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"Transcendental Idealism in the Aesthetic"TRANSCRIPT
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Transcendental Idealism in the "Aesthetic"Author(s): Kieran SetiyaReviewed work(s):Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 2004), pp. 63-88Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40040659 .Accessed: 01/11/2012 07:47
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Transcendental Idealism in the "Aesthetic"1
KIERAN SETIYA
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXVIII, No. 1, January 2004
University of Pittsburgh
In the "Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers an argu- ment for transcendental idealism. This argument is one focus of the longstanding con-
troversy between "one-world" and "two-world" interpretations of the distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear. I present an interpretation of the argument of the "Aesthetic" that supports a novel "one- world" interpretation. On this interpretation, Kant is concerned with the mind-dependence of spatial and temporal properties', and with the idea that space and time can be identified with mental objects. I end by arguing that, for Kant, even on a "one-world" interpretation, we do not know the nature or even the existence of mind-independent things.
In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic" of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant offers an argument for transcendental idealism, an argument that turns on his "Metaphysical Expositions" of space and time. This argument is one focus of the longstanding controversy over the interpretation of transcenden- tal idealism. For, on the one hand, some take the distinction between things as they appear and things in themselves to be a distinction between two exclusive classes of things, which are, respectively, mind-dependent, and
mind-independent.3 And, on the other hand, some take the distinction between
things as they appear and things in themselves to be a distinction between two "ways of considering" the same mind-independent things.4
Proponents of the first, "two-world" interpretation can point to passages in the first Critique, and in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, in which Kant comes close to a form of phenomenalism, in which appearances are logical constructs of mental representations. Consider these extracts from the A-Deduction and the "Fourth Paralogism" in the A edition:
1 I owe a great many thanks to Beatrice Longuenesse for detailed and encouraging comments on several drafts of this essay. Thanks also to Jonathan Beere, and to an anonymous referee for this journal; their comments forced me to make substantial revisions, and helped me to avoid some bad mistakes. I give references to the A and B editions, using the Kemp Smith translation.
3 See, especially, Bennett (1966, 1974), Aquila (1983), Guyer (1987, 1989) and Van Cleve (1999). See, especially, Bird (1962), Prauss (1974) and Allison (1983, 1996).
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE "AESTHETIC 63
[Nature] is not a thing in itself but is merely an aggregate of appearances, so many represen- tations of the mind [...] (A114)
By transcendental idealism I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded as being, one and all, representations only, not things in themselves [...] (A369)
External objects (bodies) are mere appearances, and therefore nothing but a species of my representations [...The] objects are nothing but representations [...] (A370-1)
These passages apparently express the conviction that the objects of outer
experience, the external objects or bodies that make up nature, are mind-
dependent. The claim that they are "representations" might be the claim that
they can be (somehow) reduced to mental representations (cf. A 101 -4). Or it
might be the claim that they exist only as things represented - as mere intentional objects. Either way, their existence (such as it is) depends on
something mental. At one point in the A edition, Kant speaks explicitly of a division of objects ("phaenomena and noumencT) into "two worlds" (A249).
But there is also textual evidence for a "one-world" interpretation. Signifi- cantly, many of the passages of the A edition in which Kant comes close to
phenomenalism are omitted in B. For instance, the passages above do not
appear in the B-Deduction, and the B version of the "Paralogisms." Kant
deliberately revised these claims. Moreover, the preface to the B edition, where we might expect Kant to clarify his position and its development or refinement between the two editions, contains some of the clearest evidence for the one-world interpretation.
In dealing with those concepts and principles which we adopt a priori, all we can do is to con- trive that they be used for viewing objects from two different points of view - on the one hand in connection with experience, as objects of the senses and of the understanding, and on the other hand, for the isolated reason that strives to transcend all limits of experience, as objects which are thought merely. (Bxviii-xix, fn.)
Kant writes of the "distinction, which our Critique has shown to be neces-
sary, between things as objects of experience and those same things as things in themselves." (Bxxvii, my emphasis) In these passages, it seems that the distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear is not a distinction between two classes of entities, but a distinction between two
"ways of considering" the very same things.5
The one-world interpretation also draws support from some passages in A. See, for instance: A27-8/B43-4, A35-6/B52, A38/B55, A147/B186, A277/B333, and some parts of Kant's discussion in A of "The Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena," e.g. A251. It is notable that a one-world view seems to be expressed in the discussion of space and time as forms of sensibility in Kant's (1770) "Inaugural Dissertation." See especially, §11, and §13. In the B edition, Kant expresses the one-world view very clearly at B67, B69, B306, and elsewhere. Consider B69: "[the] object as appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself"
64 KIERAN SETIYA
In the end, however, a simple examination of the texts is likely to prove inconclusive. It is possible to interpret much of Kant's one- world rhetoric in
two-world terms.6 And, even in the B edition, there are passages that stub-
bornly resist a one-world interpretation.7 In this paper, I will be concerned with one way of breaking the impasse between the one-world and two-world
interpretations, by paying attention to the argument for transcendental ideal- ism in the "Aesthetic." In effect, I want to figure out the conclusion of the
argument - the content of transcendental idealism - by asking what might follow (or plausibly seem to follow) from its premises.
I begin (in section 1) by presenting the structure of the argument in a way that can be agreed upon by one-world and two-world theorists. According to
this interpretation, it is crucial that Kant's premise is not just the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge of space and time, but the fact that such
knowledge depends on a priori intuitions. And Kant's argument turns on
considering our intuitions of spatial and temporal properties. In section 2, I turn to the heart of the debate: should we give this sche-
matic argument a one-world or two-world interpretation? I think the most
powerful evidence against a one- world interpretation of the "Aesthetic" lies in the fact that, insofar as it succeeds at all, its argument seems to support a version of the two-world view. The central task of the paper is to dispel this evidence: to show that, despite appearances, the argument of the "Aesthetic" does not rule out - and may in fact support - a one-world version of transcen- dental idealism.
On this one-world interpretation, the distinction between things as they appear and things as they are in themselves is a distinction among the proper- ties of things, between those that are relations to something mental, and those that are not. It is thus a distinction between mind-dependent and mind-
independent properties, not things. Things as they appear, or phenomena, are
things regarded just in terms of their relation to sensibility; things as they are in themselves are things regarded just in terms of their mind-independent properties.
This interpretation bears some similarity to Langton's (1998) recent account of Kant's argument in the first Critique. According to Langton, the distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear is just the distinction between intrinsic and relational properties (which need not be
mind-dependent). In section 3, I argue that my interpretation can accommo- date the evidence to which Langton appeals; and that it gives a better account of the role of space and time in Kant's argument.
6 See Van Cleve (1999: 144-6) for a version of this claim. 7 Consider: A30/B45 in the "Transcendental Aesthetic," A191/B236 in the "Second
Analogy," some passages in "The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection," especially A288/B344, and A493-4/B521-2 in the "Antinomy of Pure Reason."
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE "AESTHETIC" 65
I end with a discussion of things in themselves, arguing that Kant's pro- fession of ignorance is not just the claim that we do not know the specific properties that things have in themselves (on my view, their mind-independ- ent properties) but the claim that we do not know whether the things we in- tuit have mind-independent properties, or whether they are themselves mind-
independent. In saying this, I give up on one traditional commitment of the "one-world" view; but I continue to claim that things (considered) as they appear can be identified with things (considered) as they are in themselves.
I should note that my discussion has two limitations. First, in order to sidestep controversy about Kant's changing views, I concentrate exclusively on the B edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Second, just for simplicity, I concentrate exclusively on Kant's discussion of space and the objects of outer sense. I think my arguments apply mutatis mutandis to Kant's theory of time.
1. The Argument of the "Aesthetic"
According to Kant - and this is the central premise of the argument for tran- scendental idealism in the "Aesthetic" - we have a priori intuitions of space and time. Because they are intuitions, they bring us into immediate represen- tational contact with particular things (A19/B33). The criteria of immediacy and singularity are matters of controversy.8 For the purpose of our discus- sion, what matters first is that intuition does not relate to its object by way of marks "which several things might have in common" (A320/B377). It is representation de re. And second, it is helpful to think of the immediacy of intuition in terms of "direct phenomenological presence to the mind, as in
perception" (cf. Parsons 1992: 66). This may not be exactly what Kant means in giving his definition; but it does seem part of how he thinks of intuitive representation.
Our representations of space and time are not just intuitions; they are a priori or pure - intuitions to which sensation makes no contribution. Our intuitions of space and time are not the consequence of being "affected" by anything (A20/B34). Part of Kant's problem in the first Critique is that the idea of an a priori intuition is so obviously problematic. If an intuition is a priori, not a consequence of affection, how can it belong to the passive fac- ulty of sensibility? How is an a priori intuition possible?
At this point, let us just suppose that it is possible, postponing the ex- planation, and consider what might follow from Kant's claim (A22/B37ff.) that we have an a priori intuition of space. Kant draws two "Conclusions from the above Concepts" (A26/B42-A30/B45):
8 Smit (2000) is a very helpful recent discussion.
66 KIERAN SETIYA
(a) Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in relation to one another [...]
(b) Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. (A26/B42)
So, it is supposed to follow from our a priori intuition of space that spatial properties do not attach to things in themselves. And it is supposed to follow from this in turn that space (or does Kant mean the representation of space?) is the "form of all appearances of outer sense." In other words, the transcen- dental ideality of space - conclusion (a) - is supposed to follow quite rapidly from the fact that we have an a priori intuition of space.
I want to begin by looking at Guyer's critical account of Kant's argument in Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (1987). Guyer regards the argument as an attempt to defend a two-world view, according to which the spatiotemporal objects of outer experience are mind-dependent. (So, by a "thing-in-itself," we mean: something mind-independent.) The basic form of the argument is quite simple (cf. Guyer 1987: 362-9):
(1) The objects of outer experience are necessarily spatial.
(2) Things in themselves are not necessarily spatial.
(3) So, the objects of outer experience are not things in themselves.
The first thing to say about this argument is that its first premise is not the claim with which Kant concludes the "Expositions." He argues there that we have an a priori intuition of space. The claim expressed in (1) - that the
objects of outer experience are necessarily spatial - occurs as a premise in the second argument of the "Metaphysical Exposition." So, there is something structurally odd about an interpretation of the argument for transcendental idealism on which (1) is the central premise. The second thing to say about
Guyer's interpretation of Kant is that the conclusion of the argument given above is not Kant's conclusion (a). Kant argues that things in themselves are not spatial. But on the face of it, the most that follows from (3) is that we do not know whether things in themselves are spatial. This leaves room for the so-called "neglected alternative." Perhaps things in themselves are (contin- gently) spatial too. So, on the face of it, the argument is flawed.
Guyer offers his own objection to the argument he attributes to Kant. Premise (1) is crucially ambiguous (Guyer 1987: 363-364, 366).
(la) Necessarily, for any x, if x is an object of outer experience, then x is
spatial.
(lb) For any x, if x is an object of outer experience, then x is essentially spatial.
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE "AESTHETIC" 67
(la) reports a conditional necessity: it is a de dicto necessity that whatever
happens to be an object of outer experience had better also be spatial, (lb)
reports an unconditional de re necessity: the objects of outer experience are
essentially spatial. Guyer claims, first, that the argument above depends on
(lb), and second, that Kant is not entitled to any such claim. Even if the
argument of the "Metaphysical Exposition" succeeds, it cannot establish any- thing stronger than (la). Let me take these points in turn.
The argument does depend on (lb). Consider the following versions of
premise (2):
(2a) It is not the case that: necessarily, for any x, if x is a thing-in-itself, x is spatial.
(2b) For any x, if x is a thing-in-itself, then x is not essentially spatial.
In order to give a valid argument for the claim that no object of outer experi- ence is a thing in itself, we have to appeal to (lb) and (2b). If we read (1) as
(la) then, regardless of how we read premise (2)> our premises are consistent with the identity of objects of experience with things-in-themselves. So long as things-in-themselves are (contingently, not essentially) spatial, they may satisfy the condition set by (la), and thus count as objects of outer experi- ence.
So, Guyer is right to say that, if Kant is to give a valid argument along the lines he suggests, he must appeal to (lb). Is Kant entitled to (lb)?
According to the second argument of the "Metaphysical Exposition," we know a priori that all our representations of objects distinct from ourselves are of objects located in space. The objection is that this claim - (la) - does not imply (lb).9 And that is true enough. On the other hand, if we add the
(plausible) premise that what is spatial is essentially spatial, we can get from
(la) to (lb). It is not at all clear that Kant cannot appeal to the stronger claim that Guyer says he needs.10
The real weakness of the argument is not in the interpretation of its first
premise, but in the second premise, (2b). On the two-world view that Guyer's Kant accepts, it is very hard to see how we could know the truth of (2b). If we know that things-in-themselves are not spatial, we can quickly deduce that
they are not essentially spatial. But the claim that things-in-themselves are not spatial is supposed to be the conclusion of Kant's argument, not a prem- ise. Apart from knowing that they are not spatial in fact, the only way we could know that things-in-themselves are not essentially spatial is by way of some independent insight into their modal properties. And it runs against the
9 Cf. Guyer (1987: 366-9), following Harrison (1982). Langton (1998: 21 1-2) makes the same suggestion about Guyer's Kant.
68 KIERAN SETIYA
grain of the two-world view to suppose that Kant could appeal to any such
thing. It is possible, of course, that Kant is inconsistent here. But charity sug-
gests otherwise. We should look again at the first conclusion of Kant's dis- cussion of space.
(a) Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another. That is to say, space does not represent any determination that attaches to the objects themselves, and which remains even after abstraction has been made of all the subjective conditions of intuition. For no determination, whether absolute or relative, can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and none, therefore, can be intuited a priori. ( A26/B42)
The first thing to note is that Kant is concerned with the property denoted by our representation of space. This property or determination does not attach to the objects themselves. For we intuit this property a priori, and no prop- erty which attaches to the objects themselves can be intuited in this way. (Compare B70 on the idiom of properties.) Kant does not appeal here to our
knowledge a priori of the spatiality of the objects of outer experience. His
premise is precisely that we represent space through an a priori intuition: it is the conclusion of the arguments of the "Expositions," not just a prem- ise - Guyer's premise (1) - of the second argument of the "Metaphysical Exposition,"
We can paraphrase Kant's argument as follows:
To say that we have an a priori intuition of space is to say that we have an immediate representation of space as a particular thing, and that this repre- sentation does not depend on sensation or affection. We can think of the intuitive representation as one that involves a kind of direct acquaintance with the nature of space, and of spatial relations. (According to Kant, what we know a priori of the nature of space is expressed in synthetic a priori propositions - the central examples of which constitute geometry.) So, Kant's premise, established in the "Metaphysical Exposition" is this:
(4) We intuit a priori both space and spatial relations.
If we add a further premise:
(5) We cannot intuit a priori the properties or relations of things in
themselves,
it follows that:
(6) Spatial properties and relations do not attach to things in them- selves.
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE AESTHETIC" 69
And this argument is valid, so long as we provide a consistent interpreta- tion of "things in themselves."
This, I take it, is the argument for the transcendental ideality of space in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic." Or rather, it is the schema of Kant's argument, since until we fill in what we mean by "things in themselves," and explain why Kant accepts premise (5), we do not really understand what the argument is. In section 2, 1 try to complete the schematic argument in one-world terms.
2. One World or Two?
The argument described at the end of section 1 is prima facie neutral between the competing one- world and two- world interpretations of Kant's transcenden- tal idealism. Everything depends on the content of premise (5):
(5) We cannot intuit a priori the properties or relations of things in themselves.
So, for instance, the two-world theorist will insist that (5) should be read as follows:
(5ii)If we have a priori intuitions of certain properties, they cannot attach to mind-independent things-in-themselves.
It follows from (4) and (5ii) that the spatial and temporal properties we intuit
only belong to things-as-they-appear, construed according to some sort of
phenomenalism. The spatiotemporal objects we intuit cannot be mind-inde-
pendent things-in-themselves. The one-world theorist had better reject this
interpretation of premise (5). But then he needs to do two things: first, to
explain how, on Kant's view, it is possible to intuit a priori properties that attach to mind-independent things; and second, to provide a better interpreta- tion of premise (5). Before I give my own interpretation, I want to say a few words about Allison's (1983) one-world view.
According to Allison, Kant's concern is wholly epistemological. He is interested in the necessary epistemic conditions of our knowledge of objects (Allison 1983: 7, 10-13). These are conditions - of which we know a pri- ori - that objects must satisfy in order to be known by us. Like Guyer, Alli- son pays a great deal of attention to the premise of the second argument of the "Metaphysical Exposition," according to which we know a priori that the
objects of outer experience must be spatial. But Allison believes - unlike
Guyer - that this premise is enough to establish transcendental idealism:
[The] claim that human knowledge has such conditions is the distinctive, indeed, the revolu-
tionary thesis of Kant's philosophy, and [...] transcendental idealism is at bottom nothing more than the logical consequence of its acceptance. (Allison 1983, p. 1 1)
70 KIERAN SETIYA
This claim turns on Allison's distinctive conception of the transcendental
distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear. For Alli-
son, this is a distinction between two "ways of considering" the very same
mind-independent things. What he means is that, when we consider a thing as it appears, we consider it as a spatiotemporal object, including all its proper- ties. When we consider a thing as it is in itself, we simply abstract from those properties which serve as a priori epistemic conditions of our cognition (space and time). (As Guyer 1987: 338 notes, "to choose to abstract from a certain property of a thing in some particular conception of it is just to choose to ignore that property.")
[To] speak of appearances in the transcendental sense is simply to speak of spatiotemporal entities (phenomena), that is, of things insofar as they are viewed as subject to the conditions of human sensibility. Correlatively, to speak of things in themselves transcendentally is to speak of
things insofar as they are independent of these conditions. (Allison 1983: 7)
On Allison's view it follows analytically from Kant's premise (that we know a priori that the things we intuit are spatial) that the things we intuit are not spatial considered in themselves - that is, considered apart from the
properties we know a priori that they must have, in order to be objects of intuition.
While this one-world interpretation has the virtue of finding a valid argu- ment in the "Aesthetic," I do not think it can be right. First of all, it is sim-
ply too unambitious. It secures its result at the cost of claiming that Kant's conclusion - that space and time do not apply to things in themselves - is
just a way of re-stating his premise. But Kant purports to offer a substantial
argument for transcendental idealism.11 Second, it is natural to suppose that Kant's claim about the transcendental ideality of space and time is a meta-
physical claim about how these properties attach to things, not merely an
epistemic claim about their role in our knowledge of things. Third, Allison's distinction between things in themselves and things as they appear is thor-
oughly technical. It does not correspond to any ordinary use. But Kant
employs these terms without any kind of definition, as if they should be
already understood. (Contrast with this Kant's treatment of "appearance," "intuition," "concept," "a priori? "analytic," and so on.) We should prefer an
interpretation that makes sense of this fact. Fourth, Allison's interpretation cannot do anything to explain why Kant was tempted to phenomenalism - at the very least - in the A edition. Even if we prefer a one-world interpretation of B, we ought to account for Kant's earlier claims. If Allison is right about Kant's concerns, he had no reason ever to consider a two-world view.12
1 Langton (1998: 10) makes the same objection to Allison. A final point about Allison's view. If he is right in regarding transcendental idealism as an analytic consequence of the status of space and time as a priori conditions of human cognition, then there is no problem of a "neglected alternative." The neglected
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE "AESTHETIC" 71
Despite my disagreements with Allison, I share his interest in developing a one-world reading of the argument of the "Aesthetic." It will take some time to explain and defend the view that I prefer. I begin with the central
problem of the "Aesthetic": how is a priori intuition even possible? Kant's theory of sensibility is emphatic about its passivity.
The receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is affected in
any way, is to be called sensibility [...] Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can never be other than sensible, that is, it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. (A51/B75; cf. A26/B42, A35/B51)
If Kant is to allow for a priori intuitions, the passivity of sensibility will somehow have to be made consistent with the possibility of intuitions - our intuitions of space and time - that do not depend on our being affected in any way. What Kant means in the quotation above is that our intuitions of par- ticular things - outer objects, or our own inner states - always depend on our
being affected. But if we share this picture of the receptivity of perception, we are bound to be troubled about the idea of an a priori intuition. If our intui- tions of outer objects and inner states depend on sensation ("the effect of an
object on the faculty of representation" - A20/B34), how can things be dif- ferent for our intuitions of space and time? How can a faculty that is basically passive and receptive represent anything without affection? Kant cannot sim-
ply make an exception for space and time: he needs an account of the differ- ence between space and time, and other objects, which would explain why our intuitions of the former do not depend on sensation.
In the argument for conclusion (a) - the argument that spatial properties and relations do not attach to things in themselves - Kant describes the prob- lem in this way:
[No] determinations, whether absolute or relative, can be intuited prior to the existence of the
things to which they belong, and none, therefore, can be intuited a priori. (A26/B42)
This passage seems to imply a quite radical conclusion. If no determinations
(properties) can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong then, on the face of it, spatial and temporal properties, which we do intuit a priori, cannot attach to anything. They cannot attach to objects dis- tinct from our minds, because in order to represent such objects and their
properties, we would have to be affected by them, and our intuitions could
alternative is the thought that, while space and time are forms of human sensibility (for Allison: a priori conditions), they might also be properties of things in themselves. On Allison's view, this claim is analytically false: the properties that things have in themselves are just those which are not a priori conditions of human cognition. (Allison seems to take the neglected alternative seriously - see Allison 1983: 111-114; 1996: 8-10. If I am right, he should not do so. This might be evidence that I am wrong about the nature of Allison's view.)
72 KIERAN SETIYA
not be a priori. But nor can they attach to mental objects, because even our
representations of our own inner states depend on sensation, and so cannot be a priori.
If we read the passage in this way, it might seem to rule out any a priori intuition. But this is not quite right. It leaves open a certain two-world view, which I paraphrase as follows:
The sense in which space is an object of a priori intuition is just that,
necessarily, all our intuitions represent objects as being arranged in
space. In this sense, the spatial aspect of our intuitions does not depend on the particular objects we are affected by. But nor does it depend on our
being affected by some extraordinary object, space itself. In fact, it does not depend on our being affected by anything whatsoever. How is this
possible? It is possible because, although our intuitions represent the existence of space, they do not thereby represent some actually existing thing. (If they did, it seems they would have to be a posteriori.) In fact, there is no such thing as space, although our intuitions represent that there is such a thing. Like the dagger Macbeth's senses depicted in front of him, or the fountain of youth sought by Ponce de Leon, space is an "intentional existent."
This interpretation is endorsed by Sellars (1968: 44-50). Space exists "in"
representations just in the sense that we represent that it exists, even though it does not exist "simpliciter" or "in itself - i.e. as something not merely represented.
[Although Kant is not a phenomenalist in the usual sense, he] remains in another sense a 'phe- nomenalist' [... Physical] objects and events exist only 'in' certain representings synthesized by the productive imagination in response to the impressions of sense [...] A phenomenalism which construes the world as a system of available contents in this sense differs radically from a phenomenalism which construes the world as a system of available sense impressions [...] (Sellars 1968: 48)
On this novel phenomenalist interpretation of the "Aesthetic," particular intuitions depend on our being affected. But these intuitions represent space and spatial relations without affection, a priori', they represent that space exists, and that objects are arranged in space, irrespective of the actual exis- tence of space.13
I won't pause to argue against this two-world interpretation, since my question is whether it is entailed by the argument of the 'Transcendental Aes- thetic." But I think it may run into conflict with Kant's insistence on the
empirical reality of space, and his commitment to a correspondence theory of truth (e.g. A57-S7B82-3). If there is no such object as space, and if truth in
13 For an elaborate development of this sort of view, see Aquila (1983, esp. ch. 4).
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE AESTHETIC" 73
representation is correspondence with the facts, then our representation of
space is false or incorrect; we have a view on which "bodies merely seem to
be outside me" (B69) - and this is a view that Kant explicitly disavows. Whatever the merits of Sellars' two- world view, the challenge to the one-
world theory is now acute. We need to explain, in terms of Kant's theory of
sensibility, how our intuition of space could represent something (that actu-
ally exists) a priori. In the rest of this section, I try to provide a Kantian one- world explanation.
The explanation turns on the theory of intuitions, and the question: how do intuitions represent the world? Sellars' view suggests a picture of intuitions as a species of propositional attitude: when someone intuits that the world is a certain way, he bears a certain representational attitude to a certain content
(that the world is that way). There is no need here for a "vehicle" of content; there is just the agent who does the representing. By contrast, the traditional "sense datum theory" appeals to mental objects, which serve as vehicles of content: they represent the world in virtue of an isomorphism between their own properties and the objects and properties they represent. For an indirect
realist, the story of perception has two steps: first, as a consequence of being affected by outer objects, we come to have a direct cognitive relation to cer- tain sense-data; second, in virtue of our relation to sense-data, and in virtue of their representational properties, we come to represent outer objects as hav-
ing certain properties and as being arranged in certain ways. It is an essential
part of this account that there are two distinct sorts of cognitive relation: the direct relation we have to sense-data, and our indirect relation to outer objects, by way of sense-data. On pain of regress, we cannot construe our cognitive relation to sense-data on the model of our representational relation to outer
objects. This structure is relevant to Kant's problem in the following way: once
we distinguish two kinds of cognitive relation involved in intuition or per- ception, we open the possibility that the requirement of affection applies to one of these relations but not the other. In other words, we open the possibil- ity of a cognitive relation to particular things that does not depend on affec- tion. Presumably, this is how the sense-datum theorist conceives of our rela- tion to sense-data: our indirect representational relation to outer objects may depend on affection, but our direct relation to mental sense-data does not.
The view I want to attribute to Kant is not a straightforward sense-datum
theory, but rather a mixed theory. The first part of the view is that our intui- tion of space fits the sense-datum model. Since sense-data represent by way of an isomorphism between their own properties and the objects and proper- ties they represent, there must be some isomorphism between the structural
properties of the sense-datum of space, and the structure of space itself. One
way for this to happen is for the sense-datum of space to be three-dimen-
74 KIERAN SETIYA
sional, and to have precisely the structure that Kant attributes to space itself.14
Now, on this view, how do we represent space in intuition? If space is
something distinct from the sense-datum that corresponds to it, then our intuitive relation to space should be conceived just as the indirect realist con- ceives our relation to outer objects: it will have to depend on affection, and it will not be a priori. The picture will be one in which we are affected by space, and as a consequence, we come to have a direct cognitive relation to the sense-datum of space (and thus to represent space itself). This sort of indi- rect realism cannot account for the a priori intuition of space. But suppose instead that space is nor distinct from the sense-datum that corresponds to it.
Suppose that the sense-datum of space stands for space itself by way of an
isomorphism of identity. Then our cognitive relation to the sense-datum of
space - a relation that does not depend on affection - will be a relation to
space itself. In other words, this will be a view on which we represent space in intuition a priori.
This is not quite the end of the story. What we have so far is a fragment of a
theory of outer sense that would leave room for an a priori intuition of space. This theory is sharply distinct from the two-world view we found in Sellars
(1968). It does not depict space as an "intentional existent" - something we
represent as existing, even though it does not exist in fact. On the present view, space exists in a perfectly literal and straightforward sense. The diffi-
culty comes when we try to complete our fragmentary theory of outer sense. The simplest suggestion is that we can appeal to a perfectly general form
of indirect realism, extending the account to our intuition of space. Accord-
ingly, we can treat the perception of outer objects as follows: on the basis of
affection, we come to have a direct relation to various sense-data, including the sense-datum of space. We represent outer objects indirectly, in virtue of our direct cognitive relation to sense-data, and in virtue of an isomorphism between their properties and the objects and properties they directly repre- sent.
But this cannot be right. For it was crucial to our account of a priori intuition that the sense-datum of space represents space by way of an isomor-
phism of identity. If this is our general account of the intentionality of
sense-data, we will find that they cannot represent anything but themselves, and the properties they have. In particular, the only objects depicted in outer sense will be sense-data; and once again, we will be led to a kind of phe-
14 Jackson (1977) defends a conception of sense-data as three-dimensional mental objects. He thinks of them as located in physical space. But one might also think of sense-data as having a structure of their own, which corresponds to the structure of physical space. This is how O'Shaughnessy (1980: 168-92) thinks of visual sense-data, except that, on his view, their internal structure is ftvo-dimensional.
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE AESTHETIC 75
nomenalism. "Outer" objects will have to be (logical constructs of) sense- data. In fact, matters are much worse. The picture seems to be this: on the
basis of affection, we come to have a direct relation to the sense-datum of
space, and we depict the outer world by depicting properties as being instanti- ated at certain points in space. Since (as we have assumed) sense-data repre- sent by an isomorphism of identity, this will require the properties in ques- tion to be instantiated at certain points in the sense-datum of space. But since the sense-datum of space is space itself, it follows that the properties in ques- tion are instantiated at the relevant points in space, so that the intuition is veridical. This point will hold in general: there is simply no possibility of non- veridical perception.
How to resolve this problem? We will have to deny that outer sense
always works in the way I suggested it might work in relation to space. The
simplest account would be this: outer sense always represents things in rela- tion to space; of space itself, we have a direct, de re cognition, like the rela- tion we have to a sense-datum in indirect realism; but, apart from this, outer sense is to be construed as a propositional attitude. It represents that certain
objects have certain relations to space (and thereby to each other), but there is no "vehicle" for this representation. There is no further sense-datum beyond the sense-datum of space. There is just the intuition (veridical or not) that certain things are located here or there in space, or that they are moving this
way or that, or exerting some force or other.15 This "mixed" view of perception - part sense-datum, part propositional-
attitude - may seem odd, but other mixed theories have been proposed. A useful comparison is Baldwin's (1992) "protective theory" of sensory content. He puts the view as follows:
When, as it is said, my visual field has a blue square patch on the left and a red circular patch on the right, the protective theorist holds that I sense bluely with reference to a square region of visual space on my left and redly with reference to a circular region of visual space on my right. [... Sensing] bluely with reference to a square region of visual space is having a visual
experience as of a blue square on one's left [...This] permits the non-existence of its object [a blue square], as it should. But the reference to a region of space is to a region of real, physical, space; and though the reference here remains intentional in the sense that it is to a region of
space under a specific description - as a region identified within egocentric space - it is not intentional in the sense that it does not carry existential commitment. (Baldwin 1992: 186)
It is clear that the "projective theory" is not exactly the view I have been con-
templating - in particular, Baldwin wants to explain the intentionality of
perception in "adverbial" terms, and he does not think of space as a sense- datum - but it does have this feature in common: it adopts an act-object theory of the representation of space, and a "quasi-propositional" (Baldwin
15 For this list - location, motion, and force - see B66-67, which I discuss at length in section 3.
76 KIERAN SETIYA
1992: 186) theory of the representation of properties (and objects) in space. The "projection" from which the theory gets its name involves a relation
between the perceiving subject and space itself, in virtue of which the sub-
ject represents that certain properties are instantiated at certain locations in
space. Although the nature of the relation is different, this is exactly the structure of the view that I would like to attribute to Kant.
As we have seen, this view allows for an intuition of space a priori, without affection; and it allows for the possibility of non-veridical percep- tion. It can also explain the argument for transcendental idealism in the "Aes- thetic." On the present reading, we should understand proposition (5) as fol- lows:
(5i) If we have a priori intuitions of certain properties, they cannot attach to things in themselves - these properties cannot be thor-
oughly mind-independent.
The conclusion of the argument is that spatial and temporal properties do not attach to things in themselves: they are mind-dependent. But this is still schematic: we need to say what we mean by "mind-dependent."
On the present interpretation, space is a sense-datum. The operation of outer sense involves a direct cognitive relation to a certain particular - the kind of relation we have to sense-data in indirect realism - and this particular is space. Conceived in this way, space is mind-dependent, not in the crude sense that its existence depends on the existence of any particular human
mind, or that its properties are determined by our opinions (cf. A45/B62), but in the sense that an account of what space is has to mention the "subjective constitution" (A42/B49) of outer sense. An account of the nature of
space - such as the account I gave above - explains what space is in terms of a certain mental operation. Space just is the structured particular that figures in outer sense as something to which we have a direct cognitive relation
(without affection), and in relation to which we represent outer objects, through sensation. It is in this sense that space is mental or mind-dependent, and thus "transcendentally ideal."
Now, our intuition of space is at the same time an intuition of spatial properties and their distinctive natures (as these are revealed in synthetic a
priori knowledge). For instance, we are acquainted with relations of location, spatial inclusion, distance, and so on. In a posteriori intuition, we represent outer objects as bearing these relations to one another. It is important here that Kant rejects Leibniz's "relationism" about space, his claim that facts about the arrangement of things in space can be reduced to facts about the
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE "AESTHETIC" 77
existence of objects and the relations among them.16 On the contrary, Kant
argues in the "Metaphysical Exposition" that the existence of space does not
depend on the existence of objects bearing spatial relations to one another (cf. the second argument, A24/B38-9), and that we represent space as an "infinite
given magnitude" (A24/B39), not as something constructed out of our origi- nal representations of spatial relations. The spatial relations among things are thus to be construed in terms of their locations in space, which is to say in terms of their relations to space. If space itself is mind-dependent, these rela- tions are mind-dependent: they are relations to something mental, and in the absence of our intuition of space (which is space itself), they would not obtain. This is the content of Kant's conclusion, that spatial properties and relations do not attach to things in themselves.
[The] things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their rela- tions so constituted in themselves as they appear to us [... If] the subject, or even only the
subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish.
(A42/B59)17
If this is right, we have an explanation of Kant's argument in the "Aes- thetic" which is at the same time an objection to Sellars' two-world interpre- tation. The objection is that the central premise of the two-world argument is false.
(5ii)If we have a priori intuitions of certain properties, they cannot attach to mind-independent things-in-themselves.
On the present reading, our a priori intuitions of spatial properties are intui- tions of mind-dependent properties ', but there is no reason to conclude that the objects that instantiate such properties (in relation to space) are them- selves mind-dependent. In fact, the objects that instantiate these mind-depend- ent properties can be considered in terms of their mind-independent properties (if they have any), as well as in terms of their mind-dependent relations to
space. They can be considered "in themselves" and "as they appear." So, the fundamental distinction in Kant's transcendental idealism is a distinction between two "ways of considering" the very same things.
I have moved from describing a one-world interpretation of the "Aesthetic" to
endorsing this interpretation, and it must be said that its attribution to Kant is a matter of conjecture. The virtues of this reading are primarily philosophi-
16 On Kant's rejection of Leibnizian relationism, see Allison (1983: 82-9, 107-11) and Parsons (1992: 72-4). 17 For similar claims, see A35-6/B52, B67, A285/B341 . See also Prolegomena §11: "[Space and time] are determinations adhering not to things in themselves, but to their relation to our sensibility."
78 KIERAN SETIYA
cal: insofar as it provides an argument against (5ii), it also suggests a more charitable replacement - (5i) - and thus a fruitful and promising version of Kant's argument. But there are also many points at which Kant describes
spatial properties in mind-dependent relational terms, saying for instance that
they consist in the "relation of something in general to the senses." (A285/ B341) (I will consider some of these passages in section 3.)
The present interpretation also explains a feature of the "Aesthetic" that
many find puzzling: Kant's carelessness about the distinction between space and our representation of space. Kant happily conflates these two almost
throughout his argument. But if Kant identifies space with our representation of space, as I have proposed, this conflation makes perfect sense.18
Finally, I think it would be a mistake to object to this reading of the "Aesthetic" on the grounds that it is too elaborate, that it finds in Kant's
argument a great deal of detail - for instance, the analogy with indirect real- ism, the mixed act-object-propositional theory - that is simply missing from the text. That is not quite right. We have to distinguish my explanation of Kant's view, and the resources of this explanation, from the view that is
thereby explained. When it is pared down, the central element in my story is
just this: the way outer sense represents space is very different from the way it represents ordinary outer objects through affection; in fact, it is exempt from the requirement of affection, and as a consequence, space must be con- strued as something mental - as the "form of outer sense." These are all
things that Kant says in the "Aesthetic." The point of my detour through indirect realism was (I hope) to show that it need not be altogether ad hoc to exclude the representation of space from the requirement of affection, and to conclude from this that space is something mental. That being said, I do think of the present reading as conjectural: it is an attempt to find a one- world
interpretation of transcendental idealism that answers to the details of Kant's
argument, and that is not open to the objections I made to Allison (1983). We have found an ambitious argument for transcendental idealism, on which it is a properly metaphysical claim, and on which the distinction between things as they appear and things in themselves is the intuitive distinction between the mind-dependent and mind-independent properties of things.
3. Relations and Things in Themselves Even if Kant's conclusion is that spatial properties are mind-dependent, and even if this is consistent with their being instantiated by mind-independent things, it does not follow that, for Kant, the objects of outer sense are them- selves mind-independent. I will argue that Kant is agnostic about the mind- independence of the objects of outer sense, and, if we accept his account of
I should note that the conflation might also be explained on Sellars' two-world interpretation, since, on that reading, Kant thinks of space just as something we represent.
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE "AESTHETIC" 79
space and time, rightly so. But I want to approach this question in a round- about way, beginning with a contrast between my interpretation of transcen-
dental idealism, and the one proposed by Langton (1998). In the course of
exploring this contrast, I will partly explain a feature of the first Critique that was left mysterious on Allison's account: Kant's flirtation with phe- nomenalism. Even a staunch advocate of the one-world interpretation ought to admit that Kant's formulations suggest a kind of phenomenalism, and that Kant is not altogether careful to distinguish between this sort of phenomenal- ism and his actual (one- world) view. It is a virtue of the present interpretation that it helps to explain Kant's uncertainty or un-clarity on this point.
It is useful to begin with a controversial argument added by Kant in the B edition of the "Aesthetic":
In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of both inner and outer sense, and therefore of all
objects of the senses, as mere appearances, it is especially relevant to observe that everything in our knowledge which belongs to intuition [...] contains nothing but mere relations; namely of locations in an intuition (extension), of change of location (motion), and of laws according to which change is determined (moving forces). [...] Now a thing in itself cannot be known
through mere relations; and we may therefore conclude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this sense can contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner properties of the object in itself. (B66-67)
At first glance, this is a troubling passage. Kant moves from the premise that we know only relational properties of things to the conclusion that these
properties consist in "the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner properties of the object in itself." That looks like an equivocation, between the idea of a mind-independent property, and the idea of an intrinsic
property.19 If we know only relations, then we do not know the intrinsic
properties of things - so far, so good, it seems, But how does it follow that the relevant relational properties are not mind-independent, that they are rela- tions to us (or to the form of outer sense)? Guyer insists that Kant is guilty of just this equivocation:
[This] argument surely turns on nothing other than simply equating considering a thing abso-
lutely, in the sense of considering it in its ultimate reality [i.e. in terms of its mind-independent properties], with considering it absolutely in the sense of considering it in isolation [...] (Guyer 1987: 352, my interpolation)
19 I am afraid that I will have to take the notion of an intrinsic property as primitive here. Contemporary work on intrinsicness takes off from the idea that an intrinsic property is one that does not imply accompaniment - an object's having the property does not imply the existence of any further, wholly distinct, contingent object (cf. Langton 1998: 18- 19n.6). But this makes a nonsense of the Leibnizian idea that a thing's intrinsic properties entail its relational properties. (This is what Langton 1998: 86-7 calls "unilateral supervenience.") Even if this view is false (and even if Leibniz does not in the end accept it), I doubt that it is analytically false. Unfortunately, I do not know how to give a better account of intrinsic properties.
80 KIERAN SETIYA
If we hope to save Kant from equivocation, we will have to interpret the
argument of B66-67 consistently: either in terms of the contrast between
intrinsic and relational properties, or in terms of the contrast between mind-
independent and mind-dependent properties. Langton's (1998: 94-6, 127-8) idea is that we should interpret the argument - and the doctrine of transcenden- tal idealism more generally - just in terms of the contrast between intrinsic
properties and relations.
According to Langton, Kant's transcendental distinction between things in
themselves and phenomena is precisely a distinction between the intrinsic and relational properties of substances (Langton 1998: 20). It is not part of her view (unlike the view in section 2) that these relational properties are mind-
dependent. Nor is it part of her view that the objects that instantiate them are
mind-dependent. The central thesis of transcendental idealism is, for Langton, a matter of "epistemic humility": our intuitions represent only the relational
properties of things, and we have no knowledge whatsoever of their intrinsic nature.
It is obvious that there is some support for Langton's view. Kant does
say that our intuitions represent only relational properties of things, and not their intrinsic properties (cf. B66-67 above, A265/B321, A285/B341).20 This is particularly clear in the "Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection":
All that we know in matter is merely relations (what we call the inner determinations of it are inward only in a comparative sense), but among these relations some are self-subsistent and
permanent, and through these we are given a determinate object. (A285/B341; cf. A265/B321)
This idea - that enduring relational properties form the ground of the applica- tion of the concept of substance - is defended in the "First Analogy."
The problem for Langton is that Kant's view goes beyond an epistemic restriction of intuition (to relational properties): he thinks of these properties as mind-dependent. In a crucial passage from the "Amphiboly" (which Lang- ton cites in support of her interpretation), Kant re-iterates this mind-depend- ence.
It is certainly startling to hear that a thing is to be taken as consisting wholly of relations. Such a
thing is, however, mere appearance, and cannot be thought through pure categories; what it itself consists in is the mere relation of something in general to the senses. (A285/B341, my emphasis)
20 In making an exclusive distinction between relational and intrinsic properties, Kant implicitly rejects Leibniz's view that the relational properties of things are reducible to their intrinsic properties (see Langton 1998, chs. 5-6). This is quite consistent with Kant's claim in the "Amphiboly" that the identity of indiscernibles would have to be true of objects known entirely through concepts, or through the intellect, quite apart from sensibility. Kant does not believe that we can know any objects in this way, but if we could (as Leibniz believed) then it would be impossible for two of them to share all their intrinsic properties.
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE AESTHETIC 81
This is where Langton's view differs from mine. It is part of the view
explained in section 2 that the properties we represent in intuition are not just relational, they are mind-dependent - as Kant believes. All of these proper- ties - location, motion and force (B66-67) - involve relations to space; since
space is mental or mind-dependent, these relational properties are mind-
dependent. Langton's view cannot do justice to the passages in the "Aes- thetic" that stress this fact.
Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in relation to one another [. ..] For no determinations, whether absolute or relative, can be intuited
prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and none, therefore, can be intuited a
priori. (A26/B42, my emphasis)
[The] things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their rela- tions so constituted in themselves as they appear to us [... If] the subject, or even only the
subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. (A42/B59, my emphasis)
For Langton, things as they appear are things considered in terms of their relational properties. On this reading, it makes no sense whatever to ask whether "their relations are so constituted in themselves as they appear to us." On my interpretation, it makes perfect sense: we can ask whether the relations we intuit are mind-independent. Kant's conclusion is that they arc not: it is not just that spatial determinations are relations between things; they are relations to the form of outer sense.
A more general objection to Langton's interpretation is that it does not
really make sense of Kant's claim that space and time are transcendentally ideal.21 Indeed, she wants to find a Kantian route to transcendental idealism that does not turn on "the arguments about space, time, and the categories, for which Kant is (perhaps justly) most famous." (Langton 1998: 3) But it is the arguments about space and time that provide the initial impetus for tran- scendental idealism in the Critique of Pure Reason, and that provide us with the first guide to its interpretation. As I argued in section 2, these arguments suggest that, for Kant, transcendental idealism has to do with the mind-
dependence of the properties we represent in intuition.
Despite these disagreements with Langton, I think her account of matter or phenomenal substance is helpful to the one-world view. Commenting on Kant's claim that matter consists "wholly in relations," she draws an impor- tant distinction, between the claim that matter is the thing as it appears - on her view, the thing considered in terms of its relational properties - and the claim that matter is a logical construct of relations (cf. Langton 1998: 21; ch.
3). Kant seems to endorse the second claim, when he says that the "abiding
For a similar objection to a similar view, see van Cleve (1999: 154).
82 KIERAN SETIYA
appearance in space (impenetrable extension) can contain only relations and
nothing that is wholly inward" (A284/B340) or in the passage quoted above,
according to which matter consists "wholly of relations" and "cannot be
thought through pure categories." (A285/B341) If we graft this account of matter or appearance on to the arguments of section 2, it provides a partial explanation of Kant's phenomenalist rhetoric. In effect, we distinguish between the thing as it appears (i.e. the thing, which may be mind-independ- ent, conceived just in terms of its relations to the form of outer sense) and matter or "phenomenal substance," which is a logical construct of relations to the form of outer sense. Conceived in this way, matter is constituted entirely by mind-dependent properties, and it is therefore mind-dependent. If this is
right, it is no surprise that Kant speaks of matter or appearance in phenome- nalist terms. That he does so is quite consistent with the reading developed in section 2.
Langton's distinction also helps us to understand the controversial argu- ment of B66-67.
In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of both inner and outer sense, and therefore of all
objects of the senses, as mere appearances, it is especially relevant to observe that everything in our knowledge which belongs to intuition [...] contains nothing but mere relations; namely of locations in an intuition (extension), of change of location (motion), and of laws according to which change is determined (moving forces). [...] Now a thing in itself cannot be known
through mere relations; and we may therefore conclude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this sense can contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner properties of the object in itself. (B66-67)
I said before that this argument seems to equivocate between the idea of a
mind-independent property, and the idea of an intrinsic property. Langton (1998: 127-8) wants to interpret it just in terms of the contrast between intrinsic properties and relations. But Kant's conclusion is that we intuit "the relation of an object to the subject" (my emphasis), suggesting again that this relation is mind-dependent.
It is quite tempting here to fall back on a two-world interpretation, like the one presented by van Cleve (1999):
1 . The only properties had by objects of outer sense are relational properties.
2. A thing in itself cannot have relational properties only.
3. Therefore, objects of outer sense are not things in themselves (but only appearances), (van Cleve 1999: 154)
We are supposed to read premise 2 as the claim that a mind-independent sub- stance must have some intrinsic properties. And in fact, it is pretty clear that Kant does accept premise 2, understood in this way. He defends it at some
length in the "Amphiboly":
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE "AESTHETIC" 83
According to mere concepts the inner is the substratum of all relational or outer determina- tions. If therefore, I abstract from all conditions of intuition and confine myself to the concept of a thing in general, I can abstract from all outer relation, and there must still be left a concept of something which signifies no relation, but inner determinations only. From this it seems to follow that in whatever is a thing (substance) there is something that is absolutely inward and
precedes all outer determinations, inasmuch as it is what first makes them possible [...] (A283/B339)
The argument for premise 2 is that, when we consider the concept of a thing in general, disregarding the conditions of sensibility, we imagine a mind-
independent substance. By its very nature, a substance must be capable of
independent existence (just as it is). But if we imagine it existing independ- ently (just as it is), we cannot imagine it as a bare substratum (which would be impossible), so we must imagine it as having intrinsic properties.
The problem with the two- world interpretation is not mainly with premise 2, but with the interpretation of premise 1. Where does Kant get the premise that the objects of outer sense have only relational properties, as opposed to the premise that we only represent their relational properties in intuition? At this point, we should recall the crucial distinction between the thing as it
appears (i.e. the thing considered in terms of its mind-dependent properties), and matter or phenomenal substance (i.e. the collection of such properties). Kant is not entitled to assume that the thing as it appears has no intrinsic
properties. But he is entitled to assume that matter or phenomenal substance has only relational properties (in a manner of speaking) since it is a logical construct of such properties. If we interpret premise 1 as a claim about mat-
ter, then the argument above will show that matter is not a mind-independent substance. However, this is not because it shows that matter is mind-depend- ent, but because it is a not a genuine substance: it is a collection of rela- tional properties, which attach to objects that may or may not be mind-
dependent. So the conclusion of the argument has nothing to do with idealism. On the other hand, if we interpret premise 1 as a claim about
things as they appear, then the argument is question-begging: the objects that instantiate the relational properties we intuit may well have mind-independent intrinsic properties. Either way, this attempt to argue for transcendental ideal- ism is badly flawed.
I suggest, then, that we reject van Cleve's interpretation of the argument of B66-67. 1 think we can find here an independent argument for the version of transcendental idealism proposed in section 2. We can express this argu- ment as follows:
(i) Space and its parts have only relational properties.
(ii) A mind-independent substance must have some intrinsic nature.
(iii) So, space is mind-dependent.
84 KIERAN SETIYA
(Does this conclusion follow? As we saw in discussing the previous argu- ment, space might fail to be a mind-independent substance either because it is mind-dependent or because it consists in the properties of some other
object, which may or may not be mind-dependent. In the case of space, we can ignore the second possibility: we know that space is given to us in intui- tion as a particular, not as a collection of properties that attach to something else.)
(iv) All of the properties we intuit involve relations to space.
(v) So the properties we intuit are mind-dependent; we know things only as they appear - that is, in terms of their mind-dependent prop- erties.
Premise (ii) of this argument is van Cleve's premise 2, which I discussed above. It is clear from the "Amphiboly" that Kant accepts premise (i):
The concept of a cubic foot of space, wherever and however often I think it, is in itself
throughout one and the same. But two cubic feet are nevertheless distinguished in space by the mere difference of their locations {numero diversa); these locations are conditions of the intui- tion wherein the object of this concept is given; they do not, however, belong to the concept but
entirely to sensibility. (A282/B338)
The problem is that he does not seem to state premise (i) in B66-67; he doesn't appear to give the more elaborate argument - (i) to (v) - that I think he needs to give. At the beginning of the argument, he seems to be talking not about space itself, as in premise (i), but about the objects of outer sense.
But, since the passage is ambiguous, it is not clear that this is right. And when Kant comes to repeat his argument in the case of time rather than
space, his premise is a claim about time itself, not about the objects of inner sense:
This also holds true of inner sense [...] because the time in which we set these representations [of outer sense], which is itself antecedent to the consciousness of them in experience, and which underlies them as the formal condition of the mode in which we posit them in the mind, itself contains [only] relations of succession, coexistence, and of that which is coexistent with succession, the enduring. (B67)
If this is meant to be the beginning of an argument exactly like the one that Kant gave in the case of outer sense, then there is some reason to interpret this argument in terms of premise (i).
Against Guyer, then, we can find in Section II of the "General Observa- tions" an independent argument for the mind-dependence of space, and of the
properties we intuit through outer sense. This reading of the "Amphiboly" and of B66-67 also suggests an answer to a final interpretive question. The
question is whether the objects of outer sense - that is, things as they
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM IN THE "AESTHETIC** 85
appear - have mind-independent properties. On this question, and on the
mind-independence of the objects themselves, Kant seems to be agnostic - at
least m the B edition. There are passages in A where Kant asserts the exis- tence of mind-independent things in themselves.
For if the senses represent to us something merely as it appears, this something must also in itself be a thing [...] (A249)
[The] word appearance must be recognised as already indicating a relation to something, the immediate representation of which is, indeed, sensible, but which, even apart from the consti- tution of our sensibility (upon which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something in itself, that is, an object independent of sensibility. (A252)
But these passages are conspicuously absent from the B edition. In the new
Pretace, Kant is considerably more circumspect:
[All] possible speculative knowledge of reason is limited to mere objects of experience. But our further contention must also be borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot know these
objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position to think them as things in them- selves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears. (Bxxvi-xxvii; cf. B306)
I take it that Kant denies that we know of the existence of mind-independent
things; or, more carefully, he denies that we can know of their existence
through intuition. The same point is stressed in the "Amphiboly":
We are completely ignorant whether [the transcendental object] is to be met with in us or outside us, whether it would at once be removed with the cessation of sensibility, or whether in the absence of sensibility it would still remain. (A288/B344-5)
The picture seems to be this: we intuit only relational properties of things (B66-67), and we think of matter as composed of such relations. It follows that matter has no intrinsic nature, and is not a mind-independent substance.
Nevertheless, we can think of the transcendental object as whatever ultimately instantiates the relational properties we intuit (the properties that constitute
matter). The problem is that we cannot intuit its intrinsic properties, and so
Although I will keep this qualification throughout the following discussion, I don't think we need it. If we do not know of the existence of mind-independent things through intuition, the only way we could know it is on the basis of a "transcendental argument." But Kant gives no such argument. In the "Refutation of Idealism" - which might be thought to give this argument - Kant is not concerned to demonstrate the existence of a mind-independent substance, but to prove the existence of ordinary, empirically real, enduring things. His claim is that "All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception" (B275) and he says that "representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them." (Bxxxix, alteration of the "Refutation" from the preface to B) These enduring outer objects are things we can know, and about which we can be mistaken, but we need not suppose that they are independent of the form of outer sense.
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we cannot know (though intuition) whether it should count as a mind-inde-
pendent substance. This picture depends on the second premise of the argument I found at
B66-67, according to which a mind-independent substance must have some intrinsic properties. But we need not rely on this. Since the relational prop- erties we intuit are mind-dependent (as Kant argues in the "Aesthetic"), we can put the point as follows: while we can think the objects of outer sense as
things in themselves - that is, in terms of their mind-independent properties - we cannot know these properties through intuition. More strongly, we cannot know, through intuition, whether the objects of outer sense have
mind-independent properties, and so we cannot know whether their existence is independent of outer sense. This is what Kant means when he says that we are "completely ignorant" (A288/B344-5): we know nothing whatever of
things in themselves.
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