shattering the illusion of fema's progress

8/14/2019 Shattering the Illusion of FEMA's Progress

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Shat t er ing t he I l lus ion of FEMAs Progress :10 Recom m endat ions for Rebui ld ing a Broken Agenc y

AFGE Local 4060s Proposal for ChangeFebruary 3, 2009

Exec ut ive Summary

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1979 to help protectAmerican lives and property from the consequences of all emergencies and disasters.During the 1990s, under the leadership of James Lee Witt, FEMA evolved to become a

model Government agency with high employee morale and a strong sense of mission.

But since 2001, FEMA has been on a downward spiral, due initially to cuts in mitigation andother effective programs, and later to the diversion of funds to the newly createdDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) and to corresponding policy and resource shiftstoward the departments focus on security. The heavy departmental shift toward terrorismprevention and security, and the corresponding and misplaced agency reliance on defenseand military expertise, detracts from FEMAs critical mission to coordinate the nationalresponse to a disaster in partnership with other Federal agencies, State and localgovernments, and the non-government sector when security efforts fail, or when naturaldisaster strikes.

In the three years since Hurricane Katrina, FEMAs public relations efforts have pushed thestory that the agency has learned from its mistakes, telling the public that the agency hasbeen improving coordination, adding leadership, and recruiting talent to successfullysupport numerous disasters since those fateful days in the late summer of 2005. Theharsh truth is that the disasters FEMA has supported in recent years are basically mid-leveldisasters, and not large-scale catastrophes on the scale of Hurricane Katrina or the 9/11attacks. These more recent mid-scale disasters caused swaths of devastation, but did notfor the most part destroy local and State governments ability to coordinate and managetheir own responses to affected areas. Should a disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrinastrike today, we do not believe FEMA is ready.

This is an agency still suffering from a failure in leadership, the heavy influence of politicalappointees, a lack of strategic direction and coordination, poor and unqualifiedmanagement, over-reliance on contractors, undervaluation of employees, hostile workenvironments, wasteful spending, duplication of effort, and a systemic failure across theagency to integrate proven principles and concepts of emergency and incidentmanagement into programs and operations.


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FEMA today is running in circles. Preparedness activities are not based on the principlesand concepts of incident management, and do not serve to integrate exercises, training,and planning across the agency and across the Federal, State, tribal, and local spheres.Instead, multiple and separate plans are developed internally and externally for a variety ofpurposes, in various directorates, and often unnecessarily wasting tax dollars and staff

time. FEMAs preparedness activities do not link to other Federal, State, tribal, and localincident management activities let alone those in the private and nongovernmentalsectors. The National Response Framework (NRF) that has been put into place does notprovide a useful operational plan for coordinating a national response to any disaster, letalone an effective response to a catastrophic situation. FEMA itself does not follow theprinciples and concepts of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) that theagency is required to develop and implement nationally and that should provide aframework for the majority of its activities. Few of the mechanisms in place within FEMAspreparedness or operational response and recovery systems link soundly to State and localincident management programs or mutual aid coordination systems to create acomprehensive, coordinated approach to incident management.

American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Local 4060 is the unionrepresenting approximately 400 FEMA employees in the Washington, DC area. Many ofthese public servants who have worked for FEMA for years and have watched withfrustration and dismay as this once proud agency has been steadily dismantled, yetbranded with false claims of progress. The experience of these employees represents awealth of knowledge, yet this invaluable asset has not been tapped by FEMA.

AFGE Local 4060 believes that FEMAs role is vital for America, and that the agency needsto be put back on track before the next catastrophe strikes our country. Time is of theessence, as the both the risks and the vulnerabilities are high. To that end, this paperrecommends that the following 10 actions be taken by the new Administration immediatelyto begin to rebuild this broken agency:

1. Provide FEMA with strong and effective leadership at all levels, and the capabilitiesfor that leadership to turn the agency around.

2. Evaluate management at all levels for appropriate relevant experience; and activelyrecruit new management and staff, both from inside FEMA and from outsideagencies with first responder and emergency management experience.

3. Reduce the high number of political appointees in the agency; and ensure that allappointees have bona fide professional credentials in emergency management anda serious commitment to the reform of FEMA to ensure the agencys long-termviability and success.

4. Implement tools for job rotations and employment partnerships to strengthenFEMAs internal operations and its partnerships with Federal, State, tribal, and localgovernment agencies.

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5. Implement measures to stop the abuse, incompetence, and corruption permeatingthe ranks of FEMAs mid- and senior-level management.

6. Evaluate program areas where the use of private contracts has created waste,inefficiency, and ethically questionable policy, for potential conversion to work that

could be more efficiently and effectively accomplished by federal employees.

7. Immediately halt current agency hiring and reorganization actions until evaluationscan assess their legality and appropriateness.

8. Implement mechanisms to ensure that FEMAs knowledgeable and experiencedstaff are involved in strategy, management, and programs.

9. Build an agency strategy and organization based on the principles and concepts ofthe National Incident Management System (NIMS).

10. Pursue removal of FEMA from the Department of Homeland Security.

These recommendations are intended to provide the new Administration with a startingpoint to overhaul this damaged organization, mitigate the chronic problems underlying theagency, and lay the groundwork to rebuild a FEMA that will be prepared to facilitate aneffective and efficient response to a catastrophic disaster.

The following section provides additional background on the illusion of FEMAs progress,and specific details regarding each of these ten recommended and urgent actions.

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Shat t er ing t he I l lus ion of FEMAs Progress :10 Recom m endat ions for Rebui ld ing a Broken Agenc y

A New Improved FEMA, or a Skew ed Perspect ive?The deterioration of FEMAs capability can be best seen in three examples:

In 1995, when terrorists bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma Citywithout warning, FEMA staff mobilized immediately, and search and rescue teamswere on their way within two hours.

In 2005, FEMA and DHS leaders were unable to act effectively in response toHurricane Katrina, despite having more than two days advance warningof thestorm; and were incapable of acting effectively for several days after the storm hit.

In 2009, as the much-anticipated Presidential Inauguration approached, FEMA was

still preparingsomewhat ineffectively, as shown belowat the 11

th

hour.

FEMA is an agency suffering under the weight of inexperienced leadership, corruption,poor morale, shifting goals, and a lack of effective strategic integration. In the FEMA oftoday, funds are shifted away from Congressionally authorized and otherwise strategicallyfunded programs to questionable contracts under highly suspicious circumstances;programs are cancelled and re-started, then moved, cancelled, and re-started; offices areconstantly reorganized with no apparent long-term strategy; and agency leadershipcontinually activates emergency teams and other staff to work evenings, nights, andweekends at a high cost to the taxpayers when there is little or no danger of a majordisaster. Agency managers in many cases do not appear to grasp fundamental principles

of emergency management, and during actual disasters, many managers do notdemonstrate critical thinking relevant to the decisions that need to be made. The result inthe end is an increase in chaos, and not an agency equipped to bring some semblance oforder to an emergency.

In many ways, the agency appears to be leaning on public relations to cover the symptomsof ineptitude. In 2007, when FEMA learned that some trailers housing disaster victimscould be giving off formaldehyde, an in-house FEMA newsletter cheerfully reassured staffthat formaldehyde is a common substance that is found in homes and buildingseverywhere. But when a CBS TV News team attempted to interview FEMA AdministratorDavid Paulison about the issue, the Administrator at first did his best to turn his back to thecameras. When that failed and the cameras were in front of him, he turned his face awayfrom the cameras and mumbled a noncommittal response toward the ground. On the TVscreen, the Administrators actions more resembled those of an accused criminal thanthose of a responsible public official. The story as it unfolded in the national news over theensuing months became significantly more complex.

An aggressive FEMA public relations campaign struck again during the October, 2007wildfires in southern California. When FEMA staff were mobilized at that time, one of the

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first priorities mentioned by Deputy Administrator Harvey Johnson was for employees tovisibly display FEMA hats, shirts, and vehicle decals bearing the FEMA logo. After-actionreports from numerous sources following the fire disaster indicated that FEMAs largelyuninvited assistance actually confused things, and resulted in major resource mobilizationconfusion when FEMA added yet another coordination layer in an environment where

multiple resource coordination systems already existed. Further, FEMAs hollow andinaccurate public relations claims taking credit for the fire response coordination did nothelp build relationships with the existing Federal, State, and local agencies who wereheavily involved in actual fire suppression and response activities.

FEMAs latest public relations efforts seem focused around the message that the agency isjust a model for success, after having turned itself around following the massive failuresafter Hurricane Katrina struck. In fact, some of the credit for this supposed turnaround isbestowed upon DHS. But if the recent near-misses of the 2009 inauguration are anyindication, neither FEMA nor DHS are in a position to boast.

A Recent Event: The 2009 President ia l Inaugurat ionThe urgency of the need to make changes within FEMA may be best illustrated with a quicklook at the agencys handling of its most recent responsibility: support of the 2009Inauguration of President Barack Obama. While overall federal planning of theinauguration has arguably been in the works since the last Presidential Inauguration fouryears ago, FEMAs efforts to support the inauguration appear for all intents and purposes tohave occurred very much at the last minute and with very poor execution. Shortly after theNovember 2008 election, FEMA experienced difficulty locating hotel rooms for staff forinaugural activation at FEMAs Continuity of Operations (COOP) site in rural Virginia, asrooms had already been booked by other agencies that planned ahead, or by tourists

planning to attend inaugural activities. FEMAs internal inaugural activity planning appearsto deteriorate from there, with the agency devising plans as late as early January toactivate its National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) in downtown Washington, DCfor the Presidential Inauguration within two blocks of the National Mall.

Activation of FEMAs NRCC so close to the incident area violates generally accepted bestpractices for emergency management, specifically that numerous prior incidents haveshown that an incident command post or emergency operations center located very nearan incident runs the risk of being overrun by the incident itself therefore adding to theincidents complexity and diminishing the response capability for the incident. FEMAsdecision to activate the NRCC in such close proximity to the inauguration placed its

employees at risk, and jeopardized its own ability to coordinate an effective and efficientresponse to any potential incident in the area. Had an attack or any other unfortunateincident occurred during the Presidential Inauguration, it is difficult to tell if FEMAs alreadydiminished response capabilities might have been further jeopardized by the agencysdecision to locate its operations center location so close to event activities planned on theNational Mall.

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Near-last-minute activation of FEMAs NRCC in the downtown Washington, DC areabrought up several other issues. In the weeks prior to the inauguration, the agencyscrambled first to find employees to work the planned shifts, and was forced to recruitnumerous employees not previously trained to work in the NRCC for the planned event;and then struggled to find cots and other accommodations for a workforce that the agency

required to camp out in its headquarters office building for the event activation. Due to theinaugural event, traffic into and out of the city was restricted, and because of the latedecision to activate the NRCC downtown, FEMA did not know if it had enough hotel roomsfor staff.

Adding to the above issues are questions about inaugural event planning and responsecoordination itself. In the week since the inauguration, countless stories are surfacing fromwitnesses to the event, showing a lack of on-the-ground coordination between lawenforcement and other agencies and indicating that if an actual attack or incident hadoccurred during the Inauguration, the city and in fact the government may not have beenable to effectively manage the situation. Here again, it has been FEMAs responsibility to

build and implement a comprehensive national incident management system, yet duringthis very large-scale planned event, it does not appear that such a system was utilized bythe department or its agencies, nor does it appear to have been applied and utilizedconsistently across all involved agencies.

10 Recomm ended Act ionsFollowing are AFGE Local 4060s urgent recommendations to restore FEMAseffectiveness and for inspire our success as an agency.

1. Provide FEMA with strong and effective leadership at all levels, and thecapabilities for that leadership to turn the agency around.

The next FEMA Administrator must be technically qualified for the job, and bring broademergency management experience. The new Administrator would be best prepared tomanage the agency if he or she is able to bring in a strong background that includesemergency response coordination responsibilities across multiple and complex

jurisdictions with a high incident frequency and a corresponding need for mutual aid.FEMAs new Administrator will also be most successful if he or she has demonstratedeffective administration and coordination of the four key elements of emergency

management: 1) Mitigation, 2) Preparedness, 3) Response, and 4) Recovery.

Perhaps as importantly, the new Administrator requires support from the Administration,Congress, and departmental leadership to make appropriate agency decisions, and toensure that the agency is structured in such as way that those decisions can beeffectively coordinated and implemented.

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FEMAs career staff continue to endure an increasingly abusive and disorganizedatmosphere within the agency, and to remain greatly undervalued both for theirexpertise, and as candidates for growth and future leadership within the agency. Staffare concerned that they are not able to obtain training to do their jobs and to continuetheir careers in the agency, that they do not consistently receive required job

performance ratings, and that in some cases, they cannot even determine who theirdirect supervisor is.

In many cases, jobs at the GS-14 and 15 level have been filled with little or noadvertising, and there have been reports that several of these positions have been filledby persons who are personally connected (or even sexually involved) with the hiringofficial or corresponding FEMA executive. In countless other cases, qualified careerFEMA employees have not made certification lists for positions they should be well-qualified for. Experienced first-responders and emergency managers are also excludedfrom ranks of the well-qualified on many certification lists as well, and even when theyare not, FEMAs hiring practices and mechanisms do not necessarily encourage highly

qualified personnel who would be interested in working for FEMA to move themselvesto FEMAs locations.

In a large number of cases, GS-14 and GS-15 positions are not being filled byexperienced emergency managers. Since the creation of the Department of HomelandSecurity, there has been a heavy tendency for FEMA to hire ex-Coast Guard and ex-military personnel, many of whom have no domestic, field level civilian emergencymanagement experience, and who are not well-versed in building relationships andinteracting with the State, tribal, and local government agencies so critical to FEMAssuccess.

A new Administration would be well-served to institute an immediate temporary freezeon any hiring or promotion actions above the GS-13 level, (other than career ladderpromotions) in order to evaluate ongoing personnel actions for appropriateness and abase in merit, and to critically review previous promotion and hiring actions for the samereason. Further, an evaluation should be made to determine a strategic way forward inthis area to ensure that in future, experienced emergency managers and firstresponders from FEMA and from outside agencies are recruited and hired. With somestrategic thinking, FEMA could retool its human capital process to focus on training andpromoting qualified individuals from within, and on recruiting the most qualified andexperienced individuals from outside the agency who can bridge the gap betweenFEMA and its critical allies: the State and local agencies it is meant to support, theother Federal agencies with which it must partner, and the private and non-governmental sectors with whom it works in disasters.

3. Reduce the high number of political appointees in the agency; and ensure that allappointees have bona fide professional credentials in emergency managementand a serious commitment to the reform of FEMA to ensure the agencys long-term viability and success.

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FEMAs extremely high number of political appointees is not only disproportionate toother agencies of similar size; it also creates an environment of instability and aleadership vacuum during Administration transitions where the agencys stability, or lackthereof, could have ramifications for homeland and national security. Furthermore,FEMAs mission is not inherently political, in contrast to many other Federal

departments and agencies. In short, Americans appear to expect that FEMA will be aneffective mitigation, response coordination, and recovery agency despite the prevailingpolitical winds. Reducing the number of political appointees would create long-termstability and direction within the agency, increase cohesion, and also provide theopportunity for long-term leadership positions to be filled with agency executives whohave a solid experience base and a clear vision for the future.

4. Implement tools for job rotations and employment partnerships to strengthenFEMAs internal operations and its partnerships with Federal, State, tribal, andlocal government agencies.

While FEMA is in name a single agency, in many ways it is a series of separate, often-disconnected components. Staff who work in Preparedness may have minimalawareness of activities in Mitigation or Operations. Headquarters staff can work foryears and seldom, if ever, visit a FEMA Regional Office or Field Office. Likewise,Regional Office and Field Office staff can spend their entire careers in the agencywithout ever working at, or understanding, FEMA headquarters. Moreover, FEMAHeadquarters staff themselves are now scattered across nearly a dozen differentlocations in D.C. and Virginia, adding further obstacles to program coordination.

This situation has resulted in a fractured working culture where various groups bothinside and outside FEMA may not understand each other or may even be at odds withone another, and end up functioning in a disjointed fashion, when they function at all.

AFGE Local 4060 recommends that FEMAs new Administrator consider a proactiveapproach to this bureaucratic hurdle, and establish a system of cross-training and jobrotation at FEMA. Such a system could introduce mechanisms to get Headquartersstaff out of the Washington, DC area, and into the field to better understand FEMAsrole on the ground during a disaster, and to get field staff to Headquarters to gain depthand understanding into the policy and political context the agency is embedded within.Such a program would broaden the involvement of FEMA staff from all directorates indisaster mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and support.

There are also a number of other authorities which could be utilized to strengthenFEMAs understanding of and relationships with other Federal agencies and theagencys State, tribal, and local partners. These funding and hiring authorities could beutilized in tandem with employee development programs to increase the institutionalknowledge of the agency and its employees, and to build a stronger and more diverseworkforce for the agency.

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As an example, in the National Capital Region, a number of local governmentexecutives in Washington, DC, Maryland, and Virginia have expressed interest inparticipating in no-cost staff exchanges with FEMA for a few months to a year. FEMAsmanagement to date has not taken full advantage of this opportunity, but it representsfascinating potential. FEMA Regional Offices may have a similar situation. When a

major disaster hits, the mutual trust and familiarity between FEMA and the agencysnon-Federal partners can become crucial to a rapid and well-integrated response.Employee exchanges between the agency and neighboring partner agencies wouldbuild stronger relationships and mutual understanding of common and often complexissues all agencies face. There are opportunities for FEMA employees to learn otheraspects of response in other ways as well through the development of mutual aidagreements. Targeted agreements can improve capability as well as skills. Forexample, mutual aid agreements could facilitate deployment of agency personnel tolearn from well-established incident management teams, such as those in the wildlandfire community or hosted by experienced local government agencies, in order toimprove the agencys understanding and implementation of incident management

principles and concepts.

5. Implement measures to stop the abuse, incompetence, and corruptionpermeating the ranks of FEMAs mid- and senior-level management.

As indicated above, FEMA continues to experience a long-term trend toward hiring andpromotion practices favoring individuals whose job qualifications and often whoseethics are highly questionable. This trend began in 2001, increased in speed afterHurricane Katrina, and moved into high gear after the November, 2008 election. As aresult, FEMA has become top-heavy with less-than-qualified leaders, and well-intentioned FEMA staff who try to manage agency programs effectively (and legally)tend to be continuously frustrated in their efforts.

The following is just a partial list of the unfair hiring practices and hostile workenvironment(s) that have developed in the agencys current culture:

FEMA staff have continually been excluded from higher-paying jobs throughquestionable hiring processes that appear to favor pre-selected but under-qualified candidates.

Vacancies have been shifted from their assigned and funded program areas tonebulous programs with different managers and unclear purposes, for reasonsthat raise questions about conflicts of interest and the agencys intentions to

meet required program mandates. Experienced FEMA staff are passed over for promotions and then required to

train their newly-hired and inexperienced supervisors and expected to do sowith deference.

Many jobs are being filled without being competitively advertised. Federal civil service hiring regulations appear to have been bypassed or ignored

in the hiring of new employees at all levels within the agency.

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There is an obvious shift away from the agencys use of career ladders for thepromotion of internal employees, and other tools to train and improve theworkforce in favor of hiring unqualified outside employees into federal service.

Unqualified new employees hired into federal service who do not perform are notremoved from federal service during their probationary periods.

Managers and employees who have knowingly broken laws or regulations areoften simply counseled not to do it again, and allowed to keep their jobs andoften when they are still within the probationary period where they could beremoved from federal service.

Supervisors who are known to terrorize and intimidate their employees areallowed to remain at the agency and in supervisory positions.

Complaints of harassment and discrimination on the job have risen exponentially,and the agency has paid undisclosed sums of taxpayer dollars to settle theseclaims. (These include, for example, an allegation by a female employee thatshe was sexually assaulted in her office by a FEMA executive.)

Complaints of sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and even workplace

violence are not addressed or resolved. FEMA field offices, located far from Washington, DC, have become notorious for

sexual and racial discrimination, and for pre-selection and favoritism in hiring andpromotion practices

As indicated above, AFGE Local 4060 recommends an immediate, temporary hiringfreeze on all positions above the GS-13 level (other than career ladder promotions) toensure that new hires are qualified candidates selected on the basis of merit, and thatthe selection system has been open and fair. The union suggests that an impartialreview of all hiring and promotion actions above the GS-13 level, including all SESpositions, since January 1, 2006 be conducted to determine the validity and

appropriateness of these hiring decisions; in part for the determination of future actionsif said hires were achieved inappropriately or in violation of civil service rules.

AFGE Local 4060 also recommends re-establishing supervisory ratings, whereby staffrate their supervisors, and to make these ratings a part of supervisors records in orderto encourage appropriate behavior and to discourage abuse and misconduct.

AFGE Local 4060 encourages the new administration to research the agencys humancapital and contracting practices, and to provide an environment where employees canfeel safe in coming forward with information regarding illegal and unethical practices.This complex and potentially corrupt situation will not be easy to address, but it must be

addressed if FEMA is to be revitalized and rebuilt.

This process will undoubtedly require changes in the way FEMA's Human Capital(HC) Division is run. The failure of HC leadership to put a stop to FEMA's highlyquestionable personnel practices, and to continually allow marginally or un-qualifiedstaff to be hired and promoted at FEMA is unacceptable. It is also unacceptable thatthe HC Division continues to support some of our most abusive managers in theirhostile and adverse actions against FEMA employees. Why are GS-15 jobs

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advertised for only five days? Why are so many jobs filled without being advertisedat all? Why are some FEMA managers allowed to abuse and scream at theiremployees without penalty, while rank-and-file employees face disciplinary actionsfor relatively minor infractions?

The union has no way of knowing to what extent, if any, HC Division leadership isculpable for the many personnel abuses at FEMA, but it seems that HC would be anobvious starting point to investigate these problems. It is AFGE Local 4060'sposition that the incoming Administration needs to critically review the actions ofFEMA's HC Division leadership to assess accountability regarding FEMA'spersonnel practices, and to determine what if any remedial actions need to be taken.

In addition, we recommend an Equal Rights audit of the agency to determine ourstatus in that regard, and to suggest remedial actions that may be needed.

If FEMA is to function, we need to have a fair and efficient personnel system that not

only adheres to applicable civil service laws and regulations, but that actively worksto promote an effective, high-morale workforce.

6. Evaluate program areas where the use of private contracts has created waste,inefficiency, and ethically questionable policy, for potential conversion to workthat could be more efficiently and effectively accomplished by federal employees.

It has been widely reported that there are extensive and large contracts in place withinFEMA for a wide range of activities, from preparedness activities, to policy, to response,to long-term recovery. FEMAs spending on large contracts is extremely high, andrepresents in many cases massive and significant waste and possible fraud.Questionable ethics practices within the agency abound, and it is debatable whether theagency has sufficient oversight for the high contract volume. In addition, much workthat is done by contractors may actually be work that is inherently governmental. Dueto known violations in this area, the agency has had to send agency-wide memosseveral times over the past year to remind employees and contractors of policiesregarding work that is and is not appropriate for contractors to perform.

AFGE Local 4060 recommends that the incoming FEMA leadership immediately andtemporarily freeze all contract activities relevant to new or renewing contracts until suchtime as they can be evaluated for their appropriateness in the use of appropriated funds,and in light of ethical and political considerations and original program funding andintent. In many cases, the type of work that is done by contractors could arguably bedone by federal employees at a significantly reduced cost to the government. AFGELocal 4060 encourages the new FEMA leadership to examine the potential forsignificant long-term cost-savings and improved efficiencies in this area by convertingcontracted tasks to federal jobs.

Much of FEMAs contracting is specific to disaster response and recovery. In this areaalone, improvements in coordination of response resources, planning, and tighter

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integration between preparedness and operational components as well as actualimplementation of the principles and concepts of a national incident managementsystem could significantly improve efficiency and effectiveness of the agency and itscorresponding contracts. Exploring development of a single, integrated nationalcoordination system would provide the agency with the potential to save significant

additional contract dollars. Such a coordination system, with adherence to singleordering points and a standardized ordering process for mobilizing and prioritizingresources, could decrease FEMAs extensive spending on contracts for response byvastly improving efficiency.

7. Immediately halt current agency hiring and reorganization actions untilevaluations can assess their legality and appropriateness.

Within FEMA, there are currently numerous active reorganization, realignment, andpersonnel actions, including new hires, that are questionable in terms of ethics, agencydirection, policy, and/or appropriations requirements. While this trend has persisted in

recent years, it accelerated rapidly after the November 2008 election with an obviousrush to fill as many leadership positions as possible in place before the advent of thenew Administration. Leadership positions at FEMA have been advertised for as little asfive days or in some cases, not advertised at all before being filled by candidateswho in some cases appear to have been pre-selected by the prior Administration.

Further, there are ongoing reorganization and realignment activities underway in theagency that contradict agency direction prohibiting such actions during theAdministrations transition, but which are also prohibited in legislative direction andprovisions in agency appropriations. Immediately halting all actions related toreorganizations and realignments would allow incoming agency leadership to ensurethat the agency meets the full intent of the law before such actions are completed inpossible violation of the law, and to ensure that agency actions are in compliance withthe new Administrations intentions and direction.

8. Implement mechanisms to ensure that FEMAs knowledgeable and experiencedstaff are involved in strategy, management, and programs.

In rebuilding FEMA, AFGE Local 4060 recommends that the new Administrator draw onan excellent source of ideas for strengthening the agency: FEMAs own employees.The great majority of FEMA staff are strongly dedicated to the Agencys mission, andtheir experience brings knowledge of how to better meet that mission.

AFGE Local 4060 invites FEMAs new leadership to meet with union representatives towork together to identify problem locations, to listen to employees concerns and vision,and to work proactively toward effective and real solutions to outstanding issues. Theunion encourages a close partnership in the development of an updated, fair, andeffective personnel system within the agency.

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In preparing this paper, the union solicited suggestions from current and former FEMAstaff. The results of this solicitation are attached, and remain un-edited except foralterations toward brevity and clarity. AFGE Local 4060 recommends that the newAdministrator and his or her staff invest some time to consider these inputs prior tomaking any major changes to the agency.

The union also suggests that FEMAs incoming Administrator make an effort todetermine employees professional assessments of their managers and the actualeffectiveness of the management of program areas where they are working. Many ofFEMAs executives and managers are in fact effective leaders who should be retained,others are not. Both groups need to be identified and appropriately valued.

AFGE Local 4060 strongly recommends that the new Administration implementprocesses to ensure that employees and their input are included in agency strategy anddecision-making processes. There are many options for doing so, including astrengthening and enhancement of the role of FEMAs Labor-Management Partnership

Council (LMPC). The union also recommends the development of a program to solicitsuggestions from FEMA staff on an ongoing basis so that those public servants withinthe agency can safely and effectively express their ideas for strengthening the agency.Union members have seen the success of an Administrators open-door policy in thepast, and the practice comes highly recommended. Such a policy would allow anyemployee, at any grade level, the opportunity to talk to the Administrator in person for atleast a few minutes at some point. This approach not only improves communication, itimproves morale, loyalty, and trust.

Surveys over the past few years at FEMA show that employee morale is near or at rock-bottom. FEMA struggled to reach 95% of full staffing in 2007, but a year later thoselevels were back down to 75%; a 20% loss. In other words, employees are still quittingfaster than they can be replaced, and many of those who remain are searching for new

jobs outside the agency, or are looking into retirement. There is evidence that FEMAshighly trained Federal Coordinating Officers (FCOs) continue to leave, meaning that theemployment satisfaction issue is not limited to non-supervisory personnel.

FEMAs recent practices do not indicate that the agency values its employees, includingits own management. This became even clearer during the transition when a largevolume of questionable job announcements, new hires and promotion actions occurred,and last-minute appointments and management shifts were put in place. The union isavailable to help the new FEMA leadership find a positive way forward through thistangle to help repair the damage done to FEMA, to public servants and their careers,and to work for the success of the agency as a whole.

9. Build an agency strategy and organization based on the principles and conceptsof the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 stated that the Department of Homeland Security(DHS) Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and

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Response [now FEMA], shall include responsibilities for building a comprehensivenational incident management system [NIMS] with Federal, State, and local governmentpersonnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and disasters; [and]consolidating existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single,coordinated national response plan.

FEMA would be a more effective and efficient agency if it were built around theprinciples and concepts of a comprehensive national incident management system(NIMS), and if the national response plan it was directed to build actually followed thosesame principles and provided a single, clear, integrated operating plan for the agency.Instead, FEMA is again writing countless and separate plans, and has failed to integratepreparedness activities with operational components both internally and externally through its own policies, direction, and grants processes. FEMAs failure to build andutilize an integrated and comprehensive national incident management system meansthat FEMAs response mechanisms are separate and often stove-piped from those usedby other Federal agencies and State, tribal, and local governments, detracting from the

efficiency and effectiveness of response and negatively impacting public safety.

10. Pursue the Removal of FEMA from the Department of Homeland Security.

DHS focuses mainly on security, intelligence, and law enforcement for preventingterrorism. FEMA focuses on comprehensive emergency management: mitigation,preparedness, response, and recovery. The integration of FEMA into a departmentwhose primary mission is so different from FEMAs creates internal conflict as well ascompetition for resources, and a severely disjointed program.

For the most part, the roles of FEMA and of the roles of the rest of the DHS componentsare very different, yet personnel and leadership within and outside DHS frequentlyconfuse these roles and their corresponding expectations. When errors have occurredas a result, DHS leadership has often focused on covering up the errors rather thanaddressing them. To cite just two examples:

When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, FEMA was taking orders from homelandsecurity personnel who seemed to know little or nothing about disaster relief and who appeared to be primarily concerned with protecting the Administrationspublic image. A National Situation Report produced by FEMA staff gave FEMAand DHS executives a detailed warning about the impending storm 48 hoursbefore Katrina hit. After Hurricane Katrina, the incriminating report was deletedfrom FEMAs public website, and was restored only after outside groups aware ofthe reports existence brought legal action.

In 2006, DHS determined that hurricanes could be predicted reliably a weekprior to landfall, and that detailed response planning would be handledaccordingly. FEMA staff who disputed this unscientific approach were told not toargue the point, and a manager who used computer modeling to disprove theDHS one-week-warning theory was abruptly reassigned to different duties.

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These are just two of many cases where DHS leadership have clearly shown that theyare inexperienced and unaware of emergency management science, practices, andconcepts.

Being part of DHS crippled FEMA during Hurricane Katrina. Put simply, the systemdoes not work well when anti-terrorism experts are put in charge of rescuing floodvictims. It is AFGE Local 4060s contention that FEMA is not likely to function at its fullcapability if it stays a subordinate component of DHS. Instead, we believe FEMA andDHS should work together as co-equal partners to protect Americans in time of crisis.

In ClosingIn preparing this paper, the union solicited suggestions from current and former FEMA staff.Their responses are attached, and are un-edited except for alterations for brevity and clarity.

AFGE Local 4060 recommends that the new Administrator and his or her staff invest sometime to consider these inputs prior to making any major changes to the agency.

We would welcome the opportunity to meet with incoming FEMA leadership to discuss theideas, issues, and potentials outlined in this document to move FEMA forward and tostrengthen the agency for a better future.

The members of AFGE Local 4060 are confident that FEMA can meet the challenges of thefuture in partnership with our new leadership. We hope these ideas are useful, and wewish success to the new Administration.

Respectfully Submitted,

_________/s/____________

Michael Walker, PresidentAFGE Local 4060PH: 202-646-3177

_________/s/____________

Pleasant Mann, Vice PresidentAFGE Local 4060PH: 202-646-3161

_________/s/____________

Leo Bosner, Chief Shop StewardAFGE Local 4060PH: 202-646-3496

ATTACHMENTS: Compiled FEMA Staff Comments and Recommendations

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ATTACHMENTS

The following attachments were submitted by current and former FEMA staff. Some ofthem have been edited for clarity, spelling, or grammar, but otherwise have been left asis to represent the employees opinions.

Title Page

Topic A Reasons to Take FEMA out of DHS....18

A Comedy Writers Inspiration at FEMA21

Could My Family Schedule the Funeral for the Weekend?.22

Employee Morale, Health, and Stress...24

Employee Performance Management System for FEMA...31

Employee Recruitment, Training, and Retention.35

Hiring and Promoting Our Friends..40

History Repeats Itself at FEMA...42

Horror Stories from Texas44

Hurricane Ike Inside the New FEMA45

I Called FEMA and They Didnt Even Know a Hurricane Hit New Orleans!..50

Individual Assistance (IA) Program Suggestions..58

Integrating With the Academic Community60

Its Freezing In Here!............................................................................................63Native American Tribes and FEMA..65

Playing Politics?....................................................................................................68

FEMAs Private Sector Office Under the Obama Administration.69

Recommendations to Management..73

Reservist Cadre Issues...78

A Reservists Thoughts on FEMA 1...83

A Reservists Thoughts on FEMA 2...85

Safety and Health at Disasters...87

Voluntary Agencies...88

We Are Working Under Horrible Leadership..89

The Worst FEMA Assignment Ever90

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Topic A Reasons to Take FEMA out of DHS

1. President Barack Obama has promised change, and this is an example of a changethat can be made which will be embraced by the American people. The averageAmerican wasnt involved in the decision to put the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),however, the average American remembers when FEMA was there to support themand worked so well in the 1990s. Taking FEMA out is really a Congressional

jurisdiction issue, and the American public will embrace this change as anotherexample of Barack Obama doing something to make the government work for thepeople. Removing FEMA is a positive step from a public perception stand point. It isthe perfect example of taking an action to make government more responsive to theneeds of the people.

2. The DHS mission of preventing terrorist attacks by protecting the borders, the seas,the airports, and cyber space is a law enforcement mission. There is nothing in the

FEMA mission that supports this law enforcement objective, therefore, FEMA doesnot contribute to this mission. This is why DHS taxed FEMA funds to support otherDHS elements that were part of its mission. FEMAs mission is to help the Nationmitigate, prepare, respond and recover from the consequences of all hazards.Consistent with its consequence management mission, terrorism is one of thehazards FEMA would address, as it did as an independent Federal Agency followingthe World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, andthe terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

3. DHS mission and programs are driven by the Federal government being in charge.FEMA programs and authorities under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act (P.L.93-288), clearly defines the role of FEMA as a Federal entity, which acts in supportof and supplement al to State and local jurisdictions. This partnership with State andlocal governments is critical. This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that FEMA isthe only entity included in DHS that has 10 Regional Offices to support its activitieswith State and local governments and partnerships with the private sector.

4. Homeland Security, i.e. terrorism, is a national security issue with uniqueparameters and restrictions from a prevention perspective that do not exist or play arole in other man made or natural disasters. This is a singular issue whoseprevention should be supported, it cannot be all hazard but needs to coordinate withthose mechanisms, such as public health that can support its deterrence but willnever be the primary focus of its implementation this is truly an apples andoranges combination.

5. The idea that the agencies being combined into DHS would make for a betterFederal response has not materialized, in fact it has inhibited the Federal response.As an independent Agency, FEMA coordinated and directed the actions of all of theother Federal agencies to support State and local government response to andrecovery from disasters. It was assured of access to the full resources and

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capabilities of the Federal government through the Federal Response Plan andreimbursement through the Disaster Relief Act. During Katrina, the Coast Guard,self deployed and did an exemplary job in rescuing people in Katrina but had FEMAstill been in charge, the Coast Guard also may have been used to shore up thelevees and do other tasks that would have resulted in a less devastating event, but

because they were acting as a part of DHS, they chose their missions as opposed toperforming duties designated by what used to be the lead agency, FEMA. Otherthan the Coast Guard, there are no entities within DHS that directly support,contribute to or enhance this Nations emergency management capability.

6. It is hard to define a much more essential function of government than responding todisasters. The American populace believes that their government should be there tohelp during a time of disaster. The Administrations response to a disaster, moreoften natural than anything else, is one of the most visible examples of a competentgovernment and Presidency. This is a singular issue that can be tested in the 50 +States and territories; it is not tied to the more long term terrorism or homeland

security issues. During the 1990s, the Presidents approval ratings rose every timeFEMA responded to a disaster. This is a high priority to the American public morepeople believe they may be impacted by a natural disaster than by a terrorist attack,and the statistics support that presumption. In response to this, the Administrationneeds a single, visible face for disaster response and recovery whose soleresponsibility is to assure the populace that the Administration will support themduring their time of need and support their State and local governments,communities, private sector, etc in being rebuilt after a disaster and that they are thedirect representative of the President.

7. Returning FEMA to an independent status will reduce the bureaucratic layersbetween the FEMA Director and the President and State and local governmentsduring the response and recovery process.

8. Establishing FEMA as an independent Agency will actually reduce disaster costsand be cost effective. FEMA, as an independent Agency, operated lean, using a costeffective, temporary, surge workforce, State and local partners and some contractorsupport. We need to go back to that model and support development of State andlocal capability. For example, DHS has paid millions in dollars to private contractorsfor evacuation capabilities in the Gulf Regions even when not executed. Anindependent FEMA worked with State and local governments to support evacuationpossibilities that were executed during Hurricane Floyd when x people successfullyevacuated from Florida, GA, NC and SC.

9. Responding to disasters inhibits the Secretary of DHS from accomplishing his criticalhomeland security mission. When a disaster occurs, the Agency responsible forresponding to that disaster becomes the face of the President and must be on site atthat disaster for extended periods of time, do we want the Sec. of DHS, absent fromthe critical daily duties of combating terrorism for extended periods of time andleaving the country vulnerable? For example, the FEMA Director spent almost 6

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weeks in Southern California after the Northridge Earthquake and almost 3 weeks inOklahoma City after the Oklahoma City bombing.

10. Fix what is broken. Right now, the Nations emergency management system isbroken. Some say that FEMA needs a break and the Agency should not be

reorganized at this time. Also, it will cost money to reorganize yet again. Butkeeping the status quo will result in another Katrina. The system must be fixed andthe first step is moving FEMA out of DHS and making its mission a top priority in theObama Administration.

11. DHS has discouraged expanding the partnerships that historically made the Nationsemergency management system work. In fact, DHS has moved to centralize moreand more of the Federal governments response and recovery capabilities in DHSand FEMA. Old partners are being pushed out and new partnership opportunitiesare being ignored. All disasters are local and trying to centralize the response andrecovery capabilities in the Federal government is a recipe for disaster.

12. The aftermath of a disaster is a time when the recovery process can concentrate onbuilding a community back better and more safe than before. This includesenvironmentally sound decisions and practices, such as the recycling of debrismaterials and new construction and larger repairs that take a greener approach.Congress has encouraged these actions but the thrust of such efforts has nothing todo with DHS mission or day to day operations and a lack of understanding by DHSleadership has discouraged any innovation, even when it was included in the PostKatrina Act.

13. FEMA elements, such as Mitigation and Flood Insurance and Response andRecovery can complement each other. The floodplain mapping can inform decisionson the placement of temporary and semi-permanent housing as well asinfrastructure repairs. Insurance requirements can encourage stronger buildingcodes. FEMA must concentrate on this existing synergy rather than trying to meld itwith prominent DHS concerns such as immigration enforcement or anti-terroristintelligence.

14. In the cacophony of the post-disaster environment, its important to have one sureand certain federal voice. Given the top tier DHS leaderships need for identity, anew position was created Principal Federal Official (PFO) that appeared tooverride the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) appointed by the President.Congress now refused to fund the PFO, but that position was present after Katrinaand caused confusion and administrative problems. An independent FEMA wouldnot have a PFO and would have the necessary authority to carry out an efficientresponse and a comprehensive recovery.

***

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A Comedy Writers Inspiration at FEMA

For the first round of Katrina CORE hirings in Louisiana in March 2006, my coworkermistakenly wandered into the wrong classroom and sat in on a "How to Apply For aFEMA CORE Job" class which was taught at the Area Field Office in New Orleans. The

staff in the office had been working on their applications for months for the jobs whichwere advertised "All Sources."

The format was unpublished and required at least five pages of Knowledge, Skills, andAbilities (KSAs) in size 11 font, single spaced, with 1/2 inch margins all the wayaround. The instructor stressed that individuals were standing by the fax machine withrulers and would shred any resumes or applications that came in any other format. Theonly place this format was taught was at the New Orleans Area Field Office (AFO, laterthe Transitional Recovery Office or TRO).

Once my coworkers put their applications in this format, they were successful in getting

jobs, including a 19-year-old who had just started his senior year in high school whenKatrina hit who got a GS-11 CORE position.

That was part of the beginning of my love affair with FEMA. You know I wanted to be acomedy writer before I came to FEMA, and I felt like that little tidbit was Gods way ofagreeing with megiving me material to become a non-fiction comedy writer.

***

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Could My Family Schedule the Funeral for the Weekend?

There is a pervasive lack of professional courtesy within the Agency, which breedswaste, inefficiency, and exacerbates the retention problems. In the current culture,supervisors disrespect employees' time, talent, and professional development, which

encourages employees to disrespect each other. Some examples:

Some offices hold daily 7:00 a.m. meetings for all employees to prepare forstandard 8:30 a.m. 5:00 p.m. office hours, which builds in standard overtime foremployees during non-disaster periods. During disasters, emergencies. and atthe supervisors' request, the 7:00 a.m. meeting is held for a standard work day,but employees will stay until 7:00 p.m. or even 9:00 p.m. "in case leadershipneeds them later in the evening." Senior leadership schedules meetings andbriefings for 4:30, 6:00, or later and requests these meetings or briefings in themorning, leaving employees no time to plan for child care or their personal needs.

My supervisor would email me on my blackberry until 11:30 at night though herequired me to be at work at 7:00 a.m. If I did not answer, I got a cell phonecall. These calls would sometimes be "out of curiosity" kinds of inquiries and thesupervisor requested that I not account for the time.

Upon telling my supervisor about a death in my family, he asked if my loved onehad been cremated, and, if so, could my family schedule the funeral for theweekend because he could not spare me from the office that week. Mycoworkers asked the same question.

One employee put off chemotherapy for hurricane season though he was told he

needed it in July. Senior management said they could not spare him, though hisposition consisted mostly of attending daily meetings and being "on-call" the restof the day and the chemo treatments would only take one day per week. Whenactivated, he was required to do the same 7-day, 12-hour per day shifts as otheremployees.

Employees can be deployed at any time for any length of time. This isunderstandable during a disaster, but that is not always the case. A friend ofmine was told one morning that he would deploy for a few days. He went home,packed his things, and left that afternoon for "a few days" and returned six weekslater. This was a non-disaster deployment that the supervisor knew about

beforehand but it did not occur to him to tell the employee until the morning hewas to leave. The employee had no family and was able to give ask a neighborto care for his pet until he returned. This practice is not uncommon.

There are rivalries between offices that should be coordinating with each other;these rivalries are led by the supervisors and perpetuated by employees. On aconference call with all of the Regions and some other Federal agencies, mycoworkers began complaining that the office down the hall "does nothing and is

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completely incompetent." The supervisor chimed in and, as a result, manyRegions and Federal Agencies did not call into the next conference calls.

Supervisors rely on one employee for specific tasks and will openly tell thatemployee that it is because their coworkers "don't know what they're doing."

Standard forms are changed by offices without notice or public posting. Thesechanges can be as small as changing the width of a border on the form, but theoffice in charge of processing the action (pay roll, benefits, Travel Authorization,reimbursements, etc), will refuse to perform the action on that basis.

***

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Employee Morale, Health, and Stress

I think that the first problem at FEMA that has to be addressed by the nextadministration is morale. While a new plane or ship can help increase the productivity ofthe Department of Defense, the only thing that FEMA can rely on is a well-trained staff

with competent leadership to do its mission. However, the fact that we have beenplaced under DHS, robbed of financial and personnel resources and provided withquestionable leadership has reduced our chances of success. The constant change inresponsibilities, such as the removal and then restoration of the responsibility forproviding grants to State and local governments, has led to constant turmoil inorganization and functions. In the last six months, there have been at least sixreorganizations in various parts of FEMA. The struggle over MaxHR has also caused agreat deal of personal and professional uncertainty. Even just the fact that FEMAHeadquarters is now spread over at least nine different sites around the city hasreduced our sense of togetherness and cohesion. Even though the Post Katrina Act of2006 mandated that everyone at FEMA be put on a career path, this still has not been

done by management.

The OPM survey of the Federal government has shown that the morale at FEMA isnear the bottom of all Federal agencies, reducing our ability to be productiveprofessionals. While FEMA was able to fill 95 percent of its positions in June 2007, ayear later the number of filled positions had dropped to 75 percent to attrition, giving anidea of the current level of turmoil. The current state of written policy at FEMA is anotherproblem that shows the state we are in. A great deal of our policy and guidance is out ofdate, or published as interim guidance, although no one can tell you the process orauthorities needed to make it approved guidance.

I think we lack people with experience at State and local level emergency management.That is what we have been missing after Katrina. A lot of the hair-trigger activationsin response to any potential problem is probably due to the lack of experience that mostof our current leadership have, compared to the people at the State and local level whohave had to actually decide when to mobilize resources for an event.

***

These are some of the issues that concern us in our office:

We are constantly being told that we (FEMA) are broke and that they (the newmanagers) were brought here to fix us.

Being rewarded/bribed with candy and stickers and giving out magic wands inorder to do a good job. Treating the staff like kindergarten students.

Management is untruthful saying things and then denying that it was said.

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Staff have been told that the manager was on Prozac when interviewed for theposition.

Constantly saying that they are new to FEMA and that they do not know anythingabout what is going on.

Denying staff permission to participate in casual dress Fridays.

Management is canceling some of the staffs compressed work schedule and notothers - without any reason.

Favoritism in the office.

Hiring military friends for vacant positions instead of qualified FEMA personnel.

Katrina COREs are only given a 6 months extension but they are continually

hiring new two-year Katrina COREs.

Management feels that job titles do not mean anything they suggest that astaffer can call ones self anything that they want because a title does not meananything.

Management keeps telling the staff that we might be audited and could go to jail.

***

While I do not have access to the senior management diversity stats- actually probably

applies throughout entire agency when this administration took office- but I stronglybelieve if a comparison is drawn from the previous admin to this one you would see twounwritten requirements for senior management positions are male gender and havinghad a previous dot.mil email address. I think we would be further down the road as anagency if we had more diversity of thought and mannerism when dealing with complexissues than what we currently have. Another obvious way to get the difference acrossquickly is to note the motto under previous administration was "people helping people"under this administration that was changed to "a nation prepared". Says it all to me!

***

I was definitely stressed out, and when I went to the nurse as a healthy XX-year-old andwas told that I could plausibly be having a stroke due to stress, I was prettyshocked. The best thing that happened was that the nurse seemed like this happeneda lot with people in the Agency having stress-related health problems. I had figured outthat my work environment was not healthy, but was angered and actually kind ofinspired that it was a systemic problem. I laughed and she and I talk about it every timeI stop by.

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We forget that our coworkers have home lives and, since there's no Agency-wide pushfor work/life balance, people trudge along and cultivate a lot of stress.

And I think that's another overarching theme of the New FEMA: There's no sense ofdeliberate intention around the Agency in normal life or, thus, during a disaster. Things

in the office just seem to happen. Take, for instance, the space and furniture allocation"process:"

1. You are sitting in your office, doing your job.

2. Someone who works in some management position in your directorate walks intoyour office with a stranger.

3. You tune into the fact that they are talking about how to arrange the furniture andwho will go in each (currently occupied) office.

4. You introduce yourself and say "can I help you?"

5. The stranger explains that they are moving into the office while the managementperson avoids eye contact.

6. The management person quickly wraps up your conversation and moves thespace allocation discussion out of your space.

After this, the rumors start, you ask your boss who has heard nothing of it but finds outthat you are moving (even though you all just moved into the space) and tells everyoneto pack their stuff for "the move" which then takes weeks, months, or suddenlysomeone's box is on your desk one morning. It's quite disconcerting. Meanwhile,furniture is moved overnight (who hasn't lost a bookshelf here or there?) or while theoccupant is on deployment. It's an everyday thing, but that's not the way businesses dobusiness.

The lack of procedure exists in almost every administrative process in this Agency, andis matched only by the lack of communication throughout each process. How I requesttime off varies by supervisor (understandable - email works for some, while in-writingworks for others) but also how or if I charge time spent "on-call" varies by supervisorand by day, it seems. Most of that is the supervisors requirement - they want you attheir personal beck and call or will not hire/train additional staff, but they don't want topay for that.

Where being on-call may be an Agency requirement for NRCC and disasterdeployments, I don't think OPM has been contacted to ensure people are paidaccording to regulations. XXX, the former Team Lead on FIRST-(city), currentOperations Section Chief on Region XXX's IMAT, who has worked within theseguidelines as a supervisor, told me that if I was truly "on-call" for the NRCC ActivationTeam, according to OPM guidelines, I should be compensated per hour or day that I

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was on-call, due to the fact that I was a GS-XX. Only GS-YYs and above can beperpetually on-call. My then-supervisor said "we won't worry about that" but my nextsupervisor said "we should check that out" and never got back to me. By the way,some IMAT team members (who are perpetually on-call for deployment as a primaryduty) are GS-9s or 11s, but we never asked for or got guidance from HR or OPM for

that.

My point is that this Leaning-Forward-Always-At-The-Ready stuff is not new togovernment and thus should be checked against existing regulations. Though I was on"24-hour call" for my entire time as an employee and answered the blackberry at night,early morning, and on "time off," I was only compensated for the hours of overtimespent physically at work. I'm not asking for money, but some oversight to protectemployees.

The lack of Agency procedures surrounding on-call duration and compensation (the lossof the Red, White, and Blue team rotations, for example) creates a burnout that drives

people out of the Agency (in May 2007, FEMA was losing 29 PFT employees per monthand in June of 2008, that number had risen to 75 - a rate of over 3% of the agencyPFTs at that time). For those who stay, it severely impacts the motivation to serve themission. Four of 11 employees in the OPB left the Agency on July 4th, after a month onstraight 24-hour NRCC shifts for Midwest Flooding, and during what became a busyHurricane Season. Most offices in Operations stopped sending employees to theNRCC for Hurricane Ike because they had been deployed so often through the year. Anumber of GS-14s and one GS-13 in Disaster Ops have reached or are in danger ofreaching 15-step 10 and are no longer reporting overtime. Might check to see if this ishigher in one Directorate over another.

I would bet that the percentage of people taking all of their Use-or-Lose in Nov/Dec/Janis higher in FEMA, but I don't have experience in other Agencies. This is a missionissue: Mother Nature (or, you could say, Terrorism for those who are not afraid of her)doesn't rest because we can't stop people taking their Use-or-Lose time. The MidwestWinter Storms last year were marked by a lack of employees and leadership in theAgency, so who could deploy or make the call to do so?

My family is VERY skeptical of me returning to FEMA because of overtime I did in thefirst 6 months of the year. As a GS-XX, I earned enough in overtime to be a GS YYduring the non-Hurricane season and even then, in the NRCC, my supervisorwas asking me to work during my XXX because "no one else felt like workingweekends." This was after 17 straight nightshifts, 3 of which I spent alone in thePlanning Section because other team members or their supervisors refused thedeployment. I was feeling a little loopy at the time, but was dedicated to the NRCC andknew there was no one to take my place. Not that the agency couldn't find someone tohelp out, from PFT staff or even the DAE cadre, but my willingness to work continuallywith no time off and the lack of oversight from leadership kept anyone from reallylooking/ requiring other employees to deploy. When I gave my 2-weeks notice, theybrought in XXX who was on overnight shifts from the end of June through the end of

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September in the Planning Section. I had to quit the agency to get relief on a disasterdeployment.

I laughed when Paulison and Johnson quoted an employee who said "I've seen morechange in FEMA in the last 2 years than in the previous 25!" at the December 2007 All-

Hands. They stated this as a good thing and meant it to improve morale, but come on.

Anyway, to somewhat wrap this up, here is what changes would bring me back toFEMA (and here are the standards I've set for whichever office I return to when I return,because some actually do this): oversight and tracking of all employee deployments andovertime; established limits on the amount of overtime or time spent deployed for allemployees; establishment of office structure and space allocation systems to ensurepeople; procedures for office name, purpose, or location changes; mandatory trainingfor all employees; more access to education or training opportunities (more than 1% ofAgency funding on training too much to ask?); and a concentrated health and wellnessprogram for all employees - HQ and field offices.

Here's how I would do it:

1. Decide on a timeline for restructuring directorates and reviewing Agencystructure. "We are going to take suggestions/do review for restructuring fromJanuary 15-February 15. New structure will be announced March 15, Officesmust be moved by April 15. You will not move offices during HurricaneSeason." Then, we review again each year or every 2 years. That provideseveryone a chance to settle and get to work. Publish this cycle.

2. Create a small, possibly temporary, office of Employee Wellness Initiatives whichwill work with FOH, HR, OPM, and the Union to track deployments andovertime. This office can work one-on-one with each office to do a "GapAnalysis" on needs and provide statistics to the Administrator and help rectifydiscrepancies between offices. If something like this happens, I will apply for this

job with my clipboard and open ears as I wander the building and talk directly topeople.

3. Conduct an audit on employees working super-overtime to determine why theyare working overtime, and then develop training programs to bring coworkers upto speed and position descriptions for targeted recruiting to bring in relief. Ifemployees are addicted to their overtime, refer them to #4.

4. Develop and fund an Agency-wide health and wellness program that employeescan join together to start a fitness regimen and track progress. There is aPresidential Fitness program online that I joined last year (and forgot about) that7 FEMA employees had also joined where you can track weight loss and fitnesslevels. I was trying to recruit people, but then we all got deployed and peoplequit the Agency... There is a great recreational program at Mt. Weather and

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some Regional Offices might do the same, but there needs to be an overallcultural change.

5. Create a rotational structure for deployments and require EVERY employee to beon call for their established month. If you are so "essential" to the Agency that

you cannot deploy, you should either be the Administrator or some other familiarFace of FEMA or we should have three of you anyway in case you get the flu orsomething.

So there is my 5-point Contract with Employees.

And speaking of health, you might reach out to the nurse in Room 714 (ext 3851 Ithink). She told me that is not unusual for FEMA employees and mentioned to me thatFEMA employees have more stress-related conditions than other agencies. I don'tknow if she keeps numbers and could provide those or a comparison to other agencies,but it might provide statistics that would be useful. Of course, if she tracked this in

different offices or Directorates or if the Shiny-New FEMA wants to start trackingwellness statistics (combine these numbers with HR stats on overtime or time spentdeployed), that might be a good management improvement initiative which could lead tobetter retention and morale.

I was just thinking about that because the entire time I worked for FEMA, I went to onedoctor's appointmentsome managers are driven by the "you must be here all the timebecause any direction from above can come at any time and we can't do it withoutyou." With the IMATs especially, I often remained in the building until 7 PM, when wecould be sure the Admiral or XXX would not ask for a fly-by presentation.

If this was during Hurricane Season or any other external time constraint(Congressional investigation, end of the Fiscal Year, other deadline), it is completelyunderstandable, but this is a routine thing for many offices in Disaster Ops. Myovertime for waiting around for leadership was always approved, which is why when Ileft the Agency for a $XX,000 raise in salary, I actually took at least a $YY,000 cut inpay due to overtime. I would be happy to provide my pay stub from January-July 7thwhere I made almost twice my salary in overtime when it was NOT HurricaneSeason. The amount of overtime is staggering. I wonder if you can get these numbersfrom HR.

This whole situation is driven by my previous "Who sets Operational Requirements forDeployment" issue. For me, the manager (former fire fighter, former Coast Guard)would say "We need to be in here this weekend. Do you want Saturday or Sunday?"and I would show up. This happened on Easter Sunday but they just "allowed [us] to gohome but have [our] blackberries on [us]." When we did come in on the weekends, wedid Power Point presentations or "plans." Both of these were sometimes neverpresented or used. On Easter weekend, we were told to write a Federal "Plan" forflooding near St. Louis though no assistance was ever required. When there is adisaster, Federal planners, have a 10:00 meeting with the NRCC reps from other

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federal agencies but do not coordinate or communicate with the JFO or RRCC PlanningSections, which are actually communicating with the locals and states and field repsfrom other agencies. At these meetings, they develop a presentation and then stressout to give this presentation at the VTC or to Leadership at closed meetings later in theday. These types of initiatives were the justification for bringing employees in for 10-12

hours a day and on weekends for months at a time while field personnel were doing thework at a local and state level.

***

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A Proposed Employee Performance Management System for FEMA

Background

Throughout FEMAs existence the importance of Performance Management has been

recognized and the methods of individual performance appraisal have continuallyevolved reflecting the Strategic Goals and values of each administration. An underlyingobjective throughout has been to hold employees accountable for work tasks whileencouraging supervisors to make a subjective process as objective, as possible.Employees have consistently expressed strong desire for there to be a clear connectionbetween day to day tasks and the Agencys publicized strategic goals and objectivesand that the bases or standards in which their performance is appraised are asobjective (i.e. measurable), as possible. Many believe that a giant step towardresponding to these issues would be quantifying the performance objectives of theAgency down to the unit and individual level. It is also recognized that as necessary asPerformance Appraisals are they can be intimidating, unfair and counter-productive

when adjectives are used rather than quantitative measures to evaluate performance.

Past GAO findings (January 2003 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks Federal Emergency Management Agency) and DHS Strategic Plans (The Departmentof Homeland Security Strategic Human capital Plan 2003 2008 July 15, 2003)highlight the criticality of optimum use of human resources and the dire implications ofdemographic realities (2003), competition for recruitment, retention and welldocumented morale issues.

In both public and private sectors that performance management systems are used byorganizations as vehicles for receiving maximum return on its most valuable investment,its human resources. Each FEMA administration has placed some value on itsPerformance Management System. Yet, despite the consistent evolution of employeeperformance appraisal formats, employees have continued to express frustration aboutbasic fairness regarding evaluations of their performance, individual training anddevelopment and promotion opportunities. Past assessments of FEMAs PerformanceManagement System indicate that the process, more often than not, that managers andsupervisors are themselves delegated to particular work tasks and putting out fires tothe detriment of actually managing the human resources. Too often when the appraisalprocess is re-visited, only as frequently as quarterly, the process is not particularlyproductive. When the communication is less frequent, the process is understandablyeven less productive. In fairness, this is not a situation unique to FEMA.

Management Improvement Best Practices indicate that performance management ismost effective when there is continuous interaction regarding measurable performancestandards and out of those discussions come objectives for individual development,training, promotion opportunities, improvement of work processes and identification ofother resource needs. Best Practices also indicate that when the performance plans ofmanagers and supervisors reflect a high value placed on consistently workingcollaboratively with staff to achieve measurable objectives rather than infrequently

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providing oversight. There is a great deal of evidence illustrating extraordinary successwhen executives ensure that there managers actually manage performancemanagement. Most recent communication from FEMA Management to staff (FY 2008Fourth Quarter Performance Reviews, dated October 8, 2008 10:15 AM) emphasizedthat Although FEMA leadership has the overall responsibility for ensuring that the

employee performance plans are in place and that performance reviews are conductedon a quarterly and annual basis, employee performance management is a sharedresponsibility between supervisors and staff. The message goes on to specify somevery reasonable behavior regarding the employees responsibilities to attain anunderstanding of the supervisors expectations, seeking clarification and providingfeedback. Clearly, this process should be managed by members of the managementteam rather than sharing this responsibility with employees who look to them to setpriorities.

Recommendations

The primary purpose of the FEMA Performance Management System is to establishobjectives related to valued work against which unit and individual performance can bemeasured, to discuss performance against these objectives and to continually enhanceperformance. Continuous discussion of performance focuses not only on the individual,but also on work processes, resources and any other issues that can be addressed toimprove performance.

The process of managing performance can be initiated by collaboratively definingmeasurable objectives for unit performance that are based on assigned work. Theseunit objectives establish the framework in which individual performance in whichindividual performance objectives and those of supervisors can be defined.Performance objectives at the unit, supervisory and individual levels are frequentlyreviewed to determine their continued relevance and if needed, they are reviewed.

It is recommended that the FEMA executive issue a strong policy statement citing theimportance of the Performance Management System as a vehicle for improvement andchange when required. The system is identified as the basis for obtaining the maximumreturn on investment in human resources, as well as, a means in which FEMA canensure that its workforce possesses the capabilities (i.e. knowledge, skill and abilities)to carry out its critical national security mission and compete, in the marketplace, fortalent.

In addition, it is recommended that an organizational role is assigned responsibility forassisting and advising units regarding performance management activities. Individualsconducting performance management functions should receive the preparation neededto perform their responsibilities and adequate time and funding should be allocated.

When they arise, individual performance problems are discussed and documented. Ifperformance continues to be unsatisfactory, a Performance Improvement Plan is

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developed and tracked and appropriate policies and guidelines are followed to ensurefairness and objectivity.

Outstanding performance is recognized and rewarded on an ongoing basis. Rewardsinclude special recognition outside of the compensation system for accomplishments of

significant value to the organization. A Recognition and Reward strategy is developedand communicated to the workforce. As rewards are made, public recognition isprovided to reinforce those skills or behavior that the organization values.

Recommended Goals

1. To issue (FEMA executive) a Policy Statement citing the Performance ManagementSystem as the vehicle for ensuring the most proficient use of human resources andtheir individual development, professional growth and promotion opportunities

Potential Benefits:

An organizational role(s) is assigned responsibility for assisting and advisingunits regarding performance management activities. Adequate resources are allocated to maintain consistent focus. Individuals conducting performance management activities receive

preparation needed to perform their responsibilities.

2. To establish measurable performance objectives based on assigned work to eachunit and individual

Potential Benefits: Each individuals performance objectives are drawn, in part, from the

performance objectives of their unit. Individual performance objectives are reviewed and revised, when required,

to coincide with those of the unit. All appropriate members of the unit are involved in developing the units

performance objectives based on their involvement in making workcommitments.

Potential improvements in processes, tools or resources which could enhancean individuals performance of tasked work are identified and appropriateactions taken.

3. To initiate policies and procedures to ensure that performance problems are

managed expeditiously and fairly

Potential Benefits: Performance problems are identified, in the context of individual development

planning (IDP). Performance problems are discussed objectively, documented based on

appropriate performance objectives, policies or other applicable guidelines.

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Performance Improvement Plans are developed for resolving persistentperformance problems according to documented procedures.

Objectives and criteria are used in evaluating progress against ImprovementPlans.

4. To initiate policies and procedures to ensure that the rights and dignity of eachindividual are respected during the conduct of all performance managementactivities

Potential Benefits: Performance management information and data are confidential to the

individual(s) they concern. If necessary, disagreements about performance results, interpretations or

other performance feedback are discussed to an appropriate entity, such as ahigher level of management, the human resources function or otherappropriate professionals.

Criteria developed and used to evaluate whether a different position or careeroption should be considered.

5. To initiate processes to solicit employee feedback regarding supervisoryperformance, for use in formulating the Individual Development Plans andPerformance Plans of supervisors and managers.

Potential Benefits:

The Performance Management System can become a tool to focussupervisors and managers on the importance of enhancing their managementeffectiveness, as various needs require it.

Resolution of performance problems will consider developmental needs ofsupervisors, as well as individual staff members.

Performance Plans and Individual Development Plans can be used to fostervaluable behavior (e.g. voluntary mentorships).

6. To develop guidelines for providing for providing Recognition or Rewards Strategy inorder to

shattering the illusion of fema's progress

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