shaping the division fight - sill- · virginia army national guard soldiers assigned to the 1st...

8 • Fires, May-June, Fires in support of large-scale combat operations

Targeting can confound staffs familiar with its application within stability oper-ations yet attempting to apply it within decisive action. Developing target fold-ers, dedicating multiple persistent intel-ligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) assets to “soak” areas hiding suspected high-value individuals, and disrupting networks long enough for civil authori-ties to assume greater security roles bears little relevance when facing near-peer ad-versaries. As recent warfighter exercises (WFXs) demonstrate, threats present as formations rather than individuals. ISR platforms must loiter only long enough to positively identify, guide Fires onto a target, and conduct battle damage assess-ment (BDA). Platforms that linger become subject to enemy destruction or interdic-

Shaping the division fightTargeting doctrine reappliedBy Maj. Gen. Joseph Martin and Col. Rory Crooks

Virginia Army National Guard Soldiers assigned to the 1st Battalion, 111th Field Artillery Regi-ment, 116th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, conduct training on an air delivered field artillery raid April 14, 2018, at Fort Pickett, Va. U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers assigned to B Company, 5th Battal-ion, 159th Aviation Regiment, 224th Aviation Brigade, flew CH-47 Chinook helicopters to transport four M777A2 howitzers and Virginia National Guard Soldiers assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 224th Aviation Regiment, 29th Infantry Division, flew UH-60 Black Hawks to transport eight M119A3 howitzers. (Cotton Puryear/U.S. National Guard)

http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin • 9

tion through means of electronic warfare (EW), and acquisition of these lethal, mo-bile formations increases in difficulty. Rath-er than buying time for host nation forces, decisive action targeting objectives seek to shape enemy forces and thereby create exploitable conditions of relative advan-tage against them. The incompatibility of stability operations targeting in a decisive action operational environment (OE) lies not in the targeting principles but in their application.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-60 Joint Target-ing describes the joint targeting process as “…a rational and iterative process that me-thodically analyzes, prioritizes and assigns assets against targets systematically.” This process applies equally across the entirety of an area of operations (AO)—including the deep, close, support and consolidation areas—using the same principles through-out. It provides commanders and staffs with a vehicle to prioritize and apply avail-able joint assets to achieve layered effects in a way most advantageous to friendly maneuver. The process creates decision space for commanders, provides a meth-od for applying combat power in a way that is both manageable and measurable, and achieves the objective of developing windows of opportunity to create relative advantage against an enemy. The follow-ing paragraphs illustrate ways in which a division fighting in a decisive action train-ing environment (DATE) including a WFX or as a higher headquarters (HICON) for a combat training center (CTC) rotation can apply targeting principles throughout the depth of the AO.Creating decision space

Divisions and brigades dedicate sig-nificant organizational energy toward an-alytical decision making (in the form of the military decision making process or MDMP) on the eve of a WFX or CTC rota-tion. In the absence of current operations, staffs exert maximum effort in gaining understanding of the OE, specifics of the threat situational template (SITEMP), and building running estimates within an un-familiar environment. This includes un-derstanding those elements valuable to the enemy that enable them to fight in the most advantageous manner, known as high-val-ue targets (HVT). Staffs then constrain the variables of space and time to a window 1 The depth of friendly maneuver, or time phase lines of a decision support template, can be expressed by estimated ATO cycle day (e.g., “BK” instead of D+48). Done habitually, it facilitates commonality of products and

thereby enriches the common operational picture (COP) across the enterprise.2 D+24 hours corresponds to the Review day, where joint assets apportioned/allocated in the form of a published ATO and will be executed the following day. The available assets programmed are reviewed to see if

re-tasking must be requested. D+48 corresponds to the Validate day just one day after the ATO was published (“validating” that assets requested were apportioned/allocated). D+72 corresponds to the Approval day during which the staff recommends to the commander what joint assets to request for his/her approval. D+96 corresponds to the Guidance day during which the commander shares his visualization of the battle informed

of their scheme of maneuver, then gener-ate a list of targets (a subset of the enemy’s HVTs) that will provide maximum payoff for friendly forces known as a high payoff target list or HPTL. Fire supporters on staff choose a method familiar to joint services to constrain the time variable: the joint air tasking cycle—known informally as the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. While it affords air force and naval aviation assets with the most efficient means of managing their platforms, division and brigade staffs make it effective by applying lethal or non-lethal platforms upon selective formations during windows of time that best support maneu-ver. The predictable iterative nature of the ATO cycle provides common focal points for employing joint assets, most of which operate entirely or partly utilizing an air component. Constraining the staff to a time framework driven by the ATO cycle also creates manageable periods within which to engage and measure effects of engage-ment. Creighton Abrams advised, “When eating an elephant, take one bite at a time.” Engaging and shaping enemy formations within the framework of the ATO cycle al-lows just this.

Developing the initial plan using the MDMP, staffs invest energy into phasing an operation that logically predicts transi-tion points important for sequencing com-bat power. These transitions often generate associated decision points (DPs) for the commander to weigh conditions prior to proceeding to the next phase. When ad-opted across the staff to define time (and space1), the ATO cycle generates DPs on a daily basis with targeting battle rhythm events driving frequent smaller decisions based on most current running estimates. This often reduces the magnitude of course corrections characteristic of strictly waiting for DP conditions to be met.

Initial MDMP produces a plan that pro-vides a logical framework and sequencing of the operation, reflecting the best attempt to predict enemy actions while aligning re-sources to thwart them. Unfortunately, the heavy staff investment in the plan comes at a point where understanding of conditions on the ground are at their worst—before maneuvering and making contact. The en-emy SITEMP has not yet matured as it soon will. Staffs, especially at lower tactical ech-elons, acknowledge that current operations

will consume them and resign themselves to reacting to enemy contact—at least until reaching transition points identified when phasing the operation. Priming the ATO cycle for the first 72 hours after initiating the operation during initial planning cre-ates decision space for commanders and staffs. Battle rhythm events for targeting, including the target working group (TWG) and target decision boards (TDB), provide predictable periodic opportunities to cog-nitively get ahead of the enemy based on refined running estimates—if command-ers and key staff place emphasis on them through their direct participation. Nothing replaces the value of battlefield circulation and evaluation shared face-to-face between commanders and subordinates on the ground, but relegating targeting to junior staff deprives commanders from running estimates derived holistically. Doing so leaves their assessments and corresponding decisions to chance, rather than prompted methodically through input from various sources. Commanders require refined un-derstanding from both subordinates on the ground and structured engagement with key staff at targeting events.Shaping through targeting: Manageable and measurable

Through initial analytical planning ef-forts, staffs painstakingly build running es-timates. The targeting process refines these estimates through a multi-pronged empha-sis on deliberate and granular assessment. Land and maritime components of the joint force doctrinally follow the decide, detect, deliver and assess (D3A) methodology. Ap-plied at tactical echelons in DATE scenar-ios such as a WFX, phasing of D3A takes a different form to integrate joint assets on common focal points of enemy formations and time (expressed in ATO day). Figure 1 graphically depicts an adaptation of D3A phasing, beginning with assessment. De-veloping inputs prior to the TWG including a commander-approved HPTL and maneu-ver execution matrix, key staff participants approach four days of the joint air tasking cycle by ATO day.2 Figure 2 offers an exam-ple of key staff at a division level TWG as well as their primary roles in phasing de-tect-deliver-assess or integrating shaping assets to facilitate this activity. The figure suggests “a way” of arraying TWG partici-pants around analog (i.e., large map of the


AO) and digital common operational pic-tures used in the process.

Within each ATO day, the division G2 or his target officer begins by arraying the en-emy on the analog COP by numbered for-mations across the area of interest (usually by sizes two echelons down; for a division fight, arraying down to not smaller than battalion-sized formations). The G3 future operations (FUOPS) officer follows on the map adding friendly maneuver/disposition across the AO during the examined day. The USAF staff weather officer (SWO) de-scribes environmental impacts of weather on joint and organic assets forecasted that day. The TWG then assesses the strength of capabilities within the enemy formations arrayed and compares these to the HPTL applicable for that day. These capabilities identified within the HPTL, such as artil-lery, are assessed down to numbers of sys-tems when possible (e.g., 12 of 18 remain-ing 240 mm multiple rocket launchers or MRLs in the 12th Artillery Brigade). Based on friendly maneuver, TWG participants prioritize which arrayed formation poses the greatest threat to maneuver on that day and focus on shaping them based on this priority. The DIVARTY commander, as fire

by subordinate and staff estimates at the target decision board, approving a HPTL for that period. The staff then adopts this at the following target working group.3 The number of priority formations engaged is limited only by those arrayed and joint assets available to detect them, deliver against them, and assess the effects. For any given ATO, the number of priority formations

rarely exceeded five.

support coordinator (FSCOORD) for the di-vision, arbitrates any indecision. If the 12th Artillery Brigade happens to be the greatest threat to friendly forces that day because of its ability to engage at long range, followed by artillery organic to the 345th Armor Bri-gade and finally systems of the 67th Divi-sion Artillery Group, for example, TWG participants assign them as priority forma-tions #1, #2 and #3 respectively.3 This prior-itization constitutes the Decide phase of the D3A methodology.

The Decide phase can vary day-to-day within the ATO cycle to accommodate the entire framework of the division AO (deep, close, support and consolidation areas). The division deep area can be defined by any graphic control measure (e.g., phase lines, BCT forward boundaries) or fire support coordination measure (e.g., coor-dinated fire line or CFL, fire support coor-dination line or FSCL). The majority of the division’s shaping fight takes place in the deep area. For Validate and Guidance days, the enemy formations considered are al-most exclusively within this division deep area. For Approval day, threats to the con-solidation area can additionally be includ-ed with those in the deep area. These en-

sure that the staff addresses consolidation area shaping every working group and, by the timing, allows adequate coordination with the most effective joint asset operating in this area—friendly special operations forces (SOF) conducting counter-SOF. For divisions with a maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) attached or a support area command post (SACP) for those without, the MEB/SACP staff may target down to individual level, similar to methods used in stability operations targeting. The outputs from this subordinate process, however, only enter the targeting process at echelon (i.e., division) when requesting joint assets (e.g., signals intelligence collection or elec-tronic warfare platforms on elements op-erating within support and consolidation areas).

Division retains responsibility for shap-ing formations within its close area until the division main (DMAIN) conducts a de-liberate battle handover of the fight. During this deliberate handover, DMAIN (either the chief of operations—CHOPS—or the Joint Air Ground Integration Center—JAG-IC—chief) updates the BCT on enemy dis-position for which it will assume shaping responsibility as well as disposition of any

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Figure 1. Decide-Detect-Deliver-Assess (D3A) phasing adapted within DATE targeting at division level. (Courtesy illustration)


friendly elements remaining in what will soon become BCT battle space. BCT liaison officers (LNO) provide ideal conduits for prompting and facilitating this handover as they are both situationally aware of current operations as well as being invested in the targeting process. Within the process, the Review day of the TWG provides the last opportunity for BCT LNOs to request ad-ditional emphasis on specific enemy forma-tions of concern prior to assuming shaping responsibilities for them in the close area.

Within each of these priority formations identified in the Decide phase, TWG par-ticipants methodically align assets against detecting the targeted capabilities, deliv-ering lethal and non-lethal Fires on these capabilities, and assigns assets responsible for confirming that the delivery had its in-tended effect. As Figure 1 depicts, the TWG iteratively assigns detect, deliver and assess tasks, as well as integration responsibilities for each priority formation. Each TWG par-ticipant will have developed prerequisite staff inputs prior to the event. The discus-sion around the table then proceeds suc-cinctly as follows:

Detect. Against Priority Formation #1 (the 12th Artillery Brigade in the above example), the division G2 collection man-agement chief assigns a line of MQ-1C Grey

Eagle UAV to acquire the 122 mm MRLs against a named area of interest (NAI) de-veloped in conjunction with the DIVARTY S2 ahead of the TWG. Historic data from the DIVARTY’s AN/TPQ-53 radars contrib-uted to the NAI development.

Deliver. The division G7 EW officer then recommends disruption of the 12th Artillery Brigade’s Fires nets during a giv-en window of time relevant to friendly maneuver that ATO day, as well as mes-sages delivered in support of information operations to noncombatants in vicinity of the targeted formation. The deputy FSCO-ORD then lists the division surface-to-sur-face target groups (e.g. A14B) delivered by DIVARTY assets upon detection. The DIVARTY S3 (without prompting during the meeting) announces the target numbers and total number of rockets/rounds deliv-ered when initiating the group. The USAF air liaison officer (ALO) from the division tactical air control party (TACP) follows with the number of strike coordination and reconnaissance missions required to bring the remaining 122 mm MRLs down to a level acceptable for the BCTs to shape (e.g., three systems remaining of the original 18). The DFSCOORD checks the estimates to ensure delivery assets dedicated sufficient-

ly achieve the effects, then prompts the group for assets assigned to assess effects.

Assess. Since the F16CJs offer the great-est capability to both engage the MRLs and evaluate the results of the engagement, the ALO acknowledges the assessment task. The collection management chief follows by reiterating the same line of Grey Eagle that detect the MRLs. DIVARTY S2 announc-es responsibility for providing predictive BDA as well as assigning radars to monitor the NAI (in the form of a programmed ra-dar zone) and share assessments.

Integrate. The division Fires and G3 air announce the permissive airspace co-ordination area (ACA) developed for this engagement to facilitate proactive airspace clearance.

By priority formation, TWG participants succinctly covered joint asset responsibili-ties for detecting the relevant capability, for delivering layered effects upon the capabil-ity, for assessing results of the engagement and for integrating friendly capabilities through developing planned permissive clearance measures within the ATO day. The TWG will repeat this cadence of de-tect-deliver-assess-integrate upon Priority Formation #2, fire support assets organic to the 345th Armor Brigade, this time in-corporating a deep attack out of contact

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Figure 2. An example of target working group participants, layout, and roles within D3A. (Courtesy illustration)


with combat aviation brigade (CAB) assets in the delivery to destroy 20 of the original 36 152 mm 2S-19 self-propelled howitzers in this formation. During integration, the DIVARTY S3, G3 air, and CAB LNO brief the air corridors, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) targets initiated, and oth-er permissive airspace clearance measures needed to conduct a joint air attack team (JAAT) upon the 345th AB howitzers. The

group assigns detect-deliver-assess-in-tegrate against the 67th DAG before the DFSCOORD closes the ATO day by re-viewing the HPTL, attack guidance matrix (AGM) and target selection standards (TSS) that has been published (or will be pub-lished) in the division fragmentary order (FRAGORD) for that ATO day. This process repeats over the period of 90 minutes until the TWG has prepared recommendations

for shaping four days out for the command-ing general’s (CG) guidance.

When reinforced by command group and key staff participation, the targeting process contributes to shared understand-ing—providing decision space to methodi-cally shape and assess enemy combat pow-er—while driving other staff processes. Just as TWG participants brought prerequisite inputs from other division and corps lev-

Soldiers in 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kan., conduct live-fire training during Dynamic Front 18 in Grafenwoehr, Germany, March 6, 2018. Exercise Dynamic Front 18 includes approximately 3,700 participants from 26 nations training together from Feb. 23-March 10, 2018. Dynamic Front is an annual U.S. Army Europe exercise focused on the interoperabil-ity of U.S. Army, joint service and allied nation artillery and fire support in a multinational environment, from theater-level headquarters identifying targets to gun crews pulling lanyards in the field. (Spc. Dustin D. Biven/U.S. Army)


el events to the working group, this battle rhythm event influences others in succes-sion. The G3 and FUOPS officer, for ex-ample, take refinements to the execution matrix identified during the TWG into the operations synchronization meeting. com-mander’s update assessments at echelon further refine running estimates through subordinate, adjacent and senior command-ers’ perspective. The assessments working group, led by the division’s team of Func-tional Area 49 Operations Research/Sys-tems Analysis officers, compile assessments 4 Appendix 2 to the FRAGORD’s Annex D includes the DIVARTY’s field artillery support plan (FASP) that aligns the resources required to deliver surface-to-surface Fires where and when needed to achieve intended

effects.

from all sources (including those assigned responsibilities in the previous TWG) into the overall assessment at the beginning of each TWG and each TDB chaired by the CG. The TDB—where the CG approves the method by which the division will shape the enemy and maneuver in space and time—provides outputs that formalize the Annex D (Fire Support) and leads ultimate-ly to a published FRAGORD.4

The ultimate purpose of shaping and the targeting process, however, remains to create positions of relative advantage over the enemy. ADRP 3-0 defines a position of relative advantage as “…establishment of a favorable condition within the [AO] that provides the commander with tempo-rary freedom of action to enhance combat power over an enemy or influence [him] to accept risk and move to a position of dis-advantage.” Targeting participants develop the HPTL with this focus in mind—priori-tizing which enemy capability to interdict or destroy to create relative advantage. The HPTL retains a time component, based temporally on enemy posture and friendly posture within a defined window. Posture in this case applies broadly over multiple domains, as engagement of an HPTL with-in the electromagnetic or cyber domains still constitutes establishment of a position of relative advantage. This facet proves crit-ically important when targeting against ad-versaries layering their defenses with mul-tiple protection assets and enablers.

Recent WFX experience has witnessed an increase in enemy protection and en-abler capabilities to reflect the layering that constitutes anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) developed by near-peer competitors. On land, the stratification of air defense sys-tems of varying range and capabilities with enablers such as EW- or global positioning system- (GPS) jammers by these adversar-ies poses significant challenges to applying friendly joint capabilities—many of which rely on air platforms and GPS. This layer-ing affords the enemy freedom of action to maneuver out of contact and to employ their Fires assets, some of which overmatch current friendly capabilities. Targeting for-mations with these protection and enabler capabilities seek to methodically strip away these layers (through destruction or disrup-tion) and thereby allow friendly forces free-dom of action to employ the entire range of joint capabilities.

Targeting protection capabilities and en-ablers requires assessing not only the extent of their capabilities, but their vulnerabilities in every domain. Targeting participants prepare prerequisite inputs to the TWG that examine each enemy capability pop-ulating a HPTL, listing a menu of friendly multi-domain capabilities that can be used to engage those systems directly or the formation with whom they are associated. Successfully creating windows of opportu-nity during which layered protection and enablers are negated shifts the preponder-ance of freedom of action from the enemy to friendly forces. Freedom of action (de-scribed in FM 3-0 as including “secure lines of communication, standoff, depth, access to cyberspace, maritime and air enablers, and friendly A2 and AD measures”) also allows friendly forces to set operational tempo. The targeting process creates these windows, giving friendly maneuver a posi-tion of relative advantage to exploit.

In conclusion, targeting principles have neither changed with a changing OE nor are they less applicable in DATE than in stability operations. Adapting these prin-ciples thoughtfully to a more intense and dynamic environment, however, provides an iterative and methodical means of prior-itizing an adversary’s capabilities to defeat and the focal points to which the spectrum of joint assets can be applied. Leveraged by commanders and key staff members, the targeting process develops decision space. Its focus on assessments (often empirically derived but informed by subordinate com-mander intuition) generates in-stride deci-sion points at a higher frequency than that afforded by current operations alone. Ulti-mately and most importantly, targeting as a central part of the battle rhythm enables a division to create conditions of relative advantage to exploit against even the most sophisticated enemy. The process allows even elephantine challenges posed by A2/AD to be reduced by manageable and mea-surable bites.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Martin is the 1st Infantry Division commanding general. He served as the commanding general of the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command during Op-eration Inherent Resolve.

Col. Rory Crooks is the 1st Infantry Divi-sion Artillery commander.

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