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Citation Haggard, Stephan, and Beth A. Simmons. 1987. Theories ofinternational regimes. International Organization 41, no. 3: 491-517.

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heories of international regimes

Stephan Haggard and BethA.Simmons

Over the last ten years, intemationai regimes emerged as a major focus of

empirical resea rch and theoretical debate w ithin international relations. The

interest in regimes sprang from a dissatisfaction with dominant conceptions

of intemationai order, authority, and organization. The sharp contrast be-

tween the com petitive, zero-sum an ar ch y of interstate relations and the

autho rity of dom estic politics seemed overdrawn in explaining coopera-

tive behavior among the advanced industrial states. The policy dilemmas

created by the grow th of interdependence since World War II generated new

forms of coordination and organization that fit uneasily in a realist frame-

work.

Intellectual traditions emphasizing the so cie ta l dimension of intema-

tionai politics suffered, how eve r, from a lingering taint of idealism. Realism

questioned the importance of intemationai law as a constraint on state be-

havior and by the 1970s, its positive study by political scientists was virtu-

ally moribund. The subfield of intemationai organization, and particularly

the study of regional integration, generated rich theoretical debates during

the 1960s.' Yet the field remained closely tied to the study of formal organi-

We are indebted to Don Babai, David Baldwin, Esther Barbe, Jack Donnelly, Jeff Frieden,

Barbara Geddes, Joe Grieco, Emst Haas, Peter Haas, Stanley Hoffmann, Peter Katzenstein,

Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Fritz Kratochwil, Charles Kupchan, David Lake, Doug

Nelson, Eric Nordlinger, Helen Milner, Andy Moravcsik, Craig Murphy, Joseph Nye, Robert

Putnam, John Ruggie, Raymond Vemon, and two anonymous reviewers for their comments.

1. Fo r a review tracing the impo rtance of the study of regional integration to later theoretical

developments, see Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye , Intem ationai Integration and Interde-

pen den ce, in Fred Grenstein and Nelson Polsby, ed s..

Handboo k of Political Science

vol. 8

(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975). See also Emst Haas, Beyond the Nation State (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1964), chaps. 1-5, 13-14; Joseph Nye, ed.. International Region-

alism

(Boston: Little B rown,

196iS);

Leon

N .

Lindberg and S ttiart A. Scheingold,

sds.. Regional

Integration: Theory and Research

(Cambridge: Harva rd University Pres s, 1971); and E m st

Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory(Berkeley: Institute for Intemationai

Studies, 1975).


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492 Internationa l Organization

zations, missing a range of state behavior that nonetheless appeared regu

lated or organized in a broader sense. Few strong theories started from th

assumption that, as John Ruggie put it in a seminal article, "internationa

behavior is institutionalized.""

Regime analysis attempted to fill this lacuna by defining a focus that wa

neither as broad as international structure, nor as narrow as the study o

formal organizations. Regime analysts assumed that patterns of state actio

are influenced by norms, but that such norm-governed behavior was wholly

consistent with the pursuit of national interests. Hence, the regimes liter

ature can be viewed as an experiment in reconciling the idealist and realis

traditions.

After a decade of development, it is time to submit this research program

to critical review. A plethora of contending theories have explained regim

creation, maintenance, and transformation, but the relationship among them

is unclear and empirical research has yet to determine which are the mor

plausible. While earlier work on regimes focused on interdependence, th

widening variety of state goals, and the importance of non-state actors and

international organizations, recent work on regimes and intemationai coop

eration unfortunately reverts to an approach which treats states as unified

rational actors. In addition, little research has addressed whether, and in

what ways, regimes "matter."^ Do regimes have independent influence on

state behavior and, if so, how?

We begin by briefly surveying the contending definitions of internationa

regimes, which range from patterned behavior, to convergent norms and

expectations, to explicit injunctions. We then suggest a number of dimen

sions along which regimes vary over time or across cases; these dimension

have been or might be used to operationalize "regime change." They in

clude strength, organizational form, scope, and allocational mode. The third

section examines four theoretical approaches to regimesstructural, game

theoretic, functional, and cognitiveand attempts to clarify what each the

ory can and cannot tell us about regimes.

In the conclusion, we ask how and whether regimes "matter." So far

little research addresses this problem. Testing for the significance of re

gimeseven to verify international systemic theoriesdemands carefu

tracing of

national

level processes, structures, and values. We outline a re

search program that focuses greater attention on issues raised by theorist

of complex interdependenc e; these issues have been neglected in the reviva

of

g me

theo ry, and include the erasure o fthe boundaries between dom esti

and foreign policies, the importance of transnational coalitions, and, above


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Intem ationai regimes 493

all, the way in which dom estic political forces determine p atterns of interna-

tional cooperation.

1

Regimes: Definitions

How do we know a regime when we see one? Three answers have been

offered to this question. The most comprehensive equates regimes with

pattem ed behavior. Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins argue that a

regime exists in every substantive issue-area in intemationai relations . . .

W herever there is regularity in behavior, some kinds of principles, norms or

mles m ust exist to accoun t for it.' * But the existence of patterned behavior

alone should not lead one to suspect that a regime lurks below the surface. A

broad definition mns the risk of conflating regularized pattems of behavior

with mles, and almost certainly overestimates the level of normative con-

sensus in intemationai politics.^ Deducing regimes from pattem ed behavior

makes it difficult to decide how they mediate, constrain, or influence behav-

ior. The term re gi m e is sometimes used in a purely descriptive way to

group a range of state behaviors in a particular issue-area, but since the

potential for tautology is high, this approach has largely been abandoned.^

Stephen Krasner's influential definition seeks a middle ground between

o rd e r and explicit com mitments; it stresses the norma tive dimension of

intem ationa i po litics. Krasner defines a regime as implicit or explicit prin-

ciples,

norms, mles and decision-making procedures around which actors'

expectations converge in a given area of international relations. ^ Despite

the care with which this complex hierarchy of com ponents is defined, prin-

cip les (which include not only beliefs of fact and causation , but also of

rec titu de ) shade off into norm s, stan dards of behavior defined in terms

of rights and obh ga tions . Norm s, in tu m , are difficult to distinguish from

m les , specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action . *

4.

Donald Puchala and Raymond Ho pkins, Intem ationa i Regimes: Lesson s from Inductive

An alysis, in ibid., pp. 61-91.

5.

Friedrich Hayek,Law Legislation and Liberty;vol. 1,Rules and rder(Chicago: Univer-

sity of Chicago Press, 1973), pp. 78-79. See also H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1961), chap. 1.

6. The concept of sy ste m suffered a similar fate during the 1960s. See Em st

B.

Haas, On

Systems and Intemationai Regimes,

World Politics

27 (January 1975), pp. 147-74; Jerome

Stephens, An Appraisal of Some Systems Approaches in the Study of Intemationai Sy stem s,

International Studies Quarterly16 (September 1972).

7.

Stephen Krasner, Structura l Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening

Variab les, in Krasner, International Regimes pp. 1-21. See also Robert Keohane and Joseph

Nye,Power and Interdependence(Boston: Little Brown, 1977), p. 19.

8. Friedrich Kratochwil makes a similar point in Th e Force of Pre scrip tions,

International

rganization38 (Autumn 1984), p.

685;

John Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochw il, Intem ationa i


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494 Interna tional Organization

Not surprisingly, analysts have had serious disagreements about how th

n o rm s and pr incipl es of a given regime should be defined; their diffe

ences have strong implications for interpretations of regime stability an

change. Susan Strange, John Zysman, and Stephen Cohen argue tha

state practices such as selective safeguards and industrial targeting hav

undermined the fundamental premises ofthe trade regime.^ John Ruggie, o

the other hand, contends that these derogations are consistent with

broader ideological framework, which he calls em bedded liberalism

which will endure as long as there is some accommodation of economi

efficiency to social stabil ity .' It is exceedingly difficult to imagine any stat

abandoning this

'n o rm ''; the result is a bias in favor of seeing continuity an

a stable order.

The exphcitness of commitment required before a regime can be said t

exist creates a related problem. Focusing on implicit reg imes captures th

convergence of actor expectations and may help us summarize a comple

pattem of behavior. But it begs the question of the extent to which stat

behavior is, in fact, mle-governed. R obert K eoh ane 's effort to trace postwa

cooperation in oil and Charles Lipson's study of changes in the treatment o

foreign investment exemplify unnecessary, if not misleading, uses of th

regime co nc ep t. In both case s, the rights and duties of different actors wer

open to significant question and conflict. Violations ofthe norms governin

the treatment of foreign investment in the 19th century, for example, reall

violated European (and primarily British) expectations. Do we gain ex

planatory leverage in analyzing 20th-century investment disputes when w

point out that 'national treatm ent' [became] an

international

norm ?

The core of Lipson's argument is not normative; national policies toward

problem in

After Hegem ony: ooperationandDiscord intheWorld PoliticalEconomy

(Prin

ton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 58.

9. Susan Strange, Th e Management of Surplus Capacity: or How Does Theory Stand Up t

Protectionism Seventies Style? International Organization33 (Summer 1979), pp . 303-3

Stephen Cohen and John Zysman , Do uble or Nothing: Open Trade and Com petitive Indu

try ,

Foreign A ffairs

62 (Summer 1983), pp. 1113-39. For a careful application ofthe regim

concept to the trade system, see J. Finlayson and Mark Zacher, Th e GATT and the Regulatio

of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Effects, International Organization35 (Autum

1981),

pp. 561-602.

10.

John Ruggie, Intemation ai Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalis

in the Postwar Economic O rde r, in Krasner, International Regimes pp. 195-232.

11. Keohane, inAfter Hegemony notes that a formal intemationai regime was never estab

lished in oil

(p.

140), but late r refers to the postw ar oil regime (p. 190). Charles Lipson ,

Standin

Guard:Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and

Twentieth

Centuries (Berkeley: U

versity of Califomia Press, 1985), p. 32, includes in his object of analysis both pattems o

behavior and normative structures; the concept of regime is not central to his analysis, and i

used primarily as a summary of state behaviors. This is true also of Robert E. Wood,

From


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International regimes 95

foreign investment are neatly explained in terms of the investing countries'

relative power and the hosts' regulatory capabilities.

The oil regim e between

1945

and

197

consisted ofthe market activities

of oligopolistically interdepend ent firms, the national rules ofthe produc ers,

and ad hoc interventions by the United States. The Seven Sisters no doubt

followed certain m le s conceming production, exploration, and market-

ing. But their behavior must be understood in terms of supply conditions, a

particular market stmcture, and national regulatory environments. The be-

havior of the major powers seems even less constrained by international

m les. How co nv erg en t were British, French , and Am erican expectations

during the Suez crisis, in which the United States' diplomatic use of the oil

weapon played a key role? Clear American interests and the power to back

them adequately explain the outcom e of the crisis. By endorsing the idea of

tac it or imp licit regimes, Keohane overemphasizes the importance of

convergent expectations, particularly among govemments.

A third, more restricted definition treats regimes as multilateral agree-

ments among states which aim to regulate national actions within an issue-

area.'^ Regimes define the range of permissible state action by outlining

explicit injunctions. Regimes often contain mles which govem or specify

their own transforma tion, but to explain regim e ch ange per se is to ex-

plain why states would agree to modify the codified rights and mles that

regulate their behavior. This approach risks the charge of formalisma

charge which has plagued the study of intemationai law . On the other hand ,

it focuses attention on the evolution of the texts constituting intemationai

agreements; it also clearly separates normative consensus from the defini-

tion of regimes , treating it rath er as a causal or constitutive variable that may

be useful in explaining cooperation.' *

This definition also allows a sharper distinction between the concept of

regime and several cognates, such as cooperation.'^ Regimes are examples

of cooperative behavior, and facilitate cooperation, but cooperation can

take place in the absence of established regimes. A recent example was the

package of measures adopted by the advanced industrial states at the 1978

Bonn summit.'* Regimes must also be distinguished from the broader con-

cept of ins titu tions , the essential feature of which is th e conjunction of

13.This approach to regimes is closest to that of Oran Young,Resource Regimes: Natural

Resources and S ocial Institutions

(Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1982); p. 20;

Com-

pliance and Public Authority

(Washington, D.C .: Resources for the Fu ture , 1979); Int em a-

tionai Regimes: Problems of Concept Fo rma tion, World olitics32 (April 1980), pp. 33 1-35 ;

and An arch y and Social Cho ice: Reflections on the Intemationai Polity,

World olitics

30

(January 1978), pp. 241-63; and Vinod Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International

Politics of O rganized Textile T rade(Berkeley: U niversity of Califomia P ress, 1985), chap . 2.

14. See particularly Aggarwal,L iberal Protectionism p. 16.


7/29


convergent expe ctations and patterns of behavior or prac tice.'*' Regime

aid the institutionaU zation of portions of intemationai life by regularizing

expectations, but some international institutions such as the balance o

power are not bound to explicit rights and rules. Convergent exp ecta tions

may or may not be tied to explicit agreem ents they might, in fact, arise in

milieu characterized by substantial conflict. Finally, we should distinguish

between regimes and o rd e r or stabili ty. Regimes may facilitate orde

and stability but are not coterminus with them.'** In some instances, regime

may unintentionally contribute to instability, as when commitments to main

tain parities under the Bretton Woods regime in the late 1960s produced

chaotic exchange markets.

2 Regimes: Dimensions of variance and change

Many studies fail to specify what they mean by regime transformation o

treat it in a unidimensional way. Regimes may change over time or vary

across cases in at least four ways: strength, organizational form, scope, and

allocational mode. As we shall argue, different theoretical approaches ad

dress one or more of these va riables, but are less useful in explaining othe rs

a. Strength

The majority of regim e change studies try to explain why regime

eventually weaken or d e c a y . Stength is measured by the degree of com

pliance with regime injunctions, particularly in instances where short-term

or m yop ic self-interests collide with regime m les.

b. Organizational form

In its quest to move beyond the study of concrete international organiza

tions,

recent regimes literature has largely ignored problems of organiza

tional design and operation. Some issues are conducive to decentralized

regulation: regime injunctions may only call on states to share information

or to refrain from certain actions, such as polluting, over-fishing, nuclea

testing, or raising tariffs. Other regimes, such as a fixed-exchange-rate re

17.

Oran Young, Com pliance and Public Authority p. 16: and his Intem ationai Regime

Toward a New Theory.

18.

The dependent variable of structural analysis is often cast quite broadly. See. for ex

amp le, Duncan Snidal, Lim its of Hegemonic Stability Th eo ry,

nternational Organization

(Autumn 1985), pp. 579-614.


8/29


gimes, demand positive interventions by states, but remain largely decen-

tralized.

Most regimes, ho wever, are likely to have at least some m inimal adminis-

trative apparatus for the purpose of dispute settlement, the collection and

sheiring of information, or surveillance. Complex cooperative tasks require

more elaborate, and potentially autonomous, organizational structures. If

cooperation is already highly institutionalized, theories resting on assump-

tions of anarchy are highly misleading; blackboxing organizational stmc-

ture and processes will lead to simplistic predictions.^

The principles governing represen tation are another dimension of organi-

zational variance. Most universalist regimes are structured either on the

o ne nation, one vo te principle or, as in the Intem ationai M onetary Fund

(IMF) and World Bank, on weighted voting. Altemative principles of mem-

bership, however, are based on discrimination along functional or sectoral

lines (the Tokyo Round codes) or regional ones (the Caribbean Basin Initia-

tive).

Principles of mem bership have important distributional conseq uences,

since they affect international agendas and organizational resource alloca-

tion.

c. Scope

Scope refers to the range of issues the regime covers. Though changes in

regime scope have attracted little theoretical attention, its neglect can cause

misleading characterizations. The failure to comply with certain GATT

(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) provisions signaled a weakening

of the trade regime in the 1970s. Yet at the same time, the regime's scope

expanded through the negotiation of the Tokyo Round codes.^' The most

contentious questions on the current trade agenda concem the regime's

scopenamely, how the GATT will address new issues such as trade in

serv ices, industrial policy, and national mles governing foreign d irect invest-

ment.

The jurisdictional scop e of a regime is not incidental to its succ ess. Overly

broad jurisdiction raises administrative costs and complexity, but overly

narrow agreements may allow little room for bargaining and issue-linkage.

One important cause of regime change is the ex tern alitie s associated with

20.

Keohane and Nye,Pow er and Interdependence p. 55. Neo-functionalists drew inspira-

tion from organization th eorists, including James D . Thompson ,Organizationsin Action(New

York: McGraw-Hill, 1967). Robert Keohane, in

After Hegemony

draws on neoclassical theo-

ries of organization, such as Douglass North ,Structure and hangein E conomic History(New

York: No rton, 1981), and Oliver W illiamson,Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust

Implications

(New York: Free Press, 1975). See also W. Richard Scott,

Organizations: Ra-

tional Natural and Open Systems

(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), chap. 5.


9/29


inadequate scope. GATT negotiations in the 1950s and 1960s virtually elimi-

nated tariff barriers as an important impediment to trade. The result, how-

ever, was to expose, and even encourage, non-tariff barriers. These

externa lities drove the reform efforts which culminated in the Tokyo Round.

d. Allocational mode

Regimes can endorse different social mechanisms for resource alloca-

tion.^^ A market-oriented regime supports the private allocation of re-

sources, discourages national controls, guarantees property rights, and

facilitates private con tracting . As Oran Young state s, free enterp rise sys-

tems . . . are not institutional arrangements operating outside or in the

absence of any regime. Such systems clearly require explicit structures of

property or use rights. ^^ At the other extreme, authoritative allocation

involves the direct control of resources by regime authorities, and will de-

mand more extensive, and potentially autonomous, organizational struc-

ture s. The IM F's role in the balance-of-payments financing regime provides

an example.

The nature of the issue-area and the extent of cooperation sought will

partly determine the preference for market-oriented versus authoritative

modes of allocation. Many issue-areas could be organized either way, how-

ever, with sharply different distributional consequences. The Group of 77's

proposal for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) provides the

clearest example. Virtually all of the NIEO debates centered on allocation

mechanisms, with the South generally favoring authoritative *

3 Theoretical approaches to regime change and variance

The literature on regime development and change can be grouped into four

families: structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive. These catego-

ries are not mutually exclusive, and the m ost persuasive interpretations are

likely to draw from more than one theoretical tradition.^' Yet these ap-

22.

Stephen Krasner makes this point in

Structural C onfiict.

23 .

Oran Young,

Compliance and

Public

Authority p.

55.

24.

On the NIEO debate over modes of resource allocation, see Juergen Donges, Th e Third

World Demand for a New Intemationai Economic Orde r, Kyklos30 (no. 2, 1977) and Michae

Doyle, Stalem ate in the North-South De bate: Strategies and the New Intema tionai Economic

Order, World Politics35 (April 1983), pp. 426-64. For discussions of the N IEO in a regim

context, see Jeffrey Hart, The NewInternational Economic

Order

Confiictand Cooperation

North-South Econ omic Relations 1974 77

(New York: St. Martin's Press,

1983);

Robert Roth

stein, Regim e Creation by a Coalition ofthe Weak: Lessons from the NIEO and the Integrated


10/29


proaches often speak past one anotherin part because of fundamental

differences in their underlying assumptions, in part because they address

different dimensions of regime change and variance. We can gain a great

deal by being explicit about underlying assumptions and what each approach

can and cannot explain.

Most stmctural, game-theoretic, and functional theories of regimes are

state-centered, presuming unified rational actors, even if the assumption is

relaxed to gain exp lanatory leverage.^* Stmctu ral explanations, particularly

including the theory of hegemonic stability, attempt to show how intema-

tionai conditions define the possibilities for cooperation. Stmcturalists argue

that we cannot infer national policies from intentions because stmctures

tend to mold state behavior tow ard a comm on quality of outcomes even

though the efforts and aims of agents and agencies vary. ^' Game-theoretic

approaches incorporate exogenously determined preference orderings into

the analysis. While these preference rankings, in principle, include all do-

mestic factors that may impinge on a state's overall preferences, most re-

search emphasizes that actors are primarily constrained by the stmcture of

the interstate game. Functional theories, of which Robert Keohane's After

Hegemony is a leading example, also assume rational actors, but introduce

market imperfections, trans action s, Emd information costs and unce rtainty.

We argue that all three approaches downplay the central insight of interde-

pendence theorists: foreign policy is integrally related to domestic stm ctures

and processes.

A group of theorists we have labeled (for want of a better term) cognitiv-

is ts

have suggested a radically different research program . Focusing on the

intersubjective meaning structures that bind actors together, they necessar-

ily see a looser fit between stmctural constraints, interests, and choices.

Where functional theories see regimes as more or less efficient responses to

fixed needs, cognitive theories see them as conditioned by ideology and con-

sensual knowledge and evolving as actors leam. Cognitivists argue that

ther e is no fixed 'national intere st' and no 'optima l regim e.'

^*

Presumably

determinative stm ct ur al constraints must always be understood in terms

of historically conditioned, interpretive frameworks. This requirement

promises some corrective to the spare assumptions of other theoretical ap-

proach es, particularly by reminding us of historical context and the substan-

Studies uarterly28 (June 1984), pp. 143-70; Duncan Snidal, Lim its of Hegemonic Stability

Theory.

26.

Keohane,

After Hegemony

chap. 7, explores the implications of introducing Simon's

notion of bounded rationality. Robert Axelrod argues that his own theory is not dependent on

rational utility maximization in The Evolution of Coop eration(New York: Basic B ooks, 1984),

p. 18.

27.

Kenneth Waltz,

Theory of International Politics

(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,


11/29


tive issues over which conflict and cooperation occur. Yet, to date, th

cognitivists have not adequately resolved their relationship with the struc

turalist research program. The relationship between power, ideology, an

knowledge is one of the most exciting areas of theoretical debate, but on

strewn with basic methodological problems.^ ^

a. Structuralism: The theory of hegemonic stability

The theory of hegemonic stability offers the most parsimonious an

widely employed explanation of regime dynamics; it links regime creatio

and maintenance to a dominant power's existence and the weakening o

regimes to a waning hegemon. Ironically, the theory's early proponent

were interested primarily in the world economy's stability and openness an

did not mention the role of mles or regimes.^** In Power and Interdepen

dence Keohane and Nye first linked regime dynamics to waxing and wanin

state power. They argued that, since power is not wholly fungible unde

conditions of complex interdependence, linkage across issue-areas is no

likely to be effective. Keohane and Nye proposed a more disaggregate

issue- structu ral model, predicting that stronger states in the issue sy

tem will dominate the weaker ones and determine the rules ofthe game. ^

The theory of hegemonic stability has subsequently been challenged o

both empirical and theoretical grounds.^ First, the hazards of power analy

29.

The social theorist most interested in the relationship between knowledge and power

Michel Foucault. See particularly Colin Gordon, ed..

Pow er/Knowledge: Selected Interview

and Other Writings by Michel Foucault 1972 1977 (New York: Pantheon, 1980).

30.

In his book. World In Depression (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1973

Charles Kindleberger links the stabilit y oft he world economy tounilateralleadership by

dominant power; no formal intemationai commitments or institutional machinery would b

required. Robert Gilpin's

U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation

(New York : Bas

Books, 1975) and hisWarand ChangeinInternational Politics(New Y ork: Cambridge Uni

sity Press, 1981) make little reference to the role of intemationai mles. Stephen Krasner

State Power and the Structure of Intemationai Trade, World Politics28 (April 1976), te

the correlation between the distribution of economic power, the trade preferences of states , an

the openness of the intema tionai trading system. David Lake, Beneath the Comm erce

N atio ns , also makes no reference to the intervening role of intemationai regimes. Rathe

position within carefully specified intemationai economic structures directly conditions trad

policy preferences.

31.

Keohane and Nye,

Power and Interdependence

pp.

50-51.

32.

A nu mber of tests have been devised for the theory of hegemonic stability in recent year

Reviewing the trade, money, and oil regimes between 1967 and 1977, Keohane concluded th

we lack compelling causal arguments linking hegemonic decline and regime change, particularl

for trade ; Keohan e, The ory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in Intemationai Econom

Regimes, 1967-19 77, in Ole Holsti, ed.. Change in the International System (Boulder: Wes

view Press, 1980); Keohane, After Hegemony chap. 9. Krasn er's Stm cture of Intemation

T rade found that hegemonic theory predicted trading patterns in some periods (1820-7

1880-1900, 1945-60), but not in others

(1900-13.

1919-39,

196

to present). Timothy M cKeow


12/29

International regimes 5 1

sis plague efforts to explain concisely the stmcture of regime dynamics.

Inferring interests from capabilities implies that there is some unambiguous

way to assess the distribution of capabilities. From this stmcture flows a

greatly re stricted set of possible intem ationai outcom es. The delineation of

the relevant s tructu re, how ever, is bound to be arbitrary. David Lake offers

the most careful concep tualization of intemationai stm cture within the trade

area, including a measure of relative productivity as well as relative size.

These measures seek to explain both the capacity to underwrite or support

free trade and the willingness to do so. But as Jeff Frieden points out

(using Lake's data), the shift in the United States' share of world trade is

only minuscule between 1929, when the United States refused to lead, and

1960, the high point of Am erican hegemony.^^ Can a move from 13.9 percent

of world trade in the earlier period to 15.3 percent in the latter account for

the sharp contrast in trade practices?

Second, since stm cture alone is a poor pred ictor of regime characteristics

and national policies, "structural" theories must continually revert in an

ad hoc way to domestic political variables. As Kindleberger recognized,

America's refusal to lead in the interwar period had a domestic foundation.^''

Similarly, Krasner found that stm cture predicted the openness ofthe trading

system in only half the cases he examined, with domestic institutionsil

" lags" introduced to explain the rest.^^ If such " slip pa ge " is comm on, or if

similarly situated states tend to respond differently to intemationai con-

mon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the Intemationai Economic Order,"

International Organization 38 (Spring 1984), pp. 355-86. More positive assessments of the

theory's utility can be found in William P. Avery and David P. Rapkin, eds.,

America in a

Changing World Political Econom y (New York: Longman, 1982), though most of the pieces

address the question of U.S. policy, as opposed to regime outcomes.

Several efforts have been made to confront hegemonic stability theory with altemative expla-

nations. Joanne Gowa resorts to domestic factors and intemationai market conditions in

"He gem ons, IOs and Ma rkets: The Case ofthe Substitution Ac coun t," nternationalO rganiza-

tion 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 661-83. Beverly Crawford and Stephanie Lenway supplement a

stmctural model with a cognitive approach, "Decision Modes and Intemationai Regime

Change: Westem Collaboration on East-West Trade,"World Politics37 (April 1985), pp. 37 5-

402.InStandingGuard Lipson couples a hegemonic decline argument with an analysis oft he

changing capabilities of "weak" states. In one of the few efforts to test the theory against a

contending approach, Peter Cowhey and Edward Longfin hat theories of surplus capacity are

superior to the theory of hegemonic stability for predicting the timing of protection in auto-

mobile trade ; see Cowhey and Long, "Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline

or Surplus Capacity?"

International

Organization37 (Spring 1983), pp. 157-85.

Finally some have suggested that the theory is simply misspecified. Bm ce R ussett and Susan

Strange argue that American decline has been exaggerated; see Russett, "The Mysterious Case

of Vanishing Hegemony, or is Mark Twain Really Dead?" International Organization39

(Spring 1985) pp.

202-31;

and Strange, "C ave Hie Dra gon es." Snidal (in "Hegem onic Stability

Theory") and Russett both argue that the theory has been misapplied to cases where provision

of a public good is not at stake.


13/29


14/29


intemationai public goods. More precisely, the hegemon constitutes a

privileged g ro up , for which the cost of supplying the public good is less

than the benefit. But since the hegemon has an independent interest in

supplying public goods regardless of the contributions of others, beneficia-

ries of the system will have an incentive to free-ride. Rather than the strong

exploiting the weak, it is the weak who exploit the strong.

Two criticisms have been raised against the collective goods approach to

the hegemonic theory of regimes; both point to the inappropriate application

of otherwise sound theory. First, most regimes do not provide pure public

goods, which are characterized not only by jointness of supply but by non-

excludability. Most regimes have developed m echanisms that enhance com-

pliance through exclusionfor exam ple, trade rec iprocity, reciprocal rights

of innocent passage , and technological assistance in exchange for adherence

to non-proliferation agreements. *' Keohane and Snidal also point out that

nothing in the theory of collective action suggests that a single hegemon is

required to provide public goods. ^ If a privDeged subgroup exists such that

each member benefits from providing the good even without cooperation

from other mem bers, the public good will be provided. Individual incentives

not to contribute will increase as the size of the privileged subgroup in-

creases, but certain characteristics of the regimes, such as those which

increase the transparency of state action, may mitigate this effect.

A broader criticism m ay be leveled against the theo ry of hegemonic stabil-

ity, how ever. The relevant str uc tu re is usually defined as the distribution

of power within the intemationai capitalist system rather than within the

world political system as a whole; regimes are seen primarily as responses to

the problems of collective action among the advanced capitalist countries

rather than as an integral part of high politics and alliance solidarity. Despite

aU the attention lavished on intem ationai stm ctur e as an explanation of

regime creation and maintenance, bipolarity has been all but overlooked. *^

This hardly conforms with the views of the postwar planners who eon-

stmcted the Bretton Woodsorder. * *The W orld Bank and IM F can be seen,

and indeed

were

seen by the Soviet Union, as an American effort to close

capitalist ranks at the Eastem bloc's expense; contrast America's insouciant

response to negotiations for the Bank for Intemationai Settlements in 1929

41.

Trade reciprocity is not an example of an exclusionary device as long as there is a most-

favored nation provision. M ost reductions in tariffs are negotiated by principle suppliers, how-

ever, and discriminatory treatment couched in the language of rec ipro city has clearly grown.

For a discussion of impure public goods and so-called club go od s, which are excludable at a

cost, see Richard Cames and Todd Sandier, The Theory of Externalities Public Goods and

Club Goods

(New York: Cambridge University Press), chaps. 10-12.

42. Keohane, After Hegemony; Snidal, Hegem onic Stability The ory .

43. Keohane, After Hegemony p. 137, explicitly eschews consideration of the military-

economic linkage. Ethan Kapstein develops a perspective linking economic and security coop-


15/29


and its largely uncooperative attitude towards outstanding war debt

throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The link between economic and securit

relations is often ignored by American students of international politica

economy; it is, however, a recurrent theme in the writing of Europeans. I

has been highlighted in new interpretations of the emergence of the postwa

Pacific order, and it is an underlying theme in the work of contemporar

diplomatic historians such as Paul Kennedy. *^ By ignoring grand strategy

hegemonic interpretations may have missed this century's most importan

str uc tu ra l cause of cooperation among the advanced industrial states.

b. Strategic and game-theoretic approaches

Game theory has recently been used to explain how cooperation can

evolve under anarchic conditions which lack supranational authority to en

force compliance. *^ Again, we must distinguish regimes from cooperation

which is clearly possible in the absence of regimes. Game theory can readily

explain the conditions under which regimes might arise as an instance o

cooperative behavior, and it can also suggest the conditions conducive t

stable compliance, but it has difficulty explaining organizational form

scope, or change.

The attraction of

g me

theory is its spare elucidation of

strategic interac

tion's stmcture. The attendant risk is oversimplification, particularly given

the daunting problems which surround the application and testing of it

insights. Where multilateral interactions cannot be disaggregated into acto

dyads,

the 2 x 2 game may mislead more than it clarifies. The alternative

the n-person game does not yield determinate outcomes.' ' The 2 x 2 gam

also radically simplifies the choice set into unambiguous categoriescoop

erate and defectthough choices in most areas, such as macroeconomi

coordination, are continuous. ** Games are also frequently depicted in thei

45.

See, for example, Alfred Grosser,

TheWestern

Alliance:

Europea n Am erican Relatio

Since 945 (New York: Continuum, 1980); Bm ce Cumings, Th e Origins and Development

the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Con

sequences, International Organization 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 1-40; Paul Kenned y, Th

Realities Behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British Externai Policy 1865-198

(Glasgow: Fontana, 1981).

46 .

See the special issue of World Politics 38 (October 1985), edited by Kenneth Oye. S

also R. Harrison Wagner, Th e Theory of Games and the Problem of Intema tionai Coopera

tion, Ame rican Political Science R eview70 (June 1983), pp. 330-46.

47.

Duncan R. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions(New York: Wiley. 1957

chap.

7.

48.

For economists' efforts to model macroeconomic interdependence from a strategic per

spective, see Koichi Ham ada, A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdep end ence, Journa

ofPoliticalEconomy 84 (August 1976), pp. 677 -99; Gilles Oudiz and Jeffrey Sachs, M ac


16/29

Interna tional regimes 505

normal rather than extensive form, though game theorists have shown

that this can lead one to overlook how the dynamics of bargaining and

sequencing of moves can determine outcomes.*^ The game may change

in the course of negotiations; indeed, bargaining is precisely an effort to re-

structure preference orderings.

The greatest difficulty is in specifying preferences at the outset, which

includes not only their ordering but their intensity.^** This effort must con-

sider all relevant factors o fthe game environment: econom ic and technologi-

CEilconditions, dom estic politics, transnational relations, and the mles unde r

which the game is played. Deciding what the game ismay be as difficult as

solving it. One is tempted to constmct the payoff in light of the outcomes,

which throws into question the predictive value ofthe exercise.

Game theory can cope

in principle

with a high degree of complexity.

Games may be gra du ate d by introducing subgames, extended out into

meta- or super-gam es, lin ke d to games in other issue-areas or modeled in

an evolutioneiry fashion. The result, however, is to detract from the selling

point, parsimony, and to question how the theory actually explains particu-

lar cases. Empirical studies too often lapse into descriptive history followed

by elaborate, and perhaps redundant, translation into game theoretical argot.^'

Most game theoretic studies of intemationai cooperation and regimes

have focused on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). PD is attractive since it can

produ ce cooperative behav ior under real ist conditions.^^ If play is re-

peated, the costs of defecting on any single move must be calculated not

only with reference to the imm ediatepayoff but with reference to the oppor-

tunity costs associated with future interactions. Yet under assumptions of

complex interdependence, the dilem m a of PD diminishes. The very exis-

tence of a network of regimes and transnational relations among the ad-

49.

For example, Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing,

Confiict among Nations: Bargaining

DecisionMaking and System StructureinInternational rises

(Princeton: W nce ton University

Press, 1977), p. 40; Steven J. Brams and M . P. Hessel, Thre at Power in Sequential Gam es,

International Studies Quarterly

28 (March 1984), pp. 33-34.

50.

The intensity of players' preferences has generally been given less attention in recent

applications of game theory than their ordering. As Robert Jervis notes, howeve r, coop eration

is more probable when mutual cooperation is only slightly less attractive than exploiting the

other, when being exploited is only slightly worse than mutual competition and when the latter

outcome is much worse than mutual coop eration. Fro m Balance to Concert: A Study of

Intemationai Security Coo peration, in

World Politics

38 (October 1985), p. 64.

51 .

For a review of this problem, see Duncan Snidal, Th e Game

Theory

of Intemationai

Politics, ibid., pp. 25-57.

52.

Russell Hardin,Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982);

Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of

ooperation

(New York: Basic Boo ks, 1984) and Th e

Emergence of Cooperation among E goists, American

Political

Science Review

7

(June 1981)

306-18; Michael Taylor,Anarchy and

ooperation

(New York: Wiley, 1976) andCommunity


17/29

506 International Organization

vanced industrial states facilitates communication, enhances the importance

of reputation, and lengthens the shadow of the future. ^^ In its heuristic

use,

PD indicates why these institutions deter suboptimal outcomes: more

compelling theories of how these institutions actually evolve are still in their

infancy.

Most applications of game theory to the study of international cooperation

have assumed unified state actors and the dominance of the international

game. These presumptions are strongly challenged by earlier literature on

transnational relations and bureaucratic politics. As with structural ap-

proaches, the domestic processes affecting payoff structures are frequently

blackboxed as ex og en ou s. As we shall argue in the conclusion, one must

analyze the tradeoffs a state, or more accurately, a particular political lead-

ership, is willing and able to make between domestic and foreign games.

This certainly doesn't mle out the application of game theory, but it de-

mands that we reorient our effort towards the analysis of domestic/

intemationai linkages.

Game-theoretic approaches are strongest when they reveal the conditions

which enable cooperation and stability; they say far less about whether

regimes will actually arise , how they will be institutionalized, and , above all,

the rules and norm s which will comprise them.' * Functionalist logic prov ides

a useful supplement.

c. Functional theories

Functioned theory explains behaviors or institutions in terms of their ef-

fects.^^ If regimes serve to reduce information and transaction costs among

their adherents, for example, the rewards of compliance will reinforce the

regime. Thus, anticipated consequences explain the persistence of the re-

gime and compliance with its injunctions. Similarly, the modification of

regimes or their weakening is likely to occur when they become dysfunc-

tiona l. Functional theories explain regime strength, particularly the puzzle

of why compliance with regimes tends to persist even when the structural

conditions that initially gave rise to them changes.

Functional theories have important limitations. They are not causal in a

strong sense. They are better at specifying when regimes will be demanded

rather than suggesting how or when they will be supplied. Regimes and

53 . Joanne Gowa, Coope ration and Intemationai Relations, International rganization40

(Winter 1986), 167-86; Snyder and Diesing,

C onfiict among Nations.

54. Duncan Snidal, Co ordination versu s Priso ner's Dilemma: Implications for Intemationai

Cooperation and Regimes, American Political Science R eview79 (December 1985), pp. 92 3 -

42.


18/29


cooperation in one issue-area may arise as an unintended consequence of

cooperation in some other area. For example, three countries may respond

to a security threat from a fourth with a coope rative venture, yet the regime

may persist because of the positive ex tema lities gene rated by military coop-

eration. Unless functional theories suggest how a selection mechanism oper-

ates, they can easily become teleological, a problem suffered by earlier

functionalist writing, which viewed intemationai cooperation as a response

to imputed sys tem -m ain tenance or equ ilibrating functions.^* Collec-

tive action may not occur because ofth e free-rider problem or if the need

goes un pe rceiv ed . This criticism need not deter one from formulating a

functionalism that operates through individual motivations, peirticularly

where existing institutions mitigate the collective action dilemma. The re-

gime's benefits are simply that it provides incentives to certain forms of

cooperative action, for example, by offering fomms in which reputation

comes into play or where games can be iterated and linked. Regimes may be

supp lied when there is sufficient de m an d for the functions they per-

form, but the market analogy has obvious limitations. In any case, this

approach seems little different from an intentional theory that begins from

old-fashioned interests.

The specific functions that regimes perform naturally vary from issue-area

to issue-area. Most functionalist theorizing suggests that some

generalized

functions are unde rprovided, given conditions of anarchy or market failure.

Regime analysts w orking in this vein have drawn heavily from the economic

literature on transaction costs. In this literature, organizations, or hiera r-

ch ie s, evolve as solutions to the opportunism, uncertainty, information

costs,

measurement problems, and difficulties of contract enforcement

which plague arms-length market transactions.^* Drawing an analogy be-

tween the market and the uncoordinated actions of states, Keohane, Oye,

and Aggarwal have shown that regimes reduce transactions costs and facili-

tate decentralized rule-m akin g.' ' Aggarwal notes that con stm ction of a

multilateral mechanism is organizationally less expensive than is the devel-

opment of many bilateral c o n tr a c ts . ^ Keohane notes that the marginal cost

56 . Keohane, After Hegemony p. 81.

57.

Jan Elster, M arxism, Functionalism and Game Th eor y, Theory

and Society

11 (July-

August 1982), p. 462.

58. See Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and A ntitrust Implications

(New York: Free Pre ss, 1975); Th e Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attrib utes,

Journal of Econom ic Literature 9

(December 1981), pp. 1537-68; Transaction-Co st Econom-

ics:The Govemance of Contractual Relations, TheJournal of Law and conomics22 (Octo-

ber 1979), pp.

233-61;

Douglass North, Gov em me nt and the Cost of Exchange in History ,

Journal of Economic H istory44 (June 1984); Andrew Scho tter,TheEconomicTheoryof Social

Institutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

59.

Keohane,After Hegemony chap. 6; Aggarwal,LiberalProtectionism chap. 2; Kenneth


19/29

508 International Organization

of dealing with an additional issue will be lower with a regime, an insight that

casts light on the important question ofw yregimes often expand in scop e.'''

Once these functions are enumerated, the remaining positive research

program which follows is unclear. Crude functionalism has been criticized

for simply noting that some behavior or institutionin this case, a regime

does,

in fact, perform an anticipated function. Even if we knew that every

regime performed some specified set of functions, this knowledge would not

explain why regimes emerge in some issue-areas and not in others.

Nor would it explain why some regimes develop impressive formal organi-

zations, while others do not. Unlike the transactions cost literature, the

institutional solution resulting from failed interstate coordination is not a

hi er arch y in W illiamson's sense. Num erous institutional solutions to a

given problem of cooperation are possible, and little work has been done to

show how particular contracting problems may yield particular governance

solutions. In general, the new functionalism does not distinguish clearly

between institutions and organizations, nor indicate the conditions that lead

to the international development of the latter.* ^

In addition, we are interested not only in the fact that regimes perform

certain tasks, but the importance or weight regimes have in motivating and

explaining state behavior. The proper test of a functional theory is not the

mere existence of a regime, but the dem onstration that ac tors' behavior was

motivated by benefits provided uniquely, or at least more efficiently,

through the regime, or by reputational concerns connected to the existence

of rules.

Finally, a strong liberal bias ope rates in the new functionalism jus t as it

did in the old. Though Keohane admits that cooperation is not, in

itself

a

good, he tends to emphasize the functions which enhance global welfare, or

at least the collective welfare of the regime's adherents. The bias is sug-

gested by Ke oha ne's premise of the suboptim ality of market failure. But

the institutions prov ided may or may not be Pareto superior, let alone

optimal, and can certainly result in different distributional outcomes. The

institutions that emerge in world politics are certainly more likely to reflect

the interests of the powerful than the interests of the weak, a complaint

repeatedly raised by commodity producers against the operation of the

GATT. Aggarwal argues that regimes control large states' behavior toward

the small by reducing the need to exercise power directly. He demonstrates

that regimes have occasionally kept domestic protectionist interests from

61 .

Keohane After Hegemony pp. 103-6.

62.

Oran Young makes this point in Intem ationai Regimes: Toward a New Theory of

Institu tions and Snidal grapples with it in Coo rdination versus Prisone r's Dilem ma . The


20/29

Interna tional regimes 509

achieving their preferred solutions. Yet his analysis ofthe textile regime also

dem onstrates th at m ost of the functions which regimes perform can be used

to control states when the initial discrepancies of power are large, and that

stronger players frequently ignore the re str ai nt s placed on them . The

regime changed when it could not adequately serve the interests of the

developed country importers.^^ How do we decide between Cheryl Payer's

Marxist functionalism, which asserts that the World Bank operates as an

instmment of Northem control, and a benign, liberal functionalism, which

sees it as a more-or-less optimal institutional respon se to failu res in inter-

national capital markets?^ Douglass North has outhned the problem in a

trenchant review of the transaction costs literature:

One cannot have the productivity of an industrial society with political

anarchy. But while . . . a state is a necessary condition for realizing the

gains from trade, it obviously is not sufficient. A state becomes the in-

evitable source of stmggle to take control of it in the interests of one of

the parties. The state then becomes the vehicle by which the costs of

transacting are raised to capture the gains that will accrue to any inter-

ested party that can control the specification and enforcement of prop-

erty rights.*^

Substituting re gi m e for s ta te in the foregoing passage raises a prob-

lem for functioneilist analysis. Functional theories emphasize how the

facilitating role of regimes helps them realize common interests. But regimes

are also arenas for conflict and the exercise of power. Because functional

theories assume highly convergent interests and downplay divergent ones,

they do not explore how regimes may institutionalize inequalities.

d. Cogn itive theories: Know ledge ideology and regimes

C ogn itive theories explore what stmctura l, game-theoretic, and func-

tional approaches bracket.** The core cognitive insight is that cooperation

63. Aggarwal,

Liberal Protectionism p.

28.

64.

For a succinct example of Marxist functionalism, see Cheryl Payer, The

World

Bank: A

ritical

Analysis (New York: Monthly Review, 1982), pp. 19-20.

65.

North, Gov em m ent and the Cost of Exc hang e, p. 260.

66.

Cogn itive would best be left in quotation marks throughout, since we use the term to

refer to a quite disparate group of approaches. We focus on the commonalities among those

writers emphasizing ideology, belief system s, and knowledge as explanations of regime ch ange.

For other cuts at co gn itiv e approaches that focus more squarely on the individual decision-

maker see Deborah Welch Larson,

Origins of Containment: A Psychological Approach

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Robert Jervis,P erception and

Misperception

in

International Politics(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

The critique of stmcturalist and game-theoretic approaches from a hermeneutic, historicist,

or dialectica l viewpoint includes Richard Ashley, Th e Poverty of Neo realism,

Interna-


21/29


22/29


critique reach es dee per. Even this causal languageknowledge aff ec ts

interestsis inappropriate, since the dichotomy between ideology and

knowledge on the one hand, and interests on the other, is wholly artificial

and misleading. In te re st s only emerge within particular norma tive and

epistemic contexts and cannot be understood outside them. Cognitivists

argue that the assumption of rational utility maximization, for example, is

too spare to be of explanatory value, since it ignores the way that historically

situated actors interpret their constraints. Nor is the problem solved simply

by showing that rationality is bo un de d in various ways. Such a modifica-

tion predicts deviations from ra tio na l decision-making in environm ents

characterized by incomplete information, uncertainty, complexity, but still

divorces the con cept of interest from shared meanings. The recu rrent struc-

turalist fallacy is to expect different states o r individuals to respond similarly

to the same structural constraints and opportunities; much depends on past

history, knowledge, and purpose.

It is very difficult to generalize from the central cognitive insight. The

predictive value of cognitive theories is problematic, particularly when they

emphasize the importance of consensual knowledge. Historical episodes

of cooperation may be inexplicable without reference to shared knowledge

and meanings, but since future knowledge is, by definition, impossible to

foresee, prediction about th e substantive content of cooperation is ruled ou t.

Nonetheless, the

egree

of ideological consensu s and agreement over causal

relationships, regardless of the nature of the issue, is an important variable

in explaining cooperation.

Studies taking a cognitive perspective frequently have an evolutionary,

historicist, or, less kindly, post hoc flavor that highlights contingency and

path-dependence. Emst Haas summarizes the methodological biases of one

cognitivist:

The type of systems theory I find useful features the inductive method

in the construction of reality and uses the perceptions and actions of

concrete human beings in grappling with reality as its main data. Such

systems are assumed o p e n in the sense that they do not tend, by

definition, toward a given state, such as equilibrium. They are con-

stru cte d in the sense that the theorist considers them as heuristic

approximations rather than networks of determinative la w s

constraining choice.

Ideology and knowledge can be construed and combined in a number of

ways,

creating a wide range of possible research strategies. Writers em-

phasizing the role of consensual knowledge have naturally focused on areas

of technical cooperation. Richard C ooper has shown how a slow and painful

evolution of conse nsus on the causes of disease transmission was critical for


23/29


intemationai cooperation on public health in the 19th century.^' Don Babai

argues that structuralist models are ill-equipped to explain the types of

changes which took place at the World Bank under Robert McNamara. The

evolution of knowledge, as well as intellectual fashion concerning develop-

ment, shaped the B ank 's lending strategy. Cognitive theories which explain

intemationai cooperation primarily with ideological variables are more rare.

Judith Goldste in's work on U .S. trade policy, however, argues that a liberal

ideology has become institutionalized in a way that systemmatically condi-

tions the propensity to cooperate, even where defection might be more

rat ional . ' '

Sorting out the autonomous influence of knowledge and ideology can

prove extremely difficult in practice, particularly where there is a congru-

ence between ideology and structural position. If structural theories are

weak on cognitive variables, most cognitive theories cannot describe clearly

how power and ideas interact. The same set of objections may even extend

to know ledge-oriented cogn itivi sm . While few would claim that scientific

knowledge is reducible to social interests, scientific evidence can be re-

sisted. The

range

of scientific investigation, if not its content, is also shaped

by social and political purposes. Cognitive theory needs to specify more

clearly the types of issues and conditions under which consensual knowl-

edge is likely to drive cooperation.' * Are they many or few? No one would

disagree that purposes, values, and knowledge matter, but when? What is

the relationship between the cognitivist research program and that outlined

by various forms of structuralism?

Cognitivists pose a simple, yet profound, question: can interests in an

issue area be unambiguously deduced from power and situational con-

71.

Richard Coop er, Internation al Cooperation in Public Health as a Prologue to Mac

roeconomic Co ope ration (Harvard University, 1986); and Intem ationa i Economic Coopera

tion: Is It Desirable? Is It Likely? Bulletin ofthe Ame rican Academ y of Arts and Sciences39

(1985).

72.

Don Babai, Be tween H egemony and Poverty: The World Bank in the Intemationa

Sy stem (Ph.D . dissertation. U niversity of Califomia, Berkeley, 1984). For other work in this

vein, see Beverly Crawford and Stefanie Lenway, Dec ison M od es ; Ernst Haas, Mary Pat

Williams, and Don Babai,

Scientists and World

Order

The U ses of

Technical

Information

International rganizations (Berkeley: University of Califomia Press, 1977); Emmanuel Adle

Ideological 'Guerillas' and the Quest for Technological Autonomy: Brazil's Domestic Com

puter Industry,

International Organization

40 (Summer 1986), pp. 673-706.

73. Judith Goldstein, Th e Political Economy of Trade : Institutions of Pro tection , Ameri

ca nPoliticalScience Review80 (March 1986), pp. 161-84. Other analyses em phasizing the rol

of ideology in regime m aintenance and change are Robert Cox, Ideologies and the New

Intemationai Economic Order: Refiections on Some Recent Literature,

International

Organ

zation 33 (Spring 1979), pp. 257 -302; Jason L. Finkle and Barbara Crane, Ideology and

Politics at Mexico City: The United States at the 1984 Intem ationai Conference on Pop ulation,


24/29


25/29


convincing, however, would be evidence that domestic policymakers were

actually co ncem ed with repu tation, reducing transactions co sts, the need for

transparency, and so forth, when facing decisions about regime creation and

compliance. Even if one advances a structural explanation, the most con-

vincing evidence must be found in the calculations of national decision-

makers. Drawing on the work of Alexander George, Vinod Aggarwal

employs such a method of proc ess trac ing in analyzing the influence of

intemationai structure on national textile policies.''' Surprisingly little work

of this kind has been done.

An even stronger claim for regimes is that they can alter actors' interests

or preferences, which are generally held constant in functional and game-

theoretic formulations. Cognitivists claim that regimes may change basic

definitions of reality. Over the 1970s, for example, the United Nations Con-

ference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provided the institutional

locus for a new Third World critique of the existing international economic

order. UNCTA D virtually served as a secretariat for the Group of

devel-

oping countries; it provided studies and documentation that were crucial in

defining individual LDC's positions in international forums.^*'

Where regimes are actually suspected of altering state preferences, the

proposed research program should focus on domestic decision-making for

verification, since other forces may also be at work simultaneously. This can

be seen by examining the problems of compliance and defection.

A fit between regime rules and national behavior may not occur for three

reasons. The first is that the norms characterizing the regime may not be

formulated to be authoritatively binding. Some regimes, such as those gov-

eming human rights, allow self-selected national exemptions or represent

only broad co llective aspira tions ; they are , in effect, born weak.^^ Opportun-

ism presents a second reason for disjuncture between regime norms and

state behavior. States may negotiate regimes with the intention of breaking

them or knowingly exploit others' compliance in order to extract higher

payoffs.

A final possibility, and a more common and politically interesting one, is

what Robert Putnam has called invo luntary defection. ^^ This defection

happens when a party reaching or supporting an international agreement is

unable to sustain commitments because of domestic political constraints.

Three examples suggest the pervasiveness of this phenomenon. The first is

75.

Aggarwal,Liberal Protectionism pp. 16, 19.

76.

Rothstein,

Global Bargaining.

77. Jack Donnelly shows that the intemationai human rights regime is composed of widely

accepted substantive norms and intemationalized standard-setting procedures, but a very lim-

ited degree of intemationai implementation and no intemationai enforcement. As he concludes,


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Intem ationa i regimes 515

the rise of the ne w pro tectionism in the advanced industrial states. Taking

the form of quantitative restrictions in particular produ cts aimed at particu-

lar exporting coun tries, these orderly marketing agree m ents and vol-

untary export re str ain ts clearly violate GATT norm s, especisilly the

non-discrimination norm. Yet they are driven by efforts to diffuse political

pressures, while simultaneously limiting the extent of protection, both by

product and by trading partner. This practice has, in tum, affected the

nature of the regime. Not surprisingly, there is little agreement on a code

goveming the use of selective safeguards, but the consensus seems to be

moving towards a tolerance of their u s e .' ' Recent research on the implemen-

tation of IM F stabilization programs suggests a similar phenom enon.^ Some

programs are no doubt negotiated in bad faith, with little intention of fulfill-

ment. More commonly, those at the negotiating table are simply unable to

control those in the palace or in the streets. A final example may be drawn

from the interwar period. Great Britain's strong commitment to maintaining

the gold standard during the 1920s stimulated strong industrial opposition to

the Bank of England's policies, contributing to the final decision to go off

gold in 1931.*'

D efec tion in such instances is not the result of calculating unified ac-

tors, but the outcome of domestic political conflicts which no single actor

can contro l. How intemationai agreem ents play into these dom estic political

fights is still poorly understood. Reputation has appeared in arguments

against r a s h protectionist moves. Occasionally, the IM F has been used to

implement programs that would have been impossible without outside pres-

sure. The Bank of England argued that defending parity was key to British

leadership in intemationai financing affairs. On the other hand, opposition

forces have used the government's compliance with regime injunctions to

their own political benefit, arguing that they could have extracted a superior

bargain by defecting, or that bowing to outside pressure is intolerable.

Joanne Gowa shows how those defending the closing of the gold window

portrayed regime m les as overly re strictive of national autonom y . ^

Towards a new theory of international cooperation

Building a theory of cooperation and regime change demands that we

retu m to the central insight of the interdependence literature: growing inter-

dependence means the erasure of the boundaries separating intemationai

79.

Alan William

Wolff

Th e Need for New GATT Rules to Govem Safeguard A ctions, in

William Cline, ed.. Trade Policy in the

198 s

(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Intemationai

Economics, 1983).

80.

Stephan Haggard, Th e Politics of Adjustment: L essons from the IM F's Extended Fund

Fac ility, and Robert Kaufman, Dem ocratic and Authoritarian Responses to the Debt Issue:


27/29


and dom estic politics. D om es tic political issues spill over into interna-

tional politics and foreign po licy has domestic roots and consequ ences.

Governments, when making choices about regime creation and compliance,

try to preserve the benefits of cooperation while minimizing the costs that

may fall on politically important groups. This insight appears to have been

lost in much recent writing about regimes. One approach would be to start

with the domestic-level game, and consider the conditions favorable to

cooperation. This approach assumes that a state's decision to enter into and

abide by international rules can be treated in the same way as any other

public policy choice.**^ An institutionalist approach, for example, would sug-

gest that the a rena in which decisions are made cond itions the ability of state

elites to sustain commitments. Decisions made in insulated arenas may not

be pulled as much by un co op era tive forces. On the other hand, the decen-

tralization of certain policies, such as banking regulation and tax policy in

the United States, may inhibit the formation of international regimes. A

coalitional approach would emphasize the constellation of domestic actors

standing to benefit from cooperation. The Reagan administration's 1985

decision to seek international cooperation on the dollar and exchange rates

was prodded in part by export interests and firms facing import com petition.

Starting with the un it level is risky, since the interactive effects of

international structures, bargaining, and rules on domestic politics can get

lost. Peter Katzenstein's work on small European democracies attempts to

capture such feedback, at least over a long historical period.** * The position

of small states in the intemationai system influences the development of

domestic institutions in predictable ways; these institutions, in turn, affect

these states' ability to adjust to the dictates of a liberal international and

regional order.

The next step is to develop interactive models that link domestic and

international politics more closely. Robert Putnam has suggested that epi-

sodes of international coopera tion must be viewed as two-level games. '^''

At one level, representatives of different countries seek to reach or sustain

international agreements; at a second level, those same representatives m ust

build the political support required to sustain commitments and establish

credibility. These processes often occur simultaneously and expectations

about the likelihood of gaining acceptance in one arena influence the bar-

gaining process in the other.

Another approach focuses on the transnational coalitions that span coun-

tries.

This method is adopted by Ernst Haas in his classic study The Uniting

83 .

For an insightful review of different approaches to public policy, see Herbert Kitschelt.

Four Theories of Public Policy Making and Fast Breeder Reactor Development. Interna


28/29


of Europe

but this line of research has not been adequately pursued. For

example, does some synchronization of coalitional pattems or electoral cy-

cles across states make cooperation more likely? W here a nation may lack a

winning coalition dom estically, can pressu re or support from extem al actors

tip policy in the direction favored by the cooperative minority? Robert Put-

nam and Nicholas Bayne suggest this may have occurred in the German de-

cision to reflate in 1978.^

The central point is that growing interdependence means that groups at

the dom estic level increasingly have regim e int eres ts. Welfare is tied not

only to particular policy decisions, but to other states' compliance with

regime norms, the way in which intemationai cooperation is institutional-

ized, and the access regimes provide for private actors. Structural theory

alerted us to the myopia of the second image. It would be a misfortune if the

quest for parsimonious systemic theory displaced other research and theo-

retical traditions that study domestic histories and, above all, politics.

86 .

Robert

D .

Putnam and Nicholas Bayne,

Hanging

ogether(Cambridge: Harvard Univer-

sity Press, 1984), pp. 88-89.


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