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Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Peter R. Wilshusen Environmental Studies Program Bucknell University Lewisburg, PA 17837 Email: [email protected] Abstract Social capital has been discussed widely as networks based in trust and reciprocity that can facilitate economic development, democratic governance, and sustainable natural resource management. The concept has not been examined thoroughly as an analytical lens for understanding power relations. Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, I develop a relational and contextual view of social capital in order to explore the everyday political exchanges tied to a long-standing community forestry association in Quintana Roo, Mexico. I present a case study that recounts the emergence and decline of a timber marketing fund to illustrate how elite actors from member communities (ejidos) maintain relative dominance within social networks over time. This process of elite persistence exemplifies the downside of social capital but also suggests why institutional design (rules in use) may be insufficient for encouraging rule enforcement and accountability in community-based conservation and development initiatives. Keywords: social capital, Bourdieu, power, domination, community-based conservation, development, Mexico, political ecology, eco-regional planning Word count: 7,982 Paper presented at the Maxwell Workshop on Organizations and the Natural Environment, Syracuse University, May 24, 2007 Please do not distribute or cite without author’s permission 0

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Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Peter R. Wilshusen Environmental Studies Program Bucknell University Lewisburg, PA 17837 Email: [email protected] Abstract Social capital has been discussed widely as networks based in trust and reciprocity that can facilitate economic development, democratic governance, and sustainable natural resource management. The concept has not been examined thoroughly as an analytical lens for understanding power relations. Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, I develop a relational and contextual view of social capital in order to explore the everyday political exchanges tied to a long-standing community forestry association in Quintana Roo, Mexico. I present a case study that recounts the emergence and decline of a timber marketing fund to illustrate how elite actors from member communities (ejidos) maintain relative dominance within social networks over time. This process of elite persistence exemplifies the downside of social capital but also suggests why institutional design (rules in use) may be insufficient for encouraging rule enforcement and accountability in community-based conservation and development initiatives. Keywords: social capital, Bourdieu, power, domination, community-based conservation, development, Mexico, political ecology, eco-regional planning Word count: 7,982 Paper presented at the Maxwell Workshop on Organizations and the Natural Environment, Syracuse University, May 24, 2007

Please do not distribute or cite without author’s permission

0

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Introduction

A lot has been written about social capital. Even a brief scan of the literature reveals several

general reviews alongside abundant applied studies focused on diverse policy arenas

including education, social work, and health among others (Halpern, 2005; Field, 2003; Lin,

2002; Baron et al, 2000; Woolcock, 1998; Portes, 1998). Following trends in other areas,

those working in international conservation and development have emphasized the role

social capital might play in enhancing development outcomes at various scales, particularly as

they relate to questions of economic growth and democratic governance (e.g., Adger, 2003;

Krishna, 2002; Pretty and Ward, 2000; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Woolcock and

Narayan, 2000). At the same time, critiques of social capital are numerous (e.g., Fine, 2001;

Harriss 2002), producing a black and white terrain in which the term is either embraced or

rejected.

Amid this polarized spectrum, I chart a middle course that attends to the critiques levied

against social capital by situating the term within the broader theoretical framework of one

its originators—Pierre Bourdieu. Whereas the majority of work on social capital emphasizes

social structural traits—networks that can enhance collective cooperative capacity—

Bourdieu’s theory of practice stresses social interactions within broader institutional and

cultural “fields.” As such, the focus of attention turns to the production and reproduction

of power relationships over time. In this light, analysis concentrates on dynamic social

processes mediated by specific social structural contexts. Discussions of complex divisions

and conflict within agrarian communities appear in the literature (e.g., Agrawal and Gibson,

2001; Brosius et al, 2005), however, the everyday interactions and negotiations that, in the

aggregate, shape power dynamics over time have yet to receive a thorough interrogation.

How do certain elite actors persist in dominating community affairs over the long term?

How does elite persistence impact conservation and development activities?

This article explores the emergence and decline of a timber marketing fund linked to a long-

standing community forestry association in Quintana Roo, Mexico in order to uncover the

1

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico complex power dynamics connected with community-based conservation and development.

The first part summarizes on-going debates about social capital, arguing that the concept is

most useful as a means for analyzing everyday power relationships. The second part of the

article employs this view of social capital to analyze the everyday politics evident in the case

of the timber marketing fund. The case reveals how elite actors from member communities

(ejidos) helped to undermine the fund by encouraging and partaking in unregulated lending.

In terms of understanding the everyday politics of agrarian communities in rural Mexico, the

case illustrates how community elites persist or maintain positions of relative dominance

over time. In terms of explaining outcomes associated with community-based conservation

and development initiatives, the timber marketing fund example suggests why institutional

design (rules in use) may be insufficient for encouraging rule enforcement and

accountability.

Shades of Gray—Social Capital and Power Dynamics

Within the literature on conservation and development, social capital refers to social

networks based in trust and reciprocity. However, behind this apparently straightforward

definition considerable debate lingers regarding both the term’s meaning and utility. On one

end of the spectrum are those who view social capital mainly as a means of enhancing

collective empowerment. On the other end of the spectrum are those who claim that the

concept hides more than it reveals, given a lack of attention to broader political economic

factors. In the first instance, the developmentalist approach to social capital tends to

uncritically promote the term as a “public good,” while in the second case critical responses

often reject the concept outright as a manifestation of neoliberal hegemony. In this section,

I briefly examine these lines of debate in order to uncover a third way of looking at social

capital that returns to Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice. An explicitly Bourdieusian

perspective on social capital captures everyday politics situated within broader “fields of

play.”

Those works that fall within what I have generically called the “developmentalist” camp

equate social capital with an accumulation of collective cooperative capacity (Pretty and

Ward, 2000; Adger, 2003; Krishna, 2002; Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002a; 2002b;

2

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Building on the widely cited work of Putnam (1993; 2000),

these authors posit that social capital manifests itself as collectivities like networks and

organizations (structural social capital) or as individual attitudes and values such as trust

(cognitive social capital). They assume that building up “stocks” of social capital will

empower collective action in such a way as to encourage positive outcomes like democratic

governance, economic development, or sustainable natural resource management. In this

way, analysts can estimate the aggregate sum of social capital not just for individuals and

organizations but also for communities, regions, and countries. According to this logic,

those communities (or regions or countries) with higher accumulated stocks of social capital

are more likely to achieve positive development objectives than those with lower holdings.

Krishna’s (2002) study of 69 villages in two Indian states (Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh)

illustrates this approach, concluding that communities with higher social capital were more

successful in achieving three “societal objectives”: economic development, ethnic peace, and

democratic governance.

In contrast, Bebbington and Perreault’s (1999) conceptual framework looks beyond

Putnam’s presentation to consider access to different forms of capital (financial, human,

natural, and social) as well as social capital formation at different geographic scales.

However, their core questions fall on the developmentalist end of the spectrum in that they

focus on the extent to which social capital—“in the form of community, federated, and

national indigenous peoples’ organizations and their institutional networks” (395)—has

facilitated rural economic development. In this sense, social capital enhances community

access to other forms of capital thus presenting people and groups with greater development

options.

The main critique of the developmentalist approach centers on core paradigmatic biases.

Fine (2001) argues that social capital is but one manifestation of a wider contemporary

pattern of colonization of social theory by neo-classical economics. In this sense, the

language, and thus conceptual framing, of economics assumes dominance (capital, stocks,

assets, investments, rational choice, social capitalists) in explaining social problems, eclipsing

alternative understandings such as those rooted in critical political economy. Analysis of

“underdevelopment” from the developmentalist perspective focuses attention on a

2

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico community’s lack of social capital rather than long-standing structural inequalities. As a

result, responses emphasize “building endowments” of social capital rather than addressing

fundamental inequities (see also Harriss, 2002; Fine, 1999; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997).1

While critical political economists like Fine (2001) and Harriss (2002) largely reject social

capital on conceptual grounds (see also Somers, 2004), their views converge in significant

ways with analyses that bring to the fore issues related to class and gender differentiation

(Mayoux, 2001; Rankin, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; Mayer and Rankin, 2002), the role of the

state and global institutions (Radcliffe, 2004), contextualization (Perreault,2003; Mohan and

Mohan, 2002; DeFilippis, 2001; Foley and Edwards, 1999), and access (Bebbington and

Perreault, 1999). In sum, whether supportive or dismissive in their characterization, these

writings signal that the conceptual utility of social capital depends on the extent to which

analysts tie its deployment to questions of power relationships.2

Interestingly, although Bourdieu (1986) provided one of the first conceptualizations of social

capital, his contribution has been eclipsed by presentations derived from Putnam’s work. It

is significant, therefore, that a growing number of authors point to Bourdieu as a way to

overcome the theoretical lapses apparent in dominant views of social capital (Fine, 2001;

Rankin, 2001; Harriss, 2002; Perreault, 2003; Cleaver, 2005; Svendsen, 2006; Bebbington,

forthcoming). What makes Bourdieu’s rendering compelling and how does it aid in

understanding key conceptual issues mentioned above such as social differentiation and

contextualization? In what follows I respond to this question by showing how Bourdieu’s

social theoretical concepts generate a grounded view of social capital that reflects power

dynamics in specific times and places.

Bourdieu Redux—Social Capital as Everyday Politics

To build on the work of others aimed at refining understandings of social capital, I argue

that Pierre Bourdieu’s work—including his piece on the forms of capital but also his wider

theoretical writings—offers the most complete set of ideas for developing a contextual and

relational view of power relationships. In contrast to Putnam, who understands social

capital as a means of empowerment, Bourdieu’s rendering ties the concept explicitly to

3

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico power dynamics. In this sense, social capital is not an individual or collective attribute but

rather an intangible set of relationships; a sphere of formal and informal exchanges in which

differentially empowered actors pursue other forms of capital (cultural and economic).

In Bourdieu’s view, the interactions associated with social capital tend to reproduce

dominant relationships of inequality linked to social differentiation (e.g., class or ethnicity).

However, since Bourdieu’s explicit treatments of social capital are brief, it is important to

situate his use of the term with respect to his wider work. In this section, I explore how

three of Bourdieu’s core theoretical concepts—habitus, capital, and field—address the

conceptual problems discussed above. Such an understanding considers actors operating

(exchanging resources) in formal and informal networks embedded in specific historical,

institutional, and cultural contexts. While Bourdieu’s work has been summarized and

interpreted widely (e.g., Wacquant, forthcoming; Robbins, 2000; Swartz, 1997; Bourdieu and

Wacquant, 1992; Calhoun et al. 1993), examining debates on social capital in the context of

his wider body of work informs a more grounded definition compared to dominant

understandings of the term.

Bourdieu’s use of the term habitus is important to his presentation of social capital because

it suggests how human action shapes and is shaped by the broader structural and cultural

bounds of particular contexts (see Bebbington, forthcoming). Habitus also engenders

everyday routines and informal practices that tend to parallel the strategic, rational choices

emphasized in Putnam’s writing. Bourdieu sees action resulting largely from deeply

inscribed dispositions informing a “practical sense” (le sens pratique). From this perspective,

strategies do not derive from rationally calculated or even conscious choices but rather stem

from pre-reflective tendencies. Actors respond dispositionally but also improvise or adapt at

this pre-reflective level given constantly changing configurations of opportunities and

constraints. As a result, habitus structures possible practical strategies but does not fully

determine them (Bourdieu, 1977; 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Swartz, 1997;

Wacquant, 2005; forthcoming).3

On one level, such a practice-based understanding of human action recenters the actor

within analyses of social capital and thus overcomes the structural bias evident in most

4

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico dominant treatments. In other words, attention to social relationships within networks— as

opposed to just characterization of the types of bonds inherent in network structure—

highlights the everyday enactment of social capital. On another level, however, habitus

connotes individuals’ and groups’ lived cultural and institutional experiences such that

inequities and differences related to class, gender, and ethnicity (among other “structuring

structures”) shape actors’ dispositions.

For Bourdieu, the term capital simultaneously represented both a power relationship and a

power resource. In this sense, peoples’ lived experiences (habitus) derive from relative

endowments of different forms of capital, which, in turn, define their historically evolving

“positions” within social settings. Actors exchange and accumulate capital (material and

virtual) in the course of everyday social interaction. Bourdieu (1986) described three forms

of capital including economic, cultural, and social.4 Economic capital constitutes material

and financial assets while cultural capital encompasses symbolic goods, skills, and titles such

as educational credentials (Wacquant, forthcoming). When juxtaposed with the first two

forms, social capital represents a slightly different species given its intangible character. It is

best distinguished as a means (set of relationships) by which actors accrue economic and

cultural capital as a result of participation in culturally embedded networks. 5

Bourdieu’s (1986) discussion of the forms of capital offers two observations that inform

analyses of everyday politics. First, given unequal distributions of capital in any given

context, social interactions tend to reproduce existing power relationships even as

incremental change occurs. Second, the forms of capital are convertible such that

educational credentials (cultural capital) might produce increased income (economic capital).

In this sense, Bourdieu considered social capital a means of access to other types of capital.6

A broader understanding of capital to simultaneously encompass power relationships and

power resources extends analysis of social process beyond purely economistic approaches,

which emphasize rational actors who take calculated risks in order to maximize personal or

group benefits vis-à-vis stated objectives.7 As such, analysis can track the flow of different

types and quantities of capital, permitting some measure of outcomes—both positive and

negative—linked to social capital.

5

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico

To capture the structural constraints acting upon networks, Bourdieu linked habitus and

capital to the concept of “field.” Fields are arenas of struggle in which actors attempt to

accrue or control economic and cultural capital. It captures formally institutionalized

relationships based on explicit codes or rules as well as non-formalized, customary

relationships structured by cultural norms or practices. The dominant or subordinate

positions that individual and group actors hold within a field are determined by their relative

endowments of economic and cultural capital. As a result, the character and configuration

of fields constantly shift as power relationships change. In addition, as structural forms,

fields present certain “logics” and thus define the domain of struggle. In other words, even

though both dominant and subordinate actors may challenge one another for resource

control, they all tacitly accept that the “rules of the game” and that certain forms of

contestation are legitimate while others are not (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Swartz

1997).

To the extent that the concept of field represents institutional and cultural contexts, it

addresses the concern that dominant presentations of social capital detach networks from

wider political economies, class structures, and ideologies (Perreault, 2003). Bourdieu’s

theory of practice ties all three core concepts together such that actors’ dispositions (habitus)

reflect their lived experiences (e.g., class) but also depend on changing capital endowments

and the boundaries of fields, including overarching logics.

In summary, a grounded definition of social capital encompasses social interaction based in

formal and informal exchanges, culturally and institutionally embedded networks, and

positive and negative social outcomes. Social interaction occurs when actors seek to accrue

cultural and economic capital. On one level actors may pursue rational strategies in an effort

to enhance their power resources. On another level, actors’ moves are shaped by durable,

pre-reflective, culturally-defined practices (habitus). Formal and informal exchanges within

fields (the flow of resources) constitute the enactment of social capital. Social structures

(e.g., networks)—representing formal or informal relationships among individuals and

groups—enable social interaction. Importantly, networks are embedded within

cultural/institutional fields and thus situated in specific times and places. The sources of

6

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico social capital, such as norms of enforceable trust, thus emerge as broader cultural constructs

(rules, norms, practices, logics) linked to fields of play rather than attributes of individuals

(cognitive social capital). While accrued cultural and economic capital may empower groups

in ways that are considered socially beneficial, it may also reinforce persistent inequalities or

detract from collective efforts in a manner perceived to be socially negative. The case of the

timber marketing fund and community forestry in Quintana Roo reveals social processes and

outcomes that fall into the latter category.

Case Study—The Timber Marketing Fund

Community forestry activities in Quintana Roo, Mexico date from 1983 with the initiation of

a joint Mexican Forest Service/German development assistance (GTZ) program known as

the Plan Piloto Forestal (Pilot Forestry Program). The initiative shifted forest management

from a state-run enterprise, Maderas Industrializadas de Quintana Roo (MIQRO), to agrarian

reform land grant communities (ejidos) following the expiration of a 25-year forestry

concession. The Plan Piloto program joined ten ejidos, building on existing community level

organizations and common pool resource management arrangements (Table 1). It was

instrumental in helping communities establish local forestry enterprises supported by twenty-

five year management plans. By 1989, state and federal agencies extended the model to

cover much of central and southern Quintana Roo by creating three new associations joining

some 35 ejidos.

The close of the Plan Piloto Forestal in 1986 inspired the creation of a second-tier producer

association as a means of ensuring continued economic and political collaboration among

the ten communities. The Sociedad de Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo or

“Sociedad Sur” provides technical support in forest management as well as political

representation for member communities. The association finances its operations through a

combination of community payments (fees for technical services) and federal government

grants. From 1989-1997, it received international project support from the German and

British aid agencies (GTZ and DFID respectively) as well as the MacArthur Foundation.

7

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Over the course of its twenty year history, the Sociedad Sur has sought to diversify its

activities with projects in individual communities focused on wildlife management,

ecotourism, and woodworking among others. The organization also has played a lead role in

establishing a national-level community forestry organization intended to scale-up the

sector’s political and economic impact. Despite considerable success in reshaping the

region’s institutional landscape around community forestry, the Sociedad Sur continues to

face perennial organizational and economic development challenges stemming from physical

differences among member communities, the structure of timber markets, shifts in national

agrarian policy, and internal divisions within communities.

Figure 1 about here.

With respect to marketing timber, forestry communities in Quintana Roo have numerous

buyers for mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) but no secure outlets for lesser known tropical

hard and softwood species. By 1996, ejidos with smaller annual volumes of mahogany but

significant amounts of lesser-known timber species sought a collective marketing

mechanism, spawning the creation of the timber marketing fund. Four member ejidos of

the Sociedad Sur established the fund in June of that year with federal development funds.

The timber marketing fund (fondo de acopio maderero) functioned as a type of holding facility

that allowed ejidos to secure higher sale prices and find national and international outlets for

marketing lesser-known wood species.

By assuming the role of a central financing agency and holding facility, the fund’s

administrators sought to increase supply side efficiency, leverage higher prices on behalf of

communities, and expand both domestic and international markets for the communities’

wood. In practice, the fund did temporarily increase sales of lesser-known, tropical hard and

softwoods but did not succeed in garnering higher sale prices, enhancing supply efficiency,

or expanding markets. Under the new marketing arrangements, the fund used the federal

seed money to pre-finance timber extraction and processing based on firm orders from

wholesalers. It then collected a small fee from member ejidos (approximately US$

0.01/board foot) for performing this service.

8

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Insert Table 1 about here.

On paper, the fund was legally incorporated as a for-profit, civil association with an

administrative staff and an elected assembly of delegates from each member community.

Promotional documents emphasized that the fund was a commercial link between buyers

and sellers and that communities maintained full control over production. For federal

agencies with programs aimed at supporting ejidos, the timber marketing fund fit well with

approaches focused on community enterprise development. One federal ministry provided

all of the fund’s financial capital, a total of almost $250,000 over five years (Table 2).

From the outside looking in, the fund appeared to be operating successfully. Between 1997

and 1999, the fund reported gross annual sales averaging US$270,000. Data from 2000 and

2001 suggested significant increases in commercial activity (Table 2). Approximately 60

percent of sales corresponded to lesser known tropical hard and softwoods, pointing to

growth in what had been a marginalized secondary timber market. As a result of these

developments, in 2000, the federal ministry that supported the fund received national

recognition for what was lauded as a model project.

Insert Table 2 about here.

The view of the fund from the inside was quite different. What appeared to be a successful

development project with regional impact was, in practice, an unregulated lending operation.

While the fund was designed to serve as a marketing conduit for communities, a significant

portion of its financial capital was doled out to individuals and work groups for uses

unrelated to timber harvesting, processing, and marketing. Some of the individuals who

received money were not affiliated with either the fund or the Sociedad Sur.

To a large extent, the administrators were able to disperse money in this way because the

fund had no formal set of procedures governing its operations. Moreover, the fund lacked

clear lines of accountability. The fund’s assembly of delegates met once in 1997 when it first

started doing business but not thereafter. As a result, the fund’s administrators carried out

their daily transactions but never reported back to the member communities. Similarly, the

9

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico fund’s full name suggested that it was part of the Sociedad Sur, however, the creation of

another assembly of delegates indicated a separate governance structure. Because of these

ambiguities, the Sociedad Sur’s executive committee and technical staff did not formally

intervene in the affairs of the fund until mid 2000 when it became clear that much of the

money that had been dispersed was non-recoverable. Ultimately, the absence of clear

procedures and lines of accountability allowed community and non-community members to

access cash loans that were never repaid. In combination with unsuccessful business

transactions in which buyers did not fully settle accounts, unregulated lending left the fund

in the red by mid 2000 with few prospects for achieving solvency. By late 2000, as evidence

of widespread unregulated lending came to light, the federal ministry that supported the fund

decided against providing any further grants.

Go With the Flow—Patterns of Giving and Taking

Of the fund’s $265,000 in total capital, the vast majority (92 percent) circulated as

unregulated loans to individuals, advances to work groups, and open accounts with timber

wholesalers. Significantly, conservative estimates suggested that only 29 percent of

circulating funds was recoverable. The administrator’s report indicated that the majority of

funds (63 percent) could not be recovered, which meant that without further injections of

federal money, the operation would not be able to cover its own costs or settle accounts

with some of its member communities.

An internal audit performed in mid 2000 showed that the fund had distributed money to a

range of actors, producing four types of debt—preexisting, client, ejido, and individual

(figures 2, 3). First, the fund’s administrator reported $11,500 in previous debt, none of

which was recoverable, passed on from the fund’s first administrator. Much of this sum

likely was tied to individual loans; however, no data exist to link money to specific

individuals or groups. Second, another $71,300 represented client debt, where timber

wholesalers had not paid off balances for sawn lumber received from the fund. The

administrator estimated that 83.5 percent of this amount was non-recoverable. Third, over

half of the fund’s circulating capital corresponded to ejido debt, which was to help cover

production costs associated with timber harvesting and milling. The administrator indicated

10

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico that 58 percent of the $137,800 in ejido debt was most likely non-recoverable. In effect,

numerous disbursals to ejidos were unregulated loans to work group leaders. Finally,

$24,100 represented unregulated loans to individuals, both members and non-members of

the fund. Of the four types, individual and ejido debt present important patterns for

analysis.

Insert Figure 2 about here.

(a) Individual Debts

Three points emerge with respect to the money that went to non-members. First, past and

present leaders in Quintana Roo’s community forestry movement made use of their personal

contacts to gain access to cash loans from the fund. These types of transactions represented

20 percent of loans to non-members. Two high profile actors—a leader of another

community forestry association and one of the founders of the Plan Piloto Forestal—fell

into this group. Second, the fund fed the Sociedad Sur’s accounts and supported past and

present staff members for a total of $12,095 (55 percent of non-member debts). Some of

these loans corresponded to salary advances during a period when the Sociedad Sur did not

have enough cash to pay its employees. The organization borrowed almost $10,000 to cover

operational expenses during 2000 and it is unclear whether it later repaid the fund when its

financial situation improved. Third, the timber marketing fund’s staff—including two of its

administrators—received money ($5,100 or 23 percent of non-member loans). The fund’s

first administrator carried $2,800 in debt and, at the time of the audit, had repaid less than a

fifth of that amount.

Regarding loans to individuals from member ejidos, direct ties to the fund’s administrator

dictated access to money in most cases. First, the ejido where individuals received the most

loans (21)—four times the number of the next closest ejido—was the administrator’s home

community. Loan recipients from this community were in most cases family members (wife,

uncle) or close friends of one of the fund’s administrators. The ejido where individuals held

the second highest number of loans (5) and outstanding debt also featured numerous

examples where close friendship ties played an important role. In these two cases, close

11

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico friendships were often built on “compadre” relationships, which comprise a stated

commitment to mutual support between two individuals. Interviews conducted in 2000,

2001, and 2003 suggested that the community members used the loan money to help cover

household needs, not the least of which were medical expenses. Numerous observers both

from and external to the communities in question suggested that some of the money was

spent on consuming alcohol.

(b) Ejido Debt

In theory, debt associated with ejidos and work groups represented advance payments to

cover production costs (figure 3). In practice, most participating ejidos adhered to this

approach but groups from one community in particular applied the capital in ways that both

bypassed and depleted the fund. Of the seven ejidos that owed a total of $138,000 in mid

2000, fund administrators expected five to repay in full because all or most of their wood

was being sold via the timber marketing fund and thus served as collateral. However,

estimates calculated that only 54 percent of the total amount was recoverable since work

groups in the largest debtor ejido were unlikely to return more than 10 percent of their

$78,000 deficit. Figure 4, which schematically illustrates flows of money and timber within

the timber marketing fund, shows the differences between ejidos that worked through the

fund and the one that received advances (or loans) but diverted monies. The second type

suggests complex interchanges that altered power dynamics within and among communities.

Insert Figure 3 about here.

The first type of community, represented by ejido 1 in Figure 4, primarily maintained a

formal commercial exchange relationship with the fund in line with the financial

mechanism’s original intent. Representatives of work groups received cash advances to

cover timber harvesting, milling, and transportation costs. The fund arranged for sales of

both mahogany and lesser-known species. Timber wholesalers placed down payments with

the fund to guarantee timber contracts. Once milled, work group leaders delivered sawn

lumber to the wholesalers via the fund. The fund completed the set of transactions by

paying the work group the balance of net profits after deducting the advance and a small fee.

12

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Among those groups that worked through the fund, some leaders (L1, group 1 in figure 4)

received unregulated loans that were never repaid (as discussed above).

The second type of community, represented by ejido 2 in Figure 4, presents a much more

complicated set of interactions based in both formal and informal relationships. First, only

one work group had a formal commercial relationship with the fund (group 3). This group

sold part of its timber volume via the fund and another part independently to a wholesaler.

Second, work group leaders (L4, L5) and local buyers (B1, B2) received unregulated loans

masked as formal transactions (the buyers were nominally considered group leaders although

they did not function as such). In some cases, group leaders (L4, L5) used cash advances for

non-timber related activities and did not repay them. In other cases, local timber buyers (B1,

B2) received high payouts from the fund—one individual received $26,000—and used the

financial capital to purchase timber volume (unprocessed roundwood measured in cubic

meters) from other community members (see below). Thus, in ejido 2, local buyers

accumulated significant stocks of timber from other individuals and groups, while selling

sawn wood independently to wholesalers. In each case, informal exchanges were one-way,

enhancing the financial power of certain individuals but depleting the fund.

Elite Persistence and the Accretion of Power

The timber marketing fund played a significant role in shifting power dynamics within ejido

2 as well as between ejido 2 and other member ejidos (represented by ejido 1). First, the

total flow of financial capital to ejido 2 was almost two and half times greater than the

community receiving the next highest amount. Since ejido 2 did not sell its wood through

the fund for the most part, other communities resented what appeared to be preferential

treatment for groups that least needed marketing support. In comparative terms, ejido 1

carried five percent of total ejido debt compared to ejido 2, which accounted for 57 percent.

Second, the internal movement of money within ejido 2 differed greatly compared to other

member ejidos. For those ejidos that sold timber through the fund, work group leaders used

the financial capital mainly to finance timber extraction and milling. By contrast, in ejido 2,

disbursals from the fund circulated internally within an active local timber market in which

13

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico many community members sold all or part of their annual timber volumes to others to gain

access to cash. As a result, advances from the fund allowed certain individuals, who

otherwise would not have had sufficient investment capital, to operate as brokers and

accumulate the highest relative volumes (B1). Additionally, unregulated loans to established

elites within ejido 2 (B2) reinforced their economic positions relative to others by allowing

them to purchase wood from other community members at a significant discount. Further

discussion of flows of economic capital in ejido 2 shows how unregulated lending supported

elite persistence.

Insert Figure 4 about here.

The flow of economic capital from the timber marketing fund intersected with an emerging

timber exchange in ejido 2 over the course of the 2000 and 2001 harvest seasons. Beginning

in 1996, the three largest forestry ejidos associated with the Sociedad Sur formed largely

independent “work groups” (grupos de trabajo) that continued to follow the community’s

forestry management plan but otherwise controlled all decisions regarding their timber

volume including harvesting, milling, marketing, and reinvestment. Ejidos divide annual

timber volumes—particularly mahogany—on a per capita basis. Therefore, each registered

community member controlled anywhere from one to seven cubic meters of mahogany in

2001 depending on the total allowable volume for the ejido in question. One cubic meter of

mahogany was worth approximately $200, based on an average internal exchange rate for

that season. The community’s total mahogany volume carried a gross value of just under

$300,000. Ejido 2 presented both high per capita timber volumes and high complexity in

terms of subdivision: in 2001 the community featured eleven groups, many of which

subdivided again—often along family lines—into another eighteen “sections” (table 3).

Insert Table 3 about here.

Internal exchange dynamics, where local buyers purchased timber volume from other

community members (ejidatarios), in part enabled long-standing elite actors to maintain

positions of dominance within the ejido at a time when the emergence of work groups

tended to mitigate concentrations of power resources. Table 3 suggests how two local

timber buyers, in particular, accumulated stocks of timber well in excess of the benchmark

14

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico average. For the 2001 harvest year, each ejidatario had rights to 7.3 m3 of mahogany worth

approximately $1,460 (about two months salary of a mid-level professional working in the

state capital, Chetumal). Numerous community members sold portions of their allotted

volume to others in order to cover different types of debt, ultimately creating a futures

market in which individuals bought and sold timber up to three years in advance. Most

ejidatarios did not have sufficient investment capital to purchase large amounts of timber as

evidenced by the per capita volumes listed in table 3. Two brothers, who had historically

dominated ejido affairs, were able to accumulate stocks much higher than the benchmark

average (77.2 m3 and 90.0 m3 respectively) given access to financial capital including the

timber marketing fund. Had the ejido assembly disallowed timber trading, these two

individuals would have been limited to the per capita distribution of 7.3 m3 and thus forced

to join with other groups in order to aggregate timber volume. Instead, these individuals

maintained standing and influence in decisions regarding forest management, timber

harvesting, and processing by virtue of their accrued volumes even though they did not

represent a work group.

The informal lending that occurred in relation to the timber marketing fund was one set of

micro processes or interactions that produced a certain continuity of historical power

relationships in ejido 2. Thus the exchanges linked to social capital represented more than

elite capture since they illustrate discernible instances that, in the aggregate, suggest long-

standing practices (“durable dispositions” in Bourdieu’s definition of “habitus”) that are

culturally defined even as individuals act upon them in everyday practice (Bourdieu and

Wacquant, 1992:120-22). While ejidatarios intentionally sought loans as a means of

“capturing” resources, they also participated in performances—“propensities” or

“inclinations” discernable in what people do and say— tied to the social history of a place

(Bourdieu, 1977:214, n1; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:124). In this sense, the gestures,

physical postures, talk, and routines associated with lending are one expression of everyday

life within agrarian communities—a set of practices that resonates strongly with people’s

lived histories. These everyday performances produced slow accretions of power over time.

The exchanges between ejido 2 and the timber marketing fund represented a single snapshot

of a much longer trajectory of similar power plays.

15

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Spinning Wheels—The Insufficiency of Institutional Design

In addition to illustrating patterns of elite persistence, the timber marketing fund case

suggests how everyday politics can undermine formal governance systems underlying

community-based natural resource management enterprises. Much of the literature on

natural resource governance emphasizes “institutional design,” where community members

and their supporters develop “rules in use” as a means for mediating access and use of

“common pool resources.” Comparative analysis concludes that successful common pool

resource management institutions incorporate key design principles such as membership

criteria, enforceable rules, and enforced compliance, among others (Ostrom, 1990; McKean,

2000; Ostrom et al., 1994).

In the case of the timber marketing fund, informal exchanges based mainly in familial and

compadre relationships, exacerbated power differences within and among communities and

undermined collective timber marketing efforts. The absence of clear lines of authority,

formal operational rules, and effective oversight within the fund allowed unregulated

exchanges to persist over the life of the project even when administrative irregularities

became glaringly apparent. In addition to institutional design weaknesses, lack of oversight

and accountability stemmed from the wide distribution of money among individuals and

groups as well as the Sociedad Sur. Moreover, the federal agency that provided the financial

capital had little to gain by holding the funds managers to account since it had already

received accolades for the project nationally. Thus, all of the main parties linked to the fund

had little or no incentive to provide oversight with respect to its operations.

However, the weakness of institutional design and implementation does not entirely explain

the negative outcomes presented in this case study. In addition, the timber marketing fund

case exemplifies how informal lending networks weaken formal common pool resource

regimes. This institutional “drag” represents a positive feedback loop in which non-existent

and/or unenforced formal rules enabled unregulated lending as lending, in turn, depleted the

fund’s economic capital but also overrode existing rules (however weak) and undermined

discussions about rule adaptations. Thus, even as the leaders of the Sociedad Sur created a

special task force in 2000 to reform the fund, carrying out formal conversations regarding a

16

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico strict regulatory framework to govern transactions, unregulated lending continued behind

the scenes.

The distinction between overlapping but different “fields of play” offers a way to see the

friction created by the collision of incompatible logics of action—the field of lending based

in informal networks versus the technocratic management field based in the formal

organization of the fund and the Sociedad Sur. Historically, the everyday political and social

practices linked to informal networks—such as lending—have consistently eaten away at

attempts to institutionalize technocratic management tenets, including community

enterprises. While it is true that many of the same actors populated both networks and fields

of interaction overlapped, it was also the case that lending practices intruded upon the fund’s

formal but tenuous tenets. In the aggregate, the combination of unregulated lending and

unpaid debts forced the timber marketing fund to cease operations in 2003. As of mid 2007,

community forestry enterprises in Quintana Roo, Mexico face the same problems of

marketing lesser known timber species as they did in the mid 1990s when the fund was

conceived.

Don’t Think of an Elephant!

Social capital as the term is most commonly understood—networks based in trust and

reciprocity—points to important human organizational factors that shape conservation and

development outcomes. However, just as importantly, social capital’s application as an

explanatory variable (e.g., where greater social capital enhances economic development) has

produced a situation where the term has outrun the concept. As Smith and Kulynych (2002)

note, social capital, as deployed in popular usage, more accurately connotes “social capacity”

rather than a form of capital. In contrast, Bourdieu’s presentation of social capital

emphasizes power relationships within institutional and cultural fields. In large measure,

confusion over the meaning of social capital resides within the term itself: capital. Lakoff’s

(2004) discussion of political speech in the U.S. suggests how key words evoke broad

cognitive frames and associations underlying understandings and emotional responses. He

thus instructs political progressives to frame ideas in terms that reflect their core values

rather than language that rejects, but still affirms, conservative values (“Don’t think of an

17

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico elephant!”). Similarly, the term “capital” conjures images of tangible resources that can be

accumulated, attributed a specific value, and exchanged. However, social capital is

intangible; it is a set of relationships that provide access to economic and other forms of

capital. While Bourdieu contributed to the problem by employing numerous economic

metaphors in his writing, his collective work explicitly seeks to overcome static perspectives

on social life.

The case of the timber marketing fund in Quintana Roo, Mexico represents more than an

example of the down side of social capital in the form of unregulated lending and petty

corruption. A Bourdieusian perspective on community-based natural resource governance

reveals the everyday interactions and negotiations—both formal and informal—that create a

dynamic web of power relationships. When used in this manner, social capital offers insights

on the micro-politics of conservation and development by providing an actor-centered

schematic that is dynamic but also situated within institutional and cultural contexts. As

such, Bourdieu’s contributions to social theory complement other strands in political ecology

and development studies such as those that emphasize Foucauldian discourse analysis (e.g.,

Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990; Peet and Watts, 1996). Thus, despite lingering skepticism

and critique, social capital remains an important concept that warrants continued use and

interrogation, especially when specifically tied to power dynamics as opposed to broadband

views that cast the term as collective cooperative capacity.

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Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Bebbington A, Perreault T, 1999, “Social Capital, Development, and Access to Resources in

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Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Mota J, 2002, Estudio de Caso de Integración Horizontal: Sociedad de Productores

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Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Table 1: Member Ejidos of the Sociedad de Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana

Roo (Sociedad Sur)

Community Area (Ha.)

Forest Reserve

% Total Population

(2000) Men WomenEjidatarios

(2000) Botes 18,900 8,000 42.3 1,771 929 842 298 Caoba 68,553 32,500 47.4 1,535 749 786 311 Chacchoben 18,450 6,000 32.5 1,140 575 565 294 Divorciados 12,000 1,500 12.5 961 476 485 187 Manuel Avila Camacho 12,000 1,500 12.5 829 426 403 189 Nuevo Guadalajara 28,500 6,000 21.1 1,390 720 670 276 Petcacab 46,000 32,500 70.7 947 484 463 206 Plan de la Noria 9,450 5,000 52.9 228 132 96 52 Tres Garantías 43,678 28,000 64.1 820 445 375 105 Total 257,531 121,000 avg. 39.6 9,621 4,936 4,685 1,918 Sources: SPFEQR. 2000. Informe Final. Anualidad 17. Chetumal, QR.; INEGI. 2000. XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda,

Principales Resultados por Localidad. Aguascalientes (www.inegi.gob.mx). Table 2: Timber Marketing Fund Activity (1996-2001)

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001(*) Total

Federal grants (US$) $59,000 $55,000 $50,000 $40,000 $45,000 $0 $249,000Gross sales (US$) inactive $309,208 $205,168 $294,520 $473,347 $363,651 $1,645,894Volume (Bft.) inactive 360,433 243,795 294,417 518,294 395,060 1,811,999

Sources: Timber Marketing Fund 2001, 2003, Mota 2002. *data through July 2001.

21

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Table 3: Timber Exchange among Work Groups and Individuals in Ejido 2 (2001)

Group Section # Members

Volume (m3)a

Volume (m3)

per capita Gross per Capita ($)

Machiche, S.P.R.b --- 17 131.692 7.747 $1,549 Tankasché --- 7 127.916 18.274 $3,655 Poot Medina

Family 5 18.104 3.621 $724

Francisco Poot M.c 0 77.208 77.208 $14,842 Emilio Poot M.c 0 90.000 90.000 $18,000 Uc Chan Family 6 9.552 1.592 $318 Sinanché 4 35.104 8.776 $1,755 Secc. Tankasché 3 14.828 4.942 $988 Canul Family 8 0.000 0.000 $0 Yaití --- 3 18.828 6.276 $1,255 Sección Yaití 4 17.828 4.457 $891 Zapote Negro --- 22 135.796 6.173 $1,235 Gongora 1 5 20.828 4.166 $833 Sufricaya, S.P.R. --- 31 234.556 7.566 $1,513 Rodríguez Family 10 69.088 6.909 $1,382 Pech Family --- 4 35.380 8.845 $1,769 Reyes Poot Family 4 29.104 7.276 $1,455 Selva Tropical --- 10 77.036 7.704 $1,541 Verdes 8 42.932 5.367 $1,073 Dzul Family 6 43.036 7.173 $1,435 Botan --- 3 46.380 15.460 $3,092 Botanes 7 37.380 5.340 $1,068 Cruzché --- 4 26.104 6.526 $1,305 Tzalam 2 46.932 23.466 $4,693 Quebrahacha --- 3 9.552 3.184 $637 Quebrahacha 2 3 16.828 5.609 $1,122 Gongora 2 4 32.104 8.026 $1,605 Nicolas 1 24.552 24.552 $4,910 Caracolillo --- 5 29.104 5.821 $1,164 “Desvalagados”d 17 0.552 0.032 $6 Individual and family names are pseudonyms. a harvest volume for mahogany and cedar (high-value species); b The denomination “S.P.R.” or “Sociedad de Producción Rural” indicates that the group is formally registered with the National Agrarian Registry (RAN); c indicates an individual timber buyer whose membership and individual volume are counted under the family section; d “Desvalagados” translates as “disengaged” or “unaffiliated.” It does not represent a group per se but rather a grouping of individuals not affiliated with other groups.

22

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico

Figure 1: Member Ejidos of the Sociedad Sur

23

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico

Figure 2: Timber Marketing Fund: Summary of Accounts

Ejido debts52%

Bank Balance 0%

Operational expenses

8%

Individual debts9%

Previous debts4%

Client debts27%

Federal MinistryFederal grants$250,000 over 5 years

Fund

Figure 3: Flow of Economic Capital Associated with the Timber Marketing Fund (1997-2001)

Timber WholesalersClient debt$71,297 (83.5%)

Associated IndividualsIndividual debt$24,110 (90.0%)

Total debt(US$)

Non-recoverableamount (%)

Ejido debt$137,797 (54.8%)

Member Communities

24

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Figure 4: Flow of Economic Capital at the Community Level (1997-2001)

Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

Group 5

Ejido 1

Ejido 2

L1L1

L2L2

L3L3

L4L4

L5L5

B1B1

B2B2

Fund

$$

T

$$$$

$$

T

T

$$

$$

T

T

T

T

T

$$

$$

$$

$$

$$

$$

$$

$$

$$

$$

T

L1

B1

T

$$

Local timber buyer

Work group leader

Intermediary timber buyer

Timber

Money

Exchange of timber for money

Unregulated loan

KEY

L1L1

B1B1

T

$$

Local timber buyer

Work group leader

Intermediary timber buyer

Timber

Money

Exchange of timber for money

Unregulated loan

KEY

25

Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico

Notes

1 For responses to this line of critique see Bebbington, 2002; 2004 and Bebbington et al., 2004. 2 For example, Bebbington (2002:801) finds that “…social capital is a ‘mesolevel’ concept that can be usefully

linked to other bodies of theory in order to ground them better by focusing our attention on actors and their networks, the ways in which networks structure patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and the ways in which the mobilization of these networks helps explain change in access to resources and relations of power.” See also Perreault, 2003 and Mohan and Mohan, 2002.

3 Bourdieu (1990:53) defines habitus in the following terms: “A system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.” 4 Bourdieu’s writing also contemplates a fourth category—symbolic capital—which connotes power through

symbolic legitimation (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 5 Fine (2001: 53-64) provides an in depth discussion of Bourdieu’s forms of capital as they relate to power

dynamics. 6 Highlighting this notion of access Bourdieu (1980:2) writes, “…different individuals obtain a very unequal

return on a more or less equivalent capital (economic or cultural) according to the extent to which they are able to mobilize by proxy the capital of a group (family, old pupils of elite schools, select club, nobility, etc.).” (quoted in Field, 2003:16).

7 Although Bourdieu positions his theory of practice in opposition to economistic approaches, his use of terms like capital, endowments, and investment have generated critiques that his concepts are overly rigid and utilitarian (see Swartz, 1997:73 and Fine 2001:64; for a response, see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:118).

26