shaping phenomenal reality: dialectic and disjunction in the bureaucratic synthesis of child-abuse...

Berghahn Books

SHAPING PHENOMENAL REALITY: Dialectic and Disjunction in the Bureaucratic Synthesis ofChild-Abuse in Urban NewfoundlandAuthor(s): Don HandelmanSource: Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice, No. 13 (May1983), pp. 3-36Published by: Berghahn BooksStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23169265 .

Accessed: 16/06/2014 03:35

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Berghahn Books is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Analysis: TheInternational Journal of Social and Cultural Practice.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.82 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 03:35:41 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=berghahnbooks

http://www.jstor.org/stable/23169265?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


SOCIAL ANALYSIS No. 13, May 1983

SHAPING PHENOMENAL REALITY: Dialectic and Disjunction in the Bureaucratic Synthesis of Child-Abuse in Urban Newfoundland1

Don Handelman

1. Introduction

Some three decades ago, Dorothy Lee reminded us that Western codifications

of reality are lineal. "The line", she wrote, "is omnipresent and inescapable, and so

we are incapable of questioning the reality of its presence" (1950:92). Such codifications encompass our phenomenal worlds, and so clothe routines of activity with the appearance of stability. Since, added Lee, "the line in our culture not only

connects, but it moves" (1950:94), our perception of lineality is embued with causal

thinking. Such thought is the connective tissue of ideas and events that tailor their meanings in ways that are compatible with phenomenal reality (cf. Schutz and

Luckmann 1973). On the other hand, the daily life of such realities continues to

throw up discrepancies between the ideas to which persons hold and the actions to

which they are a party. The synthesis of such contradictions lies at the heart of a

social order that appears stable not startling, routine rather than unusual, and

common-sensical instead of paradoxical (cf. Murphy 1972). Through the perspective of child-welfare workers, this essay seeks the

phenomenal foundations of their certainty about the existence of child-abuse or

neglect in two urban Newfoundland households. The creation of such cases is the

product of what I would term small-scale dialectical processes. These are the

dialectics between the phenomenal contents, the behaviours, that come to

constitute the elements of a 'case', and the ideas of officials, whose interpretations

give structural form to the 'case'. The lineaments of a case, as they emerge through

time, become the synthesis of an ongoing interplay between structural form and

phenomenal content.

To build a case that 'makes sense' within the context of a bureaucratic life

world (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973), the child-workers must use information that

comes from the life-worlds of the clients they investigate. Such information

comprises the phenomenal elements, or contents, of the case. Y et the weave of these

elements, as they become the fabric of the case, are treated by the child-workers as a

valid reflection of the phenomenal worlds of their clients. In this way the life-worlds of bureaucracy and clients are bridged, for officials. Yet it is more accurate to

recognize that the bureaucratic rendition of the behaviour of clients is, in no minor

sense, a 'simulation' of the phenomenal reality of the latter. Therefore, by using this

simulation as a valid reflection of the meaning of client behaviour, the child

workers almost inexorably introduce discontinuities between the structural form of

a case and the phenomenal elements from which it is being constructed. Their

dilemma is again dialectical: on the one hand, they must propound a synthesis between the form of a case and its phenomenal content; yet, on the other, each step in this direction may warp the degree of congruence between the case as a

bureaucratic construction and the phenomenal experiences of the client. These

experiences, after all, are the ostensible purpose of bureaucratic intervention in the first instance. The attempt to synthesize phenomenal content and case-form often

3



skews, step by step, the extent to which the child-workers can penetrate the worlds

of their clients, and consequently also the degree to which clients can be 'helped' in

terms that are meaningful to their own life-experiences. Lee's insights into causal

thinking, together with the exigencies of bureaucracy, may suggest that the

problem of phenomenal validity, and its untoward consequences, are inherent in

the dialectics of case-construction.

This essay is about such dialectical processes, and the emergent, but implicit, dilemmas they pose for child-welfare officials. For example, in the first case to be

discussed, the child-workers come to accept responsibility for 'changing' the

behaviour of the offender/client, although whether such change actually occurred

is questionable. On the other hand, in the second case, the child-workers eschew

responsibility for such change, although they probably contributed to it in substantial measure. As Murphy notes aptly (1972:150): "The work of the world

often gets done through misunderstandings, dissonant mutual expectations, and

false images of the social system."

By intention, the organization of this essay also has dialectical properties. The

telling of the two case-studies moves back and forth, between sequential segments of my telling of their narrative and between points of analysis and discussion that, taken together, can be read as a meta-text that comments upon those versions of the

phenomenal accounts that are rendered as case-studies. Again, the emphasis is

upon another analogous account of the dialectical relationship between content

(their stories, as I render them) and form (commentaries that emerge from and

delve into particular segments of the contents of these stories). Each return to a

description of a segment of the case-story is contextualized, to a degree, by the

commentary that preceded it; just as each proceeding commentary contextualizes, in turn, that part of the story-description to come. This technique enables analysis and discussion to emerge in relation to, and in counterpoint to, the case

descriptions, but in an additive fashion that permits both digression from (where the description appears to warrant this) and convergence of text and meta-text.

Throughout, to the degree that I have been able to accomplish this, the emphasis is

on their emerging mutuality and interdependence, as text (the stories) and meta

text (the commentaries) weave through one another in a cumulative accretion; and

as generalizations emerge from the body of the paper, and yet are kept quite close to

the data. Perhaps the most significant effect of this usage of style is implicit: it suggests both a tendency towards logical closure of the story-as-text and a tendency towards open-endedness that are in close synchrony as a case develops. Therefore

the stylistic usage adopted here parallels, in no small measure, tendencies that seem

to be present in case-construction itself, as this is done by officials. This, then, is an acceptable compromise between the rigid scientistic format of numerous social

science papers — one that distorts phenomenal reality even as it claims to render it

visible — and between the flexibility of forms of fiction that incorporate into their

story-lines those ironies that tellingly bear witness to the little traps that we set for

ourselves, and that surprise us continuously, in the living of social life.

In modern society, bureaucratic organization exemplifies the lineal codification of reality. Bureaucracies are goal-directed: they exist to solve or to expedite problems. Ideally, they are invested with well-defined powers, vested in positions of authority, that are delineated in universalistic terms. Bureaucrats are

armed with explicit laws, rules, and regulations with which to make rational decisions. As Weber noted (1964:330-339), rational bureaucratic purpose depends on the application of rules to particular instances through the special knowledge that such officials command. Yet, in phenomenological terms, the application of

rule to instance, of idea to action, cannot be accomplished without the notion of

"interpretation". In the small-scale dialectics between case-form and phenomenal

4



content, it is this conception of interpretation that serves as mediator. Although

part of the "stock of knowledge" (Schutz and Luckmann 1973) of officials, it often is uncodified, tacit, and common-sensical.

Common-sense interpretation, since it mediates between the idea and action, must partake of the qualities of both of these domains: it is at once flexible and

final, open-ended and foreclosing. Therefore, officials cannot consciously scrutinize and evaluate fully the implications of interpretation: it is 'common sense' or it 'makes sense'. For, in order to mediate between idea and action, the notion of

interpretation must be only loosely integrated. Consequently, regardless of their

attempts to be systematic, objective, and consistent, officials cannot realize fully what the consequences of their decisions will be, nor what their own contributions

are to such outcomes.

Yet, by behaving as if their interpretations do have finite meaning (Manning

1971:251), as if their interpretations are valid renditions of discrete instances, and as

if other officials would reach the same conclusions in the same ways (cf. McHugh

1968:30), officials maintain that sense of accuracy and of validity that is necessary to the continuation of the bureaucratic world. The particular value of a

phenomenological perspective on bureaucracy is to highlight that tacit quality of

interpretation that contributes no less than explicit regulations and routines to the

stable continuity of bureaucratic regimen and that, for child-welfare officials, enables them to accomplish syntheses of case-form and phenomenal content. As

Manning (1971:249) notes: "The qualities of organized and organizational life most at issue are those that are not raised to the conscious level, are assumed ... are

characteristic and natural ... In short, they are the common-sense grounds of

organizational life."

I should note here that studies of social-service bureaucracies frequently have

emphasized the asymmetry of the allocation of power in contacts between officials

and clients. Too often this results in a pronouncement that, since officials have the

greater power in such contacts, they impose their conception of reality, or of what

they perceive as the common good, on their clients — while the latter have few, if

any, means to resist such imposition. Therefore a central problem for such

approaches is the question of why such asymmetries exist and why these are

associated with particular types of institutions and societies.

Although this essay is pervaded by a sense of power that officials have over

their clients, the language of power is not used explicitly, but is largely taken-for granted. Indeed, were the asymmetries in the allocation of power to be made the

central explanatory device in the elucidation of the outcomes of cases, like those

discussed further on, there would be little or no purpose in doing an intensive

exegesis of such cases. For, to explain the formation of cases primarily in terms of an imposition of reality by officials would be to conflate the 'surface' structure of the outcomes of cases with the formation of'deeper' structures of signification and

meaning that provide a shaping of phenomenal reality through, I suggest, dialectical processes. In my approach officials are not the prime imposers of reality on others. Officials themselves, and their clients, rarely understand this, for they

perceive their interplay through the surface structures of cases as a lineal

progression of cause-and-effect — and so both parties often seem bewildered by what does occur in the emergence of a given case. I will argue instead that the deeper

structuring of their interplay is dialectical, and that this becomes evident only

ihrough an intentional and intense exegesis of particular case-formations. Then a

central query is not why cases have the outcomes that they do, but how cases

:hemselves are brought into being, so that they can acquire whatever outcomes that

:hey do.

5



In an analogous vein, the great bulk of studies of abuse and neglect almost

never question how these phenomena acquire the status of social-facts in our world.

Instead, such studies accept the existence of these phenomena as a largely

unquestioned, objectified, and reified given; and are then concerned with the why of their existence, and so with how they can be prevented or treated. By contrast, in the

perspective adopted in this essay, the processes of how these phenomena become

objectified through the dialectical construction of bureaucratic cases takes

precedence over the lineal cause-and-effect inquiry, however complex and

sophisticated, into why abuse and neglect exist. Before turning to the exegetic analyses of this essay, I want to consider the

ideational development of a construct that is integral to the world of child-workers; one that aids them to interpret instances of suspected abuse or neglect. This is the

construct of the child-battering syndrome. The emergence of this construct

exemplifies how phenomenal reality is tailored to the exigencies of a bureaucratic world.

2. From Association to Causation: The Perception of Child-Abuse2

One hallmark of the modern nation-state has been the growth of service

bureaucracies which have a mandate to intervene within traditional kinship units, like that of the family (cf. Handelman 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980). In instances of child neglect or abuse, parents are forced to accept official supervision, or they may lose

their children. Such decisions are influenced often by the positivist psychologizing idiom of the "helping" professions. It is not an over-exaggeration to suggest that

one category of citizen — viz. parents — are not only required to behave correctly in

the public eye, but are required also to "think" correctly as evidence of their fitness.

For causes of 'misconduct' are sought in the presumed mental states of suspected

offenders, so that official "help" can be given to correct their apperception of

reality. Platt (1969) has described the growth of state control in North America in the

processing of children who are deemed to be neglected, abused, or delinquent, and

of the role of "social worker" in this activity. In particular, the "helping" professions have provided legitimation for, and techniques of, "therapeutic intervention" within the family. Social work, including child work, has directed much effort to changing the personality attributes of its clients (cf. Greenaway 1976). But, except in extreme instances, it has been hard for child welfare workers to establish conceptual connections between typifications about the personality states of

suspected child-abusers and the physical symptoms shown by their children. In the Western tradition of valuing "hard" evidence, medical diagnoses usually prevailed over clinical ones in influencing family courts. And medical evaluations have tended to stress the specific injuries of the child, instead of his/her overall psycho social condition.

By 1946, the verification of child abuse, particularly among infants, received greater legitimacy when the radiologist, Caffer, reported a correlation between certain fractures in the long bones and subdural hematomas. Subsequent

radiological evidence indicated that such lesions were traumatic in origin, and deliberately inflicted in some instances. By 1962, the pediatrician Kempe (Kempe et al 1962) had constructed the gloss of the "battered-child syndrome". This subsumed

a number of physical and behavioural criteria suggestive of abuse. One cannot

overemphasize the importance of the creation of such a gloss in providing child

welfare workers with an ideational typification that purported to identify abuse,

although its criteria themselves existed together only in association (cf. Helfer 1974:29).

6



Even where medical experts maintained that injuries caused by child battering were quite specific, there remained aspects that could be clarified only by reference

to typified behaviours or to social contexts. For example, the radiologist,

Silverman, writes that even though the forces that produced injury may be deduced,

"... they provide no information whatsoever concerning the circumstances

surrounding the injury or the motivation of the individuals responsible" (1974:58; see also Weston 1974:85; my emphases).

Where medical personnel pointed to suspicion of battering, officials who had

to process and to treat the families concerned had different priorities. They were

required to investigate instances that dealt not with "associations", but with

relationships of cause-and-effect, in order to allocate responsibility for the instance, and to establish why it had occurred. Inevitably, there was a shift in focus from the

abused child to the abusing parents; and here psychological typifications were

introduced to explain the causality of abuse.3

But these cause-and-effect constructs of abuse rested heavily on the medical

construct of abuse as a cluster of attributes that coincided in association with one

another. Therefore, in the main, the approach of the intervenor was to accept that

children identified as abused (according to medical correlations) came from

families that contained one or more child-abusers. Then these suspected abusers

could be treated as if they did indeed maltreat their offsprings. In a pioneering study of therapeutic intervention, Steele and Pollock noted that they began by treating

parents of children with severe injuries, but that: "Soon we became aware that we

were dealing only with the extreme of a much more widespread phenomenon and

began including cases in which the infant was moderately bruised by severe hitting,

shaking, yanking, choking, or being thrown about" (1974:90). Given the difficulty of distinguishing between injuries caused by brutality and

those resulting from physical discipline, or from accident, a tenet of therapeutic intervention was to oppose corporal punishment in principle

— and to regard its

perpetrators as beset by psychological "problems". This approach raised a host of

definitional problems — for the great majority of instances that might come to the attention of officials could well be ones of light or moderate injury (cf. Gil 1973:119). Still, if these should be defined as abuse, then the parents could be treated as if they suffered from certain inadequacies or psychopathologies. Ad

absurdum, officials might find themselves stating that under no circumstances

should a parent be permitted to strike a child (cf. Handelman 1978). By embedding medical correlations within a matrix of motivation, clinicians

and social workers created a construct that enabled them to meet their professional tasks of discovering psychological causation, and to find solutions that fell within

their sphere of competence. So, for example, Davoren states that: "The most

outstanding characteristic the child beaters share is their attitude toward their

children. Understanding this attitude and what it means helps one to make sense of

the behavior of these people" (1974:136, my emphasis). Here the psychological construct of "attitude" is used to define a population of child-beaters. This

population is then examined for evidence of the typicality they are presumed to

possess. From the psychologistic reductionism of "attitude", as an independent

variable, it is but a short step to the perception, in similar terms, of unconscious

processes. For example: "In some instances unconscious motives in the parent... seem to be linked with accidental injuries sustained by their young children ... This could well be interpreted as an expression of unconscious hostility" (Okell, quoted in Renvoize 1975:167, my emphases).

As a causal factor, 'motivation' became a province that only the accomplished

expert could plumb, and over which the "child-abuser" had little control. Thus the interpretation of abuse became defined in terms of the ideation of the child-worker

7



or the clinician. The suspected offender was reduced to Schutz's celebrated puppet —

dependent for consciousness on the social investigator (Schutz 1962:47).

Moreover, the fervent investigator of suspected abuse on occasion approached a

metaphysical position in which the mind, as a causal agent, eliminated the

possibility of coincidental or accidental injury — as for example in the following account by a head nurse of a children's ward:

Children bounce. Recently we had m a child who'd fallen nearly ñfty feet

from a building and it hadn't even fractured its skull. But another mother brought in her baby with a severe injury which can only have been caused by an attack, and do you know what her explanation was? It had fallen off

the table! (Renvoize 1975:39). In this instance, the stock of knowledge of the investigator provides explanations that subsume the reality of the suspected offender's life-world by denying its relevance. In other instances, should the suspected offender object, he or she may well be said to "deny reality".

This is not to suggest that no parents brutalize or neglect their children. But,

except in extreme and unequivocal instances, whether a parent becomes a child

abuser, and to what extent, often remains a matter of official interpretation,

typification, and disposition. For the investigator is permitted a literal reading of the suspect's behaviour, a reading that reduces the actions of the latter to meanings

acceptable to the former. Such a literal reading — itself a homology of idea and

action — also signifies for the investigator a homology of the "phenomenal" and the

"existential" states of the suspect. If the suspect's existential state is perceived as

coterminous with the phenomenal condition attributed to him by the investigator, then the suspect has little or no independent human existence —

except as a

creature of motives and drives, in the Schutzian sense. Therefore it is not surprising that child-workers often are surprised by the reactions and the decisions of their

clients.

The emphasis on motivation, as explanation, also allowed experts to de

emphasize the significance of physical symptoms, and instead to stress their

underlying "causes". For example, in a major study of child-abuse, Gil argued that

previous attempts to define the phenomenon were ambiguous, in part because there

was an over-reliance on physical evidence, while "the motivation and behavior of

the attacking person" (1970:5) were given insufficient recognition. Instead he offered a definition of physical abuse based on "... the intentional, nonaccidental

use of physical force ... aimed at hurting, injuring, or destroying that child" (Gil 1970:6). But he then admitted that, in practice, instances of abuse may involve a

complex admixture of the intentional and the accidental that would be difficult to

separate. Like that of "attitude", the idea of "intentionality" was quite amenable to

professional tailoring (cf. Scott 1970). The final step in the reconstruction of child abuse, in the clinical image,

occurred when the expert could elevate the psychological symptoms of the abusing parent to the same level of validation as that of the physical (medical) aspects of the

battered-child syndrome. Thus Morris and Gould (1963:32) could state that: "The etiology of this syndrome is essentially social [read psychological] — and social and relationship symptoms are as clear as medical symptoms. Moreover, they are always present, even when bruises and broken bones are not" (my emphases).

The typification of child-abuse has become an open-ended construct that

absorbs the continuing accretion of "new" criteria and attributes of abuse, to

encompass a growing client population, that only the expert is qualified to evaluate.

As Gelles (1974:193) has noted, most of the adherents of what he terms the

"psychopathological" model of child-abuse, "make a special effort to point out that social variables do not enter into the causal scheme of child abuse" (his emphasis).

8



Oííicial attention has shiíted írom the physical evidence that something did

happen, to expert conjecture about how and why this happened, and then to what

may happen should there be no official intervention. Official intervention then is justified in instances where parents were not proven to be abusive, but where their

competence becomes suspect because the behaviour imputed to them leads experts to believe that they have the potential to harm their child.

Here I have concentrated briefly on the development of the construct of "child

abuse". But a brief word is in order about its counterpart: "child-neglect".

Interestingly, "neglect" is being constructed as the complement to "abuse": abused

children are neglected rarely, while neglected children seldom are abused. Thus

parents of battered children are overly concerned with their child's neatness and

cleanliness. These parents are "over-fussy, over-anxious, and over-possessive"

(Renvoize 1975:38). In counterpoint, the neglected child may be undernourished,

insufficiently clothed, left unattended for lengthy periods, but rarely is physically attacked (Renvoize 1975:38).

Intervention may be justified either on the grounds of abuse or of neglect. Between these two generic categories, experts and officials are putting together a

life-world of causality in which accidence and coincidence have little place. Within such a world, many parents would qualify as "unfit" should they not accept intervention, supervision, and guidance. To round out this picture, experts also are

seeking legitimation for constructs of "emotional abuse" and "emotional neglect". A phenomenological perspective suggests that what began as a concern for the

welfare of the child and the solving of unequivocal abuses, itself generated consequences that should question the validity of this aspect of child-welfare, and its continuing penetration into the lives of North American families. Phenomenology suggests that in an indeterminate world of multiple realities such

edifices of positivist determinism are neither simply "right" nor "wrong", but merely tenuous.

3. The Processing of Suspected Neglect and Abuse4

Schutz and Luckmann (1973:231) argue cogently that the process of

interpretation is necessarily problematic, even where an organization offers its members typifications (see Bittner 1965), like that of the battered-child syndrome, through which to establish that an instance is representative of its type. In urban

Newfoundland, instances of suspected child neglect or abuse are exemplary of the

process of interpretation. The caseworker has available a number of solutions

through which to dispose of an instance of suspicion, but there are no official guidelines to specify how the caseworker is to typify a particular instance.

Thus the caseworker must proceed from the reporting of a suspicious instance to a decision (i.e. a solution), with a stock of ideas that are not codified officially, but that are used to make common-sense interpretations about the motivation and character of her clients, in order to decide "what really happened". She must synthesize a story-line that is intelligible to, and justifiable of, the conditions and goals of her employment.

Families who have received, or who are receiving, public welfare assistance are particularly vulnerable to accusations of neglect/abuse. In two-thirds of instances of suspected neglect/abuse that I examined, the parents had received, or were

receiving, welfare assistance; and less than ten percent could be considered middle class in terms of socio-economic resources. First, welfare-families will have dossiers in the Department of Social Services. The details of such files enable officials to construct biographies of such persons. Second, families receiving public welfare assistance are frightened of attracting official scrutiny, and of losing their assistance. Third, welfare clients apparently feel that officials disapprove of their

9



modes of living (Federal-Provincial Study Group on Alienation 1974:31). Therefore there is a strong likelihood that many parents suspected of abuse or

neglect will react with fear and hostility; and that their behaviour will tend to

confirm the suspicions of the investigator that they are concealing information.

Initially, a household is reported for a variety of reasons. Experts often report

suspicion on the basis of medical or clinical evidence. In other instances, kinfolk,

neighbours, acquaintances, or landlords have been known to report suspicion because they feared for the well-being of the child, because they wanted to settle

grudges, or because they desired to evict their tenants or boarders. Still, for

purposes of the report, unofficial informants tend to be treated as dutiful citizens.

The varied reasons that result in a report are standardized initially as a gloss of

"suspected neglect/abuse": this is an official category of knowledge that "makes

sense" to investigators. Thus child workers gain entry to households, for a

multitude of reasons, on the basis of the validity of this gloss. But their subsequent evaluation of the household is a function of whatever they discover there — and this

is not necessarily related to the reasons that elicited the invocation of the gloss in the

first place.5

Following a report of suspected neglect/ abuse, the child worker who turns to

Departmental Regulations for assistance in evaluation will find the following statement:

Every Welfare Officer, at some time in his career, will have brought to his

attention a child who is not receiving the care and upbringing considered necessary for his proper development. This child for some reason, or for a

number of reasons, may be considered a neglected child. Every such

complaint or report of neglect must be investigated to determine its

authenticity and the extent of the neglect (Section 221). The above is the only guideline in the Regulations that suggests what a caseworker

seeking to interpret an instance of suspicion should search for. The remainder of the

Regulations go on to describe procedures that are relevant only after the worker has

decided that the case is one of neglect/abuse. The Child Welfare Act, 1972 (Article 2, Subsection (p)), provides twenty

criteria according to which a child (under the age of sixteen) can be considered

"neglected". But these criteria are summations that imply that the worker already has reached a decision that can be matched with one or more of these legal glosses. Thus the criterion used most commonly for the apprehension of a child (Article 2, Subsection (p) (iv)) states that a neglected child is one, "... whose parents, or

surviving parent, or guardian or other person in whose charge he may be, cannot by reason of misfortune, disease or infirmity properly care for him, or are unfit to have

charge of him, or refuse to maintain him". The problem of how to understand, for

example, "misfortune", or "are unfit to have charge of him", is left to the common

sense interpretations of the child-worker, her colleagues, and her supervisor. When a welfare officer decides that there are "... reasonable or probable

grounds for believing that a child is a neglected child ..." (Child Welfare Act, 1972,

Article 11), the offspring in question can be apprehended without a warrant, and

held "in care" of the Department for ten days, without a court hearing. If legal

proceedings are initiated by the caseworker, there are four possible kinds of

decision: the judge can dismiss the case; he can leave the child within the household,

subject to the "supervision" of the Department of Social Services; he can make the

child a "temporary ward" of the Department, to be placed in a foster home or in an

institution for an initial period of one year; or the child can be made a "permanent ward" of the Department. As a result of this latter decision, the child is removed

from the household for an indefinite period, and may under certain circumstances become available for adoption.

10



Neither in the way that the reporting of suspicion is done, nor in the codified

knowledge available to the child worker, is the problematic quality of

interpretation resolved. In an important sense, this quality is inherent in the

dialectics of case-construction. The caseworker simulates the world of the client in

order to build a case-form that makes sense in organizational terms. The dialectical

synthesis of the overall case is then a bureaucratic creation; and interpretation, as the mediation between case-form and phenomenal content, becomes a dialogue that is imbued with bureaucratic purpose.

But, as a case develops in sequence, as additional actions and events of the

client's life-world continue to intrude into the ongoing synthesis of the overall case, its validity is threatened. Further re-interpretation is resorted to. But this continues

to assert the validity of a bureaucratic homology between official ideas and the

simulation of client actions. And this premise of homology sustains the distortion or falsification of the phenomenal world of the client. In turn, further

contradictions, or unexpected consequences, are produced by the ongoing

synthesis of the case — and this skews further the relationship between the

bureaucratic world and that of its clients.

The two cases to follow are synthesized by the child-workers through causal

interpretation. In doing so, incongruities are created between their ideas of what is

happening and between what may be occurring. But, caught within the emergent case-forms they are constructing, the sequential interpretations of the caseworkers

introduce additional distortions. The first case demonstrates that there need be no

substantive change in a client for bureaucratic reality to be constructed as if this

client indeed did change her motivation and attitudes, under the supervision of the

child-workers. The second case complements the first: it demonstrates that major

changes in a client may be set in motion by caseworkers who do not perceive their

own contributions to this changing reality — for they do not acknowledge that they

placed this client within a reality of their own construction in the first place.

4. Shaping Phenomenal Reality, I: Changing the Unchanged

One spring evening, two women encountered a small boy wandering barefoot

in a neighbourhood close to the centre of St. John's and took him to the police station. With the child in a patrol car, constables cruised the area until informed

that the child was in the care of Lynn Knight, at a local address. There they spoke with the landlady who informed them that the boy, aged approximately two and a

half, was the son of Ruth Schmidt, who lived down the street. The landlady stated

that Ruth had brought the boy, Charles, to Lynn that morning with a promise to

pick him up by the late afternoon. In the early evening Lynn left, without asking

anyone to look after the child, who later wandered out. The police proceeded to

Mrs. Schmidt's address and there spoke with her mother, Mrs. Knight. She refused to look after the child, and advised the police to check with the family's welfare

officer. The welfare officer on duty that evening accompanied the police to Mrs.

Knight's where they also found Ruth Schmidt, the boy's mother, who would only say that she had left Charles with Lynn, her younger sister, but that she had been

unable to return on time. Unsatisfied with the explanation of how Charles came to

be wandering around the city without shoes, the welfare officer placed the boy

temporarily in a foster home until the following day, when the Child Welfare

Division would decide the meaning of these elements. But, with speed, the instance acquired more sinister overtones. The same

evening the foster parents had to delouse the boy, and they later stated that because

his clothes were so filthy, they were burned. More damaging still, the foster parents noticed "scars" on the boy's body, and they immediately took him to a local

Ii



hospital for examination. Therefore, before the instance came actually to the Child

Welfare Division, the boy was examined in hospital and was referred to its social services division.

The medical report, issued the following day, was unequivocal. The child was markedly fearful of objects brought near to him. His extremities were covered with

multiple bruises. He had blisters on the soles of his feet, and points of searing on his

posterior, on the supra-pubic area, and on his left wrist. He also had a light case of

pneumonia. The examining physician suggested that the blisters and burns

appeared to be the result of cigarette burns, and his diagnosis suggested this

instance to be one of child abuse.

(a) Simulation and Meaningful Relation

The phenomenal elements, with which to construct the form of a "case", were

present early on in this instance. But this required that the investigators meet

certain conditions of the lineal codification of reality. Interpretation must mediate, between ideas that can be applied to phenomenal elements, and between the ways in

which these elements come to be organized as a structural form with an

independent, if temporary, existence. In this process, ideas that are perceived as relevant connect phenomenal elements to one another, to form configurations of

meaning. These meanings then feed back to reinforce those ideas that were first seen

as relevant.

Practically, this requires that investigators perceive discrete elements to be in

"meaningful relation" with one another (Handelman 1978). Therefore, such elements are not coincidental items that exist in association only because an

examiner has adopted an investigative stance towards them. Instead, there should

exist a meaningful pattern among them that will represent an "objective reality" that exists apart from the modes of inquiry of the investigator.

Such a pattern of meaningful relation raises the problem of idiosyncracy: given that phenomenal contents exist in a meaningful relation to one another, is such a

pattern temporally and situationally idiosyncratic, occurring only by happenstance? Or is it itself representative of more inclusive ideas of officials?

Thus a pattern of meaningful relation among phenomenal contents also raises

the question of their temporal and spatial consistency. In turn, this raises the

question of "motivation": if phenomenal elements consistently cohere in a

meaningful way, why do they create such a pattern? In the opening stages of the investigation, meaningful relation establishes the

"thematic relevance" of the instance to the bureaucratic task, and suggests the

hypothetical relevance of the gloss of "suspicion" in the sense suggested by Schutz and Luckmann (1973:196):

Our action is frequently adjusted so as to give rise to situations in which it is

possible to determine whether a hypothetical relevance should be

converted into a 'valid' relevance or be considered as void. If such

confirmations or annulments are independent of our action, one must

simply 'wait'. Given the problem-orientation of bureaucratic relevancy, the investigators

cannot wait. They assume that the meaningful pattern, assembled by (a) the child's

wandering, (b) the absence of his mother, (c) the unwillingness of the landlady or his grandmother to look after him, (d) the delousing of the child, and (e) the medical diagnosis, is a valid hypothetical simulation of the phenomenon of suspected

neglect/abuse, as this corresponds in "objective" reality to the validity of such an

idea.

12



Thus they assume that someone caused (in the sense of permitted) the child to

wander outside without shoes, and that someone or something burned the child in

numerous places. By questioning the protagonists, they expect to establish what

happened.

They discover that Ruth is in her early twenties, one of seven children, and

separated from her husband, Hans Schmidt, a German landed-immigrant now

living in Ontario. Mrs. Knight, widowed the previous year, receives long-term welfare assistance. After their marriage Ruth and Hans moved to Ontario. Ruth, who left school at fifteen, was employed as a chambermaid in a local hotel until she was laid off a few months before. She then began to receive short-term welfare

assistance.

The doctor who examined Charles in the hospital spoke with Lynn (aged 16) and with Ruth. Lynn maintained that she had bathed Charles and had changed his

clothing, before leaving him with her landlady. She said that she had taken off his shoes because he had the habit of running across the street.

Ruth described herselí as someone who alternated between rage and tears; and

that her "nerves" were poor after her separation and return from Ontario.

Occasionally she had to slap Charles when he was not obedient. But, he was struck

more frequently by her own brothers and sisters who resented his father's foreign

background. She described her present living conditions with her mother as difficult; they quarrelled frequently; she and Charles had to sleep on a mattress in

the kitchen; and so the boy rarely went to sleep before midnight. Although she

admitted that Charles was not looked after properly, she denied abusing him. At

the time of this interview she was in her third month of pregnancy, and her style of

life was also an issue between herself and her mother. The doctor described her

behaviour during the interview as "very cautious, reserved, and obviously defensive".

Ail the investigators thought the case could not be taken to family court on a

charge of child abuse, unless they had oral corroboration of their suspicions. The key element to be concretized was how Charles received his burns. Such

information would pinpoint personal responsibility and liability, in a causal sense. The child worker spoke with Ruth, who stated that she had paid Lynn to baby

sit for Charles, while she "went to some clubs with some friends". This element complicated the interpretation of the child's wandering out of doors, since Lynn said she left Charles with her landlady. As Ruth's sixteen year-old sister, Lynn would appear a reasonably competent baby-sitter. But the caseworker looked upon Ruth's nightclubbing as irresponsible behaviour on the part of a young mother.

1 he aspect oí neglect in Charles' wandering out of doors, together with the

contradictions among the accounts of Lynn, Ruth, and the landlady, made the

synthesis of a consistent story-line difficult for the caseworker. But the medical

report wrote of deliberately inflicted "physical abuse". Thus the caseworker stated:

''Naturally, the big question in this case is how Charles sustained his burns." In this regard, Ruth said that Charles was burned when he bumped into the hot stove. To

this the caseworker replied: "Where this would account for two or three scars, it by no means offers an explanation for the many scars on his body."

Still, the caseworker was initially impressed with Ruth: "an open, out-gomg

person very easy to converse with. I was considerably surprised at her attitude —

she seemed to take everything so well". Nevertheless, during their conversation, the

attitude of the caseworker changed toward Ruth. Either she was indifferent to

Charles' fate — an attribute of parental behaviour that is congruent with the

neglected-child syndrome — or Ruth was deliberately trying to create the

mpression that Charles' injuries were accidental; and this was congruent with the Dattered-child syndrome. The caseworker later wrote: "I began to realize that she

13



was making all the right answers and I eventually felt I was being handled." From

the caseworker's perspective there was no behaviour that could absolve the suspect; unexcitement connoted indifference; sorrow indicated the non-accidental nature of

the injuries; while moderate concern suggested that the suspect was welfare-wise —

she was "handling" the caseworker.

To find a causal explanation for Charles' burns, the caseworker suggested that

the hospital social worker interview Ruth. To the latter Ruth appeared indifferent to herself and to Charles. Thus Ruth had a "blowzy, sloppy appearance. Her

features are coarse and uncared for... she did not seem to express a genuine concern

for her child — she did not ask a single question about him in the foster home. I felt I was being handled by this woman." This impression, of being welfare-wise, was reinforced when Ruth explained Charles' fearfulness in terms of the loss of his

father and grandfather, "the two men who meant most to him".

Ruth denied that either she or her husband had maltreated the child. But, like

Lynn, she maintained that the other children in the household treated him roughly. Regarding Charles' burns, she said that he had bumped into the stove and was

burned on the hand and stomach (the supra-pubic region); and that he had bruised

his back in a neighbour's playroom the week before. The social worker concluded:

"Her account of her married life and her present relationship with her child was

unconvincing. I found it difficult to relate to her. I believe she withheld significant information about her own current life style."

The hospital social worker also interviewed Lynn. She appeared pleasant and

genuinely concerned about Charles' welfare; but "she seemed exceptionally

guarded about divulging information regarding Ruth's treatment of the child. She also withheld other facts about the family or even deliberately misled me." Lynn

insisted that before she had left her landlady's house she had called out to ask her to

look after Charles.

Asked about Charles' scars, Lynn explained: he had bumped into the stove and

burned his stomach. He had arrived from Ontario with some marks on him. She

herself had accidently flicked a match which had burned him on the back of the neck. But worst of all, the other children in the household beat him, and once he was knocked from his tricycle and required six stitches over one eye. Finally Lynn admitted that relations between Ruth and her mother were poor, because Mrs.

Knight objected to Ruth's affair with a married man, who had caused her current

pregnancy.

(b) Interpretation as Mediation

The emerging structure of the case had grouped relevant phenomenal elements

into three areas of inquiry: how did Charles come to wander off; how did he acquire

the burn scars on his body; and what was his mother's life-style and character? The

instance begins to acquire the form of a "case" that has delineated areas of inquiry. But the form itself is still malleable; it may develop into one of neglect, abuse, or

accidental injury. And the elements within this form-in-flux have yet to settle into a consistent pattern of meaningful relations that will synthesize one particular form

through an interpretation that will encompass the largest concentration of

phenomenal elements.

If the answers to how Charles wandered off, and to how he was burned, remain

contradictory, the third area of inquiry has acquired consistency in the meaningful

relations between its phenomenal elements. The person with primary legal and

moral responsibility for Charles is his mother. Ruth's behaviour was perceived by

the caseworker and by the hospital social-worker as undesirable in a mother. From

these attributes they decipher her attitudes and motivations toward motherhood

14



and toward her son. As the caseworker put it: We believe that what we have

uncovered is only the tip of the iceberg — which suggests that there is much more to

be learned about this child's life experiences." lhe locus ol the case is no longer exactly what happened to Charles, but the

character and motivation of his mother. Although they have not interpreted

satisfactorily the events that related specifically to Charles, they have succeeded in subsuming these within the more inclusive biography of Ruth. Whether or not she was specifically responsible for what happened to Charles, her negative character

has the potential to produce future events that will be harmful to the boy. They have

more-or-less decided that she is an unfit mother; that grounds should be found to

have him removed from her; and that her attitudes and life-style must change before

he will be returned.

Note that the synthesis ot this aspect ot the case was not inherent in the initial

perception of its prospective development. Hence it may be a function of the

investigators' inability to resolve what did happen to Charles. Since their relevancies are problem-orientated, they have concretized an area of the case that

has the capacity to illuminate other phenomenal elements whose patterns of

meaning are still latent. Thus an ongoing synthesis of phenomenal content and

case-form will be used to clarify additional contents, and so the structure of the case

itself. In turn this structure will secure the phenomenal arrangements it contains.

Because the story-line of the case must stand as an "objective" rendition of reality, the investigators do not acknowledge that their particular reasoning is itself a

function of their simulation of an official reality of neglect/abuse. Instead, they uncover patterns of meaning as they exist in everyman's reality.

I should note again that, common-sensically, these investigators are aware that

contradictions require interpretation and synthesis (see Handelman 1978). This is hardly at issue, for "making sense" of the partially unknown is inherent in their

task. So, at approximately the point where I interrupted this re-telling of Case 1, the

hospital social-worker noted: "information received differs significantly from

interview to interview ... I have attempted to interpret this information and make

some judgements about the reliability of the information received." Only by knowing how to interpret their data can they recognize an interpretation that is

valid, in that it will hold as the reality of the case. What is problematic for analysis is tiow the work of interpretation is shaped; and how its effects come to be surprising, îven though retrospectively they are represented as the natural outcome of a real

progression of events.

The investigators decided that "Ruth is an unfit mother" was a consistent and

meaningful relation; and they approached other informants for further evidence of :his. The caseworker visited Mrs. Knight, Ruth's mother. Before leaving the office she "... made a list of all the scars and bruises found on Charles' body, so that I could

isk specifically about each." 1 would note that the bureaucratic reality of the case permits investigators to

treat each element as a diacritical fact. Although parents may treat routine bruises ind cuts as part of the ordinary flow of household experience, and therefore not

make mental notes about their context and cause, for caseworkers such "scars and

bruises" are the impetus of the case. Because caseworkers often perceive them as

:vidence of wrongdoing, they expect parents to be equally aware of their

significance. So parents may not keep track of the kinds of information that the

;aseworker values. The caseworker may perceive this as lax or suspicious behaviour, but the parent simply may be confused and resentful.

Present at this interview were Mrs. Knight and her son, Guy, aged eleven. Mrs.

■Cnight was "basically kind and pleasant, a person who has had to face many iifficulties in life". Guy, although a borderline delinquent who behaved in a "rough,

5



abrasive" way, had a "very likeable quality about him". In comparison with

previous character evaluations of Ruth, and even of Lynn, these were quite

positive. In contrast to Lynn's account, both maintained that Charles had returned

from Ontario without any "marks" on him. Then they confirmed that the scars on

his stomach and hand were burns from the stove. The caseworker pressed Mrs.

Knight about other scars on Charles' body that did not appear accidental. Finally

Mrs. Knight stated that Guy had deliberately burned Charles' neck. Guy flatly denied this, and appeared "angry" and "embarrassed". According to the

caseworker, he added: "Well she's not going to blame me for all the marks on

Charlie"; and he described watching Ruth holding her son by the scruff of the neck,

or by his hair, and beating him about the head "until the blood came through". The caseworker pressed him to be more specific: "Where did the blood come

from? His nose? His ears? His mouth?" Guy nodded affirmatively, and hurried on to say that Ruth had kicked Charles across the kitchen floor, from one side to the

other. He said that she was angered particularly if the child messed his pants. "She calls the boy names'S. and F. and B. and C.' She told him she wished he'd never

been born." Mrs. Knight confirmed this account, and added: "and that's not all".

Her mother criticized Ruth's life-style: her leaving Charles to go to nightclubs,

her adulterous relationship, and her pregnancy. She suggested that the caseworker

return to Lynn's landlady, who could confirm what was said, since Charles spent much time there. The landlady agreed that Ruth physically mistreated Charles.

Both she and Mrs. Knight agreed that Lynn was kind to Charles, but that her care

of him was haphazard.

(c) Form and Content: Interplay

In the previous two interviews the caseworker heard clear-cut evidence that

would account for most of the marks on Charles. Phenomenal content begins to

suggest clearly that the case-form is one of deliberate physical abuse by the child's

mother. But the assumption of meaningful relation requires consistency among

phenomenal elements. And in this instance these are still in contradiction to one

another. Is the interpretation that Ruth physically abused and neglected Charles a

valid one? On the one hand, she is described by Guy as obsessive about Charles' messing

his pants; and she herself had admitted that he was difficult to toilet train. Such behaviour corresponds to an attribute of the battered-child syndrome. On the other

hand, she is described as quite indifferent to the child; and this corresponds to attributes of the neglected-child syndrome. Moreover, the attributes of these two

syndromes are usually the reverse of one another. While such contradictions may

pose an interpretative problem for experts, in legal terms what is important is a

prima facie case that Ruth is an unfit mother, either because of her abuse or neglect,

or both.6 At any rate, this disjunction is explained, later on, in a way that connects

neatly with Ruth's description of herself as one given to sudden fits of rage and tears

since her marital estrangement.

More serious are discrepancies in the accounts of the protagonists. Ruth never

admitted to abusing Charles, and in this she was supported by her sister Lynn. Her

mother, her brother Guy, and the landlady, said that she did abuse and neglect

Charles. The previous interpretation of Ruth's life-style, by the investigators,

pointed to her as a cause of Charles' neglect. This interpretation received support

from Mrs. Knight, and from the landlady who stated that Ruth often left the child

with Lynn, who in turn neglected him. But Mrs. Knight disapproved of Ruth's life

style; Lynn and the landlady accused one another of neglecting Charles the night he

16



wandered off; and Guy was accused by his mother of mistreating Charles, before he

in turn accused Ruth. Furthermore, the supposedly witnessed physical attacks, and

the possibly accidental nature of some burn marks, did not account for all such

scars and blisters on the child's body, many of which the physician had attributed to

cigarette burns.

The caseworker s solution is to seek a more comprehensive synthesis, which

will not resolve necessarily each and every disjunction in meaning, but which will

subsume, and so explain, all of them in conjunction. Connections between

phenomenal elements are used to infer general patterns of causality. These, in turn, are used to explain more fully the connections between discrete elements. In this

there is a continuing dialectic between the shifting patterning of the content of a

case and its malleable structural form. But, as the form of a case grows firm, it

finally comes to guide meanings attributed to phenomenal elements, as these

continue to be added to the case, through time. The "truth" of the explication of the

case lies in the patterns of meaning that the dialectic between case-form and case

content throws up; and in the degree to which these simulations of reality

approximate ideas present in the stock of knowledge of officials.

The interpretation of the caseworker runs this way: since Ruth is the person most responsible for, and in closest contact with, her son, she is the most likely cause of his abuse and neglect. This story-line is well-supported by the evidence of

Guy, of Mrs. Knight, and of the landlady. Although the landlady may have been

responsible in part for Charles' wandering off, this element has been eclipsed by that of physical abuse. Lynn, since she often cared for the child, bears some

responsibility for his neglect, and her behaviour toward investigators appeared

uneasy and guarded. Mrs. Knight's attitude toward Ruth's life-style echoes that of

the caseworker — and she is perceived as a fairly truthful, if reluctant, witness. But

since she refused to have much contact with her grandchild, she is also an

indifferent witness. As for Guy, Mrs. Knight accused him of deliberately burning Charles, but: "even though Guy has reason to accuse Ruth of mistreating Charles, I

believe he was telling the truth because Mrs. Knight confirmed it". Still, Guy is the

weak link in the chain of evidence presented by his mother and by the landlady because he had admitted to injuring the child deliberately, and because of his youth. Moreover, he was the major eyewitness to Ruth's brutality.

1 he caseworker solves these dilemmas of interpretation by arguing that the

evidence given her can be only "the tip of the iceberg" — particular representations

of a more general pattern — and by retaining within the story-line all the negative

evidence she has collected. Once she has established neglect and abuse, those

elements that she used as interpretative devices to understand the contradictions

imong accounts become the "facts", that then describe "what really occurred". In

phenomenological terms, she uses phenomenal elements both as datum and

:oncept, as evidence and explanation. In their revised status these elements become

in integral part of the official biography of the household. Thus, Ruth physically attacked her son on a number of occasions. The other

children, of whom Guy is an example, beat him at times. Lynn accidently, but neglectfully, burned him. Ruth, irresponsibly, often left him with Lynn, who was concerned about him, but who neglected to ensure his welfare; and he was neglected

by his grandmother and by the landlady. The caseworker concludes: "I would

gather that everyone, adults and children, Lynn included, in his own way has mistreated this child. He has been physically abused by others as well as his mother. He has been neglected and he has been emotionally abused."

1 he three major themes in the case — the boy's wandering off, the marks and

Durns on his body, and his mother's life-style — come together in a meaningful and consistent way that accurately represents the biography of the whole household. In

.1



this ongoing synthesis, Ruth is the major culprit and prime mover: she did not

protect her child against the other children; she neglected his welfare; and she beat

him herself. But a major component of cause-and-effect explanation still is missing:

why did she behave in these ways? What is her motivation regarding her child?

Without this crucial factor it will be difficult for the caseworker to triangulate what had happened, with how Ruth is likely to behave, in order to predict how she will behave (cf. Cicourel 1973).

(d) The Clarification of Motivation

Some three weeks after the investigation began, the case was taken to family court. There Charles was made a temporary ward of the Department for one year. None of the protagonists opposed the petition of the caseworker. The judge ordered

Charles placed in a foster home, ordered Ruth to cooperate fully in her own

rehabilitation, and required her to seek psychiatric aid. Ruth became a psychiatric day-care patient at a local hospital. The caseworker

stated that when her emotional problems had been treated and when she obtained

adequate living conditions, Charles would be returned to her.

During the investigation and its aftermath, Ruth was unaggressive toward the

investigators. Previously, this was read as "indifference". Now it was perceived as

"cooperation". After two months she was discharged from day care, but still was

seen regularly by the psychiatrist. He wrote that she showed no signs of major mental illness. Instead, "her abuse of her child had taken place in the setting of a

psychoneurotic reaction to various personal and social stresses ... her recent

disturbance seems precipitated by breakup of marriage and death of father, to

whom she would have normally turned to for support .. she manages to give the

impression of being rather immature and vulnerable though this is to a certain

extent belied by the absence of any real evidence of neurotic breakdown in the past.

One might speculate that she is well as long as she is free of major responsibilities as at the present time."

This psychiatnc evaluation finally clarified the interpretive problem of Ruth's

motivation. Her abuse and neglect of Charles were responses to situational stresses

that she was unable to handle. She was unstable, but did not suffer from any

chronic disorder whose behavioural symptoms would threaten her son. The

caseworker interpreted the diagnosis to explain all the elements of Ruth's life style:

her frequent night-clubbing and adultery were also responses to situational stress.

Therefore if she would accept psychiatric aid, visit her son regularly, and change her

life-style, she would prove her control of psychic stress.

Ruth kept to her psychiatric visits, and visited her son twice a month. But she

continued to "frequent the down-grade nightclubs and occasionally mentions this

sailor friend or that one". Still, she found employment as a bar-maid in one of these

"down-grade" clubs, and an apartment over a beerhall which she shared with Lynn. Most of the other residents of this apartment house were single women who worked

in the same club that employed Ruth. Mrs. Knight and her other children rented an

apartment in the same building. After a few months, Ruth stopped visiting the

psychiatrist, and went to see her son less frequently. The caseworker expressed doubts about Ruth's living quarters and about her

place of work. But Ruth assured her that she had "toned down her night life". To

the caseworker, Ruth had acquired "a fresher look in her appearance, not quite so

hard", and Ruth expressed great desire to have Charles back. In the months that

followed the caseworker expressed satisfaction with Ruth's progress. But what

exactly had changed in the interim?

18



She worked in one of the centres of her night lite. She kept her boy friends. She

lived over a tavern, in close proximity to other night club employees of whom the

caseworker disapproved, and close to her mother and the other children, all of

whom were implicated in the interpretation of abuse and neglect. She missed

psychiatric appointments, although the psychiatrist found her "reasonably well"; and she visited her son infrequently, although she expressed strong wishes for his return. The welfare-wise "handler" of caseworkers had acquired a "fresher look in

her appearance", even though she worked a night shift.

I he Notion oj Cooperation : A Phenomenal/ Existential Homology

I he key to comprehending this change in perception, by the caseworker, seems

to lie in the notion of "cooperation" on the part of the client. When caseworkers

synthesize a case of neglect/abuse, they are quite convinced that its ultimate

validity lies in the protection of the child; but that this goal also will be for the

parents' own good, even if they should not perceive it as such in the present. For the caseworker, the shut Irom being an agent of punition to one of

rehabilitation, toward an offender who becomes a client, is an extremely difficult

one. Some caseworkers who have concluded the punitive phase of a case are unable

to switch roles to the rehabilitative phase. Others are unable to complete the

punitive phase. As one put it: "Either you take one side or the other, or you get torn

apart." Another added: "My God, we're the biggest threat... Imagine how a mother

feels when we come to take her kids away." Therefore the "cooperation" of the

offender/client is valued, particularly in the rehabilitative phase, because it

indicates to the caseworker that her synthesis of abuse/neglect does have

phenomenal validity: for the offender/client appreciates and understands the goals md efforts of the caseworker. Sometimes the offender/client will be told something like the following: "I felt that I should drop in and see them occasionally for their 3wn protection in case we should receive complaints

— and that they should

:ooperate for their own good."

Because the caseworker, tor official purposes, assumes a homology between the existential and phenomenal states of the client, that the latter cooperates indicates to the former that the client is "facing reality". But this is a reality of the arganizational life-world: so "cooperation" indicates that the client accepts the

motives and goals of the caseworker, not only phenomenally, but also existentially. In other words, "cooperation" indicates that the client accepts the validity of the >ood intentions of the caseworker. Then the caseworker can perceive herself as

'eally "helping" the client, even though the beneficial consequences of this re îabilitation may not be immediately evident. Therefore, the validity of the :aseworker's synthesis of neglect/abuse is verified by the object of that simulation — the client. Then, knowing that her interpretation is correct, the caseworker can ¡witch more easily from a punitive role to a rehabilitative one.

Jtiut, should the client oppose, reject, or defy the caseworker, then the

existential/ phenomenal homology suggests that the caseworker's simulation may be incorrect. Then the caseworker is likely to become more coercive and punitive :oward the client, in order to convince her of its validity. In trying to "help" the

:lient, by continuing coercion in the punitive mode, the caseworker will attribute

opposition to the "objectified" condition of the client herself. Although the caseworker perceives that she is dealing with a real person, she is in contact with its bureaucratic simulation. By shaping the simulation, the caseworker also re-creates he client in its image.

in phenomenological terms, the reductionist homology between existential md phenomenal states is false. Therefore the distortions in this homological

y



simulation do affect the real person-as-client, but in refracted and ambiguous ways. The responses of the real person-as-client, in turn, reach the caseworker in a

distorted manner, through the refractions of the simulation. But, within the

bureaucratic simulation, such responses are read as true diacrítica of the client's

inner state of motivation and intent. The reductionist existential/phenomenal

homology permits the caseworker to do a literal reading of the client's behaviour.

Then the caseworker's attempts to convince the client to "face the reality" of the

latter's position, within the simulation of neglect/abuse, may result in misunderstanding, confusion and resentment. As will be seen, this is apparently what happened in Case 2.

In Case 1, Ruth's appearance of full cooperation with the caseworker permits the latter to re-interpret a high degree of continuity in phenomenal elements as a

transformation of these same elements. The key is not a major change in living style: instead it is a re-reading of phenomenal elements through the notion of

"cooperation", rather than through those of suspicion and concealment, as in the

punitive phase of the case. During the punitive phase Ruth, the "handler" of investigators, also tried to please the latter. Then, such behaviour evoked the

response that she had something to hide and that she was impeding the

investigation. Later, such behaviour suggested that she was cooperating fully, and

that the case was progressing satisfactorily. Although caseworkers and clients may not be fully aware of this, the phases of a case exert strong influences on caseworker

perception and emotion; and similar behaviours that occur in both phases will be

interpreted accordingly.

(f) Case Phases: Resolution, Synthesis, Doubts

Although caseworkers often phrase their talk and their reports about case

developments in terms of the presence, absence, or change of particular

phenomenal elements, they appear to be indexing these in terms of: (a) the

temporal-structural unfolding of a phase of the case, and (b) the resolution of the

complementary opposition between punition and rehabilitation. "Cooperation",

particularly in the rehabilitative phase, tends to indicate that this opposition has been resolved through a transformation in attitude, motivation and intent on the

part of both caseworker and client.

In instances where there is no clear decision about whether neglect or abuse

have occurred, but where suspicion still lurks, the household is checked regularly by the caseworker. Because neither the resolution of punition and rehabilitation, nor

the transition from one phase to the other, have taken place, anomalies of

perception are thrown up, as in the following:

Undoubtedly Mrs. X is coping very well with baby. In fact, she tries so hard

and protests so much that she does not mind at all the work and trouble

and never complains, that I feel sometimes that she has guilt feelings about

the past. Here the caseworker is "out of phase", because no phase has been synthesized.

Instead, she simultaneously tries to work through both the punitive and

rehabilitative modes: this creates ambiguity and confusion. But unlike, for

example, anomalies (Douglas 1966) that are dealt with through categorical cultural

rules, anomalous cases are mediated by interpretation, and so solve themselves. If

no evidence of neglect/abuse eventually is found, the case is closed. It is either

reinterpreted never to have been a proper "case" or belatedly, in retrospect, it may

acquire the phase-form of a regular "case", should evidence of neglect/abuse be

uncovered.

In Charles's case, with the year of temporary wardship ending, the caseworker

recommended that no additional period be requested. Although she still had

20



doubts about Ruth's life-style, another indeterminate point appeared: Charles'

foster home was due to close in the near future. Either the boy would be transferred

to another home, which would raise new questions about his welfare, or he had to

be returned to his mother. The caseworker preferred the latter course, arguing:

"Although she does not lead a model life, she is gainfully employed and she has

made an honest and sincere attempt to improve. Also, I feel that it is time for her to

have another chance." The caseworker would continue to keep the household

under supervision, but "there is no cause for concern".

I entitled this case, "changing the unchanged". As investigations into child

neglect/abuse go, it was quite straightforward: eye-witnesses were prepared to

speak, and the contradictions between their accounts were resolved to synthesize a

story-line of cause-and-effect that explained the unfolded case to the satisfaction of

the organizational life-world. But the synthesis of the phenomenal reality of "case", I argued, was a simulation that simplified disjunctions among different elements. Although such a simulation permitted the establishment of causal relationships, it

also contained, within itself, contradictions which threatened the validity of its

synthesis. Lineal codifications of reality affect the lives of their protagonists — but these

influences are refractive and ambiguous ones that must be straightened by the

causal assumptions of the simulation. Therefore there is continuing disjunction, instead of conjunction, between simulated reality and its environment — and this, in turn, creates the necessity for further mediative interpretation and synthesis.

By official criteria, Ruth most probably was a child-abuser. But, how did the

caseworker know she had stopped being one? Within the synthesis of the "case" she

had evidence of this. But what were the conjunctions and disjunctions between the

"case", Ruth's environment, and her existential condition? Did the caseworker

spend a year constructing a lineal case, only to go full circle when Charles was

returned? Perhaps she was unable to recognize this, since her perception of the case

had changed in response to the form of its synthesis? Are teleological effects a

consequence of the lineal construction of phenomenal reality? Case 1 also raises questions about the scale of the dialectics of idea and action,

and about the nature of their synthesis. Perhaps the dialectic of form and content

should be separated from that of idea and action. I will discuss this further, in the

light of Case 2, in the final section.

5. Shaping Phenomenal Reality, II: Unchanging the Changed

One summer morning the Child Welfare Division received a telephoned report from a neighbour to the effect that a young child had been beaten the previous

night. Two child workers and two detectives went to the address. The mother, Mrs.

Fort, denied beating her daughter, aged four. The child workers examined the

child, and one reported that "four bruises could plainly be seen on the child's legs". While one worker phoned a hospital, Mrs. Fort locked herself and her

daughter in the kitchen. The detectives told her to open the door, or they would break in. "She said if I forced my way in, she would stab the child with a knife." For approximately an hour, they argued through the door. Then, "she decided to let us in but said she had a knife and a kettle full of boiling water, and if we tried to take the child, she would stab or scald her to death. After we entered the kitchen I found

that the child was placed under the table and barricaded in with chairs. Mrs. Fort was standing by the table with a knife in her hands and a kettle of boiling water nearby." After some minutes she surrendered the knife.

At the hospital, the examining physician stated that the child had not been

beaten or ill-treated in any way. She was returned to her mother.

21



This event appeared to be an unfortunate misunderstanding. Perhaps the

workers over-reacted by taking policemen along; while the mother's reaction to

their entry appeared hysterical. Yet, if she did not physically abuse her daughter, what did she have to fear? And why were policemen taken to check a routine report?

As will be seen, the event emerged as a logical consequence of a constructed

reality, within which the pursuit of client cooperation led the caseworkers to coerce

their client. However, in their simulation of the client's phenomenal/existential state, the workers omitted the effects of their coercion. Therefore, they were

absolved of responsibility for the reactions of the client, and blame was placed on

her lack of cooperation. In Case 2, the dialectic between the case-form and case-content indicates how

client opposition created worker coercion, in contrast to the avowed aims of the

latter. By contrast, Case 1 showed how client cooperation created worker

compliance. In Case 1, the client may not have altered her motivation; but worker

perception certainly did change. In Case 2, the client appears to change, but the

child-workers do not recognise their contributions to her deterioration. In their

quest to "help", they contribute to debacle.

What sort of synthesis of case-form and phenomenal-content leads to a

mistaken apprehension; in which police are used, and in which a mother threatens

the daughter to whom she refers as her "love child"?

(a) Phenomenal Elements: Initial Accretions

lona Fort, born in the early 1940's, was one of eight children; an illiterate, who

left elementary school to work in a laundry. In her late teens she bore an illegitimate

child who, with her agreement, was placed for adoption. Iona was described as a

reliable and dependable worker, who was somewhat "dull". Her shyness was

attributed to a speech impediment. She married and bore three more children. Her

husband, an unskilled labourer, worked seasonally, and the household often

subsisted on welfare assistance. Iona, her husband George and their daughter Mary

contracted tuberculosis, and were treated in sanitoriums.

Four years prior to the apprehension described above, the Minister of Social

Assistance received a letter from a neighbour of the Forts. This stated that, with

George Fort in a sanitorium, lona frequently went out at night, leaving her children

unattended. Moreover, she often brought home "strange men". Her oldest child,

Anthony, was then four; Mary was three; and the youngest, Mandy, who was not

George's offspring, was less than a year old.

An investigation reported that the Fort apartment was cramped, but clean and

tidy, and that Mrs. Fort did the family wash. The child worker found no evidence of

physical neglect. Iona, although admitting to an occasional night out, denied that she entertained men at home.

The following year, George left the sanitorium. He complained at times to the Child Welfare Division that lona often left the children unattended, that she drank

heavily, and that she often stayed out "entertaining men". When the child workers

investigated, Mrs. Fort refused to speak to them. In the middle of that year, George left his wife because he "couldn't take it any more". He asked that the children be

placed temporarily in a foster home. When the child worker arrived, Mrs. Fort was washing the floor. "She

wouldn't talk to me at all when I told her that I was from the City Welfare and we

had heard of neglect in the home. All she would reply to my questions was that

'Mrs. Fort isn't home'." On a subsequent visit, she told the caseworker that

"Welfare interferes with other people's lives." The latter replied that: "If she wouldn't let me help her then I would have to go to court to make the children

22



temporary wards. Apparently she didn't believe me and shut the door in my face."

Mrs. Fort's landlord, and Mr. Fort, agreed to testify that she was frequently drunk, and that she brought men home.

The caseworker informed Mrs. Fort of the date of the court hearing. Iona

cursed the worker and refused to listen to her plea to be permitted to aid: "I said we

didn't need to go to court if only she would talk to me and let me help her to keep the

family together. She then said I could take the children now but she would not go to court. I told her we didn't want the children but only to help her. She still wouldn't listen and shoved the children over to me and kept screaming for them to go."

The caseworker took Anthony and Mary. Iona would not give up Mandy, to

whom she was described, by the caseworker, as "very attached". George Fort stated

that Iona had never wanted Anthony and Mary.

(b) Consensus and Coercion

The phenomenal elements, perceived by the caseworkers, are not compatible

directly with either physical neglect or abuse. Instead, these elements are seen to be

connected more to Iona's life-style, and to her relationship with her husband. The

caseworkers are disturbed by the potentially harmful effects this life-style will have on the children, as they grow older. Their fears are strengthened when Mr. Fort

leaves his wife as the sole caretaker.

The caseworkers seek a consensus on cooperation from Mrs. Fort. But, such a

consensus is phrased in terms of supervision of the offender: in other words, it is

based on control that underlies cooperation. Intersubjectively, the caseworkers

recognize the grounds for conflict between themselves and the offender/client. But

their bureaucratic life-world requires that the offender/client accept, phenomenally, its simulation of herself. This legitimizes its intervention within her life. Organizational reality is predicated on control, which in turn is simulated as a

consensus about intervention, with which the client cooperates. The caseworkers try to convince Mrs. Fort to accept their "help" for her own

good. But her implacable opposition speedily concretizes the coercion and control

that lie beneath the rhetoric of cooperation: either she accepts "help", or she will be

forced to. Her dramatic rejection of her two oldest children permit the phenomenal contents of the case to acquire a pattern of "neglect", and the case-form smoothly assumes its punitive phase.

Thus the contradiction between consensus and coercion generates an official

interpretation of "neglect". This strengthens the form of the case. Ideally, coercion

should convince the client/ offender to accept the simulation of consensus, and so to

move the case into its rehabilitative phase. Then "help", on the basis of cooperation, will be applied. In this instance, the opposite effect results.

(c) Scrutiny: Watching and Waiting

The caseworkers petitioned the family court to have all three children made

temporary wards for one year. The judge reasoned that Mrs. Fort did appear indifferent to her two oldest children, and ordered them made temporary wards.

But he found that Mandy could in no way be considered "neglected", and ordered

that she remain with her mother, although subject to the supervision of the Child

Welfare Division.7 This verdict outraged the caseworker, since it questioned whether Mrs. Fort

was unequivocally an unfit mother. The caseworkers had assembled phenomenal elements in a consistent pattern of meaningful relations. This pattern excluded

attaining the cooperation of the client through consensus. Instead, it pointed to the relevancy of coercion, to control her. Since the case was being synthesized as one of

23



neglect, the next step was to coerce Mrs. Fort by removing all her children. If Mrs.

Fort was an "unfit mother", then she was not competent to care for any of her

children. That the judge ruled otherwise questioned whether the synthesis of case

form and case-content was as valid a pattern of meaning as the caseworkers had

perceived. Since they did not doubt their synthesis, they did doubt the validity of the verdict.

The caseworker wrote to the Director of Child Welfare, in part, as follows:

... the youngest and most impressionable child, Mandy, age one year, was

not made a ward but rather left at home with her mother. Since Mr. Fort

has left the home ... Mandy is still under her mother's influence. Even

though the home is subject to the worker's supervision, it cannot be kept under constant surveillance. We are at a loss to explain how the judge could declare two children neglected and yet the third, who was subjected to the same type of treatment, was not made a ward. We are convinced that

not just two but all three children involved were being neglected and the

youngest child, while she is allowed to remain with her mother, will continue to be neglected ... would it be in order to appeal the judge's decision ... (my emphasis).

The judge's verdict was dangerous, for it was anomalous to the synthesis of form

and content of the case. Thus it threatened the internal consistency of the case, as a

representation of "true" reality, and not only of one that met the relevancies of the

organizational life-world. Reinterpreted, the anomaly of the verdict became a

"mistake", to be corrected with speed. The verdict also took from the caseworker a major resource with which to

control, and then to guide, Mrs. Fort. The one child for whom she expressed affection was left with her. Thus, from the caseworker's perspective, the verdict also

was mistaken because it prevented the case from moving smoothly into the

rehabilitative phase. Therefore the case itself became anomalous; and the

caseworker was trapped in her own construction of its punitive phase. The child

workers' involuted attempts to escape the punitive phase, through coercion,

eventually thwarted the rehabilitative aim of the organizational life-world. In his reply, the Director of Child Welfare recognized the need of the

caseworker to maintain the synthesis of case-form and phenomenal content, in

order to re-establish its correct progression. He noted that the verdict was legally

binding. But he suggested that the caseworker visit the household twice weekly, and

"if the situation does not improve then it is our prerogative to again approach the court to request temporary neglected wardship. In situations such as this it is our

responsiblity to maintain as much supervision as possible and when necessary to

present such cases to court" (my emphasis). The child-workers were to watch Mrs.

Fort until they uncovered further evidence of neglect.8 Then her third child could be

taken.

Consequently, the caseworker visited frequently, although Mrs. Fort rarely

permitted her to enter. But the caseworker collected information from neighbours, who reported that Mrs. Fort was so drunk "she kept falling on the floor of the

apartment", and that Mandy was left alone for periods during the night. In her

reports, the caseworker stressed that Mandy had to be removed with haste. Still,

she lacked indisputable evidence.9

The following year, temporary wardship for the two older children was

extended for an additional twelve months. In succession, two other child workers

took over the case. Both were admitted rarely to Mrs. Fort's dwelling, but on these

occasions both found that Mandy was well cared for.

Anthony adapted well to his foster home. But Mary, then five years old, had been placed in her fourth foster home. She was enuretic, and defecated in her

24



clothing. In this new home, two years after she was taken from Mrs. Fort, Mary showed marked improvement: her mental age matched her physical one, and she

was rarely enuretic. That summer, her foster parents planned to leave

Newfoundland for a few months, and Mary's pediatrician recommended

emphatically that the child go with them. Mrs. Fort refused to give formal consent

to Mary's trip. Illiterate, she apparently feared being tricked into "signing Mary

away permanently". The caseworker obtained a court order permitting Mary to go.

Shortly before their departure, Mrs. Fort arrived at the home of the foster

parents. According to them, Mrs. Fort, in profane and abusive language, threatened to beat Mary if she did not return with her. Mary clung to her foster

mother crying, "I love you", and appeared terrified of Mrs. Fort. The foster father

called the police; and a constable later testified that "Mrs. Fort was abusive to her

child" (viz. in her choice of language and in her threat). The caseworker summed up the incident as an attempt to "kidnap" Mary. The

Child Welfare Division believed that sufficient evidence was available to take a

further step. Anthony and Mary said they had no wish to return to their mother.

For over two years Mrs. Fort had resisted every effort to advise and to guide her.

She was evaluated as an incorrigibly "unfit mother" whose children should never be

returned, and from whom Mandy should be taken, for Mrs. Fort inevitably would

neglect and corrupt her. The Division requested permanent wardship for the two

older children. This would make them eligible for adoption, if parental consent was

forthcoming.

(d) Time and Phenomenal Validity

The passage of time itself, together with the above incident, facilitated the

continuing synthesis of case-form and content.

Mrs. Fort was typified as an "unfit mother". The synthesis of a case of

neglect/ abuse was rendered somewhat inconsistent, as a blanket indictment, by the

court verdict. But the strain toward consistency between case-form and content

also was stimulated by the verdict. Before she was defined formally as "neglectful", the question was "is she?" After the verdict, the question became "is she not?"

Meaningful relations among phenomenal contents of the case suggested she

probably was such a person. Therefore there was a strain toward consistency, to

transform this probability into a certainty. This finally would clarify her "true" character and motivation.

For two years she had persisted in her implacable opposition to the intervention, the guidance and the help of the child-welfare authorities. This behaviour had contributed substantially to their punitive and coercive position. Her persistence, and their inability through time to alter her stand, turned

probability into certainty. But note that the certainty of "neglect" was elicited in large measure because she rejected the "help" of the authorities.

If there was initial doubt about the homology of phenomenal evidence and

existential condition, with time this gained validity — for Mrs. Fort did nothing to

disprove it. She could escape the pressure of the case only by first accepting her

correct role within it. The more she resisted the role given her, the more anxious were the child workers to place her within it in order to move the case through its

structural phases, and so to complete their own tasks. As long as the "cause" of

neglect refused to enter into this role, the progress of the case was blocked in its least

valued phase. Y et the strain toward consistency, between phenomenal elements and

case-form, demanded a completed synthesis. Put differently, Mrs. Fort's total rejection of the validity of the organizational

life-world did place in doubt its phenomenal validity for the caseworkers. Either she

25



was an unfit mother, or they were engaged in an enterprise of fantasy — one whose

degree of fit with their phenomenal reality was questionable. Such a disjunction created strains between the simulation of the case and the reality of the

organizational life-world. I think this explains, in part, their persistence to prove her neglectful, and to coerce her into accepting her proper part. Her compliance would reduce the disjunction between their world of work and the case, even if it

should increase the disjunction between the simulation of the case and her own

phenomenal reality.

(e) Expectations Denied...

Mrs. Fort did not attend the court hearing. Mr. Fort testified that his wife still

drank heavily, and that she went out with other men. The pediatrician testified that

Mary's progress in her present foster home was remarkable; and that she certainly would regress if returned to her mother. The constable, who was present when Mrs.

Fort tried to take Mary back, testified that she had cursed and threatened her

daughter. Mary's foster mother attested to Mrs. Fort's behaviour during that

incidents. The judge ruled that Mary and Anthony be made permanent wards; and

that Mrs. Fort be denied all rights to visit Mary, since she had so upset the child

during the incident. As permanent wards, these two children became eligible for adoption; and the

Child Welfare Division decided on this course. During the next months, the caseworker visited Mrs. Fort occasionally, but

could find no evidence that Mandy was neglected, contrary to all of the dire

warnings of the past three years. Nevertheless, she was certain that Mandy was

mistreated and that evidence of this would turn up eventually. In addition, she

pressed Mrs. Fort to sign the "consent to adoption" documents, which Mrs. Fort

adamantly rejected. When a fifth child-worker took over the case, eight months later, its form had

settled, but it still contained ambiguous elements. Anthony and Mary were

disconnected from Mrs. Fort's rehabilitation, but her consent still was required for

their adoption; and Mandy still remained with her. A succession of caseworkers

had failed to move the case past its punitive phase. When the latest caseworker asked Mrs. Fort to sign the "consent to adoption"

forms, "she told me not to come back and slammed the door in my face". A month

later this caseworker stated: "She cannot be approached as she refuses to let a

worker inside the door. This woman is antagonistic and rebellious to the point of being dangerous. There is no possibility of completing consents on behalf of the children." The child-workers could only continue to press Mrs. Fort, and to await a

new incident that would prove her to be completely unfit, as their synthesis of case

form and content suggested would occur eventually. Three weeks later, they received the report described at the beginning of my account of this case: a

neighbour telephoned that Mrs. Fort had beaten Mandy the previous night.

(f) Expectations Delivered ...?

The child-workers had waited over three years for the behaviour towards

Mandy that they had anticipated from Mrs. Fort. The use of two detectives and two

child workers to seize Mandy appeared justified when four bruises were found on

the child's legs; and their intention to apprehend her was clear. Finally, Mrs Fort

had filled fully the role assigned to her in the case. Her hysterical reaction and her

threats to kill Mandy were interpreted literally, as evidence of her character, and

not as the culmination of over three years of continued pressure by the child

workers.

26



Thus the cause of her outburst lay withm her own psyche: it was quite

independent of the efforts of the child-workers to "help" her, for her own good. Yet

the disjunction between the phenomenal construction of the case and its

environment persisted. If the child-workers did not recognize their own

contributions to Mrs. Fort's existential state, could they comprehend her reaction

as anything but an effect of which she was the sole cause?

Although the medical examination of Mandy turned up no evidence of

physical neglect or abuse, her mother's proper role within the constructed case still

led the caseworker to believe that her influence on the child was harmful. The

child's apprehension was a "mistake" only in that it turned up no evidence of ill-use — it did not change the consistency of explanation that had developed through time.

Mrs. Fort's hysterical reaction — possibly provoked by the shock of the

apprehension — was not read in that context, but instead was understood as a

capacity for violence that could turn against her daughter. The issue once again was

her potential for harming Mandy, rather than any treatment the child had received.

She was told that Mandy would be returned only if she permitted the caseworker to

"help" her to become a proper mother. To retain her "love child", she acquiesced: "She agreed to allow the Department of Child Welfare to help her in any way they saw fit." One condition was that she allow the caseworker to visit whenever

necessary. Another was that she undergo a psychiatric examination. Belatedly the

case appeared to move from the punitive to the rehabilitative phase, although not in

a manner foreseen by the child-workers.

The psychiatrist found Mrs. Fort to be a woman of limited intelligence, who

seemed quite "paranoid". She spoke of her phone being bugged, and of persons

stealing letters from her that could be used as evidence to take Mandy. She feared

that her tubercular condition would be used as an excuse to remove Mandy. She

spoke of the child being "kidnapped" from her, which was why she had reacted as

she did during the apprehension.10 The psychiatrist stated:

She tends to react to anything that she views as a threat with extremely

paranoid ideas and behavior. People of this kind can on occasions be quite dangerous, but I feel I can safely say that there is no immediate danger to

the child in this situation as long as Mrs. Fort is willing to accept

supervision and psychiatric treatment.

Mandy was again medically examined: she was found to be "physically and

emotionally normal", while the psychiatrist had described her as a "bright normal

child". The diagnosis of paranoia substantiated, in retrospect (Handelman 1978), all

of the Division's attempts to make Mrs. Fort accept guidance. The condition of

paranoia explained her motivation in continually rejecting the child-workers. As such, the diagnosed condition was perceived as embedded within her identity: it was not a reaction, in full or in part, to the pressures she had withstood for three years.

According to the synthesis of the case, the child-workers could not have

contributed to the development of such a mental condition, or to its worsening, since their intentions were wholly to the benefit of Mrs. Fort: thus positive efforts

could not trigger negative effects. Therefore Mrs. Fort's diagnosed condition was

wholly her own responsibility, and it demonstrated fully how much she was in need

of help.

(g) Expectations Confounded

The caseworker visited Mrs. Fort every second day. Again, since intentions

were beneficial, there was little perception that an intensification of supervision

27



brought Mrs. b ort under the increasing control oi the very type of person she feared

would try to take her child. She remained very wary, believed she was "tricked", and

that her telephone was monitored. The caseworker attributed these sentiments to

paranoia, and not to her own more frequent presence. But Mrs. Fort maintained

that she did not need a "shrinker", and missed her psychiatric appointments. Mrs. fort also stated that she was followed whenever she went out by

someone, disguised in a red wig and yellow outfit, who looked strangely like the caseworker. When the caseworker wore a different outfit, the figure stalking Mrs.

Fort became modelled on this costume. The caseworker said: "I tried wearing

exactly the same set of clothes, every time I visited, to try and stabilize the identity I

presented to her — so she would recognize me as one and the same person each

time." But Mrs. Fort persisted in seeing her skulking in a variety of guises. Un a subsequent visit, she accused the caseworker of "kidnapping" Mandy.

Although Mrs. Fort had welfare and family allowance cheques in her possession, she refused to go out to cash them. Asked about food provisions for Mandy, she

replied: "If I can do without, so can tootsie." The caseworker offered to take her

shopping, "but she refused, again displaying that she did not trust anyone". 'Trust", of course, was a corollary of cooperation; and if Mrs. Fort had accepted lier correct role within the case, she should have displayed this attribute. Yet, from tier own perspective, why she should have "trusted" the child-workers was a moot

point. The caseworker said: "She was not prepared to listen to reason, and there was no way to reassure her that our Department's intention was only to help."

ine caseworker turned to the psychiatrist tor advice. He had seen Mrs. Fort

only once, but he told the caseworker that Mrs. Fort was one of the most paranoid

patients he had seen. She described Mrs. Fort's behaviour to him. The next day he wrote to the caseworker that: "from what you told me about her and from the interview I had with her .. at times she is psychotic ... and from what you told me

yesterday her behavior seems to be deteriorating ... I do feel that this lady does

present a potential danger to her child and that it probably would be best if the child were removed from her, even though this in itself might make her so acutely sick

:hat she would have to be committed to hospital...". The caseworker was pleased vith the psychiatrist's forthrightness — she commented: "I hit a good one there!"

but the psychiatrist's reasoning posed difficulties for the child-workers. For :he case synthesis hovered between its punitive and rehabilitative phases, and there

ivas still no solid evidence that Mrs. Fort had neglected or abused Mandy in any way. Punitively, there was no basis upon which to apprehend the child; while Mrs. Fort still did not cooperate in her own rehabilitation. The caseworker blamed the previous child-worker for the lack of evidence. Because she had been "so ntimidated" by Mrs. Fort she saw her seldom, and consequently she knew little

ibout Mandy. But the caseworker herself had no evidence of physical neglect or

ibuse.

1 ne caseworker discussed the problem with her supervisor. They decided that:

although there was no physical abuse evident in this case, there was emotional tbuse in the sense that it was inevitable for Mandy to develop abnormally under her

Tiother's care". And they agreed that the child should be apprehended.

h J Causality and Paradox: Reflection or Refraction?

Caught within the teleoiogical effects of the causal construct they had created, he child-workers did not recognize the paradox that they themselves had brought nto being. Over three years before, the dialectic between case-content and form

lad suggested that Mrs. Fort was an unfit mother, for all her children. Therefore

hey carefully scrutinized, as much as was possible, Mrs. Fort's life-style and her

!S



behaviour toward Mandy. Their expectations did not materialize, but they continued to track her.

She apparently perceived them as a threat, and limited contact with them to

the best of her ability. When they seized an opportunity to apprehend Mandy without investigation, in quite an abrupt fashion, this triggered a hysterical reaction in Mrs. Fort. For the child-workers this was proof that their synthesis of the case was correct. For Mrs. Fort, this may have been the culmination of her persecution

by the child-workers. After the diagnosis of "paranoia", attempts at intervention were amplified.

Not surprisingly, the child-workers uncovered further evidence of "paranoia", much of it orientated thematically to keeping Mandy from them. If three years before it was "inevitable" that Mrs. Fort would neglect or abuse Mandy, it was now

"inevitable" that Mandy would "develop abnormally" because her mother was a

"paranoic". But at no time was there ever any evidence that this child was

mistreated. If the logic of the form of the case, and of its relations among

phenomenal content, was initially indeterminate, it now had the solidity of

predetermination. Thus for the child-workers, in retrospect, Mrs. Fort had been

paranoid at least for the previous three years. This explained her adamant and

unreasonable rejection of their efforts.

To paraphrase W.I. Thomas, social definitions contain within themselves the

seeds of their own actualization. According to the caseworker, no evidence of

"emotional deprivation" was found in Mandy because the previous caseworker had

not looked hard enough. And, when both a psychiatrist and a physician found

Mandy to be a normal, bright, healthy child, the child-workers explained that this inevitably would change, in the future. Put differently, the logic of determinism was

also the reasoning of futility: for the child-workers perceived only their own

refractive synthesis of the case. They would not recognize that their efforts to "help" Mrs. Fort through their simulation of reality may well have contributed to the onset

of a breakdown. The determinism of the bureaucratic dialectic had created a

paradox: a process of interpretation that began with the problem of how to save

mother and child, was discovering its resolution in the destruction of the mother, in

order to save a child who apparently needed no succour.

The child-workers knew that the family-court judge would not agree to

wardship on the grounds of potential "emotional abuse". But, if the child could not be removed from her mother, then perhaps the mother could be separated from her

daughter. The caseworker and her supervisor agreed to investigate this alternative:

to commit Mrs. Fort for observation in a mental hospital. Mrs. Fort's psychiatrist

agreed that: "it was possible for Mrs. Fort to be a potential danger not only to her

child but also to herself as well".

It was simple to prepare the ground for committal. The caseworker would

make a deposition to the court, declaring that Mrs. Fort was apparently insane. The

court would issue a warrant to have Mrs. Fort arrested, and the police would

execute the warrant. Then a psychiatric examination, by two court-appointed

psychiatrists, would decide whether commital was warranted.

(i) The Intersection of Life- Worlds

The caseworker was uncertain whether to proceed. From the perspective of her

wider life-world, the logical strictures of the case-synthesis were driving her to a step of conscious coercion. As she said: "I got angry at the workers here. Well, not really

angry, but fed up —

they were telling me to do this and that, and I just wanted to go home and think about what to do."

The following day the caseworker attended a conference with her supervisor

29



and the Regional Administrator.11 She was reminded that although Mrs. Fort was

"genuine and sincere in her love and care of her daughter", if she would not accept

voluntarily psychiatric treatment (here another euphemism for "help" and

"guidance"), she had to be made to. The caseworker still hesitated: "They were pushing me hard to take a decision,

and have her committed. Finally [the Regional Administrator] came right out and said it — 'You had better take some action this afternoon, because if something

happens to that child in the meantime, and [the head of a local citizens-rights group]12 gets a hold of itSo who do you think would get shit piled on shit? All on me, that's who. Because if anything happened to that child while I was diddling, it would by my responsibility. So I went down to the court and did it."

The organizational life-world itself existed among others, to whose pressures it

was sensitive. When the caseworker vacillated, she was reminded that her synthesis of the case had to be compatible with the aims of the organization; and that, on

occasion, it had to answer to outside audiences (cf. Jehenson 1973:226-227). In

addition, she was encouraged to believe that the proposed committal of Mrs. Fort

was both a neat organizational solution, and one that was compatible with the

reality of Mrs. Fort as a. person. Later that day, some six weeks after Mandy was mistakenly apprehended,

three policemen, the caseworker and Mrs. Fort's social-assistance welfare-officer

went to the Fort residence. The welfare workers remained in the car while the police entered. In a few minutes they returned with Mrs. Fort and Mandy. The caseworker

was struck by Mrs. Fort's lack of resistance. "It was interesting, that this time she

didn't cause a scene but was very mild and docile." At the jail the child workers

"attempted to explain to Mrs. Fort the necessity of our actions. She refused to

listen." There she was examined by two psychiatrists, and both recommended that

she be committed to a mental hospital for a period of thirty days observation.13

Mandy was placed temporarily in a foster home.

With Mrs. Fort incarcerated, and unable to care for Mandy, the Child Welfare Division had grounds on which to request temporary wardship for the child for a

period of twelve months; and to place her in a foster home for this duration. A date

for the hearing was set. But, Mrs. Fort was not notified, although the Child Welfare

Act requires that a parent or guardian be notified at least ten days in advance of

such a hearing. The caseworker said: "I didn't send her a notice of court hearing. The poor woman is so depressed. I just couldn't send it to her. I suppose the judge

may throw me out of court, and postpone the case."14

(j) Phenomenal Disjunction and Existential Shock

The caseworker remained ambivalent about her decision. Within the terms of

reference of the organizational life-world, and within the meaning of the case synthesis, she was convinced her actions were correct. She dwelt upon Mandy's welfare, certain that the child was "emotionally deprived", or would become so, even though there was no legal ground for apprehension on this basis. Therefore other means had to be found to separate mother and child. Although she recognized that, indirectly, the incarceration of Mrs. Fort was a way of forcing her to cooperate, the caseworker thought this route was justified, since all others had

failed. And she hoped that eventually Mandy would be returned to Mrs. Fort. For

as the caseworker explained: "If lona had only recognized that all we wanted to do

was help her, this probably wouldn't have happened." In other words, the dialectic of case-content and case-form required that the

case be understood as one of neglect/abuse. In turn, this idea suggested a punitive stance toward the offender. Through the latter's "cooperation", the child-workers

30



were to control and to guide her. Because of her implacable opposition to this, the

overall synthesis of the case — the resolution of its internal contradiction between

punition and rehabilitation — remained unaccomplished. The punitive phase turned on itself, seeking through involution to find the means to force Mrs. Fort to

comply. Since the case was a synthesis of a simulation of neglect/ abuse, it refracted

and distorted contacts between the child-workers and Mrs. Fort — and this led to

unexpected consequences. Thus the caseworker's exclamation was accurate phenomenologically: had

Mrs. Fort accepted the "help" and control of the child-workers, the synthesis of

punition and rehabilitation would have been accomplished, with different

consequences for her. Could she have kept Mandy? Would a context have arisen

within which she would be diagnosed as paranoid? Would she have been committed for observation to a mental hospital?

In deciding to have Mrs. Fort committed for psychiatric observation, the

organizational and the wider life-worlds of the caseworker intersected with impact. Although the case was a bureaucratic concern, the act of committal struck stronger chords of recognition within the wider society in which the caseworker lived. It was a type of step that affected not only those who neglected or abused their children, but one that could strike at everyman, regardless of his position in society. The

meaning of mental illness, and of committal for psychiatric observation, could be

contained no longer within the simulation of the case. Instead, it stood out against the ground of a complex, indeterminate, and wider life-world. For the caseworker, at least temporarily, committal shattered the existential/ phenomenal homology of

Mrs. Fort that had currency within the case. She asked: "What do we know about

her [Mrs. Fort], really?" In particular, the caseworker was disturbed by the ease of the commitment

proceedings, and with the capacity of authority, invested in her, to affect the lives of

other human beings. She stated: "I didn't like doing it. After it was over, when I was

already home, they came over with a bunch of legal documents for me to sign. I was

shocked how easy it is to commit anyone. It was unpleasant. God, I could commit

my own husband if I wanted to!"

Suddenly, against the backdrop of the wider life-world, the arbitrariness of the

organizational life-world, of its constructs and patterns of meaning, struck her. If

committal was accomplished so easily within the organizational life-world, was it

so also in the wider life-world? And if it was, how much attention was paid to the

identities and feelings of persons (like her husband) to whom this was done? Was the commital of Mrs. Fort a bureaucratic solution to an organizational problem, or

was it done really for the good of the child? Within her world of work, she seemed to believe that the decision was correct. But the disjunction between this world and her

wider life-world was not resolvable in any ultimate or final sense. Instead

interpretation would mediate their simulated reunion — and this would create

other disjunctions in the perception of reality.

6. Questions and Suggestions: Testing the Validity of Phenomenal Reality

In this concluding section, I want to raise some questions about the connection

between certain dialectic processes and phenomenal reality, and to offer some

suggestions for future work. These thoughts develop from the preceding analyses, but they may have more general applicability.

At the heart of social order, from a phenomenological perspective, are those

processes that replicate such order, and those that alter it. The replication of social

order connotes its stability. The alteration of order questions its validity. Foci of the

replication of social order (that include, for example, myth, ritual, and game) pose

31



questions about the meaning of reality, and resolve them (cf. Ortner 1975:159). For

example, within ritual and myth, the dialectic between moral and social order, or

between the individual and society, is unfolded with affirmation and confirmation. In other words, the answer to a phenomenal question is condensed within the form

of its proposition, as this is posed at the outset. The form of synthesis is not in doubt. Accordian-like, contradictions between sets of meaning are exposed, are resolved, and are re-folded within ritual.

Such "grand" dialectics summate syntheses of phenomenal reality, and renew

with certainty its contradictions: for these syntheses are inherent within the

condensed programmatic meanings of their display. Most anthropological work on socio-cultural dialectics has dealt with this "condensed" variety of grand dialectics:15 for these explicate what society conceives of as its most ramified

structural dilemmas.

By contrast, social institutions or organizations (like the Department of Social

Assistance), in order to function in routine ways, must test continuously the validity of their own phenomenal reality. This is accomplished through the creation of

temporary, finite, micro-structures. Such micro-structures, like those of "cases" of

abuse/neglect, derive from the aims and programs of institutions; and their shape and resolution feed back into these ongoing programs. Through long series, and

through lengthy durations, of the birth and death of such micro-structures,

institutions are informed of the compatability of their programs with the everyday realities that they bring into being.

Intermittently, such micro-structures raise contradictions between the

programmatic ideas that gave them birth and the phenomenal realities that they in

turn create. Thus they cast doubt upon the validity of such programs: for they

suggest that phenomenal reality is a reading of probability, rather than of certainty.

Through time, series of micro-structures contribute to discrepancies, between their

organizational programs and the realities such programs should create. Thus, all

efforts to stabilize the organizational life-world by testing it also introduce

questions about its phenomenal validity. Therefore, conditions of instability are

also created within this life-world. But, through durations that are differently synchronized, grand dialectics summate and synthesize such disjunctions; and they re-validate the programs of institutions. In turn, this permits such institutions to

continue to test their own validity, in phenomenally indeterminate ways.

Throughout this work, I argued that persons related to one another, and to

their life-worlds, through micro-structures that were termed simulations of reality. The term, "simulation", was used deliberately to emphasize the misunderstanding and indeterminacy that are implicit in routine glosses of human conduct. Micro structures, I argued, are built through dialectic processes among ideas and actions

(Murphy 1972). This raises the following question: are the grand dialectics of

idea/action that confirm, renew and replicate the "lightness" of social order the

same kinds of dialectics through which routine micro-structures are built? My

suggestion is that they are not: micro-structures, like those of cases of

neglect/abuse, are built from the ground up. Although they have ideal forms, their

developing shapes are indeterminate. On the other hand, the foci of grand dialectics

are decoded and re-condensed by syntheses that affirm the complementariness of

the ideal and the real. The form and meaning of the closure of these syntheses are

built into the nature of their opening and unfolding. This suggests that there is a

simple distinction between the summatory dialectics of affirmation and the

developmental dialectics of doubt: namely, the dialectics of replication and of

emergence.

The analysis of the cases within the text of this essay suggests the value of an additional distinction: between a "minor" dialectic of idea and action, and between

32



that of phenomenal content and phenomenal form. The organizational world of

child-welfare expects to throw up micro-structures that will be termed "cases" of

neglect/abuse. Such cases will synthesize, serially, phases of punition and of

rehabilitation. But, before an actual instance of suspected neglect/abuse is

reported, there is in this world an interplay of ideas about the ideal forms such cases

should take.16 The relationship between these ideas is not dialectical, for it is not

problem-involved. The relevancies of these ideas have not yet been put to the test, to

synthesize elements thrown up by the wider life-world.

Once an instance of suspected neglect/abuse is reported, such elements — the

evidence of "reality" — raise problems that reverberate throughout the ideational

preconception of micro-structural form. Immediately, I would suggest, the

organizational life-world begins to test its own validity. According to its ideas, can these phenomenal elements be assembled into "content": how are these elements

interrelated? If the child-workers establish that the connectivity of these elements is

relevant to the concerns of their organization, then they can take action

(investigate, request medical examinations, apprehend, and so forth). Once actions

are taken, they begin to build the micro-structure of the "case": to enclose content

with form and to imbue it with meaning. From this point, the micro-structure begins to acquire an independent

existence. It becomes a simulation, a refraction, of the organizational life-world, rather than its reflection. But, it must be treated as if it were a valid phenomenal extension of this life-world: for, only in this way can the life-world self-examine the actuality of its own expectations, purpose and existence. On one level of minor

dialectics, as phenomenal elements cohere into phenomenal content, they suggest the kind of shell that is to enclose them. As this shell, or form, bounds its

phenomenal content, it also suggests how this is to be understood. Throughout the

building of a case, content and form are tailored to one another — and

contradictions between them generate re-organization in both. The same processes are at work among the elements of content, to bind their consistency of meaning; and among the forms of case, to establish which is relevant to the content they enclose.

On another level of minor dialectic, those ideas that legitimated the building of

the case in the first instance, and that monitor its progression, interact with those

actions taken to carry the case through. Again, the compatability of idea and action are tailored to one another. But, as the case acquires its own existence, the hierarchy of relevance of these two minor dialectics is reversed. When the idea of

neglect/abuse first is connected to the phenomenal elements of a suspected instance, the building of the case is guided more by the dialectic between idea and action than it is by that between content and form. At this time, the disparity between the preconceived idea of "case" and the actual case-form is relatively small.

The synthesis of content and form is directed by those ideas and actions that are

:ompatible with the self-perception of the organizational life-world. But, as the :ase acquires its own momentum and shape, two consequences follow.

First, the dialectic between content and form supercedes that between idea and

action, so that the case becomes self-guided, to an important degree. To synthesize the accretion of phenomenal elements with the form it is acquiring, the case detaches itself from its ideal preconception, in the organizational world. Second, this development stretches the connectivity between ideas and actions: for these

must respond to those discrepancies that are being generated by the intervening dialectic between content and form. In turn, this more tenuous connectivity between idea and action creates disjunctions within the organizational world. In

response, the child-workers try to resolve these problems through the synthesis of

form and content. Eventually, the completed, synthesized, case bears out formally

53



the validity of the organizational world: for this life-world has the means to

terminate, and to dispose of, its own creation. But, by this time, the gap between the

synthesis of the "case" and its ideal preconception has cast doubts on the validity of

the program of the organizational world. Thus, Case I could be entitled, "Changing the Unchanged", and Case II, "Unchanging the Changed".

As the case-analyses showed, my suggestion about the centrality of dialectic

processes is relevant also to the level of the phases of a case. I argued that cases of

neglect/abuse were composed of two phases. The punitive phase could not be

completed until the synthesis of content and form permitted the notion of

"cooperation" to be applied. Then the case could be moved into its phase of

rehabilitation. The consequences of an incomplete synthesis, in the punitive phase, were demonstrated in Case II.

A phenomenological perspective strongly suggests the following. Our routine

life-experiences are composed through what I have termed minor dialectics. Such

minor dialectics synthesize units of experience through which persons relate to one

another. Such units of experience, that I have described here as"'micro-structures",

not only create on-going reality, but also test the validity of the life-worlds from which they derive. The mediating agent of such minor dialectics is that of

interpretation. Interpretation necessarily creates discrepancies between the life

world and its phenomenal representation or simulation — the micro-structure.

Such disjunctions are synthesized ultimately, not on the level of minor dialectics, but on that of those grand dialectics that generally affirm social order. The kind of

approach to social order that has been briefly outlined here necessarily combines a

phenomenological approach with that of the dialectical: each is necessary to the

working of the other. In this essay, the synthesis of cases of neglect/abuse was used

to show the explanatory capacities of such an approach. However, life-worlds give rise to numerous other micro-structures (encounters, social relationships, groups, other kinds of "cases", and so forth), whose genesis is worth explicating more

precisely through an approach that combines the phenomenological with that of

the dialectical. It is to this end that the suggestions of this section of the essay are

directed.

NOTES

!. Data was collected during the tenure of a research fellowship, in the Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1973-1974. This essay was written while I was a fellow of the Institute, August-September, 1978. I am indebted to T.M.S. Evens for his critical comments. All personal names, and some minor details, have been altered to ensure anonymity. 2. These ideas are developed in greater detail in Handelman (1978), although some additional information is given here. 3. In other words, emphasis shifted from the construction of a syndrome of battered children to one that stressed the batterers of the battered. 4. The operation of the Child Welfare Division is given in greater detail in Handelman (1978). 5. The "syndrome" is invoked as a gloss, in making its implications compatible with the elements of an instance of suspicion. Therefore a point-by-point comparison, between the criteria of the syndrome and elements of the instance, is not necessary. This also permits the selective excerpting of syndrome criteria to strengthen a case without questioning whether, as discrete attributes, these criteria lose their indexical

capacities. 6. The legal question is atemporal and passive: is a child in a state of neglect? Or abuse? But the child workers need to establish who did what to whom, in order to complete a causal synthesis of the case. 7. That Mrs. Fort continued to reject cooperation with the child-workers was insufficient ground to have Mandy apprehended, since there was no evidence that she had been neglected. 8. In terms of the Child Welfare Act, parents are found neither guilty nor innocent at a wardship hearing. Again, for the court, the relevant state is atemporal and passive: for whatever the reason, is the child in a state of neglect?

34



9. Such evidence would need to indicate that this child was actually in a state of neglect — and not that Mrs. Fort only had the potential to neglect her. 10. For the officials, the expression, "kidnapped", is a function of Mrs. Fort's'paranoia'. Since their intentions are beneficial, they cannot abduct a child. If Mrs. Fort would accept the role allocated to her within the case-synthesis, she would recognize this. Since she refuses to do so, with time her role within the simulation is denigrated: from being 'stubborn', she eventually becomes 'mentally ill'. Thus the point in time at which the client agrees, or is forced, to accept the notion of'cooperation' is crucial in affecting her phenomenal position within the case. Note also that, when the caseworker described Mrs. Fort's effort to force Mary to return to her as 'kidnapping', this was compatible with Mrs. Fort's position within the punitive phase of the case. In this phase, her intentions toward her children were not perceived as beneficial. 11. The Regional Administrator is in charge of the field operations of all the welfare divisions within a

region that includes the city of St. John's. 12. This group acted on behalf of welfare clients who claimed that they did not receive their just entitlement from the Department of Social Assistance. 13. Within the organizational world, a diagnosis of'paranoia' was a practical element, to be integrated common-sensically with the rest of the case. Within psychiatry, such a diagnosis is also a theoretical

problem, with quite different implications. The caseworker was pleased with the psychiatrist because, albeit with qualifications, he committed himself in his diagnosis in a way that could be used practically by the caseworker. In other cases, psychiatric perceptions of mental disorder clash with the needs of the

organizational life-world. Then caseworkers are dissatisfied with the unwillingness of the psychiatrist to

help them solve their problems, 'common-sensically'. 14. This happened rarely, when parents were represented by legal counsel. But parents at times were not advised of their right to counsel at wardship hearings (cf. Handelman 1978). 15. Here I omit those dialectics, among institutions, that work through lengthy historical durations: these generally remain external to phenomenal reality. They are detected in comparatively rare historical circumstances, and in the consciousness of few human beings. 16. But these ideas are not integrated fully with one another. For example, bureaucratic ideas of what constitutes neglect or abuse may conflict with ideas of child-workers that emotional neglect/abuse, or

potential neglect, should also form the bases of cases. Or, bureaucratic ideas about the phases of a case

may conflict with the ideas of child-workers that the cooperation of their clients outweighs any consideration of punition. Or, the meaning of syndromes of identification may conflict with bureaucratic regulations, and so forth.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bittner, Egon 1965 "The Concept of Organization", Social Research, 32:230-255.

Blau, Peter M. and M.W. Meyer 1971 Bureaucracy in Modern Society, New York: Random House.

Blum, Alan F. and Peter McHugh 1971 "The Social Ascription of Motives", American Sociological Review, 36:98-109.

Cicourel, Aaron V. 1973 Cognitive Sociology, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Davoren, E. 1974 "The Role of the Social Worker", in R. Heifer and H. Kempe (eds): The Battered Child, 2nd

edn, University of Chicago Press, 135-150.

Douglas, Mary 1966 Purity and Danger, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Federal-Provincial Study Group on Alienation 1974 Report, Ottawa: mimeo.

Gelles, Richard J. 1974 "Child Abuse as Psychopathology: a Sociological Critique and Reformulation", in S.

Steinmetz and M. Strauss (eds): Violence in the Family, New York: Dodd, Mead, 190-204. Gil, David G.

1973 Violence Against Children: Physical Abuse in the United States, Cambridge: Harvard

University Press.

Greenaway, W.K. 1976 "Faith and Science in the Professional Ideology of Caseworkers", Canadian Review of

Sociology and Anthropology, 13:106-113.

35



Handelman, Don 1976 "Bureaucratic Transactions: the Development of Official-Client Relationships in Israel", in

Bruce Kapferer (ed.): Transaction and Meaning: Directions in the Anthropology of Exchange and Symbolic Behavior, Philadelphia: ISHI, 223-275.

1977 Work and Play Among the Aged, Assen: Van Gorcum. 1978 "Bureaucratic Interpretation: the Perception of Child Abuse in Urban Newfoundland", in D.

Handelman and E. Leyton: Bureaucracy and World View: Studies in the Logic of Official Interpretation, St. Johns: Memorial University of Newfoundland.

1979 "The Interpretation of Child Abuse: Bureaucratic Relevance in Urban Newfoundland", Sociology and Social Welfare, 6:70-88.

1980 "Bureaucratic Affiliation: the Moral Component in Welfare Instances in Emanuel Marx

(ed.): An Anthropological Portrait of Israel, London: Academic Press, 257-282.

Helfer, R.E. 1974 "The Responsibility and Role of the Physician", in R. Heifer and H. Kempe (eds): The

Battered Child, 2nd edn, University of Chicago Press, 25-40.

Jehenson, Roger 1973 "A Phenomenological Approach to the Study of the Formal Organization", in George

Psathas (ed.): Phenomenological Sociology, New York: John Wiley, 219-250.

Kempe, Henry et al.

1962 "The Battered-Child Syndrome", Journal of the American Medical Association, 181:17-24.

Lee, Dorothy 1950 "Lineal and Nonlineal Codifications of Reality", Psychosomatic Medicine, 12:89-97.

Manning, Peter K. 1971 "Talking and Becoming: a View of Organizational Socialization", in J.D. Douglas (ed.):

Understanding Everyday Life, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 239-256.

McHugh, Peter 1968 Defining the Situation, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Morris, M.G. and R.W. Gould 1963 "Role Reversal: a Concept in Dealing with the Neglected/Battered-Child Syndrome", in The

Neglected/Battered-Child Syndrome, New York: Child Welfare League of America, 29-46.

Murphy, Robert 1972 The Dialectics of Social Life, London: Allen & Unwin.

Ortner, Sherry B. 1975 "Gods' Bodies, Gods' Food: a Symbolic Analysis of Sherpa Ritual", in Roy Willis (ed.): The

Interpretation of Symbolism, London: Malaby Press, 133-169.

Piatt, Anthony 1969 The Child Savers: the Invention of Delinquency, University of Chicago Press.

Renvoize, Jean 1975 Children in Danger, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Schutz, Alfred 1962 Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, edited by Maurice Natanson, The Hague:

Martinus Nijhoff. Schutz, Alfred and Thomas Luckmann

1973 The Structures of the Life-World, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Scott, Robert A. 1970 "The Construction of Conceptions of Stigma by Professional Experts", in J.D. Douglas (ed.):

Deviance and Respectability, New York: Basic Books, 255-290. Silverman, F.N.

1974 "Radiologic Aspects of the Battered Child Syndrome", in R. Helferand H. Kempe(eds): The Battered Child, 2nd edn, University of Chicago Press, 41-60.

Steele, B.F. and C.B. Pollock 1974 "A Psychiatric Study of Parents who Abuse Infants and Small Children", in R. Helferand H.

Kempe (eds): The Battered Child, 2nd edn, University pf Chicago Press, 89-134. Weber, Max

1964 The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, edited byTalcott Parsons, New York: The Free Press.

Weston, J.T. 1974 "The Pathology of Child Abuse", in R. Heifer and H. Kempe (eds): The Battered Child, 2nd

edn, University of Chicago Press, 61-86.

Wilson, Thomas P. 1970 "Conceptions of Interaction and Forms of Sociological Explanation", American

Sociological Review, 35:697-710.

Zimmerman, Don 1969 "Record-keeping and the Intake Process in a Public Welfare Agency", in Stanton Wheeler

(ed.): On Record, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 319-354.

36



shaping phenomenal reality: dialectic and disjunction in the bureaucratic synthesis of child-abuse...

Documents