58 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 200102

structure still clings to the Soviet mili-tary legacy, with more than 300,000personnel remaining in uniform. It is apivotal state with substantial potentialto stabilize the region.

This article examines how DODexecutes the national military strategyin shaping the international securityenvironment relative to Ukraine. U.S.engagement strategy has been moder-ately successful and is worth continu-ing, but resources have not been lever-aged efficiently. The government inKiev has shrewdly exploited Americanefforts to its own advantage while

U kraines independent statusand location are key to thepermanent demise of the So-viet empire. A strategic hingebetween Central Europe and the part-ner states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia,it is also the second largest country inEurope and, except for Russia, has thelargest military outside NATO. Its force

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy C. Shea, USA, serves in the Resources and AssessmentDirectorate (J-8), Joint Staff, and recently completed an assignment as the Armyattach in Kiev.

Shaping onNATOs DoorstepU.S.-Ukraine RelationsBy T I M O T H Y C. S H E A

Cooperative Osprey 98.

2d Marine Division (Charles E. Rolfes)

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Report Documentation Page

Report Date 00 00 2002

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Dates Covered (from... to) -

Title and Subtitle Shaping on NATOS Doorstep U.S.- Ukraine Relations

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Autumn/Winter 200102 / JFQ 59

largely spurning attempts to influenceits external behavior or internal politics.

Sovereignty, Stability, andIndependence

Creating a peaceful, stable regionwhere an enlarged U.S.-led NATO re-mains the preeminent security organi-zation is an enduring American objec-tive. Additionally, the United Statesseeks cooperative Russian and Ukrain-ian relations with the Alliance. Toolsinclude forces stationed abroad andtroops deployed for operations and ex-ercises; military-to-military contacts;programs such as security assistanceand defense and international arms co-operation; and a regional academic fa-cility, the George C. Marshall EuropeanCenter for Security Studies.

Americas hopes for engagementare ambitious. The U.S.-Ukraine JointWorking Group on Bilateral Defenseand Military Cooperation produced avision statement that calls for actions toensure that Ukraine is a stable, inde-pendent democratic, and economicallyprosperous state, meeting its legitimate

security needs and playing a construc-tive role in promoting both regionaland international political, military,and economic stability. To that end,the country has created a civilian-con-trolled defense establishment increas-ingly interoperable with Euro-Atlanticsecurity organizations.

But achievements have notmatched expectations. Responsibilityfor the overall engagement strategy to-ward Ukraine remains fragmented. Allactions are supposed to complementthe Mission Performance Plan (MPP),approved by the ambassador for allFederal agencies operating under theumbrella of the country team in Kiev,

but MPP, NATO activity, and the U.S.European Command (EUCOM) Mili-tary Contacts Program all exist withoutone master.

In this vacuum, the Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD) works toformulate sound engagement policy

and sponsors interagency workinggroup sessions. OSD manages the bilat-eral annual Ministerial Plan of DefenseCooperation, which includes a varietyof initiatives such as the InternationalMilitary and Education Program(IMET), the EUCOM-administeredU.S.-Ukraine Military Contacts Pro-gram, Foreign Military Finance (FMF)cases, Partnership for Peace (PFP), andother bilateral initiatives such as sup-port for Ukraines participation inKosovo Force (KFOR).

OSD receives little help in manag-ing engagement. No national bodyoversees the effort to integrate the po-litical, economic, and informational in-

struments of national powerwith the military. Likewise,EUCOM lacks the authorityand capacity to synchronizemilitary efforts with the work

of other Federal agencies. The defenseattach office in Kiev, while not for-mally tasked or sufficiently manned,assists DOD in synchronizing in-coun-try activities but with mixed results.Most peacetime military engagement

Luts'k

Simferopol'

Zhytomyr

Chornobyl

Uzhhorod

Chernivtsi

ReniIzmayil

Sevastopol

Illichivs'k

Kherson

Mykolayiv

Yalta

Kerch

Mariupol'

Berdyans'k

Luhans'k

Chernihiv

Dnipropetrovs'k

Donets'k

KharkivL'viv

Odessa

ZaporizhzhyaKryvyy Rih

Kiev

HUNGARY

ROMANIA

POLAND

BELARUS

UKRAINESLOVAKIA

MOLDOVA

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RUSSIA

Dnipro River

Dnister River

Black Sea

Sea of Azov

Central Europe

overall engagement strategy towardUkraine remains fragmented

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60 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 200102

be an important aspect of the emerg-ing European security architectureand a goal of the NATO-Ukraine Char-ter, which provides a framework foran open-ended association throughconsultation and cooperation oncommon issues.

Progress in improving Ukrainesrelations with the West is not assured.The NATO bombing campaign in theBalkans had a negative impact onUkraines perception of the Allianceand disastrous consequences on yearsof progress in building support for en-gagement within its skeptical officercorps. The NATO information center inKiev sat unmanned while allied bombs

involving Ukraine, a military culturedominated by landpower, is PFP exer-cises, KFOR deployments, and otherpeacekeeping effortsland operations.Inexplicably, the U.S. defense attach isan Air Force officer who is generallynot a regional specialist and by skill setis ill-equipped to handle the myriad de-mands of a robust engagement pro-gram. He should logically be an Armyforeign area officer. The present condi-tion is symptomatic of the failure tothink through and fully integrate en-gagement initiatives.

Between Eagle and BearU.S. strategy toward Ukraine is de-

signed to prevent conflict, but it inher-ently risks confrontation with Moscowby compelling Russia to accept a weak-ened position regarding its regionalambitions. Russias view of being encir-cled by this cordon sanitaire along itsnear abroad encourages behavior to-ward the United States vis--vis Ukrainemore as a regional rival than a partnerfor stability. Additionally, Ukraine hassought to assert its independence.While not anti-Russian, it wants to bal-ance East and West, as evidenced in itsestablishing bilateral military interac-tion with the United States by signing a

memorandum of understanding andcooperation in 1993. Ukraine was thefirst spinoff from the former SovietUnion to join PFP in February 1994.Further symbolizing how criticalUkraine is to U.S. interests, Vice Presi-dent Al Gore and President LeonidKuchma formally established a sym-bolic strategic partnership in 1996.

Moscow will no doubt retain sig-nificant influence over Ukraine nomatter how close the Washington-Kiev relationship becomes. Neverthe-less, an enduring relationship be-tween NATO and Ukraine promises to

UkraineDefense Budget: $582 million for2000; the gross domestic productin 2000 was $3.2 billion ($4,762per capita).

Manpower: With a population of50,387,000, Ukraine has a total of5,472,000 men between 18 and 32years of age. Active militarystrength is 303,800. Reserve forcesnumber approximately 1,000,000.

Armed Forces: Ukraine has anarmy of 151,200 with 3,937 mainbattle tanks, a navy with 13,000sailors and one submarine, onecruiser, and two frigates; and anair force with 96,000 personneland 534 combat aircraft.

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Military Balance, 20012002 (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press for the International Institute forStrategic Studies, 2001).

Ukranian soldiers in Kosovo.

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fell. Support for active cooperationwith NATO among the corps fell from a

pre-Kosovo level of 24 to 12 percent inone poll. Half of the population nowviews the Alliance as an aggressive bloc.The events of September 11 have soft-ened attitudes, but many officers re-main wary of America and the Alliance.

The NATO liaison office has re-opened and is grappling with interop-erability issues. The Verkhovna Rada(parliament), following years of grid-lock, finally ratified the partnershipsStatus of Forces Agreement. This willfacilitate and simplify Allied activity inthe country. The robust UkrainianIndividual Partnership Program in one

year included 295 activities involvingexercises, training, education, civil

emergency plan-ning