shaftesbury_sensus communis, an essay on the freedom of wit and humour)

An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humoura letter to a friend

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

Copyright 20102015 all rights reserved. Jonathan Bennett

[Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small dots enclose material that has been added, but can be read asthough it were part of the original text. Occasional bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations,are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicatesthe omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difficulty than it is worth. Longer omissions arereported between brackets in normal-sized type.This work is the second of the five Treatises in ShaftesburysCharacteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Its title fits less than half its content; there are all sorts ofother good things on offer here.

First launched: March 2011.

Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury

Contents

Part I 1Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Section 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Section 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Section 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Part II 8Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Part III 15Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Section 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Part IV 22Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Section 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26


glossary

affection: In the early modern period, affection could meanfondness, as it does today; but it was also often used tocover desires, approvals, likings, disapprovals, dislikings,etc. In this work it is mainly used to refer to pro-feelings,but the negative ones may be hovering in the background.

animal spirits: This stuff was supposed to be matter that iseven more finely divided than air, able to move extremely fastand seep into tiny crevices. and (this being Shaftesburyspoint on page 4) continuously active. his other mentions ofspirits in this work are to mental items.

education: In early modern times this word had a somewhatbroader meaning than it does today. It wouldnt have beenmisleading to replace it by upbringing on almost everyoccasion

formality: On page 6 this refers to intellectual conduct thatis stiff, rule-governed, prim.

generous: It had todays sense of free in giving but alsothe sense of noble-minded, magnanimous, rich in positiveemotions etc.

genius: Sometimes used to mean nothing much more thanintellect; more often meaning (the possessor of) very high-level intellect. In early modern times genius wasnt giventhe very strong meaning it has today.

humour: In ancient Greek medicine it was held that thehuman body contains four basic kinds of fluid (humours),the proportions of which in a given body settled that personsphysical and mental qualities. By the early modern periodthis theory was dead; but the use of humours to refer tobodily states, character-traits, moods, lingered on. In the

present work (including its title), Shaftesbury uses the wordmainly in our present sense.

imposture: Willful and fraudulent deception.

luxury: This meant something like: extreme or inordinateindulgence in sensual pleasures.

magistrate: In this work, as in general in early moderntimes, a magistrate is anyone with an official role in gov-ernment; the magistrate usually means the government orthe ruler. The magistracy is also just the government, orthe collective of all the senior officials in the government.

mixed company: On page 6 Shaftesbury uses this to meancompany comprising people of different backgrounds orcharacters, not in its more usual sense of company contain-ing both men and women.

moral: In early modern times, moral could mean roughlywhat it does today, but also had a use in which it meanthaving to do with intentional human action. On page 25 itsuse is even broader than that: Shaftesbury is saying that thebeauty and significance of fine works of art comes from theirbearing on the human conditionhow they affect peoplesfeelings and thoughts.

passive obedience: The doctrine that anything short of orother than absolute obedience to the monarch is sinful.

peculiar: Individual, pertaining exclusively to one individual.On page 27 the requirement that a work of visual or literaryart not contain anything peculiar or distinct means that itis not to have any features that mark off what is representedin a highly individual way that would, Shaftesbury thinks,be distracting.


performer: In early modern times, a performance couldbe the writing of a book, the composing of an opera, or thelike. The performers referred to on page 25 are poets andcomposers rather than actors and singers and violinists.

popular: It means of the people; in early modern times itseldom means liked by the people.

prince: As was common in his day, Shaftesbury uses princeto mean ruler or chief of government. It doesnt stand fora rank that would distinguish prince from king or indeedfrom commoner.

principle: In a few places Shaftesbury uses this word ina once-common but now-obsolete sense in which it meanssource, cause, driver, energizer, or the like.

raillery: Good-humoured witty ridicule or teasing, done witha light touch. Engaging in raillery is rallying.

science: In early modern times this word applied to anybody of knowledge or theory that is (perhaps) axiomatisedand (certainly) conceptually highly organised.

selfish: In the paragraph It is the height of wisdom. . . on page 20 Shaftesbury is using the word to mean merelyself-ish, i.e. self-related or concerned with ones owninterests. Most of his uses of the word make it mean also. . . to the exclusion of proper care for the interests of others.

speculation: This has nothing to do with guess-work. Itmeans an intellectual pursuit that doesnt involve morality.ethics is a practical discipline, chemistry is a speculativeone.

vice, vicious: Morally wrong conduct, not necessarily ofthe special kind that we reserve vice for these days, or thedifferent special kind that we label as vicious.

vulgar: Applied to people who have no social rank, arenot much educated, and (the suggestion often is) not veryintelligent.

wit: This often meant about the same as intelligence; but inShaftesbury and some other writers it usually carries somesuggestion of todays meaninge.g. in the works title andin the link on page 1 between wit and raillery.

Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury I/2

Part I

Section 1

When in conversation the other day I spoke in defence ofraillery [see Glossary], you were surprised; and I have beenthinking about why. Is it possible that you have supposedme to be such a grave [= solemn] person that I would dislikeall conversation of this kind? Or were you afraid that if youput me to the test by the use of raillery I would fail?

I must confess that you had reason enough for yourcaution if you thought me to be basically such a true zealotthat I couldnt bear the least raillery on my own opinions. Iknow there are many people like that. Anything that theythink is grave or solemn must, they hold, be treated only ina grave and solemn way; though they dont mind treatingdifferently anything that others thinkthey are eager to trythe edge of ridicule against any opinions except their own.

Is it fair for them to take this attitude? Isnt it just andreasonable to handle our own opinions as freely as we doother peoples? To be sparing with our own opinions may beregarded as a piece of selfishness. We might be accused ofwillful ignorance and blind idolatry, for having taken opinionson trust and consecrated in ourselves certain idol-notionsthat we wont allow to be unveiled or seen in day light. [Foridol notions see Bacons New Organon, aphorism 1:39.] The itemsthat we carefully tuck away in some dark corner of ourminds may be monsters rather than divinities or sacredtruths; the spectres can impose on us if we refuse to turnthem every way and view their shapes and complexions inevery light. Something that can be shown only in a certainlight is questionable. Truth, they say, can stand any light;and one of the principal lights. . . .by which things are to be

viewed in order to evaluate them thoroughly is ridicule itself,i.e. the form of test through which we discover whatever isvulnerable to fair raillery in any subject.. . . .

So I want you to know fully what my views are regardingthis, so that you can judge whether I was sincere the otherday in defending raillery, and can still plead for those ablefriends of ours who are often criticised for their humour ofthis kind, and for the freedom they take in this airy way ofconversing and writing.

Section 2

Seriously, thinking about how this species of wit is some-times employed, and how excessively some of our contempo-raries have been using it lately, one may be a little confusedand unsure what to think of the practice or where thisrallying frame of mind will eventually take us. It has passedfrom the men of pleasure to the men of business. Politicianshave been infected with it, so that grave affairs of state havebeen treated with an air of irony and banter. The ablestnegotiators have been known as the most notable clowns;the most celebrated authors have shown themselves as thegreatest masters of burlesque.

There is indeed a kind of defensive raillery (if I may socall it) which I am willing enough to allowin affairs of anykindwhen the spirit of inquiry would force a discovery ofmore truth than can conveniently be told, and the raillery isa device for heading off inquiry. In some contexts the worstharm we can do to truth is to discover too much of it. Its thesame with understandings as with eyes: for a given sizeand structure just so much light is necessary, and no more;

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anything beyond that brings darkness and confusion.It is real humanity and kindness to hide strong truths

from tender eyes. And it is easier and more civil to do this bypleasant humour than by a harsh denial or by remarkablereserve [= by conspicuously buttoning your lip]. But to work atconfusing men by creating mysteries, and getting advantageor pleasure from the perplexity you are throwing them intoby such uncertain talk, is as mean when it is done throughraillery as when it is done with the greatest seriousness ina solemn attempt to deceive. It may still be necessary, asit was long ago, for wise men to speak in parables with adouble meaning, so that the enemy will be confused and onlythose who have ears to hear will hear. [This echoes Matthew 13:9where Jesus, after presenting a parable, says Who hath ears to hear, let

him hear.] But it is certainly a mean, impotent, and dull sortof wit that confuses everyone and leaves even ones friendsunsure what ones real opinions are on the topic in question.

This is the crude sort of raillery that is so offensive in goodcompany. And indeed theres as much difference between thetwo sorts of raillery as between fair-dealing and hypocrisy,or between the most genteel wit and the most scurrilousclowning. But this illiberal kind of wit will lose its crediti.e.will be exposed for the low device that it isby freedom ofconversation. That is because wit is its own remedy; its truevalue is settled by free trade in it; the only danger is settingup an embargo. The same thing happens here as in the caseof trade: tariffs and restrictions reduce trade to a low ebb;nothing is as advantageous to it as a free port.

We have seen in our own time the decline and ruin of afalse sort of wit that delighted our ancestors so much thattheir poems and plays, as well as their sermons, were fullof it. All humour involved some sort of play on words; thevery language of the royal court was full of puns. But nowsuch word-play is banished from the town and from all good

company; there are only a few signs of it in the country; andit seems at last to have been restricted to the schools, asthe chief entertainment of teachers and their pupils. Otherkinds of wit will also improve in our hands, and humourwill refine itself, as long as we take care not to tamperwith it and hold it down by severe discipline and rigorousprohibitions. Everything that is civilised in conversation isdue to liberty: we polish one another, and rub off our cornersand rough sides by a sort of friendly collision. To restrainthis is inevitably to cause mens understandings to rust. Itis to destroy civility, good breeding, and even charity itself,under a pretence of maintaining it. [Here charity seems to mean,roughly, kindness.]

Section 3

To describe true raillery would be as difficult and perhaps aspointless as defining good manners.

Shaftesburys next sentence: None can understand the spec-ulation, besides those who have the practice.

meaning: To understand what true raillery is, you have toknow how to engage in it. To understand what good mannersare, you have to be well-mannered.

Yet everyone thinks himself well-mannered; and the mostdry and rigid pedant imagines that he can rally with agood grace and humour. I have known cases where anauthor has been criticised for defending the use of railleryby some of those grave gentlemen who at the same timehave constantly used that weapon themselves, though theyhad no gift for it. I think this can be seen in the case ofmany zealots who have taken it upon themselves to answerour modern free-writers [= writers who are free-thinkers = writerswho are atheists or anyway dont shrink in horror from atheism]. When

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these severe gentlemen, with the grim look of true inquisitors,condescend to leave their austerity and deal in a joking andpleasant manner with an adversary whom they would preferto treat very differently, they dont do it gracefully. To dothem justice, Im sure that if they had their way their conductand tone would be pretty much the same all through; theywould probably give up occasional farce and stay withcontinuous tragedy! But as things are, theres nothing soridiculous as the two-faced performance of writers who withone face force a smile and with another show nothing butrage and fury. Having signed up for the tournament andagreed to the fair laws of combat by wit and argument, theyhave no sooner tried their weapon than you hear them cryingaloud for help and delivering their adversary over to thesecular arm. [That is a joke. At some times and places, when a court ofsome Church found a person guilty of a crime for which it was unwilling

or legally unable to enforce punishment, it would ask the secular arm

of government to do the punishing.]

There cant be a more preposterous sight than an execu-tioner and a clown acting their part upon the same stage! ButIm convinced that anyone will find this to be the real pictureof certain modern zealots in their controversial writings. Theyare no more masters of solemnity than they are of goodhumour, always running into harsh severity on one sideand awkward buffoonery on the other. Between anger andpleasure, zeal and joking, their writing is about as gracefulas the play of cantankerous children who at the same instantare both peevish and wild, and can laugh and cry almost inthe same breath.

Theres no need for me to explain how agreeable suchwritings are like to be, and what effect theyll have towardswinning over or convincing those who are supposed to bein error! Its not surprising to hear the zealots publiclylamenting the fact that while their adversaries books are so

current, their answers to them can hardly make their wayinto the world or be taken the least notice of. Pedantry andbigotry are millstones that can sink the best book if it carriesthe least part of their dead weight. The temperament of thepedagogue doesnt suit the times, and the world may bewilling to learn but it isnt willing to be tutored. When aphilosopher speaks, men hear him willingly as long as hekeeps to his philosophy. A Christian is heard as long ashe keeps to his professed charity and meekness. And ina gentleman we allow of joking and raillery as long as it ismanaged with good manners and is never crude or clownish.But if a mere academic scholarimpersonating all thesecharacters and in his writings bouncing back and forth fromone to anotherappears over-all to be as little able to keepthe temperament of Christianity as to use the reason of aphilosopher or the raillery of a well-mannered gentleman, isit any wonder if the monstrous product of such a jumbledbrain strikes the world as ridiculous?

If you think, my friend, that by this description I havedone wrong to these zealot-writers in religious controversy,just read a few pages in any one of them. . . .and thenpronounce.

Section 4

Now that I have said this much about authors and writings,youll hear my thoughts (which you asked for) on the subjectof conversation, and especially a recent free-ranging con-versation that I had with some friends of yours whom youthought I should have very solemnly condemned.

It was, I must admit, a very entertaining conversation,despite its ending as abruptly as it did and in a confusionthat almost annihilated everything that had been said. Somedetails of this conversation oughtnt to be recorded on paper,

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I think. It will be enough if I remind you of the generallines of how the conversation went. Many fine schemeswere destroyed; many grave reasonings were overturned:but because this was done without offence to the partiesconcerned and with improvement to the good humour ofthe company, it gave us a still keener appetite for suchconversations. And Im convinced that if Reason herselfwere asked to judge how her own interests fared in thisconversation, she would answer that she received moreadvantage in the main from that easy and familiar wayof conversing than from the usual stiff adherence to oneparticular opinion.

Perhaps you are still in the frame of mind of not believingme to be in earnest about this. You may continue to tell methat I am merely trying to be paradoxical when I commend asadvantageous to reason a conversation that ended in suchtotal uncertainty concerning things that had seemingly beenso well established.

I answer that according to my notion of reason, one cantlearn how to use it from the written treatises of the learnedor from the set lectures of the eloquent. The only waysomeone can be made a reasoner is through the habit ofreasoning. And men can never be better invited into thehabit than when they find pleasure in it. Now, the only wayfor such speculative [see Glossary] conversations to be at allagreeable is for them to have

a freedom of raillery,a liberty in decent language to question everything,and

permission to unravel or refute any argument withoutgiving offence to the arguer.

The fact is that conversations on theoretical matters havebeen made burdensome to mankind by the strictness of thelaws laid down for them, and by the prevailing pedantry and

bigotry of those who reign in them and assume themselvesto be dictators in these provinces.

The ancient the satirists complaint in poetryMust Ialways be only a listener?is an equally natural complaintin theology, in morals, and in philosophy. Taking turns is amighty law of discourse, and mightily longed for by mankind.In matters of reason, more is done in a minute or two ofquestion and reply than is achieved by hours of continuousdiscourse. Orations are fit only to move the passions; andthe power of rhetoric is to terrify, exalt, enchant or delight,rather than to satisfy or instruct. A free conversation is aclose fight, compared with which the other waythe lectureor orationis merely a waving of weapons in the air. Sobeing obstructed and manacled in conferences, and beingrestricted to hearing orations on certain subjects, is boundto give us a distaste for those subjects, making themwhenmanaged in that wayas disagreeable to us as the managersare. Men would rather reason about trifles if they canreason freely and without the imposition of authority thanreason about the best and most useful subjects in the worldwhen they are held under restraint and fear.

And its no wonder that men are generally such weakreasoners who dont much care for strict argument in con-versations on minor topics, given that theyre afraid to exerttheir reason in greater matters, and are forced to arguefeebly in contexts where they need the greatest activity andstrength. What happens here is like what happens in strongand healthy bodies that are debarred from their naturalexercise and confined in a narrow space. They are forcedto use odd gestures and contortions. They have a sort ofaction; they do still move; but they do it utterly ungracefully.That happens because the animal spirits [see Glossary] in suchsound and active limbs cant lie dead, i.e. unemployed. Andin the same way the natural free mental spirits of clever

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men, if they are imprisoned and controlled, will discoverother ways of acting so as to relieve themselves in theirconstraint. . . .

If men are forbidden to speak their minds seriously oncertain subjects, theyll do it ironically. If they are forbiddento speak at all on such subjects, or if they think it reallydangerous to do so, they will then redouble their disguise,wrap themselves in mystery, and talk in such a way thattheyll hardly be understood. . . .by people who are disposedto do them harm. Thus raillery comes more into fashion,and goes to extremes. The persecuting spirit has arousedthe bantering one; and lack of liberty may account for thelack of true civilisedness, and for the corruption or wronguse of joking and humour.

[In the next sentence, the italicised words come from the Latin urbs= city and rus = countryside.] If in this respect we go beyondthe limits of what we call urbanity and are apt sometimes tobehave in a buffooning rustic manner, we have the ridiculoussolemnity and sour mood of our pedagogues to thank for this;or, rather, they can thank themselves if they in particularmeet with the heaviest of this kind of treatment. For it willnaturally fall heaviest where the constraint has been theseverest. The greater the weight is, the more bitter will bethe satire. . . .

To see that this really is so, look at the countries wherespiritual tyranny is highest. The greatest of buffoons are theItalians. In their writings, in their freer sort of conversations,on their stages and in their streets buffoonery and burlesqueare in the highest vogue. Its the only way the poor crampedwretches can express a free thought. We have to concedethat they are better than us at this sort of wit. And its notsurprising that we who have more liberty are less nimble inthat gross kind of raillery and ridicule?

Section 5

I really think that thats why the ancients exhibit so little ofthis spirit, and why in all the writings of the more polishedages theres hardly a sign of mere burlesque or anything likeit. Their treatment of the very gravest subjects was indeedsomewhat different from ours: their treatises were generallywritten in a free and familiar style; they chose to representreal discourse and conversation by treating their subjects inthe manner of dialogue and free debate. . . . The usual witand humour of their real discourses appeared in the onesthat they composed; and this was fair, because without witand humour reason can hardly be tested, or be identified assuch. The magisterial voice and high strain of the pedagoguecommands reverence and awe; it is admirably fitted to keepunderstandings at a distance and out of reach; whereas theother manner gives the fairest hold, and allows an antagonistto use his full strength hand to hand, on level ground. . . .

But some gentlemen are so full of the spirit of bigotryand false zeal that when they hear principles [see Glossary]examined, sciences and arts inquired into, and matters ofimportance treated with this frank kind of humour, theyquickly conclude that all the professions must collapse,all establishments come to ruin, and nothing orderly ordecent be left standing in the world. They fearor say theydothat religion itself will be endangered by this free wayof discussing things; so they are as much alarmed by thisliberty when it occurs in private conversation and underprudent management as if it were crudely used in publiccompany or before the most solemn assembly. But I see thesituation very differently. For you have to remember, myfriend, that I am writing to you in defence only of the libertyof the clubthe sort of freedom that is employed amonggentlemen and friends who know one another perfectly well.

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That it is natural for me to defend liberty with this restrictioncan be inferred from the very notion I have of liberty itself.

It is surely a violation of the freedom of public assembliesfor anyone to take the chair without having been called orinvited to it. To raise questions or steer debates that offendthe public ear is to be lacking in the respect that is due tocommon society. In public such subjects should be treatedeither not at all or in a manner that doesnt lead to scandalor disturbance. The public is not on any account to belaughed at to its face, or scolded for its follies in such away that it thinks it is being treated with contempt. Andwhat is contrary to good manners in this way is equallycontrary to liberty. Coming across as superior to thevulgar [see Glossary] and as despising the multitudethatsthe conduct of men of slavish principles [Shaftesburys phrase].Men who love mankind will respect and honour gatheringsand societies of men. And in mixed company [see Glossary],and in places where men have unselectively come togetherfor amusement or for business, it is an imposition and ahardship to force them to hear what they dislike, and todiscuss matters in a dialect that is unfamiliar to many ofthem. Its a breach of the harmony of public conversationto say things in a way that is above the common reach andsilences others, robbing them of their turn. But in privatesociety. . . .where friends meet knowingly, and with the actualintention of exercising their wit and looking freely into allsubjects, I see no basis for anyone to claim to be offended atthe way of raillery and humour, which is the very life of suchconversationsthe only thing that makes good company,and frees it from the formality of business and the tutorialdogmaticness of the schools.

Section 6

To return now to our argument. If the best of our modernconversations are apt to be chiefly concerned with trifles;if rational discourses. . . .have become discredited and dis-graced because of their formality [see Glossary]; then theresall the more reason to allow humour and gaiety. An easierway of treating these subjects will make them more agreeableand familiar. Disagreeing about them will be like disagreeingabout other matters; they neednt spoil good company, ordetract from the ease or pleasure of a civilised conversation;and the oftener these conversations are renewed the betterwill be their effect. Well become better reasoners by reason-ing in a pleasant and relaxed fashion, taking up or layingdown these subjects, as we please. So I admit that I cant bescandalized by the raillery that you took notice of, or by itseffect on our company. The humour was agreeable, and thepleasant confusion in which the conversation ended pleasesme as I look back on it, when I realise that instead of beingdiscouraged from resuming the debate we were so much thereadier to meet again at any time and disagree about thesame subjects, perhaps even with more ease and satisfactionthan before.

As you know, we had been occupying ourselves for along time with the subject of morality and religion. Amongdifferent opinions presented and maintained with great lifeand ingenuity by various participants, every now and thensomeone would appeal to common sense. Everyone allowedthe appeal, and was willing to have his views put to thattest, because everyone was sure that common sense wouldjustify him. But when the hearing was conductedthe issueexamined in the court of common senseno judgment couldbe given. This, however, didnt inhibit the debaters fromrenewing the appeal to common sense on the next occasion

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when it seemed relevant to do so. No-one ventured to callthe authority of the court into question, until a gentlemanwhose good understanding had never been brought in doubtvery gravely asked the company to tell him what commonsense was. he said:

If by the word sense we understand opinion andjudgment, and by the word common we mean whatis true of all mankind or of any considerable part of it,it will be hard to discover what the subject of commonsense could be! For anything that accords with thesense of one part of mankind clashes with the senseof another. And if the content of common sense weresettled by majority vote, it would change as oftenas men change, and something that squares withcommon sense today will clash with it tomorrow orsoon thereafter.

But despite the different judgments of mankind on mosttopics, it was thought by the members of our conversationalgroup that they agreed on some. The question then aroseas to what those subjects were. The questioner said:

It is thought that any topic that matters much will bein the categories of (1) religion, (2) policy [here = abstractpolitical theory] or (3) morals.

(1) Theres no need to say anything about dif-ferences in religion; the situation is fully known toeveryone, and feelingly understood by Christians, inparticular, among themselves. They have taken turnsin applying rigorous tests to one another. When anyparty happened to have the power of the state, itdid everything it possibly could to make its privatesense the public one; but it never succeededandcommon sense was as hard to pin down as catholicor orthodox when these are taken as general terms,not the names of two branches of Christianity. What

one sect regards as an inconceivable mystery is easyfor another sect to grasp; what is absurd to one isrigorously proved for another.

(2) As for policy: there is equally a question aswhat sense or whose sense could be called common.If plain British or Dutch sense is right, Turkish andFrench sense must be very wrong. And althoughpassive obedience [see Glossary] strikes us as merenonsense, we have found it to be the common senseof a large party among ourselves, a larger party inEurope, and perhaps the greatest part of all the worldbesides.

(3) As for morals; the difference is still wider, if thatis possible. Setting aside the opinions and customsof the many barbarous and illiterate nations, andattending only to the few nations that have achievedliterature and philosophy, even they havent yet beenable to agree on one single system, or acknowledge thesame moral principles. And some of our most admiredmodern philosophers, even, have told us flatly thatvirtue and vice have no other law or standard thanmere fashion and vogue.

It might have seemed unfair in our friends if they had treatedonly the graver subjects in this manner, and allowed thelighter ones to escape; for our follies in the gayer part oflife are as solemn as our follies in the most serious. Thefault is that we take the laugh only half-way: we ridiculethe false pronouncement but leave uncriticised the falsejoke, which becomes as utterly deceitful as the other. Ourentertainments, our plays, our amusements become solemn.We dream of happinesses and possessions and enjoymentsregarding which we have no understanding, dont knowanything for certain; and yet we pursue these as thoughthey were the best known and most certain things in the

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury II/1

world. Theres nothing so foolish and deluding as a partialscepticism; for while the doubt is cast only on one side, thecertainty grows so much stronger on the other. While onlyone face of folly appears ridiculous, the other grows moresolemn and deceiving.

But thats not how things stood with our friends. Theyseemed better critics, and more intellectually able and fair

in their way of questioning accepted opinions and exposingthe ridiculousness of things. If youll allow me to continue inthe tone they adopted, Ill conduct an experiment: theres away of going about things that you thought made assuredknowledge impossible and introduced endless scepticism;I want to discover whether by proceeding in that very sameway we can get that assured knowledge back.

Part II

Section 1

If an Ethiopian were suddenly transported into Europe andplaced either in Paris or Venice at a time of Carnival, whenalmost everyone wears a mask, he would probably be at aloss for some time until he discovered the cheat; because atfirst it wouldnt enter his head that a whole people could be sowild as to agree at an appointed time to transform themselvesby changing their clothing and wearing masks and makinga serious solemn practice of deceiving one another by thisuniversal confusion of characters and persons. He mightat first have looked on this with a serious eye, but once hediscovered what was going on hed have found it hard to keepa straight face. The Europeans might laugh back, mockinghis simplicity. But our Ethiopian would have better reasonfor laughter. Its easy to see which of the two would be moreridiculous: someone who laughs and is himself ridiculousbears a double share of ridicule. But then this might happen:Our Ethiopian, still in fits of laughter with his head full ofmasks, and knowing nothing of the fair complexion and

common dress of the Europeans, happens to see someonewith no mask and in his normal clothing; and this makes himlaugh as much as ever. By a silly presumption he is takingnature for mere art, and mistaking a sober and sensible manfor one of those ridiculous amateur actors! Isnt he makinghimself ridiculous by carrying the joke too far?

[In this paragraph and the next, Shaftesbury is talking about (i) waysin which truth has been disguised in terms of (ii) the wearing of masksand fooling around at Carnival. Sometimes he uses the language of (ii)when really he is talking only about (i); read alertly!] There was atime when men were accountable only for their actions andbehaviour [Shaftesburys phrase]. Their opinions were left tothemselves. They were free to differ in these, as in theirfaces! everyone acquired the manner and look that wasnatural for him. But in the course of time it came to bethought decent to correct mens faces and to make theirintellectual complexions uniform and of one sort. Thusthe magistrate [see Glossary] became a dresser, and after hehad given up his power to a new order of clothiers, he in

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turn was dressed as he deserved! But although. . . .it wasagreed that only one manner of dress was correct, and onlyone particular manner of behaving to which all people mustconform, the misery was that neither the magistrate nor theclothiers themselves could settle which of the various stylesand manners was the exactly true one. Imagine now whatthe effect must be when men came to be persecuted fromall sides about their manner and appearance, and had tostruggle and improvise in attempts to adjust and composetheir facial expressions according to the right mode; when athousand patterns of dress were current, and kept alteringaccording to fashion and the mood of the times! Judgewhether mens faces werent likely to show strain, and thenatural face of mankind distorted, convulsed, and madehardly recognisable.

But although the general face of things has been madeunnatural or artificial by this unhappy concern for dress andover-tenderness for the safety of complexions, we mustntbe led by this to think that all faces are alike besmearedor plastered, that its all a matter of rouge and varnish,or that the face of truth is any less beautiful under allthe counterfeit faces that have been put on her. We mustremember the Carnival: what has led to this wild jumbleof people, who started it, and why men were pushed intothis pastime. We may have a good laugh at the originaldeception, and if pity doesnt stop us we can have fun atthe expense of the folly and madness of those who are thuscaught and manipulated by these impostures [see Glossary].But we should remember our Ethiopian, and beware lest bytaking plain nature for a mask we become more ridiculousthan the people we are ridiculing. Now, if a misplaced jokeor ridicule can lead the judgment so far astray, its probablethat an excess of fear or horror may have the same result.

[The Magi referred to here are mythical creatures with magical pow-ers who are supposed to have created a kingdom in Persia (here called

Asia). When Shaftesbury compares them with the Knights Templars

whom he calls a body of conjurers he is expressing his contempt for

the supposed magic powers of the supposed Magi.] If, my friend,you had chanced to live in Asia at the time when the Magiby a wicked imposture got possession of the empire, nodoubt you would have detested that act; and it might havehappened that the very persons of the men, after all thecheats and abuses they had committed, became so odious toyou that you would have seen them killed with as relentlessan eye as our later European ancestors saw the destructionof the Knights Templarsa similar body of conjurers whohad almost become an over-match for the civil sovereign.Your indignation might have led you to propose the razingof all monuments and memorials of those magicians. Youmight have resolved not to leave so much as their housesstanding. But if it had happened that these magicians whenthey were in power had made any collection of books, orwritten any themselves, treating of philosophy, or morals, orany other science [see Glossary] or branch of learning, wouldyou have carried your resentment so far as to destroythese also and to condemn every opinion or doctrine theMagi had espoused, simply because they had espousedit? Hardly a Scythian, a Tatar, or a Goth would act orreason so absurdly. Much less would you, my friend, havecarried out this. . . .priest-massacre with such a barbarouszeal. Seriously, destroying a philosophy out of hatred for aman shows thinking as wildly barbaric as murdering a manin order to plunder his wit and get the inheritance of hisunderstanding!

I must admit that if all the institutions, statutes, and reg-ulations of this ancient hierarchy, the Magi, had resembledthe basic law of the order itself, it might have been right to

9


suppress them, for one cant read that law of theirsa Magus must be born of a mother and her son

without some abhorrence. But the conjurers (which iswhat they were, not magicians) thought that their principlesshould look as good as possible to the world so as betterto conceal their practice; so they found it to be highly intheir interests to accept some excellent moral rules and toestablish the very best maxims of this kind. They may havethought at the outset that it would be to their advantage torecommend the greatest purity of religion, and the greatestintegrity of life and manners. Perhaps they also preached upcharity and good-will. And they may have presented to theworld the fairest face of human nature and, together withtheir laws and political institutions, have interwoven themost honest morals with best doctrine in the world.

So how should we have behaved towards them? Howshould we have carried ourselves towards this order of menat the time of the discovery of their cheat and ruin of theirempire? Should we have started to work instantly on theirsystems, struck indiscriminately at all their opinions anddoctrines, and erected a contrary philosophy in defianceof them? Should we have attacked every religious andmoral principle, denied every natural and social affection,and made men as much like wolves to one another as waspossible for them, while describing them as wolves andtrying to make them see themselves as far more monstrousand corrupt than with the worst intentions it was everpossible for the worst of them to become? No doubt youllthink that this would have been a very preposterous line totake, which could have been followed only by mean spirits

who had held in awe and overfrightened by the Magi.Yet an able and witty philosopher of our nation was

recently so possessed with a horror of this kind that hedirectly acted in this spirit of massacrewith respect bothto politics and to morals.1 The fright he got from seeing thethen-governing powers, who had unjustly taken authorityover the people, gave him such a horror of all popular[see Glossary] government, and of the very notion of libertyitself, that to extinguish it for ever he recommends theextinguishing of books, and urges princes [see Glossary] not tospare so much as an ancient Roman or Greek historian. Isntthis in truth somewhat gothic? And doesnt our philosopherlook rather like a savage in treating philosophy and learningin the way the Scythians are said to have treated Anacharsisand others as punishment for having visited the wise ofGreece and learned the manners of a civilised people?

His quarrel with religion was the same as his quarrelwith liberty: the events during his lifetime gave him thesame terror of each. All he could see were the ravages ofenthusiasm [here = fanaticism] and the tricks of the peoplewho created and then steered that spirit. And this goodsociable mansavage and unsociable as he tried to makehimself and all mankind appear by his philosophyexposedhimself to great hostility during his life, and took greatpains that after his death we might be spared the kinds ofevents that led to these terrors. He tried to show us that

Both in religion and in morals we are imposed onby our governors; there is nothing which by natureinclines us either way, nothing that naturally drawsus to the love of anything beyond ourselves;

1 Hobbes, who expresses himself thus: By reading these Greek and Latin authors, men have from their childhood fallen into a habit (under a falseshow of liberty) of favouring riots, and of licentiously controlling the actions of their sovereigns. (Leviathan II.21). By this reasoning, it should followthat there can never be any riots or deposing of sovereigns at Constantinople, or in the Mughal empire. In other passages he expresses his view aboutthis destruction of ancient literature in favour of his Leviathan hypothesis and new philosophy.

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although his love for such great truths and sovereign maximsas he imagined these to be made him the most laborious ofall men in composing systems of this kind for our use; andforced him, despite his natural fear, to run continually thehighest risk of being a martyr for our deliverance.

So let me head off your anxieties and assure you thattheres no such mighty danger as we are apt to imagine fromthese fierce prosecutors of superstition, who are so downon every religious or moral principle. Whatever savagesthey may appear to be in philosophy, they are in theirordinary lives as civilised as one could wish. Their freedomin communicating their principles is a witness on theirbehalf: its the height of sociableness to be friendly andcommunicative in that way.

If their principles were concealed from us and made amystery, they might indeed become considerable [= becomesomething that we had to reckon with]. Things are often madeconsiderable by being kept as secrets of a sect or party;and nothing helps this more than the hostility and anxietyof a contrary party. If hearing maxims that are thoughtto be poisonous immediately pushes us into horrors andconsternation, were in no state to use the familiar and easypart of reason that is the best antidote. The only poison toreason is passion, for false reasoning is soon corrected whenpassion is removed. But if merely hearing a philosophicalproposition is enough to move us into a passion, its clearthat the poison already has a grip on us and we are effectivelyprevented from using our reasoning faculty.

If it werent for prejudices of this kind, why shouldnt weentertain ourselves with the fancy of one of these modernreformers we have been speaking of? What should we say toone of these anti-zealots who, with all the zeal of such a coolphilosophy, should earnestly assure us:

You are the most mistaken men in the world, toimagine that theres any such thing as natural faithor justice. What is right is determined by force andpower. Theres no such thing in reality as virtue; noprinciple [see Glossary] of order in things in heaven oron earth; no secret charm or force of nature by whicheveryone is made to work willingly or unwillinglytowards public good, and is punished and tormentedif he does otherwise.

Isnt this the very charm itself? Isnt the gentleman at thisinstant under the power of it? The next paragraph is whatwe could say to him.

Sir! the philosophy you have condescended to reveal tous is most extraordinary. We are indebted to you for yourinstruction. But please tell us: this zeal of yours on ourbehalfwhere does it come from? What are we to you? Areyou our father? And even if you were, why this concern forus? Is there then such a thing as natural affection? If not,then why all this industry and danger on our account? Whynot keep this secret to yourself? What good does it do you todeliver us from the cheat? The more that are taken in by it,the better. Its directly against your interests to undeceiveus, and let us know that you are governed only by privateinterest, and that nothing nobler or broader should governus whom you converse with. Leave us to ourselves and tothat notable art by which we are happily tamed and made asmild and sheepish as we are. Its not fit that we should knowthat by nature we are all wolves. Is it possible that someonewho has really discovered himself to be a wolf should workhard to communicate such a discovery?

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Section 2

In reality, my friend, theres nothing to frown at here, whenwere being challenged to defend common honesty by fairhonest gentlemen who are so different in practice from howthey want to appear in theory. I know that some peopleare knaves in notion and principle as well as in practice:they think all honesty as well as all religion is a merecheat, and so in consistency they have resolved deliberatelyto use whatever force or skill they have for their privateadvantage. But men like that never open themselves infriendship to others. They have no such passion for truth,or love for mankind. They have no quarrel with religion ormorals, but they know what use to make of both when theopportunity arises. If they ever reveal their principles, it isnever intentionally; they are sure to preach honesty, and goto church.

On the other hand, the gentlemen whose side I am takingcant be called hypocrites. They speak as ill of themselvesas they possibly can. If they have hard thoughts of humannature, its still a proof of their humanity that they give sucha warning to the world. If they represent men as being bynature treacherous and wild, they do this out of care formankind, to help them not to be caught easily through beingtoo tame and trusting.

Impostors naturally speak the best of human nature, tomake it easier for them to manipulate it. These gentlemenwhom I am defending, on the other hand, speak the worst;and they would rather be censured along with the rest thanallow a few impostors to prevail over the many. Its theopinion that men are good that makes it easy for them totrust one another; and its through trust that we are betrayedand put at the mercy of power, with our very reason beingcaptured by those in whom we have gradually come to have

an implicit faith. But if each of us supposes all the othersto be by nature outright savages, well take care to comeless into one anothers power; and, taking it that everyoneis insatiably hungry for power, well build better defencesagainst the evil of malign powernot by putting everythinginto one hand (as Hobbes, the champion of this cause,wants us to do), but on the contrary by a proper divisionand balance of power, and by the restraint of good laws andlimitations that can secure the public liberty.

You may want to ask me Do you really think thesegentlemen are fully convinced of the principles they so oftenadvance in company? My answer is as follows (it runs to theend of the paragraph). I wouldnt absolutely question thegentlemens sincerity, but there is something of a mysteryabout their conduct, more than has been suspected. Perhapsthe reason why men of wit delight so much in espousingthese paradoxical theories is not that they are fully satisfiedwith them, but that they want to make a better job ofopposing some other theories whose fair appearance hashelped (they think) to bring mankind under subjection. Theythink that by the general scepticism that they want tointroduce theyll better deal with the dogmatic spirit thatprevails in some subjects. And when they have accustomedmen to putting up with being contradicted and hearing thenature of things being argue over in a general way, it maybe safer (they conclude) to argue separately about certainmatters of detail over which they arent quite so well satisfied.From this you may get a better sense of why in conversationthe spirit of raillery prevails so much, and notions are takenup for no reason except that they are odd and out of the way.

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Section 3

But, speaking for myself, I have no worries about thissceptical kind of wit. Men may in a serious way be so pushedand puzzled by different ways of thinking, different systemsand schemes imposed by authority, that lose all notion orcomprehension of truth. I can easily grasp the effect that awehas over mens understandings. I can very well suppose menmay be frightened out of their wits, but I dont see that theycan be laughed out of them! I can hardly imagine that inpleasant conversation they should ever be talked out of theirlove for society, or reasoned out of humanity and commonsense. Wit framed by good manners cant hurt any cause orinterest that I care about; and philosophical speculations,managed in a civilised way, surely cant ever make mankindmore unsociable or uncivilized. That s not the direction fromwhich I can expect an invasion of savageness and barbarity.What I have found is that virtue never suffers as much frombeing contested as it does from being betrayed. My fearis not so much from virtues witty antagonists, who give itexercise defending itself, as from its tender nurses, who areapt to smother it in blankets and kill it by their excess ofcare!

I have known a building that was tilting in one directionand was then so thoroughly fixed that it leaned and fellin the opposite direction. Something like that may have

happened in morals. Not satisfied with showing the nat-ural advantages of honesty and virtue, men have actuallylessened these in order (they thought) to advance anotherfoundation for virtue. They have made virtue such amercenary thing, and have talked so much about its rewards,that one can hardly tell what there is in virtue that is worthrewarding; for theres not much honesty or value in beingbribed or terrified into behaving honestly. . . .

If the love of doing good is not in itself a good and rightinclination, I dont know how there can possibly be such athing as goodness or virtue. And if the inclination is right, weare perverting it if we think of it solely in terms of the rewardfor it, conceiving such wonders of the grace and favour thatvirtue will bring, when so little is shown of the intrinsic worthor value of the thing itself.

Im almost tempted to think that the true reason whysome of the most heroic virtues have so little notice taken ofthem in our holy religion is that if they had been entitled to ashare of the infinite reward that providence has by revelationassigned to other duties there would have been no roomleft for disinterestedness. [This seems to mean: there would havebeen no reward left over for disinterestedness, but Shaftesbury cant have

meant that, because it is too obvious that an infinite reward is not an

exhaustible quantity.] (i) Private friendship and (ii) zeal for thepublic and for our country are purely voluntary virtues for aChristian.2 They arent essential parts of his charity. He isnt

2 No fair reader can think that by private friendship I mean the common benevolence and charity that every Christian is obliged to show towards allmen, and in particular towards his fellow-Christians, his neighbour, his brother, his more or less closely related kindred; but the special relation thatis formed by a consent and harmony of minds, by mutual esteem, and reciprocal tenderness and affectionwhat we emphatically call a friendship.Thats what there was between the two Jewish heroes that I shall mention shortly, whose love and tenderness surpassed that of women (2 Samuel, ch.1). Such were the friendships, described so often by poets, between Pylades and Orestes, Theseus and Pirithous, and many others. Such were thosebetween philosophers, heroes, and the greatest of menbetween Socrates and Antisthenes, Plato and Dion, Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Cato andBrutus. . . . And such there may have been more recently, and perhaps even in our own age, though envy prevents the few examples of this kind frombeing mentioned in public. [This very long footnote continues with Shaftesburys response to critics of what he has said about the status of friendshipin the system of Christian virtues, a response based largely on what the learned and pious Bishop Taylor wrote in his Treatise of Friendship.]

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so tied to the affairs of this life; nor is he obliged to involvehimself in this lower world in ways that wont help him toacquire a better world in the after-life. His real concernsare in heaven, and he has no occasion for any extra cares orembarrassments here on earth that may obstruct his way toheaven or hold him back in the careful task of working outhis own salvation. But if any portion of reward is reservedhereafter for the generous part of (ii) a patriot, or that of (i) athorough friend, this is still behind the curtain and happilyconcealed from us, so that we may be the more deserving ofit when it comes.

It seems indeed that in the Jewish scheme of things eachof these virtues had its illustrious examples, and was in somemanner recommended to us as honourable and deservingto be imitated. Even Saulwho is presented to us as a badprinceappears to have been respected and praised, beforehis death and after, for his love of his native country. Andthe remarkable love between his son Jonathan and hissuccessor David gives us a noble view of a disinterested

friendship, at least on one side. But the heroic virtue of thesepersons had only the common reward of praise attributed toit, and couldnt claim a future reward under a religion thatdidnt teach any future state and didnt present any rewardsor punishments except this-worldly ones in accordance withthe written law.

And thus the Jews as well as the heathens were left to beinstructed by their philosophy in the sublime part of virtue,and induced by reason to do what they had never beencommanded to do. No premium or penalty being enforcedin these cases, the disinterested part stood alone, the virtuewas a free choice, and the magnanimity of the act was leftentire. Someone who wanted to be generous, had the meansto do so. Someone who fully wanted to serve his friend orhis country, even at the cost of his life,3 could do it on fairterms. his sole reason was that Dulce et decorum estit wasinviting and becoming, or sweet and fitting. It was goodand honest. And Ill try to convince you that this is still agood reason, and one that squares with common sense. . . .

3 Perhaps, says the holy apostle Paul, for a good man some would even dare to die (Romans 5:7) He judiciously supposes this to belong to humannature; though he is so far from basing any precept on it that he introduces his private opinion with a very dubious perhaps.

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury III/1

Part III

Section 1

The Roman satirist Juvenal may be thought more thanordinarily satirical when, speaking of the nobility and thecourt, he is so far from allowing them to be the standard ofpoliteness and good sense that he makes them in a way thereverse: Common-sense is rare in men of that rank. Someof the ablest commentators, however, interpret this verydifferently from how it is ordinarily understood: they givethe poets common sense a Greek derivation through whichit stands for

a sense of public good and of the common interest;love of the community or society, natural affection,humanity, obligingness, or the sort of civility thatcomes from a sound sense of the common rights ofmankind and the natural equality there is amongthose of the same species.

And if we think carefully about this, it must seem rather hardor unkind in the poet to have denied wit or ability to a courtsuch as that of Rome, even under a Tiberius or a Nero. Butit didnt take any deep satire to question whether humanityor a sense of public good and of the common interest ofmankind was properly the spirit of a court! It was hard tosee what community there was among courtiers; or whatpublic there was containing an absolute prince [see Glossary]and his slave-subjects. As for real society, there couldntbe any between people whose only sense of good was theirsense of their own individual welfare. [Shaftesbury attaches tothis paragraph an enormous footnote giving details of the battles among

the commentators on how that line of Juvenals should be understood.]

So our poet seems to be not so immoderate in his censureif we take him to be criticising the heart rather than the head.Reflecting on the education [see Glossary] that a court will offerhe thinks its not likely to raise any affection towards acountry. He sees young princes and lords as the youngmasters of the world: being indulged in all their passions,and trained up in all sorts of licentiousness, they have athorough contempt and disregard of mankind. (And mankindin a way deserves this, when it permits arbitrary power andadores tyranny!). . . .

A public spirit can only come from a social feeling, ora sense of partnership with human kind. Now, there arenone so far from being partners in this sense, or sharersin this common affection, as those who scarcely know anequal and dont regard themselves as subject to any law offellowship or community. That is how morality and goodgovernment go together. Theres is no real love of virtuewithout the knowledge of public good; and where absolutepower is, there is no public.

Those who live under a tyranny, and have learned toadmire its power as sacred and divine, are perverted asmuch in their religion as in their morals. According to theirway of thinking, public good isnt the standard or rule ofgovernment for the universe any more than it is for the state.They have almost no notion of what is good or just other thanwhat mere will and power have determined. Omnipotence,they think, would hardly be omnipotence if it werent free todispense with the laws of fairness and change the standardof moral rectitude just as it pleased.

But despite prejudices and corruptions of this kind,there clearly is still something of a public principle [see

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Glossary], even where it is most perverted and depressed.The worst of governmentsthe despotic kindcan showsufficient instances of zeal and affection towards it. Where noother government is known, a despotic government usuallyreceives the allegiance and duty that is owing to a betterform. The eastern countries and many barbarous nationshave been and still are examples of this kind. The personallove they bear their prince [see Glossary], however severe he istowards them, may be evidence of what a natural affectionmankind have towards government. If men really have nopublic parent, no magistrate in common to cherish andprotect them, they will still imagine they have one; andlike new-born creatures who have never seen their motherthey will imagine one for themselves, and (as if promptedby nature) apply for favour and protection to something ofabout the right shape. Lacking a true foster-father and chief,they will follow a false one; and lacking a legal governmentand just prince, they will obey even a tyrant, and endure awhole series of tyrants in the same family line.

As for us Britons, thank heaven, we have a better senseof government passed down to us from our ancestors. Wehave the notion of a public, and a constitution; and howa legislature and an executive should be structured. Weunderstand weight and measure in these matters, and canreason soundly about the balance of power and property.The maxims we draw from our reasoning are as evidentas conclusions in mathematics. Our increasing knowledgeshows us every day, more and more, what common sense isin politics: and this is bound to lead us to understand a likesense in morals, which is the foundation of politics.

It is ridiculous to say that theres an obligation on manto act sociably or honestly in a formed government but notin what is commonly called the state of nature. To put itin the fashionable language of our modern philosophy:

Society being founded on a compact, the surrenderthat every man makes of his private unlimited rightinto the hands of the majority, or whoever is appointedby the majority, is freely chosen and based on apromise.

Now, this promise was made in the state of nature; andwhatever can make a promise obligatory in the state ofnature must make all other acts of humanity as much ourreal duty. . . . Thus faith, justice, honesty, and virtue mustall have been as early as the state of nature, or they couldnever have been at all. The civil union or confederacy couldnever make right or wrong if right and wrong didnt existalready. Someone who was free to perform any villainy beforehis contract will and should dispose as freely of his contractwhen it suits him to do so. . . .

A man is obliged to keep his word.Why?Because he has given his word to keep it.

What a striking account of the origin of moral justice andthe rise of civil government and allegiance!

Section 2

But setting aside these complaints against a philosophy thatsays so much about nature and means so little, we cansurely accept this as a principle:

If anything is natural in any creature or any kindof creature, its whatever tends to preserve the kinditself and conduces to its welfare and support.

If in original and pure nature it is wrong to break a promiseor to be treacherous, it is as truly wrong to be in any respectinhuman, or in any way lacking in our natural part towardshuman kind. [Those last seven words are Shaftesburys.] If eatingand drinking are natural, so is herding [i.e. coming together in

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a herd]. If any appetite or sense is natural, so is the senseof fellowship. If theres anything natural in the affectionbetween the sexes, the affection towards the consequent off-spring is equally natural; and so again between the offspringthemselves, as kindred and companions brought up underthe same discipline in the same household. Thats how aclan or tribe is gradually formed, a public is recognised; andbesides the pleasure found in social entertainment, language,and conversation there is such an obvious necessity forcontinuing this good set of relationships that having nosense or feeling of this kind, no love of country, community,or anything in common, would be the same as having sosense even of the most obvious means of self-preservationand the most necessary condition of self-enjoyment.

I dont know how the wit of man could puzzle away atthis and come up with the answer that civil governmentand society are a kind of invention, a skilful contrivance.My own view is that this herding principle, this inclinationto associate, is so natural and strong in most men that itsviolence might easily be blamed for much of the disorder thathas arisen in the general society of mankind.

Universal goodthe interests of the world in generalis akind of remote philosophical object. That greater community(the world in general) is hard to see; and the interests of anation or of a whole people or body politic arent easy to gethold of either. In smaller groups men can know one anotherpersonally, they can get a better taste of society, and enjoythe common good and interests of a smaller public. Theysee right across and around their community, and see andindividually know those whom they serve, and know whatthe purpose is of their associating and working together. Allmen naturally have their share of this drive to come together;and those whose faculties are the most lively and active havesuch a large share of it that unless it is properly directed

by right reason it cant find things to do in such a remotesphere as that of the body politic at large. For here one maynot even know by sight one in a thousand of those whoseinterests are concerned. No visible band is formed, no strictalliance; the relations are all with different persons, orders,and ranks of mennot men that one meets and talks to, butmen of whom one has some idea according to the generalview or notion of a state or commonwealth.

Thus the social aim is disturbed for lack of definite scope.The virtue of feeling what others feel and working togetheris apt to get lost for lack of direction in such a wide field.And the passion for herding together is nowhere as stronglyfelt or vigorously exerted as in actual joint action or war,in which the highest geniuses [see Glossary] are often knownto be the readiest to take part. That is because the mostgenerous [see Glossary] spirits are the most combining: theydelight most to move in harmony with others, and feel (if Ican put it this way) in the strongest manner the force of theconfederating charm.

Its strange to think that war, which of all things appearsthe most savage, should be the passion of the most heroicspirits. But its in war that the knot of fellowship is pulledtightest. Its in war that mutual help is most given, mutualdanger run, and common affection most exerted and em-ployed. For heroism and philanthropy are almost the samething. To turn a lover of mankind into a ravager, a hero anddeliverer into an oppressor and destroyer, all it takes is asmall misguidance of the affection.

Hence other divisions amongst men. Hence, blockingpeace and civil government, the love of party and of subdi-vision by cabal. For sedition is a kind of cantonizingi.e.splitting into sub-groupsthat has already begun withinthe state. When a society grows vast and bulky, it is naturalto cantonize; and powerful states have found that sending

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colonies abroad brings other advantages than merely havingelbow-room at home, or extending their dominion into distantcountries. Vast empires are unnatural in many respects, butespecially in the fact that in such an empire, however wellit is constituted, the affairs of many must be in the handsof very few; and the relation between the magistrate andpeople is less visiblein a way it is lostin a body that is sounwieldy in its limbs, and whose limbs lie so far from oneanother and from the head.

It is in bodies like this that strong factions are most likelyto arise. What happens is that the associating spirits, lackingexercise, form new movements within which they can havea narrower sphere of activity because they cant get actionin a greater. Thus we have wheels within wheels. Andsome nations are structured in such a way that, absurd asthis is as a matter of political theory, we have one empirewithin another. Nothing is as delightful as incorporatingi.e.forming bodies or groups.

All sorts of distinctions are invented.Religious societies are formed.Orders are set up. and their interests espoused andserved with the utmost zeal and passion.

Theres never any lack of founders and patrons of this sort.Wonders are performed in this wrong social spirit by themembers of separate societies. Mans associating genius isnever better proved than in the societies that are formed inopposition to the general society of mankind, and to thereal interests of the state.

In short, the very spirit of faction seems mainly to benothing but the misuse or irregularity of the social loveand common affection that is natural to mankind. Thatsbecause the opposite of sociableness is selfishness; and of allcharacters the thoroughly selfish one is the least ready to joinany group or faction. The men of this sorti.e. the selfish

onesare true men of moderation. They have too muchself-knowledge and self-control to be in danger of enteringwarmly into any cause or engaging deeply with any side orfaction.

Section 3

As you know, it is commonly said that self-interest governsthe world. But I think that anyone who looks closely into theaffairs of the human world will find that passion, humour,caprice, zeal, faction, and a thousand other springs that goagainst self-interest have as large a role in the movements ofthis machine as self-interest does. There are more wheelsand balances in this engine than are easily imagined. It istoo complex to fall under one simple view, or be explained ina word or two. Those who study this mechanism must have avery selective eye to overlook all other motions besides thoseof the lowest and narrowest range. In the plan or descriptionof this clockwork, it is hard that no wheel or balance shouldbe allowed on the side of the better and broader affections;that nothing should be understood to be done in kindnessor generosity, nothing in pure good-nature or friendship orthrough any social or natural affection of any kind, giventhat the main springs of this machine may well turn out tobe either these very natural affections themselves or somecompound kind containing them and retaining more thanone half of their nature.

But dont expect me to draw you up a formal blueprintof the passions or to claim to show you their genealogy andinter-relationshow they are interwoven with one another,or how they interfere with our happiness and interest. Todevise a sound plan or model that would enable you tosee how much of the load in this architectural structureis carried by the friendly and natural affections would be

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beyond the scope and above the level of a letter like this.Modern designers, I know, would willingly get these

natural materials off their hands, so that they could buildin a more uniform way. They would like to new-frame thehuman heart, and intensely want to reduce all its motions,balances and weights to one principle and foundationcooland deliberate selfishness. Men, it seems, are unwilling tothink they can be outwitted and imposed on by nature soas to be made to serve her purposes, rather than their own.Theyre ashamed to be drawn out of themselves in this way,and forced away from what they regard as their true interest.

There have always been narrow-minded philosophers whohave thought to set this difference to rights [= to put and endto this struggle [between man and nature]] by conquering nature inthemselves. A father and founder among these [Epicurus] sawwell this power of nature, and he understood it so far thathe urged his followers not to have children or to serve theircountry. There was no dealing with nature, it seems, whilethese alluring objects stood in the way! He saw clearly that

relatives,friends,countrymen,laws,political constitutions,the beauty of order and government, andthe interests of society and mankind

were objects that would naturally create stronger affectionsthan any that were grounded on the narrow base of mere self.So his advice not to marry or engage at all in the service ofthe public was wise, and suitable to his design. The onlyway to be truly a disciple of this philosophy was to leavefamily, friends, country, and society, and cling to it. . . .

But the modern revivers of this philosophy seem to be of alower genius. They seem to have understood less of this forceof nature, and have thought to alter the thing by changinga name. They give an account of all the social passions andnatural affections that puts them all in the selfish category.Thus civility, hospitality, humanity towards strangers orpeople in distress, is only a more deliberate selfishness.An honest heart is only a more cunning one; and honestyand good-nature are a more deliberate or better-regulatedself-love. The love of relative, children and posterity is purelylove of self and of ones own immediate blood; as if, bythis calculation all mankind were not included, becausethey are all of one blood, and joined by inter-marriagesand alliances!. . . . Thus, love of ones country and love ofmankind must also be self-love. Magnanimity and courage,no doubt, are also versions of this universal self-love! Forcourage (says our modern philosopher) is constant anger.4

And all men (says a witty poet [Lord Rochester] would becowards if they dared to.

We can accept without argument that the poet and thephilosopher were both cowards; they may have reported whatthey knew about themselves. But true courage has so littleto do with anger that the strongest evidence that someone isnot brave is that he is very angry. True courage is the cooland calm sort. The bravest of men have the least of a brutalbullying insolence, and are found to be the most serene,pleasant, and free in the very time of danger. We know thatrage can make a coward forget himself and fight. But what isdone in fury or anger cant be attributed to courage. If thatwere not so, womankind might claim to be the braver sex,because their hatred and anger have always been known tobe stronger and more lasting than mens.

4 Sudden courage, says Hobbes, is anger. Therefore courage considered as constant and belonging to a character must on his account be defined asconstant anger or anger constantly returning.

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[Shaftesbury writes harshly of still lower writers whouse word-play and cheap jokes to propagate the idea thatself-interest is the only basic human motivation. He contin-ues:] If these gentlemen who delight so much in the play ofwords but shy away from definitions would simply tell uswhat self-interest is, and pin down what happiness and goodare, that would put an end to this enigmatical wit. We will allagree that happiness is to be pursued, and in fact is alwayssought after; but whether it is to be found in

following nature, and giving way to common affection,or rather in

suppressing nature and turning every passion to-wards private advantage. . . .or the preservation ofmere life,

that is something we could debate about. The question wouldnot be Who loves himself and who doesnt? but rather Wholoves and serves himself in the most right and true manner?"

It is the height of wisdom, no doubt, to be rightly selfish[see Glossary]. And to value life, as far as life is good, belongsas much to courage as to discretion. But a wretched life isno wise mans wish. To be without honesty is in effect to bewithout natural affection or sociableness of any kind. Anda life without natural affection, friendship, or sociablenesswould be found a wretched one if it were tried. The valueof self-interest depends on the intrinsic value and worth ofthese feelings and affections. What makes a man himself is,more than anything else, his temperament and the nature ofhis passions and affections. If he loses what is manly andworthy in these, he is as much lost to himself as when heloses his memory and understanding. The least step intovillainy or baseness changes the character and value of alife. Someone who is willing to preserve his life at any cost isabusing himself more than anyone else can abuse him. Andif life is not a dear thing indeed [here = utterly beyond any price],

someone who refused to live as a villain and preferred deathto a base action was a gainer by the bargain.

Section 4

Its as well for you, my friend, that in your education youhavent had much to do with the philosophy or the philoso-phers of our days. A good poet and an honest historiancan provide enough learning for a gentleman. And when agentleman reads these authors for pleasure, hell get the feelof them and understand them better than will a pedant, withall his labours and the aid of his volumes of commentators.Im aware that it used to be the custom to send the youthof highest quality to philosophers to be formed. It was intheir schools, in their company, and by their precepts andexample that the illustrious pupils became used to hardshipand were exercised in the severest courses of temperance andself-denial. By such an early discipline they were equipped

to command others,to maintain their countrys honour in war,to rule wisely in the state, andto fight against luxury and corruption in times ofprosperity and peace.

If any of these arts [here = skills] are included in universitylearning, thats good; but some universities these daysare shaped in such a way that they seem not to be veryeffective for these purposes, and not to make a good job ofpreparing the young for right conduct in the world or soundknowledge of men and things. If you had been thoroughlyeducated in the ethics or politics of the schools, I wouldnever have thought of writing a word to you about commonsense or the love of mankind. I wouldnt have quoted thepoets dulce & decorum. . . . Our philosophy these days runs

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along the lines of the able sophister who said Skin for skin:all that a man has he will give for his life. [This able buttricky reasoner was Satan addressing God in Job 2:4.] According tosome men it is orthodox theology and sound philosophy tovalue lives in terms of the number and exquisiteness of thepleasing sensations they contain. They constantly set thesesensations in opposition to dry virtue and honesty. Andupon this basis they see fit to call a fool anyone who wouldrisk his life for anything, or part with any of these pleasingsensations unless he could later get them backbe repaidin the same coinwith interest. So it seems that we are tolearn virtue through money-lending, and to be wise and livewell by raising the value of life and of the pleasures of sense!

But you, my friend, are stubborn about this. Instead ofbeing led to think mournfully of death, or to bewail the lossof anything you may sometimes have risked by your honesty,you can laugh at such maxims as these, and be entertainedby the improved selfishness and philosophical cowardice ofthese fashionable moralists! You wont be taught to valuelife in terms of their price-scale, or degrade honesty as theydo who make it only a name. You are convinced that theressomething more in the thing than fashion or applause; thatworth and merit are substantial, and dont depend on whatmen imagine or what they want; and that honour is as muchitself when acting by itself and unseen as when seen andapplauded by all the world.

If someone who looked like a gentleman were to ask meWhy should I avoid being nasty when no-one else is present?,my first thought would be that someone who could ask thisquestion must himself be a very nasty gentleman, and thatit would be hard to make him conceive what true cleanlinessis. Still, I might settle for giving him a slight answer, sayingBecause you have a nose.

If he pressed on by asking What if I had a cold? or Whatif I naturally lacked a delicate sense of smell? I might answerthat I cared as little to see myself nasty as that others shouldsee me in that condition. But what if it were in the dark?Even then, though I had neither nose nor eyes, my sense ofthe matter would still be the same; my nature would rebelat the thought of what was sordid: or if it didnt, that wouldshow that I had a wretched nature indeed and hated myselffor being a beast. I could never honour myself while I had nobetter a sense of what I owed myself, and what was fittingfor me as a human creature.

In much the same way have heard it asked Why shoulda man be honest in the dark? I wont say what sort of manwould ask this question; but I wouldnt much want to knowhim or spend time in his companyor in the company ofanyone whose best reason for being honest was his fear ofthe gallows or a jail. . . .

I know very well that many services to the public aredone merely for the sake of reward; and that informers inparticular are to be taken care of, and sometimes given statepensions; but let me have my particular thoughts of thesegentlemens merit. Thinking of all the people who contributeto solving and prosecuting crimes, I shall never give myesteem to paid informers, or to anyone but the voluntarydiscoverers of villainy and the vigorous prosecutors of theircountrys interests. And in this respect I dont know ofanything greater or nobler than undertaking and managingan important accusation through which some high criminalof state, or some organised body of conspirators against thepublic, can be arraigned and brought to punishment throughthe honest zeal and public affection of a private man.

I know that the mere vulgar [see Glossary] of mankindoften need a correctional object such as the gallows beforetheir eyes. But I dont believe that any man with a liberal

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury IV/1

educationor any man with common honestyever neededto bring this idea into his mind in order to restrain himselffrom acting as a knave. And if a saint had no virtueexcept what was raised in him by the thought of reward

and punishment in the after-life, I dont know whose love oresteem he might gain, but I would never think him worthy ofmine. . . .

Part IV

Section 1

I hope you are now convinced that as I am in earnest indefending raillery so also I can be sober too in the use ofit. [The most recent occurrence of the word raillery was at the end ofPart II section 2, but some of the intervening material has had a little of

the teasing tone that defines it.] It really is hard work learningto temper and regulate the humour that nature has givenus so that it works as a more lenitive remedy against vice[see Glossary] and a kind of specific against superstition andmelancholy delusion. [In that sentence, the italicised expressionsare medical terms.] Theres a big difference between trying toraise a laugh from everything and trying to discover in eachthing what there is that can fairly be laughed at. For nothingis ridiculous except what is deformed; and theres no defenceagainst raillery except being handsome and just. So it wouldbe the hardest thing in the world to deny fair honesty theuse of this weapon, which can never cut into honesty itselfand can cut into everything that is contrary to it.

If we take our lead from the Italian stage-buffoons, wecan learn from them that in their lowest and most scurrilouskind of wit theres no better target than the passions ofcowardice and avarice. No-one in the world could turn

real bravery or generosity into ridicule. A glutton or meresensualist is as ridiculous as the other two charactersthecowardly and the money-hungry ones. And unaffectedtemperance cant be made the subject of contempt by any butthe grossest and most contemptible of mankind. Now, thesethree ingredientsbravery, generosity, temperancemakeup a virtuous character, as the contrary three make upa vicious one. So how can we possibly make a joke ofhonesty? To laugh both ways is nonsensical. And if therereally is something ridiculous about sottishness, avarice,and cowardice, you can see what follows: it would take athoroughly ridiculous person to muster all his wit to ridiculewisdom or laugh at honesty or good manners.

A man of thorough good breeding, whatever else hemay be, is incapable of acting in a crude or brutal [here= animal-like] manner. He doesnt wonder whether to act insuch a way or consider the matter by prudential rules ofself-interest and advantage. He acts from his naturein away necessarilyand without reflection; and if he didnt,he wouldnt be a well-bred man, not one who could berelied on to be such in all circumstances. Its the samewith the honest man: he cant think about whether to act

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Freedom of wit and humour Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury IV/1

in a plainly villainous manner. . . . Anyone who wants toenjoy a freedom of mind, and to be truly in command ofhimself, must be above the thought of stooping to anythingvillainous or base. And anyone who is capable of stooping inthat way must give up the thought of manliness, resolution,friendship, merit, and a good character in his own eyesand the eyes of others. To pretend to have these enjoymentsand advantages together with the privileges of a licentiousprinciple [see Glossary]to pretend to enjoy society and a freemind while having a knavish heartis as ridiculous as theconduct of children who eat their cake and then cry for it.When men begin to deliberate about dishonesty, find thatthe thought of it doesnt make them sick, and ask slyly Whyshould I stick at a good piece of knavery if theres a goodsum to be earned by it?, they should be told like childrenthat they cant eat their cake and have it.

When men have become accomplished knaves, they arepast crying for their cake. They know themselves, andmankind knows them. These are not the ones who areso much envied or admired; we are more attracted by themoderate kin

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