariat has moved, beyond adoubt, on the matter of whether fishing rightsare good or not. They are absolutelynecessary and fundamental to thesustainability of the world’s fisheriesresources.

However, fisheries policies, managementapproaches—and fishing rights—need to betailored to the specific context of countriesand localities with respect to the fisheries inquestion, the social setting, culture, etc.Indeed, fishing rights have been allocatedunder long-standing programmes, such as thecommunity development quota (CDQ)systems that have been operating in fishingcommunities in the Bering Sea; the varioustypes of territorial use rights in fisheriessystems (TURFs) such as those found inJapan, the Philippines, Samoa and Fiji; theManagement and Exploitation Areas forBenthic Resources of Chile; and the beachmanagement units (BMUs) found in Uganda,Tanzania and Kenya. It is for communitiesto decide on how efficient they would liketheir fisheries to be, with few or many boatsof small or large size.

Fishing rights do not simply equate to the bigindividual transferable quota (ITQ) systemsthat have been designed for large-scalefleets. Moreover, fishing rights should not belimited to large-scale fisheries. The currentvariety of schemes for formally allocatingfishing rights has vastly expanded the rangeof fisheries and fishing situations to whichrights-based schemes can be applied. Theyshould apply to large and small fisheries, bothwith large and small boats. They are, by far,the best tool to re-establish and formalizetraditional fishing rights and, thus, protect therights of fishermen. Even ITQs need notthreaten the livelihoods of small-scalefisheries, and they should not foster inequityif well designed.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach, andmore attention needs to be given toappropriately sequence policies and policyreforms. Perhaps it is time to convene aninternational conference on the allocation ofrights in small-scale fisheries, to which I amsure ICSF would be able to contribute.

No one-size-fits-all approachIchiro Nomura

This response to an article in SAMUDRA ReportNo. 43 discusses rights-based schemes in fisheries

This Letter to theEditor is from IchiroNomura, AssistantDirector General,FisheriesDepartment, Foodand AgricultureOrganization of theUnited Nations(FAO). This articlefirst appeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 44, July 2006

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SAMUDRA Dossier

A group of South African artisanalfishers has launched class actionlitigation against the Minister

responsible for fishing rights allocation on thegrounds that the policies pursued by the SouthAfrican government are inequitable anddiscriminatory, and violate the human rightsof artisanal fishers in the country. Is itpossible that the introduction of a rights-basedmanagement system might violate the humanrights of certain fishers?

South Africa began introducing a rights-based fisheries management system as earlyas the 1960s, when quotas were introducedby the Department of Sea Fisheries for alimited number of commercially exploitedspecies. From 1988 onwards, the Departmentallocated rights in terms of the Sea FisheriesAct 12 of 1988. These quotas were allocatedwithin a racially defined fisheries structureand were largely held by white rights holders,while the artisanal fishery was beingmarginalized. Highly capitalized commercialcompanies predominated in the industryduring this period.

Following the election of the first democraticgovernment in 1994, the government begana process of restructuring the fishing industryand developing new legislation and policiesto guide the allocation of fishing rights andthe management of these rights. Towards thisend, the Marine Living Resources Act(MLRA) was introduced in 1998.

This Act empowered the Minister ofEnvironmental Affairs and Tourism to allocatefishing rights in three defined fishingcategories: subsistence, commercial andrecreational. No provisions for artisanal

fishers were included in this Act and thelegislation states clearly:

“no person shall undertake commercialfishing or subsistence fishing, engagein mariculture or operate a fishprocessing establishment unless a rightto undertake or engage in such anactivity or to operate such anestablishment has been granted to sucha person by the Minister” (MLRA,1998,18 (1)).

In terms of the MLRA, a fishing right is grantedto a specific person or entity and, “in termsof Section 21 of the MLRA, the right may notbe transferred without the approval of theMinister or his delegate. Upon the death,sequestration, or liquidation of the right holder,the right vests, respectively, in the executor,trustee or liquidator and the right may continueto be exploited for the period of time permittedby the applicable legal provisions. However,any transfer of the fishing right to a third partyrequires approval” (General Fishing Policy,2005).

Following the introduction of this Act, thegovernment established a SubsistenceFisheries Task Group (SFTG) to investigatethe nature and extent of subsistence fishingand to advise on the management of thissector. This task group undertook researchalong the coast in South Africa and identifiedapproximately 30,000 subsistence fishers.

Most significantly, the SFTG recognized thatthree categories of fishing practices could bediscerned amongst these fishers, based on theempirical survey data that was gathered forthis purpose.

Fishing rights vs human rights?Naseegh Jaffer and Jackie Sunde

An ongoing class action litigation in South Africa brings to focus thechallenge to the rights-based management system in the country’s fisheries

This article is byNaseegh Jaffer,Director ofMasifundiseDevelopment Trust,South Africa, andJackie Sunde, aResearcher forMasifundise, andMember of ICSF.

This article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 44, July 2006

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SAMUDRA Dossier

According to a 2005 affidavit by Ken Salo,presented in support of the court case ofKenneth George and others vs the Ministerof Environmental Affairs and Tourism, thesethree categories “were classified assubsistence, artisanal and commercialaccording to a comprehensive combinationof social, economic, technical, spatial,ecological and historical criteria that did notweigh any one criterion more than the other”.

In South Africa, the artisanal fishery hasspecific characteristics. Artisanal fishershistorically live in communities near theshoreline, use low-technology fishing gear,and harvest a variety of marine species foundnear the shoreline. Over generations, theyhave developed an understanding of the mainbiological lifecycle and migration patterns ofcertain marine species. Their catch is eitherconsumed, shared, bartered or marketedthrough a complex set of relations andtraditions developed between men andwomen, families, neighbours and localretailers. In this manner, fishing communitieshave developed a culture and caring for oneanother’s livelihood.

There was considerable debate regarding thedefinition of artisanal fishers, and, although itwas acknowledged by the Task Group thattheir needs should be accommodated, noformal recognition of this group legallyensued.

Business and the large-scale commercialcompanies actively lobbied the authorities tomaintain the status quo regarding theallocation of quotas and not to re-allocate tothe artisanal or small-scale sector to anyextent. They argued that government couldbest achieve its transformation andredistribution goals by supporting establishedindustry to provide employment and toincrease its black empowerment component.They were also successful in wooingorganized labour in these companies tosupport them by promising them job securityand, in some instances, a share in the profitsthrough worker share schemes.

Following the introduction of the newlegislative framework, the governmentdepartment responsible for allocating andmanaging fishing rights, Marine and CoastalManagement, developed a medium-termfishing rights allocation policy with a view toallocating rights for the period 2002 -2005. Itwas intended that a long-term rightsallocation policy would be implementedfollowing this initial period. The medium-termrights period did not recognize artisanalfishers as a category of fishers on their ownand instead forced them to apply for‘commercial’ or ‘limited commercial’ rights.

Limited rightsOnly a small number of artisanal fishers weresuccessful in obtaining these limitedcommercial rights and those who did getrights were allocated totally unsustainablequotas. Many bona fide fishers were left outof the system completely and hence no longerhad access to the sea. Others were able toeke out an existence by working for rightsholders in one or other sector at certain timesof the season but often had no income duringother times of the year.

During 2005, Marine and CoastalManagement released the Draft Long-termFishing Rights Policy, which wouldeffectively allocate long-term rights for upto 15 years in 19 of the commercial species.Artisanal fishers up and down the coast heldhigh hopes that this policy would recognizeand accommodate them; however, this newpolicy further entrenched their exclusion. Theapplication process was extremely costly andcomplicated, and the application forms wereonly provided in English, which is not thehome language of the fishers. The fisherswere forced to either form companies orother legal entities with others and competewith the large commercial companies for thehigh-value species or apply as individuals formeagre quantum in a few limited nearshorespecies.

The majority of the artisanal fishers havebeen completely excluded from obtaining

Artisanal fishershistorically live incommunities nearthe shoreline, uselow-technologyfishing gear, andharvest a varietyof marine speciesfound near theshoreline. Overgenerations, theyhave developed anunderstanding ofthe main biologicallifecycle andmigration patternsof certain marinespecies

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SAMUDRA Dossier

long-term fishing rights. For example, in thenearshore West Coast rock lobster sector,of the 4,070 fishers who applied, only 813have been allocated rights. Those who havebeen allocated rights have only receivedbetween 250 and 750 kg per annum. Oncetheir catching and marketing costs have beendeducted, these fishers will barely be livingabove the poverty line and those allocatedonly 250 kg will be way below the povertyline. Those who did get long-term rights haveto operate in the narrow confines laid downin the policy. They are not skilled operatorswithin this system and thereby remain totallyvulnerable to exploitation.

The past 18 months have seen unprecedentedaction by the artisanal sector in South Africaas the fishers fight for their rights to theirtraditional livelihoods and those of the coastalcommunities in which they live, which dependon the artisanal fishing economies. They haveembarked on a range of advocacy andlobbying activities, including numerous lettersand memorandums to the Ministry andPresidency, meetings with officials, marcheson Parliament, the chaining of leaders to thegates of Parliament, a hunger strike and vigilby veteran artisanal fisher activist AndrewJohnston, and building strong alliances withother stakeholders in civil society.

Currently, the fishers’ hopes are pinned onthe outcome of litigation, which they havelaunched with the support of MasifundiseDevelopment Trust, members of the ArtisanalFishers Association of South Africa and theLegal Resources Centre. The LegalResources Centre, a non-governmentalorganization (NGO), is funding this classaction against the Minister, and has launchedpapers on behalf of the artisanal fishers inthis regard. The court cases have beenlaunched in both the High Court and theEquality Court. The Equality Court is a newcourt introduced in South Africa, followingthe introduction of the first democraticConstitution in the country in 1996. TheEquality Court aims specifically to give effectto the Equality Clause in the Constitution,which states that “everyone is equal before

the law and has the right to equal protectionand benefit of the law” (Section 1).

In order to provide the legal framework forthis protection, the Promotion of Equality andPrevention of Unfair Discrimination Act of2000 was promulgated. This Act states:“Neither the State nor any person mayunfairly discriminate against any person”(Section 6). The argument presented by legalcounsel for the artisanal fishers centres onthe belief that the Minister’s failure to defineand provide for the artisanal fishers in theMarine Living Resources Act of 1998, andthe consequences of this failure on the livesand livelihoods of this fishing community,constitute a violation of a number of humanrights contained in the South AfricanConstitution. Matters of ‘non-equality’ naturein this case will be argued in the ordinary HighCourt.

Right to chooseThe artisanal sector argues that the Ministerhas deprived them of their right to choosetheir trade or occupation. Section 22 of theSouth African Constitution provides that“every citizen has the right to choose theirtrade or occupation freely” (Constitution ofSouth Africa, 1996, Section 22). Accordingto a 2004 affidavit filed by Naseegh Jafferon behalf of Masifundise in the matterbetween Kenneth George and others vs theMinister of Environmental Affairs andTourism: “These fishers are faced with theuntenable options of either forsaking theirtraditions and the skills passed betweengenerations of fishers, and entering acommercial fishing industry for which theyare not skilled, or resigning themselves to alife of poverty outside the framework of legalfishing operations, risking prosecution andcriminal sanction. It is thus believed that theseoptions do not constitute a proper ‘choice’ oftrade or occupation as contemplated by theConstitution and are, accordingly, unlawfuland unconstitutional”.

It is also argued that the current legislativeframework violates a number of other basicsocioeconomic rights, most notably, the right

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SAMUDRA Dossier

of access to sufficient food, and hence theinternationally recognized right to foodsecurity is threatened. The impact of thisviolation is felt by not only the fishers but byall members of their households and theextended community that depend on theselivelihoods within the local marine and coastaleconomy. The right to healthcare, housing andeducation, and the rights of the child to basicnutrition are threatened by this violation, andhence are also cited in the arguments to bepresented to the Courts. The right to havethe environment protected through reasonablelegislative and other measures is central tothe case as the Minister has a duty to developlegislation that fulfills this right whilstpromoting the sustainable use of the country’snatural resources. In addition to theabovementioned socioeconomic rights, thefishers argue that the way in which the policyand application process has beenadministered violated several keyconstitutional provisions, namely, the right ofeveryone to use the language of their choice.Enshrined in this is the duty imposed on theState to “use at least two official languagesand to ensure that all official languages aretreated equitably”. The failure of theDepartment to provide application forms inthe home languages of the fishers greatlyexacerbated the difficulties experienced bythe artisanal sector in understanding whatwas required of them when applying forrights. This aspect is directly linked to theright to reasonable administrative action,which is also a right protected by theConstitution.

This case argues that all of the above-allegedviolations of the rights of artisanal fishersarise because the State, through the Minister,has failed to treat the fishers equitably incomparison to the other fishing sectors. Infailing to do so, the law is inequitable anddiscriminatory and hence violates the centraltenet of the Constitution, that of the EqualityClause.

The Minister of Environmental Affairs andTourism has, to date, fought the legalproceedings by appealing against the decisionto hear the matter in the Equality Court. The

fishers were heartened by the judgment ofthe Appeal Court that insisted that the fishershad the right to have the matter heard in thisCourt and noted that the Minister should notdeny the fisher’s prayer to have their say incourt. The advantage of the matter beingheard in the Equality Court as well as theHigh Court is that the Equality Court isempowered to order a variety of forms ofredress, if it is deemed necessary. This raisesthe hope that it may yet be possible toenvisage a real, rights-based fisheriesmanagement policy in South Africa, onebased on the principles of social justice andthe rights enshrined in the country’sConstitution, and upon which the future ofSouth Africa’s new democracy rests.

The fishers arguethat the way inwhich the policyand applicationprocess has beenadministeredviolated severalkey constitutionalprovisions

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Through the last two issues ofSAMUDRA Report, we havewitnessed an interesting debate

regarding the allocation of fish rights. First,Derek Johnson reflected on the Sharing theFish Conference 2006, held in Australia,pointing out the traditional dominance of therich ‘temperate minority’ countries over theSouthern developing countries in matters ofpresentations, discussions and solutions (seeSAMUDRA Report No. 43, March 2006, pg.11). Later, Ichiro Nomura, Assistant DirectorGeneral in the Fisheries Department of theFood and Agriculture Organization of theUnited Nations (FAO), came up with a reply,claiming that rights-based fisheries are thesolution but admitting that ‘one size does notfit all’, ending with the suggestion for aconference where focus should be on thechallenge of allocating fishing rights indeveloping countries (see SAMUDRA ReportNo. 44, July 2006, pg. 25).

My reflection here is on the dilemmascontained in this challenge. Before that,however, a clarification on rights-basedfisheries management in the North. Rights-based management comes in many forms,including licensing and individual as well ascommunity quotas. Individual quotas mayagain be allocated as individual fishing quotas(IFQs), individual vessel quotas (IVQs) orindividual transferable quotas (ITQs), eachwith special features and outcomes. Allsolutions are well known in the North (and‘down under’ South), but during the last 10years, focus has increasingly been on theITQs, a fact reflected also at the first FishRights 1999, where New Zealand andAustralia featured prominently.

I think it is fair to say that ITQ systems, asoriginally developed in New Zealand andIceland and later copied in at least 15 othercountries, have experienced differentialsuccess. They have, most often, improved theeconomic performance of the fisheries, andhave contributed to more sustainable fisheriesin biological terms (although hard evidence isstill often lacking), but they have generallybeen weak on equity, especially in terms ofneglecting crews and local communities.Some countries, like the United States, haveintroduced community quotas (as in Alaska),but these attempts have been few andmarginal compared to the massive drivetowards ITQs or systems closely resemblingthem (as is the case with the Norwegian IVQ

system). Generally, these countries have thehuman and economic resources necessary torun ITQ-systems, and, even more important,they have (although to a variable degree)alternative employment possibilities for fisherswho are made redundant. To illustrate,Norway had 115,000 fishers in 1946, but itnow has fewer than 15,000. Yet, this declinehas not created any major unemploymentproblems.

The problem arises, as pointed out by JohnKurien in People and the Sea: A Tropical‘Majority World’ Perspective, when theITQ-missionaries start preaching the ITQ

gospel to large developing countries withthousands of artisanal fishers, like China,India, Indonesia and Vietnam, and also smallerones in Africa and Latin America.

Greater cautionFAO is a little more cautious, advocating infavour of rights-based fisheries

This article is byBjørn Hersoug ofthe NorwegianCollege of FisheryScience, Universityof Tromsø, Nor-way. This articlefirst appeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 45, November2006

Opening the tragedy?Bjørn Hersoug

Institutional reform and the need for reallocation should figureprominently in policy on fishing rights, especially in developing countries

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SAMUDRA Dossier

management (although not necessarily ITQ

systems), with the rhetorical bottom-line thatwithout biological sustainability, all fishers aregoing to end up poor. According to Nomura,“The current variety of schemes for formallyallocating fishing rights has vastly expandedthe range of fisheries and fishing situationsto which rights-based schemes can beapplied.

They should apply to large- and small-scalefisheries, both with large and small boats.They are, by far, the best tool to re-establishand formalize traditional fishing rights andthus, protect the rights of fishermen. EvenITQs need not threaten the livelihoods ofsmall-scale fisheries, and they should notfoster inequity if well designed.”

As indicated by Johnson in his SAMUDRA

Report article, there are good reasons to besceptical about too simple solutions. Whiledonor agencies have gradually changed theirpriorities, more in favour of small-scalefishers and, in particular, targeting the poor(and for a period ‘the poorest of the poor’),the underlying logic has all along been thatfishers in developing countries are generallypoor, measured against any standard.

However, as pointed out by C. Béné (WhenFishery Rhymes with Poverty: A First stepBeyond the Old Paradigm on Poverty inSmall-scale Fisheries, World Development31, No. 6, 2003), in the current literature onpoverty there is almost a complete absenceof references to case studies from fisheries.Béné attributes this lack of references not tothe low number of fishing studies portrayingpoverty but to the nature of scientificproduction and the way the literatureproposes to explain the cause(s) and origin(s)of poverty in small-scale fisheries.

Generally, there seem to be two contrastinginterpretations of the relationship betweenpoverty and fisheries. The first claims, “Theyare poor because they are fishermen”. Withinthis intellectual tradition, there are two linesof reasoning. One has its origins in H. S.Gordon’s classic paper on open-accessfisheries (The Economic Theory of aCommon-Property Resource: The Fishery,Journal of Political Economy 62, 1954), anidea that was powerfully reinterpreted inHardin’s seminal article, describing thetragedy of the commons (The Tragedy ofthe Commons, Science 162, 1968).

Figure: A Framework to Identify the Occurrence andTypes of Poverty (Béné 2004)

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Here the open-access nature leads to moreand more people entering the fisheries,resulting in overfished resources, anelimination of the resource rent and,ultimately, in the impoverishment of the fishersand their communities. This intellectualtradition is a solid one, with a large numberof contributions from both scientists anddonor organizations. There is no doubt thatoverexploitation is a major cause ofimpoverishment, but not necessarily the majorcause.

Exogenous originWhile poverty, in this tradition, is explainedas an endogenous effect, the exogenousorigin of poverty is explained by showing thelow alternative cost of labour in the fisheries.Writing on the particular problems of small-scale fisheries, T. Panayotou pointed to thefact that most fishers (in Asia) have a lowalternative cost of labour, and with easyaccess and difficult exit they are ‘trapped’in the fisheries (Management Concepts forSmall-scale Fisheries: Economic andSocial Aspects, FAO Fisheries TechnicalPaper 228, 1982).

In other words, the situation outside thefisheries is most important. However, severalwriters combine the two explanations withoutmaking the necessary distinction, thusconfusing the analytical understanding ofwhat causes poverty in the fisheries.

The other major idea—”They are fishermenbecause they are poor”— indicates thatfisheries is an employer of last resort, wherethose falling out of the agricultural systemcan manage to eke out a living by fishing.Common-property resources are, therefore,extremely valuable for poor people, and anyattempt to close the participation may resultin increased poverty. The coastal fisheriesin Mozambique may be a good case in point,where large numbers of people havemigrated from the countryside to the coast,because of the civil war and the problematicagricultural situation. They have taken upsubsistence fishing, partly in competition with

existing fishers. Limiting access for themwould often be a life-and-death matter.

Both solutions (limiting access and providingalternative employment) have been utilizedby a variety of donor-assisted fisheriesprojects, with mixed success. The latterapproach opens the way for a diametricallydifferent policy than the former. If thefisheries is seen as an essential employer oflast resort, within a much larger system oflivelihood creation (based on variousresources and various occupations), it is hardto stick to the idea of sector development. Itis even harder to limit access in the classicway done in Western, developed fisheries.On the other hand, unlimited access can causesevere damage to a developing fishery. Sowhat should we do? If we limit access to‘traditional fishers’, ‘original fishers’ or‘existing fishers’, we run the risk of cuttingoff an important source of livelihoods for poorcoastal populations, while, if we keep thecommons open, the resources will sooner orlater be fished down.

Some try to escape the dilemma, by pointingto the fact that open access does notnecessarily have to produce the tragedy.

According to one study (Management, Co-management or No Management? MajorDilemmas in Southern African FreshwaterFisheries, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper426/1, FAO, 2004), classical managementapproaches applied to the inland lake fisheriesin southern Africa have been misplaced, beingled by patchy or simply wrong informationregarding fishing effort (catching capacity).

The main argument is that the catchingcapacity of the inland lake fisheries has beenextremely variable, fluctuating not only withthe amount of fish available (following naturalvariations), but also following macroeconomicvariations, thereby creating increasing ordecreasing opportunities in other occupations.During severe droughts, many people arenaturally attracted to the fisheries, while whenthe situation is more normal, they will returnto former occupations. Capacity moves up

If the fisheries isseen as anessential employerof last resort,within a muchlarger system oflivelihood creation(based on variousresources andvariousoccupations), it ishard to stick to theidea of sectordevelopment

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SAMUDRA Dossier

and down as a result of numerical flexibility,while few fishers have invested in moreefficient gear or vessels. Most fishers in thesouthern African inland fisheries are notspecialist fishers. They have fishing as oneof several possibilities in a livelihoodrepertoire. Even if the total effort hasincreased in all inland lakes’ fisheries, thisincrease is not always considered seriousenough to warrant limiting access. Limitingaccess under these conditions would onlyaggravate the situation for the poor. In somecases, no management can actually be betterthan the existing regime!

Greater mobilityThis is, no doubt, an important result, havingprofound consequences for management ofthe fisheries in these lakes, but it is difficultto generalize and extend these findings toother artisanal fisheries, for example, in themarine sector, for several reasons.

First, because of greater mobility in marinefisheries, it is much more difficult to maintainthe idea of slow growth. Vessels fromneighbouring countries as well as distant-water fleets will easily operate in fisheriesthat seem promising and profitable. This iseven more so since most developing countriesdo not have an efficient system of monitoringand control.

Second, it seems that technologicalimprovements are much more easily spreadin the marine fisheries. This is partly becausemarine fishing, especially in several Asiancountries, is extremely dynamic, with accessto varied sources of capital and with fewobstacles in acquiring more efficient gear.

Third, much of the marine catch is now meantfor a world market, being within reachabledestinations and quality standards, andmarket opportunities are much greater thanthose for African inland lake fisheries.

Finally, there are good reasons to return toPanayotou’s argument about easy access anddifficult exit or Daniel Pauly’s concept of‘Malthusian overfishing’ (On the Sex of Fish

and the Gender of Scientists: Essays inFisheries Science, Chapmann and Hall,1994). While this may not be the case forinland fisheries in southern Africa, it isdefinitely the case in a number of Asianfishing nations. Effort is being increased bothvertically (improved technology) andhorizontally (numerically).

In sum, these factors would indicate that wecannot be too optimistic regarding thecatching capacity in the marine fisheries.Even if stock assessments are scarce, weknow enough to say that the fishing pressureon near-shore resources in a number of largefishing nations in the Third World, especiallyin Asia, is not sustainable in biological terms.Still, we should maintain the institutionalperspective, turning “the research away fromthe issue of natural resources limitations perse, toward social, cultural and politicalelements which shape the relationshipsbetween poor people and these naturalresources and between poor and less poorpeople” (Béné, 2003).

There is no clear-cut solution to this dilemma,but perhaps we should start discussing morein the direction of policy reform, that is, onthe need for reallocation. While fisherieseconomists are eager to make a distinctionbetween management and allocation, Ibelieve that there is a clear connection.

Effective managementWithout a better, more legitimate allocation,it will prove impossible to introduce (andmaintain) an effective management system.Again, I find it useful to return to a schemedeveloped by Béné (The Challenge ofManaging Small-scale Fisheries withReference to Poverty Alleviation. InNeiland, A. and C. Béné (Eds.): Poverty andSmall-scale Fisheries in West Africa.Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,2004).

One route to poverty is via the lack of surplusgeneration, caused by lack of efficient gearor an ecological crisis (a temporarydisappearance of the exploited stocks). But

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SAMUDRA Dossier

even with surplus generation, there may bepoverty, because of what is called aninstitutional entitlement failure. As Béné putsit: “In other words, satisfying the constraintsof ecological and economical viabilities is anecessary, but not sufficient, condition toreduce the level of, or to prevent theoccurrence of, poverty in fishery. A secondnecessary condition is the existence of somesort of (re-)distribution mechanism which willensure that the rents generated throughfisheries activities are redistributed (eitherdirectly or indirectly) to the community/society. If such mechanisms do not exist, therent is likely to be appropriated by the mostpowerful, and poverty will occur.”

Béné concludes by saying, “Poverty infisheries [may be] more related to institutionalfactors than to natural ones”. If this is thecase—and I happen to believe Béné’sanalysis is correct also outside west Africa—more effort and thinking need to be devotedto institutional reform. The point is simple:rights-based fisheries management maysecure some type of ownership, be itindividual or collective. But we need tosecure rights for the right people. That canonly be done through institutional reforms,giving some type of preferential access tothe poor fishers. This can be done in manyways. Indonesia, for instance, has shown thebeneficial results of prohibiting trawling in thenear-shore fisheries.

In other cases, fishing rights have to bereallocated. Needless to add, this will bedifficult. Even in developed countries, it isextremely complicated to carry outredistributional reforms. But this institutionalrequirement has to be set on the agenda, andone start could be made by donororganizations operating in fisheriescontributing to the buying out of morepowerful interests. While confiscation wasthe key to many previous land reforms, theprinciple of a ‘willing buyer’ and a ‘willingseller’ is more appropriate at present. Tophrase it differently: starting a new fisheriespolicy by confiscating the rights of the mostpowerful will quite often be detrimental. I

am not saying that direct reallocation of rightsand quotas can be done in all developingcountries’ fisheries, but we certainly need tostart the process of considering such reforms.If not, we will repeat the case of the SouthAfrican fisheries reform, where a large partof the bona fide fishers were excluded fromparticipating precisely because the reformsmainly catered to the more powerful interests.Institutional reform and the need forreallocation should figure prominently in policyand a future conference on rights-basedfisheries should perhaps be called ‘FishingRights to the Right People’. Even if one sizedoes not fit all, reallocation will certainly fitmost poor fishers.

The point issimple: rights-based fisheriesmanagement maysecure some typeof ownership, be itindividual orcollective. But weneed to securerights for the rightpeople

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The litmus testSvein Jentoft

Unless it can be demonstrated that a property-rights regime will increase thewelfare of those most in need, we all have legitimate reasons to remain sceptical

Recently property rights have beenheralded as the solution to the‘fisheries problem’ (that is,

overfishing)—by economists at a conferencein Australia (see article by Derek Johnson,“Who’s sharing the fish?”, SAMUDRA ReportNo. 43, March 2006) and by leadinginstitutions such as the Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations (FAO)(see piece by Ichiro Nomura, “No one-size-fits-all approach”, SAMUDRA Report No. 44,July 2006). That comes as no surprise. It isold news. The puzzle worth ponderinghowever, is this: If property rights are sucha blessing to fisheries as alleged, why arethey so often received with animosity withinthe fishing population? Let me suggest thefollowing possibilities:

The reason could be that people do not getthe message; it is either incomprehensible orthey are not yet ready for it. They may notsee the problem for which property rights areheld to be the solution. Thus, what is neededis more effective communication to makepeople understand the significance of themessage and feel better about it. Maybe it isnot property rights per se that people find soproblematic, but the particular kind ofproperty rights that is promulgated. Toproclaim that property rights “are absolutelynecessary and fundamental to thesustainability of the world’s fisheriesresources” (Nomura) does not say muchunless one is willing to specify what type ofproperty rights one is talking about: privateproperty, common property, communityproperty, State property, corporate property,etc.— which all come in various forms andhave different implications. Therefore, if the

argument had been more nuanced and peoplewere offered a set of alternative property-rights solutions that they could relate to, theymight be more supportive.

But perhaps the problem lies elsewhere.People may both understand the message andsee its merits, and yet oppose it because theysee it as threatening to their livelihoods andways of life. For people living under an open-access regime, the property-rights conceptis often perceived as an alien andinappropriate concept: “How can somebodyacquire privileged ownership of a resourcethat was free for all to share?” If that is thecase, a more cautious presentation that doesnot ignore people’s unease might do the job.

Still another explanation for people’s defiancemay be that property rights do not offer anysolution to what people perceive as their mostimportant and urgent problems: “Whateverthe problem property rights are supposed tosolve, my problem is another one.” If you,for instance, struggle to feed your family ona daily basis, a property-rights regime mightnot figure high on your priority list. I can thinkof yet another reason, which is perhaps themost likely one, why many fishing peopleshow resistance to the property-rightssystems favoured by economists: They havealready suffered their consequences. They,in contrast to academics, fisheries managersand others who believe so strongly in propertyrights, know how it feels to lose access tothe resource.

Standard definitionBut in order to understand what the problemis really all about, we need to dig even deeper

This piece is bySvein Jentoft([email protected]) of theNorwegian Collegeof Fishery Science,University ofTromsø, Norway.This article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 46, March 2007

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SAMUDRA Dossier

and ask what property rights are in the firstplace. Here is a standard definition: Theessential thing about a property right is notthe relationship it establishes between aperson who is the owner and the item that isowned but the relationship it forms betweenpeople: the haves and the have-nots. Thus,property rights are a social relationship, andany change in property rights is interveninginto existing social relations by differentiatingcategories of people. As someone benefitsfrom acquiring a property right, othersnecessarily lose, because the owner is in arightful position to exclude others fromenjoying the stream of benefits from the thingthat is owned. Thus, property rights areinherently inequitable, and this problem doesgo away if you simply ignore it—as DerekJohnson found was happening at theSharing the Fish 2006 Conference.Neither can the equity issue be postponeduntil after property rights are introduced, asit will typically pop up long before you try toimplement them, because people cananticipate their social and economic impacts.

It is not for nothing that social scientists havelong been concerned with the empoweringand disempowering effects of property rights.The famous French anarchist andphilosopher Pierre-Joseph Proudhoncaptured the quintessence of this problem inhis 1840 treatise What is Property? Or, anInquiry into the Principle of Right andGovernment through his oft-quotedstatement, “Property is theft!” Fishing rightsare often opposed by similar language. Thatis perhaps going too far since property rightscan mean many things, and also serve goodpurposes. As Bjørn Hersoug argues in hiscommentary on both Johnson and Nomura(“Opening the tragedy”, SAMUDRA ReportNo. 45, November 2006), we, therefore, needto ask if fishing rights are used to empowerthe right people. Consequently, one shouldnot be dogmatic about property rights, as theycome with potentials as well as risks. Propertyrights can lead to more inequity but they canalso be employed for correcting inequities,as they can be used as a mechanism toprotect those in need of protection, that is,

the marginalized and impoverished amongfishers. This is unfortunately not what thosewho most eagerly sponsor property rights suchas individual transferable quotas (ITQs), havein mind.

I suggest, therefore, that before we embraceany particularly property-rights regime, itshould be litmus-tested against the “differenceprinciple’ established by John Rawls–perhaps the most important philosopher of the20th century—in his 1971 work, Theory ofJustice: “Social and economic inequalitiesshould be arranged so that they are to thegreatest benefit of the least advantagedpersons.”

Specific situationThus, unless it can be demonstrated—notonly in theory but also in practice, and notonly on average but for the specific situationsin which fishing people find themselves—thata particular property-rights regime willincrease the welfare of those most in need,we all have legitimate reasons to remainsceptical, whatever the economists and FAO

might say.

Maybe it is notproperty rights perse that people findso problematic,but the particularkind of propertyrights that ispromulgated

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SAMUDRA Dossier

Fulfilled, healthy, secure?John Kearney

Conventional fisheries management has been dominated bythe enclosing-the-commons model, even as small-scale fishers demand socialjustice and ecological sustainability through recognition of their fishing rights

A debate has emerged in the last threeissues of SAMUDRA Report (Nos. 43-45) about rights-based fisheries and

the allocation of fish resources. The debatewas triggered by Derek Johnson in his reviewarticle on the Sharing the Fish Conference2006 in Australia, in which he describes howthe discussions on rights-based fishing weredominated by presenters from the rich,“temperate-minority” countries. Debate atthe conference thus tended to focus on theoptions preferred by policymakers andeconomists in these countries; namely,market-based access rights and allocationmechanisms, such as individual transferablequotas (ITQs). Conference participants hadlittle to say about the applicability of these oralternative rights schemes to the tropical-majority countries.

Ichiro Nomura, Assistant Director Generalof Fisheries of the Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations (FAO)highlights in the next issue of SAMUDRA

Report that fishing rights and rights-basedschemes are “absolutely necessary andfundamental” to the sustainability of all theworld’s fisheries. However, the configurationof these rights needs to be tailored to thespecific social setting of the countries inquestion. He proposes that it may be anopportune time to organize an internationalconference on the allocation of rights in thesmall-scale fisheries that dominate thetropical and developing countries.

Finally, in the last issue of SAMUDRA Report,Bjørn Hersoug picks up the thread byconnecting the debate over rights-basedfishing to the existence of widespreadpoverty in fishing communities throughout the

developing world. He concludes that povertymay be more related to institutional failuresthan ecological or economic ones, and thusinstitutional reform is a prerequisite for theestablishment of right-based fisheries in orderto ensure preferential access to individual orcollective rights for poor fishers. ForHersoug, a conference on rights-basedfishing should perhaps be entitled, “FishingRights to the Right People.”

In response to this timely debate within thepages of SAMUDRA Report, I wish to examinemore closely what is meant by fishing rightsand rights-based fishing. When economistsand government officials talk about fishingrights at conferences and in publications andpolicy documents, are they talking about thesame fishing rights that small-scale fishershave been demanding for the last fewdecades? I say, no. Like many progressiveideas promoted in the recent past by small-scale fishing organizations around the world—ideas like community-based management,ecological fisheries management, andintegrated management—the notion offishing rights has been seized by the academicand bureaucratic sectors, filtered throughtheir market-based frameworks, andpromoted as something quite different fromthe original intent. In other words, the notionof fishing rights has been co-opted to meannot the guarantee of rights but rather thegranting of privilege. In most cases, rights-based management consists of the grantingof fishing privileges to certain groups withinfishing communities as a means of ‘enclosingthe commons’. Based on common-propertytheory, the objective is not to guarantee afishing people the right to fish, but to excludeas many as necessary to ensure that those

This article is by JohnKearney, an independ-ent researcher whohas worked withsmall-scale fishersand fishingcommunities for thepast 28 years. Thisarticle first appearedin SAMUDRA ReportNo. 46, March 2007

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SAMUDRA Dossier

remaining can capture the wealth producedby the sea for themselves.

If rights-based fishing then has nothing to dowith rights, what is the alternative view ofrights? In my view, the notion of rights is abouta fundamental respect for the human being,and addresses the many conditions necessaryfor fulfilled, healthy and secure living. If weare going to talk about fishing rights withinthis understanding of rights, there are anumber of dimensions in the lives of fishersthat must be considered.

The first is to state that the current distortionin the distribution of the world’s resourcesmakes it close to impossible to guarantee thisfundamental respect and provide thenecessary conditions for every human tohave fulfilled, healthy and secure lives. Aswe increasingly realize the limits on theavailability of resources on this planet, it isclear that the guarantee of rights involvesnot only poverty reduction but also, and justas importantly, wealth reduction on the partof the minority who control the vast bulk ofthose resources. It is only in this two-prongedapproach that there can be the ability to ensurefishing rights since so many fishers are amongthe world’s poorest inhabitants. If themeaning of this view is not immediatelyevident, let me illustrate by saying that thedemand for such products as luxuryaquaculture seafood, industrial chemicals andtourism beaches on the part of the wealthyhas led to serious degradation of coastalhabitats and the viability of fishing livelihoods.

Among the many other dimensions of fishingrights, I would list the following as some ofthe most important:

1.The right to fish for foodFishers provide food for their families,communities, regions and country. In Asiaand Africa especially, large numbers ofpeople depend on fish protein for their basicnutritional requirements. Local, regional andnational food security should be the numberone priority of sustainable fisheriesmanagement. All fisheries development

should be built on this foundation, not only indeveloping countries but also in the developedcountries where there is an increasingrecognition that the most healthy and nutritiousfood comes from local sources.

2.The right to fish for a livelihoodFor many coastal communities, fish, as arenewable resource, has the potential to bean unending means of deriving a livelihood.Coastal communities have depended on thisresource for generations, and they should bepermitted to continue to find their livelihoodsthus for generations to come.

3. The right to healthy households,communities and culturesFishing provides not only an income streamto fishing households but is also an activityaround which many dimensions of life areorganized, and from which meaning is derivedby men, women and youth. The way fishingactivities are managed and the benefitsdistributed are crucial in fostering healthysocial relations in communities and in nurturingthe culture that binds them together.

4. The right to live and work in a healthyecosystem that will support futuregenerations of fishersAll of the above rights depend on taking careof the environment in which it takes place,living within the limits of what the ecosystemcan produce, and without upsettingirreversibly the functioning of that system.

5. The right to participate in thedecisions affecting fishingThe protection of fishing rights and theiroptimal implementation for the benefit offishing communities requires that everyonein these communities have a voice indecisionmaking. This means placing a highvalue on the knowledge of fishing peopleabout fishing and the environment, promotinga bottom-up and community-driven decision-making process, and implementing nationalpolicies that protect fishing rights.

The development of fisheries and the designand implementation of management plans

As we increasinglyrealize the limitson the availabilityof resources onthis planet, it isclear that theguarantee ofrights involves notonly povertyreduction but also,and just asimportantly,wealth reductionon the part of theminority whocontrol the vastbulk of thoseresources

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SAMUDRA Dossier

based on the above-listed rights would lookvery different from a rights-based fishery asadvocated by those who wish to enclose thefishery commons. A rights-based fisherystresses one value: economic efficiency. Onthe other hand, a fishery based on a guaranteeof the fundamental rights of fishing peoplerecognizes their equal status and dignity asmembers of global society, and their equalright to a fulfilled, healthy and secure life.

A rights-based fishery would allow one factorto determine the future of fisheriesdevelopment: a privilege granted to a few topromote the sale of fish as a commodity tothe highest bidders on international markets.In contrast, a fishery based on thefundamental rights of fishing people wouldresult in a fishery where communities shapea future based on providing their basic humanrequirements for food, livelihood, communalliving and a vibrant culture. It is a fisherywhere fishing people could begin to realizetheir dreams to steward the resources of thesea, make friends with them—as some ofthem would say—own boats and gear, obtaina fair price for their fish, and offer a brighterfuture to their children.

It is also important to point out that the fivefishing rights listed above can all be found ina more generalized form in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights. All too often,the denial of human rights is understoodnarrowly as the violation of civil liberties,without adequate recognition of the rights tofood, livelihood, communal living and culture.

Finally, I wish to conclude by makingreference to Derek Johnson who started thisdebate in SAMUDRA Report No. 43. In anotherarticle that he wrote last year (“Category,Narrative and Value in the Governance ofSmall-scale Fisheries”, Marine Policy 30,2006), he argues that the perceivedimportance of small-scale fisheries may notonly lie in the sustainability of their scale ofoperations but also in the values of socialjustice and ecological sustainability thatsmall-scale fishers have come to representin response to the dominant modern

narratives of change. He goes on to statethat this view does not always correspond toreality, given those situations where small-scale fisheries have been overly exploitativeand ecologically destructive.

The fact that the fisheries of the last 50 yearshave been dominated by the drive to kill fishand that many are responsible for this miningof the sea, is not at issue. The theme of thisarticle is that fisheries management for thepast 30 years has been dominated by theenclosing-the-commons model, at the sametime that small-scale fishers have beendemanding social justice and ecologicalsustainability through recognition of theirfishing rights. I would argue that the dominantmodel of fisheries management hascontributed to—or, at least, not stopped— thecollapse of fish stocks and ecologicaldegradation around the world. It has resultedin greater inequities in the distribution offisheries benefits, and now has co-opted thenotion of fishing rights in support of itself. Itis time to recover the true and full meaningof fishing rights, to listen to small-scale fishers,and allow them the opportunity to exercisetheir fishing rights for a socially just andecologically sustainable fishery.

...a fishery basedon the fundamentalrights of fishingpeople would resultin a fishery wherecommunities shapea future based onproviding theirbasic humanrequirements forfood, livelihood,communal livingand a vibrantculture

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The possibility that the Food andAgriculture Organization of the UnitedNations (FAO) would sponsor an

international conference on the allocation offishing rights focused exclusively on theinterests of small-scale harvesters andtraditional fishing communities is heartening.Such an event is long overdue and, if it wereto provide an opportunity to hear anddocument those authentic voices that havebeen resisting and offering alternatives to theprivate appropriation of public fisheriesresources, it would be a good thing. It mighteven begin to re-establish some sense ofbalance and objectivity in the debate aboutthe merits of different rights schemes byidentifying those that work to supportsustainable development in traditional fishingcommunities and those that undermine it.

If the objectives of such a conference wereto include discussions about how theallocation of rights could “re-establish andformalize traditional fishing rights and thus,protect the rights of fishermen”, as IchiroNomura of FAO suggests (see pg.82), itwould also challenge the central orthodoxyof modern fisheries management; that in theirnatural state, fisheries develop in the absenceof rights and play out the “tragedy of thecommons”.

In “Opening the Tragedy?” (SAMDURA

Report No. 45), Bjørn Hersoug correctlyidentifies Scott Gordon’s The EconomicTheory of a Common-property Resource:The Fishery and Garrett Hardin’s TheTragedy of the Commons, as the coreintellectual foundations that underpin thetheories of modern fisheries management.

But the Hardin contribution to this foundationis seriously flawed when it comes tounderstanding fishing communities and howthey manage fisheries resources held incommon. While Gordon recognized thatfishermen come together to establish rules toregulate fishing activity, Hardin did not. Thisis a very significant difference.

Gordon’s treatise recognized that the so-calledcommon-property problem was, in fact, anopen-access situation. Even the mostprimitive of societies, he noted, generallyrecognized the risks of overexploitationcaused by unregulated access, and moved toregulate resource use for “orderly exploitationand conservation of the resource”. Societiesthat failed to do so, he posited, simply wouldnot survive. Gordon recognized that humanslive in societies that impose norms to inhibitsocially destructive individual behaviour.

In Hardin’s construct, community or societalregulation is non-existent, and society is butthe aggregation of selfish individuals, eachseeking their own individual short-termadvantage.

Since Gordon understood social control as anessential trait of human society, he did notprescribe the form it should take to avoidresource depletion. (Like Nomura, he appearsto have been of the “one-size-does-not-fit-all” school.) On the other hand, the absenceof community in Hardin’s flawed analysis ledhim to prescribe only two options to preventresource depletion: paternalistic Statemanagement or privatization of the commonproperty.

Private rights tragedyMarc Allain

This article draws from the Canadian experience to show how flawed economictheory works to undermine sustainable development in fishing communities

This article is byMarc Allain( m a r c a l l a i n @sjma.net), formerpolicy adviser to theCanadian Council ofProfessional FishHarvesters, and nowa Geneva-basedfisheries consultantThis article firstappeared inSAMUDRA ReportNo. 46, March 2007

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SAMUDRA Dossier

In Canada, unfortunately, Hardin, not Gordon,has been used to understand the problemsand make prescriptions for sustainablefisheries management. In fact, it could beargued that Canada’s modern fisheriesmanagement has followed Hardin to theletter: first, through a short-lived and failedexperience with paternalistic Statemanagement; and, in the face of failure, thesubsequent dogged pursuit, in many of thecountry’s fisheries, of Hardin’s alternative —the privatization and concentration of thecommon property in individual and primarilycorporate hands, through marketmechanisms.

The first phase–the one of paternalistic Statecontrol–started with the extension ofCanada’s fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nauticalmiles in 1977, and saw the uncontrolledgrowth of harvesting capacity, much of itencouraged by the government’s desire toindustrialize the fishery. By the mid- to late-1980s, overcapacity, overfishing and sharpconflicts between fleet sectors over resourceaccess defined many of Canada’s fisheries.In Atlantic Canada, much of this conflict wasbetween the traditional small-scale sector,known as the inshore fishery, and the highlycapitalized corporate offshore and individuallyowned midshore sectors.

The second phase of Canada’s modernfisheries management, dealing with thisovercapacity through the allocation ofproperty rights through individual transferablequota (ITQ) schemes, began in the late 1980s,and has been the State’s preferred, almostexclusive, option ever since.

Descriptions of the Canadian State-sponsored private-property schemes can befound in the proceedings of both theFishRights99 and the Sharing the Fish2006 conferences. They provide textbookexamples of the efficiency of property rightsand market-based mechanisms in putting astop to the dissipation of resource rents inindividual fisheries thereby generating rentsand subsequently allowing the State torecuperate some of these through negotiated

agreements with quota holders, anincreasingly important objective of Canada’sDepartment of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO)as it attempts to generate external revenuesto compensate for more than a decade ofcontinued budget cuts.

Critics in the small-scale fishery do notchallenge the efficiency of classic ITQ

systems in dealing with the macroeconomicproblems of oversubscribed fisheries. Theefficiency of the market is readilyacknowledged. It is the externalized costs tofishing communities of the ITQ approach thatis in question.

Small minorityFrom the small-scale/community-fisheryperspective, ITQ systems give rights andbenefits (including significant economicwindfalls) to a small minority of individualsin fishing communities, who are encouragedto dispose of these rights in pursuit of theireconomic self-interest, irrespective of theimpact on the community. Under this system,the benefits of the right go to the individual,while the long-term costs, in terms ofemployment opportunities, resource accessand wider distribution of resource rents, gettransferred to the communities and futuregenerations.

In late 2004, the environmental non-governmental organization (NGO), EcotrustCanada, published a major study on theimpacts of resource privatization in Canada’sPacific fishery, documenting, for the first time,its costs from the perspective of communityand the small-scale fishery.

According to the study, the capital costs ofvessels and equipment in the Pacific fisheryshrunk dramatically from Can$777 mn in thepre-privatization period (the late 1980s) toCan$286 mn in 2003, as fishing rightsconcentrated in fewer and fewer hands, andindividual quotas eliminated overcapitalizationin the race for fish. But the research alsofound that this decrease was offset by thesoaring capital costs of quota and licences,which are now estimated at Can$1.8 bn.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

According to the report, “In the past, theproblem was too many fishermen chasing toofew fish, but today it has become too muchmoney chasing too few fish.Overcapitalization in licence and quota hasbecome the problem, especially in terms ofsocial equity.”

The costs of licences and quotas are now sohigh, Ecotrust Canada says, that a fishermanneeds to be a millionaire to enter most BritishColumbia (BC) fisheries, putting ownershipof licences and quota out of the reach of mostrural families, aboriginal people and youngerfishermen.

The study goes on to document how market-led mechanisms undermined the interests oftraditional fishing communities by strippingthem of fishing licences and quota. Withvirtually no restrictions on who could buyfishing rights, rural ownership of both quotaand licences declined precipitously.Traditional fishing communities—particularlyaboriginal communities, which have been hitespecially hard—lost 45 per cent of all majorlicences. The big winners were urbaninvestors—both corporate and individual—who had better access to the capital neededto purchase the quotas and fishing licencesthat increased rapidly in value as more buyersentered the market.

Limited abilityRural residents, hobbled by lower incomes,reduced economic opportunities and lowerproperty values that limited their borrowingability, simply could not match the pricesurban dwellers and corporations were willingto pay for licences and quotas that were putup for sale by harvesters in theircommunities.

Another notable consequence of this transferof fishing rights from rural to urban handshas been the siphoning off of resource rentsfrom working fishermen to ‘slipper skippers’,absentee resource-rights owners, who do notfish but lease the rights they own back toworking fishermen. In separate research, theCanadian Council of Professional Fish

Harvesters (CCPH) has documented how insome BC fisheries, like herring, up to 70 percent of the landed value in some years is paidto rights holders. Since the rights are leasedat prices set prior to the fishing season, thishas led to fishermen fishing an entire seasonat a loss. The practice of leasing is now sowidespread that even those captains who ownlicences and quotas deduct the going marketrate for leases from the calculation of crewshares, thereby significantly reducing returnsto crew members. According to CCPH, thecosts of leasing are also endangering the livesof fishermen as captains cut back on crewlevels to reduce costs and also venture out inunsafe conditions because of the need to fishquota they have paid for, before the seasonends.

The DFO is now in the process of introducingITQs for the Pacific salmon fishery, followingthe recommendations of Professor PeterPearse, a consultant to the department whowas also one of the keynote speakers at theSharing the Fish conference. This will bringthe last major Pacific fishery under a property-rights scheme. There is nothing to suggestthat safeguards will be established to protectcoastal-community interests as that processis launched.

With property rights now firmly establishedin Canada’s Pacific fishery and the costs ofacquiring these rights beyond the reach ofmost residents of coastal communities, theonly way to restore these rights to thecommunities that originally had them is byentering the rights market. This is whatEcotrust Canada now proposes to do. It hopesto establish a capital fund to acquire fishinglicences in the open market, and then leasethem to young, new entrants to the fisheryfrom coastal communities at affordable rates.The irony here is that an NGO is having toraise significant amounts of capital topurchase rights in order to restore them to anew generation of rural residents whosepredecessors acquired them for nominal costsbut were allowed—even encouraged—bygovernment policy, to sell them off to thehighest bidder.

...market-ledmechanismsundermined theinterests oftraditional fishingcommunities bystripping them offishing licencesand quota

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SAMUDRA Dossier

In Atlantic Canada, there has beengeneralized resistance to market-drivenprivatization by the inshore fishery, generallyunderstood as comprising boats under 45 ftlength overall (LOA). There, inshorefishermen’s organizations have developedalternative rights-based schemes to controland regulate access to the fishery. Thesealternatives tend to be value-driven, and aregenerally concerned with the equitabledistribution of resource rents because of theimpacts of inequitable distribution on coastalcommunities. They are also very process-oriented, seeking to build consensus throughbottom-up, democratic decisionmaking thatbuilds from the community level towardslarger territorial units (region, province, inter-provincial). They have also tended to beecocentric, seeking to provide small-scaleharvesters with rights to the full range ofharvestable species adjacent to theircommunities, using low-impact, fixed-geartechniques, as opposed to limiting these rightsto specialist, single-species fleets usinghigher-impact mobile gear. Throughout thelast 30 years of modern fisheriesmanagement, this community-/small-scaleapproach has been in constant tension andconflict with a corporate view of rightsschemes that concentrates access and seeksprimarily to maximize the generation ofresource rents.

Modernization processThere are numerous examples of how thesmall-scale sector in Atlantic Canada hasbeen successful in devising value-based rulesto allocate rights and restrict access to thefishery. Very early on in the modernizationprocess, as the State imposed limited entryto control access to fisheries resources, itmade a significant concession to the small-scale sector by prohibiting corporations fromholding licences for species fished fromvessels of less than 65 ft LOA. This becameknown as the ‘fleet separation policy’ as itprohibited fish processors from ‘owning’inshore fishing licences, thereby ‘separating’processing from harvesting. Individuals whoobtained fishing licences in the under-65 ftfleets also had to fish these licences

themselves. They could not (and still can not)lease the licence or hire others to fish forthem. This became known as the owner-operator policy.

Individuals were also prohibited from holdingmore than one licence for the same speciesbut a multispecies-licence portfolio approachwas encouraged for the small-scale sector,allowing only those who held certain keylicences to obtain licences for other speciesas these became available either throughharvester retirement or the development ofnew fisheries. The use of value-based criteriasuch as ‘dependency’ (level of incomederived from fishing) and ‘attachment’(length of time in the fishery) were also usedfirst in the Gulf region of the Maritimeprovinces (New Brunswick, Prince EdwardIsland and Nova Scotia) under the ‘bona fidepolicy’ and, subsequently, in Newfoundland,under the fish harvester professionalizationprogramme, to restrict access to full-timefishermen. In Newfoundland, this led to thedenial of access to approximately 15,000 part-time licence holders, cutting the numbers inthe small-scale sector in half, a process thatgenerated surprisingly little opposition, largelybecause of the extensive community-levelconsultations on the measures.

Nowhere has the contrast been sharperbetween the value-driven approach for theequitable distribution of fishery rents and therents concentration model than in theAtlantic’s Area 12 snow-crab fishery.

Until the 1980s, snow crab was a marginalfishery in Atlantic Canada. The collapse ofthe Alaskan king crab fishery and theJapanese appetite for seafood conspired toincrease international demand for this productand turn it into one of Canada’s most lucrativefisheries. Under limited entry, access rightsto Area 12, the most bountiful of the Atlantic’sdifferent crab-fishing areas, have beenrestricted to 130 licence holders, since the1970s. (They include seven native-ownedlicences that were transferred to aboriginalcommunities following a Canadian SupremeCourt ruling recognizing their treaty rights to

Throughout thelast 30 years ofmodern fisheriesmanagement, thiscommunity-/small-scale approach hasbeen in constanttension andconflict with acorporate view ofrights schemes thatconcentratesaccess and seeksprimarily tomaximize thegeneration ofresource rents

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SAMUDRA Dossier

the fishery.) This fishery is generallyrecognized as being well-managed. Theowner-operator licence holders in thismidshore fleet (vessels under 65 ft LOA)moved to individual quota management withstrict limits on transferability in the late 1980s,eliminating the race for fish and manywasteful practices. The licence holders fundand manage dockside monitoring, andcontribute significantly to funding thegovernment-based scientific stockassessment through co-managementagreements. In many ways, the midshoreArea 12 crab fishery is a model fisheryexcept in one crucial area: the equitabledistribution of resource rents.

The generation and concentration of rents,however, is the fishery’s hallmark. Accordingto costs and earnings estimates for 2002, thisfishery generated gross earnings per vesselof more than Can$750,000, and average netreturns of Can$363,000 for what amounts toa five-to-eight-week fishery. (The net returnis the amount generated above the break-even point of Can$400,000 per vessel. Thebreak-even point includes salary ofCan$50,000 for the captain, and wages ofCan$29,400 for each of the crew, and areturn on capital invested of 11 per cent.)

Despite fluctuations in crab prices and totalallowable catch (TAC), this pattern of veryhigh profitability has been consistent for thelast 15 years. It also contrasts sharply withthe very low returns to both labour and capitalfor the 1,230 inshore-fishery licence holdersin some of the same communities along theeastern shore of the province of NewBrunswick (NB). These small-scale,multispecies fishermen, who derive most oftheir income from lobster but also fish otherspecies in a season that lasts six months,generate net incomes per vessel betweenCan$3,500 and Can$5,600, after payingthemselves wages between Can$10,350 andCan$14,000.

Easily accessibleNB inshore fishermen were excluded fromthe snow-crab fishery until 1995, despite the

fact that the resource was both plentiful andeasily accessible to them using their existingvessels. In communities where unemploymentis very high and where job opportunitiesoutside the fishery very limited, this exclusionwas a source of resentment, social conflictand general instability in the fishery.

After extensive political lobbying, the Ministerof Fisheries reallocated a small percentageof the snow-crab fishery quota to NB inshorefishermen for the first time in 1995. Underthe leadership of their organization, theMaritime Fishermen’s Union (MFU), thelicence holders chose to exercise this right ina highly creative and democratic way, with astrong emphasis on equitable distribution ofbenefits.

Given that the allocation was not large enoughto make a significant impact on eachindividual enterprise—had it been dividedequally—the licence holders chose to hold andmanage the quota collectively, through theMFU, and distribute its benefits in thefollowing way:

Approximately 60 per cent of the quotawas divided into 11,000-lb individualquotas, which were distributed by lotteryto partnership groups of four or morefishermen (that is, a partnership of fourwould receive 44,000 lb) who were leasedcrab traps purchased by the MFU. It wasagreed that any fishermen who receivedquota through the lottery would not beeligible in subsequent years for anotherchance at receiving quota until all licenceholders had received a 11,000-lb share.The remaining quota was fished by charter,and the proceeds were used to:finance an extended healthcare plan forall 1,230 licence holders and their familiessupport a fish-harvester professionali-zation programme, finance scallop- andlobster-enhancement projects, and forscientific research on herring stocks.

Except for the years it was excluded fromthe crab fishery (1998, 1999 and 2000), theMFU continued to manage its allocation of

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SAMUDRA Dossier

snow-crab quota according to the sameformula.

Fleet rationalizationHowever, the long-term decline of lobsterlandings in eastern NB and the deterioratingreturns to the inshore fleet forced the MFU,in 2004, to significantly change its strategyand to begin using the crab resource for fleetrationalization purposes. It chose anapproach, however, that was a radicaldeparture from traditional practices. Insteadof using market mechanisms or centrallymanaged licence buyback and retirementschemes, it has instead turned the crabresource over to fishing communities andempowered them to make the decisions onhow best to use it to bring harvesting capacityin their communities in line with resourceavailability and fleet economic viability. Theapproach, if it is successful, will ensure thatrevenues from the inshore crab allocation arespent in the best interests of coastalcommunities by allowing these very samecommunities, through democratic, grass-roots processes, to make these decisionsthemselves.

Under the new approach, which was adoptedin 2005 after extensive communityconsultations, the MFU continues to receivean allocation of snow crab on behalf of allinshore licence holders in eastern NB. Fromthe proceeds of the crab allocation, it alsocontinues to fund a health insurance plan,which is available to all licence holders andtheir families. But the MFU no longer conductsa central lottery for the distribution ofindividual crab quotas. Instead, it distributesthe crab quota on a pro-rata basis to 12Communities of Interests (COI), territorialunits made up of groups of inshore fishinglicence holders who share a certain affinity/territory (see map). The COIs decide howmany vessels will harvest their respectivequotas and how much they will pay to havefishermen in their communities fish the crabaccording to harvesting plans determined andapproved by all licence holders in publicmeetings.

The other significant change is that amandatory minimum of 50 per cent of netrevenues - after paying administration andhealth-plan costs - must be used for licence-retirement schemes in the communities.However, it is up to the COIs to decide howbest to remove excess capacity in the fisheryin their communities, according to the fundsavailable to them.

In addition, monies from the crab sales arealso set aside in each COI for economicdiversification and development funds tofinance sustainable-development projects inthe communities, again decided upon by thefishermen according to criteria common toall COI. For example, several COIs havealready identified the purchase of lobsterlarvae for seeding in their communities froma project that was initiated by the MFU severalyears ago.

The COI approach to the allocation of fishingrights is a radical departure from the market-driven, individual-property-rights processexperienced elsewhere in Canada. Insteadof allocating fishing rights to individuals, whoare then free to use them in the pursuit oftheir self-interest, irrespective of the impacton the community, it creates a situationwhereby community interests are placedfront and centre. In the words of the MFU,under the COI approach, fishermen have toorganize themselves and make decisionscollectively on the use of the fishing rights“to tackle both the problems of the fisheryand the economic development challengesfaced by their communities.” The approachis designed to work in the long-term interestsof fishing communities and to makefishermen accountable for the decisions thatthey make on the use of their rights. Theprogramme is very new and has created allkinds of challenges for the MFU. It remainsto be seen how successful it will be. But fromthe community perspective, it can do no worsethan the alternative processes that havealready proven to strip communities of accessto fishery resources.

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SAMUDRA Dossier

The Canadian experience with the allocationof tradable, individual property rights as ameans for dealing with fisheriesovercapacity shows that these schemes canbe highly successful in concentrating thebenefits of the fishery in the hands ofindividual rights holders. These schemes,however, have worked to underminesustainable development in traditional, ruralfishing communities by depriving them ofaccess to fisheries resources. In the bestinterest of their communities, the small-scalefish harvesters in Canada have consistentlysought to devise rights-based systems forfisheries management that distribute thebenefits of fisheries access equitably andavoid concentration.

If there is to be an international conferenceon rights-based systems focused on theinterests of the small-scale fishery andtraditional fishing communities, thenrepresentatives of the Canadian small-scalefishery would surely want to participate. Theywould not come forth proselytizing for ITQs,however, nor representing a ‘temperate-world minority’ view. Rather, I suspect, theywould come to share, listen and learn as partof a universal majority of women and menwho fish for a living, care passionately abouttheir small communities, and want them tocontinue providing decent livelihoods for theirchildren’s children’s children.

...fishermen haveto organizethemselves andmake decisionscollectively on theuse of the fishingrights “to tackleboth the problemsof the fishery andthe economicdevelopmentchallenges facedby theircommunities”

Sizing Up

As the world's fisheries continue to come under scrutiny for their potentialto be depleted of resources due to various pressures, including overfishing,modern fisheries management has focused on allocation of fishing rights asone prescription for sustainable fisheries management. Solutions based onsuch a perspective have often pivoted around the gamut of property rights,and how to control the social arrangements that govern the ownership, useand disposal of factors of production and goods and services in the fisheriessector.

Rights-based management in fisheries, as this dossier shows, can take severalforms, including licensing, and individual and community fishing quotas.How property-rights regimes address the issue of allocation of ownershipwill determine their effectiveness in equitably spreading welfare throughoutthe fishing/coastal community. Only by recognizing fishing rights that aresocially sensitive and address the issues of labour, gender and human rights,can fishing communities, especially small-scale, traditional ones, be assuredof social justice in the face of moves towards ecological and resourcesustainability.

These are some of the issues discussed in this dossier, which is a collectionof articles from SAMUDRA Report, the triannual publication of theInternational Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF).

ICSF (www.icsf.net) is an international NGO working on issues that concernfishworkers the world over. It is in status with the Economic and SocialCouncil of the UN and is on ILO's Special List of Non-GovernmentalInternational Organizations. It also has Liaison Status with FAO. Registeredin Geneva, ICSF has offices in Chennai, India, and Brussels, Belgium. As aglobal network of community organizers, teachers, technicians, researchersand scientists, ICSF's activities encompass monitoring and research, exchangeand training, campaigns and action, as well as communications.

Property Rights and Fisheries Management:a collection of articles from SAMUDRA Report

ISBN 81-902957-6-4

sizing up · 2016. 5. 14. · scale fisheries, and coastal and inland fishing communities. some of...

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