september 20, 2019 citizens of the market · collaborating with the former communist-era secret...

Ruxandra Paul Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, Amherst College Visiting Scholar, Center for European Studies, Harvard University

[email protected] * [email protected] September 20, 2019

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Citizens of the Market Migration’sRescueofLiberalDemocracyandtheEuropeanUnion

Thirty years after the fall of communism in 1989, the political trajectories of Central and Eastern

European (CEE) countries continue to defy expectations. The early 1990s were dominated by

concerns over the likelihood that democracy will not take root in CEE. Some predicted the

erosion of support for democracy as a result of economic reforms (Przeworski, 1991), while others

thought that “the danger of new dictatorship in Eastern Europe comes from the bottom, not from

the top” (Ost, 1992). The mid-1990s and early 2000s brought reassurance that democratic CEE

polities worked fairly well (Levitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010; Roberts, 2009). Some saw the region as

an “unqualified democratic success story” and declared earlier analogies with Latin America

misplaced (Greskovits, 1998). The first couple of decades after the end of the Cold War seemed to

bode well for postcommunist new democracies. Since 2004, eleven CEE have countries joined the

European Union (EU). Many noted that Poland and Hungary had rapidly consolidated (Linz and

Stepan, 1996) and thought they “passed the point of no return” making “authoritarian reversal”

inconceivable (Ekiert and Kubik, 1998). In the 2000s, however, it became clear that earlier

optimism had been somewhat premature. Some warned of “democratic fatigue” and populist

backlash (Rupnik, 2007). What was most puzzling, however, was the uneven way in which

backsliding affected the region.

In the last decade, the political trajectories of Central and Eastern European countries have

reversed. The frontrunners of democratization and Europeanization (countries like Hungary and

Poland) have experienced democratic backsliding, as signaled by destabilization or return to semi-

authoritarian practices. Scholars also noted a “hollowing,” or declining popular involvement in

democracy (Greskovits, 2015). According to Nations in Transit, Hungary declined from

Consolidated Democracy into Semi-Consolidated Democracy status (its current overall democracy



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score is 3.71 – Freedom House rates countries on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the

highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic quality). In 2017, the country experienced the largest

cumulative decline in Nations in Transit history, after its scores had been falling for ten

consecutive years. Poland recorded the largest category decline and the second-largest Democracy

Score decline in the history of the report, but remains in the consolidated democracy category with

an overall score of 2.89. Some argued Hungary and Poland “can no longer be considered liberal

democracies” because their governments have established authoritarian institutional systems that

give “largely unrestricted political power to the ruling party” (Ekiert, 2017). Meanwhile, former

postcommunist laggards (countries like Romania and Bulgaria) have shown resilience and now

outperform Hungary and Poland on some measures of democratic quality and political stability

(overall democracy score, electoral process, civil society etc.). What explains this surprising reversal

in which the leaders of democratization have become its laggards, and the laggards are now taking

the lead? What makes some countries more resilient to populism and illiberalism than others?

Hungary, Poland and Slovakia all witnessed attacks on constitutional courts and the rule of

law, violations of civil rights, the introductions of restrictions on freedom of the press, and policies

meant to weaken opposition parties and strengthen the executive (Roberts, 2018). Many anti-

establishment populist politicians, like Czech billionaire and current Prime Minister Andrej Babis,

whose party ANO 2011 (Action of Dissatisfied Citizens) build his career on declaring that the

political establishment is immoral and needs to be discarded. The Czech Republic elicited

comparisons with Weimar Germany after Milos Zeman, the first president that the country elected

directly (in 2013), defied Parliament by installing one of his confidants as prime minister (Müller,

2014). Democratic backsliding has been so severe that the EU moved towards imposing Article 7

sanctions against Hungary and Poland. Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty can be triggered when one of

the EU’s member states violates “human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and

respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.”

In Poland, since winning elections in October 2015, the governing Law and Justice (PiS)

party has passed reforms that reduced judicial independence and politicized the media, clamped



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down on civil society, and branded those criticizing it as traitors. Laws passed in 2017 give the PiS

dominated Sejm (parliament) full control over the election of members of the National Judicial

Council (NJC), an institution that appoints judges across the country. In December 2016, Poland’s

parliament adopted an amendment to the Law on Assemblies, which authorities then used to ban

certain protests and rallies. Judges that supported the citizens’ rights to protest peacefully in their

rulings were subject to disciplinary proceedings. Jaroslaw Kaczynski accused political opponents of

collaborating with the former communist-era secret police, of being traitors, and “the worst sort of

Poles.” In June 2018, Amnesty International warned that the right to peaceful protest is under

serious threat in Poland. In 2017, the EU moved towards adopting formal sanctions against

Poland for failing to uphold democracy at home: in December, Article 7 was triggered, and Poland

became the first country to elicit that action in EU history. In 2018, the EU Commission sued

Poland at the Court of Justice of the European Union for its decision to force judges to retire

(Poland passed a law which lowers the retirement age of judges on the Supreme Court from 70 to

65, which effectively forces 27 of the 72 sitting judges into retirement). The Commission found

the law incompatible with EU law, because it undermines judicial independence, and harms the

EU’s legal order by creating a risk of serious and irreparable damage in Poland.

In Hungary, Viktor Orban and his FIDESZ party have transformed the country into “a

semi-authoritarian state,” a model that Polish PiS emulated (Kelemen and Orenstein, 2016). After

coming to power in 2010, Orban’s government launched a “constitutional revolution to eliminate

independent checks on its power and consolidate Fidesz’s rule for years to come” (idem supra).

Hungary’s Constitutional Court was a target: Orban’s government first changed the procedure for

appointing judges to allow the parliamentary majority to appoint without consulting the

opposition. In 2011, a new constitution expanded the Constitutional Court, allowing Orban to

pack it with Fidesz loyalists. When the Court declared some of Orban’s measures unconstitutional,

the government amended the Constitution in 2013 to limit the Court’s power further. Orban also

replaced and reorganized independent public bodies whose mission was to keep government’s

powers in check (like the National Election Commission and the National Media Board), attacked



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mass media and civil society organizations, and modified the country’s electoral system (Kelemen

and Orenstein, 2016). In September 2018, the European Parliament voted to censure the

Hungarian government for eroding democracy and failing to uphold fundamental EU values, a

vote that opened the door for Article 7 sanctions to be imposed, including a temporary loss of EU

Council voting rights. A report authored by MEP Judith Sargentini found that Orban’s attacks on

mass media independence, academics and universities, the independence of the judiciary, migrants

and refugees, and minority rights posed a “systemic threat to the EU’s fundamental principles.”

While attempts at undermining rule of law also took place in Romania, the outcome was

different. On August 10, 2018, one hundred thousand people gathered in Victoriei Square in

Bucharest, Romania, to protest against government decrees that many (including the European

Commission and the US Department of State) said would undermine the fight against corruption,

weaken the rule of law, and reduce judicial independence. The protests had no identifiable

organizers in Romania. On social media, Romanians working abroad in the EU coordinated

efforts and spread the word in the months before the demonstration. The movement galvanized

under the motto Diaspora Vine Acasa (“Diaspora Comes Home”). It remained a broad, non-

hierarchical, leaderless collective, separate from the political establishment, but powerful enough

to bring migrants and non-migrants together in support of common political causes: protecting the

rule of law, sustaining anti-corruption efforts, and consolidating Romania’s position in the EU.

Under pressure, the government annulled the executive orders that had triggered the protests.

In Poland, May 2016 brought massive protests, with some 240,000 flooding central

Warsaw marching to protect their country’s place in the EU and resist the government’s attempts

to undermine democracy. The demonstration took place under the banner “We Are and Will

Remain in Europe,” led by an organization called The Committee for the Defense of Democracy

(KOD). Some said it was the largest protest in Poland since 1989. Confronted with the pressure,

Poland’s president Andrej Duda vetoed attempts to change the judicial system by the PiS-led

government. In May and July 2018, tens of thousands of anti-government protesters marched in

over 60 Polish cities and towns for independent courts following the judiciary overhaul that



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angered the European Union. The last couple of years have seen a number of “Chain of Lights”

demonstrations in which protesters light candles, waved European Union and Polish flags,

displayed banners with one word: Konstytucja (“Constitution”), and demanded judicial

independence (Reuters, BBC, The New York Times 2018). While Civic Platform (PO), the main

liberal centrist opposition party to PiS remains weakened after corruption scandals that led to its

losing power in 2015 after eight years in office, PiS legitimacy has come under question. Polls show

both Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of PiS, and Grzegorz Schetyna, the leader of Civic Platform, to

be the country’s two most distrusted politicians. A poll published in February 2019 found that 71

percent of respondents thought Kaczynski should retire from politics (Tilles and Junes, 2019). In

2017, various polls showed PO scoring ahead of the PiS by a small margin (31 to 29 percent). Still,

in this summer’s European Parliament elections, PiS won a clear victory, with 45.6% of the vote,

while European Coalition (KE, which includes Civic Platform and a group of leftist politicians)

came in second with 38.3%, a pronounced decline since 2014 when the parties now forming the

coalition achieved a combined result of 48.2% (Goclowski and Florkiewicz, 2019). New parties,

including Palikot’s Movement in 2011, and Kukiz’15, Modern (Nowoczesna) and Together

(Razem) in 2015, showed that challengers of both PiS and PO have a future in galvanizing liberal,

pro-European forces (Tilles and Junes, 2019). PiS has managed to retain support by combining

anti-communist rhetoric with social conservatism and highly popular welfare programs such as

Family 500+, which guarantees a subsidy of 500 zloty ($130) for each child in low-income families,

and the second and every child after for most other families, and other expanded benefits for the

disabled, pensioners, and farmers. Throughout this tumultuous period, Polish intra-EU movers

did not appear as a group on the political stage to make their voices heard.



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Central and Eastern European Countries’ Democracy Scores (2003-2018)

Changes in Democracy Scores in Central and Eastern Europe



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What explains this reversal of trajectories in which the leaders of democratization have

become its laggards, and the laggards have shown remarkable resilience? The puzzle eludes many

familiar historical, cultural, socio-economic, political, institutional, and international explanations.

Backsliding did not occur in countries where communist regimes were the most repressive (like

Romania and Bulgaria), and resilience did not characterize countries where the legacies of

communism involved some openness and experimentation with liberalism (Poland and Hungary).

Countries with Catholic or Protestant traditions were not more resilient to backsliding than those

with Christian Orthodox traditions; ethnic homogeneity did not prevent Poland and Hungary

from turning against liberalism, and ethnic diversity did not give impetus to nationalist populist

parties in Romania. The strength of societal pushback and mass mobilization against illiberal

policies were not correlated with strength of civil society under communism and after: civil society

remains stronger in Poland and Hungary. Disenchantment and democratic decline do not come

from deteriorating economic performance or recession: Poland was the only EU country that

maintained 3% economic growth at the peak of the recent economic crisis that hit the EU hard, in

particular the Baltics, Southern Europe (Greece, Spain), and Romania. Neither can backsliding be

fully explained by the European migration crisis, which reached its maximum level in 2015:

Poland and the Czech Republic were largely untouched by the inflow of migrants from the Middle

East and Northern Africa, and Hungary had begun dismantling liberal checks and balances after

FIDESZ party won the 2010 elections, long before the Mediterranean crisis affected the country.

Nor can simple institutional explanations account for patterns of democratic backsliding and

resilience. Scholarship has generally shown that parliamentary systems maintain superior

democratic quality than semi-presidential regimes. Parliamentarism, when combined with

proportional representation, gave representation to more groups, encouraged coalition-making,

and limited the power of executives to act unilaterally (Roberts, 2018: 15). However, recent

developments have exposed the vulnerabilities of parliamentarism to authoritarian take-over: there

is no limit on the number of mandates a Prime Minister can hold, which can lead to potential

concentration of power in the executive (PM and cabinet) as long as the executive maintains a



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majority/supermajority in the Parliament, as has been the case in Hungary. In semi-presidential

systems like Romania, directly elected presidents share executive power with a prime minister and

government that enjoy the support of an elected legislature (Sedelius and Aberg, 2018). This

creates the possibility of cohabitation, a situation in which the president and prime minister are

from opposing parties. This risk of intra-executive tension can lead to stalemate and conflict, but

also prevents concentration of power and limits the ability of a prime minister that enjoys

supermajority in parliament to pass legislation that favors its party. In Romania’s case, President

Klaus Iohannis (former leader of the center-right National Liberal Party) has often given pushback

against Prime Ministers like Victor Ponta and Viorica Dancila (from the opposing Social

Democratic Party). External actors like the EU have sought to redress democratic backsliding

where it occurred, but their success record has been mixed. While the EU threatened material

sanctions and applied social pressure in response to backsliding in Poland, Hungary, and

Romania, Hungary and Poland did not respond, while political elites and the Romanian PM

Victor Ponta agreed with EU demands. The EU can “anchor democracy from above,” through top-

down processes, only in some cases, and existing research on the effectiveness of conditionality

almost always notes that “the right context” (Sedelmeier, 2014) or some level of domestic support

(Jacoby, 2006; Roberts, 2018) is crucial. In other words, anchoring democracy cannot happen only

from above. Democracy promotion efforts succeed only when the “active leverage” of

conditionality works together with bottom-up mechanisms that anchor democracy from below.

Some refer to this as “passive leverage” (Vachudova, 2005). In contrast, this book (and the current

summary) explores the mechanisms and bottom-up pressures that anchor democracy from below.

This paper argues that the way in which countries participate in the European Union, and

– in particular – the way in which people practice European citizenship and rely on intra-EU

freedom of movement in their living-making influences the resilience of postcommunist countries

to democratic backsliding and illiberal agendas. In countries where many people depend on the

EU with their jobs, social status, and prosperity, European integration and commitment to the

liberal democratic norms that the EU promotes retain their appeal. European citizenship is useful:



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citizens of EU countries enjoy the right to travel, work, reside, and study in any other EU member

state. High-mobility migration across national borders (the back-and-forth intra-EU mobility of EU

citizens) shapes worldviews, political and economic preferences, voting, and the state-citizen

relationship in profound ways.

The European Commission estimated that, in 2017, roughly 5.6 million EU-28 movers of

working age had been living in their country of residence for up to 10 years. This statistic of recent

movers does not include the numerous migrants who work abroad but do not establish residence

in their country of destination, commuting between their country of citizenship and the country

where they work for shorter periods. The most represented nationalities among EU-28 recent

movers are Romanian (22%), Polish (18%), Italian (8%), Bulgarian (6%), and Portuguese (5%);

taken together, these nationalities make up over 50% of intra-EU mobility (Fries-Tersch et al.,

2019). The main sending countries for intra-EU migration have remained the same in recent years,

with Poland and Romania together sending 30% of overall outflows among the EU-28 member

states. When it comes to return mobility, Romania has maintained a high share of nationals

among its inflow from EU-28 countries. Some 89% of inflow movers of working age (20-64) were

Romanian nationals. Looking at the difference between inflows and outflows of nationals, the two

main countries of origin – Romania and Poland – have balanced rates for inflows to outflows of

nationals. Returnees make 69% compared to the number of nationals leaving the country in the

case of Romania, and 49% in the case of Poland, which suggests that strong return mobility is

accompanying outflows (Fries-Tersch et al., 2019). In July 2019, the Romanian minister for

diaspora, Natalia-Elena Intotero, presented the most recent official statistics according to which

about 9.7 million Romanians are living abroad, of which a majority (5.6 million) live in the

diaspora, while the rest are part of historical communities that were once part of Romania, like

Moldova, but also Ukraine and Hungary (Melenciuc, 2019). It is estimated that anywhere between

3-5 million Romanians work abroad, and some 3-4 million Poles work abroad. It is estimated that

over 21.3% of Romania’s working age population (total population 19.3 million) were EU mobile

citizens (compared to 9.5% that were mobile in 2008). Out of Poland’s population of 37.9 million,



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4.4% were EU mobile in 2008 and 7.5% resided in another EU member state in 2018. In

contrast, 1.7% of Hungarians lived in another EU country in 2008, and 5.3% were EU movers in

2018, with many leaving for political rather than economic reasons (Eurostat Statistics Explained,

2019).

Change in Democracy Score (2013-2018) and Levels of Intra-EU Mobility (2018)

Living in another country and experiencing politics there changes how people see the

world, including how the think about the state, the national economy, and political party

platforms. Political attitudes and preferences change as a result of migratory experience: migrants

develop or adopt new norms, behaviors, and values (Levitt, 1998; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow,

2010; Rother, 2009). Previous research on immigrant political participation mainly focused on

receiving countries, with much less attention given to the migrants’ countries of origin. It was

assumed that, when people emigrate, they gradually disconnect politically from the country they

leave behind as their new life revolves around their country of destination. In the traditional



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emigration-immigration scenario very few people maintain any political connection with their

former homeland: some do so because they fail to integrate in the receiving society, but most who

retain transnational political connections are part of diaspora elites who have the time and

resources to maintain political ties that others cannot afford. Long-distance ties between

traditional diasporas and sending countries have little political substance and weight, and political

interest declines over time (Guarnizo et al., 2003; Itzigsohn et al., 1999; Itzigsohn and Villacrés,

2008). Emigrants and their children may attempt to influence politics in former homelands from

afar by participating in politics in receiving countries, via transnational associations (Mügge, 2010).

Intra-EU movers challenge this conventional wisdom. Diaspora Comes Home is just one of

the most recent examples that EU migrants do not disconnect from the politics in their homeland.

The movement illustrates the emergence of a new kind of politics, a politics of mobility, which

becomes possible when free movement enables people to disconnect from the national economy

(the labor market, specifically) without becoming politically uprooted. Diaspora Comes Home reflects

profound political changes in a country where over 20% of the population works abroad, and a

society characterized by relatively weak civil society, a scarce and episodic history of protest, and

little experience with social movements. August 10th also challenges received knowledge that

portrays transnational political engagement as top-down, state-led endeavors (Alonso and Mylonas,

2017; Délano Alonso, 2018) or dependent on the outreach work of state and non-state agents

within countries of origin, such as parties, bureaucracies, and civil society organizations (Koinova

and Tsourapas, 2018). It highlights the fact that migration itself is changing, and questions claims

that EU membership results in mass emigration and uprooting (Waterbury, 2018). Emigration has

been seen as threat to the physical and cultural survival of postcommunist nations (Dumbrava,

2017; Waterbury, 2018). Diaspora Comes Home shows that those working abroad still identify as

members of the nation in their country of origin. It shows that diasporas care enough about

homeland politics that they are willing to return and participate, pressuring the government for

reform. When migrants leave the country, their departure is seen as “exit” and migrants are

described as voting with their feet (Hirschman, 1970). Instead, the Romanian diaspora



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demonstrated the ability to exercise “voice,” not only by voting, but also by returning to participate

in homeland politics, mobilizing bottom-up and asserting its power independently from

established actors. Around the world, countries have granted the right to vote to expats, but

turnout remains low reflecting the absence of political interest (Lafleur, 2013). Meanwhile,

Romanians and Poles who are intra-EU movers wait in line for hours to cast their ballot, causing

scandals in national mass media about expat de facto disenfranchisement. In Romania, non-

migrants have demonstrated for migrant voting rights in solidarity with migrant protests abroad,

which resulted in three-day weekend voting and correspondence voting for Romanians abroad.

Migrants have already influenced election outcomes in Poland, Romania, Italy, Mexico and

Iraq (Ellis et al., 2007). Diaspora influence was decisive in the 2009 presidential elections in

Romania, and the 2006 elections in Cape Verde. Still, we know surprisingly little about the

political impact of frequent, temporary, circular migration on sending countries and migrants

themselves. This book examines high-mobility contexts, where physical exit from the national

territory is temporary and does not dissolve political connections between state and citizen. How

does intra-EU movement change politics in the migrants’ countries of origin? Through what

mechanisms does this transformation occur? Under what circumstances does intra-EU mobility

contribute to democratic resilience in postcommunist liberal democracies? When do intra-EU

movers play a role in homeland politics and what is the nature of their contribution?

I examine the political effects of free movement on migrants’ countries of origin in the

European Union, using quantitative and qualitative evidence from Poland and Romania, the EU’s

main migrant-sending countries. I argue that the EU’s extension of free movement to citizens of

member states amounts to a new stage in the evolution of citizenship. Access rights and their

practice creates a new category of movers, whom I call citizens of the Market. These are people who

work abroad to climb the social ladder at home. They do not see themselves as immigrants, but

rather as commuters, citizens of their country who enjoy the rights and privileges granted by

European citizenship. They exit their country’s economy and take advantage of the opportunities

the European labor market offers, but maintain their social and political ties to their country



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where they ultimately plan to return. They send money home and prioritize building a comfortable

life for themselves and their families there, while living a frugal life abroad, a life that they often

describe as self-sacrifice for a better future. Citizens of the Market do not naturalize elsewhere, and

do not aspire to become citizens in their receiving countries. They experience migration as a

restructuring of life across borders, which shapes their worldviews, political attitudes, orientations,

and preferences. Their transformation and the connection they maintain with non-migrants in

sending communities result in politically salient changes at home: citizens of the Market

communicate with non-migrant relatives, friends and acquaintances from the homeland on a daily

basis, on the phone, on WhatsApp or Skype, and on social media. They exchange information and

opinions about politics and economic realities. Over time, intra-EU movers emerge as powerful

constituencies that have their own political agendas and preferences. In communities where the

only path towards prosperity and social mobility is working somewhere else in the EU, intra-EU

mobility becomes an engine of economic growth and a source of hope, and the voices of citizens of

the Market command increasingly more attention.

The analysis includes three levels:

1. At the micro level, a multi-sited political ethnography of Romanian high-mobility migration (based on fieldwork conducted over the span of three years in several locations in Romania, Italy and France) documents socio-political changes and identifies causal mechanisms. The ethnography includes in-depth interviews with migrants, non-migrant family members, and non-migrants, as well as conversations with Romanian and foreign informants: local authorities, civil society representatives, embassy and consulate officials, religious leaders and priests, political party leaders etc. To capture the ensemble of the intra-EU migratory experience, I conducted participant observations and over 150 semi-structured interviews in the sending country (in three different judete, i.e. counties: Neamt, Maramures, and Satu Mare), and several receiving communities in Italy (Treviso, Rome, Venice) and France (Paris, Strasbourg). The ethnography shows a distinct profile of the Romanian intra-EU migrant that crystallizes as a result of working abroad. The results are analyzed in comparison with findings about Polish intra-EU movers. This reveals similarities and differences between the two groups, with politically salient differences resulting from (a) historical legacies: Poland has a long history of international migration that precedes EU freedom of movement, while in Romania mass high-mobility migration developed as a result of EU accession; (b) the political context in receiving countries: Romanians migrate to Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium etc., while Poles are highly



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concentrated in UK, the most Eurosceptic EU member that took the decision to leave the Union as a result of the Brexit vote; and (c) changing patterns of migration, from free movement to settlement/immigration: the Brexit referendum in 2016 has determined many Polish intra-EU movers to apply for permanent resident status and stay in the UK.

2. At the meso level, I examine variation in voting (in national parliamentary elections) at the subnational level and show how, over time and especially after the introduction of free movement in Poland and Romania, the political preference profiles of counties (Romanian judete and Polish voivodships) with high levels of intra-EU mobility diverge from the political preference profiles of counties that have lower levels of EU mobility. I use data from both UNC Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and the Manifesto Project to corroborate results. Findings reveal significant and systematic differences in voting between places with more intra-EU migration and those with less. Counties with more high-mobility migration are generally more supportive of liberal and liberal conservative parties on the center-right, with strong commitment to reducing state intervention in the economy and European integration. High-mobility migration counties become more center-right and pull to the right on economic and political measures when compared to their lower migration counterparts.

3. At the macro level, I analyze how governments and political parties in migrant-sending countries (Poland and Romania) adapt their strategies to a context in which they can no longer assume that their citizens are physically present on national territory. I compare the transnational political engagement philosophy and programs of the Polish and Romanian governments, and examine the work of their representatives and institutions abroad. I study the approaches of Romanian and Polish political parties and candidates running for office. The analysis shows the importance of political histories of migration in both countries. Paradoxically, a longer history of migration and diaspora engagement like Poland’s does not guarantee higher levels of migrant participation, representation, and visibility in homeland politics for citizens of the Market. A more laissez-faire approach and lack of institutional inertia from traditional diaspora management structures provide more space for diaspora bottom-up mobilization resulting in more impactful participation than attempts to incorporate migrants top-down in line with the interests of established political actors who often misunderstand the needs and intentions of intra-EU movers.

Much of the existing scholarship claims that European citizenship is “politically sterile” (Recchi

2015). This comes, in part, from the fact that studies concentrate predominantly on elites, highly-

educated, highly-skilled migrants, many of whom are highly supportive of European integration

and liberal values before moving to another EU country. Other research has sought to find



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whether transnationalism has led to the emergence of a European identity across the Union (Kuhn

2015), but without addressing the way in which migration shapes politics in the migrants’

countries of origin. These approaches make assumptions about where and how political effects

materialize, expecting that intra-EU movers might have a higher sense of belonging to Europe as a

community (the identity dimension) or be more involved in collective decision-making at the

European level (the participation dimension). The findings presented in this book show that intra-

EU migration is politically consequential, but on other metrics. The qualitative research I present

shows that average citizens who work abroad experience EU citizenship pragmatically and talk

about European integration as useful to them and their countries. Migrants remain politically

rooted in their country of origin, and have limited time and resources for developing an interest

for the highly complicated processes of EU collective decision-making. They do not “feel” more

European, and do not seek to integrate in another host country society (“Do I feel Italian? Of

course not. I just… you know, ‘go out’ to work,” laughed one of the Romanians I interviewed), but

they know the rights they have as European citizens (“Of course it’s a good thing that Romania

joined the EU. European citizenship has restored my dignity. I no longer have to hide from the

Carabinieri [i.e. the Italian Police]. I can go back to see my family, they can come visit me… I don’t

have to hide anymore,” said a Romanian caretaker who worked in Venice). More recent

contributions from the transnationalism literature examine the effects of free movement and non-

material, social remittances on lifestyles, families, communities, and economic development in

new EU member-states from Central and Eastern Europe, but do not analyze the political impact

of new mobilities (Grabowska et al. 2017; White 2011).

This book examines the new politics of mobility in migrants’ countries of origin,

concentrating on the experiences of average citizens and their political effects on people,

communities, and political systems. It contributes to comparative politics scholarship, in

particular, to the literatures on democratization and political development, through its

examination of democratic backsliding and consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe, drawing

attention to the fact that – contrarily to received wisdom – certain types of migration can boost



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resilience against the rise of illiberal actors. It contributes to the literature on citizenship by

examining the functioning of citizenship beyond a nation-state, showing how citizenship of the

Market emancipates people from the state and allows them to access and combine opportunities,

as well as to have more political voice in their country of origin. It contributes to EU studies by

demonstrating that, in an age of Euroscepticism, the heart of European integration can now be

found in Europe’s periphery. By extending freedom of movement to all, the EU has managed to

create reservoirs of public support for itself in the least likely places, consolidating liberal

democracy not top-down, as an elite project disconnected from what people want, but rather

bottom-up, as citizens of the Market rely on free movement to make a living and climb the social

ladder.

The rest of this paper presents the main findings at each analytical level: micro, meso, and

macro. It discusses the similarities and differences in impact of free movement migration in

Poland and Romania, which offers an answer to the empirical puzzle of why citizens of the Market

form a new, visible and influential political power group in Romania, while they do not in Poland.

Of Fences and Borders: Socialization, Political Remittances, and Demonstration Effects ‘That fence is quite something,’ sighed the fifty-year-old Mrs. Iancu as she sipped her espresso,

shielded from the afternoon sun by a motley parasol on the terrace of the family villa. Without

turning her head, the housewife felt her husband’s gaze drawn to the same magnet: the neighbor’s

house across the street. For months, Apetrei’s garden had been covered in piles of river stone,

wrought iron and sand. Workers had toiled from morning till evening, but now… what a sight!

The fence surrounding the Iancu residence, while still shiny and trendy, was no match. There was

no doubt about it: Apetrei had raised the bar. The small Romanian town of Targu Neamt had a

new standard for fancy fences. There was only one way to keep up. Even though Mr. Iancu and his

sons are skilled electricians, their earnings would not suffice. As she tied her apron to cook dinner,



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Mrs. Iancu sighed: ‘I’m going back to Italy next month.’ Her husband nodded and stepped into

the backyard to water the vegetable garden and the three young cherry trees.

There is nothing exceptional about Mrs. Iancu “leaving for work,” as people call it here.

Most families in this county (judetul Neamt) have one or several members who work in Spain, Italy

or Germany. Men usually work in agriculture, construction, plumbing or transportation. Women

find jobs as caretakers, babysitters, vegetable and fruit pickers, or waitresses. Migrants spend

anywhere from a few months to a few years away from home, working hard and living austerely to

save what becomes a small fortune upon return. In Targu Neamt, prosperity flows down the intra-

European routes towards the Southern and Western parts of the continent. In post-communist

CEE countries like Romania and Poland, an large part of the destitute countryside, where jobs

were rare and wages low after the post-1989 collapse of state-supported local industries, relies on

European mobility for wealth, social protection, and upward mobility. Remittances build homes,

buy cars, send children to college, start businesses, pay for weddings, connect households to the

Internet, and display, for the first time in years, a story of success that gives hope to many.

Mrs. Iancu’s earnings from her first trips to Brindisi and Lecce, Italy, helped the family

move out of the crammed three-room apartment on the last floor of a grey “Communist” block.

The Iancus bought land and built a villa in Pomete, the affluent neighborhood on the hill. ‘There

are no words to describe how difficult our life was before: we had no money, we were in debt…,’

remembers Mrs. Iancu. The money she made as a caretaker for the elderly allowed the family to

build and consolidate a middle-class status in the community: the Iancus started a couple of small,

but lucrative family businesses, sent their children to private universities, purchased two cars, as

well as central heating, AC, flat-screen TVs and computers. ‘It’s hard to work abroad, to be away

from home. There were times when I felt like I could not take it anymore. But being away and

working for your family’s future makes you stronger, you know?’ Mrs. Iancu told me, wiping a tear

from the corner of her eye. ‘After working outside for a year or so, I’d come home and tell

everyone I’d never leave again. But it does not work that way, you see? The need pushes you.’



18

The neighborhood where the Iancu’s villa is located abounds in stark contrasts between

old and new: traditional-style one-level houses with flower beds, chicken coops and barns stand

next to brightly colored villas with balconies, paved alleys and garages. Two worlds greet the visitor

in juxtaposition: shiny Audis scare off the placid cows grazing next to unpaved roads. Construction

sites are mushrooming. On the streets, grandparents and grandchildren breathe the new air of

affluence, waiting for migratory parents and older siblings to return.

To shed light on how intra-EU movement influences worldviews, economic preferences

and political orientations, and to identify the mechanisms through which socio-political

transformation influences politics, I conducted between 2009 and 2011 several rounds of

fieldwork in Romania, Italy and France provided the basis for a multi-sited political ethnography

of intra-EU migrant life, that covered the ensemble of migratory experiences at home and abroad.

Via qualitative research, I examined the socio-political impact of high-mobility migration on

individuals and their sending communities in three counties: judetul Neamt, judetul Satu Mare and

judetul Maramures.

Figure 5. Summary of Interviews: Categories Migrants Non-Migrant

FamilyNon-Migrants Informants TOTAL

Romania(Neamt) 15 9 3 3 30Romania(Maramures) 15 6 2 7 30Romania(SatuMare) 15 4 3 5 27Romania(Bucharest) 4 3 7ROMANIA(TOTAL) 45 19 12 18 94ITALY 19 - - 10 29FRANCE 10 - - 10 20TOTAL 74 19 12 38 153

When it comes to the profiles of interviewed migrants, most had worked abroad several times, and

only a handful had worked in another country once; some were planning to return soon, while



19

many were undecided. The length of stays abroad ranged from three to eighteen months (the long,

uninterrupted stays happened before the introduction of free movement, when work migrants left

as tourists, overstayed and worked as undocumented, and then were unable to return). All came

from small cities, towns and villages. On average, women interviewees were older than men. Men

worked in the construction sector and in agriculture. Women generally worked as caretakers,

waitresses, or fruit and vegetable pickers (agriculture). Some migrants had used their earnings to

start small businesses (e.g. construction firms, bed & breakfasts, restaurants, electronics). Most

migrants had completed high-school education, and about a dozen had some level of higher

education. Reported reasons for migration were exclusively economic. Most migrants maintained

residence in both sending and host societies. In general, migrants’ parents and children stayed at

home where they could enjoy the fruits of migrants’ work. Older generations took care of the

house and oversaw family businesses; children enjoyed high-quality public education up to high-

school level, then migrant parents invested in sending them to university (private or public).

Informants in Italy and France included highly educated migrants, diplomatic personnel

(embassy and consulate), Romanian Cultural Institute officials (in Rome, Venice and Paris), artists

(Venice), political party leaders (Romanian Identity Party in Rome), religious leaders, student

group representatives, and founders of Romanian organizations. With one exception, émigrés had

college education. Many worked as IT technicians, doctors, engineers, economists and artists.

Many, especially among the Romanian community in Paris and Strasbourg, were Romanian

students in Master’s or exchange programs. In Italy, the Romanian community was more diverse,

but also divided between highly-skilled, highly-educated émigrés and highly-mobile workers. A

couple had experiences in both worlds: a young artist had tried to work on a potato farm to

finance his studies (he could not withstand the physical effort and gave up), while another worked

as a waitress to support herself during her years as a Master’s student in the UK.

Figure 6. Issues Discussed in Migrant Interviews TransnationalTies&Experiences Host-CountryTies&ExperiencesEconomic Building/Renovatingfamilyhome Employment&training Sendingmoney&goodstofamily Accommodation



20

Entrepreneurship Remuneration&benefits Savingsandplansforusingearnings Plansforthefuture Political Nationalidentity/identification Desiretosettledownabroad Europeanidentity&EUsignificance Attitudestowardshostcountry Membershipinpol.organizations Membershipinpol.organizations Discussionofhomelandpolitics Interestinhost-countrypolitics Politicalparticipation Politicalparticipation Political attitudes & preferences

(state, economy, EU, favoritepolitician)

Interactions with sending-countryinstitutions;viewsaboutthestate

Interactions with host countryinstitutions

Social Communication with non-migrant

family&friends–frequency,meansCommunication with employer andcolleagues:workplaceinteractions

Interactions & friendship with co-nationalsabroad

Getting along & friendship withhost-countrynationals

Exclusion from community of originbynon-migrants

Discrimination

Visitstothehomeland Bringingfamilytohostcountry Participationinorganizations Participationinorganizations Viewsof foreignmigrants incountry

oforiginViews of other migrants whileabroad

Cultural Speakingone’snativelanguage Languageskills Ethnicandreligiousidentification Culturaladjustment Participationinorganizations Participationinorganizations Traditions,customs,lifeevents Learningnewvalues,behaviors Personal Effectsofmigrantlifeexperience Attitudestowardswork Is migration good/bad for your

communityandcountry?Comparinglifeathomeandabroad

Optimism/pessimismab.future Ideasofsuccess

Figure 6 summarizes the topics discussed in interviews with highly mobile migrants. Interviews

with non-migrants included questions about similar topics, but concerning non-migrants’

perceptions of intra-EU mobility and its effects (on individuals, families, the community and the



21

country). Non-migrant relatives answered questions about communication with those abroad.

Interviews with non-migrants included questions about whether the respondent had contemplated

working abroad, perceptions of migrant behaviors after return and evaluations of migration as a

living-making strategy. All interviews included questions about political attitudes, party

preferences, political figures, national and supranational identifications, government performance,

EU accession etc.

Socialization

Migratory experiences open up new possibilities and new horizons. They expose migrants to new

life styles, attitudes, socio-political and economic relations, cultures and behaviors. A part of the

experience concerns adjusting to the work experience itself, which migrants generally describe as

very hard. However, migrants emphasize that good-quality, hard work pays off abroad: “Once you

go, you see how money is made and saved. It’s beyond any imagination. Once you see that, you

realize that salaries at home are a mockery. You cannot live decently on that money,” said Sofica,

42, from Negresti-Oas (Satu Mare), who is now working for the fourth time in Italy. Adjustment

and success require considerable “self-engineering” (Ong, 2006): migrants learn foreign languages,

professional skills and cultural norms to communicate with employers and better respond to

customer needs. “Every evening after work, I’d open the conversation guide and my dictionary and

study. In two months, I could understand and chat with everyone in the family,” said Luiza, 49,

from Targu Neamt. Migrants see undergoing downward mobility abroad as temporary strategy to

climb the social ladder at home. “If Italians came here and saw how we live, they’d say they’re the

ones who should clean our houses, not the other way around,” said Maria, a 42 year-old housewife

from Targu Neamt, who occasionally works as a caretaker in Italy. Yet, for intra-EU free movers,

integration in host societies usually stops at labor market goals: they do not intend to settle down

abroad or naturalize, nor do they have time to socialize with foreigners. Since their stays abroad are

short, citizens of the Market have different interests from co-national traditional diasporas.



22

Migrants describe the experience of working abroad as deeply transformative. “Life has a

different pace abroad. People are more open, but they also work harder. I tried to come back and

stay, but I was not able to. I just cannot stay still like I used to, like everyone around here does…

I’ll see in a few years, but for now I’m still good for work (bun de munca),” said Gheorghe, 47, from

Viseul de Sus (Maramures), who works as a construction worker in France. “Seeing the fruits of

your labor” is highly motivating; work standards and exigencies abroad are high, so Romanian

workers have a lot to learn professionally. Most migrants expressed pride in their work and

achievements. Many experienced discrimination abroad, which accentuated political uprootedness

in the countries of destination, and confirmed the usefulness of European citizenship that intra-

EU movers invoke to push back against exploitation and discrimination. “If the boss violates the

terms of the work contract, I can report him, I know the office where I can do that now that I have

rights as a European citizen,” said Alexandra, 24, who works in a pizzeria in Venice.

Social life and networking occur within the temporary worker community, and political

discussions relate to developments at home. But citizens of the market spend more time interacting

with host societies, whether in the family that hires them (in the case of caretakers) or on multi-

national worker teams. Migrants who had experienced migration before free movement recalled

living in isolation and fear of local authorities when they were undocumented. Some caretakers

said they avoided leaving the house and interacting with people other than employers and close

friends. “When you are in order (in regula, i.e. legal, hired with a contract), you do not have to hide

anymore; so yes, the EU allows us to go to work freely. It’s a very good thing,” said Daniel, 45,

from Targu Neamt. Citizens of the Market develop a pragmatic, work-centered lifestyle, in which

diligence, self-reliance, merit, frugality and investing in the future (in the sending country)

represent the main pillars. Many migrants reported learning realities and experiences abroad: many

caretakers noticed the level of independence children have in host societies, and told me they too

tried to give their children more space and to become their friend rather than an authority figure.

Many women reported feeling free and proud after becoming the breadwinner in their household.



23

Migrants develop a rights-centered view of their relationship with political authority (many

invoke their rights as European citizens during interactions with government officials and

employers). Some Romanian officials complained about migrants’ fixation with their rights: “They

always say ‘my rights were encroached upon; help me!’ or ‘do something: I’m discriminated

against!’ But there’s often very little we as representatives of the Romanian state can do for them.

They always complain that we don’t do enough,” said a high-level consulate official in Rome.

Migrants discuss politics among themselves and with family members, but they approach it from a

pragmatic perspective. When asked about the ways in which migration transformed them, many

citizens of the Market (and family members describing transformations in intra-EU movers) report

an increased, almost obsessive preoccupation with work, a tendency to become more

individualistic, but also increased professional and general knowledge, a broader horizon as a

result of having lived abroad, higher expectations and goals, improved confidence in one’s abilities,

and a higher propensity to speak up for oneself, and against inefficiency or injustice. Local

politicians in sending communities find that intra-EU movers complain more when they return;

returnees argue their complaints are justified. Citizens of the Market do not see themselves as

immigrants: they identify primarily as Romanian and speak about their travels for work abroad

using vague and imprecise expressions like “going out” or “going to work,” as if they never even

left the country. Non-migrants in high-mobility communities also use this language to talk about

temporary exits and fluid migratory project when speaking about relatives “working outside.”

Citizens of the Market undergo downward social mobility abroad in order to secure

upward mobility at home for themselves and their children. They like to talk about what they

accomplished through sacrifices and take pride in the fruit of their hard work. Some remember

with delight the instances in which they showed their foreign employers photos of their villa in

Romania, and the employer admitted the house was more beautiful than his. They are not

concerned with fitting in or socializing in the host country: they do what is necessary to learn the

language and communicate with employers and clients. Many work difficult jobs (in caretaking or

the construction industry) and live in austere conditions to save every penny. But living abroad



24

also gives migrants a unique sense of independence, self-worth and freedom of choice, liberating

them from traditional relations, kinship and community obligations – what Gellner called the

“tyranny of cousins” (Gellner, 1994). Emancipation from traditional ties is particularly valuable for

migrant women. Status markers like building a house, buying a car, starting a business and sending

one’s children to college are among the most common longer-term goals migrants mentioned. All

involve projecting a new, updated image of the self and/or the family (and even engaging in

conspicuous consumption) in the community of origin. They all reinforce the connection between

migrants and the sending country, a connection that is also kept alive through regular visits for

vacation and occasional longer stays. Most communicate several times a day with their families and

friends “at home”; they read Romanian newspapers online and spend time chatting on forums.

Abroad, especially in Italy, many public squares or parks function as meeting places at lunchtime:

people gather around and chat about jobs, life abroad and life at home.

In terms of politics, migrants value positively their country’s accession to the European

Union, but they tend to be critical of government inefficiency, corruption and unresponsiveness.

Many report having tried to vote while abroad, but failing due to administrative failures. In

participant observations during the 2009 presidential elections, voters abroad had to wait in line

for 4-5 hours to vote at the Romanian Embassy in Paris. Across the board, intra-EU movers

complained that the number of voting stations abroad was insufficient and their location made

them inaccessible to many who would have otherwise wanted to participate. While, at the first

question, migrants quickly declare that they are not interested in politics (“I don’t do politics” is a

leitmotif), upon light further probing, they open up and enjoy discussing local and national

politics. They generally prefer center-right political parties that favor European integration and

dislike excessive state interference in their life (especially via limitations of mobility and taxation).

Most migrants were highly skeptical of nationalistic, populist politicians (some openly ridiculed

them), and expressed dissatisfaction with the persistence of tainted politicians from the former

communist regime among political leaders. Communist-successor parties draw a high amount of

criticism. Diaspora politicians (ethnic entrepreneurs or immigrant leaders) are seen as ineffective



25

and disinterested in high-mobility migrant affairs: many migrants notice the distinction between

diaspora and high-mobility migrants, and often report facing rejection from both elites and

established diaspora members, who scorn temporary migrants. The EU is perceived in a positive,

but realistic light: citizens of the Market like it just the way it is, as a supranational labor market

that gives them access to jobs, training, capital and opportunities in other countries.

Political Remittances Non-migrant family members and friends stay in touch with migrants on a daily basis. Most

reported communicating with those “gone to work” via cell phone several times a day. Important

decisions are always taken together. Older non-migrants whose children work abroad often said

they trusted the young generation for important decisions. Many ask for advice on financial

matters and when it comes to interactions with local authorities. Non-migrant family members

often see migrants as the enlightened ones in the family: migrants bring back knowledge about the

outside world that is inaccessible to older generations. They have experienced the West and can

share their impressions about it. Non-migrant family members tended to assess the impact of intra-

EU migration more positively than non-migrants. Like migrants, they usually saw EU membership

as a positive step in national politics. They also echoed migrants’ increasing sense of frustration

with poor government performance: “Do you think people leave because they have everything they

need? Of course not. What can they do here? Die of hunger? Romania does nothing for them. And

these people have to make a living, they have children to send to school, they need to build a

family house… With what money?” (Ana, 55, non-migrant family member from Salistea,

Maramures, whose daughter and son-in-law work in France). Non-migrant relatives embrace the

view of European integration as the only viable living-making strategy; many describe it as the only

hope for a decent existence: “My brother works in Italy. He started as a construction worker and

now owns his own business: he hires other folks from our town and takes them along [abroad].

He’s tried to come back several times – his business thrives since everyone around now wants

houses like they build abroad, so there is demand,” says Mihai, 48, from Certeze. “So my brother



26

comes here, stays a few months, but then he gets bored because there is not that much for him to

do, and not as much money to make. So he told me he’s too young to come back, he wants to keep

working for as long as he can to save money for the family.”

Many family members describe migrants’ transformations as a result of working abroad in

terms of work discipline, ambition and independence. Non-migrant family members often report

that migrants “work like robots,” that they have much more energy and drive when they know

their work pays off. This is in line with the way in which migrants report the transformation:

“When I got to Paris and saw how money was made, I started working like a crazy man. I worked

over time. I worked on weekends… It paid off, but it also changed how I think about my time. I

know I can accomplish a lot over there,” says Tinu, 35, who specializes in ironwork.

Non-migrants family members learn from migrants and often see them as more informed

and generally knowledgeable about political and economic matters. They share, to a large extent,

migrants’ skepticism vis-à-vis state-centered, nationalist, populist and leftist agendas. Only one non-

migrant family member expressed support for the nationalist-populist Greater Romania Party

(PRM), a party that has meanwhile declined so much that it has failed to gain representation in

Parliament since 2008. Social Democrats were slightly more popular, especially among retirees, due

to the party’s general commitment to higher pensions, but even among retirees resistance towards

state meddling in the economy and higher taxation was high.

Demonstration Effects Non-migrants had more mixed views of temporary migrants. Most saw working in the EU as

necessary (“people don’t have a choice; there are no jobs here”), but some pointed out that

migrants’ standards have changed and they would not accept the jobs that the community has to

offer for the salaries Romanian employers can provide. Some non-migrants saw intra-EU movers as

a positive influence (“they come back and the entire town comes back to life with them; they have

money, they bring the latest trends… they have new ideas”), while others said those who work in

the EU shift gears when they come home (“they only act polite abroad, here they think they are



27

better than everyone just because they have money… they leave civilization at the border”). Some

non-migrants recalled the pre-migration life of many temporary migrants, its challenges and

hardships. Non-migrants agreed that working abroad was difficult, but brought visible and obvious

rewards. Non-migrants in high-mobility regions evaluated their own success in relationship with

migrants: “As long as I live just as well as my neighbor here, who works in Italy, there’s no reason

for me to leave. My house is just as big, beautiful, newly renovated,” said George, 43, from Targu

Neamt. Some had considered migration (some still were considering it as a possibility), but a few

found the idea of undergoing downward mobility demeaning. “As long as I can still make a living

here, at home, I won’t go to humiliate myself as a servant to foreigners,” said Dumitru, 45, from

Negresti. Overall, non-migrants’ answers demonstrated that they evaluate socio-economic success

in relationship with the standards set by migrants and their families. Politically, the evidence of

demonstration effects was mixed, with some non-migrants influenced by the success stories of

intra-EU movers, while others were still longing for a past in which intra-EU migration was

unnecessary to make a decent living. While non-migrants varied more in terms of political party

support, almost all expressed support for EU membership, exasperation with corruption, and

outrage at the lack of economic opportunities. “People wouldn’t leave if they had other

possibilities available,” exclaimed Margareta, 67, from Targu Neamt. “The EU is their only

chance.”

Comparing Romanian and Polish Intra-EU Movers There is an extensive qualitative sociological literature on Polish intra-EU mobility, much

of which seeks to establish the ways in which practicing EU citizenship as freedom of movement

and working abroad in order to make a living at home change worldviews, preferences, attitudes,

and behaviors (Burrell, 2009; Düvell and Garapich, 2011; Grabowska et al., 2017; Grabowska and

Engbersen, 2015; White, 2014, 2011). As a result, one can compare and contrast the findings in

these works with those of the political ethnography I conducted. Below I summarize the most

interesting conclusions of the analysis.



28

In terms of similarities, Polish citizens of the Market also become more pragmatic, self-

reliant, economically independent from their country, and eager to self-sacrifice abroad to climb

the social ladder together with their family. They decide to work abroad for serious economic

reasons: they see their work as a way to solve pressing needs, to have a decent standard of living for

oneself and one’s family, and not merely to satisfy a desire for luxury or for other frivolous

motives, like traveling for pleasure or out of a sense of adventure (White, 2011). They also value

European citizenship as liberal citizenship, for the rights and opportunities it creates. Like

Romanians, intra-EU Polish movers adopt more cosmopolitan and tolerant social attitudes and are

less socially conservative than their non-migrant peers. They engage in conspicuous consumerism

to signal their socio-economic success, and the fact that working abroad has paid off. They also

encourage their children to get a good education, and support this family priority with remittance

money. Like Romanians, Polish intra-EU movers often maintain deliberately open-ended plans, a

strategy which scholars have called “intentional unpredictability” (Eade et al., 2007; White, 2011).

Many struggle to balance transnational life and family commitments across borders, and flexibility,

while empowering, comes with a fair amount of stress. Like Romanians, many Poles who worked

in the EU try to return only to be disappointed and frustrated once more in the lack of

opportunities to make a living, and decide to return to migratory strategy that relies on EU free

movement. Despite the fact that many experience discrimination in receiving societies, they still

value the professional environment abroad, and see their countries of destination as models of

civilization that their homelands should follow.

In stark contrast with Romanian intra-EU movers, many Polish citizens of the Market

perceive intra-EU mobility as the latest episode in a long history of Polish migration. In migrant-

sending communities, many migrants and non-migrants comment on the fact that, in the past,

people would migrate to Germany and the United States and send money home. Some remember

remittances and presents that arrived during communism. Work migration has been a part of local

culture and living-making strategies for decades, long before Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004.

Some parts of the West are viewed as “culturally and socially Polish” (White, 2011: 82), due to the



29

strong presence of Polish diaspora communities abroad in countries like Germany, the US, and

even parts of the UK. One of White’s interviewees said that her sister in London “only talks to

Poles, there are lots of Poles, my husband was in the States, he says there as well, you don’t need

English because there are just Poles, Poles and more Poles, Poles everywhere” (idem supra).

Another respondent described the feeling of living in a Polish district abroad “you feel as if you

were back home in Poland [because] there are lots of people [from the respondent’s village].”

Another set of differences highlights the importance that the country of destination has on

political remittances. In particular, exposure to political realities in Eurosceptic UK raises

questions about the value of EU membership in a country where citizens worked abroad before

acquiring EU citizenship. Recent reports show that, after the Brexit vote, Polish intra-EU movers

have started to change their strategies, shifting from living in mobility and having open-ended

migratory projects to seeking to acquire permanent resident status and emigrate to the UK. The

regulations effective at the moment of the referendum allow people staying in the UK for at least

five years continuously to apply for permanent resident status. A threshold date of December 31,

2020, will be used to calculate the stay, which is favorable to the majority of Poles without

permanent resident status who were present in the UK at the time of the referendum. A 2016

survey found that only 20% of respondents had already acquired permanent resident status in the

UK, and another 27% med the conditions and were planning to apply for permanent residence.

15% of respondents that had not fulfilled the formal requirements intended to fulfill the

conditions and apply, 23% had not yet made a decision, and 16% said they were not interested in

becoming permanent residents (Chmielewska, Dobroczek and Strzelecki, 2018). Other studies,

including research conducted by the European Commission, have also confirmed increasing

settlement migration among Poles, rather than a continuation of intra-EU movement as is the case

of Romanians (Fries-Tersch et al., 2019). The post-Brexit vote shift from citizens of the Market to

migrants seeking permanent residence has led to large numbers of Poles staying in the UK. It has

also led to a change in political views: the UK Polish community saw an increase in PiS support,

some members of the Polish diaspora have embraced anti-immigrant, Eurosceptic platforms, and



30

far-right Britain First has designed since 2017 a string of videos designed to attract Polish

immigrants living in the UK (including a video from a Britain First rally in Birmingham in which

UK-based formed wrestling champion Marian Lukasik can be heard advocating the assassination

of Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel because of her country’s refugee policy). One of the most

organized neo-Nazi groups in the UK is the National Rebirth of Poland. Members of the Polish

diaspora civil society have also noticed a spike in far-right activity among Poles living in the UK,

but some claim this has recently declined.

A Quantitative Analysis of Subnational-Level Variation in Political Preference Profiles of Romanian Judete and Polish Voivodships

This section examines the effects of migration on home country political outcomes: how do

areas (counties) that have high levels of intra-EU mobility differ from those that do not?The

following maps illustrate the dynamics and growing importance of temporary migration in Poland

and Romania. Figure 1 shows the percentage of population who has migratory experience by

Polish voivodship across 5 rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS). Figure 2 shows cross-

regional variation in the percentage of population that had experienced temporary migration in

Romania, based on ESS Round 4 data (2008).

Figure 1. Population with Migration Experience in Poland, by Voivodship, 2004-12



31

Figure 2. Population with Migration Experience in Romania, by Region, 2008



32

Two aspects are particularly striking.

1. Percentages are high, approaching 20% in some Polish voivodships, and much higher than

in most surveys (e.g. Careja and Emmenegger).

2. Patterns of intra-EU mobility do not align with former cleavages. Post-communist

trajectories have been significantly influenced by historical legacies at the national and

subnational level (Bunce, 2005; Ekiert and Hanson, 2003; Pop-Eleches, 2007), with old

partitions influencing political cleavages, political discourses, patterns of partisan

affiliation, institutional choice, and “the quality of democracy itself” (Ekiert and Ziblatt,

2013), as well as civil society (Badescu and Sum, 2005).

European integration has expanded the horizons of experience of average member-state

citizens, creating new opportunities for circular, temporary, highly fluid migration, and exposing

those who move to democratic political socialization contexts (Careja and Emmenegger, 2012;

Paul, 2013). Research on the transnational social practices of German citizens has showed that

people with border-crossing experiences and transnational social relations are more likely to adopt

cosmopolitan attitudes with respect to foreigners and global governance (Mau et al., 2008).

Transnational experiences have a positive effect on openness, tolerance, perception of

interconnectedness as enriching rather than threatening, and evaluations of international bodies

(Kwok-Bun, 2002). This effect is not limited to migrants, but manifests itself more broadly in the

population. Non-migrant families and friends also experience increases in cosmopolitanism.

Communication places individuals “beyond local and national settings without detaching them

from locality” (Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann 2008: 5; Tarrow 2005). However, the mere fact

that the space of individual experience transcends national space does not mean that everyone will

become a cosmopolitan (Beck, 2002). Contacts and transnationalization could be perceived as a

threat, triggering prejudice, nationalistic rhetoric and reflexes (Chavez, 2008; Quillian, 1995).

This section examines the effects of migration on home country political outcomes: how do

areas that have high levels of intra-EU mobility differ from those with lower levels? The dependent

variables are political outcomes (preferences for some political agendas over others, and attitudes



33

towards the state, the market, and European integration, as expressed by voting for different

parties in parliamentary elections). Regional differences reflect the cumulated effect of high-

mobility migration, including the electoral preferences of temporary return migrants, as well as the

electoral preferences resulting from migrants’ influence on non-migrants.

The analysis conducted is a linear model (OLS), each observation being a region-year, specified by

Score = 𝛽! + 𝛽! Temp Abs + 𝛽! Temp Abs × Post-accession + 𝐗𝛃+ 𝜖

where the dependent variable is a regional score along a specific dimension, and the first two terms

on the left-hand side are temporary absences as a percentage of total population and its interaction

with an indicator for post-accession. 𝐗 captures economic and demographic controls, as well as

year effects and broad regional effects.

Measurement at the regional level (county) is problematic: temporary absence data have

historically not been collected, so the time frame for which they exist is short relative to other data

(Romania only started to collect such data in 2012). Even when the numbers exist, they may

provide only an incomplete picture of what is happening. Unlike in low-mobility contexts, in high-

mobility situations, individuals are able to travel and work abroad without registering the plan.

DataandMethodologyDatasourcesanddescription

Election data for Poland and for Romania come from the European Election Database made

available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.1 2 The database publishes election results

by several regional levels, according to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS),

making it possible to compare election results across regions and conduct comparisons over time.

For analysis, I use Poland parliamentary (Sejm) elections in years 2001, 2005, 2007, and 2009 by

1http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/2 (Some of) the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on material from the "European Election Database" . The data are collected from original sources, prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here.



34

voivodship (16 NUTS-2 regions) and Romanian parliamentary election data in years 2000, 2004,

2008, and 2012 by judete (42 NUTS-3 regions). For each region, party vote shares are converted to a

set of scores corresponding to policy dimensions, used as dependent variables. The constructions

of these scores for the analyses based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) are described later.

For both Poland and Romania, economic and demographic data come from Eurostat where

available. Where needed, I supplement this with additional demographic data from the Central

Statistical Office of Poland's Local Data Bank (LDB)3 and from the Romanian National Institute

of Statistics (INSSE) TEMPO Statistical Database4. Control variables used in the regression

include unemployment rate, GDP per capita, percent of population with college degrees or

equivalent, percent of population living in urban areas, and percent of population temporarily

absent.

Since different variables come from different data sources, the frequency of collection differs

between variables. Economic data on GDP per capita and unemployment is annual, but some

demographic variables, e.g., urbanization in Poland and educational attainment in Romania, are

collected in the Population and Housing Census, which occurs every ten years. Data on temporary

absences do not exist for Romania until 2012, which is after the final election. Since longitudinal

measurements over the analysis period do not exist, temporary absences are treated as regional

characteristics. I control for regional effects. Given data sparsity, it is impossible to maintain

statistical power with full region effects: there are only four elections in each country, and several

independent variables at the region-level are not time-varying. The absence of strict regional

controls raises the possibility of omitted variable bias. This is addressed in two ways:

1. Regional controls at one NUTS level higher than the unit of observation are included. This captures broader regional effects, and in particular the effects of historical legacies. For Poland, this corresponds to 6 NUTS level 1 region controls, and for Romania 8 NUTS level 2 controls.

3http://www.stat.gov.pl/bdlen/html/indeks.html4http://statistici.insse.ro/shop/?lang=en



35

2. Temporary absences are interacted with a post-accession indicator. The non-interaction term coefficient captures the effect of temporary absences in all periods, including after EU accession, while the interaction term represents the additional effect of temporary absences after accession. Even if temporary absences were correlated with some unobserved characteristic, we would not expect the effect of that unobserved characteristic to be higher post-accession.

Finally, since elections happen once every 2-4 years, the values used for all annual dependent

variables is the mean of the election year and the year preceding the election year.5

Dependentvariables:Regionscores

Raw vote shares, over time, in multi-party political systems are difficult to analyze directly. A single

party's record may tell little about overall regional trends. Some political parties reinvent

themselves under new labels, while others disappear. Finally, political platforms may shift over

time, as parties reposition themselves on some issues. In order to examine county-level political

preference profiles, I transform vote shares into political positions using data from the Chapel Hill

Expert Survey (CHES) scores for party positions along four dimensions. This project uses CHES

data from the 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014 rounds, where scores assigned to each party come from

the first CHES round after each election. An argument can be made that scores from before the

election better reflect voter perceptions of party positions, but party names and coalitions often

change by election time. By using CHES scores post-election, I ensure that the parties rated match

up with those running in the election.

The dependent variable is a set of expressed policy preferences for each region. The four

dimensions examined are:

1. EU Position 2. GALTAN 3. Left-Right General 4. Left-Right Economic

5Results are robust to different "windows;" for simplicity and consistency, taking the mean of election year and the year preceding is used for all reported tables.



36

Region scores are constructed as the mean of party scores, weighted by party vote shares. Since

regions vote for unmatched parties at different rates, vote shares are renormalized as the share of

votes for some party for which CHES data exist. If parties are indexed by 𝑗 and regions by 𝑖, the

GALTAN score for a region, for instance, is given by (GALTAN)! = (! GALTAN)!𝑣!", where 𝑣!"

is the share of votes for party 𝑗 in region 𝑖.

Results and Discussion The tables below show regression results for Poland and Romania. To facilitate interpretation,

continuous independent variables are standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1; the

dependent variables are left as is. Tables report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in

parentheses.



37

Poland: Political Profiles of Counties (Voivodships) with High-Mobility Migration

The figure below is a coefficient plot illustrating these results, in which black-colored dots identify

significant coefficients, gray-colored dots mark lack of significance, and the lines represent

confidence intervals.



38

Effects Temporary Absences (General and Post-EU Accession) on Four Policy Dimensions, as Expressed via Parliamentary Election Results in Poland (County Level)

Temp Abs * Post-accession




39

Romania: Political Profiles of Counties (Judete) with High-Mobility Migration



40

Effects Temporary Absences (General and Post-EU Accession) on Four Policy Dimensions, as Expressed via Parliamentary Election Results in Romania (County Level)

For both Poland and Romania, the interaction term between temporary absences and post-

accession is significant for EU Position and Left-right Economic: counties with higher levels of

temporary absences vote for parties that are more favorable to the EU and more right in terms of

economic policy. For Romania, there is also a significant negative effect on GALTAN, which

means that counties with more intra-EU mobility have lower support for nationalist parties.

For Poland, there are also significant main effects of temporary absences on GALTAN and

LRGEN. While this may suggest voivodship-level differences correlated with temporary absences

but not related to migration, there are several reasons to believe this is not the case. First, Poland

enjoyed visa-free travel since 1992, so it is more plausible that the main effect captures migration-

related effects that are relatively independent of market access, e.g., attitudes generally associated

with cosmopolitanism. Second, Poland gained accession in 2004. Since the primary focus of this





41

book is migrant workers and we expect a lag for workers to leave and come back, 2005 as "pre-

accession", but it is likely that some effects are seen by the 2005 election.

The results confirm expectations that intra-EU mobility has a significant effect on home-

country politics. Over time, after EU accession, the political preference profile of areas with high

levels of intra-EU movement vote more for parties that view the EU favorably and for parties that

are toward the right end of the spectrum on economic policy (center-right, liberal, pro-EU). The

results are quite large in magnitude. Since independent variables are standardized, all coefficients

can be interpreted as the effect of a 1 standard deviation increase on the regional score. In all

cases, the migration effects are on the same order of magnitude as major economic and

demographic variables, such as education and unemployment.

Transnational Political Engagement: Current Strategies and Historical Legacies

This section examines varieties of transnational political engagement that political actors in

the country of origin (governments and political parties) use in their attempts to mobilize and

connect with citizens abroad. I summarize the different government outreach programs and

discuss their effectiveness. I present the transnational political engagement activities and analyze

the discourse of Romanian and Polish political parties targeting citizens of the Market. While both

Poland and Romania are main sources of intra-EU mobility, citizens of the Market have gained

visibility as a group in Romanian politics, but not in Polish politics. I explain this puzzle through

the existence of an ample history of diaspora engagement pre-EU accession in Poland, and the

relative inexperience with diaspora management in Romania. Paradoxically, institutional

structures set up to facilitate traditional diaspora management do not constitute an advantage in

addressing the needs of citizens of the Market, whose mobility, priorities, and demands are

fundamentally different. The absence of prior strategies and structures allows for more flexibility

and openness in prioritizing the interests of intra-EU movers, without assuming that extending



42

traditional diaspora management will work. This empowers citizens of the Market who have more

political space to engage with the government and develop relationships with political parties that

vie to represent them in homeland politics.

Poland and Romania are post-communist CEE democracies that became EU members in

2004 and 2007, respectively. Party representation in both countries is characterized by a very

strong “historical cleavage” (Gwiazda, 2015), between communist successor forces (typically parties

on the center-left and left, including the Democratic Left Alliance in Poland, and the Social

Democratic Party in Romania) and the parties resulting from the anti-communist opposition forces

in the transitional moment (generally parties on the center, center-right and right, including

Solidarity Electoral Action, the Labor Union, the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland,

and the Centre Accord in Poland, and the Liberal Democratic Party and the National Liberal Party

in Romania). In the early 2000s, the historical cleavage started to wane, and other divides emerged.

The pro versus anti-EU/Eurosceptic political cleavage brought new political forces onto the

political arena (the League of Polish Families and Self-Defense in Poland and Great Romania Party

in Romania). In the mid 2000s a new “social” versus “liberal” cleavage was politicized on the

center right in Poland with the right-wing ‘social solidaristic’, social conservative (Catholic) and

Eurosceptic Law and Justice Party (PiS) on one side and the center-right liberal-conservative, pro-

EU integration Civic Platform (PO) on the other (both founded in 2001 from post-Solidarity

parties). In Romania, the political scene remains dominated by the Social Democrats on the

center-left (socially solidaristic, but without any religious or socially conservative elements), and the

National Liberal Party (conservative liberal, right-wing party that merged with the Liberal

Democrats in 2014, and Save Romania Union (Uniunea Salvati Romania, USR, a big tent type

political party focused on anti-corruption and the rule of law – which emerged in 2016 with

considerable support from migrants abroad, including Romanians returning from abroad to run

for political office in their communities of origin).

While Poland and Romania are the top two countries of origin for intra-EU migration and

share many political and historical characteristics, they differ in a number of interesting ways. In



43

Poland, the right-wing absorbed ‘social solidaristic’ populist elements currently combined with

Euroscepticism and anti-communism in the Law and Justice platform. The center-left and left

remain weak and fragmented in Poland. In Romania, the pro versus anti-EU divide is dormant;

the main political parties support European integration and Romania’s participation in the EU

and other Euro-Atlantic organizations. Religion (Catholicism) plays an important role in Polish

politics, but not in Romanian politics. Historically, during communism, Poland was much more

open to international migration, while Romania was highly restrictive. In terms of intra-EU

mobility, Poles work in high numbers in Germany, the UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Austria, Greece

etc., while Romanians work in Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Austria etc.

The countries differ in terms of how they incorporate migrant votes in their electoral

systems. In Poland, migrants do not enjoy special representation in Parliament. Diaspora votes are

counted in the Warsaw constituency. In Romania, migrants elect their own representatives (4

Deputies and 2 Senators). One would predict that political parties in Poland pay less attention to

migrants for that reason, but in fact this is not the case. All the main contenders in Polish

elections (both Euro-enthusiastic and Eurosceptic) have engaged with Polish intra-EU labor

migrants working, despite the lack of specially designated seats for diaspora representation.

Traditional diasporas often have a distinct political profile characterized by a strong

political identity, supporting one party and rejecting another (often the party in office at the time

they emigrated) (Paarlberg, 2017). Romanian and Polish high-mobility migrants do not. Citizens of

the Market do not leave for political reasons. The in-depth interviews and other research I

conducted showed that economic motivations determined decisions to migrate and re-migrate.

Migrants and their families never mentioned the party that was in office at the time they left; many

actually left during periods in which the party they supported was in power, and migration

recurred despite government changes. The voting pattern of the Romanian emigrant electorate has

been characterized as “volatile” (Østergaard‐Nielsen and Ciornei, 2017). The traditional Polish

diaspora in the US (emigrants who fled communism before 1989) leans heavily towards the anti-

communist, socially conservative (Catholic) right wing, a political space that PiS controls. Polish



44

intra-EU migrants have generally supported the center-right, pro-EU Civic Platform, but have

exhibited electoral volatility, as well (Polish communities in the UK switched from supporting

Civic Platform to PiS in the 2015 presidential election).

Based on existing literature which studies the behavior of diasporas with clear political

leanings towards one party in the sending country, one would expect that political parties who

have obtained low percentages of the abroad vote would be less likely to engage in transnational

political engagement. Once again, this is not the case for Poland and Romania, where political

parties that performed poorly with the expat electorate in previous elections still campaigned

abroad and, in the Polish case, even managed to win the diaspora vote in some countries where

they had been highly unsuccessful before. Law and Justice Party candidate for the Presidency – and

current Polish President – Andrzej Duda campaigned abroad in 2015, and managed to persuade

citizens abroad to support him in unprecedented numbers, especially in the UK. Prime Minister

Victor Ponta who ran for President in Romania representing the Social Democrats, campaigned

abroad in 2014, traveling to Italy (Torino) and Spain (Madrid).

POLAND Despite the large number of Poles living abroad, the Polish state does not have an active

official general policy towards the Polish diaspora and return migrants (Stefanska, 2017). In 2012,

the Polish government adopted an official principle which states that emigrants should not be

treated more favorably than non-migrant Polish citizens, because such a policy would reward

emigration and result in unequal treatment of citizens.

Poland is a traditional country of emigration, and migrant outflows have characterized the

country’s historical development since the late 18th century, after Poland’s partitions and repeated

disappearance from the map (in 1772, 1793 and 1795). For 123 years, Poland did not exist as a

state. Uprisings and struggles for independence produced several emigration waves in the 19th

century, mostly to other European countries (France, especially), but also to the US. Forced

migration to Siberia and other parts of imperial Russia was also significant. Because of the



45

occupation by foreign powers that all attempted to suppress Polish language, cultural heritage and

identity, Poles who emigrated maintained a strong “commitment to the Polish cause”: Poles who

migrated to America in the 19th century, for instance, “generally held a very emotional attachment

to their homeland and a strong desire to see its independence regained” (Pula, 1995: 1). After

World War I and Poland’s independence (1918), many Polish coal miners, iron and steel workers

were contracted abroad in Northern France, Belgium and Britain (the Midlands) (Fassmann and

Munz, 1994). Many seasonal migrant workers went to Germany, despite the fact that the Polish

government banned emigration to Germany between 1919 and 1926.

In the first half of the 20th century, Poland – following the Italian and German models –

established official channels connecting the national government with Polish communities abroad

(a diaspora affectionately called Polonia) to capitalize on the financial and political advantages of

émigré loyalty, access and connections. Polonia crystallized as a vast network of civil society

organizations, Polish-language publications, churches, schools and mutual aid societies between

1880 and 1914. In the interwar period, diaspora management emerged as a national strategy

involving government authorities at home and émigré communities abroad. The Polish Sejm

discussed with great concern the “Americanization of immigrants abroad” and considered ways to

maintain their allegiance and fight assimilation by government subsidies to promote Polish

culture, history and crafts. The Senate assumed responsibility for maintaining ties with Polish

immigrant communities, an institutionalization channel that was revived after the fall of

communism and still functions today. Several Congresses of Poles from Abroad took place and

many programs supported cultural activities and the preservation of national identity abroad.

World War II resulted in massive population exchanges and border shifts. Two million ethnic

Poles escaped the Soviet Union (especially from Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania), and several

million ethnic Germans and Polish citizens who had been living in Poland for centuries were

pushed westwards to Germany. In Britain, a government decision to allow Polish soldiers to settle

down, coupled with the decision to bring in displaced migrant labor force from Nazi labor camps

to fill worker shortages led to the establishment of a Polish diaspora in the UK (Burrell, 2006).



46

This consolidated a culture of mobility of ethnic Poles (Davies, 1982) long before the European

Union’s freedom of movement. Abroad, with immigrant communities congregating around

Roman Catholic parishes, Polish patriotism was often infused with religious commitment to

Catholicism and social conservatism.

During communism, Poland was officially a closed country; however, in stark contrast with

Romania, it did not seal its borders, and remained one of the most liberal communist countries

when it came to international migration. The regime encouraged several waves of emigration

(hundreds of thousands of people) as a safety valve. After WW II many Polish soldiers decided to

remain abroad to avoid persecution. 1968 led to purges in the communist party: many Polish

nationals of Jewish origin emigrated to Israel, the US, or Western Europe. Under Edward Gierek,

Warsaw attempted rapprochement and diaspora management in the early 1970s. The Polish state

tried to reactivate its connections with Polonia with a campaign aimed at attracting Polish émigrés

back to Poland, at least as tourists, and managed to get some Polish-born retirees to re-establish

residence in Poland (which they could do without giving up their American citizenship or their

Social Security benefits; the program also created special benefits for resettlers, some inaccessible

to co-nationals).6 In the 1980s, Poland witnessed the largest wave of emigration (over 2 million

people), as refugees fled the martial law that Wojciech Jaruzelski introduced in 1981 and the deep

economic recession that followed. Clandestine, short-term labor migration to Germany increased.

After the fall of communism in 1989, Poles could leave the country to go abroad and,

crucially, were also free to return afterwards. Many engaged in short-distance, short-term, circular

migrations, primarily to Germany. These mobilities gradually started replacing previous permanent

emigration trends: as circular mobility increased, emigration levels decreased (Burrell, 2009).

The historical legacy of interwar diaspora management resurfaced. The Senate renewed the

partnership between the Polish government and civil society organizations abroad in the 1990s.

Diaspora organizations meet regularly in Congresses of Polish Communities and Poles abroad, and

rely on the financial support of the Polish Senate for their activities. The Polish Parliament

6TimeMagazine1972.



47

maintains ties with Poles and people of Polish origin residing abroad mainly through the work of

the Committee of Emigration Affairs and Contacts with Poles Abroad (Polish Communities

Abroad Office - The Senate of the Republic of Poland: Chancellery of the Senate, 2012). The

Polish Senate notes that “Polish communities living in countries with a long-standing democratic

tradition have been free to organize and acquire experience in conducting social, cultural or even

political activities” and that diaspora communities expect the Polish government to provide

funding for their activities in receiving countries to “boost the prestige of the Polish ethnic

minority, contributing to the positive image of our country abroad” (Polish Communities Abroad

Office - The Senate of the Republic of Poland: Chancellery of the Senate, 2012).

Traditional diasporic communities received a lot of government attention: policies towards

these emigrants (some from generations ago) aligned with arguments about Poland’s “moral

obligation” towards citizens that were the “victims of history” persecuted by foreign powers, or left

in the hands of the Soviet empire on the wrong side of the border in 1945 (this refers primarily to

migrants East of Poland). Migrants from West of Poland were portrayed as successful adventurers

who may come back with riches; those returnees were represented as heroes (Stefanska 2017: 105).

By contrast, after 2004, Poles who migrated to work in the EU initially received little

attention. Sometimes, they were represented as unwanted workers, other times as successful

professionals; but, in both cases, they were migrants enjoying EU rights of free movement and seen

as in little need of Polish state intervention (Stefanska 106). Media reports revealed that this view

was overly optimistic: forced labor camps in Italy and Polish migrant workers exploited by agencies

in the Netherlands, violence against Polish migrants in the UK, hostile statements and actions

undertaken by foreign politicians (e.g. the anti-Polish campaign by right-wind anti-immigrant

politician Geert Wilders in the Netherlands), the phenomenon of Polish homelessness in Great

Britain, the Netherlands and Germany, or the problems of “Euro-orphans” (children living with

relatives while parents work abroad), were just some of the problems intra-EU Polish movers faced.

The first government reaction to post-accession migration occurred in 2006, during the

government of Jaroskaw Kaczynski (PiS), when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the



48

“Closer to work, closer to Poland” program (Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski), targeting Polish labor

migrants abroad and those who intended to migrate. Its goal was to help Poles working abroad by

providing easier access to consulates and increase their numbers. An information campaign tried

to educate citizens about work conditions and employment procedures in destination countries, to

protect Polish citizens against dangers and threats that come from lack of information and

experience (Lesinska, 2013).

The consulate network focuses on preserving cultural identity and the Polish language.

Consulates offer language instruction for children and propose cultural projects. Thus, the state

presents itself as a supporting force, one that makes it easier for parents to educate their children

and communicate a rich cultural and linguistic heritage that would otherwise remain hard to

access due to the distances separating the family from the homeland. To manage the activities of

Polish embassies and consulates, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinates the “Government

Program of Cooperation with Polonia and Polish Citizens abroad,” established in October 2007

after Poland’s accession to the EU. As representatives of the Polish state, consuls now carry the

responsibility of developing contacts between new organizations of Polish migrant workers in EU

countries. State representatives also have the mission to promote and support the integration of

new organizations of mobile citizens (new migrants) with older Polish diaspora organizations. The

state has been trying to integrate “old emigration,” diaspora civil society with the recent back-and-

forth migratory flows, but this remains a challenge. Since the Catholic Church supports Poles

abroad, the government has also intensified its communication with Polish Catholic missions.

Return started to appear as an issue in government documents in 2007. The Ministry of

Labor and Social Policy announced the launching of a Return (“Powrot”) Program, aimed at

“creating the best possible conditions for return for those who in recent years have decided to

leave the country and migrate to more developed EU countries.” The general framework drew

attention to the problem of labor shortages in some sectors of the economy. Government officials

emphasized that employers were forced to hire foreigners as substitute labor force, and pointed out

the demographic problems that emigration of active labor force could cause. The state had a



49

rationale to intervene to avoid “serious demographic crisis and labor market collapse” (Lesinska).

The Return Program tried to encourage return for those who had left for economic reasons.

Suggested measures included an income tax relief for people running a business and reducing the

social insurance and pension contribution rate of individuals who stayed abroad for at least a year.

The Return Program never got implemented, however, due to national elections and change of the

government and parties in power.

During the government led by Donald Tusk (center-right pro-EU Civic Platform, PO, a

party that enjoyed substantial support from Poles living in Western Europe), the question of

return remained on the government’s agenda. Donald Tusk’s campaign platform in the 2007

Polish Parliamentary elections included items that encouraged young Poles to come back home.

He campaigned abroad, and built a close relationship with Polish communities in the UK. Mass

media showed Poles waiting for hours to cast a vote in the 2007 Parliamentary elections. In early

2008, an Inter-ministry Working Group on Return Migration was appointed and tasked to

produce a report. The document recommended that state policy not try to stimulate return

migration, but rather provide Poles abroad with tools to make rational choices and make things

easier for those who decide to come back (esp. reintegration into the national labor market).

In November 2008, PM Donald Tusk launched a government campaign entitled “Have

you got a PLan to return?” that aimed to facilitate return and showcase employment opportunities

available in Poland for potential returnees. A special manual (The Returner, “Powrotnik”) was

distributed among Poles abroad through the network of consulates and Polish organizations

(50,000 copies and available online). An official website also provided information about the most

relevant issues for returnees concerning taxes, social security and benefits, education, starting a

business, diplomas recognition etc. The most popular functionality of the website was a forum that

allowed users to submit a question online and receive a reliable official response within 14 days.

The government spent about 4 million Polish zloty (a million euro) on the campaign, which was

overall considered a failure. The government did not manage to make return more attractive and

persuade highly-mobile citizens to give up migration as a living-making strategy. Those who did try



50

to take advantage of the program complained that opportunities at home had been deceptively

presented and that they were not able to find the promised jobs through the advertised Polish job

centers.7 In 2011, the website was incorporated into the special service Green Line set up by the

Polish Public Employment Service as an online information and consultation center for

individuals searching for a job and employers in Poland.

The Civic Platform government passed in 2008 the Tax Abolition Act, which allowed Poles

who earned income abroad between 2002 and 2007 to apply for a refund on taxes already paid (a

relief from double taxation). By 2010, only 57,000 people had used the program. The government

also gave a legal regulation (2010) to give children returning from abroad with their migrant

parents the right to minimum two and no more than five hours of additional instruction in Polish

language (or another subject) in the school where the child is registered, free of charge for a

maximum of 12 months upon the parents’ request (the final decision about holding such

additional classes was left at the discretion of the school manager).

In the 2010 Presidential election, Bronislaw Komorowski (the PO candidate) campaigned

abroad in intra-EU mover destination countries. He managed to defeat PiS candidate Jaroslaw

Kaczynski, by effectively mobilizing pro-EU reform-minded voters that supported further

integration. Komorowski also won the diaspora vote in the EU, and was perceived as a close ally of

PM Donald Tusk (who had won 75% of the votes of Poles living in the UK against 46% of the

vote in Poland).8 On the Polish radio in London, Komorowski declared during his UK campaign

tour: “If the Polish economy continues to grow at the present rate, many Poles will come home.”9

In the 2015 presidential election campaign, Komorowski emphasized continuity. He did

not campaign abroad, and focused instead on the electorate in Poland. His opponent, Andrzej

Duda (PiS) campaigned in the UK, telling expat voters that they were representative of a lost

7Lojek-Magdziarz,Aleksandra.2009.“Polestrappedbetweennations.”TheGuardian.April13.8Levitz,David,andRafalKiepuszewiski.“KomorowskiwinsPolishpresidentialelection.”DeutscheWelle.July5,2010.9https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/1046-presidential-election-in-poland-a-round-up-one-week-before-the-election



51

generation with no prospects in Poland: “If there is no recovery in many areas of Poland, the

young generation will leave, and the next will be born abroad.”10 Duda echoed some of intra-EU

movers’ concerns, especially the difficulty or impossibility of return, as big problems of the Polish

economy, and blamed them on the incumbent. He emphasized the fact that, while the economic

transformation had brought rapid growth to Poland, not all Poles benefitted from it. The message

resonated with high-mobility migrants in Eurosceptic UK, where Duda won the expat vote.

All people who live abroad and have Polish citizenship and – most importantly – a valid

Polish passport (or Polish ID), have the right to vote in the European Parliament and national

parliamentary and presidential elections, even if they are also citizens of another country. It does

not matter how long they have been living abroad: they just have to register as a voter before every

election. Poles not residing in Poland also have candidacy rights. Poles can vote abroad at polling

stations outside the country (268 in the 2011 elections and 229 in the 2015 elections). Since 2011,

it is also possible to vote by mail-in ballot (Stefanska, 2017). The issue of Polish elections abroad,

and the long lines of voters outside Polish consulates, have often attracted the interest of Polish

media. Discussions about the diaspora have been politicized: the transfer of funds for the Polish

diaspora and Poles abroad from the Senate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013 was

perceived by the opposition as a political decision aimed at strengthening control over Polish

communities abroad (Stefanska 106).

Law and Justice Party (PiS) represented intra-EU movement in a negative light, as evidence

that – even in times of economic growth – PO was unable to transform return into a viable option.

The government of Beata Maria Szydlo (since 2015) adopted a policy line that aims at creating

better conditions for those who choose not to migrate. The government introduced new child

benefits allowing a mother of two to give up a minimum-wage job and still receive an equivalent of

her salary in benefits until the child reaches 18 years of age. Under PM Mateusz Morawiecki, the

government launched in 2016 the “Family 500Plus” program, which pays a monthly stipend of

10http://inside-poland.com/t/polands-main-presidential-candidates-komorowski-and-duda-on-the-road-in-election-campaign/



52

500 zlotys ($148) per child starting with the second (beneficiaries have no obligation to work).11

Poland has also cut the retirement age from 67 to 65 for men and 60 for women. Understandably,

these welfare policies are popular among voters and non-migrant family members of intra-EU

movers.

Emigration and diaspora policy have gained new momentum after the 2015 elections.

President Duda created the Office for Maintaining Contact with Poles Abroad in his Chancellery.

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs established a special deputy Minister to liaise with Polish

communities abroad. Senate regained control over funding powers for Polish organizations and

diaspora policy (which it had lost in 2012 when the Civic Platform government transferred them

to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The PiS government has announced that a special

representatives of Poles abroad in the Senate would be established, such that starting with the

2019 elections, Polish citizens abroad will vote for Warsaw candidates in the lower chamber (Sejm)

and elect a special diaspora representative in the Senate.

ROMANIA

Romania has several government institutions that manage the country’s relation with

communities abroad. Since 2017 (Executive Order no. 1), the government includes a Ministry for

Romanians Abroad (Ministerul pentru Romanii de Pretutindeni), with attributions transferred

from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The institutional ancestor of the Ministry was the Council

for the Problems of Romanians Abroad (established in 1995, and subordinated to the Prime

Minister, as the first governmental structure tasked to support Romanian communities abroad),

and its successors, the State Under-secretary for Romanians Abroad, the Department for

Romanians Abroad (established in 2001 and subordinated to the Ministry of Public Information),

and Department of Policies Concerning the Relation with Romanians Abroad and subordinated 11https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/01/25/in-europe-right-wing-parties-are-offering-bigger-handouts-than-traditional-ones



53

to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Following the 2008 electoral reforms under the Democratic

Liberal Party’s leadership (PDL, center-right, pro-EU), citizens abroad can elect their own

representatives in the Romanian parliament (four representatives in the Chamber of Deputies and

two Senators). The main political parties on both sides of the political spectrum campaigned in

Italy and Spain (Burean, 2018).

In the 19th century, Romanian elites and intellectuals participated in temporary migratory

flows towards Western European countries, particularly France, Germany, Austria and Italy. The

Phanariot Princes of the Romanian principalities had already imported numerous elements of

foreign culture, language and civilization (especially French). The French Revolution of 1789 had

significant echoes on Romanian territory, spreading the ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité and

inspiring the future leaders of the Romanian unification movement. In the first half of the 19th

century, young Romanian elites traveled abroad for a part of their studies. Between 1835 and

1838, the sons of many boyar (aristocratic) families attended universities in Western Europe and

were exposed to new political ideas. These rising politicians and intellectuals saw the power of

national ideals in action and learned about models of constitutional rule. Most of them studied in

Paris and actively participated in the revolution of 1848 abroad. By the time they returned to

Romania, they had already matured into the generation associated with importing 1848 ideals

(The Generation of ’48 – Generatia pasoptista) (Pastre 2003: 305-306).

In contrast to elites, the rest of the population had little migratory experience. Romanian

peasants generally led their lives in an environment contained within the limits of their village,

with occasional trips into neighboring towns or cities to sell, purchase and exchange goods on fair

days (Rey, 2003). Only the most affluent merchants and privileged community members

participated in local, short-range mobility. Even among the inhabitants of towns and cities, most

had little exposure to migration apart from the local rural-urban flows associated with late

modernization. Emigration was rare.

The situation changed in the second half of the 19th century. Following the efforts of the

’48 Generation, the Romanian principalities of Moldova and Wallachia united in 1859 to form a



54

modern Romanian state. The first wave of non-elite emigration occurred between 1848 and 1918,

when Romanian workers (mostly agricultural) left the country to settle down in America or in

Western Europe (Dumitrescu, 2010). But the numbers of Romanian émigrés remained modest

and so did their socio-economic standing in receiving countries. Diasporas did not try or could not

afford to initiate a transnational communication channel with Romania, and the government in

Bucharest did not talk about Romanians abroad or create a national diaspora management

strategy.

In fact, Romania was for a longer time in its history a country that attracted migrants from

elsewhere. Between 1860 and 1918, the government pursued social and economic modernization

that required importing specialized labor force from abroad (Muntele, 2003). Before 1880, 27% of

the population growth in Romania was due to immigration. The number dropped to 4% after

1900. At the time, Romania ranked second in the hierarchy of countries with high number of

foreigners relative to total population (Colescu 1944, cited in Muntele 2003: 35) and fifth in terms

of the absolute number of citizens from abroad (the majority came from Austria-Hungary, Turkey,

Greece, Italy and Bulgaria). Muntele cites Ghelerter 1916, who reported that Romania received

around 43,000 Jewish émigrés between 1890 and 1912 – the last wave of immigrants were 3,222

Jews fleeing the 1905 pogroms in Tsarist Russia. Many of these left Romania for Argentina.

The interwar period brought a relative balance between immigration and emigration,

minus the beginning and the end, when emigration registered high levels. Romania became less

attractive to foreign migrants, and the crisis of 1929 further enhanced this profile. Emigration

continued between 1919 and 1939, but numbers decreased. Canada severely restricted immigrant

inflows in 1929 when it was hard hit by draught; the economic crisis limited available work

options for emigrants to the US as well. Most emigration was family reunification and exodus of

educated and highly trained professionals. Students and artists left, most for Paris (Pastre, 2003).

Between 1940 and 1948, Romania experienced its first wave of mass emigration. About

230,000 people were forced to leave the country. Some fled from territories surrendered to the

Soviet Union, Hungary or Bulgaria; the Germans of Bucovina and Bulgarians of Dobrogea were



55

“repatriated.” Between 1944-1946, emigration reached the highest levels, with many ethnic

minority members leaving the country, in particular Germans, Jews, but also Hungarians. Most

notably, large numbers of Romanians left to avoid Soviet occupation (Muntele: 36). Those who

emigrated after WW II were usually well educated, came from urban environments and left the

country for political reasons (Dumitrescu, 2010).

Romanian Communist Party leaders used emigration as a safety valve. Return was out of

the question, unless the person had political approval. Emigration trends responded to the policy

line of the regime: a moment of relaxation in the 1970s, followed by increasing repression in the

1980s, under the last years of Ceausescu’s rule, led to a peak of out-migration. Around 800,000

citizens emigrated from Romania during communism. The regime controlled international

migration, restricted the right of citizens to travel abroad and monitored closely the movement of

foreigners living on Romanian territory (Buletinul Oficial al Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1969).

The Ceausescu regime let subversive individuals emigrate to Israel, the US, Canada (Muntele,

2003; Rey, 2003).

After the fall of communism in December 1989, the 1991 Romanian constitution

recognized the existence of Romanian communities abroad and established polling stations in

embassies and consulates to enable Romanians abroad to vote. The government focused on

strengthening the ethnic identity of Romanians living in neighboring countries (Hungary,

Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia). A wave of emigration took place in the early 1990s. Hundreds of

thousands of people left, some to request asylum in Western Europe, many as tourists, some to

work illegally abroad or try to bring back goods and sell them in Romania (suitcase commerce).

With the introduction of visa-free travel during EU accession negotiations in 2002, and

with Romania’s joining the EU in 2007, intra-EU mobility became the norm. Citizens working

abroad can vote if they show a valid Romanian ID or passport, as well as a document that

demonstrates that they reside in the country where they are trying to vote. This proof of residence

requirement often prevents migrants from voting, since many are still registered on electoral lists

in Romania (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe si Autoritatea Electorala Permanenta 2012).



56

Romanian political parties adapted quickly. The Liberal Democratic Party (PDL) was the

first political party to establish an organization abroad. The first branch was created in April 2008

in Castellon, Spain. In 2009, PDL Diaspora had five organizations in Italy (Florence, Rome,

Milano, Padova, Torino), fourteen in Spain (including Madrid, Zaragoza, Alicante, Malaga,

Valencia, Seville, and Barcelona), as well as organizations in Portugal, France, the UK, Ireland,

Greece etc. In 2011, the PDL Senator for the Romanian diaspora Viorel Badea declared that the

party had 22 organizations in Italy, each having between 20 and 400 members.

The Social Democratic Party (PSD) officially launched PSD Diaspora in October 2010. In

2012, PSD Diaspora had territorial organizations active online in Spain (nine branches), Belgium,

Italy, Greece, the UK and France. PSD Italy discussed on its website the launch of a Platform

Program of the Diaspora for 2012-2014, a social platform centered on the ideals of solidarity and

progress, urging Romanians to get involved. Some branches of PSD Diaspora collaborated with

politicians the migrants’ countries of destination: Alexandru Petrescu, the President of PSD

England and Vice-President of PSD Diaspora entered a partnership to support Ken Livingstone,

the Labour Party candidate for the office of Mayor of London in 2012. PSD President Victor

Ponta signed in 2011 a collaboration protocol with the Democratic Party of Italy (the main left-

wing party and the main opposition party at the time) with the goal of fighting anti-Romanian

discourse and the discriminatory policy line of Italian populist right-wing forces.

The National Liberal Party (PNL) started developing a transnational political engagement

network later (2011-2012). PNL founded a network of Liberal Clubs for Romanians abroad. In

2012, there were eight branches in Italy, including Rome, Milano, Toscana-Pistoia, Toscana-Lucca,

Siracusa-Sicily and Palombara. The network expanded quickly, adding more branches in Italy (13

in the first year), and elsewhere (Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Great Britain etc.).

Romanian emigrants to Italy have actually founded their own political parties abroad in

their receiving countries (in Italy and Spain). These concentrate on issues in the country of

destination and attempt to persuade intra-EU movers to also shift their attention away from

homeland politics (unsuccessfully). Traditional diaspora parties (like the Party of Romanians in



57

Italy – Romanian Identity) have repeatedly condemned transnational political engagement

activities of Romanian parties. In my interviews with diaspora party leaders, these politicians said

they encouraged migrants to refrain from voting in Romanian elections as a protest vote and a way

to punish corrupt officials back home.

In the 2009 presidential elections, incumbent President Traian Basescu launched his

electoral campaign abroad, in Castellon, Spain, a festive open-air event that 9,000 Romanians

attended. On election day, mass media showed for the first time Romanians queuing in front of

embassies and consulates abroad to vote. The race was so close that the Diaspora vote made a

difference and determined the winner of the elections, giving Traian Basescu a second mandate.

Basescu kept emphasizing his transnational political message, stating that he intends to be a

President for all Romanians, including those who work abroad, even in occupations with the

lowest prestige: ‘We do not intend to differentiate between Romanian citizens in the country and

those outside. Promoting the interests and protecting the rights of both categories represents a

priority for me and for the Romanian foreign policy’ (2010). Basescu condemned those who

dismiss high-mobility migrants with the scornful term capsunari (“strawberry pickers”) saying:

‘Politicians have no idea who Romanians abroad really are or what they do’, and declaring himself

in solidarity with Romanian work migrants in Spain, while thanking them for sending money

home. Basescu said that one of the greatest satisfactions of his mandate was that he managed to

fulfill the promises made to Romanians abroad ‘whether it was about the liberalization of the labor

market, the modification of laws on citizenship, the representation of these Romanians in

Parliament in Bucharest, or the increase in the number of consulates abroad’ (2010). Basescu also

strongly advocated for the introduction of correspondence voting for Romanians abroad.

Interestingly, events associated with campaigning abroad by the two leading parties in

Romanian elections highlight the different effectiveness on transnational political engagement

strategies. Three hours before one of Basescu’s support rallies that drew thousands of participants

in Castellon, Spain, in May 2007, just a couple of streets away, the leader of PSD Bucharest



58

Marian Vanghelie held a gathering to support a Romanian diaspora politician running as a

socialist candidate for a seat on the Local Council. Only 200 people showed up.

In the 2014 presidential elections, Klaus Iohannis had a special section dedicated to

Romanians abroad in his program. PSD’s Victor Ponta’s platform only mentioned the Diaspora

once. Iohannis promised electronic voting, correspondence voting, more consulates, more

Romanian classes in schools where members of Romanian communities abroad are present.

Prime Minister Victor Ponta (PSD) campaigned abroad in 2014, traveling to Italy (Torino)

and Spain (Madrid). In Torino, he said he intends to be a president for all Romanians, not just

those who live in Romania. He talked about the financial support policies that he introduced (the

programs “First house”; “First car”; the European funds and programs financed with EU money,

the elimination of consular taxes for children. ‘The most important thing is for it to be understood

everywhere that we are not second-hand European citizens; we are European citizens like all

others’. He took pride in the fact that the average purchasing power during his mandate as Prime

Minister went from 48% of the European average to 54%. About correspondence voting, Ponta

said he agrees with it in principle, but that a secure system will be achievable for the 2016

elections. He declared that the government was looking for solutions so that voting abroad would

be correct. He stated that the number of voting stations would be the same as in 2009, and that

the priority is to have good organization to avoid lines at the closing time for voting centers

abroad. In Madrid, Ponta talked about a financing program that would provide 50-100K euro for

Romanians living in EU countries to start businesses in Romania, with the possibility of having

operating branches in these countries, but on condition for the tax on profit to be paid in

Romania. An incident was reported at the orthodox church in Madrid where, after having

attended the mass, Ponta was booed by a group of Romanians when he was leaving the church,

and asked to resign. He allegedly replied ‘I will resign if I become president’.12

12Mateescu,RazvanMateo.2014.“Jurnaldecampanie:CandidatulPSD,VictorPonta,huiduitsilaMadrid.”Puterea.October19.http://www.puterea.ro/politica/jurnal-de-campanie-candidatul-psd-victor-ponta-huiduit-si-la-madrid-102078.html



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In October 2014, Ponta was leading in the polls, but there were no data to reflect the

voting intentions of Romanians abroad (who gave Traian Basescu the decisive advantage to be

reelected president in the preceding elections in 2009). Ponta had claimed the number of

Romanians who choose to leave the country is smaller and smaller (‘Today’s Romania is not the

same as Romania 15 or 20 years ago. Differences between Romania and the West have been

decreasing, both with regard to career opportunities, a decent life, and also from the point of view

of institutional functioning and rule compliance. But there is still a lot to do! I want to give as

many reasons as possible for Romanians to stay at home and for those who have left to return…’).

Ponta focused on elite migrants and declared wanting to limit the phenomenon of doctors or

teachers leaving the country because of low wages, also to increase opportunities for those who

come back from abroad through the so-called SMART Diaspora initiatives – the Multidimensional

Strategy for Attracting Young People to Romania (Strategia Multidimensionala de Atragere in

Romania a Tinerilor). ‘Romanians in Germany, Italy, Spain, France or the US must be able to

enjoy at the maximum level the services of embassies, consulates, and the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs… They must feel protected by authorities in Bucharest’. ‘I encourage those in the Diaspora

to go vote, without the influence of propaganda, but by their own families in Romania, who can

better and more accurately than anyone tell them what is the reality today’.13

The first round of election drew attention to the high levels of participation of Romanians

abroad. Many were not able to cast a vote because of high participation. Ad-hoc protests occurred

in UK, Germany, Austria, Belgium and Italy (Burean 2018). Romanians abroad criticized the

deficient organization and blamed it on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and PM Victor Ponta.

Diaspora representatives asked for more voting stations and booths in the second round of the

presidential elections. In Romania, non-migrants protested across the country in solidarity with the

Diaspora and their political demands. Both former president Traian Basescu and candidate Klaus

13Cehan,Sorin.2014.“EXCLUSIV–VictorPontaredimensioneazadiaspora:‘Emigreazadinceincemaiputiniromani’.”Ziarulromanesc.de.October10.http://ziarulromanesc.de/eveniment/exclusiv-victor-ponta-redimensioneaza-diaspora-emigreaza-din-ce-in-ce-mai-putini-romani/



60

Iohannis accused the government of deliberately interfering with the Diaspora vote to prevent

Romanians abroad from making their voice heard. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to

respond; some PSD officials argued it was against the law to change the number of voting stations

between rounds. In the run-off, turnout of Romanian citizens abroad more than doubled. Many

were mobilized to vote because they wanted to fight back against a government led by a party now

perceived as hostile to Romanians abroad. As in 2009, national polling agencies projected Victor

Ponta as a winner. The next day, after the votes from abroad had been counted, the result was

overturned. Iohannis won 89% of the expat vote. After the election, President Iohannis traveled to

Spain and Italy to thank citizens abroad for their support.

In the 2016 Parliamentary elections, the Save Romania Union party (USR) founded earlier

that year managed to gather substantial support from Romanians abroad and became the third

largest political party in the Romanian Parliament. It won slightly higher numbers of votes than

the National Liberal Party among citizens abroad chambers.

In 2018, Romanian migrants and their organizations abroad and migrants organized a

massive protest on August 10th against the current government. The demonstrations mobilized

migrants and non-migrants in cities across Romania under slogans that included “On August 10th,

all Romania comes to Bucharest! Down with the Government! (“Pe 10 august, toata Romania vine

la Bucuresti! Jos Guvernul!”) and “We resist! We don’t give up!” (“Rezistam, nu cedam!”). The

protests contributed to a longer series that started in 2017, when the Grindeanu Cabinet proposed

government decrees that would pardon certain crimes and amend the Penal Code of Romania,

especially sections concerning corruption and abuse of power. The protests have continued each

time the government attempted to interfere with anti-corruption and undermine the commitment

to European integration.

In 2019, the Diaspora Comes Home movement launched a vast pro-EU campaign in the run-

up to European Parliament elections (May). Once again, migrants and non-migrants came together

on social media, exchanging calls to action, memes, and messages to get out the vote under the

hashtags #RomaniiVoteaza (Romanians Vote), #diasporavoteaza (the diaspora is voting),



61

#EUMergLaVot (a word play between the word “EU” for European Union, and “Eu merg la vot”

which translates “I am going to vote”), and #yeslavot/#EUyeslavot (a word play between “yes to

voting” and “ies la vot” which translates “I’m going out to vote”). Throughout the EU, Romanians

documented on social media (twitter, Instagram, Facebook) the saga of their effort to vote, sharing

pictures of themselves in line, early in the morning, and then over the course of the entire day.

Many posts expressed outrage at the long lines and hours of waiting, but also determination, and

urged others to participate and thus respond to what was perceived as an attempt to silence the

voice of voters abroad. The election registered a record turnout of almost 50% for the European

elections in Romania. The diaspora vote contributed 3% to the total number of votes, with votes

going primarily to pro-European parties, while Romania’s ruling Social Democratic Party obtained

only 4% of the Diaspora vote. Overall, the pro-European opposition scored a massive victory over

the ruling coalition. The center-right National Liberal Party and the centrist USR-Plus alliance

(between Save Romania Union and former technocrat prime minister Dacian Ciolos’s party

PLUS) together racked up more than 48% of the vote (dominating in the big cities and diaspora),

while the Social Democrats obtained 23.4%, a sharp drop from the 37.6% they won in 2014.

Romanians abroad claimed intentionally poor organization was maintained to prevent them from

voting: in London, Brussels, Paris, Rome, London, Munich, and Madrid, Romanians waited in

line for up to seven hours to cast a vote. In Stuttgart, the police had to intervene to calm down

irritated voters when the access to the polling station seemed to be stalled. Before the polling

closed, the National Liberal Party and USR-Plus Party requested additional ballot boxes and longer

working hours for officials at the polling stations, a demand rejected by Romanian authorities.

The case of Romania shows a strong imbalance between sporadic top-down, state-led

transnational political engagement, and the political participation of citizens of the Market. The

government’s attempts to control the political and economic contribution of intra-EU migrants

have been overshadowed by the political entrepreneurship of intra-EU migrant collectives who

have mobilized and engaged in forms of electoral and non-electoral political participation outside

traditional channels controlled by political actors from Romania.



62

Conclusions Intra-EU movers bring back and remit more than money and savoir-faire. They are the agents of

change, transforming communities with their wealth, their pragmatism and their experience as

European citizens. As “collective agents of change,” migrants communicate via transnational

connections or bring back with them “political ideas, such as ideas on forms of government, rights

and responsibilities, and democracy” (Faist 2008: 26-27). This paper has shown that intra-EU

mobility not only influences migrants’ worldviews and attitudes, but also empowers them to

persuade others. This is consistent with previous findings on migrants’ propensity to engage in

political discussion and desire to persuade others about politics (Careja and Emmenegger, 2012).

Recent research using Eurobarometer data from all EU member states has established the

existence of a significant positive relationship between individual transnationalism and

orientations towards European integration (EU support and European identity) at the individual

level, but concluded that these effects are limited to a cosmopolitan elite (“a small avant-garde of

highly skilled young individuals from predominantly rich member states”) and create negative

externalities among Europeans who are not transnationally active themselves (Kuhn, 2015).

Previous work had shown that the same social groups that are more likely to interact across

borders are also more likely to support European integration: specifically, a young, wealthy and

highly educated minority that regularly interacts across borders (Fligstein, 2008).

In contrast, this project sheds light on a previously overlooked storyline in the broader

story of experiencing European integration. It shows that European citizenship dramatically

transforms the lives of many average Europeans from CEE. It shows that in high-mobility contexts,

as access rights become a dimension of citizenship, categories previously unlikely to support pro-

market policies and European integration (low middle-class professionals, blue-collar workers,

housewives and retirees) participate in intra-EU migration, develop cosmopolitan worldviews, and

support European integration. Through its usefulness for average citizens, the European project

that has acquired new reservoirs of support that anchor liberal democracy from below. This book



63

shows how intra-EU mobility contributes to the resilience of liberal democratic institutions,

preventing backsliding and the hollowing of postcommunist new democracies.

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