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CRITICAL CITIZENS REVISITED: CHAPTER 6 5/8/2023 8:26 PM

Chapter 6

The democratic deficit

The previous chapter established cross-national patterns in system support, but not it did not

examine trends or compare the size and distribution of the democratic deficit under a wide range of

political conditions. This chapter starts by establishing longitudinal analysis of selected case-studies, to

monitor if and when any changes occurred. The pooled World Values Survey 1981-2007 contains time-

series survey data for a more restricted sub-set of eleven nations included in all five waves of the survey

conducted over twenty-five years. This includes five states (Spain, South Africa, Mexico, South Korea,

and Argentina) which have experienced transitions from diverse types of autocratic rule and the rapid

consolidation of democratic regimes during this era. Mexico, Argentina, South Korea, and South Africa

are also emerging market economies, characterized by moderate levels of per capita GDP. The effect of

democratization on public opinion are examined by examining trends ‘before’ and ‘after’ the year when

regime changed in these particular case studies, exemplified by the fall of the Argentinean military junta

in 1983, the collapse of South African apartheid in 1994, and the end of PRI’s predominance in the 2000

Mexican presidential elections. The number of cases under comparisons is admittedly limited but

nonetheless the results of the analysis serve to confirm the picture already familiar; during the last

quarter century, no significant erosion of system support was detected from the indices of composite

institutional confidence (with the notable exception of declining public confidence in parliaments),

attitudes towards democratic governance and rejection of autocracy, or feelings of nationalism. Instead

trendless fluctuations over time (suggesting explanations based on either actual or perceived

performance), or else a relatively stable pattern, can be observed.

Building on this foundation, this chapter also compares the size and distribution of democratic

deficits among regimes and nations. This phenomenon is conceived as the tensions which arise from the

imbalance between the public’s demand for democracy (measured by strong adherence to democratic

values and rejection of authoritarian alternatives) and the perceived supply of democracy (monitored by

public dissatisfaction with the democratic performance of governments in each country). Scholars have

conceptualized similar disparities as the phenomenon of ‘disaffected’, ‘dissatisfied’, or ‘disenchanted’

democrats.1 Operationalizing the conceptual framework more precisely with the empirical indicators

already developed allows the distribution of democratic deficits to be compared among different types

of contemporary regimes, as well as within each global region. The analysis suggests that the older

liberal democracies display strong endorsement of the importance of this form of governance, but also

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relatively positive perceptions of how democracy works in their own country. Younger liberal

democracies are far more dispersed on these dimensions, with the most congruence between

aspirations and performance displayed in cases such as Ghana, Uruguay and South Africa, all countries

which independent observers emphasize have experienced rapid progress in democratization during the

third wave era. By contrast, a far larger disparity between expectations and performance is evident in

the post-Communist states. Many puzzles remain and the conclusion speculates about some of the

reasons for these disparities, including the role of the media, government performance, and cultural

values.

I: Trends over time in system support

By itself, the cross-national evidence cannot determine whether any signs of system support

have gradually eroded over time, as commentators fear. For this, the available longitudinal evidence

from the pooled World Values Survey needs to be examined, comparing the eleven countries included in

all five survey waves from 1981 to 2005. These countries cannot be treated as a representative sample

of democracies, by any means. Nevertheless they do include some important cases of regime change

and they reflect a variety of cultural traditions, types of regime, and patterns of democratization. Figure

6.2 illustrates the process of democratization in these societies during the third wave era, including

some long-established democracies, such as Sweden, Britain, and Japan where trends remain flat, and

others states such as Spain, South Africa and South Korea, which made rapid progress in

democratization during the last quarter century.

Most are rich nations but the comparison also includes three emerging market economies with

moderate levels of human development -- Mexico, Argentina, and South Africa. During the late

twentieth-century, economic growth remained relatively flat in Mexico, Argentina, and South Africa,

although democracy made rapid strides following the restoration of constitutional rule in 1983 in

Argentina, the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, and the demise of the PRI’s long predominance

in Mexico, following the victory of President Vincente Fox in 2000. Today these three economies are

classified as middle income, with average per capita GDP around $9,000-$10,000 in 2005, about one

third of the level of the United States. The comparison also includes one transitional case - South Korea -

which has been transformed by rapid social, economic, and political change in recent decades. During

the late-twentieth century, the country shifted from an agrarian/industrial to a post-industrial service

sector economy, and politically from autocracy to democracy. Today the population enjoys affluent and

secure lifestyles; for example, average incomes for South Koreans roughly quadrupled during the last

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quarter century (measured by per capita GDP in Constant $ in purchasing power parity). Using each

wave of the WVS for the eleven countries, with the results aggregated at societal level, generated 55

nation-wave observations in total as the units of analysis.

Institutional confidence

To start to examine trends over time in these countries, Figure 6.2 shows how the composite

institutional confidence index, operationalized in the previous chapter, varies during the last twenty-five

years. For comparison, Figure 6.3 focuses upon the trends in confidence in parliaments in these nations,

since much of the concern emphasizes that the public has lost faith in legislatures. 2 Moreover there may

well be contrasts between trust in all public sector institutions, including the army and security forces,

and those agencies which are most closely linked with representative democracy. There are only five

time-points, so that any observations remain limited and it is not possible to establish the degree of

annual flux in support. Nevertheless the extended time period means it should be possible to detect any

steady and consistent flows, especially any changes which occurred before or after the decisive period

of regime change which occurred in Argentina (1983), South Korea (1987), South Africa (1993), and

Mexico (2000). To test the direction and significance of any change over time more systematically, the

year of the survey wave was regressed on political attitudes.

Among the younger liberal democracies, there are a few specific cases of decline across both

indicators of institutional confidence, notably during the 1980s in Argentina and in South Korea.

Constitutional rule was restored in Argentina in 1983; the presidency of Raúl Alfonsín saw the re-

establishment of civilian command over the military and strengthened democratic institutions, although

there were persistent economic problems in controlling hyperinflation. During this era, however,

Argentinean institutional confidence fell sharply before stabilizing at a lower level. The Sixth Republic of

South Korea began in 1987 with democratic elections which marked the transfer of power from the

authoritarian President Chun Doo-hwan; despite this, and growing economic prosperity prior to the

Asian economic crisis of 1997, confidence in public sector institutions gradually slipped among Koreans,

and confidence in the National Assembly fell sharply. In South Africa, however, rising institutional

confidence peaked in both indicators during the first post-apartheid election and then fell back

(especially for the parliament) after the initial honeymoon period.

Figures 6.2 and 6.3 about here]

Overall, confirming our earlier observations, however, there is no support from the available

time-series evidence for the argument that institutional confidence progressively eroded -- or indeed

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strengthened significantly -- during the third wave era among the democracies under comparison. 3

Despite the radical regimes changes which have occurred during recent decades -- including the

restoration of civilian rule in Argentina, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the breakdown of the

hegemony of the ruling party in Mexico --any historical processes of cultural change in citizen’s

orientations towards state institutions appears to operate on a far longer time-scale.

In the remaining countries, the composite institutional confidence scale generally shows a fairly

stable pattern from the start to the end of the series; the regression coefficient proved insignificant. The

trends in confidence in parliament, however, do display a significant fall over time. The WVS evidence

confirms the erosion in public confidence in the United States Congress that we have already observed

from the GSS data, and a similar decline occurred in Germany, Argentina and South Korea. Despite the

limited number of observations (50 year-country units), the erosion of confidence in parliament since

1981 in the eleven countries under comparison proved statistically significant. The diagnosis, therefore,

suggest that any loss of institutional confidence is more clearly related to the legislative body rather

than to all public sector institutions, and this finding needs to be examined further in subsequent

chapters to determine the underlying reasons.4

Endorsement of democratic attitudes

For comparison, trends in the endorsement of democratic values and the rejection of autocracy

scale can also be compared from 1995 to 2005 across these eleven countries, using the same scale

developed in chapter 5. The available data provides a limited range of observations but nevertheless the

results in Figure 6.4 show a fairly flat pattern; the regression of year of the survey on the democratic

values index proved insignificant. Only in South Korea does there appears to be a slight erosion of

support for democratic attitudes during this decade, but this trends is not evident elsewhere.

[Figure 6.4 about here]

Nationalism

What about feelings of nationalism since the early-1980s? Using the WVS measure discussed

earlier, Figure 6.4 shows either trendless fluctuations or else a fairly stable level of nationalist

orientations across most of the eleven countries under comparison. Nationalist feelings were

persistently low in Germany and Japan, probably reflecting the enduring legacy of World War II, in

comparison to all the other countries. The major changes in the series involved South Korea, where

nationalism fell over the years, whereas by contrast the indicator became more positive in South Africa,

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peaking around the time of the end of apartheid and the first fully-democratic elections in the early-

1990s. Again there are a limited number of observations but the regression coefficient proved weak and

insignificant.

Nationalism is also expected to weaken progressively under the forces of globalization and the

process of growing regional integration. Hence in the European Union the experience of growing

economic and political integration within the EU, with people working, living, studying and traveling

across the borders in different member states, have dissolved traditional geographic national barriers.

European identities are also expected to have gradually strengthened most clearly among citizens of the

founding states that have lived under European institutions for a long time, such as Italy, France, and

Germany. 5 Despite the dramatic process of regional unification and the single market which has

deepened and widened the European Union, in fact the empirical evidence presented here provides no

support for the claim that nationalism has progressively weakened during the last quarter century

among the EU member states under comparison (Germany, Spain, the UK or Sweden).

II: Estimating the size and distribution of the democratic deficit

The evidence considered so far challenges any over-simple claims about a uniform erosion of

systems support experienced across older liberal democracies in recent decades- or indeed more widely

around the world. Ideas of a democratic crisis should be rejected as an oversimplification of more

complex developments. Based on this foundation, we can focus more narrowly on the evidence for

distribution and size of any democratic deficit. Using the World Values Survey 2005, the relationship

between satisfaction with democratic performance and adherence to democratic values can be

examined. Regimes which fail to meet public expectations over long periods of time can lose their

legitimacy, risking instability. The dangers exist for all regimes but it is thought to be particularly risky for

younger democracies which have not yet developed a deep reservoir of mass support and where

government authority depends to a large degree upon voluntary compliance, such as in the willingness

of citizens to pay taxes and obey the law.

As discussed in the previous chapter, democratic satisfaction, reflecting citizen’s evaluations of

the performance of democratic governance in their own country, is measured by the question: “And

how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1

means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position

would you choose? Democratic aspirations, or the value of democracy, are gauged from the World

Values Survey 2005 by the question: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed

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democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely

important” what position would you choose?” This item is arguably superior to asking simply about

approval of democratic attitudes and the rejection of autocracy, as it seeks to measure the depth or

strength of any support.

[Figure 6.6 and Table 6.1 about here]

Overall, based on the difference between these indicators, the net democratic deficit is

therefore relatively similar in size across each type of regime, but for slightly different reasons. Hence in

in autocracies, electoral democracies, and younger liberal democracies, the deficit ranged from -2.1 to -

2.6 overall. In the older liberal democracies, democratic values were regarded as slightly more

important, but there was also slightly greater satisfaction with the performance of democratic

governance, generating a net deficit of -2.0. At the same time, as observed earlier, there are more

substantial differences among countries within each type of regime, such as a relatively modest deficit in

Thailand and Vietnam compared with Russia. Amongst the electoral democracies, similar variance could

be observed between Malaysia and Ethiopia, with the latter country displaying high democratic

aspirations but exceptionally poor marks for performance. Contrasts can also be observed among

younger liberal democracies between the modest gap evident in India and Mali, compared with the

more substantial deficit in Bulgaria and Ukraine. As consistently noted, among the long-established

democracies, the disparities between aspirations and satisfaction with performance were smallest in

Norway, Spain and Finland, compared with larger gaps in the U.S., Cyprus and Italy.

[Table 6.2 about here]

Comparison of these indicators across global regions, presented in Table 6.2, demonstrates that

the largest democratic deficit is evident among the post-communist states in Central and Eastern

Europe, especially in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, and Russia, where the public expresses

widespread aspirations for democracy and yet also minimal satisfaction with how democratic

governance is actually performing in their own countries. The deficit is also substantial in the five

countries under comparison in the Middle East. By contrast, widespread satisfaction with democratic

governance means that the smallest democratic deficit exists in the Scandinavian nations under

comparison. Relatively modest deficits are also registered among states in Asia-Pacific and South

America. The challenges facing democracy in Latin America have been widely discussed, especially

political turmoil and instability among states in the Andean region (Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia and

Colombia), as well as the presidential coup in Honduras and popular pressures ousting elected

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presidents earlier in Ecuador, Argentina and Peru.6 But in fact the overall gap between democratic

expectations and perceived performance in the seven Latin America nations contained in the 2005 WVS

survey is relatively modest when compared with other world regions.

Conclusions and discussion

This chapter leads to several major conclusions. Limited cross-national survey evidence is

available to establish systematic longitudinal trends in political attitudes during the third wave era.

Nonetheless the result of the time-series analysis of successive waves of the World Values Survey data

presented here, comparing a range of liberal democracies, serves to confirm the picture already familiar;

during the last quarter century, (except for confidence in parliaments), no significant erosion of system

support can be detected from the indices of composite institutional confidence, attitudes towards

democratic governance and rejection of autocracy, or feelings of nationalism. Instead trendless

fluctuations over time are apparent, or else a relatively stable pattern.

Tensions between almost universal public aspirations for democracy and more skeptical

evaluations of how democratically governments work in practice have been widely observed in the

previous literature, but nevertheless many puzzles remain. These components are most commonly

analyzed separately, rather than being integrated.7 Moreover systematic research has not yet

established the underlying reasons for the democratic deficit and why this varies across different types

of societies and regimes. The analysis suggests that the older liberal democracies display strong

endorsement of the importance of democracy but also relatively positive perceptions of how democracy

works in their own country. Countries which have only democratized during the third wave era are far

more diverse in their orientations, with the greatest congruence between aspirations and perceived

performance displayed in cases such as Ghana, Uruguay, and South Africa, all relatively successful

democracies. By contrast, larger disparities between expectations and perceived performance are

evident in many post-Communist states, including Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Serbia.

The descriptive evidence clears away some popular myths but it still leaves multiple puzzles to

explain. Several general theories could help to account for the variations in the democratic deficit

among countries, as well as the exceptionally positive attitudes observed in the Communist one-party

states of Viet Nam and China, furnishing several plausible propositions to be analyzed in subsequent

chapters.8 One potential explanation, derived from theories of political communication, focuses upon

the news media’s framing of politics and government. In particular, human rights observers report that

many repressive autocracies routinely deploy techniques designed to suppress independent journalism,

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manipulate and slant news selectively in their favor, and limit critical coverage of the regime. 9 In this

context, state-controlled media coverage generates one-sided messages. Any effects arising from one-

sided messages should be apparent in countries with state-controlled broadcasting where regular

television news users would be expected to display more positive system support. Some previous

studies have started to document this process.10 By contrast, in countries with an independent news

media where the public is exposed to two-sided messages (with both positive and negative framing of

public affairs), regular news media use would not be expected to have a dramatic impact upon

evaluations of the performance of government. Under conditions where the proportion of negative

news about politics and government increases, however, such as the outbreak of a major political

scandal, then this would be expected to erode specific levels of system support. To test the impact of

political communications, the attitudes of regular news users can be compared with non-users in each of

these countries and types of regimes, including examining a few national case studies where changes in

the directional tone of the news coverage of political scandals can be analyzed over time.

Yet rational choice theories suggest alternative propositions, relating public opinion more

directly to the instrumental performance of the government, rather than the role of the media in

framing perceptions. In the cases of China and Viet Nam, for example, positive perceptions of

government could be driven by the remarkable economic record these societies have experienced

during recent decades; today China is the fourth-largest economy in the world. It has sustained average

economic growth of over 9.5% for the past quarter century, becoming the manufacturing power-house

of the globe, lifting millions out of poverty and producing dramatic improvements in living standards.

The reformed mixed market economy in Viet Nam has also achieved remarkably strong economic

growth, expanded foreign trade, and sharp reductions in poverty. Vietnam has been one of the fastest-

growing economies in the world, averaging around 6.5-8% annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth

since 1990. Per capita income rose from $220 in 1994 to $1,024 in 2008. 11 If institutional confidence is

generally related to public assessments of the government’s management of the economy and welfare

services, then attitudes towards state agencies and more diffuse indicators of system support should be

strongly linked to levels of economic satisfaction within each society, as well as to macro-level indicators

of national economic performance.12

In addition, cultural theories suggest that other values and beliefs could also be expected to

shape attitudes towards the political system, for example in the cases of China and Vietnam, left-right

ideological beliefs in Communist states are predicted to influence attitudes towards the market and

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state, reinforcing confidence in public sector agencies, while strong affective feelings of national pride

found in these societies could also spill over to influence positive support towards the national

government and its agencies.13 Subsequent chapters build upon this foundation by using the market

model to analyze the democratic deficit, monitoring the interaction concerning public demands for

democracy, the impact of information conveyed by the mass media, and the instrumental performance

of regimes.

9


Figure 6.1: Changes in democracy during the third wave era, selected states

Note: The selected societies include the eleven countries included in all five waves of the World Values Survey 1981-2007. The figure shows the annual rating based on Freedom House’s classification of political rights and civil liberties in each society from 1972 to 2007, standardized to a 100-point liberal democracy scale.

Source: Freedom House. Freedom around the world. www.freedomhouse.org

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Figure 6.2: Trends in institutional confidence, 1981-2005

Notes: Institutional confidence scale (8) 1981-2005. V146-147 “I am going to name a number of

organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal

of confidence (4), quite a lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? (Read out

and code one answer for each): The armed forces; The police; The courts; The government (in your

nation’s capital); Political parties; Parliament; The Civil service” The standardized 100-point institutional

confidence scale, where high represents most confidence, combines these items. The table describes

the mean distribution by nation. For more detail about the survey items contained in each indicator, see

the factor analysis in Table 3.2 and Technical Appendix A. Observations = 43. To test for the slope (beta)

and statistical significance, the year was regressed on institutional confidence (b =-.127 N/s).

Source: Pooled WVS 1981-2005

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Figure 6.3: Trends in confidence in parliament, 1981-2005

Notes: Confidence in parliament, 1981-2005. “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each

one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence (4), quite a

lot of confidence (3), not very much confidence (2) or none at all (1)? Parliament.” Observations = 50. To

test for the slope (beta) and statistical significance, the year was regressed on institutional confidence (b

=-.015 p=***).


12


Figure 6.4: Trends in support for democratic values, 1981-2005


13


Figure 6.5: Trends in nationalism, 1981-2005

Notes: The nationalism scale is constructed from two items: (V75) Willingness to fight for one’s country in a war, and (V209) Feelings of national pride. These items are summed and standardized to a 100-point scale. To test for the slope (beta) and statistical significance, the year was regressed on the nationalism scale (b =.071 N/s).


14


Figure 6.6: The democratic deficit by regime type, 2005

Democratic values: Endorsement of democracy and rejection of autocratic principles

Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again

using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is

“completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”

Source: World Values Survey 2005

15


Figure 6.6: The democratic deficit by regime type, 2005

Democratic values: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed

democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely

important” what position would you choose?”

Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again

using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is

“completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”

Democratic deficit: Mean difference between columns (i) and (ii)


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Table 6.1: The democratic deficit by regime and nation, 2005Older liberal democracies Younger liberal democracies Electoral democracies Autocracies

Values

Performance

Deficit

Values

Performance

Deficit

Values

Performance

Deficit

Values

Performance

Deficit

Norway 9.3 8.1 -1.2 India 7.1 6.5 -0.6 Malaysia 7.9 7.0 -0.9 Thailand 8.2 7.0 -1.2Spain 8.7 7.4 -1.3 Mali 7.7 7.0 -0.6 Colombia 7.9 6.3 -1.6 Viet Nam 9.2 8.0 -1.2Finland 8.7 7.4 -1.3 Ghana 9.2 8.5 -0.7 Jordan 9.4 7.8 -1.6 China 8.5 6.7 -1.8Japan 8.5 6.9 -1.6 Uruguay 8.9 7.7 -1.2 Zambia 8.8 6.7 -2.0 Iran 7.9 5.2 -2.7Switzerland 9.3 7.6 -1.7 Chile 8.2 7.0 -1.2 Burkina Faso 8.0 5.7 -2.3 Russia 7.5 4.4 -3.1Canada 9.0 7.1 -1.9 South Africa 8.7 7.4 -1.3 Moldova 7.9 5.1 -2.8France 8.5 6.6 -1.9 Indonesia 8.5 6.5 -2.0 Turkey 9.1 5.9 -3.2Australia 9.1 7.1 -1.9 Taiwan 8.9 6.9 -2.0 Morocco 8.9 5.0 -3.9Germany 9.2 7.2 -2.0 Brazil 8.2 6.2 -2.1 Ethiopia 9.2 4.2 -5.0Sweden 9.5 7.5 -2.0 Slovenia 7.9 5.8 -2.1United Kingdom 8.6 6.4 -2.2 Mexico 8.7 6.6 -2.1Netherlands 8.7 6.5 -2.2 Korea, South 8.6 6.4 -2.1United States 8.8 6.3 -2.5 Argentina 9.1 7.0 -2.1Cyprus 9.1 6.5 -2.6 Serbia 7.5 5.2 -2.4Italy 8.8 5.8 -3.0 Trinidad & Tobago 8.7 6.1 -2.6

Romania 8.6 5.8 -2.8Poland 8.7 5.7 -3.0Andorra 8.9 5.4 -3.5Bulgaria 8.0 4.3 -3.7Ukraine 8.0 4.2 -3.8

Mean 8.9 7.0 -2.0 8.4 6.3 -2.1 8.6 6.0 -2.6 8.4 6.3 -2.1

(i) Democratic values: V162.”How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”(ii) Democratic performance: V163: “And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 means that it is “completely democratic,” what position would you choose?”Democratic deficit: Mean difference between (i) and (ii). Source: World Values Survey 2005

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Table 6.2: The democratic deficit by world region, 2005

VALUES EVALUATIONS DEMOCRATIC

DEFICIT

#

Global region Importance of

democracy

(i)

Satisfaction with

democratic

performance

(ii) (i-ii)

Scandinavia 9.19 7.68 -1.53 3

Asia-Pacific 8.43 6.90 -1.55 11

South America 8.34 6.57 -1.78 7

Africa 8.65 6.71 -1.91 7

North America 8.81 6.62 -2.20 3

Western Europe 8.87 6.64 -2.25 9

Middle East 8.59 5.79 -2.77 5

Central & Eastern Europe 7.99 5.06 -2.96 8

Total 8.54 6.44 -2.10 53

Notes: For details, see Table 5.7


18


19

1 Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. (Eds.) 2000. Disaffected Democracies: what's troubling the trilateral

countries? Princeton: Princeton University Press; Mariano Torcal and José R. Montero. 2006. Political

Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics. London: Routledge;

Richard I. Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its Discontents in Post-Wall

Germany.’ International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378.

2 John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. Congress as Public Enemy. New York: Cambridge

University Press.

3 See also Steven Van de Walle, Steven Van Roosbroek, and Geert Bouckaert. 2008. ‘Trust in the public

sector: is there any evidence for a long-term decline?’ International Review of Administrative Sciences

74(1): 47-64.

4 Similar regression analysis models were run to monitor trends in confidence 1981-2007 in the judiciary,

civil service, and police, but none proved significant.

5 Sophie Duchesne and Andrè-Paul Frognier. 1995. ‘Is There a European Identity?’ In Public Opinion and

Internationalized Governance. Edited by Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott. Oxford: Oxford University

Press; Angelika Scheuer. 1999. ‘A Political Community?’ In Political Representation and Legitimacy in the

European Union. Ed. Hermann Schmitt and Jacques Thomassen. Oxford: Oxford University Press; T. Risse.

2001. ‘A European identity? Europeanization and the evolution of nation-state identities.’ In Transforming

Europe. Eds. M.G. Cowles, J. Caporaso and T. Risse. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. See also B. Nelson,

D. Roberts and W.Veit. (eds). The Idea of Europe: Problems of National and Transnational Identity. Oxford:

Berg; Lauren M. McLaren. 2005. Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration. London: Palgrave

Macmillan.

6 Roderic Camp. ed. 2001. Citizen Views of Democracy in Latin America Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh

Press; Marta Lagos. 2003. ‘Support for and satisfaction with democracy.’ International Journal of Public

Opinion Research 15 (4): 471-487.

7 See, for example, Min-Hua Huang, Yu-tzung Chang and Yun-han Chu. 2008. ‘Identifying sources of

democratic legitimacy: A multilevel analysis.’ Electoral Studies 27(1): 45-62. See also, however, Richard I.

Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2001. ‘Democracy and Its discontents in post-wall Germany.’

International Political Science Review 22(4): 363-378.

8 See also, Russell J. Dalton and Doh Chull Shin, eds., 2006. Citizens, Democracy and Markets around the

Pacific Rim Oxford: Oxford University Press; Z. Wang. 2005. ‘Before the emergence of critical citizens:

Economic development and political trust in China.’ International Review of Sociology 15(1): 155-71;

Tianjian Shi. ‘China: Democratic values supporting an authoritarian system.’ In Yun-han Chu, Larry Diamond,

Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. Eds. 2008. How East Asians View Democracy. New York: Columbia

University Press.

9 Louis Edward Inglehart. 1998. Press and Speech Freedoms in the World, from Antiquity until 1998: A

Chronology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; Leonard R. Sussman. 2001. Press Freedom in Our Genes.

Reston, VA: World Press Freedom Committee; Alasdair Roberts. 2006. Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in

the Information Age. New York: Cambridge University Press.

10 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. 2010. ‘Limits on press freedom and regime support.’ In Public Sentinel:

News media and Governance Reform. Washington DC: The World Bank; J.J. Kennedy. 2009. ‘Maintaining

Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled

Media.’ Political Studies 57 ( 3): 517-536.

11

12 Z. Wang. 2005. ‘Before the emergence of critical citizens: Economic development and political trust in

China.’ International Review of Sociology 15(1): 155-71

13 Tianjian Shi. ‘China: Democratic values supporting an authoritarian system.’ In Yun-han Chu, Larry

Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin. Eds. 2008. How East Asians View Democracy. New York:

Columbia University Press.

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