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DEMOCRATIC DEFICITS: CHAPTER 6 5/10/2023 12:46 PM
Chapter 6
Trends in democratic deficits
The previous chapter established cross-national patterns in system support, but it did not
examine trends or compare the size and distribution of the democratic deficit under a wide range of
political conditions. This chapter starts by establishing longitudinal analysis of selected case-studies, to
monitor if and when any changes occurred. The pooled World Values Survey 1981-2007 contains time-
series survey data for a more restricted sub-set of eleven nations included in all five waves of the survey
conducted over twenty-five years. This includes five states (Spain, South Africa, Mexico, South Korea,
and Argentina) which have experienced transitions from diverse types of autocratic rule and the rapid
consolidation of democratic regimes during this era. Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, and South Africa
are also emerging market economies, characterized by moderate levels of per capita GDP. The effect of
democratization on public opinion are examined by examining trends ‘before’ and ‘after’ the year when
regime changed in these particular case studies, exemplified by the fall of the Argentinean military junta
in 1983, the collapse of South African apartheid in 1994, and the end of PRI’s predominance in the 2000
Mexican presidential elections. The number of cases under comparisons is admittedly limited but
nonetheless the results of the analysis serve to confirm the picture already familiar; during the last
quarter century, no significant erosion of system support was detected from the indices of composite
institutional confidence (with the notable exception of declining public confidence in parliaments),
attitudes towards democratic governance and rejection of autocracy, or feelings of nationalism. Instead
trendless fluctuations over time (suggesting explanations based on either actual or perceived
performance), or else a relatively stable pattern, can be observed.
Building on this foundation, this chapter also compares the size and distribution of democratic
deficits among regimes and nations. This phenomenon is conceived as the tensions which arise from the
imbalance between the public’s demand for democracy (measured by strong adherence to democratic
values and rejection of authoritarian alternatives) and the perceived supply of democracy (monitored by
public dissatisfaction with the democratic performance of governments in each country). Scholars have
conceptualized similar disparities as the phenomenon of ‘disaffected’, ‘dissatisfied’, or ‘disenchanted’
democrats.1 Operationalizing the conceptual framework more precisely with the empirical indicators
already developed allows the distribution of democratic deficits to be compared among different types
of contemporary regimes, as well as within each global region. The analysis suggests that the older
liberal democracies display strong endorsement of the importance of this form of governance, but also
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relatively positive perceptions of how democracy works in their own country. Younger liberal
democracies are far more dispersed on these dimensions, with the most congruence between
aspirations and performance displayed in cases such as Ghana, Uruguay and South Africa, all countries
which independent observers emphasize have experienced rapid progress in democratization during the
third wave era. By contrast, a far larger disparity between expectations and performance is evident in
the post-Communist states. Many puzzles remain and the conclusion speculates about some of the
reasons for these disparities, including the role of the media, government performance, and cultural
values.
I: Trends over time in system support
By itself, the cross-national evidence cannot determine whether any signs of system support
have gradually eroded over time, as commentators fear. For this, the available longitudinal evidence
from the pooled World Values Survey needs to be examined, comparing the eleven countries included in
all five survey waves from 1981 to 2005. These countries cannot be treated as a representative sample
of democracies, by any means. Nevertheless they do include some important cases of regime change
and they reflect a variety of cultural traditions, types of regime, and patterns of democratization. Figure
6.2 illustrates the process of democratization in these societies during the third wave era, including
some long-established democracies, such as Sweden, Britain, and Japan where trends remain flat, and
others states such as Spain, South Africa and South Korea, which made rapid progress in
democratization during the last quarter century.
Most are rich nations but the comparison also includes three emerging market economies with
moderate levels of human development -- Mexico, Argentina, and South Africa. During the late
twentieth-century, economic growth remained relatively flat in Mexico, Argentina, and South Africa,
although democracy made rapid strides following the restoration of constitutional rule in 1983 in
Argentina, the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, and the demise of the PRI’s long predominance
in Mexico, following the victory of President Vincente Fox in 2000. Today these three economies are
classified as middle income, with average per capita GDP around $9,000-$10,000 in 2005, about one
third of the level of the United States. The comparison also includes one transitional case - South Korea -
which has been transformed by rapid social, economic, and political change in recent decades. During
the late-twentieth century, the country shifted from an agrarian/industrial to a post-industrial service
sector economy, and politically from autocracy to democracy. Today the population enjoys affluent and
secure lifestyles; for example, average incomes for South Koreans roughly quadrupled during the last
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quarter century (measured by per capita GDP in Constant $ in purchasing power parity). Using each
wave of the WVS for the eleven countries, with the results aggregated at societal level, generated 55
nation-wave observations in total as the units of analysis.
Institutional confidence
To start to examine trends over time in these countries, Figure 6.2 shows how the composite
institutional confidence index, operationalized in the previous chapter, varies during the last twenty-five
years. For comparison, Figure 6.3 focuses upon the trends in confidence in parliaments in these nations,
since much of the concern emphasizes that the public has lost faith in legislatures. 2 Moreover there may
well be contrasts between trust in all public sector institutions, including the army and security forces,
and those agencies which are most closely linked with representative democracy. There are only five
time-points, so that any observations remain limited and it is not possible to establish the degree of
annual flux in support. Nevertheless the extended time period means it should be possible to detect any
steady and consistent flows, especially any changes which occurred before or after the decisive period
of regime change which occurred in Argentina (1983), South Korea (1987), South Africa (1993), and
Mexico (2000). To test the direction and significance of any change over time more systematically, the
year of the survey wave was regressed on political attitudes.
Among the younger liberal democracies, there are a few specific cases of decline across both
indicators of institutional confidence, notably during the 1980s in Argentina and in South Korea.
Constitutional rule was restored in Argentina in 1983; the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín saw the re-
establishment of civilian command over the military and strengthened democratic institutions, although
there were persistent economic problems in controlling hyperinflation. During this era, however,
Argentinean institutional confidence fell sharply before stabilizing at a lower level. The Sixth Republic of
South Korea began in 1987 with democratic elections which marked the transfer of power from the
authoritarian President Chun Doo-hwan; despite this, and growing economic prosperity prior to the
Asian economic crisis of 1997, confidence in public sector institutions gradually slipped among Koreans,
and confidence in the National Assembly fell sharply. In South Africa, however, rising institutional
confidence peaked in both indicators during the first post-apartheid election and then fell back
(especially for the parliament) after the initial honeymoon period.
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 about here]
Overall, confirming our earlier observations, however, there is no support from the available
time-series evidence for the argument that institutional confidence progressively eroded -- or indeed
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strengthened significantly -- during the third wave era among the democracies under comparison. 3
Despite the radical regimes changes which have occurred during recent decades -- including the
restoration of civilian rule in Argentina, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the breakdown of the
hegemony of the ruling party in Mexico --any historical processes of cultural change in citizen’s
orientations towards state institutions appears to operate on a far longer time-scale.
In the remaining countries, the composite institutional confidence scale generally shows a fairly
stable pattern from the start to the end of the series; the regression coefficient proved insignificant. The
trends in confidence in parliament, however, do display a significant fall over time. The WVS evidence
confirms the erosion in public confidence in the United States Congress that we have already observed
from the GSS data, and a similar decline occurred in Germany, Argentina and South Korea. Despite the
limited number of observations (50 year-country units), the erosion of confidence in parliament since
1981 in the eleven countries under comparison proved statistically significant. The diagnosis, therefore,
suggest that any loss of institutional confidence is more clearly related to the legislative body rather
than to all public sector institutions, and this finding needs to be examined further in subsequent
chapters to determine the underlying reasons.4
Endorsement of democratic attitudes
For comparison, trends in the endorsement of democratic values and the rejection of autocracy
scale can also be compared from 1995 to 2005 across these eleven countries, using the same scale
developed in chapter 5. The available data provides a limited range of observations but nevertheless the
results in Figure 6.4 show a fairly flat pattern; the regression of year of the survey on the democratic
values index proved insignificant. Only in South Korea does there appears to be a slight erosion of
support for democratic attitudes during this decade, but this trends is not evident elsewhere.
[Figure 6.4 about here]
Nationalism
What about feelings of nationalism since the early-1980s? Using the WVS measure discussed
earlier, Figure 6.4 shows either trendless fluctuations or else a fairly stable level of nationalist
orientations across most of the eleven countries under comparison. Nationalist feelings were
persistently low in Germany and Japan, probably reflecting the enduring legacy of World War II, in
comparison to all the other countries. The major changes in the series involved South Korea, where
nationalism fell over the years, whereas by contrast the indicator became more positive in South Africa,
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peaking around the time of the end of apartheid and the first fully-democratic elections in the early-
1990s. Again there are a limited number of observations but the regression coefficient proved weak and
insignificant.
Nationalism is also expected to weaken progressively under the forces of globalization and the
process of growing regional integration. Hence in the European Union the experience of growing
economic and political integration within the EU, with people working, living, studying and traveling
across the borders in different member states, have dissolved traditional geographic national barriers.
European identities are also expected to have gradually strengthened most clearly among citizens of the
founding states that have lived under European institutions for a long time, such as Italy, France, and
Germany. 5 Despite the dramatic process of regional unification and the single market which has
deepened and widened the European Union, in fact the empirical evidence presented here provides no
support for the claim that nationalism has progressively weakened during the last quarter century
among the EU member states under comparison (Germany, Spain, the UK or Sweden).
II: Estimating the size and distribution of the democratic deficit
The evidence considered so far challenges any over-simple claims about a uniform erosion of
systems support experienced across older liberal democracies in recent decades- or indeed more widely
around the world. Ideas of a democratic crisis should be rejected as an oversimplification of more
complex developments. Based on this foundation, we can focus more narrowly on the evidence for
distribution and size of any democratic deficit. Using the World Values Survey 2005, the relationship
between satisfaction with democratic performance and adherence to democratic values can be
examined. Regimes which fail to meet public expectations over long periods of time can lose their
legitimacy, risking instability. The dangers exist for all regimes but it is thought to be particularly risky for
younger democracies which have not yet developed a deep reservoir of mass support and where
government authority depends to a large degree upon voluntary compliance, such as in the willingness
of citizens to pay taxes and obey the law.
As discussed in the previous chapter, democratic satisfaction, reflecting citizen’s evaluations of
the performance of democratic governance in their own country, is measured by the question: “And
how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1
means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position
would you choose? Democratic aspirations, or the value of democracy, are gauged from the World
Values Survey 2005 by the question: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed
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democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely
important” what position would you choose?” This item is arguably superior to asking simply about
approval of democratic attitudes and the rejection of autocracy, as it seeks to measure the depth or
strength of any support.
[Figure 6.6 and Table 6.1 about here]
Overall, based on the difference between these indicators, the net democratic deficit is
therefore relatively similar in size across each type of regime, but for slightly different reasons. Hence in
in autocracies, electoral democracies, and younger liberal democracies, the deficit ranged from -2.1 to -
2.6 overall. In the older liberal democracies, democratic values were regarded as slightly more
important, but there was also slightly greater satisfaction with the performance of democratic
governance, generating a net deficit of -2.0. At the same time, as observed earlier, there are more
substantial differences among countries within each type of regime, such as a relatively modest deficit in
Thailand and Vietnam compared with Russia. Amongst the electoral democracies, similar variance could
be observed between Malaysia and Ethiopia, with the latter country displaying high democratic
aspirations but exceptionally poor marks for performance. Contrasts can also be observed among
younger liberal democracies between the modest gap evident in India and Mali, compared with the
more substantial deficit in Bulgaria and Ukraine. As consistently noted, among the long-established
democracies, the disparities between aspirations and satisfaction with performance were smallest in
Norway, Spain and Finland, compared with larger gaps in the U.S., Cyprus and Italy.
[Table 6.2 about here]
Comparison of these indicators across global regions, presented in Table 6.2, demonstrates that
the largest democratic deficit is evident among the post-communist states in Central and Eastern
Europe, especially in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Russia, where the public expresses
widespread aspirations for democracy and yet also minimal satisfaction with how democratic
governance is actually performing in their own countries. The deficit is also substantial in the five
countries under comparison in the Middle East. By contrast, widespread satisfaction with democratic
governance means that the smallest democratic deficit exists in the Scandinavian nations under
comparison. Relatively modest deficits are also registered among states in Asia-Pacific and South
America. The challenges facing democracy in Latin America have been widely discussed, especially
political turmoil and instability among states in the Andean region (Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia and
Colombia), as well as the presidential coup in Honduras and popular pressures ousting elected
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presidents earlier in Ecuador, Argentina and Peru.6 But in fact the overall gap between democratic
expectations and perceived performance in the seven Latin America nations contained in the 2005 WVS
survey is relatively modest when compared with other world regions.
Conclusions and discussion
This chapter leads to several major conclusions. Limited cross-national survey evidence is
available to establish systematic longitudinal trends in political attitudes during the third wave era.
Nonetheless the result of the time-series analysis of successive waves of the World Values Survey data
presented here, comparing a range of liberal democracies, serves to confirm the picture already familiar;
during the last quarter century, (except for confidence in parliaments), no significant erosion of system
support can be detected from the indices of composite institutional confidence, attitudes towards
democratic governance and rejection of autocracy, or feelings of nationalism. Instead trendless
fluctuations over time are apparent, or else a relatively stable pattern.
Tensions between almost universal public aspirations for democracy and more skeptical
evaluations of how democratically governments work in practice have been widely observed in the
previous literature, but nevertheless many puzzles remain. These components are most commonly
analyzed separately, rather than being integrated.7 Moreover systematic research has not yet
established the underlying reasons for the democratic deficit and why this varies across different types
of societies and regimes. The analysis suggests that the older liberal democracies display strong
endorsement of the importance of democracy but also relatively positive perceptions of how democracy
works in their own country. Countries which have only democratized during the third wave era are far
more diverse in their orientations, with the greatest congruence between aspirations and perceived
performance displayed in cases such as Ghana, Uruguay, and South Africa, all relatively successful
democracies. By contrast, larger disparities between expectations and perceived performance are
evident in many post-Communist states, including Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Serbia.
The descriptive evidence clears away some popular myths but it still leaves multiple puzzles to
explain. Several general theories could help to account for the variations in the democratic deficit
among countries, as well as the exceptionally positive attitudes observed in the Communist one-party
states of Viet Nam and China, furnishing several plausible propositions to be analyzed in subsequent
chapters.8 One potential explanation, derived from theories of political communication, focuses upon
the news media’s framing of politics and government. In particular, human rights observers report that
many repressive autocracies routinely deploy techniques designed to suppress independent journalism,
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manipulate and slant news selectively in their favor, and limit critical coverage of the regime. 9 In this
context, state-controlled media coverage generates one-sided messages. Any effects arising from one-
sided messages should be apparent in countries with state-controlled broadcasting where regular
television news users would be expected to display more positive system support. Some previous
studies have started to document this process.10 By contrast, in countries with an independent news
media where the public is exposed to two-sided messages (with both positive and negative framing of
public affairs), regular news media use would not be expected to have a dramatic impact upon
evaluations of the performance of government. Under conditions where the proportion of negative
news about politics and government increases, however, such as the outbreak of a major political
scandal, then this would be expected to erode specific levels of system support. To test the impact of
political communications, the attitudes of regular news users can be compared with non-users in each of
these countries and types of regimes, including examining a few national case studies where changes in
the directional tone of the news coverage of political scandals can be analyzed over time.
Yet rational choice theories suggest alternative propositions, relating public opinion more
directly to the instrumental performance of the government, rather than the role of the media in
framing perceptions. In the cases of China and Viet Nam, for example, positive perceptions of
government could be driven by the remarkable economic record these societies have experienced
during recent decades; today China is the fourth-largest economy in the world. It has sustained average
economic growth of over 9.5% for the past quarter century, becoming the manufacturing power-house
of the globe, lifting millions out of poverty and producing dramatic improvements in living standards.
The reformed mixed market economy in Viet Nam has also achieved remarkably strong economic
growth, expanded foreign trade, and sharp reductions in poverty. Vietnam has been one of the fastest-
growing economies in the world, averaging around 6.5-8% annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth
since 1990. Per capita income rose from $220 in 1994 to $1,024 in 2008. 11 If institutional confidence is
generally related to public assessments of the government’s management of the economy and welfare
services, then attitudes towards state agencies and more diffuse indicators of system support should be
strongly linked to levels of economic satisfaction within each society, as well as to macro-level indicators
of national economic performance.12
In addition, cultural theories suggest that other values and beliefs could also be expected to
shape attitudes towards the political system, for example in the cases of China and Vietnam, left-right
ideological beliefs in Communist states are predicted to influence attitudes towards the market and
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state, reinforcing confidence in public sector agencies, while strong affective feelings of national pride
found in these societies could also spill over to influence positive support towards the national
government and its agencies.13 Subsequent chapters build upon this foundation by using the market
model to analyze the democratic deficit, monitoring the interaction concerning public demands for
democracy, the impact of information conveyed by the mass media, and the instrumental performance
of regimes.
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Figure 6.1: Changes in democracy during the third wave era, selected states
Note: The selected societies include the eleven countries included in all five waves of the World Values Survey 1981-2007. The figure shows the annual rating based on Freedom House’s classification of political rights and civil liberties in each society from 1972 to 2007, standardized to a 100-point liberal democracy scale.
Source: Freedom House. Freedom around the world. www.freedomhouse.org
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Figure 6.2: Trends in institutional confidence, 1981-2005
Notes: Institutional confidence scale (8) 1981-2005. V146-147 “I am going to name a number of
organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal
of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? (Read out
and code one answer for each): The armed forces; The police; The courts; The government (in your
nation’s capital); Political parties; Parliament; The Civil service” The standardized 100-point institutional
confidence scale, where high represents most confidence, combines these items. The table describes
the mean distribution by nation. For more detail about the survey items contained in each indicator, see
the factor analysis in Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A. Observations = 43. To test for the slope (beta)
and statistical significance, the year was regressed on institutional confidence (b =-.127 N/s).
Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005
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Figure 6.3: Trends in confidence in parliament, 1981-2005
Notes: Confidence in parliament, 1981-2005. “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (4), quite a
lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? Parliament.” Observations = 50. To
test for the slope (beta) and statistical significance, the year was regressed on institutional confidence (b
=-.015 p=***).
Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005
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Figure 6.4: Trends in support for democratic values, 1981-2005
Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005
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Figure 6.5: Trends in nationalism, 1981-2005
Notes: The nationalism scale is constructed from two items: (V75) Willingness to fight for one’s country in a war, and (V209) Feelings of national pride. These items are summed and standardized to a 100-point scale. To test for the slope (beta) and statistical significance, the year was regressed on the nationalism scale (b =.071 N/s).
Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005
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Figure 6.6: The democratic deficit by regime type, 2005-7
Democratic values: Endorsement of democracy and rejection of autocratic principles
Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again
using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is
“completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
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Figure 6.6: The democratic deficit by regime type, 2005-7
Democratic values: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed
democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely
important” what position would you choose?”
Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again
using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is
“completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”
Democratic deficit: Mean difference between columns (i) and (ii)
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
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Table 6.1: The democratic deficit by regime and nation, 2005-7Older liberal democracies Younger liberal democracies Electoral democracies Autocracies
Values
Performance
Deficit
Values
Performance
Deficit
Values
Performance
Deficit
Values
Performance
Deficit
Norway 9.3 8.1 -1.2 India 7.1 6.5 -0.6 Malaysia 7.9 7.0 -0.9 Thailand 8.2 7.0 -1.2Spain 8.7 7.4 -1.3 Mali 7.7 7.0 -0.6 Colombia 7.9 6.3 -1.6 Viet Nam 9.2 8.0 -1.2Finland 8.7 7.4 -1.3 Ghana 9.2 8.5 -0.7 Jordan 9.4 7.8 -1.6 China 8.5 6.7 -1.8Japan 8.5 6.9 -1.6 Uruguay 8.9 7.7 -1.2 Zambia 8.8 6.7 -2.0 Iran 7.9 5.2 -2.7Switzerland 9.3 7.6 -1.7 Chile 8.2 7.0 -1.2 Burkina Faso 8.0 5.7 -2.3 Russia 7.5 4.4 -3.1Canada 9.0 7.1 -1.9 South Africa 8.7 7.4 -1.3 Moldova 7.9 5.1 -2.8France 8.5 6.6 -1.9 Indonesia 8.5 6.5 -2.0 Turkey 9.1 5.9 -3.2Australia 9.1 7.1 -1.9 Taiwan 8.9 6.9 -2.0 Morocco 8.9 5.0 -3.9Germany 9.2 7.2 -2.0 Brazil 8.2 6.2 -2.1 Ethiopia 9.2 4.2 -5.0Sweden 9.5 7.5 -2.0 Slovenia 7.9 5.8 -2.1United Kingdom 8.6 6.4 -2.2 Mexico 8.7 6.6 -2.1Netherlands 8.7 6.5 -2.2 Korea, South 8.6 6.4 -2.1United States 8.8 6.3 -2.5 Argentina 9.1 7.0 -2.1Cyprus 9.1 6.5 -2.6 Serbia 7.5 5.2 -2.4Italy 8.8 5.8 -3.0 Trinidad & Tobago 8.7 6.1 -2.6
Romania 8.6 5.8 -2.8Poland 8.7 5.7 -3.0Andorra 8.9 5.4 -3.5Bulgaria 8.0 4.3 -3.7Ukraine 8.0 4.2 -3.8
Mean 8.9 7.0 -2.0 8.4 6.3 -2.1 8.6 6.0 -2.6 8.4 6.3 -2.1
(i) Democratic values: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”(ii) Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”Democratic deficit: Mean difference between (i) and (ii). Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
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Table 6.2: The democratic deficit by world region, 2005-7
VALUES EVALUATIONS DEMOCRATIC
DEFICIT
#
Global region Importance of
democracy
(i)
Satisfaction with
democratic
performance
(ii) (i-ii)
Scandinavia 9.19 7.68 -1.53 3
Asia-Pacific 8.43 6.90 -1.55 11
South America 8.34 6.57 -1.78 7
Africa 8.65 6.71 -1.91 7
North America 8.81 6.62 -2.20 3
Western Europe 8.87 6.64 -2.25 9
Middle East 8.59 5.79 -2.77 5
Central & Eastern Europe 7.99 5.06 -2.96 8
Total 8.54 6.44 -2.10 53
Notes: For details, see Table 5.7
Source: World Values Survey 2005-7
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19
1 Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. (Eds.) 2000. Disaffected Democracies: what's troubling the trilateral
countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mariano Torcal and José R. Montero. 2006. Political
Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics. London: Routledge;
Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall
Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378.
2 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. Congress as Public Enemy. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
3 See also Steven Van de Walle, Steven Van Roosbroek, and Geert Bouckaert. 2008. ‘Trust in the public
sector: is there any evidence for a long-term decline?’ International Review of Administrative Sciences
74(1): 47-64.
4 Similar regression analysis models were run to monitor trends in confidence 1981-2007 in the judiciary,
civil service, and police, but none proved significant.
5 Sophie Duchesne and Andrè-Paul Frognier. 1995. ‘Is There a European Identity?’ In Public Opinion and
Internationalized Governance. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University
Press; Angelika Scheuer. 1999. ‘A Political Community?’ In Political Representation and Legitimacy in the
European Union. Ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press; T. Risse.
2001. ‘A European identity? Europeanization and the evolution of nation-state identities.’ In Transforming
Europe. Eds. M.G. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. See also B. Nelson,
D. Roberts and W.Veit. (eds). The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity. Oxford:
Berg; Lauren M. McLaren. 2005. Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration. London: Palgrave
Macmillan.
6 Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press; Marta Lagos. 2003. ‘Support for and satisfaction with democracy.’ International Journal of Public
Opinion Research 15 (4): 471-487.
7 See, for example, Min-Hua Huang, Yu-tzung Chang and Yun-han Chu. 2008. ‘Identifying sources of
democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis.’ Electoral Studies 27(1): 45-62. See also, however, Richard I.
Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its discontents in post-wall Germany.’
International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378.
8 See also, Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds., 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the
Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press; Z. Wang. 2005. ‘Before the emergence of critical citizens:
Economic development and political trust in China.’ International Review of Sociology 15(1): 155-71;
Tianjian Shi. ‘China: Democratic values supporting an authoritarian system.’ In Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond,
Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. Eds. 2008. How East Asians View Democracy. New York: Columbia
University Press.
9 Louis Edward Inglehart. 1998. Press and Speech Freedoms in the World, from Antiquity until 1998: A
Chronology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; Leonard R. Sussman. 2001. Press Freedom in Our Genes.
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