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Transit Vehicle Design Standards and Risk Analysis on Fire Development in Rapid
Transit Vehicles
Adrian Milford
Sereca - a Jensen Hughes Company, Project Engineer
Vancouver, BC, Canada
Motivation
● Design fire size: important parameter in the design of emergency ventilation systems
Factors: materials, train geometry, ignition source characteristics, ventilation conditions, suppression…
Potential impact on life safety (system performance)
Construction and equipment costs
Important Factors: Fire Development
● 1. Material ignition and burning properties
Flame spread, smoke development characteristics
● 2. Ignition source characteristics
Potential severity, locations, exposure to combustibles
Likelihood of occurrence
● 3. Conditions for fire development
Configuration of materials, ventilation conditions
Operational response, detection/intervention
1. Material Fire Properties
● Transit vehicle design standards
ie: NFPA 130, EN 45545
Testing methodology, performance criteria based upon material function
Flame spread, smoke developed – Fire hardened materials
1. Material Fire Properties - Example
● EN 45545
3 hazard levels assigned based upon 4 operational categories and 4 design categories
1. Material Fire PropertiesSide Walls Example
EN 45545 NFPA 130
Flame spread
Heat release – cone calorimeter
Smoke generation
Flame spread – radiant panel
Smoke generation
2. Ignition Sources
● Exterior fire development
Train equipment, vehicle systems separated from interior
● Interior fire development
Train equipment/systems not separated from interior
Limited by vehicle design standard requirements
Introduced combustibles/ignition sources
Generally – potential for greatest fire size
● Severity and likelihood - Risk
2. Ignition Sources - Interior
● Range ~1 kW to 350 kW, most likely sources are minor
● Extreme ignition sources – flammable liquids
Item Peak HRR [kW] Approximate Peak Burning
Duration [s]
Lighter or match < 1 -Polyethylene wastebasket (0.6 kg) filled
with shredded paper (0.2 kg)
15 100 - 200
Pillow with 0.65kg of polyurethane foam 40 100
Luggage filled with clothes 120 (hard suitcase)
25 (soft suitcase)
300
1000
Two men’s jackets 75 - 85 10 - 20
Trash bags filled with paper (1.17kg total) 140 (1 bag - 1.17 kg)
280 (2 bags - 2.34 kg)
350 (3 bags - 3.51 kg)
100
20
100
Amtrak trash bags from overnight trains
(1.8 - 9.5 kg)
30 – 260 10 - 400
3. Conditions for Fire Development
● Ignition source sufficient to ignite exposed materials
● Fire development undetected/no intervention occurs in incipient stages
● Material configuration and ventilation conditions facilitate spread
● Operational response
Train remains operational or is disabled?
Fuel configuration, ventilation, suppression response
How are Design Fire Sizes Estimated?
● Traditional methods
Typically assume 1 car is fully burning
Summation of all vehicle material heat release rates or available ventilation (post-flashover)
Assumptions based upon historical events and testing
● Advanced methods – pyrolysis, prescribed material burning rate modelling
Skilled user knowledge, important material inputs required
Model parameter uncertainty, limitations, validation
Traditional Fire Estimation
● Limitations relative to key factors:
1. Historical fire events/testing largely involve materials that do not comply with current design standards
2. No ignition source context
3. Propensity for fire spread not included, no risk context
● Further limitations
Fire dynamics in interconnected vehicles?
Influence of train configuration, interaction of ventilation conditions with fire development, …
Advanced Methods of Fire Estimation
● Objective: obtain better understanding of influence of key factors on fire development
● Limitations
Uncertainty in model input parameters, sub-models
Impact of simplifying assumptions (ie: prescribed burning rates)
Further work would be beneficial in evaluating/validating prediction methodology flame spread at assembly and full scale for modern fire-hardened materials
Advanced Methods – Example 1
● Prescribed burning rate methodology with interconnected trains
● FDS 5.5.3, material burning properties from cone calorimeter testing
Reference: Milford A, Senez P, Calder K, Coles A (2014) Computational Analysis of Ignition Source
Characteristics on Fire Development in Rapid Transit Vehicles, 3rd International Conference on Fire in
Vehicles (FIVE), 131-142
Advanced Methods – Example 1
Ignition location: floor beneath
seats
No fire development
One portion of incident car● Objective:
estimation of fire development trends relative to:
Forced ventilation (open doors)
Ignition source strength and location
Reference: Milford A, Senez P, Calder K, Coles A (2014) Computational Analysis of Ignition Source
Characteristics on Fire Development in Rapid Transit Vehicles, 3rd International Conference on Fire in
Vehicles (FIVE), 131-142
Advanced Methods – Example 2
● Assembly scale testing of rapid transit vehicle materials with large initiating source (500 kW)
● Pyrolysis modelling and comparison: FDS 5
Reference: Coles A, Wolski A, Lautenberger C (2009) Predicting Design Fires in Rail Vehicles, 13th
International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, 819-833
Advanced Methods – Example 2
● Comparison of model with experiment (500 KW burner)
● Evaluation of other ignition source: 300 kW (peak) trash bag
Reference: Coles A, Wolski A, Lautenberger C (2009) Predicting Design Fires in Rail Vehicles, 13th
International Symposium on Aerodynamics and Ventilation of Vehicle Tunnels, 819-833
Advanced Methods: Example Findings
● Small localized ignition sources unlikely to lead to fire development beyond the immediate area under natural ventilation
Most common ‘nuisance’ ignition sources (trash, minor introduced combustibles): minimal risk
● Extreme ignition scenarios (ie: flammable liquids) have potential for fire spread beyond initiating area
Remote event, disproportionate to materials typically present, security and risk implications
Risk Considerations
● Risk philosophy: What is ‘acceptable’ and what constitutes acceptance?
Owners/operators, authorities/regulators, public
● Likelihood of occurrence for the key factors vs potential severity
Event Tree Analysis
Type of Incident Type of Fire Spread Detection Extinguished Probability
0.1 1.608E-05
0.99
0.9 1.447E-040.05
0.01 1 1.624E-06
0.56
0.93 2.841E-030.0058
0.99
0.95 0.07 2.138E-04
0.01 1 3.086E-05
0.44 2.552E-03
0.9942 0.9942
1.000000
Incident
P(fire)=0.0058
P(other)=0.9942
P(arson)=0.56
P(mech/elec)=0.44
P(det)=0.99
P(det')=0.01
P(ext)=0.10
P(ext')=0.90
P(ext')=1.0
P(spread')=0.95
P(spread)=0.05
P(det)=0.99
P(det')=0.01
P(ext)=0.93
P(ext')=0.07
P(ext')=1.0
Full Vehicle Involvement
Localized Damage
Evaluation of Risk Context
● Probabilistic assessment
What is credible?
Statistical data
Uncertainty?
● Evaluation
Risk scoring
Cost-benefit analysis