sick industries

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Economic Policy Paper

on

Sick Industries: Causes, Remedies and Prevention

1. Introduction and Scope & Methodology

1.1 Introduction

Sickness in the industrial units is not a new phenomenon as is evident in the developing countries.

Even in the industrially advanced countries of the world, varying degrees of sickness are found to

occur. An industrial unit may face a number of odds during its implementation and operationstage because of a number of factors in the environment internal and external. If the problems

perpetuate & does not permit the unit to pursue the normal course of operations leading to

reasonable utilization of capacity, generation of surplus, debt servicing, etc, it can be presumedthat some kind of sickness has engulfed the unit and if this trend grows unchecked, it would

adversely affect production and employment in the country besides other socio-economicrepercussions. However, it is also recognised that in a market economy, the survival of the fittest

and weeding out of inefficient industrial units is a natural outcome which is considered useful as

well. Because the exit of the non-competitive and loss-incurring units should not pose difficulty toany society. But sickness assuming an epidemic shape creates concerns to the policy makers and

stakeholders. Experience suggests that small scale industries are more prone to sickness as

compared to medium and large scale industries. In this context, sickness in small industry shouldnot be left only to the market forces. Creation of objective conditions and enabling environment

through suitable policy support are essential for sustained growth of the small industry sector inthe developing economies. It is, therefore, imperative to diagnose the causes of sickness so that

preventive measures are suggested. Even if a small unit turns sick despite taking all possible

precautionary measures, efforts should be made to find out the possibility of its revival. This

warrants appropriate package of restructuring and rehabilitation strategies. If the units survival isstill under threat, it should be better allowed to die a natural death.

1.2 Scope & Methodology

The purpose of this paper is to explain the incidence of sickness and causes thereof in the industrysector of Bangladesh with particular reference to small industry sub-sector and suggest policy

measures, both preventive and corrective, to address the problem of sick industries in thebackdrop of pursuing the rapid industrialization strategy as the major prop for acceleration of

economic growth. For this purpose, extensive survey of literature has been made and relevant

Govt. publications, pervious studies and various initiatives taken by the successive Governmentshave been consulted. SectionII presents the industrial scenario in Bangladesh, Section-III

highlights the role of small industries in the economy and polices pursued, Section-IV brings out

the sickness syndrome prevailing in the industrial sector of Bangladesh, industrial sickness inneighboring countries is briefly described in Section V, and Section-VI deals with the suggested

policy framework for prevention of industrial sickness and rehabilitation measures.

2. Industrial Scenario in Bangladesh

2.1 Strategy for Industrialization

Like many other developing countries, the economy of Bangladesh though agrarian in nature ispoised for industrial development. It is an admitted fact that any development strategy which aims


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at raising output and generating adequate employment opportunities, needs to address the rapidindustrialization move. The emphasis on industrialization should not, however, be stressed by

undermining the role of agriculture in the economy, rather a case of complementarity has to beestablished between these two fundamental/vital sectors in order to reap the relative benefits

accruing to each other, resulting in acceleration of the economic growth. Again, the argument of

structural shift from agriculture to industry sounds to be a welcome proposition in the context ofpursuing the export-led growth strategy. The acceleration of industrial growth is thus a crucial

goal for reaching the take-off stage of the Bangladesh Economy. In the days ahead, as the

increasing trend of liberalization sets on, it will continue to remain as the prime mover ineconomic modernization, employment generation, expansion and broadening of domestic as well

as export markets. The awareness of the successive governments in this regard have been

reflected in various policy moves as initiated from time to time for diversification andmodernization of the economy with industry and its close linkage with dominant agriculture as the

major vehicle in the process.

2.2 Performance of the Industry Sector

The achievements so far made in the industry sector are not satisfactory. A vibrant and dynamic

industry sector is yet to show up to attain a breakthrough. While several South-East Asian and

some other developing countries are fast moving up the ladder of industrial development, theperformance of the industry (manufacturing) sector of Bangladesh may be rated below

satisfactory level. The contribution of the industry sector to the gross domestic product (GDP) at

1995-1996 prices was 15.58% in 2001-2002, hovering around at almost same figures in thesecond half of the nineties. Regarding the growth rate, the sector witnessed a declining trend from

8.54% in 1997-98 to 5% in 2001-2002. Over the period from 1990-91 to 1995-96, themanufacturing sector grew at an average annual rate of 6.3%. The share of the manufacturing

sector in countrys total employment is 13.1% only. It provides employment to about 5.1 million

people in which the share of the private sector is over 95%. (Source: Labour Survey, 1999-2000,

BBS). However, the contribution of manufactured exports to the total exports is significantly highwhich accounts for more than 90% . In terms of productivity (gross output per employee), the

manufacturing sector registered poor performance as compared to India, Pakistan and Thailand.The performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) is quite dismal during the last two decades

and its contribution to GDP decreased over time. The net loss of manufacturing SOEs recordedcolossal i.e., Tk. 26.32 billion in 2001 as compared to Tk. 6.70 billion in 1991 (Source:

Monitoring Cell, MOF & Sector Agencies - November, 2002) The corporate governance and

management of SOEs have proved ineffective. Despite the potential for growth, themanufacturing sector in the past failed to meet expectations and presents a disconcerting picture.

This sluggish trend has to be reversed for a fast turnaround of the sector. For the last couple of

years, GDP growth rate centers around 5% and little above. A minimum of 7% GDP growth rateshould be targeted for the economy and all possible efforts for development of various sectors

have to be put in place in order to attain the coveted position. Likewise, in the industry sector, atleast 25% contribution to GDP and at least employment of the 20% work force have to beachieved by the end of ensuing Sixth Five-Year Plan to support the sustained level of

development in the economy.

3. Small Industry in the Economy and Policies Pursued

3.1 Contribution of Small Industry

While pursuing the industrial development efforts, the major objectives and strategies should befocused on optimum utilization of indigenous resource endowments (e.g., abundant labour and


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scarcity of capital), promotion of employment and catalyzing the growth of production andexports. In this regard, the strategy for development of small industries merit special attention of

the policymakers in accelerating industrial development of the developing countries. InBangladesh, the importance of small industry in the economic development process has been

recognized in all official documents relating to policy prescriptions for the industry sector. The

development of small industry has been justified on grounds of (i) labour intensity (ii) use ofindigenous raw-materials, (iii) lower capital-output ratio (iv) generation of employment at

minimum investment cost (v) equitable distribution of income, (vi) regional distribution of

industrial investment, (vii) reduction in fixed investment costs through sub-contracting tie -ups,(viii) foreign exchange earnings through exports/imports substitution, (ix) building up

entrepreneurial base through trial and error at low cost, (x) introduction of new/appropriate

technology at low cost, etc. Though the contribution of small industry sector to GDP/Value addedhas remained almost static (around 5%) for more than a decade in line with the similar trend as

noticed in case of contribution of the industry sector, the growth rate witnessed a rise over theperiod. While the entire manufacturing industry grew at a declining rate over the last 5 years

(1997 - 2002), the rate of growth of the small-industry sector increased from 6.77% in 1997-98 to

7.50% in 2001-2002, implying the lower growth rate for the large and medium industry. (Source:

Bangladesh Economic Survey-2002, P-152). The contribution of small industry towards

employment generation also appears higher at lower cost. The small industry sector employs 5

million people directly and indirectly which accounts for 82 percent of the total industrial labourforce (Source: Fifth Five Year Plan, 1997-2002, P-325). Various estimates reveal that the

difference in fixed investment cost in the creation of one unit of employment generation amounts

to nearly Tk. 100,000 between small scale industry and large scale industry. In the absence ofavailability of any current national level estimates about the nature and magnitude of

contributions of the small scale industry, it is difficult to provide any dependable basis about theirimportance on the economy. As estimated by different sources, there exist about 42,000 small-

scale industries in Bangladesh (Source: Ahmed, 1999 PP. 6-7). Despite their contributions in the

economy in terms of employment and value added, the small industries suffer from numerous

operational constraints resulting from the scale barriers and resource constraints. Comprehensivepolicy support including various fiscal and financial incentives are thus inevitable to improve their

competitive strength in the backdrop of a liberalized market economy regime.

3.2 Policies in Support of Small Industry

A close look at the industrial policies initiated in the nineties in 1991 would reveal that the small

industry was identified as a priority sector and a host of useful and innovative incentive measureswere proposed for development of the sector. These include decentralization of regulatory

functions with BSCIC as the principal functionary, provision of credit facilities to special small

industries and credit guarantee scheme, sub-contracting based linkages, tax-holiday, managementdevelopment and training facilities, extension of industrial estate facilities, review committee to

monitor policy implementation, etc. However, the priority status was first accorded to the smallscale sector under the revised industrial policy, 1986. A number of promotional measures werefound to be contained in that policy which focussed primarily on the preferential access of the

small industries to institutional credit. The industrial policy, 1999 up- holding the spirit ofliberalized market provided for almost similar facilities and incentives for the growth of the

sector, but with no mention as priority sector. No new policy measures or support assistance were

found in the 1999 policy document. Since the definition of the industries falling under the Smallcategory depends on the fixed investment ceiling, there exists variation in the level of investment

to identify small industries under various industrial policies. According to IP-91, an industrial

undertaking whose total fixed investment excluding the value of land was limited to Taka 3 croreor 30 million, was designated as small industry. However, the extent of extended investment for


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BMRE was not more than 50% of the original investment limit. IP-99 provided definition of thesmall industry on the basis of both number of workers and fixed investment limit. Under this

policy, enterprises employing fewer than 50 workers (excluding the cottage units) and/or with afixed capital investment of less than Tk. 100 million would come under the purview of the small

industry.

3.3 Policy Intervention and Imple mentation Status

Though the above-mentioned policy provisions indicate positive direction towards growth of thesmall scale industry, these mostly remained in paper only. There has been wide gap between

policy prescription and policy implementation, rende ring much of the needed proposals into pious

wishes. A survey on the implementation status of IP91 reveals that though regulatory functionsdecentralized with the BSCIC were discharged more or less satisfactorily, some degree of

bureaucratic tangles and inefficiency still remained. The policy remained vague in terms ofidentification of special small and cottage industries (SCIs) for providing credit facilities. BSCIC

also did not play its role to procure funds for establishment of special SCIs. No small industry

credit guarantee scheme was launched by BSCIC though provided for in the policy. NCBs

introduced a credit guarantee scheme with assistance from Bangladesh Bank (Source: Ahmed,

1999 P-11). It is true that financing persists as a perennial problem for the small industries in

Bangladesh. But no special credit scheme has been launched under IP-91. No attempt has beenmade by the BSCIC and no credit provision has been arranged by the banks to facilitate sub-

contracting between large and small scale industries. Tax-holiday facilities to be offered to the

small industry entrepreneurs by NBR have been reported to be exceedingly complicated andhighly bureaucratic. There have been no follow-up arrangements to examine the impact of

management training received by the potential entrepreneurs. Further, training had less impactfinally as the same was not linked to the provision for credit. The location of the industrial estates

have not been selected in many cases by considering their economic and commercial viability. No

progress has been made so far in regard to provision of facilities in the BSCIC industrial estates

similar to those available in EPZs. As per policy, though the review committee has been formed tomonitor the implementation of relevant policies applicable to small industries, the committee has

not become active at the desired level. The progress of implementation of the small industrydevelopment policies under IP-99 is yet to be assessed.

The above analysis suggests that the enabling environment for the growth of small industries has

been limited to official documents only, in reality much less has been done to promote the small-

industry-oriented industrialization in the country. Moreover, the environment for the growth of thesector has been somewhat hostile due to the ever increasing competition arisen out of the trade

liberalization policies of the Government. The protective regime has largely been discontinued

leaving the small industries to stiff competition arising from the influx of foreign goods throughboth official and unofficial channels. This paper does not, however, advocate for generous

assistance to be provided to the small industries. Because financial opportunities or highereffective rates of assistance provided earlier have contributed to the inefficiency in the sector, assome studies revealed. Very important to reckon with in this regard is the firm commitment of the

relevant agencies to ensure the timely availability of appropriate package of financial and non-financial facilities and incentives for the growth of the sector in the competitive market economy.

It is true that small industries are afflicted with a number of built in constraints and are more

vulnerable to non-performance/poor performance because of the entrepreneurial and managerialdeficiencies. This has largely inhibited their access to formal credit institutions. As stated above,

the policy constraints including liberalization as well as internal constraints have compounded the

problems besetting the development of the small industries which are largely responsible forgrowth of sickness in the small industry sector.


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4. Sickness Syndrome in the Industry Sector of Bangladesh: Chronology of Govt.Initiatives and Various Studies

4.1 Industrial Sickness and its Incidence in Bangladesh

Sick industries refer to those units which perform poorly against expected results, incur cashlosses for consecutive years, gradually erode the entire networth and obviously fail to service the

debt obligations. The major criteria to identify a sick unit may generally be listed as follows :

(i) A unit incurring financial loss/not being capable to produce at / above break-even point.(ii) A unit incurring continuous cash losses(iii) A unit having negative equity(iv) A unit having excess of current liabilities over current assets.(v) A unit making defaults in payment of principal sums with interest.(vi) A unit having low capacity utilisation(vii) A unit having worsening debt-equity ratio.

However, it is very difficult to recognize a sick unit on some definite criteria as a wide variety of

interlinked symptoms characterize the sickness of an unit. Likewise, a number of causes areresponsible for turning an industrial unit as sick. These causes prevailing simultaneously in an

unit may be closely inter-related or even independent of each other. Some of the causes originateoutside the unit (e.g. changes in the structural and environmental factors like infrastructural

problem, govt. policies, etc.) and some crop up within the unit itself which relate to the functiona l

areas like management, production, finance etc. Thus, the causes are classified into two categories: (i) external causes (exogenous factors) and internal causes (endogenous factors). The external

causes, which are beyond the control of the industrial unit, usually affect the industry group as a

whole, while internal causes occur due to some intra-firm weaknesses in various functional areasof the unit and are, therefore, management related.

In Bangladesh, the growing incidence of industrial sickness and its adverse impact on the

economy in the form of loss of productive capacities, investment potential, employment, etc. drew

the attention of the policymakers in the Government first in the late eighties. In the nineties, withthe advent of market economy and consequent trade liberalization, the intensity of industrial

sickness took a new dimension. The successive governments came up with policy measures at

different periods to address the problem of sick industries.

4.2 MOI - Sponsored Sickness Study by the House of Consultants Ltd.

In 1988, under the sponsorship of Ministry of Industries (MOI), Government of Bangladesh

(GOB), the House of Consultants Ltd. undertook a study to develop criteria and identify the

causes of sickness of manufacturing establishments in Bangladesh and find solutions to remove or

at least reduce the impact of the causes. According to the study, an industrial unit has been

defined to be sick if it fails to cover all the costs of production (including finance cost) and earnnormal profit in the long run (i.e., a three year period). A set of criteria was developed for the

study in order to identify an industrial unit as sick which are as follows:

(i) if it incurs net loss in consecutive years,(ii) if its debt-equity ratio deteriorates over time (net loss wiping out the equity base),(iii) if it fails to meet debt-servicing liabilities on time,(iv) if it defaulted in payment of past taxes,


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(v) if its share price is going down (in case of public limited companies listed in the stockexchange),

(vi) if it is facing working capital problem and its cash ratio is declining over time (creatingliquidity problem).

By applying the above criteria to a sample of 300 industrial units, it was found that 67.3% weresick in terms of one or more criteria. The extent of sickness is the highest i.e., 75.8% among the

small scale industries. The major causes contributing to the state of sickness are listed below :

- Poor entreprenurship- Lack of proper studies- Lack of management & technical know-how.- Low equity base and dishonesty of purpose- Poor market planning- Idle capacity/low capacity- Infrastructure (power, etc)- Shortage of funds (Working capital & BMRE)

The study suggested a number of measures to alleviate the cause of industrial sickness. The

immediate measures includedEasing debt burden, Reappraisal of sick units, Debt-equity swap,Rescheduling, Funds for BMRE & Working Capital, Manpower training, uninterrupted power

supply, etc. On the other hand, the suggested long run measures were Conducting sector

reviews, Developing project preparation capability, Creating an Institute of Technology, Creatingmanagement capability, etc. However this study suffers from methodological problem.

4.3 Functioning of Sick Industries Rehabilitation and Revival Cell Under IP-91

In 1991, the announced industrial policy, interalia, included the provision that problems of sick

industries will be identified and appropriate measures will be taken for solution of these problems.In line with that, a Sick Industries Rehabilitation and Revival Cell was formed in the middle of

1991 at the Ministry of Industries (MOI). The cell headed by the Secretary, MOI, GOB withrepresentatives of all prominent chambers and financial institutions had the following terms of

reference

(a) to define a sick industry(b) to identify sick industries and the reasons thereof on the basis of a survey.(c) to submit report with specific recommendations for arriving at the appropriate solutions in

each case.

The cell defined a sick industry as follows

An industrial unit (a) which could not reach the stage of normal production with normal profit or(b) has incurred loss or remained at the unprofitable level for consecutive 3 to 6 years from the

first year of commercial production or (c) could not produce above the break-even point forreasons beyond the control of the entrepreneurs.

The entrepreneurs of the problem industrial units were requested to fill up a prescribed applicationform containing necessary information about the enterprises, their own views on reasons and

remedies for sickness and, thereafter, submit the same to the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers

of Commerce and Industries.


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In order to identify the genuinely sick industries, ascertain the reasons and suggest remedies forsickness, ten selection committees comprising eminent persons and specialists were formed for

ten-different sub-sectors, viz. Food, Textiles, Engineering, Chemical, Handloom, Service,Pharmaceuticals, Jute, Rubber and Miscellaneous.

A total of 1889 applications were received from the industrial units claiming sickness. Of those,1580 enterprises were identified as sick in which total bank loan outstanding amounted to Tk.

1239 crore. As calculated by the selection committees, the required amount for working capital

and BMRE of the identified sick industries were estimated at Tk. 252 crore.

The major causes of various types of industries fallen sick as have been mentioned in the reports

of the selection committees are compiled as follows:

(i) Selection and Implementation of Projects without the required feasibility studies.(ii) Supply of imbalanced and defective machinery.(iii) Inadequate/Non-availability of working capital (in majority of the cases)(iv) Non-provision of financial assistance for BMRE, where necessary.(v) Lack of timely decision and support by the financial institutions and the related agencies (in

majority of the cases)

(vi) Loss incurred by natural calamities.(vii) Unauthorized inflow of smuggled and officially duty-free foreign goods.(viii)Frequent power disruption, irregular supply & high price of power(ix) Improper utilization of productive capacity.(x) Disruption of production due to political unrest, labour unrest, etc.(xi) High rate of interest on bank loan(xii) Marketing problem for locally produced goods.(xiii)Upward movement of exchange rates.(xiv) Fiscal anomalies between the imported raw-material of locally produced goods and

imported finished goods.(xv) Lack of sound management(xvi) Lack of proper implementation of industrial policies.A number of recommendations were suggested by the selection committees separately sub-sector-wise in order to rehabilitate and revive the identified sick industries which were finally approved

by the sick industry cell. The principal recommendations were here as under :

(a) Waiver of 100% penal and 50% - 100% normal interest(b) Rescheduling of outstanding loan for repayment in easy installments(c) Provision of necessary working capital, financial and technical assistance to BMRE cases

after conducting fresh feasibility studies.

(d) Withdrawal of all filed suits.(e) Supply of electricity and other utilities on regula r basis and discontinuance of peak hours of

electricity.

(f) Unnecessary delays in providing financial assistance and support to be avoided.(g) Stoppage of unauthorized inflow of foreign goods.(h) Lowering of interest rate on industrial loan.(i) Fiscal anomalies to be removed.(j) Introduction of special insurance scheme on easy terms for natural calamities.(k) Compilation of accurate statistics for investment decision(l) In order to provide protection to home industry, local goods which are produced abundantly

should be discouraged for import.


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The report further suggested that as there exists special need for co-ordination between theoperations of the different ministries, agencies, banks and financial institutions and the policies

and rules of the Govt. and various laws for rehabilitation of sick industries, a Board for Industrialand Financial Restructuring may be formed through enactment of special laws. Under the same

law, there may be a high level appellate authority to review the appeals of the concerned quarters

and provide judgements against the decisions of the said board.

The concerned banks and financial institutions were sent letters by the MOI for extending

assistance to the respective sick industries as per recommendation. The resolution was alsosimultaneously communicated to the concerned sick units for individual perusal of the case with

the bank(s). Thereafter, the sick industry cell was declared formally abolished. However, the

concerned banks provided fresh financial assistance only to a few identified sick units and in othercases expressed their inability in implementing the recommendations. Then, the identified sick

industries continued to be pursued by the concerned banks for failing to service their debts.

4.4 Formation of High-Level Review Committee to act on Recommendations for

Rehabilitation of Sick Industries

In 1992, the Government formed a high-level Review Committee to devise a pragmatic and

effective solution in regard to the recommendations. The enterprises failing to get financialassistance as recommended, were asked to apply to the Review Committee for reconsideration.

However the Review Committee could not proceed with its job as it was facing difficulty in

implementing decisions. It was then decided to reorganize the Review Committee w ith Secretary,Banking Division, Ministry of Finance (MOF) as the Convenor. Even after that, no significant

progress did happen in terms of rehabilitation of sick enterprises. Meanwhile, upon assumption ofthe power by the new government in June, 1996, the MOI reviewed the activities of the previous

committees which achieved only marginal success so far in this regard. Hence, the Review

Committee was further reconstituted with a modified mandate under the convenorship of

Secretary, MOI, to adopt appropriate steps and proper actions in the light of the experiences of theprevious committees in order to rehabilitate and revitalize sick industries.

The Reconstituted Review Committee (RRC) took two significant decisions (i) to undertake an

in-depth study on the sick industries to be carried out by the Bangladesh Institute of DevelopmentStudies (BIDS) and (ii) to update the list of sick industries by inviting applications through

advertisement in the newspapers from both identified (in 1992) and newly sic k industries.

In February 1997, a Reconciliation Committee was constituted in the MOF to resolve the cases of

sick industries which are in litigation with the banks and financial institutions, outside the court

premises through a process of arbitration. The progress was, however, slow due to either non-availability of response from concerned banks/financial institutions (FIs) or absence of

entrepreneurs in the meetings of the committee.

4.5 BIDS Study on Sick Industries

BIDS Sick Industries Study (1998) based on MOI data reveals that the highest incidence of

sickness (19.6%) is in the manufacturing of textiles, followed by the sub-sectors-food

manufacturing (14.3%), textile manufacturing (8.8%), non-electrical machinery (5.7%) andleather and its products (5.4%). It appears from the study that small scale industries is at the top

(72.5%) in terms of incidence of sickness, followed by medium and large scale industries

19.7% and 4.1% respectively.


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From the enterprise level survey of the study it is found that among the internal factors causing

industrial sickness, the entrepreneurs have singled out use of obsolete technology as the mostimportant one (23%) followed by faulty employee appointment (15%), lack of working capital

(13%), marketing proble m (11%), poor management (9%), and wrong feasibility (5%). Among

the external factors, lack of working capital has been mentioned as the single most importantcause (35%) followed by natural calamities (13%), trade liberalization (9%), problems in

disbursement of project loan (7.5%), poor infrastructure/utilities (7%), political unrest (5%), and

smuggling (3%).

The survey further reveals that sick units were concentrated (64.3%) during the 1980s and the

mean rate of capacity utilization for the sick projects was 39%

4.6 Study On Sub-Sectoral/Enterprise Level Sickness

Saha (1997) carried out a research work on industrial sickness of the DFI- financed projects in

Bangladesh. The sample was taken from the identified sick list approved by the Sick Industry Cell

in 1992. The principal causes attributed to the sickness of DFI-financed projects are as follows

[Figures in parentheses indicate percentages of the total causes of sickness]:

Internal:

i. Marketing problem (31%)ii. Management inefficiency and lack of entrepreneurial skills (22%)iii. Faulty project planning and appraisal (14%)iv. Imbalance of machinery and inappropriate technology (12%)v. Implementation delay in (mobilization of equity, etc) (12%)vi. Others (diversion of funds, labor problem, etc.) (9%)

External:

i. Delays in loan sanction and disbursement (22%)ii. Non- availability/ shortage of working capital (21%)iii. Power problem (15%)iv. Changes in Govt. policy (import liberalization) (13%)v. Non-availability/ irregular supply of raw material and other critical inputs (11%)vi. Natural calamities (57%)vii. Smuggling, Political unrest (5%)viii. Others (8%)

The important findings of the study included, inter alia, the following:

Most of the sick projects (64%) were established during the 1980s Average capacity utilization of the sick proje cts was 41% Working capital finance gap (difference between the required working capital and available

working capital) prevailed within the range of 21-80%. for 76.48% of the sample sick

projects. Average time overrun (difference between average time planned and average time actual

taken at different stages of project implementation) stood at 51 months incase of sick projects.


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4.7 Recognition of Sick Industries in the Fifth Five Year Plan (1997-2002)

Meanwhile, the Fifth Five Year Plan (1997-2002) was launched by the Government. Unlike theprevious Five-Year Plans, the Fifth Five Year Plan recognized the presence of a large number of

sick industries and listed the main reasons therefor as follows :

(a) depreciation of taka in relation to the foreign currency in which loan capital was obtained.(b) technological obsolescence(c) withdrawal or lowering of protective tariff wall,(d) management inefficiency(e) inadequate working capital support by the banking system; and(f) pilferages by the sponsors, in collusion with the personnel of the lending banks or financial

institutions.

It has been categorically mentioned in the plan document that during the plan period concrete

steps will be taken to remove the relevant causes of sickness through joint efforts of the owners,

management, labour and the funding agencies.

4.8 Supportive Measures Proposed in the National Budget of 1998-99 for Curbing

Industrial Sickness

While announcing the national budget for the financial year 1998-99, the Finance Minister

referred to the sick industries in Bangladesh. Though he admitted the realities of sickness in thecontext of governing principles of capitalism, he attributed the main reasons of sickness to

mismanagement, political and economic stability and rapid liberalization and unexpected shifts ineconomic policy. A package of supportive measures were proposed in the budget speech with a

view to scaling down the problems of sick industries which are follows :

(i) Since small entrepreneurs are adversely effected by the phenomenon of sickness and detailedinvestment analysis is hardly possible in case of small units, steps would be taken forproviding assistance to the small sick industries already registered with MOI.

(ii) A special committee would be set up to consider remission of interest and penal interest upto100% of those enlisted sick industries which had borrowed upto Tk. 50 lacs from any state-owned bank. The Government would reimburse 50% of such remitted interest amount to

banks. The amount remaining due after remission would become payable by three years in

monthly instalments.(iii) Sponsors of sick industries having borrowed more than Tk. 50 lacs, and being unable to pay

the dues, may submit compromise proposal to the banks for decision on the basis of bank-

client relationship. In cases, the sponsors believe that their sick industries can be profitablyrehabilitated, they may submit feasibility reports to the concerned banks for taking

appropriate steps on the basis of guidelines given by the special committee.(iv) Where court cases are pending, all proceedings would be taken within the legal framework

without compromising the interests of the banks.

(v) Upon implementation of the above measures, all Govt. Committees relating to sick industrieswould stand abolished and hence, all sick industries would have to seek redress under the

Bankruptcy Act.

(vi) The Government will issue bonds worth Tk. 60 crore in FY 1998-99 to compensate the banksfor implementation of the above measures. If necessary, allocations for this purpose may be

enhanced in the future.


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The Sick Industries Association (SIA) came up with the following noteworthy observations inresponse to the package offer announced by the Government:

(i) The proposed special committee should consider the cases of identified sick industries of1992 alongw ith the sick cases registered later which are in the process of consideration by

the Reconciliation Committee. Further, the RRC (1996) should continue to identify sickindustries from the fresh applicants.

(ii) There should have been specific time frame for the special committee for overallimplementation of the process.

(iii) The financial jurisdiction of the special committee upto Tk. 50 lac. project loan has limitedthe scope for addressing the sick small industries and hence there should be no such limit.

(iv) The application of the package should be extended to the loan cases involving private banksas well.

(v) The policies of the review committee in regard to remission of 100% interest and realizationof principal should be sustained in the modalities of the proposed special committee.

4.9 Formation of Special Committee on Interest Remission for the Identified Sick

Industries

The Ministry of Finance considered some observations of SIA and constituted a SpecialCommittee on Interest Remission under the convenership of a retired judge. According to the

TOR, the committee was empowered to consider the following cases for interest remission on the

basis of the stipulated criteria:

(a) 1580 identified (in 1992) sick industries which are under consideration of the RRC.(b) Pending cases lying with the Reconciliation committee(c) Out of 1325 new applications (in 1996) which are really sick as received by RRC

(Committee to identify sick units on the basis of 1992 definition).

The committee has been asked to consider the remission of interest only if the unit is found sick

and project loan does not exceed Tk. 50 lacs. The cases involving project loan exceeding Tk. 50lacs would be sent to the concerned bank(s) for consideration. Only the loan cases of NCBs and

DFIs would come under the jurisdiction of the committee. The decisions of committee would beimplemented through the process of approval by the Board of Directors of the concerned bank(s).

The Government, upon recommendations of the committee, would reimburse 50% of the waived

interest to the banks for the sick industries in two phases as compensation.

A total of 2464 cases were received by the special committee from the reconciliation committee

(MOF) and the RRC (MOI) for consideration. After preliminary screening, 1715 cases wereselected for consideration. Originally, the tenure of the committee remained effective upto June

30, 1999. Later on, the tenure was extended twice upto 31/12/2000. Within two years ofoperation, the committee resolved 1440 cases out of 1715 cases with a note of recommendation tothe concerned banks and returned 275 cases to the concerned banks for settlement on the basis of

bank-client relationship. The resolution of the cases were done in the presence of sponsors andbank representatives and in many cases by undertaking site visit.

While resolving the cases under consideration for remission of interest, the following reasonswere found to be dominant in contributing to sickness in industries:

a. Selection of project without proper feasibility studies and appraisal.b. Failure in selecting appropriate technology.c. Supply of defective machinery due to inexperience of both entrepreneurs and banks.


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d. Problem in marketing the produced goods.e. Location problem and lack of skilled manpower.f. Non-availability/Inadequacy of working capital from the financing banks.g. Delay in financing decision and loan disbursementh. Natural disastersi. Smuggling of foreign goods/liberal import policy.j. Frequent power disruption/Non-availability of gas and power connection.k. Frequent changes in exchange rates and fiscal anomalies.l. Lack of co-ordination amongst various ministries and Govt. departments.m. Over-crowding of industries in the same sub-sector.n. Deterioration of law and order, political instability, extortion, strike, etc.o. Management ineffic iency, etc.Business leaders opined that positive steps have been taken for revival of sick industries throughthe interest remission measures for the identified cases. But the discontinuance of the special

committee for the purpose has left a number of genuine sick units out of consideration. Moreover,

the cases involving project loan of above Tk. 50 lacs falling sick were tipped to be settled through

bank-client relationship. No substantial progress has been made so far in this regard. Some of

them suggested that interest remission committee should continue to function for the cases which

would be identified as sick over time. Further, for the purpose of interest remission, ceiling forproject loan of sick cases may be increased upto Tk. 1 crore from the present limit of Tk. 50 lacs.

However, in April, 2001 the Finance Minister in his speech remarked that there was no scope for

continuing state support for rescue of sick industries. He added that the Govt. tried its best toreduce the number of sick industries from over 1700 to less than 400 through supportive

measures. But this should not be looked upon as a permanent phenomenon in a market orientedeconomy.

5. Industrial Sickness in Neighboring Countries - India

5.1 Alarming Rate of Sickness in the Small Scale Industry Sector

In India, Industrial Sickness increased at an alarming rate in the eighties and has also increased in

the nineties particularly in the small scale sector. Small Scale industry in India is defined on thebasis of investment in plant and machinery. The investment limits varied over the passage of time.

This limit was Rs. 35 lakhs from 1985-86 to 1990-91 and Rs. 60 lakhs from 1991-92 as of today.

Similarly, the small scale ancillary units are defined as having investment in plant & machinerybelow Rs. 75 lakhs. The incidence of sickness in the small scale sector is a matter of serious

concern in India. SSI sick units which accounted for 94% of the total incidence of industrial

sickness in 1980, have increased their share to 99% in the overall profile of industrial sickness in1990. Large and medium scale sick units account for only 1% of the total incidence of sickness.

But in terms of locked up bank credit, they represent 75% of the total bank credit outstandingfrom all sick units. On the other hand, the locked up bank credit in the small scale sick unitswhich constitute 99% of the total incidence of sickness, represent only 25% of the total bank

credit outstanding from all sick units. Again, of the identified SSI sick units, 92% are found to beunviable.

5.2 Definition of Sick Industry by Different Institutions

Industrial sickness in India has been defined by different institutions in different ways. The

Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has given two definitions one for large and medium scale units andthe other for small scale units. According to the RBI definition, large and medium scale sick unit


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is one which incurs cash losses for one year and which, in the judgement of the bank, is likely tocontinue to incur cash losses for the current as well as the following year and which has an

imbalance in its financial structure, such as current ratio of less than 1:1 and worsening debtequity ratio. RBIs definition of a sick small scale unit follows like if it has (a) incurred cash

losses in the previous year and is likely to incur cash loss in the current year and has an erosion of

50% or more of its networth; and/or (b) made defaults in payment of four consecutive quarterlyinstallments of interest or two half-yearly installments of principal on the term loans and there are

persistent irregularities in the operation of its credit limits with the bank.

The Study Team of the State Bank of India in its report on Small-Scale Industry Advances defined

a sick unit as one which fails to generate internal surplus on a continuing basis and depends for

its survival upon frequent infusion of external funds.

The Government of India enacted the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.As per the revised definition provided by this Act, a sick industrial company would be one which

is registered for a period not less than five years and whose accumulated losses are equal to the

sum of paid up capital and free reserves.

5.3 Findings of Various Studies about the causes of Sickness

A number of studies were conducted to determine the relative importance of different factors in

the causation of sickness of the industrial units in India. One study was conducted in 1990 to

examine the causes of sickness in the new SSI units. It was found that marketing problems as awhole (resulting from highly competitive markets, unfavourable linkage with ancillary and

medium units etc.) were the most important factor (29.6%) for sickness in the group followed bymismanagement (21.9%), inadequacy of working capital (16.6%), time overrun (13.4%) and govt.

policy (11%). The total weight of all external causal factors for the group is 59.2 and that of

internal causal factor 40.8. It appears that external causal factors are dominant in causing sickness

in the new SSIs than internal causal factors.

Another study conducted by the Reserve Bank of India on 378 medium and large sized sickindustrial enterprises enjoying credit limits of Rs. 1.00 crore and above revealed that 52% of the

units fell sick due to management problem, 23% of the units went sick because of marketrecession, 14% for initial faulty planning, 9% for power-cuts, shortage of raw-materials, etc. and

the rest 2% became sick due to labour trouble.

5.4 Govt. Concessions and Incentives for the SSI Sector

The Government of India provided various concessions and incentives to the SSI sector for theirsustained growth, which have briefly been outlined here as under :

(a) Assisting new SSI units on soft terms by lending institutions,(b) Reservation of Certain Industries for the SSI sector,(c) Incentives related to land/shed financing, machinery and raw-materials,(d) Provision of facilities within the Industrial Estates, and(e) Excise duty exemption and price preference


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5.5 Govt. Measures to deal with the Problem of Industrial Sickness

Various measures have been initiated by the Govt. of India in order to deal with the problem ofsickness in industries. These may be briefly described here.

(i) The RBI set up a Sick Industrial Undertaking Cell to monitor the performance of the banksin identifying the sick units and initiating appropriate remedial measures, and to co-ordinatethe efforts of banks, financial institutions, Govt. and other agencies involved.

(ii) RBI advised banks to take urgent measures to set up Special Sick Unit Cells to carryoutperiodical inspection and to undertake diagnostic studies for techno-economic viability.

(iii) The Ministry of Finance of the Govt. of India and RBI provides supportive measures forrehabilitation of viable sick units in terms of relief in excise arrears, reduction in interestrate on term loans and waiver of penalty applied to cash credit facility.

(iv) The Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India (IRCI) was set up by the Govt. of Indiafor industrial revival and rehabilitation of sick and closed industrial units.

(v) Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act (1985), was enacted in 1987 as alandmark in Govt. Policy to combat the problem of sickness. Under this Act, the Board for

Industrial and financial Reconstruction (BIFR) came into being with vast powers aimed at

assessment and implementation of revival plans for the sick industrial companies. However,

this Act has no applicability for the sick SSI units.

However, different studies revealed that in some cases liberal policies for the growth of the small

industry sector were counter-productive in terms of affecting the viability through unhealthygrowth and inefficiency of the units. On the other hand, the measures aimed at revival of sick

industries could not achieve a desired breakthrough in curbing the magnitude of sickness due totheir inadequacies and implementation bottlenecks.


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6. Summary of Causes of Industrial Sickness and Suggested Policy Measures forPrevention and Rehabilitation

6.1 Summary of Causes

The deliberations elaborated on the causes of industrial sickness in Section III & IV indicate that anumber of factors, both internal and external are responsible for turning an industrial unit as sick.

The major causes pushing the industrial units towards sickness in Bangladesh have been summedup in the following table :

INTERNAL

Sl. # Broad Area Detail Causes01. Management (a) Lack of proper education, training, experience and business outlook

of the Sponsors/Entrepreneurs(b) Poor Entrepreneurial skills(c) Poor Management(d)

Poor Equity base(e) Lack of Integrity/Division of Funds

(f) Faulty Project Planing and Appraisal02. Production/

Technical

(a) Wrong choice of technology(b) Improper utilization of production capacity(c) Imbalanced and Defective Machinery(d) Poor Raw-material Planning(e) Inadequate Quality Control(f) Poor labour relations(g) Location problem

03. Marketing (a) Lack of Market Planning(b) Inadequate Market Survey(c) Poor Collections(d) Defective Pricing

04. Finance (a) Poor Management of Financial Resources(b) Delay in Mobilisation of Equity Funds(c) Faulty Costing(d) Adverse debt-equity combination(e) Lack of Proper Accounting system

05. Personnel (a) Lack of Competence(b) Lack of Loyalty(c) Lack of Professionalism

EXTERNALSl. # Broad Area Detail Causes

01. Govt. Policy &Implementation

(a) Frequent Policy changes(b) Lack of Proper Implementation of Industrial Policies(c) Liberal Import Policies(d) Poor Infrastructure / Frequent Power Disruption(e) Smuggling(f) Fiscal Anomalies(g) Exchange Rate Fluctuation(h) Lack of Co-ordination between various ministries and Govt.Departments, etc.(i) Over-Saturation of particular industry type / Sector due to wrong


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EXTERNAL

Sl. # Broad Area Detail Causespolicy

(j) Non-availability of Raw-material, etc.02. Bank &

FinancialInstitutions

(a)Non-availability/Inadequacy of Working Capital(b) Lack of required financial assistance for BMRE(c) High rate of Interest on bank loan(d) Lack of timely decision & support by the banks and financialinstitutions.

03. Environment (a) Political Unrest(b) Labour Unrest(c) Market Recession(d) Delay in Project Implementation

6.2 Preventive Measures

Experience indicates that small industrial units fall sick much to the occurrence of external causeswhile medium and large industries get exposed to sickness largely due to internal causes. Though

it would be hardly impossible to eliminate the causes altogether, attempts should be made to

undertake measures that would reduce the magnitude of ailment in the industrial units for healthysurvival and growth. Viewed in this context, the following measures may be suggested to prevent

industrial sickness:

(i) Macro-economic Policy changes: The industrial entrepreneurs should make their own

appraisal within a predictable macro-economic environment. For this, policy changes shouldnot be abrupt, have to be pre-announced and gradual.

(ii) Sub-Sectorwise Long term Policy: For each sub-sector, the long-term policy (e.g. for a

period of 5 years) should be announced by the Government so that entrepreneurs appraisal

of the policy implications do take a near-accurate shape.(iii) Implementation of the Announced Polices: There should be effective co-ordination

amongst the various ministries, Govt. Departments and relevant agencies involved for properimplementation of policies related to industrialization.

(iv) Development of Small Industry Sector: The small industry sector is characterized by low-level of technology, low equity base, traditional management practices, poor marketing

outlets and undeveloped sub-contracting arrangement. The small industries should not be left

to the market forces only. The following measures may be taken for preventing sickness inthe small scale sector :

(a) Arranging access to institutional credit at reasonably lower rate of interest.(b) Industrial Estates equipped with the required facilities should be set up in suitable

locations.

(c) Entrepreneurship and Technology training should be arranged and then linked with theprovision of credit facilities. A national level training institute for entrepreneurshipdevelopment in the small scale sector should be set up. Meanwhile, BSCIC Training

Institute and DCCI Business Institute may be strengthened for upgradation of capabilityof the existing entrepreneurs.

(d) Sub-contracting arrangements should be made by establishing complimentaryrelationship with the medium and large industries. Government supplies may be

procured from small industries as far as possible.

(e) Data Bank should be developed at the Chamber Bodies/BOI/BSCIC to facilitate theadequate flow of market-related information.


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(f) There may be one marketing agency entrusted with the responsibility of purchasing allgoods manufactured by SSI units (Say, upto Tk. 10 million investment) and the task of

channeling sales through various sales depots.(v) Rationalization of Tariff : In cases where deemed necessary, some protective measures

should be taken by restricting import of the locally produced finished goods so that fiscal

anomalies could be removed.(vi) Improvement of Infrastructural Facilities: Insfrstructural facilities including utilities

should be made available to the entrepreneurs at low cost and at the appropriate time.

(vii) Monitoring of Saturation in Particular Industry Sub-sector: There should be someagency entrusted with the task of monitoring the establishment of too many units in the

same sub-sector so that over-crowding could be prevented.

(viii) Development of Linkage Industries: In order to mitigate the problem of non-availability/scarcity of raw-material as well as marketing of finished goods, backward and

forward linkage industries should be set up in a planned way. Moreover, close linkage ofIndustry with agriculture will help ease problem of scarcity of raw-material.

(ix) Active Support of Banks and Financial Institutions:

(a) In case of industrial units where term loan is needed, the availability of working capitalshould be ensured as part of the financial package.

(b) Banks should provide due attention to process the working capital needs of theindustrial units without any delay.

(c) BMRE Loan should be actively considered by the banks and financial institutions forthe existing industrial units undergoing the reality of rapid change in technology so that

productive capacities are not rendered idle/underutilized.(d) Interest rate on loan should be made lower by improving operational efficiency of the

banks. This will help reduce financial costs of the industria l units and thus gain accessto competitiveness.

(e) Bank-client relationship should be based on understanding of the mutual problems andprospects for greater interest of survival of both the entities.

(f) Banks should improve the quality of project appraisal in order to prevent the growth ofborn-sick projects and for that, availability of adequate and accurate data and skilledmanpower have to be ensured.

(g) Banks could fix up a time limit for sanction and disbursement of loan limits for helpingtimely implementation of the projects/utilization of capacity of the borrowing industrialunits.

(h) Monitoring system of the projects financed by the banks should be thoroughlyintensive and for this, both off-site and on-site mechanisms should be used inconjunction with each other in order to take timely steps for prevention of sickness.

(i) Educated entrepreneurs with technical know-how should be encouraged to set upindustrial units. They should be provided with all possible support, both financial andnon-financial without emphasis on collateral.

(x) Expansion of Market Base through Increased Exports : Domestic market is graduallygetting squeezed due to the influx of officially imported foreign goods and smuggledgoods. On the one hand, export market should be expanded by increasing the number of

exportable products. On the other, anti-smuggling drive should be strengthened. For this,import policy should be restructured in a way that discourages smuggling to a great extent.

(xi) Use of Predictive Models : Banks and entrepreneurs should follow some predictive models

for early detection of sickness on the basis of evaluation of financial health of the industrialunits.

(xii) Facilitation of Enabling Environment: Deterioration of Law and Order, extortion,

harassment etc. should be checked at any cost. In case of natural calamities, specialassistance should be provided for resilience.


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6.3 Remedial Measures

Despite all preventions and sincerity of the policy-makers and stakeholders, some industrial unitswould genuinely face sickness. In order to provide scope for timely revival of those units, efforts

should be underway from all concerned. However, some unviable units should be allowed to die a

natural death without delay.

The suggested remedial measures for the industrial units approaching towards sickness and

already turned sick, are as follows :

(i) Every bank and financial institution should have a Project Rehabilitation Cell manned by

the experts of various disciplines. There should be ongoing process of evaluation of theheath of the assisted units by the banks to detect early warning signals. For this, congenial

bank-client relationship is a must for extending co-operation to each other.(ii) Genuine sick units capable of being revived should be allowed rehabilitation package by

way of rescheduling of existing loans, waiver/remission of interest payments, conversion of

short term liabilities into long term obligations, etc. depending on the merit of the each case.

(iii) There might be one Interest Remission Committee to be formed by the Govt. from time totime to address the genuine problems of small sick units (where investment ceiling may be

upto Tk. 1 crore). However, this step should not encourage the non-sick units to avail of thistemporary facility. The screening process should be strict enough to select the genuine sick

units for such concession. As it was followed previously, the Govt. may compensate upto

50% of the waived interest to the concerned banks.(iv) If necessary, change of management of the sick units should be brought in to facilitate

successful running of the projects.(v) Only financial and management rehabilitations of the sick units will not bring the desired

result unless Govt. assistance in the form of reduced taxes, duties, concessions on various

charges like gas, electricity, etc., imposition of restriction on related import items etc are

made available.(vi) Bangladesh Bank may set up a Sick Industry Cell to monitor the performance of the lending

institutions in handling the problems of sick units and to co-ordinate the rehabilitationefforts of banks, financial institutions, Govt. and other agencies involved.

(vii) Possibilities of mergers and acquisitions may be explored in case of sick industrial units notcapable of being revived by their own strengths. Suitable policy guidelines may be framed

in this regard.

(viii)SOEs found chronically sick should not be allowed to operate in the limping state anyfurther. In case of sick SOEs capable of being revived, disinvestment process may be

expedited.

(ix) The provisions of Bankruptcy Act should be strictly enforced in case of sick industrialenterprises with liabilities for exceeding assets.


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References

01. Ahmed, M.U.(1999), Small and Cottage Industries Development Polices in Bangladesh: AnAnalysis of Effectiveness in the context of Industrial Policy 1991, Bank Parikrama Vol.

XXIV, March Issue, Dhaka.

02. Bhattacharya, D et.al. (1998), Sick Industries in Bangladesh A Report of the StudyCommissioned by MOI, GOB, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, Dhaka.

03. Bidani S.N. and Mitra, P.K. (1983), Industrial Sickness : Identification and Rehabilitation,Vision Books, New Delhi.

04. Chattopadhyay, S.K. (1995) Industrial Sickness in India, Sane Publications, New Delhi.05. GOB, (1982) : New Industrial Policy- 1982, Ministry of Industries, The Government of the

Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.06. GOB (1986): Revised Industrial Policy 1986, Ministry of Industries, The Government of

the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

07. GOB (1991) : Industrial Policy 1991, Ministry of Industries, The Government of thePeoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

08. GOB (1992), Report on Sick Projects Ministry of Industries, The Government of thePeoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

09. GOB (1997) : The Fifth Five Year Plan (1997-2002), Planning Commission, Ministry ofPlanning, The Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

10. GOB (1998): The Annual Budget 1998 99, Ministry of Finance, The Government of thePeoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

11. GOB (2002): Bangladesh Economic Survey, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, TheGovernment of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.

12. Khan, N.A. (1990), Sickness in Industrial Units, Anmol Publications, New Delhi.13. Pahwa, H.P.S. and Puliani, M. (1994), Sick Industries & BIFR, Bharat Law House, New

Delhi.

14. Panda, R, K. and Meher, R. K., (1992) Industrial Sickness A Study of Small ScaleIndustries, Ashish Publishing House, New Delhi.

15. Parmar, Renu S. (1995), Industrial Sickness in Small Scale Sector , Dattsons, Nagpur.16. Reza, S, Ahmed, M.U. and Mahmud, W. (1992) Small and Medium Scale Enterprises in

Industrial Development, Academic Publishers, Dhaka.

17. Saha, Sujit R. (1997) Industrial Sickness: A Study of the Selected Projects Financed by theDFIs in Bangladesh Ph. D Thesis (Unpublished).

18. Various Issues of the DCCI Review (Monthly), Dhaka.

sick industries

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