Aggression and Violent Behavior 19 (2014) 447–453

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Aggression and Violent Behavior

Shame and aggression: Theoretical considerations

Jeff Elison a,⁎, Carlo Garofalo b, Patrizia Velotti c

a Adams State University, Psychology Department, 208 Edgemont Blvd., Alamosa, CO 81101, United Statesb Sapienza — University of Rome, Department of Dynamic and Clinical Psychology, Via degli Apuli, 1, 00185 Rome, Italyc University of Genoa, Department of Educational Sciences, Corso Andrea Podestà, 2, 16126 Genoa, Italy

⁎ Corresponding author at: Psychology Department, 2081101, United States. Tel.: +1 719 587 8175; fax: +1 719

E-mail addresses: jeff_elison@msn.com (J. Elison), carl(C. Garofalo), patrizia.velotti@unige.it (P. Velotti).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2014.05.0021359-1789/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

a b s t r a c t

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Received 17 December 2013Received in revised form 8 February 2014Accepted 8 May 2014Available online 20 May 2014

Keywords:ShameAngerAggressionViolent behaviorEmotion regulation

Within the shame literature, anger and aggression are widely recognized as responses to shame. Recent findingson the affective neuroscience of social pain suggestmultiplemodels bywhich social pain (e.g., shame) and anger/aggressionmay be linked. Thesemodels describe themechanisms underlying the prominent role of shame in in-terpersonal aggression, a role revealed by many dozens of studies. Anger and aggression in response to shamemay be viewed as emotion regulation, coping strategies, and evolutionary adaptations. Unfortunately, these at-tempts at coping with shamemay be adaptive or maladaptive. Indeed, aggression may be an adaptive defensiveresponse to physical pain and many physical threats that, through evolutionary processes, came to be linked toshame once social pain co-opted the affective response to physical pain. In a related article (Velotti, Elison, &Garofalo, 2014), we review themany contexts and populations in which aggressionmanifests, providing furtherevidence for the models proposed here. Thus, a more complete understanding of anger and violent behavior re-quires consideration of social pain, shame, and shame-regulation, for which physical pain serves as a usefulmodel.

© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4472. Negative emotionality and aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448

2.1. From the study of anger to the focus on shame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4483. Evolutionary and psychobiological perspectives linking shame to aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4484. Strategies for shame-regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4505. Conclusions: pain and threat-defense: models for shame and aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451

1. Introduction

Consider the commonalities in the following three scenarios. In re-sponse to insecurity, amanwith borderline personality disorder verbal-ly abuses his partner, the very person whose love he fears losing.Following repeated bullying and exclusion, a normally meek studentretaliates with fists against one of her persecutors. After beingembarrassed by a comment regarding his competence, a man spreadsrumors denigrating his boss via email. These scenarios illustrate a simi-lar chain of events, a chain supported by empirical studies and

8 Edgemont Blvd., Alamosa, CO587 7176.

o.garofalo@uniroma1.it

consistent with multiple theories reviewed in this paper. First, eachscenario begins with a social threat: personal devaluation, a decline inrelational value, status, or rank (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; Elison,2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 1997, 2007; Leary & Guadagno, 2011;MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Second, these de-clines threaten the basic universal need to belong (Baumeister &Leary, 1995; DeWall & Bushman, 2011). Third, threatening this basichuman need elicits negative emotional reactions (Baumeister & Leary,1995; DeWall & Bushman, 2011), all of which are members of thebasic emotion family shame (feelings of inferiority, embarrassment, hu-miliation; Elison, 2005; Izard, 1977; Nathanson, 1992; Scheff, 1987;Tomkins, 1963; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Fourth, shame – an alarmwarning us of these threats of social exclusion – is physically painful,as well as emotionally painful (Dickerson, Gruenewald, & Kemeny,2009; Eisenberger, 2011; Elison, 2005; MacDonald & Leary, 2005;

1 Distinctions between shame and guilt are controversial. Some theoristswould includeguilt in the shame family. Others view shame as maladaptive and guilt as adaptive, withguilt being unrelated or negatively related to anger and violence (e.g., Tangney, Stuewig,& Mashek, 2007). We view guilt as an emotional situation with which a number of basicemotionsmay be associated (Elison, 2005; e.g., shame due to implications for the self ver-sus sadness for the effects of one's actions on others). Therefore, guilt experiencesfit with-in our definition and review only to the degree that they are laden with shame.

448 J. Elison et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 19 (2014) 447–453

Miller & Leary, 1992). Fifth, discomfort in the form of pain is sufficient toelicit anger (Berkowitz, 2012; MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Finally, angermotivates aggression in some instances (Berkowitz, 2012; Davey, Day, &Howells, 2005; Novaco, 1994, 2007). Taken together, these points ofcommonality represent a psychobiological chain linking shame toanger and aggression.

Research and theory on shame and exclusion support this linkage,approaching it in terms of coping/defense/emotion-regulation (Crowe,2004; Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Lewis, 1971; Nathanson, 1992;Scheff, 1987, 2009; Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012; Tangney &Dearing, 2002; Tomkins, 1963), evolutionarily adaptive strategies(Gilbert, 1997, 2007; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Weisfeld & Dillon,2012), action tendencies or action readiness (Frijda, 2010), and psycho-biology (Berkowitz, 2012; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Dickerson et al.,2009; Eisenberger, 2011; Eisenberger, Way, Taylor, Welch, &Lieberman, 2007; Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2010;MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Indeed, our central argument is thatshame and anger are so closely associated because the power of shame'ssocial selection pressure (i.e., social exclusion) required multiplestrategies (i.e., emotion-regulation or coping) that co-opted previousadaptations. These adaptations include physical pain components(Eisenberger, 2011; Elison, 2005), humans' general threat-defensemechanism (MacDonald & Leary, 2005), and dominant versus submis-sive displays and behaviors related to rank (Gilbert, 1997; Weisfeld &Dillon, 2012). Such adaptations are enabled by underlying neurologicalstructures or pathways. In this article, we argue that many instances ofaggression would be better understood as reactions to shame.

In a related article (Velotti, Elison, & Garofalo, 2014-in this issue),wereview the shame and aggression literatures in order to explore themany contexts in which the shame–aggression link is evident. Acrossthe board, those studies are consistent with, and provide further evi-dence for, the evolutionary and psychobiological links from shame toanger and aggression described here. In both articles, we stress thepoint that social threats are ubiquitous, taking endless forms — mani-festing in intimate partner violence, bullying, antisocial personality dis-order, borderline personality disorder, as well as minor occurrences ofslights, embarrassments, and mistakes in everyday life.

2. Negative emotionality and aggression

Negative emotions are characterized by specific neural pathways(Lane, Fink, Chau, & Dolan, 1997) and neuropsychological mechanisms(Taylor, Dickerson, & Klein, 2002), and the link between negative emo-tions and aggression is often reported in the literature (DeWall,Anderson, & Bushman, 2012; Elison & Harter, 2007; Gilligan,2003; Scheff, 2011; Scheff & Retzinger, 2002; Shanahan, Jones, &Thomas-Peter, 2011; Steiner et al., 2011; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel,Harty, & McCloskey, 2010; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Thomaes, Stegge,Olthof, Bushman, & Nezlek, 2011; Walker & Knauer, 2011). In an at-tempt to find a common theoretical ground underlying the emotion–aggression relationship, many authors highlight the possible causalrole of traumatic experiences during childhood (Levinson & Fonagy,2004; Moffitt & Caspi, 2001; Pfäfflin & Adshead, 2004), as well asrelative poverty and social disadvantage (Fonagy, 1999). Moreover,negative emotionality heightens dysregulation, triggering aggressivebehavior (Roberton, Daffern, & Bucks, 2012). Of particular relevance tothe current review, experimental results do indeed demonstrate thatsocial exclusion and shame diminish self-regulation, increasing angerand aggression (Dansie, 2006; DeWall & Bushman, 2011; Jones &Elison, 2013; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Thomaes et al., 2011; Wright,Gudjonsson, & Young, 2008).

Due to the recent shift of attention toward discrete emotions andtheir specificity in the interpersonal encounter (Van Kleef, 2009;Velotti, Zavattini, & Garofalo, 2013; Walle & Campos, 2012), some au-thors recommenddisentangling thebroad concept of negative emotion-ality by focusing on the influences of specific emotions in predicting

aggressive behavior (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). To date, mostresearchers interested in the study of the emotion–aggression linkhave focused their attention on the well documented role of anger(Berkowitz, 2012; Davey et al., 2005; Novaco, 1994, 2007), with fewstudies (e.g., Izard et al., 2008) examining other emotions. The role ofthese latter feelings may be more subtle and perhaps more insidious.

2.1. From the study of anger to the focus on shame

In this paper, we focus on neurobiological and evolutionary perspec-tives that help elucidate the links from shame to aggression, as wellas the importance of shame-regulation in mediating these links.Shame is a painful, self-focused affect, depicted as one of the most diffi-cult emotions to identify and to attribute to oneself (Lewis, 1971). It isconceptualized as an affect elicited by devaluation of the self, especiallywhen the shamed is aware of having violated a standard held by others(Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 2007; Gilligan, 2003; Nelissen,Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2013; Scheff, 1987, 2009). Although manytheorists view shame as being exceptionally painful, even devastatingto one's sense of self (e.g., Lewis, 1971; Tangney & Dearing, 2002), webelieve this to be a very Western perspective (Elison, 2005). Shamevaries in intensity. It can be horribly painful at times, yet, at othertimes, it can be so mild that it is experienced at non-conscious levels(Elison, 2005; Scheff, 1988). Moreover, both shame and its anticipationare ubiquitous inmodern societies, yet shame is largely invisible (Scheff,1988). Within this review, we conceptualize shame as a basic emotionfamily, which includes embarrassment, humiliation, and mortificationas members (Elison, 2005; Izard, 1977; Nathanson, 1992; Scheff, 1988;Tomkins, 1963; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). Therefore, our use ofthe term shame is broad, encompassing all of these painful emotionalexperiences, which share devaluation of the self as their commonantecedent.1

According to Fonagy (2004), “the act of violence (…) is rarely one ofblind rage. Rather, it is a desperate attempt to protect the fragile selfagainst the onslaught of shame,mostly innocently triggered by another”(p. 42). In pathological cases such as borderline personality disorder,where shame may be experienced as having power to destroy the self,violence toward the other might be the only way of reducing thediscomfort (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Nathanson, 1994). From an evo-lutionary perspective, shamewarns of a potential threat to one's life, viaimpending social exclusion; violence, in turn, is best understood as adefense. While borderline personality disorder and social exclusion il-lustrate the extreme dynamics of shame, everyone faces negative eval-uations by others and associated loss of status, rank, or reputation. Wenow turn to details of evolutionary and neurobiological mechanisms.

3. Evolutionary and psychobiological perspectives linking shameto aggression

Explanations for a fairly direct link between shame and anger/aggression can bemade at two levels of analysis. At the higher, psycho-logical level, the link between shame and anger follows from an evolu-tionary perspective. Shame, anger, and aggression are responses to lossof rank, status, or relational value (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; Dickersonet al., 2009; Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 1997, 2007; Weisfeld &Dillon, 2012). In this context, shame and aggression are viewed as evo-lutionary adaptations in response to thedemandsplaced onmembers ofsocial species that organize themselves into rank hierarchies. Gilbert(1997) describes two types of hierarchies: dominance and attraction.

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Members' rankwithin each type ismaintained by different strategies. Indominance hierarchies, rank is based on amember's physical power viathreats of harm or actual aggression (Gilbert, 1997; Weisfeld & Dillon,2012). High-ranking, dominant members threaten or attack lower-ranking members during conflicts over rank or resources. The formermay even stand more erect, puff themselves up, or raise the hair ontheir backs to increase their size. In response, low-ranking membersdemonstrate their submissiveness and understanding of the rank differ-ential by retreating or cowering, displaying submissive postures.Cowering often involves gaze aversion to avoid eye contact, and shrink-ing, such as holding the tail between the legs and dropping the shoul-ders. The opposite nature of these dominance versus submissivedisplays illustrates what Darwin (1872) called the principle of antithe-sis. Just as displays of anger and threats of aggression by dominantmembers control the behavior of non-dominant members (e.g., dogsover a food bowl), displays of submission by low-ranking membersalso serve to control the behavior of dominant members. The submis-sive display conveys the message that the low-ranking individualaccepts its position and intends to back-down, thus effectivelycircumventing an attack.

In contrast, rank in attraction hierarchies is maintained by conspe-cifics' “opinions” or liking or acceptance of each other (Gilbert, 1997;Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012). These assessments of attraction may bebased on virtually any identifiable characteristic (e.g., appearance, intel-ligence, humor, prosocial behavior). In most cases, they are based onsome combination of multiple characteristics. As humans, we feelpride when admired and shame (embarrassment, etc.) when othersthink poorly of us (see also Leary's similar sociometer model; Leary &Guadagno, 2011). Others' evaluations are conveyed through negativecomments or looks, disapproval, contempt, or mocking. Across humanand non-human primates, perception of status, dominance behaviors,shame, and pride appear to involve the orbitofrontal cortex (Weisfeld& Dillon, 2012). Similarly, social threats produce increased levels of cor-tisol and immune system activity in humans (e.g., proinflammatory cy-tokines, related to inflammation; Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Dickersonet al., 2009), just as do physical threats to humans and other primates.Further evolutionary continuity is evidenced by the similarity of sub-missive and dominant displays in other species and shame and pride,respectively, in humans (Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 1997;Keltner & Harker, 1998; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Weisfeld & Dillon,2012). Pride involves making oneself larger and more prominent, simi-lar to upright stances and pilo-erection observed in other species (Tracy& Robins, 2007). Tracy and Robins suggest that the humanpride expres-sion may have evolved from similar expressions in ancestral species. Incontrast to pride, shame involves gaze aversion, as well as visible andphenomenological shrinking. Again, the expression probably evolvedin earlier species and manifests similarly in humans, although shamemay be a uniquely human emotion. Just as cowering in response to aphysical threat communicates a great deal of information and mayavert the attack, the submissive posture of shame in response to a rela-tional threat communicates understanding of the relational dynamics(Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Keltner & Harker, 1998). The shamed un-derstands that they have been evaluated negatively, rank or acceptanceor inclusion have been threatened. The nonverbal display of shamealso conveys a person's emotional pain and may elicit sympathy orforgiveness.

Gilbert (1997) asserts that attraction hierarchies evolved from dom-inance hierarchies, co-opting many of their associated mechanisms(e.g., nonverbal displays, aggressive defense), but both types of hierar-chies coexist within human and non-human social structures. Thus,anger and aggression in response to threatened rank may be similar,whether the threat comes fromphysical dominance or social evaluation.

Just as a non-human animal may switch between strategies (e.g.,cower first, then defend when actually attacked), humans deploythe cower-versus-defend strategies as alternatives (Elison, Pulos, &Lennon, 2006). However, they are not necessarily distinct. A shamed

individual may start with one and then switch to the other, especiallyif the first is not effective. For example, he may apologize, but becomeangry when the apology is not accepted. Or he may use them in somecombination, at a point along a continuum. For example, hemay displayshame or embarrassment, yet attempt to blame the other.

As an evolutionary adaptation, shame has neurological and endocri-nological substrates, such as the previously mentioned orbitofrontalcortex activation and hormonal changes; however, we now turn tothe neurological basis for the chain of events from devaluation to emo-tional pain (i.e., shame), to physical pain, to anger, and to aggression.

The chain of events linking shame and anger/aggression at thelower, neurological level of analysis is based on two relatively recent ob-servations or theories. First, social exclusion elicits physical pain(Eisenberger, 2011; Eisenberger, Lieberman, &Williams, 2003). Second,physical pain may be sufficient to elicit anger (Berkowitz, 2012).

To begin the chain, many theorists believe that the threat ofsocial exclusion (or loss of status, rank, or relational value) was thereoccurring challenge that led to shame as an evolutionary adaptation(Elison, 2005; Fessler, 2007; Gilbert, 2007; Weisfeld & Dillon, 2012).Thus, shame is a social emotion. Moreover, shame is clearly an aversive,painful emotion. Eisenberger et al. (Eisenberger, 2011; Eisenbergeret al., 2003) demonstrated that social exclusion elicits physical pain. Al-though researchers (Elison, 2005; Miller & Leary, 1992) had previouslysuggested that the function of shame is analogous to pain, Eisenbergeret al. (2003) fMRI study demonstrated similar patterns of anterior cin-gulate cortex (ACC) activity in response to social exclusion and physicalpain. The authors suggest:

Because of the importance of social bonds for the survival ofmost mammalian species, the social attachment system mayhave adopted the neural computations of the ACC, involved in painand conflict detection processes, to promote the goal of socialconnectedness.

[p. 291]

Numerous subsequent studies have explored the mechanism of so-cial pain (see Eisenberger, 2011 for a review). Thus, there is solid evi-dence from affective neuroscience linking shame to physical pain.

Next, Berkowitz's (2012) cognitive-neoassociationmodelmakes thefinal links between physical pain and anger and aggression. In thismodel, anger is elicited by aversive conditions, such as physical painor discomfort — without the higher-level cognitive appraisals outlinedby competing theories. Thus, the path from shame to pain to anger is ap-parent. Furthermore, hismodel emphasizes the importance of automat-ic, unconscious, anger-related scripts, just as Nathanson (1992) viewsshame-regulation strategies as automatic scripts that often involveanger. In some cases, anger activates automatic scripts that lead to ag-gression, often primed by features of the situation, without controlledcognitive evaluations. Berkowitz explicitly mentions that “evenshame” (2012, p. 324) may be sufficient to elicit anger and, in turn, ag-gression via anger-related scripts. Berkowitz acknowledges that angercan be elicited by shame or emotional pain, but the argument becomesmore compelling given the evidence from Eisenberger's (2011) workthat shame elicits physical pain. In summary, Eisenberger's findingsand Berkowitz's theory fill the gaps, providing a clear chain of eventsfrom devaluation to emotional pain in the form of shame, to physicalpain, to anger, and finally to aggression.

Expanding on the social pain discoveries, MacDonald and Leary(2005) reviewed numerous studies of social animals, human and non-human, involving exclusion, rejection, or isolation, concluding thatcues indicating threat of social exclusion (e.g., shame) trigger thesame affective pain associated with physical threats. Furthermore, dueto the link between social and physical pain, social pain elicits thesame threat-defensemechanisms as physical pain: fight, flight, or freez-ing. MacDonald and Leary's hypotheses, while based on the social painobservations of Eisenberger et al. (2003), are consistent with the

450 J. Elison et al. / Aggression and Violent Behavior 19 (2014) 447–453

dominance and attraction hierarchies described by Gilbert (1997).More importantly, their social-threat-defense hypothesis is consistentwith increases in cortisol and immune system activity in humans(Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Dickerson et al., 2009), which are also re-sponses to physical threats in humans and other primates. MacDonaldand Leary do not describe the nonverbal displays of fear versus exclu-sion, but their hypotheses would clearly account for the observed simi-larities discussed previously.

Of most importance in understanding the shame–aggression link istheir hypothesis that the fight response is common due to the factthat evolution capitalized on the existence of physical pain, co-optingthe physical pain mechanism and its associated threat-defense strate-gies. Thus, threat-defense is deployed in response to social pain, inspite of the fact that the fight response is less likely to be adaptive in re-sponse to social threats than to physical threats. Furthermore, they notethat in order to be effective, the threat-defense mechanism to physicalpain is often deployed rapidly and automatically, even prior to con-scious evaluation, sometimes as a panic response (consistent withBerkowitz's anger scripts). Thus, physical pain may result in maladap-tive defensive aggression (e.g., shoving a loved one who accidentlystepped on one's toes), even against someone not responsible for thepain. Even if a shamed individual does not respond automatically, socialpain (like physical pain) can disrupt the cognitive resources necessaryfor behavior regulation. Unfortunately, because the same threat-defense mechanism is deployed in response to social pain, the sametwo byproducts are evident:maladaptive defensive aggression, even to-ward innocent bystanders.

Thus, from multiple perspectives, shame and anger/aggression maybe biologically linked as alternative strategies (action tendencies oraction readiness; Frijda, 2010) for controlling threat. In this case, whatis being controlled is a relational threat (e.g., drop in rank or level ofacceptance) from conspecifics. Deployment of these strategies ismoderated by individual differences and sensitive to immediateconditions (DeWall & Bushman, 2011; DeWall, Twenge, Bushman, Im,& Williams, 2010; Eisenberger et al., 2007; Jones & Elison, 2013;MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Maner, Miller, Schmidt, & Eckel, 2010).Eisenberger et al. (2007) reported higher levels of dACC activation(dorsal anterior cingulate cortex) following a social exclusionmanipula-tion, and higher levels of trait aggression, and rejection sensitivity inparticipants with the MAOA-L (monoamine oxidase-A) allele. Theyinterpreted these findings as being consistent with the hypothesis thatmen andwomenwhoweremore sensitive to negative evaluation expe-rienced greater emotional pain, leading to greater defensive aggression.Maner et al. (2010) reported changes in progesterone, a marker ofaffiliative motivation, in response to social exclusion. Whether thesechanges represented increases or decreases was moderated by individ-ual differences in social anxiety and rejection sensitivity. Moreover,levels of progesterone and affiliative motivation varied with immediateconditions, being higher when rejection sensitive participants weregiven the opportunity to socially connectwith others, after initial exclu-sion. Similarly, even minor acceptance by a single stranger has beenfound to reduce aggression (DeWall et al., 2010). Thus, opportunitiesfor social acceptancemay be protective against withdrawal and aggres-sion; neither is the default response. Conversely, aggression maybe most common when individuals feel completely rejected (stigma-tized or shamed), with no chance of regaining social connection(MacDonald & Leary, 2005), just as physically threatened individualsare most likely to fight when there is no opportunity for conciliationor withdrawal.

4. Strategies for shame-regulation

Two of the major challenges in the study of shame are assessing un-acknowledged shame feelings and the variety of ways in which peoplereact to, cope with, or regulate shame. Individuals who experienceshame may cope with it in different ways after recognition, or may

willfully or unconsciously avoid it, producing unacknowledged shame(Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Harper, 2011; Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 1987,2009; Schoenleber & Berenbaum, 2012). The threat-defense strategiesdiscussed in the previous section map nicely to several shame responseshistorically noted in the shame literature. In this section, we discuss thedifferent trajectories in which the shame–aggression link manifests.

Many authors have noted the variousways inwhich people respondto experiences of shame, sometimes framing these responses as copingor defense (Crowe, 2004; Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Lewis, 1971;Nathanson, 1992; Scheff, 1987, 2009; Stuewig et al., 2010; Tangney &Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow,1996; Tangney et al., 2007; Tomkins, 1963;Wright et al., 2008). In keep-ingwith current thinking regarding the fuzzy distinctions between cop-ing and defense, as well as the importance of emotional and behavioralself-regulation, we will refer to these responses as shame-regulationstrategies. Nathanson's (1992) Compass of Shame model incorporatesmany previously documented shame-regulation strategies by describ-ing four families (i.e., categories) of scripts used to manage experiencesof shame. Although many responses to shame are adaptive, he assertsthat all of the strategies described by his model are employedmaladaptively, to varying degrees.

Anger is a common response to shame as noted by all the authorslisted in the previous paragraph, and consistent with the social pain/threat-defense model, in this case the fight strategy (MacDonald &Leary, 2005). Nathanson's shame-regulation model includes internal-ized self-directed anger, self-disgust, and even self-harm in a responsestyle he labels attack self. Just as a person may be angry at oneself forcarelessly smashing one's own thumb, one may experience self-directed anger when social injury (e.g., shame, embarrassment) isone's own fault. Alternately, blame, anger, and aggressionmay be exter-nalized in what Nathanson calls attack other. Just as other-directedanger is a common response when someone else is to blame for one'sphysical pain, other-directed anger is a common response when some-one else is to blame for one's social pain (e.g., Elison & Harter, 2007). In-deed, Tangney and colleagues describe shame as largely maladaptive,due in part to these inward- andoutward-directed anger and aggressionresponses (Stuewig et al., 2010; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangneyet al., 1996, 2007).

Although the attack self and attack other responses appear to be op-posites, they are correlated (Elison, Pulos, & Lennon, 2006). Immediate-ly following the shaming event, an individual may first internalizeanger; however, given minutes or hours to reframe the situation, theymay come to blame others, externalizing their anger. Conversely, an in-dividualmay react initiallywith outward-directed anger, only to feel re-morse over blaming others and then turn the anger inward. Lewis(1971) wrote of similar “feeling traps,” leading Scheff (1987, 2009) toextend the idea to recursive shame-based spirals. In these traps or spi-rals, shame may result in more shame, fear, or anger. Shame–shameand shame–anger spirals, inwhich negative affect is directed inward to-ward the self, may lead to depression or self-harm, as in Nathanson's at-tack self. Shame–anger spirals, in which anger is directed outward maylead to violence, as in Nathanson's attack other. Intense forms of this lat-ter spiral have been referred to by Scheff and Lewis as “shame-ragespirals” or “humiliated fury” (see also Thomaes et al., 2011), with humil-iation viewed as a variant of shame. Indeed, among the emotions stud-ied by Elison and Harter (2007), ratings of humiliation intensity weremost highly correlated with violent ideation toward self (rs = .72)and toward others (rs = .88), with shame and embarrassment beingsignificant, but weaker predictors of violent ideation. Elison and Harterconcluded that humiliation and these shame-regulation strategiesplayed a role in the vast majority of school shootings, where self-harm(i.e., suicide; attack self) and harm to others (attack other) were appar-ent (see also Leary, Kowalski, Smith, & Phillips, 2003).

Supporting the importance of shame-regulation and the link be-tween shame and anger, Elison et al. validated a measure of shame-regulation strategies, the Compass of Shame Scale (CoSS; Elison,

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Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Elison, Pulos, & Lennon, 2006) based onNathanson's model (1992, 1994). Positive correlations were observedbetween the attack self and attack other subscales and independentmeasures of hostility and anger. With regard to pathology, Campbelland Elison (2005) investigated relationships between Nathanson'sshame-regulation strategies and psychopathic personality traits. Prima-ry and secondary psychopathy scores were positively correlated withattack other scores. When primary and secondary psychopathy scoreswere partialed from one another, primary psychopathy was negativelycorrelated with attack self scores, while secondary psychopathy waspositively correlated. Similarly, Nyström and Mikkelsen (2013) founda positive correlation between psychopathic personality traits andmore unconscious and externalized shame-regulation strategies in ado-lescents. Wright et al. (2008) reported that offense-related shame feel-ings were associated with more difficulties in anger managementamong an incarcerated sample. Most compellingly, experimental stud-ies have also demonstrated self- and other-directed anger in responseto shame (Dansie, 2006; Jones & Elison, 2013; Thomaes et al., 2011).All thesefindings are consistentwith the evolutionary and neurobiolog-ical explanations for the strength of the shame–anger link described inSection 2.

A third shame-regulation strategy in Nathanson's model is avoid-ance, in which individuals attempt to bar shame from awareness. Mostof the authorsmentioned in this section have described something sim-ilar, labeling it disavowal, denial, escape, or minimization. Lewis (1971)insightfully identifiedwhat she called “bypassed shame.” In these cases,shame-regulation is successful inminimizing the feeling and awarenessof shame, sometimes to the point of completely keeping it from con-sciousness. It may or may not manifest later. If it does appear, it maytake the form of anger and aggression. She recognized that the suddenappearance of anger in the absence of any obvious trigger is, in somecases, the result of bypassed shame. Scheff (2009), again expandingon Lewis's contributions, extols the importance of recognizing bypassedshame in understanding depression and violence. Given the denial-likenature of avoidance strategies, they can be difficult to identify in face-to-face settings and transcripts. Although self-report assessment presentsan even greater challenge (i.e., asking someone to self-report whatthey want to keep from consciousness), Campbell and Elison (2005)found significant correlations between CoSS avoidance scores and pri-mary and secondary psychopathy.

The final shame-regulation strategy in Nathanson's (1992) model,withdrawal, is another commonly recognized response to shame(Crowe, 2004; Elison, Lennon, & Pulos, 2006; Lewis, 1971; Scheff,1987, 2009; Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tomkins, 1963). Like anger,withdrawal is consistent with the social pain/threat-defense model, inthis case the flight or submission strategies (MacDonald & Leary,2005). Because shame is typically the result of negative evaluations byothers, an individual desires to be free from their judgments. If possible,shamed individuals may simply leave the situation; if not, they maywish they could disappear. In either case, they typically internalizetheir sense of inferiority during withdrawal. Unfortunately, withdrawalsometimes takes a passive-aggressive form, whereby the person fanta-sizes about revenge. Elison and colleagues have observed moderate-to-high correlations between withdrawal and attack other scores inevery study they have performed with the CoSS. Further support forthewithdrawal–aggression link comes from Cook (1996)who reportedstrong correlations between shame and theMCMI-II Passive-Aggressivescale and his own measure of attack other. Similar to their findingswith regard to internalization in the form of attack self, Campbelland Elison (2005) reported that primary psychopathy was negative-ly correlated with withdrawal scores, while secondary psychopathywas positively correlated, after partialing. Again, Nyström andMikkelsen (2013) reported parallel results in their study with ado-lescents, noting an unexpected association between more consciousand internalized shame-regulation strategies and higher rates ofpsychopathic traits.

In summary, an understanding of shame-regulation strategies re-vealsmultiple pathways from shame to violence, all ofwhich are consis-tent with the evolutionary perspectives presented in Section 2.Responses to shame may be viewed as action tendencies or changes inaction readiness (Frijda, 2010), deployedwith some degree of flexibilitydependent on past history and immediate conditions, rather than hard-wired reflexes. Indeed, inflexible patterns of responding in which a per-son fails to be sensitive to one's environment are maladaptive, even anindication of psychopathology (Bonanno & Burton, 2013; Kashdan &Rottenberg, 2010; Nathanson, 1992, 1994). As an assessment tool, theCoSS appears to effectively assess shame-regulation strategies and dem-onstrates the importance of shame and shame-regulation in under-standing anger and violence.

5. Conclusions: pain and threat-defense: models for shameand aggression

Our basic argument is that research and theory support a chain ofevents linking shame to anger and aggression. The chain begins withrelational devaluation in its limitless forms, which elicits shame —

acknowledged or not. Shame, including forms such as embarrassmentand humiliation, is a form of social pain. As an adaptation, social painco-opted the physical pain mechanism, along with the general threat-defense mechanism (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Therefore, the chain,all too often, ends in anger or aggression. Although anger and aggressionmay be viewed as coping/psychological defense/emotion-regulation,the theories and evidence reviewed here suggest that these strategiesare based on evolutionary adaptations. Unfortunately, aggression mayserve the short-term interests of the shamed — at a cost to others andeven the long-term interests of the self.

Although defensive strategies of anger and aggression in response tosocial threats may generally be less adaptive than in response to physi-cal threats, we do not mean to suggest that they are exclusively mal-adaptive. Social threats are epitomized by attempts to publiclydisparage or humiliate one's character, such as non-physical bullying,slander, or libel. Under such circumstances, one's reputation, rank, job,and relationships may be threatened. As a threat-defense response,anger may be the necessary motivator to take action, such as verballyconfronting the attacker publicly, or even in court. In ancient times, aswell as today, even aggression may be an appropriate and effective re-sponse in some contexts.

In a related article (Velotti et al., 2014-in this issue), we discuss ingreater detail specific contexts and populations that provide evidencefor the shame–aggression link: couple violence, familial homicide, sex-ual assaults, narcissistic injuries, adolescent and incarcerated popula-tions. In addition, data on moderators such as self-esteem andrejection sensitivity are reviewed. Finally, examples frompsychopathol-ogy and implications for treatment are presented. Across the board,those studies are consistent with, and provide further evidence for,the evolutionary and psychobiological links from shame to anger andaggression described here. In both articles, we stress the points that so-cial threats are ubiquitous, fromminor to serious, and that anger and vi-olence are common responses. Therefore, in both articles, we advocatefor more research on the chain of events linking shame to aggression,as well as on shame-regulation strategies, adaptive and maladaptive.Such research should employ physical pain and humans' generalthreat-defense mechanisms as models to better understand social painand its correlates. Understanding anger and aggression as threat-defense mechanisms, or shame-regulation strategies, deployed in re-sponse to social threats andmotivated by social pain is crucial to design-ing effective therapeutic and social interventions to reduce violence.

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