sharing inventory information to manage supply chain
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Sharing Inventory Information to Manage Supply Chain Frictions
Anil Arya
Ohio State University
Brian Mittendorf
Ohio State University
September 2009
Sharing Inventory Information to Manage Supply Chain Frictions
Abstract
Supply chains often encounter inefficiencies stemming from self-interested vendor pricing
and ensuing distortions introduced by self-interested retailer purchases. This paper adds
the issues of information sharing and inventory management to the mix of decisions made
by such supply chain participants. Despite each acting in self-interest (and, in fact, due to
it), the supply chain parties can be in agreement over formal sharing of inventory
information. In particular, by providing information on inventory and sales volume to its
vendor, the retailer permits the vendor to engage in usage-contingent pricing contracts.
Rather than being exploitative, such usage-contingent pricing can engender the manufacturer
to offer rebates to the retailer to encourage early sales. With its attention shifted more to
sales, the retailer in turn relies less on carrying inventory as a strategic weapon to pressure
the vendor in subsequent periods. In effect, information sharing encourages each party to
make concessions to the other, thereby benefiting all supply chain participants (including
consumers). The paper also demonstrates that the information-contingent manufacturer
rebate pricing scheme can also be equivalently implemented by a simple Vendor-Managed
Inventory system, an arrangement commonly associated with retailers both sharing
information and ceding inventory control to vendors.
1. Introduction
Formal information sharing mechanisms in supply chains, once a rarity, have
become increasingly common in a wide spectrum of industries. The use of such
information (via, say, Electronic Data Interchange) in conjunction with Vendor-Managed
inventory (VMI) arrangements too has expanded substantially. These arrangements,
characterized by a retailer intentionally ceding control (and information advantage) over
inventory to vendors are aimed at developing an agile supply chain, one whose operations
are responsive to global and local demand conditions. With formal information sharing,
vendors, who are already privy to macro-level demand information, are provided the
information and wherewithal to quickly adjust supply levels based on demand at specific
retail locations.
While vendor learning and supply chain responsiveness purportedly form the basis
for the ubiquity of information sharing, this paper demonstrates another benefit, one rooted
in improving strategic interactions among supply chain parties. In particular, when pricing
and inventory decisions are choices made by self-interested vendors and retailers, supply
chain coordination is a concern. In light of such frictions, this paper demonstrates the value
of a retailer intentionally ceding power by giving the vendor access to its inventory and sales
volume data. Such information sharing acts as a goodwill gesture that yields reciprocal
action in that the self-interested vendor may naturally respond by using the information to
provide rebates to the retailer for early sale of items. This, in turn, incentivizes the retailer to
sell more of its purchases to consumers and to retain less in inventory which could
otherwise have been used as a strategic weapon to pressure the vendor down-the-road. The
net result is that information sharing can benefit the retailer, vendor, and consumers alike.
Further, the paper demonstrates that the ideal contractual outcome under information
sharing achieved via manufacturer rebates can also be equivalently implemented using a
simple Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) arrangement wherein the vendor prescribes
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inventory levels as a percentage of the retailer's sales, i.e., the vendor sets the required
inventory-to-sales ratio.
To elaborate, we consider a two-period model of vendor-retailer interactions wherein
the vendor sets periodic wholesale prices and the retailer responds by procuring and setting
prices in the retail market. In such a setting, the usual problem of double-marginalization
threatens to undermine supply chain profitability, and such concerns give rise to inventory
as a strategic device. In an effort to convince the vendor to lower its wholesale price in the
second period, a retailer may opt to carry additional stocks of inventory after the first period.
These extra stocks lower the retailer's marginal benefit of, and thus its willingness to pay
for, additional units in the second period. Aware of this retailer tendency to hold inventories
for strategic gains, the vendor opts to set an excessive wholesale price in the first period to
avert retailer inventory hoarding.
Under information sharing, the retailer indirectly gives a measure of inventory
control to the vendor at the outset. Such control translates into the vendor's ability to
condition wholesale prices on the retailer's (now fully transparent) use of the products. And
rather than being exploitative, the vendor's optimal use of contingent pricing can entail
offering a discount for early sales which gives the retailer pause in its quest to accumulate
excess inventory for strategic purposes. This eases the pressure on the vendor to use a high
first-period wholesale price to rein in retailer self-interest. In short, information sharing can
cultivate an environment wherein the parties commit to being less exploitative of each other.1
Importantly, information sharing governs the interactions in a specific way: it encourages a
modicum of strategic inventories and thus maintains the use of inventory for strategic
reasons but restrains the retailer's tendency to be excessive in this regard. This feature
means that not only can information sharing be preferred to withholding information, but it
1 In a similar vein, Fellingham and Young (1990) demonstrate that keeping a history of reported costscan discipline a party’s intra-firm behavior in a multi-period context even when intertemporalindependence precludes learning effects. In the current paper, the multi-period effects arise in inter-firmrelationships, yielding Pareto improvements.
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can simultaneously also be preferred to the alternative of a commitment to no inventory.
Further, we show that Vendor-Managed Inventory can serve as a means of
implementing such outcomes even in the absence of a manufacturer rebate scheme, as VMI
gives the vendor an analogous level of control over inventory. In this case, by stipulating
inventory levels as a function of retail sales volume, VMI ensures that the only way for the
retailer to carry greater strategic inventory stocks is by boosting first-period retail sales (i.e.,
cutting first-period retail price). Unwilling to cut retail price excessively, the retailer is less
aggressive in inventory holdings. This eases the pressure on the vendor to use a high first-
period wholesale price to discipline the retailer.
To consider variants of the model and test its robustness, we examine the effects of
additional tensions that often govern inventory management. In particular, we consider the
consequences of inventory holding costs, cost of capital (discounting), supply-side
disruptions, and demand-side uncertainty on the value of information sharing. While each
added consideration points to subtle new tensions in information sharing and inventory
management (detailed in the paper), there is a unifying theme: the stronger the retailer's
incentives to hoard inventories for strategic reasons, the more it is willing to formally share
information; further, such sharing of information is generally met with approval by the
vendor and consumers.
Inventory management is a routine topic in managerial accounting. The standard
discussion views the issue as primarily a decision problem entailing a tradeoff between
inventory carrying to shield from unforeseen supply and demand risks versus ordering
costs (see, for example, Horngren et al. 2008, Ch. 20). In contrast, this paper looks at
strategic implications of inventory management, and its consequences for information
sharing and vendor inventory control. Starting with Spengler (1950), many studies have
examined the lack of supply chain coordination due to self-interested pricing (for
summaries, see Katz 1989 and Lariviere 2008). The prevalence of such double-
marginalization problems has been validated both in experimental and archival settings (e.g.,
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Durham 2000; West 2000; Park and Lee 2002). Proposed means of alleviating these
supply chain frictions include vertical integration, retail price maintenance, increased
upstream competition, expanded contractual terms, and strategic inventory holdings.
Most germane to the present study is the notion that a retailer’s inventory stocks can
put downward pressure on future wholesale prices and, thus, alleviate frictions in future
interactions (Anand et al. 2008). Anand et al. demonstrate that a retailer’s decision to carry
inventory, while reducing future wholesale prices, can also intensify near-term double-
marginalization. Building on this theme, the present paper demonstrates a role for formal
information sharing (and delegated inventory control) in balancing across-period double
marginalization concerns.
Extant research examines other facets of information sharing in supply chains. The
traditional practitioner view of information sharing is that it enables a supply chain to better
coordinate inventory and sales flow to meet changing demand. In a setting consistent with
this view, Lee et al. (2000) show that benefits of a retailer sharing information with its
supplier are most pronounced when demand is volatile, consumer preferences are correlated
across time, and/or there are substantial lead times in production. Similarly, Cachon and
Fisher (2000) demonstrate efficiencies from sharing sales and inventory data arising from
improved replenishment policies and better allocation of products to multiple retailers. A
key related advantage is that information sharing can mute the effects of the "bullwhip"
effect, wherein demand variability has increasingly large effects as one moves up the supply
chain (e.g., Chen et al. 2000).
The literature has also documented reasons that discourage information openness by
the retailer. For one, concomitant wholesale price effects can dissuade a retailer from
sharing its demand information with a supplier (e.g., Li 2002). Baiman and Rajan (2002)
show that investment hold-up concerns and strategic appropriation by the supplier can also
undermine information sharing. The potential for information leakage to retailer
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competitors further undercuts incentives for information sharing (Li 2002).2 Other key
considerations are the extent to which the information shared can be deemed reliable by the
supplier and the degree to which the shared information gives the supplier either de facto or
de jure inventory control (Kulp 2002). These various competing tensions that permeate
considerations of supply chain information sharing are also borne out in archival data (e.g.
Kulp 2002; Kulp et al. 2004) and controlled experiments (e.g. Croson and Donohue
2005).3
In the present analysis, coordination of inventory levels to balance holding and
stockout costs is initially excluded from consideration. Further, information sharing
provides no avenue through which the supplier learns about demand so as to exploit the
retailer, be it through variation in wholesale prices or reduction in investments. By
(intentionally) excluding such extant tensions in our analysis, we are able to isolate the key
upside of information sharing that is unique to our analysis – information sharing helps
alleviate frictions wrought by excessive accumulation of strategic inventory. In subsequent
sections, we layer in other benefits and costs of inventory information sharing to test the
robustness of the results and to better identify key determinants of information sharing.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model. Section 3 demonstrates the key results: section 3.1 derives the equilibrium under
information sharing; section 3.2 derives the equilibrium under no information sharing;
section 3.3 compares outcomes under each information regime; and section 3.4 examines
the use of Vendor-Managed Inventory to implement the desired contractual arrangement.
2 In subsequent work Li and Zhang (2008) demonstrate that the nature and intensity of competitionamong retailers may actually justify information sharing due to the supplier's desire to makeconcessions to put its customers on level footing. Importantly, such forces are prominent only whenthe supplier keeps such information in confidence.
3 Interestingly, Croson and Donohue (2005) note that due to ever-present behavioral biases, the beneficialeffects of information sharing on mitigating the bullwhip effect arise in more subtle ways thanoperational reasons alone would suggest, and that this feature means that more of the benefits ofinformation sharing accrue to upstream parties. Subsequent work by Croson et al. (2009) has detailedthe robust nature of these behavioral biases and the associated role of "coordination" by inventorystocks aimed at reducing exposure to risks due to suboptimal behavior by supply chain partners.
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Section 4 then addresses the robustness of the results by considering other facets of
inventory management: section 4.1 considers the effects of inventory holding costs; section
4.2 examines the consequences of a nontrivial cost of capital; section 4.3 introduces the
effects of supply-side disruptions; and section 4.4 includes the possibility of demand-side
uncertainty. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model
Consider the following baseline model of supply chain inventory management.
Over the course of two periods, an upstream firm (vendor) produces and sells products to a
downstream firm (retailer) who then markets and sells the products to consumers. The
(common knowledge) demand function for the retail product in each period is
q( pi ) = [a − pi ] / b , where pi, i = 1, 2, denotes the retail price in period i. The vendor's per-
unit production cost is c, and the retailer's sales/marketing cost of each unit is s.
At the beginning of each period, the vendor establishes the (per-unit) wholesale
price, wi. Given the wholesale price, the retailer sets its retail price, pi. To isolate the forces
of interest from traditional considerations in inventory management (e.g., safety stocks,
holding costs, cost of capital, uncertainty), for now we presume that the vendor can supply
the products as and when needed and that the retailer incurs no cost from carrying
inventory. Denoting the inventory carried forward by I, period 1 purchases amount to
q( p1) + I, and period 2 purchases amount to q( p2 ) - I. As is standard, we assume
a > c + s to ensure nontrivial sales choices (we assume analogous conditions, as detailed in
the appendix, for subsequent extensions to the baseline model).
The focus of this study is on the role of information sharing in supply chains and
how it impacts the strategic use of inventory. In particular, we examine the circumstances
under which the retailer opts to establish an information system that formally reports its
inventory stocks. Such an information system permits the vendor to make its wholesale
prices contingent on whether units are initially sold to consumers or kept in inventory. In
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effect, while informal channels may allow a vendor to observe retailer inventory and sales
levels, only a formal information sharing arrangement permits such information to be
contracted upon.
To reflect the above feature, we consider both Information Sharing (IS) and No
Information Sharing (NI) regimes. Under the IS regime, the vendor can tailor its first-
period wholesale price to its use. In particular, the vendor specifies {w1S ,w1
I}, where w1S
( w1I ) is the wholesale price for items initially sold to consumers (kept in inventory). In
contrast, under NI, the vendor can not fine tune its pricing terms, and is restricted to
charging w1 for all purchases. (Throughout, we use "^" to denote IS outcomes and "~" to
denote NI outcomes.) The following timeline summarizes the sequence of events.
Retailer chooses
information regime
(IS or NI).
Vendor sets first-
period wholesale
price: {w1S ,w1
I}
under IS and w1
under NI.
Retailer sets retail
price, p1 , and
chooses inventory
level, I.
Vendor sets w2. Retailer sets p
2.
Consumer demand
is satisfied by
inventory and
additional
purchases.
FIGURE 1. Timeline.
Given this basic setting, we seek to compare the outcomes under IS and NI and
identify the retailer's information sharing decision. The ensuing analysis employs backward
induction to identify the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium.
3. Information Sharing and Inventory Management
Since the model entails no uncertainty or intertemporal learning, the retailer
seemingly has no reason to carry extra inventory let alone share such information with its
supplier. Yet, strategic supply chain tensions compel the retailer to carry forward inventory.
This is because carrying forward inventory reduces the retailer's subsequent demand for
inputs in the second period, which, in turn, convinces the vendor to lower its second-period
wholesale price (Anand et al. 2008). In light of this strategic behavior, the question we ask
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is whether the retailer is willing to give its vendor a means through which it can regulate
inventory levels (in particular, usage-based pricing). To analyze this question, we next
examine the equilibrium outcomes under each information regime.
3.1. Outcome under Information Sharing (IS)
Working backwards in the game, given I and w2 , the retailer's second-period price,
p2 , solves:
Maxp2
[p2 − s]q( p2 ) − w2[q( p2 ) − I]. (1)
In (1), the first term reflects the revenue (net of sales cost) for the units sold in
period two, and the second term reflects the payment to the vendor in the second period for
units purchased. Solving (1) yields the retailer's chosen retail price,
p2 (w2 ) = [a + s + w2 ] / 2, and substituting this back into (1) yields ΠR2 (w2 , I) , the
retailer's second-period profit as a function of the wholesale price in the period and the
carried-forward inventory. Also, p2 (w2 ) generates the induced second-period demand for
the vendor, q( p2 (w2 )) − I . As a result, the vendor sets wholesale price to solve:
Maxw2
[q( p2 (w2 )) − I][w2 − c]. (2)
Solving (2) reveals the second-period wholesale price, w2 (I) = [a + c − s] / 2 − bI ,
and substituting this back into (2) yields ΠV 2 (I), the vendor's second-period profit as a
function of the inventory level. In period two, the carried-forward inventory provides the
retailer with the benefit of reducing wholesale price. Roughly stated, the retailer can supply
high-value customers in period-two using its own stock, thus, reducing its willingness to
pay for new purchases; the vendor attempts to offset retailer hesitance by cutting its
wholesale price. Knowing such second-period wholesale price effects are on the horizon,
the retailer chooses first-period retail price and inventory level to solve:
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Maxp1,I
[p1 − s]q( p1) − w1I I − w1
Sq( p1) +ΠR2(w2(I), I). (3)
The so lu t ion to (3 ) y i e lds p1(w1S ) = [a + s + w1
S ] / 2 a n d
I(w1I ) = [3a + c − 3s − 4w1
I ] [6b]. Given the induced period-one demand, the vendor sets
wholesale price to solve:
Maxw1
I ,w1S
q( p1(w1S ))[w1
S − c]+ I(w1I )[w1
I − c]+ΠV 2(I(w1I )) . (4)
Solving (4) reveals the usage-contingent first-period wholesale prices,
w1I =
9[a − s]+ 7c
16 and w1
S =a − s + c
2. Iteratively substituting w1
I and w1S into the
solutions to (4), (3), (2), and (1) reveals the equilibrium outcome in the information sharing
case, as presented in Lemma 1. (All proofs are presented in the Appendix.)
Lemma 1. The outcome under Information Sharing entails
(i) wholesale prices: w1I =
9[a − s]+ 7c
16, w1
S =a − s + c
2, and w2 =
3[a − s]+ 5c
8;
(ii) retail prices: p1 =3a + s + c
4 and p2 =
11a + 5s + 5c
16;
(iii) demand: q( p1) =a − s − c
4b and q( p2 ) =
5[a − s − c]16b
;
(iv) inventory: I =a − s − c
8b;
(v) profits: ΠV =17[a − s − c]2
64b and ΠR =
35[a − s − c]2
256b.
Notice from Lemma 1 how the strategic use of inventory is manifest in wholesale
prices under information sharing. Due to the retailer's decision to carry extra stocks in
order to reduce its second-period willingness to pay, the wholesale price applied to second-
period is below that for first period sales: w2 = w1S − [a − c − s] / 8. Further, to dissuade
excess inventory and to prop up second-period wholesale price, the vendor embeds a
premium for units carried forward in inventory: w1I = w1
S + [a − c − s] / 16. Equivalently,
one can view the fact that w1S < w1
I as the vendor (manufacturer) offering a rebate to the
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retailer to encourage quick turnover of first-period purchases. Given the inherent tension
between the supply chain partners, and the fact that the vendor uses the supplied information
to charge an inventory-premium to reduce strategic inventories, it might seem that the retailer
would be hesitant to share information. We next consider the outcome if the retailer opts
not to share information and, thus, prevent usage-contingent pricing by the vendor.
3.2. Outcome under No Information Sharing (NI)
When a formal information sharing arrangement is excluded, the second period
interactions are again as in (1) and (2). The key difference arises in the first period, where
the vendor has no ability to employ usage-contingent pricing to (indirectly) control the
retailer's inventory choices. In particular, under NI the retailer chooses first-period price and
inventory to solve:
Maxp1,I
[p1 − s]q( p1) − w1I − w1q( p1) +ΠR2(w2(I), I). (5)
The so lu t i on t o (5 ) y i e ld s p1(w1) = [a + s + w1] / 2 a n d
I(w1) = [3a + c − 3s − 4w1] [6b]. Given the induced period-one demand, the vendor sets
wholesale price to solve:
Maxw1
[q( p1(w1)) + I(w1)][w1 − c]+ΠV 2(I(w1)) . (6)
Solving (6) reveals the first-period wholesale price under NI, w1 =9[a − s]+ 8c
17.
Iteratively substituting w1 into the solutions to (6), (5), (2), and (1) reveals the equilibrium
outcome in the no information sharing case, as presented in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The outcome under No Information Sharing entails
(i) wholesale prices: w1 =9[a − s]+ 8c
17 and w2 =
6[a − s]+11c
17;
(ii) retail prices: p1 =13a + 4s + 4c
17 and p2 =
23a +11s +11c
34;
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(iii) demand: q( p1) =4[a − s − c]
17b and q( p2 ) =
11[a − s − c]34b
;
(iv) inventory: I =5[a − s − c]
34b;
(v) profits: ΠV =9[a − s − c]2
34b and ΠR =
155[a − s − c]2
1156b.
Note from Lemma 2 that since NI precludes the vendor from charging an inventory
premium, the retailer does find it cheaper to carry forward inventory relative to under IS:
w1 − w1I = −9[a − s − c] / 272 . At the same time, the vendor's desire to discourage inventory
carry-forward, and its inability to decouple pricing for sales and inventory under NI,
necessarily implies that the retailer's procurement costs for units sold in period one are
higher relative to that under IS: w1 − w1S = [a − s − c] / 34. Finally, the vendor's weakened
ability to limit inventory carry-forward under NI results both in greater inventory levels
( I − I = 3[a − s − c] / [136b]) and ensuing lower second-period wholesale prices
( w2 − w2 = −3[a − s − c] / 136 ). We next consider how these features affect retail prices,
profits of the parties and, critically, the decision to share information.
3.3. Contrasting the IS and NI Regimes
In comparing IS and NI, it is helpful to first contrast each with the single-period
benchmark. In a single-period interaction (reflected in (1) and (2) with I = 0), the vendor's
wholesale price is w = [a − s + c] / 2 and the ensuing retail price is p = [3a + s + c] / 4.
Recall that under both IS and NI the retailer opts to hold inventory so as to reduce wholesale
price in period two; and, knowing first-period input demand will be higher due to this effect,
the vendor can increase wholesale price(s) in period one. So, the multiperiod interaction
means that wholesale and retail prices are lower (higher) in period two (one) relative to a
single period benchmark.
These features point to two distinct supply chain consequences of information
sharing for inventory management in the setting. The first effect, the "average pricing
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effect", reflects the fact that inventory may decrease the retail price in period two more than
it increases it in period one (or vice-versa). That is, the way in which inventory is carried
forward can alter the underlying problem of double-marginalization inherent in supply
chains. The second effect, the "pricing variation effect", reflects the fact that inventory leads
to across-period variability in pricing. Since retail (and supply chain) profits are concave in
retail price, such variation represents a deadweight loss.
The key question in comparing IS and NI is how pronounced the two (strategic)
inventory effects are under each. Proposition 1 performs such a comparison.
Proposition 1.
(i) The average retail price is lower under IS than under NI.
(ii) In period one (two), the retail price is lower (higher) under IS than under NI.
As can be gleaned from Proposition 1(i), the benefit of inventories, the average
pricing effect, is more pronounced under IS. In fact, comparing prices in Lemma 1(ii) to the
single-period benchmark, IS allows for a lower second-period retail price (relative to the
single period benchmark) without necessitating any increase in the first-period retail price.
Further, from Proposition 1(ii), the cost of strategic inventories, the pricing variation effect is
also less pronounced under IS. When prices are lower (in period two), they are not as low
under IS; and when prices are high (in period one), they are not as high under IS. Thus,
from a supply chain efficiency perspective, IS is sure to be preferred to NI in the baseline
case.
To elaborate, consider the consequence of providing the vendor an extra measure of
control over inventories due to usage-contingent pricing. When the vendor stipulates w1S it
sets it low enough (relative to w1I ) so as to introduce an added caveat for the retailer seeking
to parlay first-period purchases into second-period concessions. This vendor rebate means
that not only does the retailer rely less on inventories but also that it is encouraged to
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purchase more units for the purpose of a quick sale. In short, the added incentive of
manufacturer rebates linked to retailer sales proves quite attractive to the retailer.
Taken together, the above considerations point to IS preserving the key benefit of
inventory (lower second-period retail price) without the pronounced downside (higher first-
period retail price), as reflected in Proposition 1(i). By reducing the magnitude of such
price shifts, IS also diminishes the inherent price variability due to inventory, as in
Proposition 1(ii). This two-pronged advantage leads to a more efficient outcome for the
supply chain.
The key question is whether the supply chain gains from IS translate into gains for
the retailer. After all, providing the vendor a measure of control over the its inventory
choices is a double-edged sword from the retailer's perspective: on one hand, usage-
contingent pricing can undercut its strategic use of inventories while, on the other hand, the
means through which such usage-contingent pricing arises is in the form of vendor rebates
for quick sales. A comparison of profits across the regimes reveals
ΠR − ΠR = 195[a − c − s]2 / [73984b] > 0. In other words, the retailer is willing to give its
vendor a measure of control over its inventory choices, as the vendor uses such control more
as a "carrot" than as a "stick". The next proposition confirms this retailer preference, as
well as presents the unanimity for which the preference is held.
Proposition 2.
(i) Due to strategic repercussions, the retailer opts to share inventory information.
(ii) The retailer's decision to share information also benefits the vendor and consumers.
From Proposition 2, not only does IS magnify the benefits and diminish the costs of
strategic inventory at the supply chain level, but it also yields net benefits for each firm.
This is because IS allows the parties to, in a sense, commit to helpful reciprocal actions. In
particular, by giving an additional lever of control to the vendor, the retailer "precommits"
not to overly exploit the vendor in period two via excessive inventory. The same
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interlinkage also enables the vendor to return the favor by being less exploitative of the
retailer in period one sales. In contrast, under NI, an excessive period-one wholesale price
that is applied to all period one purchases significantly lowers sales to consumers. Put a bit
differently, under NI, the only means available to the vendor to curb the retailer's penchant
for inventories is by setting a high wholesale price for all period one purchases. Under IS,
the wholesale price hikes can be targeted to goods kept in inventory. As a result, the vendor
sets a lower wholesale price for units sold by the retailer in period one under IS. Thus,
though counterintuitive on its face, the retailer delegating a measure of control over
inventory via information sharing helps both the vendor and the retailer.
The benefit of IS to consumers follows a related line of thinking. With linear
demand, consumer surplus is calculated using the familiar quadratic expression
CS = (b / 2) [q( p1)]2 + [q( p2 )]2( ) . Notice the convexity in the expression implies the
consumers favor greater pricing variation. Thus, the intertemporal smoothing in retail prices
that arises under IS serves as a boon for the firms but not for the consumers. That said, the
reduction in average price accompanying IS turns out to be the more pronounced effect for
the consumers.
Since gains can arise from IS due to its ability to reduce the retailer's aggressiveness
in holding inventory for strategic reasons, a natural follow-up question is whether
eliminating inventories all together would be preferable for any of the parties. Such a
precommitment to just-in-time (JIT) purchases by the retailer, simply amounts to a two-fold
replication of the single-period supply chain game.4 Comparing this repeated single-period
outcome to that under IS, note that IS permits an equivalent retail price in period one but a
lower price in period two. Thus, as discussed above, IS engenders an efficiency-enhancing
role of strategic inventories that is disabled under JIT. As it turns out, these gains are also
shared by each party.
4 This is also the retailer's preferred inventory level if the retailer were to precommit to a particularinventory level.
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Corollary. All parties prefer flexible inventories with IS to a Just-In-Time inventory
arrangement.
As the corollary confirms, IS permits the retailer to commit to less aggressive use of
inventory while maintaining the key advantage to the supply chain of retailer flexibility. It is
readily confirmed that this basic notion too applies to the vendor. That is, if the vendor
could precommit at the outset to wholesale prices that govern both periods (or a single
wholesale price that persists both periods), the outcome is precisely the same as in the Just-
In-Time case. Thus, all parties also prefer IS with dynamic pricing and inventory choices to
a world in which the vendor precommits to all of its behavior.
To summarize, IS harnesses the retailer's use of inventory to influence subsequent
wholesale prices. At the same time, IS alters the dynamic evolution of the parties'
interactions so as to prevent excessive initial wholesale prices. In effect, IS restrains the
retailer while also preserving the advantages of strategic inventories. We next consider
implementation of the optimal contract using a common manifestation of information
sharing arrangements in supply chains.
3.4 Implementing the IS outcome using Vendor Managed Inventory
The above analysis has outlined the benefits of IS presuming implementation of
usage-based pricing (contingent manufacturer rebates) is simple and costless. While this
presumption provides the optimum contractual outcome, it is worth noting that even if
manufacturer rebates were not employed, information sharing permits alternate practical
means of implementing the solution. In particular, information sharing and a retailer's
associated decision to cede inventory control often takes the form of Vendor-Managed
Inventory (VMI). Under VMI, the manufacturer uses the retailer's shared information on
retail sales not to adjust wholesale prices but instead to regulate and manage retailer
inventory levels. This often takes the form of a vendor stipulated inventory-to-sales ratio
16
target, wherein the vendor establishes a target level of inventory which depends on the
reported level of sales. The question we ask in this section is how such a VMI arrangement
fares relative to the ideal contract that explicitly stipulates usage-based pricing.
Denoting the vendor's chosen inventory-to-sales ratio by r, the equilibrium outcome
under VMI is as follows. Since inventory is established at the end of period one, the parties'
second period interactions are precisely as before. The distinction with VMI arises in
period one. In this case, the retailer's choice entails only picking p1, while I is replaced by
rq( p1), as reflected in (7).
Maxp1
[p1 − s]q( p1) − w1rq( p1) − w1q( p1) +ΠR2 (w2 (rq( p1)),rq( p1))) . (7)
T h e s o l u t i o n t o ( 7 ) y i e l d s p1(w1,r) = [a + s + w1] / 2 −
r[3(1− r)(a − s − w1) − (w1 − c)] / [8 + 6r2 ]. Given the induced period-one demand, the
vendor sets wholesale price and an inventory-to-sales ratio to solve:
Maxw1,r
[q( p1(w1,r)) + rq( p1(w1,r))][w1 − c]+ΠV 2(rq( p1(w1,r)). (8)
Solving (8) reveals the first-period wholesale price with VMI and the preferred
inventory-to-sales ratio. Iteratively substituting each into the solutions to (8), (7), (2), and
(1) reveals that information sharing with VMI in lieu of usage-contingent pricing replicates
the preferred contractual arrangement.5
Proposition 3.
VMI with the vendor's preferred inventory-to-sales ratio replicates the optimal information
sharing outcome.
By ceding substantial inventory control and information access to vendors, VMI is
5 This arrangement also replicates the solution obtained if VMI is used in conjunction with usage-contingent pricing. That is, VMI and usage-contingent pricing are contractual substitutes underinformation sharing.
17
ostensibly aimed at developing supply chain operations that are more responsive to global
and local demand conditions. With VMI, vendors, who are already privy to macro-level
demand information, are provided the information and wherewithal to quickly adjust
inventory levels based on demand at specific retail locations. While vendor learning and
supply chain responsiveness purportedly form the basis for VMI's success, the added
premise identified herein is that ceding control of inventory also has strategic implications.
As confirmed in the proposition, such strategic motives provide further justification for the
use of information sharing and VMI arrangements.
In particular, with vendor-managed inventory, the retailer willingly gives a measure
of inventory control to the vendor that takes the form of an ability to stipulate inventory
levels as a function of sales volume. By permitting the vendor to prescribe the sales-to-
inventory tie-in, VMI ensures that the only way for the retailer to carry greater strategic
inventory stocks is by boosting first-period retail sales (i.e., cutting first-period retail price).
Unwilling to cut retail price excessively, the retailer is less aggressive in inventory holdings.
This eases the pressure on the vendor to use high first-period wholesale price to rein in the
retailer. In short, just as with usage-contingent pricing, VMI cultivates an environment
wherein the parties commit to being less exploitative of each other. This less cut-throat
arrangement leads to gains for the vendor, retailer, and consumers alike, even in the absence
of information or learning effects.
The basic analysis herein has demonstrated strategic benefits of information sharing
and Vendor-Managed Inventory resulting in better supply chain coordination. Admittedly,
(and intentionally) it has done so in a setting wherein other more recognized inventory
management tensions are absent. In what follows, we examine some natural ways of
appending the analysis to examine if and how other such considerations alter the
conclusions.
18
4. Robustness of Information Sharing
In this section, we layer in additional considerations in inventory management both
to test the robustness of the main conclusions of the analysis and to examine the key
determinants of information sharing and inventory management.
4.1. Cost of Holding Inventory
The strategic justification both for holding inventory and for information sharing
between the vendor and retailer unfolded in the baseline analysis presuming costless
inventory holding. Of course, one oft-discussed reason for reduced inventory levels is that
it is costly to maintain inventory (say due to storage costs, spoilage, or opportunity costs of
shelf space). To determine the effect of such holding costs on the analysis, say each unit of
inventory carried forward compels the retailer to bear a cost h associated with holding the
unit. In this case, the analysis follows precisely the logic as before, except the retailer profit
calculations in (3) and (5) each is reduced by an extra term of -hI. Repeating the analysis
using this variant reveals the following proposition.
Proposition 4.
(i) The retailer opts to share inventory information if and only if h < [1 / 4][a − s − c].
The retailer's decision to share information also benefits the vendor and consumers.
(ii) Under VMI, the vendor's preferred inventory-to-sales ratio is r = a − s − c − 4h
2[a − s − c].
With this choice, VMI replicates the optimal information sharing outcome regardless
of how holding costs are split among the parties.
The central message of Proposition 4(i) is that holding costs do not derail the
strategic benefits of information sharing unless they are sufficiently pronounced so as to
preclude inventories in the first place. Proposition 4(ii) introduces an additional wrinkle in
that a question arising naturally in VMI arrangements is who should bear the costs of
19
inventory holdings. As demonstrated in the proposition and its proof, holding costs (and
how they are shared), while influencing the wholesale price and preferred inventory-to-sales
ratio, do not affect the efficacy of VMI in governing the strategic use of inventory. To see a
visualization of the strong connection between benefits of information sharing and its role in
reducing (but not eliminating) the strategic control of inventory, Figure 2 plots retailer
profits and equilibrium inventory levels as h changes.
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35@a-s-cD2 ê256b
155@a-s-cD2 ê1156bP`
R HhL
Pè
R HhL
@a-s-cDê40h
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5@a-s-cDê34b
I`HhL
IèHhL
FIGURE 2. Retailer Profit and Inventories as a function of h.
While the central message herein holds for the tangible cost h of holding inventory,
another important cost of carrying inventory is the inherent opportunity cost associated with
tied-in capital. We next consider if and how this cost alters the underlying premise of the
base analysis.
4.2. Cost of Capital (Discounting)
In this section, we revisit the model by modeling the opportunity cost of capital as a
prominent cost of inventory holding. After all, from the retailer's standpoint even if its
shelves permit costless holding of inventory, there is an added cost of having to pay for
units now which will not yield cash inflows for some time to come, particularly when a firm
is cash constrained. That is, presume there is no exogenous h-cost of holding inventory but
20
instead that the firms discount future cash flows based on a periodic cost of capital, k,
0 ≤ k ≤ 1. In this case, there is an implicit holding cost of inventory (due to mismatched
timing between the cash outflow for the goods and the cash inflow from their later sale).
Further, the implicit cost is not just a dead-weight loss (as with h), but instead a transfer of
wealth upstream (since early cash outlays by the retailer are a plus for the vendor).
The derivation of the equilibrium outcome in this case under each regime mirrors
that in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Here, the key difference is that ΠR2 (w2 , I) and ΠV 2 (I) in (3),
(4), (5), and (6) are multiplied by the discount factor 1 [1+ k]. Following this process
yields analogous (albeit substantially cumbersome) solutions to those in Lemmas 1 and 2.
From this solution (detailed in the appendix), the key tension introduced by discounting is
best seen in the equilibrium wholesale prices under IS: w1I =
9[a − s]+ 7c +12ck
16 +16k and
w1S =
a − s + c
2. The wholesale price for first-period sales is as before (reflecting the fact
that the retailer's cash outflows and inflows associated with such sales are in the first period
and thus discounting is a non-issue); the wholesale price for inventory, however, is
decreasing in the discount rate, k. Roughly stated, since the retailer is paying up front for
inventories it will not see cash flows from until a future period, the vendor must provide a
discount in nominal terms in order to keep the wholesale price level in real terms. It is this
feature that adds a new wrinkle when time value of money is a prominent consideration.
To elaborate, in the absence of discounting (k = 0), the role of strategic inventories
as a function of the information environment is as described in section 3.3. With
discounting (k > 0), there is an additional divergence between retailer and vendor
preferences. In particular, the retailer pays for inventory units upfront but does not glean
benefits until down-the-road (in terms of retail sales and reduced subsequent wholesale
price). This mismatch of cash flows makes the retailer hesitant to carry inventory. All else
equal, the vendor of course gains from the early payment for inventory and, hence is
increasingly inclined to support inventory buildup. In fact, as this consideration becomes
more prominent, the vendor may actually use information sharing to give a discount not for
21
quick sale of units but instead as an enticement for the retailer to carry forward additional
inventory. Recall, as k increases, w1I decreases while w1
S is unchanged; in fact, for k >a − s − c
4[2(a − s) − c], w1
I < w1S . Since the retailer's underlying reason to share information is to
secure discounts for items purchased for quick sale, such a circumstance makes the retailer
unwilling to share information. Consistent with the above intuition, the following
proposition confirms that the retailer only shares information for k < a − s − c
4[2(a − s) − c].
Proposition 5.
(i) The retailer opts to share inventory information if and only if k < a − s − c
4[2(a − s) − c]. The
retailer's decision to share information also benefits the vendor and consumers.
(ii) Under VMI, the vendor's preferred inventory-to-sales ratio is r = a − s − c[1+ 4k]
2[a − s − c].
With this choice, VMI replicates the optimal information sharing outcome for any k.
The key aspect of the proposition is that strategic inventories continue to support
information sharing provided the divergence of preference induced by cost of capital is not
too severe. Once k > a − s − c
4[2(a − s) − c] the ramifications of a decision to share information lie
not in the realm of better management of strategic inventories but instead in the realm of the
vendor exploiting the retailer to accelerate payments for units not sold until future periods.
As in previous sections, the advantage of information sharing to the retailer manifests in its
ability to reduce (but not eliminate or magnify) the use of strategic inventories. This feature
is demonstrated in Figure 3.
22
a - s - cÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ4@2 Ha - sL - cD
0k
35@a-s-cD2 ê256b
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R HkL
Pè
R HkL
a - s - cÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ4@2 Ha - sL - cD
0k
@a-s-cDê8b
5@a-s-cDê34b
I`HhL
IèHhL
FIGURE 3. Retailer Profit and Inventories as a function of k.
As noted in Proposition 5(ii), the underlying key feature of the baseline result
remains even in the presence of discounting. That is, the ideal contractual arrangement
under IS is replicated using a simple VMI implementation. In this case, discounting again
does not affect the efficacy of VMI, only the ideal inventory-to-sales ratio.
4.3. Supply-side Disruptions
While the focus thus far has been on testing the robustness of the main results when
layering in additional tensions that represent costs of inventory, it is worth noting there are
also benefits of carrying inventory beyond strategic reasons. Namely, an inventory buffer
helps insure a retailer from future shocks to its supply line and/or unexpected shifts in
demand, either of which can lead to potential stockout. In this subsection, we hone in on the
first such benefit; the subsequent subsection will consider model the case of demand
uncertainty.
To reflect possible disruptions in the future supply which may necessitate (or
discourage) inventory stocks, consider the following parsimonious adjustment to the model.
Say at the outset of the parties' interactions, it is recognized that the current vendor may be
unable to provide inputs in the second period . In particular, the first-period input supply
23
source may cease with (common knowledge) probability d. This reflects the possibility that
the vendor departs/exits the industry, runs into capacity constraints, or faces labor or other
disputes that stall production. Each of these circumstances are often suggested as reasons
for a retailer to shield itself via "safety stocks" of inventory. The flip side of the equation is
that there is also an (independent) probability e that an entrant to the supply market will
introduce competition for the incumbent supplier in the second period. This reflects that
from the retailer's perspective, some supply disruptions are welcome. For simplicity,
presume the entrant vendor produces inputs at the same cost as the incumbent.
Using this succinct characterization of supply disruptions, equilibrium outcomes are
derived as follows. With probability (1-d)(1-e), the initial vendor is the retailer's only
supplier in the second period (i.e., d = e = 0 corresponds to the baseline analysis). With
probability d(1-e), the retailer is faced with no additional supplies in period two and can
only sell its inventory stocks (i.e., q( p2 ) = I , or p2 = a − bI ). With probability (1-d)e, the
retailer is faced with two suppliers who, due to price competition, sell inputs at marginal
cost. Finally, with probability de, the retailer faces only one supplier in period two who is
the new entrant; while this scenario yields an identical outcome in period two for the retailer
as the baseline analysis, it clearly alters the incumbent vendor's choices in period one.
Given these four possibilities, under IS the retailer chooses first-period price and inventory
level to solve:
Maxp1,I
[p1 − s]q( p1) − w1I I − w1
Sq( p1) + (1− d)(1− e)ΠR2 (w2 (I), I)
+ d(1− e)[a − bI − s]I + (1− d)eΠR2 (c, I) + deΠR2 (w2 (I), I).(9)
The solution to (9) yields retail price and inventory level denoted p1(w1S ;d,e) and
I(w1I ;d,e), respectively. Given the induced period-one demand, and cognizant that supply
uncertainties reduce its future potential profit, the vendor sets wholesale price to solve:
Maxw1
I ,w1S
q( p1(w1S ;d,e))[w1
S − c]+ I(w1I ;d,e)[w1
I − c]+ (1− d)(1− e)ΠV 2(I(w1I ;d,e)) . (10)
24
Solving (10) reveals the usage-contingent first-period wholesale prices, w1I (d,e) and
w1S (d,e) . In the NI case, events proceed in a similar fashion, except the vendor is unable to
condition first-period wholesale prices on their use. An alternate interpretation is that the
vendor's problem in (10) entails an additional constraint that w1I = w1
S . We relegate the
details of this derivation to the appendix; here, we get to the brass tacks. Recall, the
underlying motivation for information sharing is that it engenders a mutually-beneficial give
and take between the supply chain partners. Importantly, this give and take entails the
vendor softening its input price for goods sold in the first period while having an
opportunity to raise its second period price.
The more likely it is that the beneficiary of increased second period wholesale price
is a new vendor, the less likely the incumbent vendor is to provide initial softening of input
prices. Thus, the higher e, the more information sharing is viewed by the vendor as an
opportunity to employ usage-contingent pricing not as a precursor to a mutually-beneficial
long-term relationship but instead as an invitation to take advantage of the retailer in the
short-run (not internalizing the subsequent supply chain consequences). For this reason,
the retailer adopts IS only if e is not too high. Similar logic indicates that if d too is large,
the likely-to-exit period-one vendor again resorts to short-term thinking, thereby
transforming information sharing into an invitation for abuse. The following proposition
formally confirms this intuition.
Proposition 6.
(i) The retailer opts to share inventory information if and only if
e < e* (d) =5 − d − 2d 2 − 2 4 + 5d −14d 2 + 6d 3
[3 − 2d]2 . The retailer's decision to share
information also benefits the vendor and consumers.
25
(ii) Under VMI, the vendor's preferred inventory-to-sales ratio is r = 1− e + 3d
2[1− e]+ d[2 + e].
With this choice, VMI replicates the optimal information sharing outcome for any d
and e.
Consistent with the above intuition, from Proposition 6(i), information sharing is
associated with a lower-tail of e-values. And, since it is readily confirmed that e* (d) is
decreasing in d, lower d-values too are linked with information sharing. The basic intuition
from before continues to apply: information sharing is beneficial to all parties if and only if
it results in less aggressive inventory holding. This view is evidenced in Figure 4 which
plots retailer profits and inventory levels as a function of e for a given d value (d = 1/5). For
e < e* (d), inventory levels are lower under IS, and it is precisely then that information
sharing is in the forefront.
e* H1ê5Lº0.070e
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P`
R H1ê5,eL
Pè
R H1ê5,eL
e* H1ê5Lº0.070
e
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11@a-s-cDê62b
I`H1ê5,eL
IèH1ê5,eL
FIGURE 4. Retailer Profit and Inventories as a function of e.
As confirmed in Proposition 6(ii), the result that VMI can replicate the optimal
information sharing outcome is also robust to the nature of supply disruptions. By
judiciously setting the inventory-to-sales ratio, the vendor ensure that VMI replicates the
usage-contingent contract despite the potential for supply disruptions.
26
4.4. Demand-side Uncertainty
Another commonly-discussed tension in inventory management is the role of
demand uncertainty in boosting (or softening) the preferred inventory cushion. That is,
inventory is often held to accommodate unexpected spikes in demand so as to avoid
stockout costs. To reflect this notion most succinctly in our setup, consider the possibility
that demand is uncertain in each period, and when choosing inventory levels the retailer is as
of then unsure of its subsequent demand. In particular, suppose the parameter of consumer
demand, ai , is independently and identically distributed in each period: ai ∈[a − ∆,a + ∆],
with mean a and standard deviation σ . Demand is (publicly) observed only at the
beginning of each period, and the decision to share information is made upfront by the
retailer (before learning a1 or a2).
This formulation permits a simple characterization of the role of uncertainty. In
particular, the second-period interactions are as before, whereas the added caveat in the first
period is that pricing and inventory decisions are made in expectation of period two
conditions. As in the previous section, we will relegate details to the appendix, and focus
discussion here on the underlying added forces.
Recall, there are two key strategic effects of inventory to consider: the average
pricing effect and the pricing variation effect. For σ = 0 , each of these effects is as under
the demand certainty case. Further, as confirmed in the appendix, uncertainty does not alter
either the average retail price or the average inventory level. As such, the only role of
uncertainty is in altering pricing variation. In the demand uncertainty case, price variation
entails an added dimension, that of variation in prices within each period. In particular, an
extreme demand realization (be it high or low) for period 1 has less of an effect on
wholesale (and thus retail) prices in period one under NI. This is because the wholesale
price under NI serves the dual role of a price for units sold in period one and units kept in
inventory, and only the former role suggests fluctuations with the extreme realization. In
27
contrast, since the supplier's wholesale price is decoupled based on use under IS, wholesale
prices for period one sales are more responsive to fluctuations in demand. This feature can
create a demand for NI for the retailer in that NI entails less intra-period (stochastic)
volatility in wholesale and retail prices.
Proposition 7.
(i) The retailer opts to share inventory information if and only if σ 2 <65[a − s − c]2
2368.
The retailer's decision to share information benefits the vendor; it also benefits
consumers if and only if σ 2 <3[a − s − c]2
1984.
(ii) Under VMI, the vendor's preferred inventory-to-sales ratio is r = 12−
a1 − a
2[a1 − s − c].
With this choice, VMI replicates the optimal information sharing outcome for any σ.
An alternative way of viewing Proposition 7(i) is that the conclusion of the baseline
analysis is that when inventories are used to secure lower subsequent wholesale prices,
information sharing acts as a natural salve on supply chain frictions. However, as demand
uncertainty increases, a different justification for inventory becomes paramount: under NI,
the retailer can boost (reduce) inventories when its first period demand is low (high) given
that the common period-one supplier price is lower (higher) when demand is low (high).
As uncertainty becomes increasingly prominent, this feature becomes more vital to the
retailer and leads the retailer to shy away from information sharing which permits the
vendor to prescribe different wholesale prices for inventory and sales.
Proposition 7(ii) is consistent with another running theme of the analysis: though
additional tensions affecting inventory management stand to alter the chosen inventory-to-
sales ratio, VMI continues to implement the ideal contractual arrangement under information
sharing.
28
5. Conclusion
Common wisdom posits that the prevalence of formal information sharing
arrangements and vendor-managed inventory (VMI) systems are rooted in a spirit of
cooperation in supply chains. That is, when parties exhibit substantial cooperation,
information sharing and the use of VMI can benefit the parties by improving vendor
responsiveness to rapidly changing needs of the supply chain. In contrast, this paper
demonstrates that information sharing benefits can also arise due to strategic frictions that
underlie supply chain relationships. We demonstrate that when a retailer uses inventory as
a strategic tool to force lower future wholesale prices only to face the downside of
retaliatory higher near-term wholesale prices, information sharing can provide an efficient
means of restraining the parties' behavior. When the retailer opts to provide information on
inventory and sales levels, it permits a formal means through which the vendor can price
discriminate based on retailer usage. This translates into the vendor providing rebates to the
retailer for early sales; the retailer responds in kind by reducing its use of inventories and
thereby increasing its willingness to pay in the future. These gestures arise from a spirit of
self-interest yet benefit the retailer, vendor, and consumers. We further demonstrate that
such information sharing contractual outcomes can be implemented using a standard VMI
relationship wherein the vendor sets inventory-to-sales targets.
This paper also examines how these key results are impacted by additional inventory
management tensions including holding costs, cost of capital, supply disruptions, and
demand-side uncertainty. While each added tension represents subtle incremental
considerations in information sharing, the underlying theme of analysis remains unaltered:
the more prominent is the role for strategic and self-interested behavior in inventory
management, the more effective is information sharing in reducing frictions in the supply
chain.
Future work could consider potential reporting distortions, and the accompanying
29
role for audits, given strategic considerations in managing inventories. Extant work has
stressed that information sharing may be derailed by incentives for information distortion
(e.g., Mishra et al. 2007). While such issues may point to the necessity of frequent audits,
multi-period considerations may naturally curb distortions. In particular, the natural linking
of unaudited data to future inventory and pricing decisions may create countervailing
incentives which might add credence to disclosures. So, for example, with demand
correlated across time, a retailer who wants to convey low demand to secure a low wholesale
price does so at potential cost since the vendor responds by requiring lower (and, thus,
insufficient) inventory stocks. In effect, delegated inventory decisions can create a bond
between supply chain partners across periods, a tie-in that can serve to discipline reporting.
30
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the outcome under IS. Working backwards, given I and w2,
the first-order condition of (1) yields the second-period retail price:
p2 (w2 ) =a + s + w2
2. (A1)
Using (A1), the vendor's problem in (2) yields the second-period wholesale price:
w2 (I) =a − s + c
2− bI . (A2)
The retailer's problem in period 1 is presented in (3). In choosing p1 and I, the
retailer accounts for the fact that p2 depends on w2 (as noted in (A1) and w2 in turn depends
on I (as noted in (A2)). The solution to (3) yields:
p1(w1S ,w1
I ) =a + s + w1
S
2 and I(w1
S ,w1I ) =
3[a − s]+ c − 4w1I
6b. (A3)
Using (A1), (A2), and (A3), the vendor's problem is written as a function of w1S and
w1I in (4). Solving the first-order condition of (4) with respect to these variables yields:
w1S =
a − s + c
2 and w1
I =9[a − s]+ 7c
16. (A4)
Substituting (A4) into (A3) yields the first-period retail price and inventory;
substituting these, in turn, into (A2) and (A1), yields second-period wholesale and retail
prices; the demand in period i is q( pi ). Substituting this solution into (3) and (4) yields
retailer and vendor profit, respectively. Finally, note that the condition a > c + s ensures
that demand ( q( p1) and q( p2 )), the inventory level ( I ), and purchases ( q( p1) + I and
q( p2 ) − I ) are each positive. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. In the NI case, the second-period problem for the retailer and vendor
are as in (1) and (2), respectively, so (A1) and (A2) again represent the second-period retail
and wholesale prices.
Given the choice of w1 by the vendor, the retailer chooses p1 and I to solve (5). The
first-order condition of (5) yields:
p1(w1) =a + s + w1
2 and I(w1) =
3[a − s]+ c − 4w1
6b. (A5)
Using (A1), (A2), and (A5), the vendor's problem is written as a function of w1 in
(6). The first-order condition of (6) yields:
w1 =9[a − s]+ 8c
17. (A6)
Substituting (A6) into (A5) yields the first-period retail price and inventory;
substituting these into (A2) and (A1) yields second-period wholesale and retail prices; the
31
demand in period i is q( pi ). Substituting this solution into (5) and (6) yields retailer and
vendor profit, respectively. Again, the condition a > c + s ensures demand, the inventory
level, and purchases are each positive. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 1.(i) From Lemma 1(ii) and Lemma 2(ii), the average retail price is lower under IS than
under NI:
p1 + p2
2−
p1 + p2
2= −
a − s − c
544< 0.
(ii) Again, from Lemma 1(ii) and Lemma 2(ii), the retail price in period 1 is lower under IS
than under NI:
p1 − p1 = −a − s − c
68< 0.
However, in period 2, the retail price is higher under IS than under NI:
p2 − p2 =3[a − s − c]
272> 0 .
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) The retailer's preference for IS follows from Lemma 1(v) and Lemma 2(v):
ΠR − ΠR =195[a − s − c]2
73984b> 0.
(ii) The vendor's preference for IS also follows directly from Lemma 1(v) and Lemma 2(v):
ΠV − ΠV =[a − s − c]2
1088b> 0.
Turning to consumers, using the demand expressions derived in Lemma 1(iii) and
Lemma 2(iii), the difference in consumer surplus is as follows:
CS^− CS
~=
b [q( p1)]2 + [q( p2 )]2⎛⎝
⎞⎠
2−
b [q( p1)]2 + [q( p2 )]2⎛⎝
⎞⎠
2=
9[a − s − c]2
147968b> 0.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of the Corollary. In the absence of inventory, the solution is merely a two-fold
replication of the standard single-period supply chain pricing problem under both IS and
NI. Formally, this can be verified by repeating the backward induction process employed in
Lemmas 1 and 2 with the added constraint that I in (3) is not a choice variable for the
retailer but is fixed at I = 0. With I = 0, (A2) and (A1) reveal that, in each period, the
32
wholesale price is [a − s + c] / 2 and the retail price is [3a + s + c] / 4 . Using this solution,
the two-period retailer profit is [a − s − c]2 / [8b], vendor profit is [a − s − c]2 / [4b], and
consumer surplus is [a − s − c]2 / [16b].
From Lemma 1, under IS, retailer profit is 35[a − s − c]2 / [256b], vendor profit is
17[a − s − c]2 / [64b], and consumer surplus is 41[a − s − c]2 / [512b].
Using the above expressions, the retailer profit's under IS less its profit under just-
in-time inventory is:
35[a − s − c]2
256b−
[a − s − c]2
8b=
3[a − s − c]2
256b> 0.
The vendor's profit's under IS less its profit under just-in-time inventory is:
17[a − s − c]2
64b−
[a − s − c]2
4b=
[a − s − c]2
64b> 0.
Finally, the consumer surplus difference is:
41[a − s − c]2
512b−
[a − s − c]2
16b=
9[a − s − c]2
512b> 0.
This completes the proof of the Corollary.
Proof of Proposition 3. Under VMI, the second-period problem for the retailer and
vendor are as in (1) and (2), respectively, so (A1) and (A2) again represent the second-
period retail and wholesale prices.
Given the choice of w1 and r by the vendor, the retailer chooses retail price p1 to
solve (7). The first-order condition of (7) yields:
p1(w1,r) =a[4 − 3r + 6r2 ]− r[c − 3s]+ 4[(1+ r)w1 + s]
2(4 + 3r2 ). (A5)
Using (A1), (A2), and (A5), the vendor's problem is written as a function of w1 and
r in (8). The first-order condition of (8) yields wholesale price w1∗ and inventory-to-sales
ratio r∗ :
w1∗ =
25[a − s]+ 23c
48 and r∗ =
12
. (A6)
Substituting (A6) into (A5) yields the first-period retail price of [3a + s + c] / 4 ,
which is the same as p1 in Lemma 1; using this price, the inventory level is
r∗q( p1) = [a − s − c] / [8b], which is the same as I in Lemma 1; from (A1) and (A2) it
follows that the second-period wholesale price and retail price under VMI is equal to w2
and p2 , respectively. Finally, using the VMI solution in (7) and (8) yields retailer and
vendor profits of ΠR and ΠV , respectively. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
33
Proof of Proposition 4.(i) With holding costs, in the IS case, the analysis proceeds in the same way as in the proof
of Lemma 1 except that the retailer's profit in (3) is reduced by the holding cost hI . With
this change, the retailer's first-order condition yields:
p1(w1S ,w1
I ;h) =a + s + w1
S
2 and I(w1
S ,w1I ;h) =
3[a − s]+ c − 4[w1I + h]
6b. (A7)
Using (A1), (A2), and (A7) in (4), , and solving the vendor's first-order conditions
with respect to w1S and w1
I yields:
w1S (h) =
a − s + c
2 and w1
I (h) =9[a − s]+ 7c − 4h
16. (A8)
Using (A8) in (A7), in the h-adjusted (3), and in (4) yields the optimal inventory level and
profits listed below:
I (h) =a − s − c − 4h
8b; ΠV (h) =
17[a − s − c]2 − 8h[a − s − c − 2h]64b
; and
ΠR (h) =35[a − s − c]2 − 24h[a − s − c − 2h]
256b. (A9)
In the NI case, the analysis proceeds in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 2
except that the retailer's profit in (5) is reduced by the holding cost hI . With this change,
the retailer's first-order condition yields:
p1(w1;h) =a + s + w1
2 and I(w1;h) =
3[a − s]+ c − 4[w1 + h]
6b. (A10)
Using (A1), (A2), and (A10) in (6), and solving the vendor's first-order condition
with respect to w1 yields:
w1(h) =9[a − s]+ 8c − 2h
17. (A11)
Using (A11) in (A10), in the h-adjusted (5), and in (6) yields the optimal inventory level and
profits listed below:
I (h) =5[a − s − c − 4h]
34b; ΠV (h) =
9[a − s − c]2 − 4h[a − s − c − 2h]34b
; and
ΠR (h) =155[a − s − c]2 − 2h[59(a − s − c) −152h]
1156b. (A12)
From the inventory expressions in (A9) and (A12), both I (h) and I (h) equal 0
when h = [1 / 4][a − s − c]. Hence, for h ≥ [1 / 4][a − s − c], the solution under both IS and
NI entail a two-fold repetition of the single-period solution, and so information sharing is
34
moot. Using the retailer profit expressions in (A9) and (A12), it follows that for
h < [1 / 4][a − s − c], the retailer strictly prefers to share information:
ΠR (h) − ΠR (h) =[a − s − c − 4h][195(a − s − c − 4h) + 2176h]
73984b> 0.
As noted below, when the retailer shares information (i.e., a − s − c − 4h > 0), it also
benefits the vendor and consumers:
ΠV (h) − ΠV (h) =[a − s − c − 4h]2
1088b> 0 and
CS^
(h) − CS~
(h) =[a − s − c − 4h][9(a − s − c − 4h) + 544h]
147968b> 0.
(ii) With holding costs, in the VMI case, the analysis proceeds in the same way as in the
proof of Proposition 3 except that the retailer's profit in (7) is reduced by [1− f ]hI and the
vendor's profit in (8) is reduced by fhI . With this change, the retailer's first-order
condition yields:
p1(w1,r;h, f ) =a[4 − 3r + 6r2 ]− r[c − 3s − 4h(1− f )]+ 4[(1+ r)w1 + s]
2[4 + 3r2 ]. (A13)
Using (A1), (A2), and (A13), the vendor's first-order condition yields:
w1∗ (h, f ) =
a − s + c
2+
[a − s − c − 4h][a − s − c − 4h(1− 4 f )]16[3(a − s − c) − 4h]
and
r∗ (h, f ) =a − s − c − 4h
2[a − s − c]. (A14)
Using (A1), (A2), (A13) and (A14), and noting I = rq( p1), provides the solution to
all variables of interest, and using these in (7) and (8) yields retailer and vendor profits.
These profit numbers, along with the inventory level, are listed below:
I∗ (h, f ) =a − s − c − 4h
8b, ΠV
∗ (h, f ) =17[a − s − c]2 − 8h[a − s − c − 2h]
64b, and
ΠR∗ (h, f ) =
35[a − s − c]2 − 24h[a − s − c − 2h]256b
.
From the above, notice the inventory level and profits are free of f and equal to the
corresponding expressions under IS derived in (A9). This completes the proof of
Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5. As in the base k = 0 setting, here we presume a is sufficiently
large so as to ensure prices, quantities, and inventory derived using first-order conditions are
positive; this requires a >c[5 +16k + 8k 2 ]
5 − 4k+ s. With discounting, in the IS case, the
35
retailer's and vendor's second-period profits in (3) and (4), respectively, are multiplied by the
term 1/[1+k]. That is, ΠR2 (w2 (I), I) in (3) is replaced by ΠR2 (w2 (I), I)
1+ k and
ΠV 2 (I(w1I )) in (4) is replaced by
ΠV 2 (I(w1I ))
1+ k. In the NI case, the same change is made
in (5) and (6). In the VMI case, the same change is made in (7) and (8). Given these
changes, the rest of the backward induction process proceeds as in the proofs of Lemma 1
(for the IS case), in Lemma 2 (for the NI case), and Proposition 3 (for the VMI case).
Rather than provide tedious details of these intermediate steps, we next present the solution
in each case as a function of the cost of capital.
IS Outcomes
(a) wholesale prices: w1I (k) =
9[a − s]+ c[7 +12k]16[1+ k]
, w1S (k) =
a − s + c
2, and
w2 (k) =3[a − s]+ c[5 + 4k]
8;
(b) retail prices: p1(k) =3a + s + c
4 and p2 (k) =
11a + 5s + c[5 + 4k]16
;
(c) demand: q( p1(k)) =a − s − c
4b and q( p2 (k)) =
5[a − s]− c[5 + 4k]16b
;
(d) inventory: I (k) =a − s − c[1+ 4k]
8b;
(e) profits: ΠV (k) =[a − s]2[17 + 8k]− 2[a − s]c[17 +12k]+ c2[17 +16k(1+ k)]
64b[1+ k] and
ΠR (k) =[a − s]2[35 +16k]−14[a − s]c[5 + 4k]+ c2[35 + 40k + 48k 2 ]
256b[1+ k].
NI Outcomes
(a) wholesale prices: w1(k) =9[a − s]+ 2c[4 + 3k]
17 + 8k and
w2 (k) =6[a − s][1+ k]+ c[11+12k + 4k 2 ]
17 + 8k;
(b) retail prices: p1(k) =a[13 + 4k]+ 4s[1+ k]+ c[4 + 3k]
17 + 8k and
p2 (k) =a[23 +14k]+ s[11+ 2k]+ c[11+12k + 4k 2 ]
2[17 + 8k];
(c) demand: q( p1(k)) =4[a − s][1+ k]− c[4 + 3k]
b[17 + 8k] and
36
q( p2 (k)) =[a − s][11+ 2k]− c[11+12k + 4k 2 ]
2b[17 + 8k];
(d) inventory: I (k) =[a − s][5 − 4k]− c[5 +16k + 8k 2 ]
2b[17 + 8k];
(e) profits: ΠV =9[a − s]2[1+ k]− 2c[a − s][9 +11k + 2k 2 ]+ c2[9 +13k +12k 2 + 4k3 ]
2b[17 + 25k + 8k 2 ] and
ΠR (k) =1
4b[1+ k][17 + 8k]2 [a − s]2[155 + 230k + 220k 2 + 64k3 ]− 2c[a − s][155 +⎧⎨⎩
289k +158k 2 + 24k3 ]+ c2[155 + 348k + 400k 2 + 228k3 + 48k 4 ]⎫⎬⎭.
VMI Outcomes
(a) wholesale prices: w1∗ (k) =
[a − s]2[25 +16k]− 2[a − s]c[1+12k]− c2[23 + 56k + 48k 2 ]16[1+ k][3(a − s) − c(3 + 4k)]
and w2∗ (k) =
3[a − s]+ c[5 + 4k]8
;
(b) retail prices: p1∗ (k) =
3a + s + c
4 and p2
∗ (k) =11a + 5s + c[5 + 4k]
16;
(c) demand: q( p1∗ (k)) =
a − s − c
4b and q( p2
∗ (k)) =5[a − s]− c[5 + 4k]
16b;
(d) inventory: r∗ (k) =a − s − c[1+ 4k]
2[a − s − c] and I∗ (k) =
a − s − c[1+ 4k]8b
;
(e) profits: ΠV∗ (k) =
[a − s]2[17 + 8k]− 2[a − s]c[17 +12k]+ c2[17 +16k(1+ k)]64b[1+ k]
and
ΠR∗ (k) =
[a − s]2[35 +16k]−14[a − s]c[5 + 4k]+ c2[35 + 40k + 48k 2 ]256b[1+ k]
.
(i) Comparing ΠR (k) with ΠR (k), it follows that the retailer shares information if and only
if k <a − s − c
4[2(a − s) − c]; note this cutoff k-value is in (0,1) since a >
c[5 +16k + 8k 2 ]5 − 4k
+ s.
Comparing ΠV (k) with ΠV (k), the vendor is always better off under IS:
ΠV (k) − ΠV (k) =(a − s)(8k −1) − c(4k −1)[ ]2
64b[1+ k][17 + 8k]> 0.
Turning to consumers, the consumer surplus difference is:
CS^
(k) − CS~
(k) =[(a − s)(1− 8k) − c(1− 4k)][9(a − s)(1+ 24k) − c(9 − 292k −192k 2 )]
512b[17 + 8k]2 .
Some tedious algebra verifies that CS^
(k) − CS~
(k) > 0 for k <a − s − c
4[2(a − s) − c].
37
(ii) The proof follows immediately from comparing the VMI outcomes with the IS
outcomes detailed above. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6. As in the base d = e = 0 setting, here too we assume a is
sufficiently large so as to ensure prices, quantities, and inventory derived using first-order
conditions are positive. This requires a > s + c and, for d ≤5 − 19
6≈ 0.106,
e <7 − d − 2d 2 − 2 1−11d +16d 2 − 6d 3
[3 − 2d]2 .
In the IS case, the wholesale price in the second-period are as described in section
4.3, and the retailer's and vendor's first-period problems are as in (9) and (10). The change
in the NI case is that there is the added restriction of w1S = w1
I ; in the VMI case, the change
is that I = rq1, with the vendor selecting r. Employing the backward induction process as
used in previous proofs, we next present the first-period wholesale price, retail price, and
inventory as a function of d and e; period 2 outcomes are then determined as noted in the
text. In addition, we also present the retailer and vendor profits.
IS Outcomes
(a) period 1 wholesale prices:
w1I (d,e) =
[a − s][3(1− e) + d(1+ 2e)]2 + c[7 + 2e − 9e2 − d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(5 + e + 6e2 )]8[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]
and
w1S (d,e) =
a − s + c
2;
(b) period 1 retail price: p1(d,e) =3a + s + c
4;
(c) period 1 demand: q( p1(d,e)) =a − s − c
4b ;
(d) inventory: I (d,e) =[a − s − c][1− e + 3d]4b[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]
;
(e) profits: ΠV (d,e) =[a − s − c]2[17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(7 + 5e − 6e2 )]
32b[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)] and
ΠR (d,e) =
[a − s − c]2
64b[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]2 5[1− e]2[7 + 9e]+ d[67 + 28e −17e2 − 78e3 ]⎧⎨⎩
+
+ d 2[33 +11e + 92e2 + 44e3 ]− d 3[1+ 2e]2[7 + 2e]⎫⎬⎭.
38
NI Outcomes
(a) period 1 wholesale price: w1(d,e) =[a − s][3(1− e) + d(1+ 2e)]2 + 4c[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]
17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2[1+ 2e]2 + 2d[7 + 5e − 6e2 ];
(b) period 1 retail price:
p1(d,e) =a[13 − 22e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(5 + 4e − 6e2 )]+ 2[s + c][2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]
17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2[1+ 2e]2 + 2d[7 + 5e − 6e2 ];
c) period 1 demand:
q( p1(d,e)) =2[a − s − c][2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]
b[17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(7 + 5e − 6e2 )];
(d) inventory: I (d,e) =[a − s − c][5 −14e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(5 + e − 6e2 )]
2b[17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2[1+ 2e]2 + 2d[7 + 5e − 6e2 ];
(e) profits: ΠV (d,e) =[a − s − c]2[3(1− e) + d(1+ 2e)]2
2b[17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(7 + 5e − 6e2 )] and
ΠR (d,e) =[a − s − c]2
4b[17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(7 + 5e − 6e2 )]2 [1− e]2[155 + 54e − 81e2 ]⎧⎨⎩
+
4d[64 − 5e − 32e2 − 81e3 + 54e4 ] + 2d 2[55 + 64e + 97e2 + 36e3 −108e4 ]−
4d 3[2 − 3e][1+ 2e]3 − d 4[1+ 2e]4 ⎫⎬⎭.
VMI Outcomes
(a) period 1 wholesale price:
w1∗ (d,e) =
1
8[6(1− e)2 + d 2 (10 + 7e + e2 ) + d(16 −11e − 5e2 )][a − s][(1− e)2⎧⎨⎩
(25 − 9e) +
d(65 − 70e − 7e2 +12e3 ) + d 2 (35 + 37e − 32e2 − 4e3 ) + 3d 3 (1+ 2e)2 ]+
c[(1− e)2 (23 + 9e) + 3d(21− 6e −11e2 − 4e3 ) + d 2 (45 +19e + 40e2 + 4e3 ) − 3d 3 (1+ 2e)2 ]⎫⎬⎭;
(b) period 1 retail price: p1∗ (d,e) =
3a + s + c
4;
(c) period 1 demand: q( p1∗ (d,e)) =
a − s − c
4b;
(d) inventory: r∗ (d,e) =1− e + 3d
2[1− e]+ d[2 + e] and I∗ (d,e) =
[a − s − c][1− e + 3d]4b[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]
;
(e) profits: ΠV∗ (d,e) =
[a − s − c]2[17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(7 + 5e − 6e2 )]32b[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]
and
39
ΠR∗ (d,e) =
[a − s − c]2
64b[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)]2 5[1− e]2[7 + 9e]+ d[67 + 28e −17e2 − 78e3 ]⎧⎨⎩
+
+ d 2[33 +11e + 92e2 + 44e3 ]− d 3[1+ 2e]2[7 + 2e]⎫⎬⎭.
(i) Comparing ΠR (d,e) with ΠR (d,e), it follows that the retailer shares information if and
only if e < e* (d) =5 − d − 2d 2 − 2 4 + 5d −14d 2 + 6d 3
[3 − 2d]2 ; note e* (0) = 1 / 9, e* (d) is
decreasing in d with e* (1) = 0 ; and e* (d) is less than the upper bound imposed on e by the
nonnegativity condition. Comparing ΠV (d,e) with ΠV (d,e), the vendor is always better
off with information sharing:
ΠV (d,e) − ΠV (d,e) =
[a − s − c]2[1−10e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 − 2d(1− e + 6e2 )]2
32b[2(1− e) + d(2 + e)][(1− e)(17 − 9e) + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d(6(1− e2 ) +1+ 5e)]> 0.
Turning to consumers, the (expected) consumer surplus difference is:
CS
^(d,e) − CS
~(d,e) =
[a − s − c]2[1−10e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 − 2d(1− e + 6e2 )]A
128b[2(1− e) + d(1+ 2e)]2[17 − 26e + 9e2 + d 2 (1+ 2e)2 + 2d (7 + 5e − 6e2 )]2 > 0,
where A = [−d 5 (1+ 2e)3 (13 + 4e + 4e2 ) + 3(1− e)3 (3 + 242e −117e2 ) +
d (1− e)2 (319 + 988e +1447e2 −1026e3 ) +
2 d 3 (−145 + 94e + 577e2 + 406e3 + 92e4 − 376e5 ) +
d 4 (−179 − 537e − 276e2 + 248e3 + 288e4 + 240e5 ) +
2 d 2 (77 + 459e + 273e2 − 323e3 −1098e4 + 612e5 )].
Some tedious algebra verifies that CS^
(d,e) − CS~
(d,e) for e < e* (d).
(ii) The proof follows immediately from comparing the VMI outcomes with the IS
outcomes detailed above. This completes the proof of Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 7. Under demand uncertainty, the analysis proceeds along the same
lines as in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 while noting the following (i) decisions in period 2
(wholesale and retail price) can be conditioned on (a1,a2 ) , while decisions in period 1
(wholesale and retail price and inventory level) can be conditioned only on a1 and (ii) given
linear demand, each firm's expected profit can be expressed in terms of mean and variance
40
of the demand intercept. Here, analogous to before, we presume a is sufficiently large that
prices, quantities, and inventory derived using first-order conditions are positive. This
requires a > s + c + 23∆ / 12 . We next present the solution in the demand uncertainty case.
IS Outcomes
(a) wholesale prices: w1I (a1) =
9[a − s]+ 7c
16, w1
S (a1) =a − s + c
2+
a1 − a
2, and
w2 (a1,a2 ) =3[a − s]+ 5c
8+
a2 − a
2;
(b) retail prices: p1(a1) =3a + s + c
4+
3[a1 − a]
4 and
p2 (a1,a2 ) =11a + 5s + 5c
16+
3[a2 − a]
4;
(c) demand: q( p1(a1)) =a − s − c
4b+
a1 − a
4b and
q( p2 (a1,a2 )) =5[a − s − c]
16b+
a2 − a
4b;
(d) inventory: I (a1) =a − s − c
8b;
(e) profits: ΠV (σ ) =17[a − s − c]2
64b+σ 2
4b and
ΠR (σ ) =35[a − s − c]2
256b+σ 2
8b.
NI Outcomes
(a) wholesale prices: w1(a1) =9[a − s]+ 8c
17+
9[a1 − a]
34 and
w2 (a1,a2 ) =6[a − s]+11c
17+
a2 − a
2+
3[a1 − a]
17;
(b) retail prices: p1(a1) =13a + 4s + 4c
17+
43[a1 − a]
68 and
p2 (a1,a2 ) =23a +11s +11c
34+
3[a2 − a]
4+
3[a1 − a]
34;
(c) demand: q( p1(a1)) =4[a − s − c]
17b+
25[a1 − a]
68b and
q( p2 (a1,a2 )) =11[a − s − c]
34b+
a2 − a
4b−
3[a1 − a]
34b;
(d) inventory: I (a1) =5[a − s − c]
34b−
3[a1 − a]
17b;
41
(e) profits: ΠV (σ ) =9[a − s − c]2
34b+
13σ 2
68b and
ΠR (σ ) =155[a − s − c]2
1156b+
511σ 2
2312b.
VMI Outcomes
(a) wholesale prices: w1∗ (a1) =
25[a − s]+ 23c
48−
[a1 − a][(a − s − c) − 24(a1 − s − c)]
24[a − s − c + 2(a1 − s − c)] and
w2∗ (a1,a2 ) =
3[a − s]+ 5c
8+
a2 − a
2;
(b) retail prices: p1∗ (a1) =
3a + s + c
4+
3[a1 − a]
4 and
p2∗ (a1,a2 ) =
11a + 5s + 5c
16+
3[a2 − a]
4;
(c) demand: q( p1∗ (a1)) =
a − s − c
4b+
a1 − a
4b and
q( p2∗ (a1,a2 )) =
5[a − s − c]16b
+a2 − a
4b;
(d) inventory: r∗(a1) =12−
a1 − a
2[a1 − s − c] and I∗ (a1) =
a − s − c
8b;
(e) profits: ΠV∗ (σ ) =
17[a − s − c]2
64b+σ 2
4b and
ΠR∗ (σ ) =
35[a − s − c]2
256b+σ 2
8b.
(i) Comparing ΠR (σ ) with ΠR (σ ), it follows that the retailer shares information if and
only if σ 2 <65[a − s − c]2
2368. Comparing ΠV (σ ) with ΠV (σ ), the vendor is always better
off with information sharing:
ΠV (σ ) − ΠV (σ ) =[a − s − c]2 + 64σ 2
1088b> 0.
Turning to consumers, the consumer surplus difference is:
CS^
(σ ) − CS~
(σ ) =9[a − s − c]2 − 5952σ 2
147968b.
It follows that CS^
(σ ) − CS~
(σ ) > 0 if and only if σ 2 <3[a − s − c]2
1984.
(ii) The proof follows immediately from comparing the VMI outcomes with the IS
outcomes detailed above. This completes the proof of Proposition 7.
42
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