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In the Devil’s Shadow: Don Nichols andU.S. Air Force Special Air MissionsMichael E. Haas

4

18

COVER: An early model C–17 lifts off during testing of its STOL abilities.

Departments:From the EditorBook ReviewsBooks ReceivedComing UpHistory MysteryLetters, News, Notices, and Reunions

35462646869

WINTER 2001 - Volume 48, Number 4

The AMST Program’s Lasting LegacyBetty Raab Kennedy 28

Aeroplanes of Lebedev’s FactoryViktor Kulikov

Slanguage: Part V, Letters S-ZBrian S. Gunderson

40

Taking Clodfelter One Step Further:Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failure ofOperation Rolling ThunderStephen W. Wilson

48

2 AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001

Contributing Members

The individuals and companies listed are contributingmembers of the Air Force Historical Foundation. TheFoundation Trustees and members are grateful for theirsupport and contributions to preserving, perpetuating,and publishing the history and traditions of Americanaviation.

BenefactorMrs. Ruth A. (Ira C.) Eaker Estate

PatronMaj. Gen. Ramsay Potts

SponsorsMaj. Gen. William LyonMaj. Gen. John S. PattonGeneral Rawlings Chapter, AFABrig.Gen. Edward W. Rosenbaum, USAF (Ret)Gen. William Y. SmithTomlinson Family Foundation Inc.

DonorsMr. John F. DonahueEmerson ElectricRockwell InternationalQuesada FoundationGen. Bernard A. Schriever

SupportersThe Aerospace CorporationAllied-Signal Aerospace CorporationArthur Metcalf FoundationCSX CorporationBrig. Gen. Brian S. GundersonMaj. Gen. John P. HenebryGen. & Mrs. Robert T. HerresMaj. Gen. Harold E. HumfeldMcDonnell Douglas FoundationMaj. Gen. Kenneth P. MilesNorthrop-Grumman CorporationMr. William O’RourkeMr. James PartonMr. George PendeltonPratt & WhitneyGen. D. C. StrotherUnited TechnologiesCapt. William C. WardMaj. Gen. Richard A. Yudkin

Annual Contributing MembersANSERARX, Inc.ASTECH/MCI Manufacturing, Inc.Beech Aircraft CorporationBoeing Defense & Space GroupGeneral Electric CompanyInstrument Systems Corp.Litton IndustriesLockheed Martin Corp.The Mitre CorporationNorthrop CorporationVinell Corporation

Officers

PresidentGen. William Y. Smith, USAF (Ret)Vice-PresidentGen. John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Secretary-TreasurerMaj. Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Executive Director Col. Joseph A. Marston, USAF (Ret)

Advisors

Gen. Michael E. Ryan, USAFLt. Gen. Tad J. Oelstrom, USAFLt. Gen. Lance W. Lord, USAFBrig. Gen. Ronald T. Rand, USAFDr. Richard P. HallionCMSAF Frederick J. Finch, USAFSMSgt. Walt Grudzinskas, USAF

Trustees

Col. Kenneth J. Alnwick, USAF (Ret)Mr. F. Clifton Berry, Jr.Lt. Col. Maynard Y. Binge, USAF (Ret)Gen. Mark E. Bradley, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Devol Brett, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. William E. Brown, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Charles G. Cleveland, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. John Conaway, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bennie L. Davis, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. Michael DeArmond, USAF (Ret)Gen. Robert J. Dixon, USAF (Ret)Gen. Michael J. Dugan, USAF (Ret)Gen. Howell M. Estes, Jr., USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Abbott C. Greenleaf, USAF (Ret)Mr. John E. GreenwoodBrig.Gen. Brian S. Gunderson, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. John P. Henebry, USAF (Ret)Col. George A. Henry, Jr., USAF (Ret)Gen. Robert T. Herres, USAF (Ret)Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr.Maj.Gen. Jeanne M. Holm, USAF (Ret)Lt.Gen. Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF (Ret)Dr. R. Gordon HoxieBrig.Gen. Alfred F. Hurley, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. James A. Jaeger, USAF (Ret)Gen. David C. Jones, USAF (Ret)Maj. John Kreis, USAF (Ret)Lt.Col. Kathy La Sauce, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Charles D. Link, USAF (Ret)Lt.Col. Donald S. Lopez, USAF (Ret)Hon. Hans MarkCMSgt Norman A. Marous, USAF Hon. John L. McLucasCol. Kenneth Moll, USAF (Ret)Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., USAF(Ret)Col. Helen E. O’Day, USAF (Ret)Hon. Verne OrrCMSgtAF Sam E. Parish, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. John S. Patton, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Ramsay D. Potts, USAF (Ret)Brig.Gen. Edward W. Rosenbaum, USAF (Ret)Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret)Gen. John A. Shaud, USAF (Ret)Gen. Jacob E. Smart, USAF (Ret)Gen. William Y. Smith, USAF (Ret)Dr. George K. TanhamCol. Robert E. Vickers, Jr., USAF (Ret)MSgt. Charles J. Warth, USAF (Ret)Col. George R. Weinbrenner, USAF (Ret)Col. Sherman W. Wilkins, USAF (Ret)Maj.Gen. Richard A. Yudkin, USAF (Ret)

The Journal of theAir Force Historical Foundation

Winter 2001 Volume 48 Number 4

PublisherBrian S. Gunderson

EditorJacob Neufeld

Technical EditorRobert F. Dorr

Book Review EditorMichael L. Grumelli

Layout and TypesettingRichard I. Wolf

AdvertisingMark D. Mandeles

CirculationRichard I. Wolf

Air Power History (ISSN 1044-016X) is produced in March, June, September,and December by the Air Force HistoricalFoundation.

Prospective contributors should consult theGUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS atthe back of this journal. Unsolicited manu-scripts will be returned only on specificrequest. The Editor cannot accept responsi-bility for any damage to or loss of the man-uscript. The Editor reserves the right toedit manuscripts and letters.

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3AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001

The horrific events of September 11, 2001, shook our nation as violently as did theattack on Pearl Harbor nearly sixty years ago. Just as we overcame that original day ofinfamy, so too shall we beat the challenge of the terrorist assault on the United Statesof America. Air power, which proved decisive throughout most of the twentieth century,will undoubtedly continue to influence events into the twenty-first. This journal willcontinue to encourage the study of air power history to serve the needs of our military,scholars, students, enthusiasts, and all people who love freedom.

To continue our study, this issue starts with an article by a Russian air power enthu-siast, Viktor P. Kulikov, who recounts the history of Vladimir Lebedev’s World War I air-craft factory and its successes and failures. Many unique photographs illustrate thearticle. Michael Haas’s fascinating account of Don Nichols’s special operations exploitsduring the Korean War, “In the Devil’s Shadow,” is drawn from his book published by theNaval Institute Press. Air Mobility Command historian, Betty Kennedy, establishes the“lasting legacy” of the AMST—Advanced Medium Short-Takeoff and LandingTransport—the C–17 Globemaster III. It is relevant even today over Afghanistan.Stephen Wilson wrote, “Taking Clodfelter One Step Further,” while he was a U.S. AirForce Academy cadet. In this article, Lt. Wilson extends his mentor’s thesis by examin-ing how the policy of gradualism led to the misuse of air power in the Vietnam War. Brig.Gen. Brian S. Gunderson, USAF (Ret.), this journal’s publisher and a World War II vet-eran, concludes his final installment of “Slanguage,” the Rosetta Stone of RAF-USAAFslang terms. Future generations will thank him for deciphering an entire body of arcaneliterature.

Nine books are reviewed in this issue, covering a variety of subjects and written byexperts in their field; these should pique everyone’s interest. Again, I invite your atten-tion to the books received list. Book review editor, Michael Grumelli, is actively solicit-ing new reviewers. If you feel qualified to review one or more of the books listed—in thisor prior issues, or have an appropriate book that was not listed—please contact Dr.Grumelli. See pages 62–63.

The departments section includes the usual categories of “The History Mystery,” let-ters, news, notices, and reunions. If you would like to express your views or advise read-ers of some upcoming event, please write or e-mail the editors. See page 2.

Gen. W. Y. Smith, USAF (Ret.), president of the Air Force Historical Foundation, wascompelled to postpone the coalition air power in the Korean War symposium that wasslated for October 17–18, 2001. We anticipate rescheduling it next spring.

On behalf of the staff of Air Power History, I wish all of our readers happy holidays,health, and good fortune.

From the Editor

Air Power History and the Air Force Historical Foundation disclaim responsibility for statements,either of fact or of opinion, made by contributors. The submission of an article, book review, or othercommunication with the intention that it be published in this journal shall be construed as prima facieevidence that the contributor willingly transfers the copyright to Air Power History and the Air ForceHistorical Foundation, which will, however, freely grant authors the right to reprint their own works,if published in the authors’ own works. In the case of articles, upon acceptance, the author will be sentan agreement and an assignment of copyright.


Aeroplanes ofL

AIR POWER History / WINTER 2001 5

Viktor Kulikov

ebedev’sFactory

During World War I, Russian aviation wasarmed mainly with French aircraft, such asthose by Farman, Voisin, and Nieuport, that

were purchased abroad or built in Russia underlicense. Some Russian designers, including VasilySlesarev, Jakov Gakkel, and Vladimir Savel’yevcreated original aircraft, but these were not devel-oped beyond the experimental stage. A fewRussian designers managed to create successfulaircraft that went into production for the Russianarmy, notably Sikorsky’s Il’ya Muromets four-engine bomber and Grigorovich’s M-5 and M-9 fly-ing boats. Also in this category was the two-seatreconnaissance Lebed-XII, one of the few produc-tion airplanes of Russian design of the period. Itwas produced in series at Vladimir Lebedev’s fac-tory in Petrograd between 1916 and 1918, withmore than 200 built during the war years andafter the revolution for the Red Army until 1920.

Vladimir Alexandrovich Lebedev was born inSt. Petersburg in 1879. While studying for a lawdegree from St. Petersburg Imperial University, hewas the Russian bicycle racing champion. InFrance in 1908, he observed the flight of a Wrightbrothers’ airplane. The following year, VladimirLebedev and his brother, Aleksandr, a professor atthe Imperial Polytechnic Institute, built a gliderthat made a series of successful flights near St.Petersburg. Vladimir Lebedev became an activemember of the All-Russian Aero Club and wrotefor Vestnik vozdukhoplavanya (The Herald ofAeronautics) magazine. In March 1910, theseactivities gained him admission to the HenryFarman flying school in France. By April, Lebedevhad earned his wings. He passed his examinations,qualifying for the rank of pilot-aviator, and soonreturned to Russia. Awarded flying diploma No.98, he became the third Russian to graduate from

the French aero club. In June, Lebedev completedseveral successful demonstration flights atGatchina airfield, frequently taking Russian offi-cers aloft. As a result of those flights, many of theofficers later became military pilots.

Lebedev had brought with him a Farman-IVand, beginning in August, began to train studentsat the All-Russian Aeronautic Club’s flying schoolon Gatchina airfield. Lebedev was soon appointedthe head and chief pilot of the flying school.Besides performing as a flight instructor, hebecame a test pilot, flying the first Russian-builtbiplanes, the Rossiya-A and Rossiya-B, and settingan endurance record of fifteen minutes. Thatautumn, he flight tested the Sommer biplane, builtat the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works.

Also in 1910, the Lebedev brothers, along withCaptain Sergei Ul’yanin and a businessmannamed Lomach established Peterburgskoye tovar-ishchestvo aviatsii (the Petersburg AviationCompany (PTA). The newly organized companywon an order from the army’s Central EngineeringDepartment to build a folding or demountable air-craft. The contract specified that the disassembledairplane be capable of reassembly and put in fight-ing trim within two hours. Completed on January26, 1911, military biplane PTA No. 1 was a modi-

fied Farman IV, distinguished from the Frenchmodel by its reduced wing area and featured agondola for an observer and the pilot. The airplanewon a prize at the First International AeronauticExhibition in St. Petersburg in 1911. Lebedev’sflight tests at Kolomyazhsky airfield demon-strated that the new airplane was as fast as the


A Muscovite, Viktor P. Kulikov graduated from Urals University. For the past twenty years, he hasbeen actively researching and writing the history of Russian aviation of the World War I period. Aversion of this article first appeared in Russian Aviation Research Group of Air Britain Bulletin,Vol. 39 No. 141, pp. 139ff. Mr. Kulikov’s article, Sikorsy’s Fighters, appeared in the Winter 2000 issueof this journal.

(Overleaf) The three-seat

reconnaissance Lebed XVI

posted good results in

1917 testing. The Le Rhone

80 hp engines were not

covered with bonnets.

Vladimir Lebedev (third

from the right) with

Russian and French offi-

cers near his aircraft.

Engineer Mikhail Shkulnik

is the first from the right.

(Far right upper) A model

of Sommer aircraft by

French designer and pilot

Roge Sommer was pur-

chased by the Russian

Military Department to be

built at the Russian-Baltic

carriage works in Riga in

1910. Vladimir Lebedev

tested the aircraft in the

spring of 1911.

(Far right lower) Military

biplane PTA No 1 was a

modification of French

Farman-IV. The idea of

folding aircraft was real-

ized in this modification.

Lebedev successfully

tested the aircraft in the

spring of 1911. Rubber

flotation bags were

attached under the lower

wing in case of water land-

ing.

(Below) Vladimir Lebedev

standing (third from the

left) near Bleriot XI aircraft.

The Second aviation week,

St. Petersburg, September

1910.

lighter Farman IV. The All-Russian Aero-Clubbought two copies of PTA No. 1 for pilot training.

In 1912, without interrupting his flying activi-ties, Lebedev decided to devote himself to business.He opened a workshop in St. Petersburg to repairand produce French Integral type propellers, partsfor Depredation aircraft, and trolleys to transportdisassembled Nieuport IV airplanes. Although thisworkshop burned down in 1913, Lebedev hadbought insurance. Then, shortly after the work-shop was restored, a second fire broke out andagain insurance compensated him. Some sus-pected that this was how Lebedev accumulated hiscapital. In April 1914, Lebedev built several indus-trial facilities for his new aircraft factory—Aktsionernoe obshchestvo vozdukhoplavaniay V. A.Lebedeva (Lebedev’s joint stock aeronautic com-pany) in the Novaya Derevnya, near Komendant-sky airfield in St. Petersburg.

A Growing Business

Lebedev’s factory began with only seven work-ers, but after obtaining many orders from theMilitary Department, the factory’s work force grewto 1,500 employees and increased industrial capac-ity. Only six planes per month were produced in1914. Two years later, the monthly average rose tothirty aircraft. The factory’s facilities includedwoodworking, drying, mechanical, fitting, welding,carpentry, and assembly shops. The factory’s chiefpilot was a French aviator named Januar. LettMartin Fyodorovich Gospovskii, who had workedas an engine mechanic, later replaced Januar.Vitold Ivanovich Yarkovskii was the factory’s man-ager and technical head. On the eve of the out-break of World War I, Lebedev recruited LeopoldMikhailovich Shkulnik to be the factory’s primarydesigner. Shkulnik, who had previously worked forthe German AGO Company, designed most of theairplanes at Lebedev’s factory. Vasilii IvanovichRebikov headed the serial construction of foreignaircraft. Engineers Samuil Borisovich Gurevich,Leonid Dement’yevich, and Kolpakov-Miroshni-chenko also worked in aircraft construction.Throughout 1914, aircraft production at the newfactory centered on the French Depredation two-seaters, powered by Gnome 80 hp. engines. Sixty-three of these airplanes were produced. In July, thefactory began to manufacture the French Voisinairplane, with the Salmson 130 hp engine.

In the summer of 1915, Lebedev’s factory inPetrograd (St. Petersburg was renamed in thesummer of 1914) acquired a captured GermanAlbatros plane, powered by a Benz 150 hp engine.Acquisition of the Albatros initiated the practice ofcopying captured aircraft at Lebedev’s factory.Slight changes were made to adapt differentengines to the copies. This line of business provedprofitable to Lebedev, as the government paid thesame price—13,700 rubles—for any two-seat air-craft, whether repaired, captured, or newly-built.

Lebedev hired two new test pilots, AlekseiPetrovich Goncharov and Vasilii Yakovlevich

Mikhailov. At the beginning of the war, Lebedev’sfactory produced many more aircraft than didother Russian aircraft factories. In 1916, his fac-tory produced on average one airplane per day, andin some months one and a half airplanes daily.Besides the Albatros, the factory also copiedGerman airplanes built by Rumpler, Aviatik, andLVG. Also constructed, but in smaller numbers,were the British Sopwith Tabloid and Sopwith 1-1/2-strutter. The copies were all named Lebed andnumbered sequentially. Thus, the Sopwith Tabloidwas named Lebed VII. Lebedev’s factory alsodeveloped experimental airplanes. He enlisted cre-ative people and provided them with favorableworking conditions, but infrequently carried thework through to completion because experimentalairplanes simply did not generate enough profitsoon enough. Nonetheless, several experimentalRussian designs were built at Lebedev’s factory,including the Svyatogor by Vasiliy Slesarev, Le-Grand by Leonid Kolpakov, Morskoy Parasol byGeorgy Fride, VM-4 by Aleksander Villish, andLebed-XVII by Sergei Gurevich.

Trophy and Licensed Aircraft of Lebedev’sFactory

Orders for military planes increased sharplyfollowing the onset of World War I. The CentralMilitary-Technical Department asked for 60Morane Saulnier type G, 30 Morane Saulnier typeL, and 72 Depredation aircraft. Later, the two-seatreconnaissance Voisin became the factory’s mainproduct, with 153 copies of that aircraft producedin 1916-1917. Lebedev also signed contracts for 40Nieuport 10 aircraft (only twelve were produced),260 Sopwith 1-1/2-strutters (five were produced),and 80 Farman 30s (none were turned out). Manyof the orders could not be filled, however, becauseof the factory’s limited capacity and a severe short-age of aircraft-engines.

Lebedev’s factory also produced the so-calledGerman “trophy” aircraft. Damaged enemy air-craft captured by Russian forces that could not berepaired at the front were sent to the factory,where they underwent thorough exploitation tolearn the latest advances in German aviation tech-nology. Usually, these aircraft were copied exactly,with only slight alternations. One of the firstGerman aircraft repaired at Lebedev’s factory wasAlbatros No. 76, powered by a four-cylinder Argusengine. Repaired by Lebedev mid-1915, it washanded over to the Gatchina military flying school.In December of that year several more trophyGerman aircraft were delivered to Lebedev’s fac-tory. Among them was the Rumpler No. 300 with aMercedes 112-hp engine and an LVG with aMercedes 129-hp engine. After repairs, both air-craft were sent to the front to the 8th Army AirDetachment in February 1916.

In 1916, about twenty German aircraft, mainlyAlbatros types, were repaired at Lebedev’s factory.Those aircraft were equipped with enginesremoved from other planes that had been shot


IN 1912, WITH-OUT INTER-RUPTING HISFLYINGACTIVITIES,LEBEDEVDECIDED TODEVOTE HIMSELF TOBUSINESS.

LEBEDEV’SFACTORYBEGAN WITHONLY SEVENWORKERS,BUT…THEFACTORY’SWORK FORCEGREW TO1,500EMPLOYEES

ORDERS FORMILITARYPLANESINCREASEDSHARPLYFOLLOWINGTHE ONSETOF WORLDWAR I

down. After alternation, repair, and test flights theaircraft were designated “Albatros of Lebedev’s fac-tory” with a corresponding number and sent tofront, providing welcome reinforcements to the18th, 33d, 34th, and Grenadier Corps Air Detach-ments; and the 8th and 12th Army Air Detach-ments. The use of outdated German planes wasnecessitated by an acute shortage of airplanes forRussian army frontline aviation during the war.

Seaplanes of Lebedev’s Factory

The Lebed-Morskoi-I (LM-I) float seaplane wasdesigned first with a 220-hp Renault engine, thena 150-hp Sunbeam engine was installed. It wasthree-bay biplane, two-seat reconnaissance thathad three floats. Its useful load was 365 kg, with atakeoff weight of 1,455 kg. After testing in thespring of 1916, the seaplane was delivered to theAir Detachment of the Emperor Peter the Great.Another seaplane produced at Lebedev’s factorywas a floatplane copied from the German AlbatrosNo. 269. The latter made a forced landing onSeptember 28, 1915, south of Mitava not far fromBabit Lake and was then delivered to Lebedev’sfactory. It was planned to equip it with a HispanoSuiza 200 hp engine. The Military Departmentordered 175 of the aircraft, but Lebedev was ableto produce only two.

At Lebedev’s factory in 1915-1916, GeorgyFride modified the Morane Saulnier type L air-craft into a flying boat, designated the MorskoyParasol (Sea Parasol). The wings, tail unit, andGnome 80 hp engine were taken from a standardMorane Saulnier type L aircraft and installed in aboat-shaped hull with significant dead rise andequipped with additional hydrofoils. The aircraftwas tested in the summer of 1916. The power ofthe hydrofoils caused the flying boat to rise fromthe water before the wings developed enough liftand the aircraft could be brought under control.Pilots did not want to risk the takeoff with hydro-foils. Without the hydrofoils, however, the flyingboat could not take off from the water. Work soonstopped.

At the end of 1916, the VM-4 seaplane wasdesigned by Aleksandr Villish and built atLebedev’s factory. It was a flying boat with a trusstail and pusher propeller, powered by a 110 hp LeRhone engine. The wing cell was equipped with adevice for changing the angle of climb during theflight; but it appeared to be unnecessary as the air-craft successfully flew with fixed wings. After suc-cessful tests in Baku, the aircraft was turned over tothe Navy pilot school, but was not mass produced.

Besides seaplanes, in 1915 Lebedev’s factoryturned out two copies of a float version of theDepredation and copies of Maurice Farman M. F.11 on floats for Navy aircraft schools. The Frenchflying boat FBA, renamed Lebedev Morskoi-2 (LM-2) was built under license at Lebedev’s factory in1914-1916. A two-seat reconnaissance aircraftwith a 100 hp Gnome-Monosoupape engine, itcould fly at up to 105 km/hr.

Other Russian-designed Aircraft

In March 1916, testing began of the giantSvyatogor bomber, designed by Vasily Slesarev.The Svaytogor, one of the largest of Russian air-craft built before 1917, was 21 meters long, with a36-meter wingspan. Specifications called for theaircraft to take off with a 6.5-ton load, and fly for30 hours at a speed of more than 100 km/hr, witha ceiling of 2,500 meters. The aircraft featuredlarge, 6-meter diameter propellers, set in motionwith a belt drive by two Renault 220 hp enginesmounted in the fuselage. In early November 1916,while taxiing at Komendantskyi airfield, a wheelof the aircraft rolled into a drainage ditch, damag-ing the aircraft. The designer failed to solve theproblem of inefficient transmission from enginesto propellers and the Svyatogor did not get air-borne. Slesarev changed the belt drive into a ropetransmission. However, breakdowns continuedand the power plant displayed new shortcomings.The airplane remained unfinished for three yearsafter the Bolshevik revolution.

The two-seat reconnaissance K-1, designed byLeonid Kolpakov, with an Austro-Daimler 100 hpengine, was built at the Lebedev factory in thesummer of 1916. The aircraft featured a variablestructure. During flight, the pilot could alter angle


The LM-1 at tests on the

Neva River in May 1916. It

was powered by an eight-

cylinder 150 hp Sunbeam

engine. The main floats

had rubber-block shock

absorbers at the rear pick

up points.

The gigantic Svyatogor

aircraft by Vasily Slesarev

was built at Lebedev’s fac-

tory in 1916.

of attack of the wing cell within limits of 7 degrees.This device was designed to obtain greater lift,while taking off and greater speed during flight byselecting a smaller, constant angle of attack.During the first flight the aircraft took off steeplythen lost speed and fell. Pilot M. Gospovskyescaped with slight injuries. The aircraft wasnever rebuilt and work on the project stopped.

The Early Lebed Aircraft

All experimental and serial aircraft producedat the Lebedev’s factory in 1914-1918 were desig-nated “Lebed” and numbered from I to XXIV.Information about the first six types is lacking, butit is assumed that they were copies of foreign air-craft. The Lebed VII, produced at the beginning ofDecember 1914, was a copy of the Sopwith Tabloid,a single-bay biplane powered by an 80-hp Gnomerotary engine. The 21st Corps Air Detachmentreceived two Lebed VIIs. The plane attracted theattention of the Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhai-lovich—Patron of the Imperial Russian Air Ser-vice—who inquired about the Lebed-VII as a fight-ing machine and also how soon it could be pro-duced in quantity. Military pilots reported that theLebed VII was capable of attaining the same speedas Morane Saulnier G, had better pilot visibility,and was easier to land. On the negative side, thesingle-seater was less desirable for military pur-poses. That estimation probably determined whythe plane did not enter serial production and theremaining copies were transferred to the Gatchinaflying school. The last ones remained at that flyingschool until the middle of 1916. The two aircraftassigned to the 21st Corps remained until May1915. Lieutenant Vernitsky made more than thirtycombat reconnaissance flights in them for theSixth Army Corps. The longest flight, on April 2,lasted 2 hours 30 minutes.

In the spring of 1915, one Lebed VII flown byLieutenant Semenov was assigned to the Gro-dnensky fortress air detachment. Another LebedVII went to the Seventh Fighter Air Detachmentin December 1916 for training, but crashed withEnsign Janchenko at the controls. Lieutenant

Tsirgiladze damaged one of the last Lebed VII air-craft, works number (WN) 52, while landing at theGatchina flying school on February 5, 1917.

A later attempt was made to improve theLebed VII by installing a two-bay wing cell withailerons at the upper wing and an undercarriagewithout anti-nose-over runners. The modified air-craft, designated Lebed VIII, failed to produce theincreased load-carrying capacity expected andonly two copies were built.

On July 5, 1915, due to the malfunction of itsMercedes 120 hp engine, a German LVG B II madea forced landing near the village of Stara Buda.The undamaged aircraft was turned over to the27th Corps Air Detachment. While on a nightflight from the nearby Kovna fortress, however, theplane was slightly damaged and sent to Lebedev’sfactory. Repaired in early 1916, it was subse-quently sold to the Military Department under thedesignation Lebed IX.

In 1915 work began on the Lebed X aircraft. Anoriginal design, its scheme and structure envi-sioned for multipurpose use. The fuselage, under-carriage, and tail were the same for two variants.However, two different wing cell arrangementscould be attached to the fuselage. The small wingset yielded as a single bay sesquiplane that couldbe used as a fighter. Its 16-sq. meter upper winghad ailerons, while the smaller, 13-sq. meter lowerwing had none. A second variant, with large wingswas produced as a standard double-bay biplane.Its two wings had the same wing span and almostthe same area—upper wing 20 sq. meters, lowerwing 19.4 sq. meters. Two of the aircraft, WN 100and 101, with different wing-cells, were built at theend of 1915 and tested by Lebedev himself the fol-lowing spring. Both performed poorly. The short-wing version was underpowered. The long wingvariant, intended for reconnaissance, was a single-seater, with little load-carrying capacity. Lebed Xdid not enter serial production and in July 1917,WN 101 was transferred to the Gatchina flyingschool.

The Monocoque No. 11 (Lebed XI) was not anexact copy of the French Depredation Racer.Russian designers tried to convert the racer into a

single-seat fighter, with a Gnome-Monosoupape100-hp engine and a synchronized gun. Its designspeed of 180 km/hr and armament made the air-craft a good prospect for Russian military aviation,


(Below left) Lebed VII in

Gatchina flying school,

winter 1915-1916.

(Below right) Lebed X

fighter with a one-strut

wing cell. Vladimir Lebedev

is in the cockpit.

AIRCRAFTPRODUCEDATLEBEDEV’SFACTORY IN1914-1918WERE DESIG-NATED“LEBED” ANDNUMBEREDFROM I TOXXIV

THE PLANEATTRACTEDTHE ATTENTIONOF THEGRAND DUKEALEKSANDRMIKHAI-LOVICH—PATRON OFTHE IMPERIALRUSSIAN AIRSERVICE

except that it experienced numerous deficiencies.Aircraft WN 401, constructed during the firstquarter of 1916, flew fairly well, but its machinegun had not been installed and the MilitaryDepartment refused to buy it. In June 1917,Lebedev managed to sell his Monocoque to theGatchina flying school. The plane was equippedwith a Gnome Monosoupape 100 hp engine and anIntegral type N 8470 propeller. It was also equip-ped with a spare set of wings and a set of skis forwinter flights.

The designation Lebed XI was also assigned toa typical two-seat reconnaissance biplane with dif-ferent versions of wings and engines. In fact, dif-ferent versions of trophy Albatros were producedunder this name from 1915 until 1916. Six vari-eties of wings (two and three-bay biplanes) hadwing spans from 13 to 14.5 meters and wing areasfrom 39 to 43.6 sq. meters. Lebed XI aircraft wereequipped with a variety of captured Mercedes,Benz, and Maybach engines. Later versions of theplane had Salmson 150 hp engines. The Lebed XIswere distinguishable by their propellers’ spinnersand engines, which had collector rings to eliminateexhaust gases passing above the center section ofthe wing. In all, ten Lebed XI aircraft were built.

The Lebed XII

Work on the Lebed XII aircraft started in mid-1915. Flight testing began in December with Lebed

XII WN 325 powered by a Salmson 130-hp engine,that was later replaced with a slightly more power-ful 140 hp engine. Lieutenant Sleptsov, from theGrenadier Corps Air Detachment was the testpilot. On December 29, he telegraphed to the headof aircraft and aeronautics in the Army in the Field,Grand Duke Aleksander Mikhailovich: “Lebed-XIIwith Salmson engine is the best of all the exist[ing]airplane[s]...urgent order for fighting tests is neces-sary.” During the tests the plane attained a speed of120 km/hr, rose to a height of 2,000 meters in 22minutes, while carrying a 350-kg. load. However,the tests also revealed some defects and Sleptsovrecommended that the exhaust pipes be modifiedto divert exhaust gases that streamed into thecockpit; that the wind screen in the pilot’s cockpitbe enlarged; the resistance at the control wheel be

lowered; and that armor be provided for the pilotand observer.

The tests were interrupted by bad weather.The experimental airplane continued the tests ona railway platform first at Kiev and then atOdessa. A Lebed XII was delivered to the A. A.Anatra aircraft factory in Odessa on February 11,1916. Flight testing was completed four days later,but after landing and while taxiing, the aircraftoverturned. It would have taken two weeks torepair, but Lebedev was afraid of competition anddemanded that the aircraft be returned toPetrograd. Two months later, Grand DukeAleksandr Mikhailovich inquired about the statusof the experimental airplane. He learned thatinstead of repairing the plane, a new one wasbuilt. Differing from its predecessor, the newLebed XII’s testing was planned for June. OnFebruary 23, during the flight testing of the firstLebed XII, the Grand Duke had placed an urgentorder for 400 airplanes. But negotiations betweenthe head of Russian aircraft, Central MilitaryTechnical Department and Military Departmentwere prolonged and a contract was not signeduntil April 19, and the number of planesrequested dropped to 225, without engines or pro-pellers. The same contract envisaged delivery of245 sets of spare parts and ten dummy Lebed XIIairplanes. The total cost was 5,153,500 rubles.

Testing of the modified Lebed-XII started inJuly 1916. On the 31st Lieutenant Barbas flew oneof the experimental aircraft (WN 457) fromPetrograd to the front. It took him three and a halfhours to reach Pskov. The engine performed well


(Above) Monocoque No. 11

(Depredation Racer) was a

beautiful plane, but it did

not become a combat air-

craft.

(Far right) Lebed XII (WN

457) with a Salmson 150-hp

engine. Testing started in

July 1916 at Komendan-

tskyi airfield, where the air-

craft achieved speeds up

to 133 km/hr. The wind-

shield and machine gun

mounting at the observer’s

cockpit are removed, and

the wheels are covered

with axle caps. The fuse-

lage was covered with a

colorless oil varnish and

had yellowish painting. The

wings and tail were cov-

ered with three coats of

varnish and painted beige.

One of the many versions

of the Lebed XI aircraft at

Komendantskyi airfield in

the summer of 1915. These

types of radiators were

usually used for Salmson

engines cooling Voisine

aircraft.

and there were no complaints about the aircraft.In Pskov Barbas obtained a new map, fueled up,adjusted the engine and flew on to Dvinsk, wherehe landed after a two-hour, twenty-minute flight.His general impression about the airplane wasgood, but he noted that “the [aircraft] during theflight pulled downwards and it was necessary to[hold it level with the] control handle.”

On September 13, Lebedev asked for a post-ponement due to technical difficulties. The prob-lem was that the experimental airplane had beendesigned for the Salmson 130-hp engine, while theproduction model was equipped with 140 hp and150 hp versions. Because the latter engines wereheavier, they altered the airplane’s center of grav-ity. In addition, the attachments for the radiatorsand engines reqired modification. At the end ofSeptember, however, the modified planes resumedflight testing. On September 27, factory pilotMikhailov took off in aircraft WN 444, with a 150-hp engine, carrying a 350-kg load to test horizon-tal speed. On the same day another aircraft (WN497), with a 140 hp engine and a new exhaust sys-tem underwent testing.

At the beginning of October, taking advantageof good weather, factory and military pilots carriedout almost all the tests of the Lebed XII. Itachieved a speed of 133 km/hr and the aircraftclimbed to 3,000 meters, with a 350-kg load in 56minutes. However, it also had excess weight, asmall useful load, and insufficient ceiling. Factorypilots Mikhailov and Goncharov and militarypilots Captains Zhokhov, Modrakh, Jablonsky, andLieutenants Kalashnikov, Korvin-Krukovsky, andLerkhe participated in the work of the test com-mission. In their October 10 report, they acknowl-


Lebed XII (WN 442) with a

Salmson 140 hp engine at

Komendantskyi airfield

during test flights July-

August, 1916. Notice the

wheels, Integral type pro-

peller, and water radiator.

Engineer Kolpakov demon-

strates versatility of

machine gun mounting of

his system.

edged the Lebed XII fit for reconnaissance in thenearest rear units, reported its maximum permis-sible loading to be not more than 300 kg, and rec-ommended sending the aircraft to frontline corpsand air detachments to replace Voisin airplanes.

The Lebedev XII featured a four-sided plywoodfuselage without internal bracing. The fuselagewalls were made of 3-mm plywood; its sheets

attached to a four-longeron framework with brasswood screws, nails, and joiner’s glue. The fuselagehad great rigidity and durability, was simple andcheap to produce, but carried some excess weightin comparison with wire-braced fuselages withcanvas covering. The wings’ profile was thin andconcave, pinewood box spars were connected bystruts that, together with a wire anchor, formed aclosed biplane-box. The upper wing angle settingwas positive, while the lower wing was negative.Later, it was discovered that the plane had diffi-culty in climbing out of a dive, the cause of severalcrashes. The tail unit was flat, its welded framemade out of steel pipes with a cloth covering. Thestandard undercarriage featured V-shaped strutsformed from steel tubes of elliptical section. Twowheels 760 by 100-mm set on steel axes had steelrims and spokes and sometimes were covered withaluminum axle caps. The pilot’s seat, at the front,was placed over the fuel-tank, the observer’s cock-pit was framed with a wooden ring, which servedas the base for the machine gun mounting. Thetraining version of the aircraft was distinguishableby the student’s seat being located in the front andinstructor’s behind it.

A 140 or 150 hp Salmson engine was mountedon a rigid steel engine bed and covered with analuminum cowling. Only the valve heads remainedopen to promote cooling. According to Lebedev’sassertion “owing to the bonnet [the] engine con-stantly worked at [a] good temperature, carbure-tors got warm air and stayed in [a] warm room.”The plane’s powerplant, together with cabin con-struction, tubular steel engine bed and undercar-riage formed a closed rigid system. The firmattachment of the engine reduced vibration to aminimum. The fuel (270 liters) and oil tanks (26liters) were made of red copper or brass and wereself-sealing. The radiators were a tubular type,made of 240 brass tubes, arranged in ten sections(24 pieces in each), and were placed at the outsideof the fuselage sides. The radiators caused consid-erable frontal resistance. The control handle oper-ated the ailerons and elevator, pedals worked therudder.

The new airplane met contract specifications,and Lebedev soon placed it into serial production.At that time some structural defects were elimi-nated and slight improvements introduced. TheLebed XII was turned over to the army equippedonly with machine gun mountings, but withoutmachine guns or ammunition boxes. The Air FleetDepartment, however, insisted that the machineguns be installed. In mid-October 1916, some addi-tional changes were introduced as a result of test-ing to improve stability. First, the angle of attackof the upper wing was increased by 1 degree and10 angular minutes and moved 35 mm forward.Second, to eliminate exhaust gases from the cock-pit, vent pipes from the crankcase were installedand additional air holes were drilled in the cowlingand fuselage.

Serial production of the Lebed XII began inNovember 1916, but only 28 airplanes were turned


(Above) General view of

machine gun mounting of

engineer Shkulnik’s system

on the Lebed XII.

(Below) Standard produc-

tion aeroplane Lebed XII

with a Salmson 150-hp en-

gine and Colt machine gun,

produced at Lebedev’s fac-

tory in the summer of 1917.

out by the end of that year, including the tendummy planes. Deliveries to the front proceededslowly, despite of the acute shortages of airplanesin the air detachments. By January 1, 1917, onlysix planes were in the Army in the Field (all at theNorthern front in the XIIth Air Division) and oneairplane was kept in the 4th Aircraft Park. In1917, 164 aircraft were built and turned over; in1918, 24 airplanes were delivered. The Lebed XIIserved in the 1st, 5th, 10th, and 12th Air Divisionsin the following air detachments: 10th, 13th, 15th,23d, 25th, 29th, 33d, and 38th Corps and the 5thArmy.

The plane was used for reconnaissance overenemy rear units, photographing and bombingenemy positions, and artillery spotting. Frontlinepilots’ opinions of the aircraft were that it was dif-ficult to control, and it could get into situationswhere it could not be brought out of a dive.Another serious drawback was that exhaust gasespenetrated the cockpit, causing a risk of fire in theair. On February 1, 1917, for example, Lebed XII(WN 483) of the 13th Corps Air Detachmentburned because of an engine fire. The pilot made aforced landing and survived, but the aircraft didnot. On June 17, during a test flight a Lebed XII(WN 540) belonging to the 5th Army AirDetachment caught fire in the air. The pilot glideddown safely, but the aircraft burned down. PilotEnsign Tikhomirov received slight burns, but theobserver escaped unharmed. An explosion in thecarburetor started the fire. Crashes and fires of theLebed XII, traced to structural defects, resulted ina temporary production stoppage.

In June, a special investigative commission wasorganized under the chairmanship of ProfessorGeorgy Botezat. Pilot Ensigns Bazilevich-Knjazh-kovsky from the 29th Corps Air Detachment andLieutenant Levchenko of the 29th Corps AirDetachment participated on the commission. Thecommission concluded, after several test flights,that was impossible to improve the aircraft, it wasnot desirable to send it to front, and that the air-craft might be used only in the flying schools. Thetraining version of the Lebed XII, with the 140 hpengine, had even worse performance, was danger-

ous to fly, and not fit for flying schools. Factorypilots A. Goncharov and V. Mikhailov, engineers L.Shkulnik and L. Kolpakov disagreed with the com-mission’s report, however. The two factory pilotshad logged 250 hours on the plane, both of themhad tested 160 aircraft of that type, and they con-sidered it to be a good reconnaissance plane withslight drawbacks.

Lebedev and his colleagues concluded that thecommission’s tests had been carried out by inexpe-rienced pilots and that its conclusions were sub-jective. To resolve the dispute another commissionconsisting of representatives of frontline pilots, theGatchina flying school, the Air Forces Department,and Lebedev’s factory was established. In a reportdated October 2, 1917, the new commissiondeclared the Lebed XII unfit, outdated not onlywith low load-carrying capacity, but by its inade-quate speed and found several structural draw-backs in the engine’s fuel and cooling systems. Thecommission concluded that “further construction isnot desirable” and serial production was pro-foundly curtailed. Trying to improve the LebedXII’s performance, Vladimir Lebedev substitutedthe Hispano-Suiza 140 hp engine for the Salmson.He also made several structural modifications,such as directing the exhaust pipes upwards. Onecopy of the altered plane was built and designatedthe Lebed XII bis.

The Last Lebed Series

The next type, the Lebed XIII, was scheduled tobe produced in March 1916, but no informationexists on its construction. The Lebed XV biplane,featured a tractor propeller and Renault 225 hpengine, and Lebedev promised that it wouldappear at the end of March 1916. But it alsoremained only a project. Engineer and inventorLeonid Kolpakov created the Lebed-XIV Le Grand.Started in 1915, it was a three-bay biplane, withtwo 150 hp Salmson engines and tractor pro-pellers, designed for a rated speed of 140 km/hr.Though its official name was the “large fighter,” itwas more typical of a mid-size bomber. Threemachine guns provided almost 360-degree protec-


The results of a collision of

a Voisin and Lebed XII air-

craft at Gatchina flying

school airfield, winter 1917-

1918.

FRONTLINEPILOTS’ OPINIONS OFTHE AIRCRAFTWERE THATIT WAS DIFFICULT TO CONTROL

TRYING TOIMPROVE THELEBED XII’SPERFOR-MANCE,VLADIMIRLEBEDEVSUBSTITUTEDTHEHISPANO-SUIZA 140 HPENGINE FORTHESALMSON

tion. In his telegram dated January 16, 1916,Vladimir Lebedev reported to the Chief of Russianaviation, Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich: “atthe end of February [we will] test [a] two-enginedfighter ‘Lebed XIV’ of 900 kg load carrying capac-ity.” However, by the second half of 1917, the planewas not yet built.

In 1916, the three-seat, two-engined reconnais-sance Lebed-XVI was built. A two-strutter biplane,it was equipped with two 80-hp Le Rhone engines,with tractor propellers. The engines were mountedon struts and covered with cowlings with fairing.The observer’s cockpit, with a machine gun waslocated at the front, behind the cockpit and the tailgunner’s cabin. Tests carried out at the beginningof 1917 by A. Gorshkov. The results were encour-aging, but no orders were placed and work on thisaircraft soon stopped.

More advanced than its predecessors, theLebed-XVII was a giant step forward. Designed bySergei Gurevich it was a single-bay, two-seatreconnaissance biplane equipped with a stream-lined cowling covering a 150-hp Salmson engine.The upper wing had a center-wing section; twotubular radiators were attached to shaped frontstruts; the fuselage sides at the front were roundedto fit the engine’s contour. The airplane was distin-guished by good aerodynamics. In August 1917, itpassed flight testing with satisfactory results butwas never placed into serial production, althoughseveral copies of that aircraft type were built bythe end of the year.

In January 1917, Lebedev prepared a plan fora two-seater reconnaissance Lebed-XVIII based onthe German Albatros type, with a 230-hp Fiatengine. He proposed to the Military Department tobuild 300 copies of that aircraft but failed to

receive an order. Seven copies of the two-seatreconnaissance Lebed-XXI were built in theautumn of 1917. The aircraft took 20 minutes toclimb to 2,000 meters. On the whole, the plane’sflight performance of the aircraft was disappoint-ing and it was not placed into production. Somecopies of the plane flew until 1921. The Lebed-XXIV remained an experimental project, as deliv-ery of the 230 hp Fiat and 200 hp Hispano-Suizaengines destined for the aircraft were stopped bythe Russia’s allies in the second half of 1917.

Major Expansion

By the middle of 1917, Lebedev managed toraise productivity to 50 aircraft per month by dip-ping into the factory’s capital reserves and acquir-ing new equipment. The factory also built skis, pro-pellers, and spare parts for its own aircraft, and foraircraft turned out by other companies. Lebedevsoon had no room in Petrograd to enlarge his fac-tory. Consequently, his joint stock aeronautic com-pany built factory branches in Taganrog and Pen-za. The planned capacity of the Taganrog branchwas to be 40 aircraft a month by year’s end. Anassembly shop was constructed for two parallelproduction lines, one for land aircraft, another forhydroplanes. Two buildings were attached to anassembly shop. The Taganrog factory included amodern conveyer belt assembly line. Located nearto the Azov Sea, there was a potential for expan-sion, thanks to the presence of metallurgical andfuel bases, waterways, railway communications,and skilled workers. Unfortunately, the economywas in shambles, transportation was paralyzed,and revolutionary chaos prevented implementa-tion of plans. Thanks to the efforts by workers and


Lebed XII aircraft from

Saratov Hydro Air

Detachment of the Red

Army in the region of

Narva, Northwest front.

Civil war, winter 1918-1919.

BY THE MID-DLE OF 1917,LEBEDEVMANAGED TORAISE PRO-DUCTIVITY TO50 AIRCRAFTPER MONTHBY DIPPINGINTO THEFACTORY’SCAPITALRESERVESAND ACQUIR-ING NEWEQUIPMENT

LEBEDEVSOON HADNO ROOM INPETROGRADTO ENLARGEHIS FACTORY

engineers, however, productivity at the Taganrogbranch reached 25 aircraft a month.

Construction of a branch in Penza, planned toproduce more than 20 aircraft a month was alsoadversely affected by war and revolution. Thus,the main burden of fulfilling orders from theMilitary Department remained with the Petrogradfactory. Lebedev received orders for hundreds ofaircraft from the Military and Navy Departments.In the spring, he contracted with the MilitaryDepartment for 200 Albatros airplanes, equippedwith the 200-hp Hispano-Suiza engine. However,the order fell through when Russia’s allies,England and France stopped delivering theengines during the second half of 1917. Lebedevalso won an order from the Military Departmentfor 260 Sopwith 1-1/2 Strutter type aircraft, with aClerget 130 hp engine, but only five copies werebuilt. The Penza aircraft factory, which specializedin producing propellers, received a contract fromthe Military Air Fleet to deliver sixty trainingAlbatros-VIIs. However, this order, too, was notfilled.

Epilogue

In 1917, Vladimir Lebedev was elected presi-dent of the All-Russian Aero-Club. And, despite hispreoccupation with industrial strife, Lebedev wasalso appointed to head the flying school, theKomendantsky airfield, and the hydroplane sta-tion at Krestov Island in Petrograd. After theBolshevik revolution in October, the new govern-

ment confiscated Lebedev’s factory and other prop-erties—the airfield, test station, and workshops—and the capitalist Lebedev was declared “anenemy of the people.”

The Bolsheviks nationalized Lebedev’s facto-ries in Petrograd, Taganrog, Yaroslavl, and Penza.Lebedev’s plant in Taganrog became aircraft fac-tory No. 32 of Narodny KommissariatAviatsionnoi Promyshlennosti (NKAP) (the Peo-ples’ Commissariat of Aviation). Lebedev’s Petro-grad factory was merged with the AviationDepartment of the Russko-Baltic Carriage Worksand renamed state aircraft factory No. 3Gosudarstvenny Aviatsionny Zavod (GAZ). Laterit was renamed Krasnyi Lyotchik (Red Pilot), thenaircraft factory No. 23.

Forced to flee for his life, Lebedev escaped tosouthern Russia, where he remained throughoutthe civil war in 1918-1920. There he became a min-ister of trade and industry in the government ofthe White Russian General Denikin. Lebedev triedto start aircraft production at a factory inTaganrog, but failed amid the chaos of the civilwar. Following the defeat of the White Russianforces, Lebedev fled to Serbia, where he worked fora time as a representative of French firms, sellingthe Gnome and Le Rhone engines. In 1926, hemoved to Paris, where he continued to work in theaircraft industry. His contributions to the develop-ment of French aviation were recognized by theaward of the Legion of Honor. He died in Paris onFebruary 22, 1947.

Throughout its existence, Lebedev’s company


Military Pilot Ensign

Shishkovsky and Observer

Poruchik Shreider from the

10th Corps Air Detachment

have returned from a

reconnaissance on a Lebed

XII, March 1917.

THE NEWGOVERN-MENT CON-FISCATEDLEBEDEV’SFACTORYAND OTHERPROPERTIES…AND…LEBEDEVWASDECLARED“AN ENEMYOF THE PEOPLE”

FORCED TOFLEE FOR HISLIFE,LEBEDEVESCAPED TOSOUTHERNRUSSIA,WHERE HEREMAINEDTHROUGH-OUT THECIVIL WAR IN1918-1920

produced some 700 aircraft of Russian and foreigndesign. His Russian engineers created about 20Russian aircraft designs, notably the reconnais-sance Lebed-XII.

Part of the problem concerned labor unrest. InMarch, strikes broke out as workers made eco-nomic demands, including an eight-hour day,which was introduced at Lebedev’s factory inApril. Also, sharp increases in the cost of materialsaffected airplane production. The factory contin-ued building the Lebed XII until the end of 1917,when it had become hopelessly obsolete. The num-

bers and types of airplanes constructed atLebedev’s factory in Petrograd from 1914-1917 istabulated to the left in Table 1.

The Red Army also used the Lebed-XII duringthe Russian Civil War in 1918-1920. The planeswere in the inventory of the 2d Petrograd AviaGroup, Tverskaya Avia Group, 1st Socialist AirDetachment, 3d Separate Navy Air Detachment,Belomorsky Hydro Air Detachment, 3d LatvianAir Detachment, and others. Fewer Lebed XIIsserved in White Army air detachments. Thus, inthe aviation of the Siberian Army of Admiral Kol-chak there were only two Lebed XIIs (WN 535 inthe 6th Air Detachment, and WN 585 in the 5thAir Detachment). Copies of the Lebed XII re-mained in service for several years after the end ofCivil War. The last Lebed-XII were used in civilaviation, including the Baku section of theObshchestvo druzei Vozdushnogo Flota (Society ofAir Fleet Friends, ancestor of the Soviet AeroflotAirlines). In May 1925 two of the aircraft (WN 703and 717) were still in service, flying propagandamissions in Azerbaijan (North Caucasus). ■


Airplane Production at Lebedev’s Factory, 1914-1917

Year built Aircraft Type Number of Aircraft

1914 Farman IV and Nieuport IV 341914-1915 Depredation 631914-1917 Voisin LA and LAS 1531914 Farman XVI 201915 Farman XXIIbis 201914-1916 Lebed VII, VIII, IX, X, XI 151914-1916 flying boat FBA 341916-1917 Lebed XII 2161916-1917 Lebed XIII, XV, XVI, XVIII, XXIV 101915-1917 Morane-Saulnier type L 301915-1916 Morane-Saulnier type G 201916 floatplane Lebed 31916-1917 Nieuport X 101917 Sopwith 1-1/2-strutter 51914-1917 French and English acft 101914-1917 Trophy aircraft 30

Total 673

A crashed Lebed XII.

(Below right) A Lebed XII of

the 2d Petrograd Air Group

of the Red Army,

Petrograd, summer 1919.

The red star was painted

over the three-colored

cockade of Imperial

Russian aviation.

THE FACTORYCONTINUEDBUILDINGTHE LEBEDXII UNTIL THEEND OF 1917,WHEN IT HADBECOMEHOPELESSLYOBSOLETE


Lebed-VIIengine Gnome 80 hplength of the aircraft 7.77 mheight of the aircraft 2.57 mwing span 6.10 mwing area 22.3 sq. mtake off weight 481 kgmaximum speed 130 km/hpractical ceiling 3000 mflight duration 2.5 h

Lebed Xengine Le Rhone 80 hplength of aircraft 7.06 mwing span

fighter 10.5/8.75 m reconnaissance 13.125 m

wing areafighter 29.0 sq.mreconnaissance 39.4 sq.m

empty weight 415 kgmaximum speed

near the surface fighter 135 km/h

Lebed XI (biplane A 1 type)engine Mercedes Benz 100 hplength of the aircraft 8.0 mheight of the aircraft 3.25 mwing span 13.0 mwing area 40.8 sq.mempty weight 735 kgcapacity of the lower/

upper fuel tank 240/20 loil tank capacity 20 lweight of the fuel + oil 160 kguseful load 350 kgtake off weight 1,085 kgwing loading 26.7 kg/sq.mpower loading 7.3 kg/hpload ratio 32 %maximum speed

near the surface 110 km/hpractical ceiling 3,000 m

Lebed-XI (later series)engine Salmson 150 hplength of the aircraft 8.0 mwing span 14.5 mwing area 43 sq.mempty weight 820 kgweight of the fuel & oil 130 + 23 = 153 kguseful load 350 kgtake off weight 1,170 kgwing loading 26.3 kg/sq.mpower loading 7.8 kg/hpload ratio 30%

Lebed-XIIengine Salmson 150 hplength of the aircraft 7.963 mheight of aircraft 3.25 mwing span (upper/lower wing) 13.15/12.0 mwing area 42 sq.mempty weight 840 kguseful load 350 kgtake off weight 1,212 kgwing loading 29 kg/sq.mpower loading 8.1 kg/hpfuel tank capacity (lower/upper tank) 210/60 loil tank capacity 26 lmaximum speed

near the surface 133 km/htime to climb the

height of 1000 m 8.5 min3000 m 56.0 min

practical ceiling 3500 mtake off and

landing run 100 m

Lebed-XIV (Le Grand)engines two Salmson 150 hplength of the aircraft 11.0 mheight of the aircraft 3.6 mwing span

(upper/lower wing)24.0/16.0 msize of undercarriage

wheels 900 x 100 mmrated speed 140 km/h

Flying boat LM–2 (Lebed Morskoi-2) or FBAengine Gnome-

Monosoupape 100 hplength of aircraft 8.0 mheight of the aircraft 2.93 mwing span 13.68 mwing area 33.5 sq. mempty weight 535 kgweight of fuel & oil 120 + 30 = 150 kguseful load 305 kgtake off weight 840 kgwing loading 25 kg/sq. mpower loading 8.43 kg/hpload ratio 36.4 %maximum speed

near the surface 105 km/hlanding speed 70 km/htime to climb the

height of 1,000 m 15 min2,000 m 40 min

practical ceiling 2.500 mflight duration 4 h

Technical performance data of the major aircraft types produced at Lebedev’s factory

Editor's note: A special debt of gratitude is due to three individuals for their invaluable critiques andcomments in preparing this article for publication: Mr. Augustus Blume, of Charlottesville, Virginia;Dr. I. B. Holley, of Duke University; and Dr. Roger Miller, of the Air Force History Support Office.


��


Michael E. Haas

�

�f I were called upon to name the most amazingand unusual man among all those with whom Iwas associated during my military service, I

would not hesitate for a second in picking outDonald Nichols as that individual.... I have oftenreferred to him as a one man war.

Gen. Earle E. Partridge,Commander, Fifth Air Force, 1948

Maj. Gen. Earle E. Partridge first met MSgt.Donald Nichols in 1948, soon after the generalarrived in Japan to assume command of the FifthAir Force.1 And though Partridge received periodicbriefings from the Counter-Intelligence Corpssergeant during the subsequent two years leadingup to the war, the general later admitted hissparse knowledge of Nichols’s activities in Koreaduring this prewar period. Little wonder, consider-ing that Nichols’s world was found in the meanstreets and back alleys of prewar Seoul, a long wayfrom the plush offices found at Fifth Air Forceheadquarters in Tokyo. The war gave Partridgecause to take a deeper look into Nichols’s operationin the summer of 1950, and he was astonished atwhat he found.

For what the gruff, burly Nichols had estab-lished on the Korean peninsula during the prewaryears was not simply an intelligence organization,but the genesis for what would become the mostsuccessful special operations unit of the war. It wasby any account a bizarre organization to be run bythe “wild blue yonder” air force. But then again,neither the newly arrived Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) nor the Far East Command’s (FEC)army intelligence team could compete with thequality of sensitive information generated byNichols’s contacts, deep penetration agents estab-lished years earlier throughout Korea. By 1950,Nichols was a man with access twenty-four hoursa day to both General Partridge and South Koreanpresident Syngman Rhee, not to mention a host ofshadowy Asian characters whose names will neversee print.

Possessing only a sixth grade education butfluent in the Korean language, Nichols was thespymaster whose warnings accurately predictedwithin days the North Korean invasion of SouthKorea, only to watch his warnings fall on deaf ears

at MacArthur’s headquarters. This former motor-pool sergeant was also the combat leader who per-sonally conceived, organized, and led a daring heli-copter mission deep into enemy territory to stripparts off a downed MiG–15 fighter, then the mosthighly sought after intelligence prize of the war.2But Nichols’s world had a darker side as well, aside visited by Partridge and others time andagain when the urgent need for results became tooimportant to question the methods used, when theneed was too sensitive to put in writing. For thisbrand of warfare Nichols coined a new term, some-thing he called “Positive Intelligence.”

Nichols himself admits that he created theterm Positive Intelligence in prewar Korea, wherehe was already well on the way to establishing apowerful intelligence apparatus throughout theentire peninsula. In his autobiography How ManyTimes Can I Die? Nichols writes, “By this time[1947-1948] our unit was really moving in ‘high,very high’ South Korean government circles. Alldoors were open to us. In those days no one in thisarea knew or even thought about PositiveIntelligence (PI).3 We invented it for this area andtaught others, as we saw fit, for our own benefit.”4

“Our unit” was Sub-Detachment K, 607thCounter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), stationed atKimpo Airfield on the western outskirts of Seoul.After reporting to the sub-detachment in June1946, Nichols soon began making extensive andeffective use of Korean civilians to establish acovert network throughout the length of the polit-ically troubled peninsula. Moreover, as PresidentRhee’s trust in Nichols grew, the president took thehighly unusual step of placing selected SouthKorean coast guard and air force personnel underthe unquestioned command of the American ser-geant. But what really swept Positive Intelligencebeyond the scope of previous U.S. counter- intelli-gence operations, was the historical coming toge-ther of “the man and the moment” as Nichols wentto war in the summer of 1950. He would emergethree years later a legend in South Korea’s mostpowerful military and intelligence agency circles,an enigma even to the American special operatorswho worked for him and to this day an unknown tothe American public.

Nichols’s sub-detachment had become a well-oiled machine by 1950, its effectiveness stemming


Michael E. Haas, a retired colonel in the U.S. Air Force, began his military career as a private in theU.S. Army infantry and subsequently served in airborne, ranger, special forces, and psychological oper-ations units. He was an assault helicopter pilot and flight platoon commander in the Vietnam War,completing 968 combat flying hours and earning the Distinguished Flying Cross and Bronze Star,among other medals. Following his transfer to the Air Force, Haas served in special operations and spe-cial tactics units, commanded the Pararescue Squadron and completed Pentagon tours with the JCSand Air Staff. A graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a master’s degree in national secu-rity affairs, Colonel Haas also wrote Apollo’s Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operationsduring the Cold War.

This article is excepted from In the Devil’s Shadow: UN Special Operations during the Korean War.Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2000, pp. 78-91, © by Michael E. Haas, reprinted by permis-sion.

(Overleaf) By early 1951,

Nichol’s Special Activities

Unit was providing Fifth Air

Force with “one-stop ser-

vice” for requirements

ranging from sensitive

intelligence collection to

airborne-ranger type

assaults on high priority

targets. (USAF Photo)

WHAT…NICHOLS HADESTAB-LISHED ONTHE KOREANPENINSULADURING THEPREWARYEARS WAS…THE GENESIS FOR WHATWOULDBECOME THEMOST SUCCESSFULSPECIALOPERATIONSUNIT OF THEWAR

NICHOLSWAS THESPYMASTERWHOSEWARNINGSACCURATELYPREDICTEDWITHIN DAYSTHE NORTHKOREANINVASION OFSOUTHKOREA

largely from its deep penetration, political contactsthroughout both South and North Korea. Onemeasure of this effectiveness was demonstratedthe month before the war started, when his agentspersuaded a North Korean pilot to defect with hisSoviet-built IL–10 ground-attack fighter. It wasthe first aircraft of its kind to fall into U.S. hands,and extensive debriefs of the willing pilot provedextremely valuable to the air force’s Air TechnicalIntelligence experts. The plane itself was promptlydismantled for shipment back to the Zone of theInterior, as the continental U.S. was then known inmilitary parlance.

But before this rare intelligence prize couldbe shipped back to the United States, Nichols’steam and all other Americans in Seoul wereforced to flee for their lives when 100,000-plusNorth Koreans poured over the thirty-eighth par-allel like a huge swarm of killer bees. Leaving “abloody wake of massacred civilians to mark theirrapidly advancing line,”5 the North KoreanPeople’s Army forced his team to abandon theirhard-earned IL–10 acquisition. Staying behindon his own volition to destroy abandoned equip-ment and aircraft at Kimpo Airfield, Nichols him-self barely escaped at the last minute by clingingto the side of a small boat crossing the Han River,just south of Seoul.

The experience was a bitter glass of wine forthe man who had repeatedly warned FEC head-quarters in Tokyo of the impending North Koreanattack. But his warnings had been sent in vain,for as the Fifth Air Force commander laterobserved, “Nichols’s reports were suppressed anddisregarded.”6 His last report actually predictedwithin seventy-two hours the “surprise” attackthat subsequently stunned a totally unprepared

Truman administration. Not so surprising, it wasNichols’s terse report from Seoul on the morningof June 25, 1950, that gave MacArthur’s head-quarters its first official notification of the NorthKorean invasion.7

After catching up with the retreating Ameri-can embassy staff south of Seoul, Nichols learnedof both his promotion to the rank of warrant officerand his next assignment. Amid the confusion atthe American camp, he was recognized by U.S.ambassador John J. Muccio, who immediatelyasked him to maintain personal contact with theSouth Korean military service chiefs. Nicholsserved in this role for the following month beforebeing relieved for appointment as a special repre-sentative to the director, Special Investigations,Far East Air Forces, a move designed for no otherpurpose but to free him for bigger things. And thebigger things came fast, as General Partridge wasa man in a hurry that summer.

For his first task Nichols was sent to secure“by any means possible” one of the Russian-builtT–34 tanks with which the Russians had equippedthe North Korean army. Despite its extensive sup-port to Russia during World War II, the UnitedStates had somehow missed getting an example ofthis highly successful weapon for study. One resultof this omission was the very disagreeable surpriseexperienced by Fifth Air Force pilots as theywatched the rugged T–34 withstand their cannonand rocket attacks on the vehicle. Following thegeneral’s orders, Nichols promptly borrowed atank retriever vehicle from a frontline army unitand secured, under enemy fire, an abandonedT–34. A grateful Partridge promptly awarded Ni-chols a Silver Star medal for valor, along withanother tasking.


A rare photo of “Mr.”

Donald Nichols, a man with

good reason to be camera

shy. This OSI agent sur-

vived assassination

attempts in 1948, 1950 and

1953, as well as enduring

an attempt to kidnap his

son, then living in Seoul.

(Photo courtesy of the

author.)

HIS AGENTSPERSUADEDA NORTHKOREANPILOT TODEFECT WITHHIS SOVIET-BUILT IL–10GROUND-ATTACKFIGHTER…THE FIRSTAIRCRAFT OFITS KIND TOFALL INTOU.S. HANDS

NICHOLSWAS SENT TOSECURE “BYANY MEANSPOSSIBLE”ONE OF THERUSSIAN-BUILT T–34TANKS

If the general’s first request seemed more suit-able for one of the army’s tank officers than an airforce intelligence operative, Partridge’s secondrequest seemed more suitable for an infantry offi-cer. The general’s problem concerned the Com-munist guerrillas harassing Fifth Air Force planesoperating from Taegu Airfield, a vital resupplybase in South Korea. Could Nichols do somethingabout the guerrillas? Partridge asked. Nicholsresponded by personally leading twenty SouthKorean soldiers into the hills around the airfield,at night, to attack the guerrillas in close quarter’scombat. Nichols’s surprise attack brought a sharpreduction in guerrilla activity around the impor-tant airfield, and yet another request fromPartridge. In response to the general’s need forinformation Nichols infiltrated forty-eight SouthKoreans by parachute behind enemy lines on thir-teen different missions, to supply the Fifth AirForce with its most complete target list to date ofenemy installations. Later that year he also sentparachutists behind enemy lines to rescue the sur-viving aircrew from a downed B–29 bomber.

Nichols’s parachutists came from a crudejump school set up earlier by him for just such mis-sions.8 As he later recalled with humor, little did heknow at the time that he himself would becomeone of its graduates. While observing training atthe school one day he watched a transport loadedwith Korean trainee’s land for no apparent reason.Upon learning that they had refused to jump, hedetermined to set the example by donning a para-chute himself and warning the students of the con-sequences if they refused to follow him out of theaircraft. After all, he told them, he too had neverbeen to jump school. As Nichols relates in his auto-biography, “I really didn’t at this time think that itwould be necessary for me to jump. However, afterwe became airborne, I noticed all eyes were on me.When we went over the Drop Zone, old manNichols jumped. I was quite elated to see the blos-

soming of every other chute on the plane spreadout above me as I dropped.”9

By this time Positive Intelligence had obvi-ously evolved into a special strike force of someunknown hybrid. If Fifth Air Force headquarterswas not sure how “air force blue” it was, GeneralPartridge knew he liked it, and that he had thefinal “vote” on the issue. Regardless of its unortho-dox activities, the time had clearly come to giveNichols’s force the organizational support itneeded to reach its full operational potential. Thissupport was initiated in March 1951 with a FifthAir Force headquarters letter that provides a rareinsight into that command’s wide-open approachto aggressive intelligence collection. The lettertasked Nichols’s newly activated Special ActivitiesUnit Number 1 to:

Provide intelligence operations of a positive nature[emphasis added] designated to meet theobjectives of this command.

Perform operations (sabotage, demolition and/orguerrilla) necessary to accomplish destructionof specific objectives.

Assist allied agencies responsible for providingevasion and escape facilities to downed UNairmen.

Coordinate with other allied UN intelligence agen-cies as required by existing directives.10

The Fifth Air Force was soon compelled todelete “guerrilla warfare” from this task list, in def-erence to the fierce outcries from army and CIAorganizations already conducting such operations.That administrative deletion appears to have beenoffered only out of bureaucratic politeness, how-ever, as the air force “blue suiters” had no intentionof surrendering any of their operational preroga-tives. For by this time Nichols was providing theFifth Air Force with “one stop service” for require-ments ranging from sensitive HUMINT (the mili-


Nichols’ men included

scholars with advanced

degrees and burly athletic

types without higher edu-

cation, but who could walk

all night through enemy

forests, ride horses, paddle

canoes, parachute from

low altitude, kill a man with

a single karate blow, and

speak three or four lan-

guages. (Photo courtesy of

the author.)

NICHOLSINFILTRATEDFORTY-EIGHTSOUTHKOREANS BYPARACHUTEBEHINDENEMY LINESON THIRTEENDIFFERENTMISSIONS

UPON LEARN-ING THATTHEY HADREFUSED TOJUMP, HEDETERMINEDTO SET THEEXAMPLE BYDONNING APARACHUTEHIMSELF ANDWARNINGTHE STU-DENTS OFTHE CONSE-QUENCES IFTHEYREFUSED TOFOLLOW HIMOUT OF THEAIRCRAFT

tary acronym for human intelligence collection), toairborne-Ranger-type assaults against high-prior-ity targets. On April 17, 1951, Nichols earnedAmerica’s second highest medal for valor by per-sonally leading a dangerous mission against anintelligence target so secret that the citation to hisDistinguished Service Cross would describe it onlyas “information of inestimable value.”11

Indeed it was: the wreckage of a Soviet-builtMiG–15, the most advanced Communist fighterentered in the war and a major threat to all UNaircraft flying over North Korea. To defeat thisthreat the U.S. Air Force badly needed technicalinformation on the MiG, but despite the high pri-ority assigned this task, no example of the fighterhad yet fallen into Allied hands. Although thewreckage was too far—some one hundred miles—behind enemy lines to retrieve, technical intelli-gence experts could still glean considerable infor-mation by studying its most important parts. Tothis end, Nichols and five Korean specialists “pro-ceeded behind enemy lines in an unarmed heli-copter...despite fragmentation hits scored on theengine and intense anti-aircraft and automaticweapons fire[,]...landed in an area only a few milesfrom a major enemy supply depot[,]... pho-tographed the materiel, recorded all inscriptionsand technical data, and supervised dismantlementof vital parts [for loading] aboard the helicopter.Although suffering serious damage to the rotorblade, the crippled aircraft flew 80 miles over theYellow Sea to make an emergency landing on afriendly island.”12 The “friendly island” was Cho-do, just off North Korea’s western coast. Itselflocated some 100 miles behind enemy lines, theisland was one of Nichols’s primary operatingbases in enemy territory and in fact his point ofdeparture for the final flight into the MiG–15crash site.13

The following July Nichols mounted another,much more complex and ultimately more success-ful operation to retrieve the wreckage of a downedMiG–15 lying in the coastal mud flats northwest ofPyongyang. So high was the priority accorded thecapture of a MiG fighter, that the UN supportedNichols with a combined U.S.-British-SouthKorean fleet directed by Rear Adm. A. K. Scott-Moncrieff of the British Royal Navy.14

To carry Nichols’s specialists to the site andretrieve the aircraft, the U.S. Navy provided alanding ship, utility, the LSU-960, that had beenmodified for the mission with the installation of acrane capable of pulling parts of the aircraft out ofthe mud.15 American and British aircraft were alsobrought in to provide air cover over the retrievalsite. It was another demonstration of Nichols’sexceptional organizational abilities and his talentfor finding the best people for his purposes. Maj.George T. Gregory, one of Nichols’s executive offi-cers during this period, describes the diverse kindsof people the enterprising Nichols brought to hisoperation: “His [Nichols] men included scholarswith advanced degrees, and burly athletic typeswithout higher education, but who could walk all

night through enemy forests, ride horses, paddlecanoes, parachute from low altitudes, and kill aman with a single karate blow and able to speakthree or four foreign languages.”16

To align Special Activities Unit Number 1with the U.S. Air Force’s established intelligencestructure, the unit was re-designated the 6004thAir Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) themonth following its activation. The squadron wasactivated on Headquarters, Far East Air Forcesorders, in what appears to have been an effort toensure top-level control of an extremely sensitive,intelligence/special operations asset. Although theorganization of the 6004th would continue toevolve throughout the war, its core structure wascomprised of the following three detachments:

Det One: Collect Air Technical Intelligence andconduct Prisoner of War interrogations.

Det Two: Collect and disseminate Air Intelligenceinformation. Due to the unusual nature of thiswork and other circumstances, both the pri-mary and secondary missions have been clas-sified Top Secret by the Commanding General,Fifth Air Force.

Det Three: Plan, coordinate, and support Evasionand Escape activities for the recovery of UNairmen downed in enemy territory...and toassist in the organization and specializedtraining of personnel necessary to accomplishthe basic mission.17

Characteristic of the times, not more than afew weeks had passed before the Fifth Air Forcetasked Detachment 1 with a mission that under-scored its commitment to retain its operationalprerogatives, regardless of any joint-service sensi-tivities.

On June 1, 1951, Nichols sent fifteen SouthKorean air force saboteurs on a parachute infiltra-tion mission to blow up two railroad bridges.Enemy uniforms, equipment, weapons, and identi-fication papers were carried by the teams shouldthey need to bluff their way past enemy chal-lenges. But despite Nichols’s attention to detailand planning, both missions failed as all the sabo-teurs were captured by the Chinese, a rare totalloss for Nichols.18 Moving beyond this setback Det1’s mission soon reverted to the more traditionaltechnical intelligence and POW interrogationroles. It was during this transition that Nicholsmoved over to assume command of Det 2, lateracknowledged as the most aggressive U.S. AirForce intelligence unit of the war.

Unlike Det 1’s mission, which could usually beaccomplished within established military intelli-gence channels, Det 2’s Positive Intelligence mis-sion took it far beyond any channels familiar to theU.S. Air Force. In particular, the detachment’s TopSecret activities led to its description by one post-war study as “the first covert collection agency of atactical nature in the history of the U.S. AirForce.”19 Activated in Seoul on July 25, 1951, thedetachment began its operations with seven offi-


NICHOLSMOUNTEDANOTHER,MUCH MORECOMPLEXAND ULTI-MATELYMORE SUC-CESSFULOPERATIONTO RETRIEVETHE WRECK-AGE OF ADOWNEDMIG–15

NICHOLSSENT FIF-TEEN SOUTHKOREAN AIRFORCE SABO-TEURS ON APARACHUTEINFILTRATIONMISSION TOBLOW UPTWO RAILROADBRIDGES

cers (Nichols commanding) and twenty-six air-men.20 As noted earlier, the latitude of its missionwas extremely generous in an operational sense.In a wide-ranging mission summary, Nichols wasauthorized to:

direct intelligence operations behind enemy lineswith special emphasis on...positive intelli-gence[,]...coordinate with allied intelligence agen-cies[,]...gather positive intelligence on the effective-ness of (allied) air operations...vital points of theenemy’s transportation system...revetment hide outareas[,]...plan and direct such special operations asmay be required to support...the Fifth Air Force andFar East Air Forces Intelligence missions.21

Most of these missions could be accomplishedonly by “eyes on target,” a reconnaissance tacticrequiring the operative to personally observe thetarget at close range—obviously at great risk tothe observer’s life. What the summary did notspecify was exactly whose eyes were to take suchgreat risks, how they were to conduct surveillancein the target area, and most important to theowner of these eyes on target, how to stay alive inthe process. The answer to the “whose eyes” ques-tion could be found in the personnel manning sta-tistics for this most unusual U.S. Air Force detach-ment. By January 1952 only 5.7 percent of thedetachment’s 665 personnel were American, offi-cers representing a minuscule 1.2 percent of thetotal.22 But Det 2 had to deal with one overwhelm-ing operational reality that no number ofAmericans could remedy. Flatly stated, noCaucasians could hope to survive in the detach-ment’s target areas, and official air force recordsleave little doubt as to why this was so.

According to one 6004th AISS unit historyreport, “The main difference between its (Det Two)mission and that of Det One, is that DetachmentNumber 2 generally works north of the bombline.”23 By July 1952 twenty-three of Nichols’s sub-detachments were “sending a steady stream ofradio reports back to Nichols’s headquarters frombehind enemy lines.”24 By year’s end this numbergrew to thirty-two sub-detachments as Nicholssent still more eyes into North Korea.25 To supportthis growing effort (and replace casualties) thedetachment grew to a strength of 900 Koreans, 178of whom came from the South Korean air force. 26

Most of the remaining Koreans were recruitedfrom the ranks of the UN partisan forces,27 whobrought with their proven valor in combat some-thing else not as useful for intelligence work.28 Foras their American supervisors soon learned, mostof these former partisans were far more interestedin fighting than intelligence gathering, an ad-mirable quality anywhere else but in Det 2. Strin-gent supervision by their Korean sub-detachmentcommanders proved necessary to keep the prob-lem under control. One problem definitely notunder control, however, was the rising death toll ofthese agents in the field. As the Chinese and NorthKoreans began to comprehend the political realitythat UN forces would not attack north of the

thirty-eighth parallel again, they began releasingmore frontline forces for internal security duty inareas where the agents had previously operatedsuccessfully.

As Nichols’s agents soon learned to their bittercost, routine missions became tough and the toughones became one-way missions. The agents werenot the only ones to suffer from this new anddeadly reality. In his haunting memoirs, Nicholsdescribes the price tag for knowingly sending mento their death, about lonely, dark nights in whichhe confesses:

I hate to call myself a man. I had to be the one togive the actual orders when I knew someone wasgoing to be killed. Maybe some of my bosses couldhave told me how to go about filling some of thoserequirements; however, I doubt it. They wanted lit-tle to do with them. They wanted the answers, andin some cases didn’t want to be told how I got them.They knew it meant lives; sometimes many.

It’s easy to give an order such as ‘I want a MiG–15’or ‘I want some enemy officers, a few enemy tanksto experiment with, some of their tank 85mm tankammo,’ etc. However, filling these requirements isanother problem, which requires lives.29

With 900 Koreans in the field conductingPositive Intelligence not found elsewhere in theU.S. Air Force, it was imperative that the detach-ment set up its own training program for itsunique operations. Unfortunately, the pace of fieldoperations and the deaths of some of its most expe-rienced agents delayed this program until the sec-ond half of 1952. Once operating, however, thetraining center comprised three schools run byboth American and Korean instructors. The cur-riculums included:

Interrogation: Agent-trainees were taught thefundamentals and techniques for interrogat-ing both prisoners of war and Koreans theywould encounter in the target area while oper-ating behind enemy lines.

Agent: Trainees learned techniques for accurateintelligence gathering on enemy airfields, air-craft, and radar. Small arms training andguerrilla warfare skills were also included andphysical fitness was emphasized.

Paratroop: As parachute infiltration was a pri-mary means of entering enemy territory, ajump school was organized to teach thebasics.30

Both in size and importance to FEC’s joint-ser-vice intelligence community, Det 2 was clearlygrowing beyond what anyone could have antici-pated early in the war. This growth had not goneunnoticed by the army and CIA. In 1952 bothbegan to suggest which organization should con-trol the detachment’s growing operations. To fendoff such bureaucratic predators Far East AirForces headquarters retained a tight grip on thedetachment, while the Fifth Air Force continued to


MOST OFTHESE MISSIONSCOULD BEACCOM-PLISHEDONLY BY…REQUIRINGTHE OPERA-TIVE TO PER-SONALLYOBSERVETHE TARGETAT CLOSERANGE

MOST OFTHESE FORMER PARTISANSWERE FARMORE INTER-ESTED INFIGHTINGTHAN INTEL-LIGENCEGATHERING

DET 2 WASCLEARLYGROWINGBEYONDWHAT ANY-ONE COULDHAVE ANTICI-PATED EARLYIN THE WAR

provide general administrative and logistical sup-port for the unit. Actual mission coordination wasusually conducted through the Combined Com-mand Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK),the Far East Command’s clearing house for allunconventional warfare operations in North Koreaafter December 1951. CCRAK also providedNichols’s agents with mission-specific equipmentdrawn from its warehouses by special arrange-ments established through the Fifth Air Force.31

This latter arrangement further confirmed Det 2’ssecondary mission, which called for it to supportselected unconventional warfare missions beyondthe scope of Fifth Air Force requirements.32

The air force had no objection to the detach-ment’s common sense cooperation with CCRAK,but it objected strongly when the army-dominatedorganization promptly set out to secure opera-tional control of this valuable air force asset. Asimportant as these bureaucratic struggles were atthe top levels, they remained of little interest tothe agents in the field who remained focused onmore important (to them at least) issues. And fore-most among these issues was the life-or-deathproblem of getting to and from the target areawithout being detected; a problem that continuedto grow as the Communists further consolidatedtheir territory. For Nichols and his sub-detach-ment commanders it was a continual game of try-ing to outfox the Communists, who of course wereplaying the same game against their agents.

Infiltration by parachute would continue to bethe primary, if not the only, practical means oflong-range penetration into North Korea’s moun-tainous interior. The early-war experiences hadproven the effectiveness of radio-parachute teams,

and Nichols’s agents were frequent users of FifthAir Force assets dedicated to supporting military(and CIA) operations behind enemy lines. But forall the different air force units flying his teamsnorth of the bomb line, there remained throughoutthe war virtually only one way back to safety forthese agents—-the slow and dangerous journey onfoot. The one viable exception to this long-range,air infiltration was Operation Salamander—agentinsertion by sea.

The Korean peninsula offers thousands ofmiles of remote, rugged coastline for those seekingdiscreet entry onto the mainland. And the roadand rail traffic running through the flat coastalareas adjacent to the coastline make ideal targetsfor both partisans and agents. But although parti-san raiders could make good use of the fast, armedgunboats provided by the U.S. Air Force’s crashboat crews, stealth and deception remained thekeys to mission success—not to mention sur-vival—for Nichols’s agents. And to that end thealways-creative Nichols found the money toacquire local, shallow-water craft identical to thoseused by Korean fisherman.

By the close of 1952, Det 2’s fleet had grown to“thirty vessels of all descriptions and sizes” to sup-port its combat and resupply missions throughoutthe partisan-held islands.33 Nichols also main-tained access to much larger vessels to support hisisland activities, including for the biggest loadsone of the U.S. Navy’s amphibious assault ships.This support was critical because as it turned outthere was a lot of activity on these islands. Locatedonly a few miles from the shoreline, forested andfar too many in number for the Communists tocontrol at any one time, the islands provided


A most unusual Air Force

intelligence collection vehi-

cle, this indigenous Korean

junk acquired by Nichols

sits at low tide awaiting its

next mission. This vessel

was part of Nichol’s “pri-

vate” fleet that ranged in

size from such vessels to a

U.S. Navy landing ship tank

(LST). (USAF Photo)

DET 2’S SECONDARYMISSIONCALLED FORIT TO SUPPORTSELECTEDUNCONVEN-TIONAL WARFAREMISSIONS

INFILTRATIONBY PARACHUTEWOULD CON-TINUE TO BETHE …ONLYPRACTICALMEANS OFLONG-RANGEPENETRA-TION INTONORTHKOREA

exceptional launching platforms for unconven-tional warfare operations against the mainland.And the islands offered still something else of par-ticular interest to Fifth Air Force leaders and theircombat aircrews.

United Nations pilots flying over North Koreaknew that a bailout from their crippled aircraftover the peninsula’s rugged interior meant almostcertain capture and torture. To stand any chance ofrescue their best, if not only, hope was to get atleast as far as the offshore islands, where partisanforces (including Nichols’s teams) operated. Theair force designated these islands as “safe havens,”a place for the pilots to head if bailing out overenemy territory appeared unavoidable. But if thesafe haven concept sounded plausible and madefor good pilot morale, in practice it rarely justifiedthe pilots’ hopes. Despite air force reports creditingpartisans or friendly Koreans with helping pilotsevade capture after being downed in enemy terri-tory, further investigation makes clear that luck,not an effective escape and evasion program,account for many of these rescues.34 One well-pub-licized rescue in particular underscores the lack ofcommunications that crippled the escape and eva-sion program throughout the war.

On May 1, 1952, U.S. Air Force Col. Albert W.Schinz, an F–86 fighter pilot and deputy comman-der, 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, parachutedfrom his battle-damaged plane into the sea nearone the small islands off North Korea’s westerncoast. Before bailing out, he contacted Air Rescuewith his position and was told to hang on for thenight to await pickup the following day. Making itsafely to a nearby island and knowing that theFifth Air Force knew his general location, heawaited pickup—for the next thirty-seven days. Inhis paper, “Special Operations in Korea,” Col. RodPaschall, director of the U.S. Army’s MilitaryInstitute, graphically describes what happenednext: “Thirty-seven days later, near starvation andthoroughly disgusted with the US escape and eva-sion system, Schinz crawled into his hut foranother lonely night of waiting, only to be rudelyawakened at two a.m. as he found himself staringinto a flashlight and a gun barrel. To his furtherastonishment, he heard “Whoopee! Americancolonel!” spoken in English by [CCRAK] partisanswho were deployed in the area.”35

Although relieved to be picked up at last,Schinz’s relief turned to anger upon learning thatthe partisans in these air force-designated safehavens were not issued receivers that could pick updistress calls from the survival radios issued to thepilots. In fact, Schinz’s rescue was purely a matterof luck. The partisans were actually out looking foranother pilot they believed had bailed out over thearea days earlier.Although Schinz was safe, his res-cue would bring tragedy to the partisans who foundhim. During Schinz’s subsequent debriefing at thePentagon he named the island on which he was res-cued by the partisans. Headquarters, U.S. Air Forcereleased the story to Life magazine, which pub-lished the saga in its July 28, 1952 issue.36 The

Chinese probably read the story too, for shortlythereafter a large raiding party stormed the island,killing all partisans present.37

Schinz’s misadventures in 1952 confirmed howlittle progress had been made in the escape andevasion program since a very frustrated Fifth AirForce had designated Det 3 (6004th AISS) as itsfocal point for such operations a full year earlier. Infact, Det 3’s activation was born of a still earlier airforce frustration with the CIA’s failure to establisha clandestine program in enemy territory. GeneralPartridge’s dissatisfaction in this regard is madeclear in a Fifth Air Force paper, “Evasion & EscapeHistorical Synopsis,” summarizing the situationduring the first four months of the war.38 Upon ask-ing his staff when an effective escape and evasionnetwork could be established to assist airmen evad-ing through enemy territory, the unhappy com-mander was told, “All clandestine activities in con-nection with Evasion and Escape are delegated toan agency not under the operational control of theAir Force, and that repeated assurances of sub-stantial covert operations within the near futurehad been received from this agency...but as yet noagents had been placed in the field.”39

By this stage of the war, the clandestine es-cape and evasion mission had already been insti-tutionalized within the CIA’s jurisdiction, andFifth Air Force efforts to reclaim the mission metstiff resistance from the agency. Although a jointmilitary-CIA meeting held later that year addedmanpower to the program the agency maintainedits bureaucratic primacy for the mission. Despiteeveryone seemed to want the mission, none of the“players in the game” could find the resourcesneeded to give it the day-to-day priority devoted tohigher profile, unconventional warfare missions.Overall, the covert escape and evasion program inNorth Korea continued to represent the low pointof military and CIA operations in North Korea,that continued to grow steadily in other areas. Andlike the other organizations, the 6004th AISS con-tinued to grow too.

In proposing yet another expansion for the6004th in September 1953, one air force reportdescribes Nichols’s unit simply, but accurately, as“the primary collection agency of FEAF.”40 Notingthe unit’s liaison as an organizational equal withthe Documents Research Section (the CIA liaisonwith FEC), the report assessed the squadron’sbureaucratic position relative to other militaryintelligence organizations within FEC: “While anexact parallel...cannot be drawn, it may be notedthat in Korea we now have a detachment opera-tion [Det 2] on an equal basis with a CIA operationof regimental strength and a Navy operation equi-valent of a Group.”41 Considering the senior rankof officers normally commanding regimental orgroup-size operations, the air force’s decision toallow the relatively low-ranking Nichols (by now amajor) to retain command of its most importantintelligence asset was indeed remarkable.

Although anecdotal sources have their obviouslimitations, they do provide rare, personal sket-


PILOTS FLY-ING OVERNORTHKOREA KNEWTHAT ABAILOUT…OVER THEPENINSULA’SRUGGEDINTERIORMEANTALMOST CER-TAIN CAP-TURE ANDTORTURE

SCHINZ’SRESCUE WASPURELY AMATTER OFLUCK…THEPARTISANSWERE ACTUALLYOUT LOOKINGFORANOTHERPILOT

ONE AIRFORCEREPORTDESCRIBESNICHOLS’SUNIT SIMPLY,BUT ACCU-RATELY, AS“THE PRI-MARY COL-LECTIONAGENCY OFFEAF”

1. The Fifth Air Force reported to Headquarters, FarEast Air Forces, the senior air force component inGeneral Headquarters, Far East Command.2. For this mission Nichols received the Distinguished Ser-vice Cross, America’s second highest decoration for valor.3. “Negative Intelligence” was the practice of denying theenemy from acquiring intelligence on U.S. forces, that is,the Counter-Intelligence Corps’ primary mission.4. Donald Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die?(Brooksville, Fla.: Brooksville Printing, 1981), p. 117.5. Ibid., p. 126.6. Ibid., p. 5.7. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force inKorea, 1950-1953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air ForceHistory, 1953, rev. ed.), p. 6.8. This was not part of the Pusan jump school estab-lished by FEC’s Liaison Group.9. Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die?, p. 130.10. Hqs, Fifth Air Force, Office of Deputy for Intelligence,to Special Activities Unit Number One, March 5, 1951,subject: “Special Activities Unit Number One (OperatingInstructions),” in U.S. Army Forces, “UN PartisanForces,” January 1954, p. 192.11. Hqs, Far East Command General Order No. 159,June 22, 1951.12. Ibid.13. Allison E. March and Donald C. McElfresh,Submarine or Phantom Target? A Search for theTruth.(Silver Spring, Md.: Edisto Press, 19980, pp. 24-25.14. Ibid., p. 26.15. Ibid.16. Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die? p. 148.17. History, 6004th AISS, May-June 1952, p. 31. MaxwellAFB, Ala.: U.S. Air Force Historical Research Agency.18. Diane Putney, “Air Force HUMINT 40th Anniver-sary,” U.S. Air Force Special Activities Center (AFSAC)booklet (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Nd), p. 5.19. Lt. Col. Lawrence V. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfareand Airpower in Korea, 1950-1953,” Maxwell AFB, Ala.:USAF Aerospace Studies Institute, p. 77.20. Hqs, Far East Air Forces General Order No. 336,

Activation, Special Activities Unit No. One, July 20,1951.21. History of 6004th AISS, 1 July 1952-31 December1952 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: U.S. Air ForceHistorical Research Agency), pp. 37-40.22. Ibid. p. 79.23. History, 6004th AISS, May-June 1951, p. 28.24. Ibid, p. 40.25. Ibid.26. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower,” p. 99.27. Virtually all the UN partisans were North Koreans whohad chosen to flee south from the advancing Communistsrather than live under their control. For the most sensitiveintelligence missions CCRAK and Det 2 found the educated,Christian Koreans to be the most reliable agents.28. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower,” p. 100.29. Nichols, How Many Times Can I Die? pp. 132-33.30. History, 6004th AISS, 1 July-31 December 1952, p. 42.31. Ibid., p. 45.32. Ibid., p. 89.33. Maj. Forrest L. Marion, “Air Force Special OperationsKorean War Chronology,” p. 17. Hurlburt Field, Fla.: AirForce Special Operations Command History Office, 1998.34. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower,” pp.151-53.35. Col. Rod Paschall, “Special Operations in Korea,”Conflict, Vol. 155, No.2 (November 1987), p. 167.36. Schuetta, “Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower,” p. 186.37. Memo, Col. George Budway, USAF (Ret.) (formerchief, Air Operations, CCRAK) to R. H. Dawson, subject:“CCRAK: Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities—-Korea,” June 1987, p. 9.38. Rpt of Hqs, Fifth Air Force, “Evasion & EscapeHistorical Synopsis,” date obscured on original docu-ment, 3. Author’s collection.39. Ibid.40. Director of Intelligence, Fifth Air Force, September12, 1953, subject: “Reorganization of the 6004th AirIntelligence Service Squadron.”41. Ibid.42. Sgt. Ray Dawson, telephone interview with author,July 3, 1995.


ches of enigmatic figures such as Nichols. Seldomknown to wear military rank and rarely a com-plete uniform of any type, the commanderappeared to instill confidence in everyone rangingfrom field agents to the most senior commandersfor whom he worked. Sgt. Ray Dawson of the U.S.Air Force, serving with CCRAK in 1952, recallsthe night he went to Nichols’s compound in down-town Seoul to discuss operations with him:

The first thing I noticed was the presence of a largenumber of Air Force security police outside Nichols’building; usually it was just Korean militarypolice. As I entered Nichols’ room it was so dark ittook a minute for my eyes to adjust to the lightcoming from one small oil lamp of some sort. Whenthey did adjust I saw the reason for the Air Forcesecurity police outside.... I was looking at GeneralPartridge and General Doolittle! They, along withNichols, were all sitting cross-legged on the floor,talking to [a casually dressed] Nichols.42

One of the most enduring aspects of specialoperations units, for better or worse, is the impact

a dominant personality exerts on the relativelysmall organization. Nichols clearly saw the poten-tial not only for Det 2, but also for what could beachieved by integrating his efforts with those ofCCRAK, the CIA, and other Fifth Air Force specialoperations units. Or was it they who benefited byintegrating their efforts with his? Nichols alonenever rotated out of the combat zone during thewar. He provided the continuity and leadership forthe successful efforts of many organizations.Special operations and Positive Intelligence mayhave been too integrated to separate, but the com-bined potential was exploited to the fullest by oneof the most unique warriors the United States hasever brought to the battlefield.

Nichols retired from the U.S. Air Force in1962, his health failing from a number of diseasesto which he was exposed in Burma, China, andKorea. He died on June 2, 1992, at the age of sixty-nine, in the Veterans Affairs hospital in Tusca-loosa, Alabama. In 1995, he was inducted into theAir Commando Hall of Fame, soon after aresearcher first declassified and published reportsof his wartime exploits. ■

NOTES

NICHOLSALONENEVERROTATEDOUT OF THECOMBATZONE DURINGTHE WAR


The AMST Program’sLasting Legacy


Betty Raab Kennedy

A lthough canceled in 1979, the AdvancedMedium Short-Takeoff-and-Landing Tran-sport (AMST) has an enduring legacy—the

C–17 Globemaster III, the nation’s premier mili-tary transport plane of the twenty-first century.Initially, the AMST was slated to replace theVietnam-worn C–130 tactical airlifter. However,politics, inflation, and national security prioritiesredirected the program. There were many similar-ities between the two programs: they shared thesame acquisition philosophy, funding difficulties,and adverse politics. But more importantly, theAMST gave the C–17 its tactical and small austereairfield capabilities. Its YC–14 and YC–15 proto-types served as starting points for designing thenew airlifter. Lastly, the AMST provided the impe-tus for a radical change in airlift doctrine, as lim-ited resources, pressing mobility requirements,and technological advances eventually drove lead-ers to reject the rigid separation of tactical andstrategic airlift so long maintained. The merging ofthese two missions resulted in the C–17 gainingits dual role. For these reasons, the AMST is sig-nificant.

AMST Origins: Congressman Price’s Support

Among the findings of the Air Force’s ProjectForecast study of 1963-1964, were recommenda-tions to develop a CX-Heavy Logistics SupportAircraft, that became the C–5, and a vertical-short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft (VSTOL) to fillthe gap between the capabilities of C–130s andhelicopters. However, the technology needed for aVSTOL aircraft had not matured. In their January1970 congressional testimony before the HouseArmed Services’ Subcommittee on Military Airlift,Tactical Air Command (TAC) officers acknowl-edged as much to the chairman, Melvin Price (D-IL), a staunch supporter of airlift requirements.1Additionally, TAC was willing “to take a realisticview and admit that the C–130 and its replace-ment should be operated more rearward to avoidheavy enemy fire, and that aircraft of lesser costmust handle the far-forward requirement.” 2 Amore forward role for the Air Force’s tactical airlift,however, was unlikely given the Army’s sizeableinventory of frontline helicopters. Thus, TACopposed developing the light intratheater trans-port (LIT) to replace the C–7s and C–123s, eventhough Air Staff analysis supported a LIT, STOL,and conventional aircraft solution as best meeting

future requirements.3 Had the Air Force persisted,the 1957 DOD directive on service roles and mis-sions, and the 1966 McConnell-JohnsonAgreement on fixed and rotary wing aircraftemployment would have settled the mission dis-pute in the Army’s favor.4 Congressman Price andsubcommittee members were receptive to TAC’srequest for developing a turbofan STOL aircraftwith greater payload and capabilities than the tur-boprop C–130. Originally, the basis for the requestcame from a USAF Tactical Airlift Center reviewof tactical airlift operations in Vietnam, thatacknowledged the obsolescence of the light trans-ports—the C–7 and C–123—and advocated replac-ing the aging C–130s, essentially the A and B mod-els worn down by wartime use. That Gen. WilliamW. Momyer, formerly the deputy commander forair operations and Seventh Air Force commanderin Vietnam, was the commanding general of TACat the time was not lost upon the subcommittee, asit completed its major review of military airlift.After all, Momyer had gained approval to form the834th Air Division, to ensure the efficient manage-ment and control of airlift within Vietnam.5 No onewas more qualified than Momyer to advise onfuture tactical airlift requirements.

General Momyer had participated in the tacti-cal airlift modernization briefing to Gen. John D.Ryan and Robert C. Seamans, Jr., the Chief of Staffand Secretary of the Air Force, respectively, andhad opposed the VSTOL LIT course, promoting anew STOL aircraft to replace the C–130. Basedupon his wartime experiences, Momyer told Ryanand Secretary Seamans that the Army would con-tinue supplying the front lines via heavy heli-copters under its air mobile concept. As a result,intratheater airlift would operate into airfields far-ther in the rear; a STOL with takeoff and landingperformances of between 1,500 and 2,000 feetwould suffice.6 In the 1970s with larger and heav-ier self-propelled firepower, the Army needed theAMST to transport the 8-inch and 155mm self-pro-pelled howitzers, Vulcan air defense gun, andChaparral guided missile system. The Army notedthat the AMST would transport 23 items, whichthe C–130 could not. Nor was the C–130 highlyregarded as a STOL capable aircraft.7

The introduction of the strategic C–5A also hadan influence, driving a need for a more efficienttheater distribution system. A new AMST intra-theater airlifter would ensure a rapid redistribu-tion of supplies and equipment brought in by the


Betty Raab Kennedy is a staff historian at Headquarters, Air Mobility Command. Her published articlesinclude “A Revolution in Air Transport: Acquiring the C–141 Starlifter,” Airpower Journal (Fall 1991)and “Historical Realities of C–17 Program Pose Challenge for Future Acquisitions,” Program Manager(November-December 1999). She has also authored An Illustrated History of Scott Air Force Base, 1917-1987 and contributed to Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: An Illustrated History of the Military AirliftCommand, 1941-1991. She served with the U.S. Army Security Agency in Berlin and was an instructorat the Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Massachusetts. In 1982, she earned an MA in EuropeanHistory from Southern Illinois University-Edwardsville. She is a graduate of the Defense LanguageInstitute and completed the Air Command and Staff College course. Ms. Kennedy is currently writing ahistory of the C–17 Globemaster III acquisition.

(Overleaf) A C–17 takes off

in Bosnia, January 1996.

THEADVANCEDMEDIUMSHORT-TAKEOFF-AND-LANDINGTRANSPORTHAS ANENDURINGLEGACY—THE C–17

TACOPPOSEDDEVELOPINGTHE LIGHTINTRATHE-ATER TRANSPORT(LIT) TOREPLACETHE C–7S

AND C–123S

huge cargo-hauling C–5. The average payload ofthe AMST would be 14 tons while the C–130 couldcarry 10 tons and required a longer runway (3,500feet). Additionally, with its wide body and STOLcapabilities, a new tactical airlifter would be ableto transport to the forward area 90 percent of anArmy brigade’s combat essential vehicles. TheC–130 could haul only 55 percent of the vehiclesneeded.8

The subcommittee report further noted thatwhile the Military Airlift Command (MAC) hademphasized modernizing its strategic airlift capa-bility by replacing the C–97s and C–124s with themore efficient C–141 and C–5 jet aircraft, “anapproved program to modernize the Tactical AirliftForce appears to be nonexistent.”9 In his testimony,General Ryan had provided little on modernizationplans, although there had been extensive discus-sions prior to the hearings. TAC had even written adraft required operational capability (ROC) state-ment for a medium STOL transport, with the vicechief of staff of the Air Force requesting commentsfrom the overseas commanders.10 Ryan may havereasoned as follows. First, he realized that modern-izing tactical airlift would take funding away fromother Air Force programs. He indicated this was thesituation in a March 1970 message. Secondly, whilethe LIT program was favored, it would face strongopposition from the DOD, as the LIT competedwith the Army’s helicopters. The more service-acceptable STOL solution, however, meant the AirForce would concede part of the mission to theArmy in the near term and would eventually haveto accommodate the Army’s desire to coordinate itshelicopter supply operations with the C–141 andC–5 at the large, safe air bases. Additionally, theC–5’s airlift capacity would be taken up transport-ing helicopters to the overseas combat theaters.11

In the end, Price’s subcommittee allayed all con-cerns. The final report recommended the Air Forceprocure an off-the-shelf STOL to address theimmediate replacement of the C–7 and C–123 (theArmy’s interest), continue the VSTOL as aresearch and development program (favored bythe Air Staff), and develop the STOL (TAC’srequest), with greater payload and operationalcapability than the existing C–130. Developing theSTOL should receive the “highest priority” in theAir Force’s fiscal year 1972 budget, the reportstated.12 The Air Force dutifully complied.

Essential Requirements

Aware of the pending discussions on consolidat-ing airlift as well as the need to coordinate AirForce airlift efforts, Momyer shared his views on anew tactical transport with Gen. Jack J. Catton,the Air Force’s strategic airlift commander:

The follow-on STOL to the C–130 should have bet-ter performance in terms of takeoff and landing,high speed, ability to operate in and out of morerudimentary airstrips and a larger cargo compart-ment. I do not think this aircraft should be able to

accommodate the Army’s outsize cargo. Such cargois primarily represented in their mechanized forcesand should be brought into battle by surfacemeans. The new STOL should be optimized for theother tactical features described in order to operatein and out of those relatively forward bases with aminimum of exposure. The size of the aircraftbecomes a major consideration because of vulnera-bility, cramped space on the airfield and limitedcargo unloading areas. All of these things plaguedus in Vietnam even with C–130s when we got into amajor operation.13

By May 1970, TAC had finalized a requiredoperational capability (ROC, 52-69) statement fora medium STOL transport. The command soughta rapid self-deployment capability and an employ-ment capability that took a 14-ton load (trackedand towed equipment) into an austere14 airfield.Among the essential requirements were inflightrefueling, a 2,600-nautical mile unrefueled rangewith a 19-ton payload, a long-range cruising speedof at least .75 Mach above 20,000 feet, and the abil-ity to operate with a 14-ton (28,000 pound) loadfrom a 2,000-foot-long by 60-foot-wide runway dur-ing the midpoint of a mission. The aircraft wouldhave a cargo handling system compatible with the463L pallet, ground loading height of 50-57 inches,and front on/offloading with rear onloading. Itwould be capable of airdrop operations. At thisjuncture, the AMST could not carry the outsized15

M-60A, the Army’s main battle tank. Later, theAMST specifications would serve as the baselinefor developing the requirement documents for themuch larger C–17.

Prototype Source Selection

The acquisition philosophy of the AMST pro-gram rested upon building demonstration air-planes or prototypes before the government woulddecide to proceed. David Packard, of Hewlett-Packard, championed the concept while serving asthe deputy secretary of defense. Packard was wellaware of the cost overruns of the C–5A acquisitionprogram, which had discredited the total packageprocurement concept. Under the prototype philos-ophy, all of the engineering development and all ofthe technical uncertainties would be resolvedahead of a major production effort. This conceptwas commonly known as fly-before-you-buy.16 TheAMST along with the Light Weight Fighter (laterthe F-16 and F-18) were the first programsselected by the Office of the Secretary of Defensefor prototyping. The contract issued, as well as themanagement approach for the C–17, reflectedPackard’s influence.

Lt. Gen. James T. Stewart, commander of theAeronautical Systems Division, released theAMST requests for proposals at the end of January1972. Each contractor was to provide a technologydemonstrator. The Air Force would evaluate thedesign, technology, and military usefulness of theoffers. There was no commitment for further devel-


THE FINALREPORT REC-OMMENDEDTHE AIRFORCE PROCURE ANOFF-THE-SHELF STOLTO ADDRESSTHE IMMEDIATEREPLACE-MENT OF THE C–7 AND C–123

BY MAY 1970,TAC HADFINALIZED AREQUIREDOPERA-TIONALCAPABILITY…STATE-MENT FOR AMEDIUMSTOL TRANSPORT

opment of the prototypes. Refraining from design-ing the aircraft by issuing specifications, the AirForce, instead, provided goals, such as a STOLpayload of 14 tons, airdropping 80 paratroopers,and a landing gear capable of a California BearingRatio (CBR)17 of 6—soil consistency of a golf coursefairway. Imbued with Packard’s philosophy, the AirForce sought the most for its money.18 In similarfashion, the Air Force provided guidance and mis-sion performance goals for the C–17 but refrainedfrom designing the aircraft.

AMST proposals came from Boeing, McDonnellDouglas, Fairchild, and Bell as well as a joint offerfrom Lockheed Martin-North American Rockwell.The Air Force completed source selection evalua-tions by the beginning of July. On November 10,1972, after receiving OSD approval, Secretary ofthe Air Force Seamans authorized awarding theBoeing Company and the McDonnell DouglasCorporation contracts, each to build two AMSTprototypes. The Air Force planned for a first flightthirty-five months after contract award. Initially,the contracts provided Boeing and McDonnellDouglas $96.2 million and $86.1 million, respec-tively. The contractors were to keep their designsto a unit cost goal of $5 million (FY 1972 dollars).If all went well, the Air Force planned to receive itsfirst AMSTs in 1980.19

Obstacles

From inception, not unlike the C–17 program,securing funding and support remained a problem.Both Boeing and McDonnell Douglas investedtheir own money in the program, believing com-mercial airlines and foreign countries would pur-chase the aircraft as well. Prospects of foreign mil-

itary sales to Iran and Saudi Arabia existed. Forthe first two years, the program received $6 mil-lion (FY 1972) and $25 million (FY 1973), but thenin December 1973, the House AppropriationsCommittee decreased the authorization for fiscalyear 1974 from $65 to $25 million. Chaired byGeorge H. Mahon (D-TX), the committee, was notconvinced the AMST was necessary and statedthat a modified C–130 could serve the long-termtactical airlift requirements.20 Politics factored inas well. Losing out in the AMST competition andwith no C–130s in the Air Force’s budget,Lockheed had sought congressional support.21

Lockheed’s Aeronautics Company was located atFort Worth, Texas.

This congressional action thoroughly disruptedthe AMST program and raised legal concerns. TheAir Force debated whether to proceed with twocontractors but knew that it could not terminateone without jeopardizing the prototyping effortand facing criticism for its program management.There were also cost considerations. After muchdiscussion, Air Force Secretary John L. McLucasdecided to continue with the two contractors. Arestructuring of the program in March 1974,reduced the funding request for fiscal year 1975,stretched out the program, and raised prototypedevelopment costs from $182.3 to $229.1 million.22

There was also pressure to make the AMST acivil-military airplane. Senate Armed ServicesCommittee member Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX) hadimpressed upon William P. Clements, Jr., theDeputy Secretary of Defense, that the AMST alsoneeded to be commercially marketable, or Bentsenwould withhold his support. So prompted, on June22, 1973, Clements wrote a memorandum toMcLucas. Although the Air Force had, in its con-


Boeing’s YC–14 takes off

from Boeing Field in

Seattle, Washington in

August, 1976, on its

maiden flight. (Photo cour-

tesy of Boeing Company,

and supplied by the

author.)

FROM INCEP-TION, NOTUNLIKE THEC–17 PROGRAM,SECURINGFUNDINGAND SUPPORTREMAINED APROBLEM

LOSING OUTIN THE AMSTCOMPETITIONAND WITH NOC–130S INTHE AIRFORCE’SBUDGET,LOCKHEEDHAD SOUGHTCONGRES-SIONAL SUPPORT…[WHICH]THOR-OUGHLY DISRUPTEDTHE AMSTPROGRAMAND RAISEDLEGAL CONCERNS

gressional testimony, talked of the AMST’s com-mercial application, Clements wanted to ensure itand requested that Boeing and McDonnellDouglas be so informed.23

Clements’ memo further disclosed service poli-tics when he also directed McLucas to seek con-currences from the Army and the Navy on theAMST’s configuration, especially the size of thecargo compartment. The Army’s AMST project offi-cer at the Air Staff had tried several times toreduce the cross-section of the AMST to that of theC–130’s and C–141’s and to reduce the landing/takeoff goals and flotation capability. Simply, theArmy desired to protect its heavy-lift helicopter(HLH) from the AMST.24 A year earlier, GeneralMomyer had drawn the same conclusion. “It isobvious what is going on—freeze Air Force out ofthe theater airlift and handle with a direct inter-face between the heavy lift helicopter and the C–5.The M [Medium] STOL is a real threat to thefuture of the heavy lift helicopter hence the chal-lenge on any grounds.”25

Flight Test Program

The first prototype, McDonnell Douglas’ YC–15,flew on August 26, 1975; Boeing’s YC–14 did so onAugust 9, 1976. McDonnell was able to field itsprototype sooner, as it had taken a “cut and paste”approach. For example, the landing gear camefrom the C–141. Along with a more conventionallook, McDonnell had also selected less advancedtechnology. Boeing, on the other hand, took itsYC–14 through seven separate design refine-ments. Boeing’s decision to refine its designresulted in a longer wing configuration, whichgave the YC–14 a medium-range STOL capability

as well as the longer range desired by the MilitaryAirlift Command, that took over the program theend of 1974, as a result of the consolidation of tac-tical and strategic airlift management. TheMilitary Airlift Command desired that the AMSTtransport a meaningful payload to the theaterwithout relying on limited air refueling resources.As a result, the two prototype contractors evalu-ated pylon tanks, longer wings, and more powerfulengines to meet the basic 2,600-nautical-mile, 19-ton deployment mission. Originally, the prototypecontracts had primarily asked the contractors toinvestigate and demonstrate STOL technologyand did not specifically request a deployment pay-load.26

AMST flight testing, comprised of a combineddevelopmental test and evaluation and a limitedinitial operational test and evaluation, ended inAugust 1977, when Boeing completed its testing.McDonnell had finished its program a year earlier.During flight testing, the prototypes exceededtheir performance specification goals. McDonnellDouglas’ YC–15 test program concentrated on con-firming flight characteristics, performance of theexternally blown flap, and STOL operations. Asdesigned, the YC–15 demonstrated its ability toland on a 2,100-foot runway with no specialrequirements. The YC–15 flew cross-country,underwent ground loading of Army equipment,performed aerial refueling proximity tests, andlaid the groundwork for heavy equipment air-drops. Testing also included airflow measurementsof the cargo ramp and the troop door. During itsyear-long flight testing, the YC–15 made 292flights, amassing 553.4 hours. Additionally in1977, McDonnell Douglas tested a new wing toincrease the range of the YC–15 and a high by-


The McDonnell-Douglas

YC–15 takes off during

testing.(Photo courtesy of

the author.)

MILITARYAIRLIFTCOMMANDDESIREDTHAT THEAMST TRANS-PORT AMEANINGFULPAYLOAD TOTHE THE-ATER WITH-OUT RELYINGON LIMITEDAIR REFUELINGRESOURCES

DURING ITSYEAR-LONGFLIGHT TEST-ING, THEYC–15 MADE292 FLIGHTS,AMASSING553.4 HOURS

pass turbofan engine capable of 22,000 pounds ofthrust, an increase of 4,000 pounds per engine.Boeing’s two jet engines provided 50,000 pounds ofthrust each.27

Beginning its test program a year later, Boeingadapted more to evolving requirements. TestingBoeing’s YC–14 included: load testing howitzersand the AN-1G attack helicopter, heavy equipmentairdrops up to 20,000 pounds, STOL landings thatexceeded the requirements, a maximum grosstakeoff weight of 213,000 pounds, the ground load-ing of the Army’s M-60A main battle tank (109,000pounds), semi-prepared soft-field runways with acombat offload of a 10,000 pound pallet, and aerialrefuelings. The YC–14 with a gross weight of160,000 pounds achieved a STOL stopping dis-tance of just over 800 feet using thrust reversers atreverse idle. With the same weight using only thethrust reversers, the aircraft realized a stoppingdistance of 1,500 feet. In addition, the YC–14 per-formed STOL approaches with a glide slope ofnearly six degrees with little or no flare used priorto landing. The YC–14’s landing configurationenabled sink rates of between five and eleven feetper second.28 During the 1995 reliability, main-tainability, and availability evaluation, the C–17showed off its YC–14 and YC–15 heritage by land-ing in less than 2,000 feet on an unimproved run-way in the Mojave Desert.29

At the conclusion of the AMST test program in1977, the commander of the Air Force Test andEvaluation Command, Maj. Gen. Howard W. Leaf,expressed his satisfaction with both the YC–15and YC–14 prototypes. The Air Force SystemsCommand (AFSC) initiated the source selectionprocess in September 1977, intending to award theproduction contract in April 1978.30 But events

had already begun to overtake and then reshapethe program.

Strategic Airlift Emerges

Within a year of the prototype source selectionaward, the Israeli-Arab Yom Kippur War of 1973disclosed a need for the United States to possess aviable response capability for the Middle East. Forits part, MAC, using its C–5 and C–141 aircraft,rushed supplies, ammunition, and equipment toIsrael. Hampered by the vast distances (on aver-age 6,450 miles one way), unavailability of enroute facilities, and lack of an air refueling capa-bility, the crisis pressed U.S. strategic airliftresources despite their good showing againstSoviet airlift aircraft.

In the aftermath, a series of studies in the mid-1970s documented a need for more strategic airlift.Although there were initiatives to increase thestrategic airlift capability, war plans still discloseda shortage in strategic airlift.31 Given the docu-mented need for more strategic airlift coupled withthe recent events in the Middle East and Congress’and OSD’s growing viewpoint that a C–130 mightdo just as well for less money, it was not surprisingthat MAC, when it published in December 1975 arevised required operational capability (MAC ROC9-75) for the AMST, broadened the mission of tac-tical airlift: “The AMST will augment the strategicairlift forces during the initial stages of an inter-national crisis.”32 Further,

The speed of the augmenting AMST is compatiblewith the block speeds of the strategic transport air-craft, while the AMST’s range and cargo-carryingcapability allow it to carry increased payloads over


The C–17 takes off leaving

a cloud of dust. (Photo

courtesy of the author.)

THE C–17SHOWED OFFITS YC–14AND YC–15HERITAGE BYLANDING INLESS THAN2,000 FEETON AN UNIMPROVEDRUNWAY INTHE MOJAVEDESERT

THE ISRAELI-ARAB YOMKIPPUR WAROF 1973 DISCLOSED ANEED FORTHE UNITEDSTATES TOPOSSESS AVIABLERESPONSECAPABILITYFOR THEMIDDLE EAST

C–130E critical legs. The AMST will also be air-refuelable which increases its range, payload, andthe number of missions flown during the period oftime it is utilized in a strategic role. The best use ofthe AMST in augmenting strategic airlift is whenfull advantage is taken of the AMST’s wide-bodiedcharacteristic in conjunction with the cargo-carry-ing capabilities of the strategic airlift forces.33

Moreover, both MAC ROC 9-75 and the subse-quent employment concept document for theAMST stated tactical airlift would airland suppliesas well as airland/airdrop combat units over“extended distances,” specifically to or betweentheaters of operations. MAC ROC 9-75 also spokeof providing “direct insertion,” the seeds of theC–17’s direct delivery capability.34 A USAF head-quarters (Studies and Analysis) study had con-cluded that tactical C–130E/H and AMST aircraftcould augment the strategic airlift force until hos-tilities broke out during a NATO contingency.Using tactical assets in the strategic role reducedthe procurement of that amount of strategic air-lift.35 Military officials were keen on improvingdeployment closure times.

Erosion and Competition

Politics also persisted. In January 1976, Gen.Paul K. Carlton, the MAC commander, penned tohis deputy chief of staff for operations: “We and theArmy better defend the AMST Requirement betterthan we have or this [C–130] is what we will get!Comment.”36 Brig. Gen. Charles C. Irions’ staffreplied that the Air Staff and the command con-tinued to challenge Lockheed’s attempts to offer amodified C–130 to OSD and Congress. OfLockheed’s military transport line, only the C–130was still in production, and then mostly for foreignsales. The Air Force had not included the C–130 inits budget requests after 1973, and Lockheed hadsecured its production line by getting C–130s

added to the military appropriations bill.37 As tothe Army’s lagging support, Carlton was told theAir Force had pushed hard in the 1970s for theArmy’s support of a new light intratheater trans-port and, after having secured the Army’s support,dropped the LIT in favor of the AMST. The C–5program had also created some unfavorableimpressions. Additionally, the Army’s heavy lifthelicopter and the AMST had similar, hence com-peting, intratheater roles.38

In March, Carlton sent Air Force Chief of StaffGen. David C. Jones letters to pass on to key Armycommanders. Of concern was the Army’s input tothe decision coordinating paper for the DefenseSystem Acquisition Review Council Milestone IIdecision scheduled for September 1977. The deci-sion before the council was whether to begin full-scale development of the AMST or cancel the pro-gram. The Army, however, was undertaking areview of its tactical airlift requirements, and untilthe results were published, senior Army leadersprovided no support.39 The best Carlton could dowas a statement from Vice Chief of Staff of theArmy Gen. Walter T. Kerwin, Jr., who told theHouse Armed Services Committee in May that theArmy “very badly needed the capability.”40

And there was erosion. In November 1975, theResearch and Development Subcommittee of theHouse Armed Services Committee had conductedhearings on the state of military airlift. The sub-committee’s report, released in April 1976,revealed the AMST was no longer the sole replace-ment for the C–130. Chairman Price had compro-mised. “Lockheed provided an analysis of C–130and AMST fuel comparisons. The analysis showsthat for a typical 400 nautical-mile-radius, tacticalairlift mission use of the C–130 provides fuel sav-ings of about 250 million gallons a year and, at 42cents per gallon, cost savings of over $100 million.”Now a mixture of AMSTs and C–130s wereregarded as the “best bargain.”41 In light of theArab oil embargo against the U.S. and other


Israeli Airlift Fall of S. Vietnam Zaire Assistance Iran/Afghanistan1973 1975 1977-78 1979

Tactical STOL

Self-Deployment

TAC ROCMay 70

StrategicDerivativePossible

ASD StudyApr 76

Tank CarryingAMST

Army StudyAug 77

Cease AMST

Start C-X

Dual RoleStrategic Primary

Outsize

SECDEF BrownOct 79

StrategicAugmentation

DirectInsertion

MAC ROCDec 75

Longer Wing

Outsize Load(Army Tank)

AMSTConfiguration

Steering GroupApr 77

AddStrategicCapability

Design Points

74,000lbs/2,600nm90,000lbs/2,000nm120,000lbs/1,300nm

PMD/AMSTConfiguration

Steering GroupMay 79

AMST “Morphing” Into C-17

“WE AND THEARMY BET-TER DEFENDTHE AMSTREQUIRE-MENT BETTERTHAN WEHAVE ORTHIS [C–130]IS WHAT WEWILL GET!”

A MIXTUREOF AMSTSAND C–130SWEREREGARDEDAS THE“BEST BARGAIN”

nations for supporting Israel and the UnitedStates’ dependence on foreign oil, Lockheed had apowerful argument. Thus, the stage was set:Lockheed would repeatedly challenge McDonnellDouglas and then Boeing over the C–17 as well.Retrospectively, it was simply a matter of “busi-ness is business and companies are in business tomake money.”42

While Lockheed’s end run at the AMST couldbe faulted for the erosion, the AMST competedagainst other aircraft modernization and modifi-cation programs and had to accommodate evolv-ing national security requirements. The Israeliairlift, during the Yom Kippur War, had high-lighted a need for air refueling capabilities andfor more strategic airlift to transport outsizeloads of tanks and helicopters rapidly. MACsought funding for an advanced tanker cargo air-craft (ATCA), what became the KC–10. The com-mand also needed funding for stretching andadding an air refueling capability to the C–141,fixing the C–5’s wings, and procuring a C–XX43

strategic airlift replacement aircraft (civil-mili-tary partnership). On the latter, Carlton wasespecially proud of his several-year effort, believ-ing the C–XX would nearly triple the nation’s air-lift capability. Industry, however, embraced theC–XX in a lukewarm fashion.44 Carlton and hissuccessor, Gen. William G. Moore, also devotedmuch energy to an enhancement program for theCivil Reserve Air Fleet, thereby gaining addi-tional oversize cargo capacity. Congressional sup-port had to be “worked.” P. K. Carlton laid out hisneed in the House to Congressmen Mel Price andin the Senate to Sam Nunn (D-GA), member ofthe influential Senate Armed ServicesCommittee and champion of Lockheed’s inter-ests.45 Thus, the inherited AMST was one of manyprograms advocated by MAC.

An Outsize AMST

In March 1976, the Air Staff queried AFSC andMAC about using an AMST derivative as a pri-mary strategic, outsize cargo aircraft.

Could non-STOL derivatives of one or both of theAMST prototype designs be developed to meet thefollowing intertheater airlift missions? (1) Trans-port without refueling any single type of equip-ment presently carried by the C–5 over the currentunrefueled C–5 range at maximum payload. (2)Transport on a routine basis an M-60 tank weigh-ing 111,000 lbs over the following unrefueledranges: (A) 4,000 NM, (B) 3,000 NM, (C) 2,000NM.46

As a result, the Aeronautical Systems Divisionstudied the matter and concluded that a strategicderivative of the current AMST prototypes was notviable, due to insufficient cargo box size and rangeperformance. A strategic derivative of a redesignedAMST was feasible, provided a larger cargo box,new wings, and more powerful engines were incor-

porated. MAC did not favor growing the AMST tocarry more of the Army’s outsize equipment“unless it can be assured that these changes willneither degrade AMST STOL capability nor jeop-ardize the program’s completion.”47

MAC remained keen on maximizing the AMSTand pushed its strategic airlift augmentation con-cept. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas had alreadyredirected their efforts to this end, testing and con-ducting paper studies. In early April 1977, thecommand’s vice commander, Lt. Gen. John F.Gonge, informed Lt. Gen. Alton Slay, the DCS/R&D, that “to avoid degrading the acknowledgedstrategic shortfall, the AMST must be able totransport a meaningful self-support payload to thetheater of operations, even though it would have toisland hop.”48 This justified revising the minimumessential mission requirements stipulated in the1970 ROC. The command would not accept less.Moreover, emerging Army concepts called forlarger equipment, faster deployments, and moremobility within the theater. A compromised AMSTprogram, offering a less than operationally capableaircraft, should not be presented as an option,General Gonge advised.49 Thus, it was not surpris-ing two weeks later when the AMST ConfigurationSteering Group, that included representativesfrom the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps andwas chaired by General Slay, decided on a longerwing to increase range and on the capability totransport the Army’s main battle tank.50

In August 1977, the Army finally released itseighteen-month study of tactical airlift require-ments. The main conclusion was already known. Atank-carrying AMST offered the Army the “mostflexible and efficient tactical airlift system.”51

While the study found the C–130H/IV satisfactoryfor moving bulk supplies and light units, it “lackedsufficient box size to transport the Army’s primarycombat vehicles, i.e., main battle tank (MBT)mechanized infantry combat vehicle, self-propelledartillery, division air defense gun (DIVAD Gun),and numerous combat service support (CSS) vehi-cles.”52 In the 1950s, when the C–130 was de-signed, the Army had more infantry than mecha-nized or armored divisions. Over twenty yearslater, the situation was reversed, and the C–130Hcould only transport between 35 and 55 percent ofa mechanized or armored division’s combat vehi-cles. The C–5 provided the Army limited capability,as it lacked airdrop and STOL capabilities, pos-sessed a small fleet size, and was primary a strate-gic airlifter. Assistant Secretary of the Army forResearch, Development and Acquisition, Percy A.Pierre, recommended, in November 1977, that theAir Force proceed with the full-scale developmentof an outsize capable AMST.53 The Army soonfound, however, that it had thrown its full supportto a program on its way out.

Carter Cancels

A change in Presidents left the AMST unsup-ported. Inclined to reduce defense expenditures,


THE COMMANDALSONEEDEDFUNDINGFORSTRETCHINGAND ADDINGAN AIR REFU-ELING CAPABILITYTO THEC–141, FIXINGTHE C–5’SWINGS, ANDPROCURINGA C–XXSTRATEGICAIRLIFTREPLACE-MENT AIRCRAFT

A TANK-CARRYINGAMSTOFFEREDTHE ARMYTHE “MOSTFLEXIBLEAND EFFICIENTTACTICALAIRLIFT SYSTEM”

President Jimmy Carter withdrew funding for thecostly AMST program in the fiscal year 1978 bud-get; it halted source selection and placed the pro-gram on hold. Support from key members ofCongress, however, provided $5 million for sourceselection in the fiscal year 1979 DOD Appro-priation Bill, to which Carter consented. But ayear later the program was no more. Unit costshad doubled from the original $5 million and wereexpected to double again due to continuing infla-tion.54 As directed, AFSC halted source selection inJanuary 1978, and cancelled the program on De-cember 10, 1979.55 Besides the affordability issueof a $9 billion program, Defense Secretary HaroldBrown rationalized that in a European conflict,rail and road transportation systems would com-pete favorably with the speed and responsivenessoffered by a STOL tactical airlift system. He alsojudged the current Air Force and Navy tactical air-lift resources along with the available short-rangecivil aircraft as sufficient for a global war. Thus,there was no immediate need to purchase addi-tional tactical aircraft.56

Before the December 1979 cancellation, propo-nents continued to work for the AMST. Againstthis background, the C–17 program emerged. TheArmy’s senior leaders were especially vocal inchampioning the AMST. They realized the onlyother aircraft available for outsize equipment wasthe C–5, and it could not operate into forwardsmall austere airfields. Moreover, it was alreadyheavily tasked in deployment plans. Army Chief ofStaff Gen. Bernard W. Rogers told the SenateArmed Services Committee that the C–130 couldnot carry the XM-1 tank, proposed infantry equip-ment, and other self-propelled vehicles. The“AMST is needed and the STOL capability in par-ticular is needed to get the equipment where weneed it.” Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., theCommander in Chief of United States Army inEurope, was equally direct before the HouseArmed Services Committee.58

As to the Air Force’s efforts, General Moore, theMAC commander, in his quarterly report toDefense Secretary Brown, politely disagreed withPresident Carter’s decision to cancel the AMST.The previous quarter, Moore’s statement that theAMST was the replacement for the C–130 hadelicited this reply from Brown: “What about newC–130H instead?”59

In March 1979, Air Force leaders, appearingbefore the House Budget Committee, expressedconcern over the ability to support forces or rapidlyredeploy them within a theater. Air ForceSecretary John C. Stetson and Chief of StaffGeneral Lew Allen stated it was “essential to iden-tify and produce a new wide-body tactical airliftaircraft to replace the C–130 and to keep pace withArmy requirements.”60

In September, as the situation deteriorated,Army Chief of Staff Gen. Edward C. Meyer threwin his personal endorsement of the AMST. Meyerremained adamant about retaining the tacticalfocus of the AMST, although he acknowledged an

enhanced strategic capability made the AMSTmore attractive.61 In effect, the Army and AirForce were taking their case before Congress, asDefense Secretary Brown had already toldCongress in February 1978 that the CarterAdministration had decided to cancel furtherdevelopment of the AMST and would seek a morecost-effective program.62

Dual Role

As the final months unfolded, it was obviousthat the AMST had to be more and more a strate-gic airlifter with just some tactical capabilities. Ashift in airlift doctrine was underway. While therewas a sincere attempt to define the kind of airlifterneeded for wartime requirements, politics and sub-jective views influenced the process as well. InMarch 1979, Headquarters USAF issued a pro-gram management directive on the “AdvancedMedium STOL Transport (AMST) TransitionProgram.” This directive tasked AFSC and MAC tocome up with range and payload combinations toadd the strategic airlift capability desired by DODofficials. The joint service AMST ConfigurationSteering Group met to work the issue. Taking intoconsideration Army brigade and division move-ment and closure time requirements, minimumstrategic design points were established: the abil-ity to airlift 74,000 pounds of cargo for 2,600 nau-tical miles, 90,000 pounds for 2,000 miles, or120,000 pounds for 1,300 miles. The 82d Airbornecommander received assurances that airdrop oper-ations would remain unaffected. The Marine Corpsreiterated its interests in a tanker/cargo version ofa strategically enhanced AMST.63

In the spring of 1979, the Air Staff released astudy, that advocated a “swing“ concept for theAMST.64 While the MAC staff believed the AMSTwas capable of swinging between tactical andstrategic airlift roles, they objected to the study’sforce structure and flying hour reductions and con-tinued to favor the strategic augmentation role.One staffer disclosed the real concern: “The ‘swing’concept proposes an aircraft that will ‘do all,’ andraises a question about the need for future airliftmodernization. The C–5 wing modification andC–141 stretch program may be affected, but mostcertainly the C–XX program will be threatened by‘strategic’ AMSTs.”65

Clearly, support was building within the upperlevels of the OSD staff for a new aircraft. After aSeptember briefing, Deborah P. Christie, OSDDirector of Mobility Forces Division, previously anopponent of the AMST, found the new strategiccapabilities attractive.66 Gen. Robert E. Huyser,the new MAC Commander-in-Chief, sensed themoment. To General Slay, now AFSC commander,he expressed:

I have followed your exchange of letters with theChief on the AMST. I have had discussions withDave Jones and Hans Mark and believe the time isright to move on this program. The desire seems to


BEFORE THEDECEMBER1979 CAN-CELLATION,PROPO-NENTS CONTINUEDTO WORKFOR THEAMST…[WHEN] THEC–17 PROGRAMEMERGED

IN THESPRING OF1979, THE AIRSTAFFRELEASED ASTUDY, THATADVOCATEDA “SWING“CONCEPTFOR THEAMST

1. Headquarters, Military Air Transport Service, laterMilitary Airlift Command (MAC), at Scott AFB, waslocated in Congressman Price’s district. Hngs, House,Military Airlift: Hearings before the Subcommittee onMilitary Airlift of the Committee on Armed Services,91st Cong., 2d sess, 1970, 6392.2. Ibid.3. Ltr, Brig. Gen. George W. McLaughlin to Gen.William W. Momyer, “Report of LIT Meeting with ViceChief of Staff,” Nov. 29, 1969; Ltr, Gen. William W.Momyer to Gen. Jack J. Catton, [Air Staff CDP onV/STOL LIT], Dec. 12, 1969.4. DOD Directive, 5160.22, Clarification of Roles andMissions of the Departments of the Army and the AirForce Regarding the Use of Aircraft, Mar. 18, 1957;Agreement, Gen. John P. McConnell and Gen. Harold K.Johnson, Agreement Between Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,and Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, Apr. 6, 1966.5. Rpt., (No. 91-59), House Armed Services Subcom-mittee on Military Airlift, Military Airlift, 91st Cong., 2dsess, 1970, 9230, 9231; Ray L. Bowers, Tactical Airlift(USAF Office of Air Force History, Washington, DC,1983), pp 190, 191.6. Ltr., Gen. William W. Momyer to Gen. Jack J.Catton, [Air Staff CDP on V/STOL LIT], Dec. 12, 1969.7. Point Paper w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “AdvancedMedium STOL Transport (AMST),” Oct. 5, 1976.8. Document, HQ TAC, Required OperationalCapability For Medium STOL Transport (TAC ROC No.52-69), May 1970, p 1, 2; Fact Sheet, Lt Col VincentHughes, AF/RDQA, “AMST,” Feb. 3, 1976.9. Rpt. (No. 91-59), House Armed Services Subcom-

mittee on Military Airlift, Military Airlift, 91st Cong., 2dsess, 1970, 9230.10. Hngs, House, Military Airlift: Hearings before theSubcommittee on Military Airlift of the Committee onArmed Services, 91st Cong., 2d sess, 1970, 6745, 6746;Msg., CSAF to PACAF and USAFE, “TAC Proposal ForModernization of Tactical Airlift Forces, Draft TAC ROC52-69 For Medium STOL Transport (MST),” 24/2045ZJan. 1970.11. Ltr., Brig Gen. George W. McLaughlin to Gen.William W. Momyer, “Report of LIT Meeting with ViceChief of Staff,” Nov. 29, 1969; Msg., CSAF to TAC/DR,“Modernization of Tactical Airlift Forces,” 05/1329Z May1970.12. Rpt. (No. 91-59), House Armed Services Subcom-mittee on Military Airlift, Military Airlift, 91st Cong., 2dsess, 1970, 9231.13. Ltr., Gen. William W. Momyer to Gen. Jack J.Catton, [Air Staff CDP on V/STOL LIT], Dec. 12, 1969.14. Then defined as semi-prepared surface.15. Outsized cargo was defined as exceeding the capa-bilities of the C–141, but fitting on a C–5.16. Hngs., House, Hearings Before A Subcommittee OnAppropriations, 92d Cong., 1st sess, 1971, 3-8, 14-20.17. The California Bearing Ratio was the system usedto classify landing surfaces for aircraft. Silt and clay sur-faces rated as low as 3-5 while graded gravel and gravelsand mixes could range as high as 60-80.18. George M. Watson, The Advanced Medium Short-Take-Off-And-Landing Transport (AMST) and theImplications of the Minimum Engineering Development(MED) Program, Air Force Systems Command Office of


be to have an aircraft with STOL capability andthat will enhance the strategic lift end. I have goneover data from both companies—Boeing and

McDonnell Douglas—if what they are putting outis correct, we can have such an aircraft withoutstarting back at ground zero. They say they havewhat they need from the YC–14 and 15. I believestate-of-the-art technology has us at a point wherewe shouldn’t define such an aircraft as tactical orstrategic—we just discuss it as an airlifter capableof dual role.67

By the end of October 1979, the matter wasover. Defense Secretary Brown had decided toimprove the strategic airlift capability. He hadmet with the Air Force’s General Allen andadvised him to cease associated activities on theAMST program and proceed with the C–X pro-gram, emphasizing strategic airlift as the primarymission, an outsize cargo capability, and a fiscalyear 1987 initial operational date.68 The Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan two months later andevents in Iran confirmed the course. The UnitedStates required a more rapid global responsecapability. Thus, over a four-year period, the short-fall in strategic mobility reinforced by worldevents altered the whole basis for justifying theAMST program. From these efforts to recast theAMST for a dual strategic–tactical role with anoutsize cargo capacity the C–17 Globemaster IIIbenefited. The C–17 owes much to the AMST.C–17 operations during Bosnia, Yugoslavia, andnow Afghanistan, validate the worth of a dual-roleairlifter. ■

NOTES

The C–17 underwent years

of operational testing and

many changes before

entering the inventory.

History (Andrews AFB, Md., nd), pp. 5, 6, 11; Hngs.,Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FiscalYear 1977: Hearings before a Subcommittee on theCommittee of Appropriations, Part 5, 94th Cong., 2dsess, 1976, 411.19. Watson, pp. 8-10, 12, 14; Article, Vincent C. Hughes,“The Airlift Enigma and a Plan for the Future,” ArmedForces Journal International, Oct. 1982, p. 25.20. Hngs., Senate, Department of Defense Appro-priations for Fiscal Year 1977: Hearings before aSubcommittee on the Committee of Appropriations, Part5, 94th Cong., 2d sess, 1976, pp. 407-409; Watson, pp. 17,21.21. Article, Vincent C. Hughes, “The Airlift Enigma andA Plan for the Future,” Armed Forces JournalInternational, Oct. 1982, p. 26.22. Point Paper, HQ TAC/DRLL, “Advanced MediumSTOL Transport (AMST),” May 8, 1974.23. Watson, pp. 17, 19, 21.24. Ibid., pp. 17, 19.25. Ltr., Gen. William W. Momyer to Brig. Gen. EugeneW. Gauch, Jr., [SEA and AMST], Jul. 31, 1972.26. MAC ROC, “Advanced Medium STOL Transport,”Dec. 5, 1975, pp. 1, 2; Background Paper, HQ. MAC/XPQA, “C–14 Briefing,” Mar. 22, 1976; Ltr. w/atch, LtGen. John F. Gonge to HQ USAF/RD, “AMSTOperational Capabilities,” Apr. 4, 1977.27. Watson, pp. 32, 57, 62, 64, 66, 69.28. Ibid., pp. 69, 71, 75, 78; Background Paper, HQ.MAC/XPQA, “C–14 Briefing,” Mar. 22, 1976; BackgroundPaper, HQ. MAC/XPSS, “AMST Derivative for StrategicAirlift,” Jul. 22, 1976.29. Article, Tony Bartelme, “Against the Wind: TheStory of the C–17, ‘High Cost, Bungled Past ThreatenPlane’s Future,’” Part 1, Post and Courier (Charleston,S.C.), Aug. 20, 1995.30. Watson, pp. 78, 81; Ltr., Gen. William G. Moore, Jr.,to Gen. David C. Jones, [Quarterly Activity Report], Jul.26, 1977.31. Besides the congressional hearings, see Study, HQUSAF (Studies and Analysis), Tactical Airlift in aStrategic Airlift Augmentation Role (SABER AUG-MENT), Apr. 1975; Study, OSD, A Report to Congress onU.S. Conventional Reinforcements for NATO, Jun. 1976;Study, Logistics Management Institute, Vol I: TheNational Strategic Airlift Dilemma, Vol 2: The NationalStrategic Airlift Dilemma: An Approach to Solution(commonly known as the Estes Study), Apr. 1976; Study,JCS Memorandum 30-77, A Report on Strategic MobilityRequirements and Programs (known as the JCSMobility Study), Feb. 1977; Study, Rand Corporation,Strategic Mobility Alternatives for the 1980s, Mar. 1977;Issue Paper, OSD (Program Analysis & Evaluation),Strategic Airlift and Air Refueling, Jul. 1977.32. MAC ROC, “Advanced Medium STOL Transport,”Dec. 5, 1975, p. 3.33. Ibid.34. Ibid., p. ii; Plan, HQ MAC/XPQA, EmploymentConcept for the Advanced Medium STOL Transport,Jun. 1975 (revised Nov. 1976), pp. 3, 12, 21.35. Study, HQ USAF, Tactical Airlift Aircraft in aStrategic Airlift Augmentation Role (SABER AUG-MENT), Apr.1975, p. iv.36. Staff Summary Sheet w/atch, HQ MAC/DOQA,“Requirement for the AMST,” Jan. 30, 1976.37. Ibid., Article, Vincent C. Hughes, “The AirliftEnigma and A Plan for the Future,” Armed ForcesJournal International, Oct. 1982, pp. 25, 26.38. Staff Summary Sheet w/atch, HQ MAC/DOQA,“Requirement for the AMST,” Jan. 30, 1976; Article,Vincent C. Hughes, “The Airlift Enigma and A Plan forthe Future,” Armed Forces Journal International, Oct.1982, pp. 25, 26.39. Ltr., Gen. Paul K. Carlton to Gen. David C. Jones

[Quarterly Activity Report], May 3, 1976. Memo., DickNemeth to Col. Duane H. Cassidy, [Dixon Ltr. to ArmyFour-Stars], May 14, 1976.40. Point Paper w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “AdvancedMedium STOL Transport (AMST),” Jul. 14, 1978.41. Rpt. (No. 94-40), House Armed ServicesSubcommittee on Military Airlift, The Posture ofMilitary Airlift, 94th Cong., 2d sess, Apr. 1976, pp. 7, 8.42. Intvw, Col. Walter S. Evans, USAF (Ret.), withBetty R. Kennedy, Sep. 24, 1998.43. The C–XX became known as the advanced civil-military aircraft (ACMA) and should not be confusedwith the C–X/C–17.44. Ltr., Gen. Paul K. Carlton to Gen. David C. Jones[C–XX], Jan. 10, 1977; White Paper, NDTA MilitaryAirlift Committee, “Summary Analysis,” ca Apr. 1977.45. Ltr., Gen, Paul K. Carlton to Gen. David C. Jones,[Nunn Support], Jan. 24, 1977.46. Msg., CSAF/RD to AFSC/SD, “Use of AMSTDerivative in a Strategic Airlift Primary Mission Role,”09/0014Z Mar 1976.47. Background Paper, HQ MAC/XPSS, “AMSTDerivative for Strategic Airlift,” Jul. 22, 1976.48. Ltr. w/atch, Lt Gen. John F. Gonge to HQ USAF/RD,“AMST Operational Capabilities,” Apr. 4, 1977.49. Ibid.50. Background Paper, HQ MAC/XPQA, “AdvancedMedium STOL Transport (AMST),” Jul. 5, 1977.51. Study, USA Combined Arms Center, AdvancedMedium STOL (AMST) Study, Aug. 1977.52. Ibid.53. Point Paper w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “AdvancedMedium STOL Transport (AMST),” Jul. 14, 1978; Ltr.,Gen. William G. Moore, Jr., to Harold Brown, [Responsesto Questions], Nov. 2, 1977.54. Hist, MAC, FY 1978, pp. 216-18; Point Paper, HQMAC/XPQA, “Advanced Medium STOL Transport(AMST),” May 17, 1977.55. Msg., AFSC/SD to USAF/RDQ, “AMST SourceSelection,” 06/1330Z Jan. 1978; Program ManagementDirective R-Q 6131 (3), USAF/RD, “Program Manage-ment Directive for Cancellation to the AdvancedMedium STOL Transport (AMST) Transition Program,”Dec. 10, 1979.56. Rpt., Harold Brown, “FY 1980 Budget, FY 1981Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 DefensePrograms,” Jan. 25, 1979.57. Point Paper w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “AdvancedMedium STOL Transport (AMST),” Jul. 14, 1978.58. Ibid.59. Ltr., w/atch, Gen. William G. Moore, Jr., to HaroldBrown, [October-December 1977 Quarterly Report], Jan.5, 1978; Memo., w/atchs, RAdm. M. Staser Holcomb toGen. William G. Moore, “CINCMAC Quarterly Report of3 October 1977,” Oct. 17, 1977.60. Statement, John C. Stetson and Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.,“Report to the 96th Congress,” Mar. 1979.61. Memo., Gen. Edward C. Meyer to Chief of Staff ofthe Air Force, “Advanced Medium STOL Transport(AMST),” Sep. 5, 1979.62. Rpt., Harold Brown, “Annual Report Fiscal Year1979,” Feb. 2, 1978.63. Ltr. w/atch, AF/RD, “Minutes–AMST ConfigurationSteering Group (CSG),” Jul. 24, 1979.64. Study, AF/RDQ, Airlift Modernization: A DifferentApproach, Apr. 1979.65. Staff Summary w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQA, “AirliftModernization–A Different Approach,” May 25, 1979.66. Staff Summary w/atch, HQ MAC/XPQ, “Selling theAMST,” Sep. 14, 1979.67. Msg., CINCMAC/CC to AFSC/CC, [StrategicSTOL], 22/2100Z Oct. 1979.68. Paper, Col. Robert A. Cole, U.S. Army War College,“The C–17: In Perspective,” Mar. 23, 1987.



Taking Clodfelter One Step Further:Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failureof Operation Rolling Thunder


Stephen W. Wilson

M ore than a century before Americaninvolvement in Vietnam, the Prussianmilitary theorist Karl von Clausewitz

penned his famous axiom: “war is nothing but thecontinuation of policy with other means.”1 Successin war relies on the national leadership’s ability toemploy its military forces as a political instru-ment, given the circumstances of the conflict athand. In the years since the United States with-drew from Vietnam, historians and strategistsalike have attempted to gain some meaning fromthe defeat. Operation Rolling Thunder—consid-ered by many to be the greatest failed air cam-paign in history—has received much of this atten-tion for its gradual approach to air power.

One of the most notable studies on this topic isMark Clodfelter’s The Limits of Air Power: TheAmerican Bombings of North Vietnam.2 This booktakes an in depth look at why America failed to useair power successfully in Vietnam and concludesthat it was not just political restraints or a militarythat misapplied air power doctrine, but the limits ofair power as a political instrument that cost theU.S. the war. Insightful as it is, Clodfelter’s analysismust be expanded–there was another importantcontributor to the failure. The existing military the-ory of gradualism, advanced by Gen. MaxwellTaylor, USA, held that an enemy’s actions could becontrolled by the gradual application of force. Thegradual application of air power in Rolling Thunderviolated many of the principles of aerial warfarelearned over time. Failure in the skies over NorthVietnam was a result of the decisions made by civil-ian and military leaders, not the limits of air power.From a Clausewitzian perspective, gradualism wasunsuccessful because it denied air power its inher-ent advantages of flexibility, surprise, and concen-tration of forces across time.

The ghosts left over from the Vietnam Warhave haunted our military and shaped its educa-tional and training philosophies. A need withinthe Air Force to vindicate itself engrossed leadersfor twenty years until success in the 1991 PersianGulf War seemingly, “kicked the Vietnam syn-drome” once and for all.3 Even the media andAmerican society at large have developed anacute fear of getting involved in “anotherVietnam.” The first military defeat suffered bythe U.S. left Americans with a bruised nationalimage and shook the idea that America couldexert its will in any corner of the globe. In themiddle of the “American Century,” Americanswere left wondering what their place in the world

actually was. “The Vietnam disaster dimmedthose concepts,” wrote Stanley Karnow in the epi-logue to Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War,“leaving Americans baffled and ambivalent abouttheir international role.”4 Many have deliberatedover the “what ifs” of strict political restraintsand their effect on Rolling Thunder. True under-standing of the failure, however, comes fromexamining the gradual application of air powerand its inability to achieve political goals in aClausewitzian framework.

When Rolling Thunder began in 1965, the U.S.had been involved in Vietnam for over ten years.This involvement stretched from aiding theFrench in their effort to maintain Indochina as acolony, to military advisors, and Special Forcescadre sent to bolster the South Vietnamese. Theconflict heated up when, in August 1964, NorthVietnamese torpedo boats attacked a U.S. Navyvessel in the Gulf of Tonkin.5 The Gulf of TonkinIncident gave President Lyndon Johnson the con-gressional support he needed to commit combatforces to Vietnam. The following winter, Viet Congattacks at Pleiku and Qui Nohn resulting in thedeaths of a number of Americans led to retaliatoryair strikes against the North. Those raids, dubbedOperation Flaming Dart, led to a sustained, strate-gic air campaign against North Vietnam.

President Johnson expected Rolling Thunderto “signal that the United States planned to holdthe North Vietnamese responsible for Vietcongactivities in South Vietnam.”6 He felt that, “doingnothing was more dangerous than doing some-thing.”7 The Johnson Administration hoped thatshowing Hanoi U.S. willingness to take the war tothe North, the Communists would hesitate beforegiving further aid to the Viet Cong insurgency inthe South. The Johnson Administration also hopedthat the strikes would show the Saigon govern-ment that the U.S. was committed to the defense ofSouth Vietnam. In return, Saigon would overhaulits corrupt government and commit itself to win-ning the war. Johnson later wrote,

I saw our bombs as my political resources for nego-tiating a peace. On the one hand, our planes andour bombs could be used as carrots for the South,strengthening the morale of the South Vietnameseand pushing them to clean up their corrupt houseby demonstrating the depth of our commitment tothe war. On the other hand, our bombs could beused as sticks against the North, pressuring NorthVietnam to stop its aggression against the South.8


The author, Stephen W.Wilson, is a second lieutenant in the United States Air Force and recent grad-uate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, where he earned a Bachelor of Science degree in history. He iscurrently assigned to the 34th Operations Group, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado and waiting tobegin Undergraduate Pilot Training in January 2002 at Columbus AFB, Mississippi. LieutenantWilson is a native of Columbia, South Carolina.

Dr. Mark Clodfelter read this paper and offered historical clarifications on several points. Col. MarkWells counseled me on the content and organization of my paper, proofread it, and gave advice onhow to make it more unique.

(Overleaf) A gaggle of

F–105s drop their bombs

over North Vietnam. (All

photos courtesy of the

Special Collections at the

U.S. Air Force Academy

Library.)

GRADUALAPPLICATIONOF AIRPOWER INROLLINGTHUNDERVIOLATEDMANY OF THEPRINCIPLESOF AERIALWARFARE

FAILURE INTHE SKIESOVER NORTHVIETNAMWAS ARESULT OFTHE DECISIONSMADE BYCIVILIAN ANDMILITARYLEADERS,NOT THE LIMITS OFAIR POWER

THE GHOSTSLEFT OVERFROM THEVIETNAMWAR HAVEHAUNTEDOUR MILITARYAND SHAPEDITS EDUCA-TIONAL ANDTRAININGPHILOSO-PHIES

He used this “carrot and stick” analogy as ratio-nale for expanding the war.

The President ordered the sustained bombingof North Vietnam on February 13, 1965.9 Despitedissention in both the State and Defense Depart-ments, USAF and VNAF fighter-bombers flew thefirst Rolling Thunder air strikes on March 2. TheAmerican forces attacked an ammunition depot atXom Bay and the Vietnamese struck the QuangKhe naval base.10 As presidential historian DorisKearns Goodwin explains, Johnson decided to be-gin bombing the North because he believed that hecould not afford to lose the war and that Americanscould solve any problem. Additionally, RollingThunder prevented him from being regarded aspowerless. It promised to end the war and allowhim to go on with his plans for the Great Society.11

At first, the intention was that Rolling Thun-der would last only a few months. The original plansubmitted by the Air Force projected a twenty-eight-day campaign. Shortly thereafter, the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) extended the plan to threemonths.12 Although seen as weak by many generalsand statesmen, no one could foresee that the NorthVietnamese would withstand such an intensebombing campaign for over two-and-a-half years.

For an evaluation of the strategy behindRolling Thunder, Clausewitz’s definitive work, On

War, is essential. This landmark book is consid-ered one of the preeminent Western works on mil-itary operations and strategy because it looksbeyond the quantifiable aspects of war to focus onthe art and individual genius of the endeavor.Clausewitz breaks down warfare to its most basiclevel, “a duel on a larger scale.”13 He claims thatwar is “an act of force to compel our enemy to doour will.”14 Clausewitz explains that the means tothe end in war is combat, and the key to combat isstrategy. On War outlines several principles thatare essential to successful strategy.

In The Limits of Air Power, Mark Clodfelteruses a Clausewitzian framework to assess theeffectiveness of the air campaigns against NorthVietnam. He writes:

In the final analysis the supreme test of bombing’sefficacy is its contribution to a nation’s war aims.Clausewitz’s definition of war...provides the onlytrue measure for evaluating air power’s effective-ness. My goal is to provide such a Clausewitzianappraisal of the air war against North Vietnam.15

This goal is accomplished by identifying the politi-cal goals set forth by the civil and military leader-ship, and then evaluating how well the three aircampaigns of the war—Rolling Thunder, Line-backer I, and Linebacker II—achieved their goals,given the restraints placed on them by the politi-cians, commanders, the environment, and theenemy. A full Clausewitzian appraisal of RollingThunder must be taken one step further by con-sidering ideas that Clausewitz advances such assurprise, flexibility, and concentration of forcesacross time.

These ideas can be used to illustrate thedefects of gradualism in warfare, especially whenan air campaign is employed. The element of sur-prise can be achieved easily by air forces becauseof their speed and range, as well as their flexibilityand versatility.16 Because of these characteristics,air planners can dictate when and where an attackwill occur, giving the enemy minimal advancewarning. Clausewitz considered surprise, “themeans to gain superiority,” over the enemy.17 Healso wrote that, “surprise lies at the root of alloperations without exception.”18 These advantagesare largely nullified when the enemy knows inadvance when and where an attack is to takeplace. During Rolling Thunder the gradual ap-proach denied the element surprise by attackingtargets in a progressive manner. The gradualapproach dictated that initial air strikes were lim-ited to certain targets in certain areas. The targetlist would expand if the North Vietnamese did notbend to the will of the U.S. It did not take long forthe North Vietnamese to realize this. Once theydid, they could concentrate their air defenses inthe areas they knew would be attacked, and use“off limits” areas as safe havens for militaryforces.19

Flexibility has long been defined as the key toair power. Current Air Force doctrine defines it as


President Johnson felt that

bombing North Vietnam

would be successful

because it would encour-

age South Vietnam by

showing American commit-

ment to their cause while

at the same time pressur-

ing North Vietnam to cease

their aggression against

the South.

APPRAISALOF ROLLINGTHUNDERMUST BETAKEN ONESTEP FURTHER BYCONSIDER-ING IDEASTHATCLAUSEWITZADVANCES

the ability to, “exploit mass and maneuver simul-taneously.”20 Flexibility aids greatly in bringingthe mass of forces against the enemy’s decisivepoint. Gradualism in Rolling Thunder precludedflexibility by implementing a regimented targetingplan that allowed no room for alteration or impro-visation. President Johnson and his civilian advi-sors tightly controlled the target selection process.Decisions on what to bomb—and what not tobomb—were made at the infamous TuesdayMorning Luncheons. President Johnson, Secretaryof Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary ofState Dean Rusk, National Security advisorMcGeorge Bundy, and Press Secretary Bill Moyersattended these exclusive meetings.21 Not untilOctober 1967 was a member of the militaryincluded in this process.22 Ironically, this lack offlexibility did not pervade the Air Force. Inresponse to Vietnam, the Air Force establishednew missions and modified old ones. Among thesewere the Misty FACs and B–52s used to provideclose air support for ground troops, as well as newcombat search and rescue tactics involving heli-borne pararescue forces supported by propeller-driven A–1 “Sandys” and SARCAP forces.Unfortunately, this atmosphere of ingenuity wasneither seen nor allowed in the bombing of theNorth.

Finally, Rolling Thunder was unable to con-centrate forces across time. This failure resulted inan inevitable violation of economy of force; frag-mented command and numerous bombing haltsprecluded efficient use of available assets. Forcesflying in Rolling Thunder missions were strungout temporally and geographically. North Vietnamwas divided in to six route packages for schedulingair strikes. The route package system made con-centration of the forces impossible by parcelingthem out to different commanders—not only in dif-ferent services but locations as well—who did notcoordinate air strikes among themselves. Navyand Marine missions fell under the command ofthe 7th Fleet at Yankee Station in the Gulf of

Tonkin. They were responsible for costal regions,Route Packages 2, 3, 4, and 6B.23

Route Packages 5 and 6A, in the northwesternarea of North Vietnam, were given to Seventh AirForce Headquarters in Saigon that utilized air-craft based out of South Vietnam as well asThailand. Finally, Route Package 1—located justnorth of the DMZ—was under Gen. WilliamWestmoreland at Military Assistance Command,Vietnam.24 A difficult objective coupled with thegradual approach led to a piecemeal pattern of airstrikes that lacked any decisive effects on NorthVietnam. According to Clausewitz, “the simultane-ous use of all means intended for a given actionappears as an elementary law of war.”25 Ap-parently, this idea was lost on U.S. military lead-ers.

While he did not consider this lower level ofthe air campaign strategy, Clodfelter’s explanationof the American failure to achieve national objec-tives through Rolling Thunder is fitting. In areview of The Limits of Air Power in the Army WarCollege publication, Parameters, Elliot Cohenpraises Clodfelter for his, “courage to study thewar and reject, politely but firmly, the stab-in-the-back theory that one occasionally hears from eventoday from serving officers.”26 In another review inthe Journal of American History, Michael Sherryof Northwestern University lauds “Clodfelter’s his-torical interpretation and strategic advice are socarefully reasoned and dispassionately offeredthat his book commands attention.”27 To under-stand why Clodfelter is successful at applyingClausewitz to Rolling Thunder, it is important tounderstand Rolling Thunder itself, why it was ini-tiated, how it was executed, what its results were,as well as Clausewitzian theory.

Both the Johnson administration and the JCSwere liable for having launched a campaign thatwas doomed from the start. Failing to keep in mindthe lessons of the Korean War, they looked insteadto the lessons of strategic bombardment fromWorld War II. The bombings of Germany andJapan became a template from which later aircampaigns would be designed. Air campaign plan-ners, using the industrial web theory from thedays of the Air Corps Tactical School, developedRolling Thunder to target the “vital centers” ofNorth Vietnam hoping that they could crush theenemy’s war making capacity and induce them toabandon the Southern insurgency.28

President Johnson hindered Rolling Thunderin a way unlike that of previous strategic air cam-paigns. Thus, the Johnson Administration estab-lished negative objectives to avoid escalating theconflict to a point where the Soviets or the Chinesemight intervene.29 Not only did this fear demon-strate the administration’s failure to understandthe conflict in broader terms, but it was also thesenegative objectives that frustrated the airmen whowere flying into harm’s way. The negative objec-tives led to the restricted areas near the Chineseborder and around Hanoi and Haiphong, as well asrules of engagement that banned any attacks on


Designed as a light fighter-

bomber, the F-100 Super

Sabre was employed along

with USN and VNAF aircraft

during the initial air strikes

against the North, dubbed

Operation Flaming Dart.

The Super Sabres attacked

an ammunition depot at

Xom Bay, and would see

more action as Rolling

Thunder took shape.

GRADUALISMIN ROLLINGTHUNDERPRECLUDEDFLEXIBILITYBY IMPLE-MENTING AREGIMENTEDTARGETINGPLAN THATALLOWED NOROOM FORALTERATION

PRESIDENTJOHNSONHINDEREDROLLINGTHUNDER INA WAYUNLIKE THATOF PREVIOUSSTRATEGICAIR CAM-PAIGNS

bridges on the Chinese border, ships entering orleaving Haiphong Harbor, aircraft on the ground,and idle air defense sites.30

In hindsight, it is hardly surprising that theNorth could and, indeed would, endure a bombingcampaign that lasted for almost four years. TheU.S. strategic goal to persuade Hanoi to bend to itswill, by making the war too costly to them, provedfruitless, despite (or perhaps because of) bombinghalts and negotiations. Clausewitz addresses thisstrategy as an alternative to directly attacking anenemy’s forces or territory. Clausewitz states that,“making the war more costly to [the enemy],” isachieved by forcing him to waste forces in combator by occupying his territory.31 Rolling Thunder didnot seek to occupy territory and it did not forceHanoi to waste its forces. In fact, the Politburo wasable to use the American bombings as justificationto ask for more support from the Soviets and theChinese.32 The original goal of forcing Hanoi to thenegotiating table using an air campaign of gradualresponse was quickly perceived as unachievableand it soon became apparent that the U.S. pursued

a tactical goal—interdiction. Rolling Thunder, withits restrictions and bombing halts served only tostrengthen the North’s will to defeat the U.S.33

Hanoi was not suing for peace, as both militaryand civilian planners had expected. Only a monthinto the Rolling Thunder campaign, doubts beganto surface among the President’s civilian advisors.

An air campaign alone could not achieve thestated national objective set forth by NSAM 288, of“a stable and independent noncommunist govern-ment,”34 in South Vietnam. During the years ofRolling Thunder, from 1965 to 1968, the VietnamWar leaned more toward an insurgency, and lesstoward a conventional conflict for which the U.S.had prepared. Destroying the industrial base of apreindustrial nation would have done little to stopthe Southern insurgency. The industrial base wasnot a center of gravity in the Clausewitzian sense,as U.S. leaders believed. The true North Viet-namese center of gravity—its allies, the Soviet

Union and Communist China—was not considereduntil President Richard Nixon’s trip to China andthe beginning of détente with the Soviets.Additionally, the Southern insurgency did notrequire many outside supplies, much less anindustrial base to sustain Viet Cong operations. Totheir credit, the American civilian leadership real-ized and attempted to redirect Rolling Thunder.National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy con-vinced President Johnson to sign NSAM 328 onApril 6, 1965.35

This directive altered the objective of RollingThunder into an interdiction campaign aimed pri-marily at North Vietnamese lines of communica-tion.36 Instead of singularly winning the war bybreaking the North’s will to fight, Rolling Thunderwould now hinder Hanoi’s ability to aid the insur-gency in the South. Rolling Thunder missionsincreasingly targeted truck convoys, rolling stock,roads, rail, bridges, marshalling yards, supplydepots, and POL reserves to curb the North’s abil-ity to export war-making materials to the South.


(Above) McDonnell Doug-

las F-4 Phantoms had the

dual responsibility of

escorting strike packages

as well as bombing targets

in the North themselves,

and were used extensively

by the Air Force, Navy, and

Marines.

(Right) Although con-

ceived to carry tactical

nuclear weapons on super-

sonic strikes against

Soviet targets, the F–105

Thunderchief became the

workhorse of Rolling

Thunder. Its unglamorous

appearance did not prevent

the venerable "Thud" from

hauling the bulk of the

bombs dropped on North

Vietnam.

IN HINDSIGHT,IT IS HARDLYSURPRISINGTHAT THENORTHCOULD…ENDURE ABOMBINGCAMPAIGNTHATLASTED FORALMOSTFOUR YEARS

This action showed the civilian and military lead-ership’s belief that coercion of the Politburo inHanoi through gradualism would not work, andthat North Vietnam’s center of gravity was not itsindustrial base, but rather its physical link toSouth.

These attempts would prove to be as fruitlessas those that preceded them. In a RAND studyevaluating the economic and political effectivenessof the first year and a half of Rolling Thunder, OlegHoeffding concluded:

It is our impression that so long as the present con-straints on objectives and operations remain asstrong as recent Administration statements indi-cate, it becomes increasingly doubtful that theadvantages of continuation or intensification of theattacks outweigh the potential net gains from, or atleast, drastic and demonstrative de-escalation.37

The Air Force simply could not effectively interdictNorth Vietnam’s supply routes to the South.

In Clausewitzian terms, Rolling Thunderfailed because it was not an effective politicalinstrument—it did not achieve its stated goal ofcompelling the North Vietnamese to do our will. Astrategic air campaign that targeted North Viet-nam’s industrial base, such as it was, could notsway their determination to fight, nor could itinterdict supply lines designed to support an in-surgency. These targets were not centers of gravityfor North Vietnam, and thus their destructioncould not break the enemy. Furthermore, the con-duct of Rolling Thunder aided the failure with itslack of massive application of force, surprise to theenemy, and concentration of forces.

American leaders incorrectly assumed that anenemy fighting by unconventional means could bedefeated with a conventional military response. Byplacing negative objectives alongside unattainablepositive ones, President Johnson worsened the sit-uation. Mark Clodfelter explains:

Despite frequently stating that the Communistwere conducting guerrilla warfare, [civil and mili-tary leaders] assumed that destruction of resourcesnecessary for conventional conflict would weakenthe enemy’s capability and will to fight unconven-tionally.... The absence of limited war experience inan unconventional environment, combined withsmug self-assurance, led to a misplaced faith inRolling Thunder. Instead of facilitating victory, theair power convictions of civilian and military chiefsserved as blinders obscuring the true image of theVietnam War.38

It is important when pointing out the failuresof U.S. leadership–which were many–during theVietnam War, that one does not use the failures towholly question the validity of air power. As provenby the Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe dur-ing World War II, the Linebacker Campaigns laterduring the Vietnam War, and Operation InstantThunder during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, airpower can be an effective tool in achieving politicalobjectives with military forces.

On War outlines several aspects of strategythat are crucial to victory. The failed Americanattempt to use air power against North Vietnamcan be linked to three of these. Surprise was com-promised after aircraft repeatedly stuck the sametargets in the same areas, allowing the Commu-nists to concentrate air defenses and protectimportant assets. Flexibility was neglected due tostrict target plans that allowed no altercations.Concentration of forces across time was lost to thefractured nature of the organization of forces. All ofthese characteristics are vital to strategy, andespecially to air power because of its unique char-acteristics of speed and range.

There is more to the failure of Rolling Thunderthan just hard-to-obtain or negative objectives. Acloser look at Clausewitz exposes the importanceof strategy to military victory. Before using the airwar against North Vietnam as a case to discreditair power or political interference in warfare, it is


Later during the Rolling

Thunder Campaign, inter-

diction overtook strate-

gicpersuasion as the pri-

mary U.S. goal. Targets

increasingly became LOCs

and soft targets such as

rolling stock, truck con-

voys, and POL reserves

which did not necessarily

require heavy bombard-

ment.

THE AIRFORCE SIMPLYCOULD NOTEFFECTIVELYINTERDICTNORTHVIETNAM’SSUPPLYROUTES TOTHE SOUTH

AMERICANLEADERSINCOR-RECTLYASSUMEDTHAT ANENEMYFIGHTING BYUNCONVEN-TIONALMEANSCOULD BEDEFEATEDWITH A CON-VENTIONALMILITARYRESPONSE

important to note that Rolling Thunder violatedalmost all principles associated with aerial opera-tions that the Air Force had learned throughoutthe twentieth century. Those who criticize airpower–specifically the usefulness of strategic

bombing in achieving political objectives–fail tomake the distinction between the actual applica-tion of air power and its potential, given that it isused in a manner that is consistent with thelessons learned over time. ■


1. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed.Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 69.2. Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: TheAmerican Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: TheFree Press, 1989).3. George Bush, quoted in Stanley Karnow’s Epilogueto Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War, by Harry G. Sum-mers (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1995), p. 210.4. Stanley Karnow, Epilogue to Historical Atlas of theVietnam War, p. 210.5. Summers, Atlas, p. 94.6. Quoted in Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup: What the AirForce Did in Vietnam and Why (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversity Press, 1991), p. 103.7. Quoted in Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and theAmerican Dream (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,1976), p. 263.8. Quoted in Kearns, Johnson, p. 264.9. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 59.10. Ibid., p. 63.11. Kearns, Johnson, p. 263.12. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Crosswinds: The Air Force’sSetup in Vietnam (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&MUniversity Press, 1993), p. 69.13. Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.14. Ibid.15. Mark Clodfelter, Limits, p. xi.16. Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force BasicDoctrine, Sep. 1997, p. 20.

17. Clausewitz, On War, p. 198.18. Ibid.19. Clodfelter, Limits, pp. 119 and 131.20. Air Force Basic Doctrine, p. 23.21. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 85.22. Ibid.23. Ibid, p. 129.24. Ibid.25. Clausewitz, On War, p. 205.26. Elliot A. Cohen, review of The Limits of Air Power:The American Bombing of North Vietnam, by MarkClodfelter, Parameters (Jun. 1990): 114.27. Michael S. Sherry, review of The Limits of AirPower: The American Bombing of North Vietnam, byMark Clodfelter, The Journal of American History (Sep.1990): 739.28. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 73.29. Ibid, pp. 141-42.30. Ibid, p. 142.31. Clausewitz, On War, p. 93.32. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 135.33. Tilford, Crosswinds, p. 76.34. Quoted in Clodfelter, Limits, p. 74.35. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 66.36. Ibid.37. Oleg Hoeffding, Bombing North Vietnam: AnAppraisal of Economic and Political Effects, RANDMemorandum 5213-1-ISA (Santa Monica, Calif.: RANDCorporation, 1966), p. 32.38. Clodfelter, Limits, p. 118.

NOTES

Key civil and military archi-

tects of the Rolling

Thunder campaign—

Secretary of Defense

Robert S. McNamara (left),

General Maxwell D. Taylor

(second from left), and

American Ambassador to

South Vietnam Henry

Cabot Lodge(second from

right)—believed that North

Vietnam could not with-

stand modern strategic

bombing, a force that

helped defeat Nazi

Germany and Imperial

Japan 20 years earlier.

ROLLINGTHUNDERVIOLATEDALMOST ALLPRINCIPLESASSOCIATEDWITH AERIALOPERATIONSTHAT THEAIR FORCEHADLEARNEDTHROUGH-OUT THETWENTIETHCENTURY


��Brian S. Gunderson

Part V: Letters S-Z

SALLY A MEMBER OF THE SAL-VATION ARMY

SALOON CAR A DELUXE SEDAN AUTOMOBILE

SAND BOYS RAF AIRMEN WHOSERVED IN UNITS IN NORTH AFRICAN DESERT

SANDRA A BRITISH SYSTEMUSING SEARCHLIGHTS TO GUIDE DISABLED RAF AND USAAF AIRCRAFT TO HOME AIRFIELD OR TO AN EMERGENCYAIRFIELD

SATURATED WITHOUT PERSONALITY

SCARECROW AN EXPLOSIVE CANISTER FILLED WITH GUNK FIRED BY GERMANS INTO ROYAL AIR FORCE BOMBERCOMMAND FORMATIONDURING NIGHTTIME TOCREATE ILLUSION THATBOMBER AIRCRAFT HADCOLLIDED OR EXPLODED, THEREBY SPOOKING NEW,INEXPERIENCED CREWS AND CAUSE THEM TO DEVIATE FROM THEIR COURSE TO TARGET OR ABORT THE MISSION

SCARECROW PATROLS BY ROYAL AIR PATROLS FORCE PILOTS IN DE

HAVILAND (DH-82) UNARMED TIGER MOTH AIRCRAFT OVER WATER TO FRIGHTEN ANY GERMAN SUBMARINES ON THE SURFACE OF THE SEA/OCEAN CHARGING THEIR BATTERIES, THEREBY CAUSING THEM TO DIVE UNDER THE SURFACE PREMATURELY

SCHRÄGE MUSIK A JAZZ MUSIC CODENAME FOR UPWARD-FIRING CANNON ON GERMAN LUFTWAFFE FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT

SCOFF EAT QUICKLY

SCRAMBLE A FAST FORMATIONTAKEOFF BY FIGHTERAIRCRAFT

SCRAPER RUN OFF, RUN AWAY,LEAVE FORMATION

SCRAPER THE THIN RING IN AN RAF’S SQUADRON LEADER’S (MAJOR’S) RANK BRAID BETWEEN TWO WIDER BANDS

SCRATCH CREW AN AIRCREW MADE UPOF PERSONNEL FROM SEVERAL CREWS AND/OR SPARES

SCREAMED EXECUTED A POWERDOWNHILL DIVE IN AN AIRCRAFT

SCREECHERS A PERSON WHO IS VERYDRUNK

SCREW A PROPELLER ON ANAIRCRAFT ENGINE

SCRIMSHANK A PERSON WHO SHIRKSASSIGNED DUTIES

SCRUB CANCEL A PLANNEDMISSION

SCUPPERED CANCELLED

SECOND DICKIE A CO-PILOT OF AN AIRCREW

SECTOR CALLING GROUND CONTROLCALLING FIGHTERS WITH INFORMATION- E.G. “SCRATCH CALLING MATCHSTICK (CODENAME FOR SQUADRON) THERE IS TRADE (ENEMY AIRCRAFT) AT ANGELS 15(15,000 FT ALTITUDE).”

SHAKEN FRIGID ASTONISHED, SCAREDFLABBERGASTED

SHAKEY DO A ROUGH, RISKY,SCARYMISSION

SHOT DOWN LOST AN ARGUMENT,IN FLAMES REPRIMANDED

ROYAL AIR U.S. ARMY AIR FORCESFORCE TERM EQUIVALENT/

DEFINITION


DEFINITION


SIGNALS RADIO MESSAGE TRAFFIC

SILENCER ON A CAR A MUFFLER

SISTER A MILITARY NURSE/USUALLY THE SENIOR NURSE ON A WARD

SKEW-ELL AN RAF SQUADRON LEADER (EQUIVALENT TO A MAJOR)

SKIPPER AN AIRCRAFT COMMANDER, SENIOR PILOT ON AN AIRCREW

SKY PILOT A MILITARY CHAPLAIN

SMACKER ONE POUND STERLING

SMALLS LADIES LINGERIE

SMARMY FLATTERING

SMASHING MARVELOUS, SUPER,WONDERFUL,

SNAKE ABOUT PERFORM OPERATIONALAEROBATICS

SNAPPERS AN ENEMY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

SNOGGING SLEEPING

SNOWDROP A TERM USED TO DESCRIBE AN RAF POLICEMAN-REFERS TO WHITE COVER ON THEIR PEAKED HATS

SNUGGERY WIRELESS/RADIO OPERATORS POSITION ABOARD THE AVRO LANCASTER BOMBER AIRCRAFT—CONSID-ERED TO BE THE WARMEST POSITION ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT

SOAKING GLASS A GLASS OF GIN ANDOF WET TONIC

SOD OFF GO AWAY, BEAT IT

SODDING TEMPER A BAD TEMPER

SOGGY MUSHY, SLOW TO REACT,AS WITH AIRCRAFT CONTROLS

SOLID LUMP A LARGE FORMATION OFOF BLITZ ENEMY AIRCRAFT

SOWING CUCUMBERS DROPPING AERIALMINES FROM RAF AIRCRAFT INTO GERMAN-OCCUPIED HARBORS

SPAM MEDAL A SERVICE/CAMPAIGNMEDAL/RIBBON

SPAM MISSION AN AERIAL-DELIVEREDFOOD DROP TO ALLIES (E.G. FRENCH UNDERGROUND)

SPANNER A WRENCH

SPARKS A WIRELESS/RADIO AIRCREW MEMBER ORGROUNDCREW TECHNICIAN

SPARROW START STARTED VERY EARLY

SPAWNY LUCKY

SPIFFY SMART-LOOKING,WELL-DRESSED

SPINNER AN AIRCRAFT PROPELLER-BOSS

SPIT(S) WWII RAF SUPERMARINE SPITFIRE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

SPOOF FLARES FLARES DROPPED ON ANENEMY CITY NEAR PRIMARY TARGETDESIGNED TO DRAW AWAY ENEMY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FROM MAIN BOMBING STREAM

SPOT, A HAVE A DRINK

SPOT OF BOTHER A RISKY, DIFFICULT SITUATION

SPOT ON RIGHT ON TARGET ORTOTALLY CORRECT

SPOTTED DICK AN ENGLISH DESSERT—PLAIN PLUM PUDDINGWITH RAISINS OR CURRANTS

SPROG CREWS INEXPERIENCED CREWS

SPUD BASHING PEELING POTATOES ASIN KITCHEN POLICE (KP)

SPY WAS SPOT ON INTELLIGENCE OFFICE CORRECTLY PREDICTED WHERE ENEMY FLAK AND FIGHTERS WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED DURING THE MISSION


DEFINITION


DEFINITION

SQUADDIE A BASIC RECRUIT,A PRIVATE

SQUARE BASHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORTRAINING OFFICER OR AN N.C.O. RECORD KEEPER

SQUIRT A SHORT BURST OF GUNFIRE FROM AN AIRCRAFT

STALLS ORCHESTRA SEATS IN ATHEATER OR MUSIC HALL

STANDING AN AIRCRAFT PARKING HARDSTAND

STARBOARD RIGHT SIDE

STATION AN RAF AIRFIELD OR AIRBASE

STATION MASTER A COMMANDING OFFICER OF AN RAF AIR STATION

STEEPLE/STEEPLING THE EFFECT CAUSEDWHEN SEVERAL ENEMY SEARCHLIGHTS LOCK-ON TO AN INCOMING BOMBER; CONING

STIFFENER A BORE

STONE USED IN MEASURING AN INDIVIDUAL’S WEIGHT IN GREAT BRITAIN (ONE STONE EQUALS 14 POUNDS)

STOOGING AROUND FLYING AIMLESSLY AROUND, CIRCLING,WAITING TO LAND AN AIRCRAFT

STOPPERS THE BRAKES

STRIPPING BEING DISCIPLINED,CHEWED OUT

STUFFED CLOUD A CLOUD COVERING A HILL OR A MOUNTAIN

SUSS TO RECONNOITER, TO CHECK OUT

SWALLOW NICKNAME GIVEN TO GERMAN MESSER-SCHMITT JET FIGHTER ME- 262

SWATS UP STUDIES HARD PREPAR-ING FOR A TEST/EXAM

SWEENY A HAIRCUT TO MILITARY STANDARDS (REFERS TO THE MUSICAL “SWEENY TODD”-THE DEMON BARBER).

SWEEP A GROUP OF RAF FIGHTERS ATTACKING ENEMY GROUND TARGETS

SWINGING THE LEAD MALINGERING, BEING LAZY

SWIPES WEAK BEER

SWOT TO WORK HARD, TO STUDY

TAIL-END CHARLIE LAST IN LINE, LAST AIR-CRAFT IN A FORMATION

TAKE A FLIP TAKE A RIDE IN AN AIRCRAFT

TAKE A WACK AT MAKE AN ATTEMPT, TRY

TAKEOFF FULL TAKEOFF A BOMBER AIR-WACK CRAFT FULLY LOADED

WITH BOMBS, AMMUNI-TION AND GASOLINE

TALL BOY 12,000 POUND BOMB USED BY SPECIALLY CONFIGURED RAF AVRO LANCASTER BOMBERS

TALLY HO PILOT RADIO TRANSMIS-SION INDICATING THAT ENEMY AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN SIGHTED—-PRE-PARE TO ENGAGE/ATTACK

TANNER A BRITISH SILVER COIN (A SIXPENCE 12 1/2 CENTS)

TANNOY RAF AIRFIELD PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS SYS-TEM LOUDSPEAKER SYS-TEM

TAPES NON-COMMISSIONEDOFFICER STRIPES/ CHEVRONS ON A UNI-FORM

TAPS AIRCRAFT CONTROLS

TARMAC THE FLIGHT LINE,RUNWAYS ON AN RAF AIRFIELD



DEFINITION


DEFINITION

TATE AND LYLE WARRANT OFFICER’S BADGE OF RANK THAT RESEMBLES TRADE-MARK OF BRITISH COM-PANY’S FAMOUS GOLDEN SYRUP

TATTY UNTIDY, CHEAP, RAGGED

TEAR OFF A STRIP SEVERELY REPRIMANDOR DRESS-DOWN A SUB-ORDINATE

THRASH A BEER PARTY

THROWS IN AN ENEMY FIGHTER THE TOWEL BEING SUCCESSFULLY

ATTACKED BY AN RAF FIGHTER INDICATES DEFEAT BY INVERTING HIS AIRCRAFT AND BAILING OUT

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TICK OFF A MILD DISCIPLINARYACTION, A CHEWING OUT

TICKING OVER AN AIRCRAFT ENGINETHAT IS IDLING

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TIDDY OGGY, A CORNISH PASTY TIDDIE OGGLE (BACON,ONIONS AND

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TIFFIN AFTERNOON TEA

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TILL A CASH REGISTER

TIP AND RUN RAID A RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT

TIPPING TERM USED TODESCRIBE AIRCRAFT SORTIES WHEREBY RAF FIGHTERS WOULD FLY ALONG SIDE GERMAN V-1 FLYING BOMBS, PLACE A WING TIP UNDER THE WING TIP OF THE V-1 AND FLIP IT OVER SO THAT IT WOULD CRASH HARMLESSLY IN AN OPEN AREA

TOAD-IN-THE-HOLE A LARGE YORKSHIRE PUDDING STUFFED WITH BANGERS (SAUSAGES) AND SERVED WITH ROASTED POTATOES

TOFF A DISTINGUISHED PERSON, UPPER CLASS PEOPLE

TOFFEE NOSE A SNOB

TONNE A METRIC TON OF 1000KILOS

TORBEAU WWII RAF TORPEDO-CARRYING BRISTOL BEAUFIGHTER AIRCRAFT

TORCH A FLASHLIGHT

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TRAPPER A FLIGHT EXAMINER, A FLYING INSTRUCTOR



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TRADES ENLISTED PERSONNEL SPECIALTY CLASSIFICA-TIONS (E.G. MECHANIC,ELECTRICIAN, ETC.)

TREACLE SYRUP, MOLASSES

TROLLEY- A HAND-PULLED ACCUMULATOR STARTER BATTERY FOR

STARTING AIRCRAFT

TRUMPETER A BUGLER

TRUNK CALL A LONG DISTANCE OR TOLL TELEPHONE CALL

TRUNK ROAD A MAIN ROAD,A HIGHWAY

TSE TSE’S NICKNAME FOR GROUND CREW PERSONNEL WHO MAINTAINED RAF DE HAVILLAND MOSQUITO AIRCRAFT

T-TROLLEY AN AIRCRAFT TOW-BAR ON TWO SMALL WHEELS

TUBE LONDON’S UNDER-GROUND RAILWAY SYSTEM

TWIGGED THE PUT EVERYTHING WHOLE THING TOGETHER

TYRO A NEW, INEXPERIENCED AIRMAN IN A UNIT

UMBRELLA MAN AN AIRCREW MEMBER WHO HAD BAILED OUT

UNDERCART AN AIRCRAFT’S UNDER-CARRIAGE, MAIN LAND-ING GEAR

UPKEEP “BOUNCING BOMB”DESIGNED BY SCIENTIST-BOFFIN DR BARNES WALLIS TO BE USED BY ROYAL AIR FORCE BOMBERS TO BREACH THE MOHNE,EDER AND OTHER DAMS IN GERMANY

UXB AN UNEXPLODED BOMB

VAPOUR TRAILS CONDENSATION TRAILS

VECTOR 90 INSTRUCTIONS FROM GROUND CONTROL TO AIRCRAFT TO STEER DUE EAST-O90 DEGREES

VEGETABLES AERIAL MINES DROPPEDFROM RAF AIRCRAFT

VERGE, SWERVED ON TO THE SWERVED ON TO SHOULDER OF A ROAD

VIC A V-SHAPED FORMATION OF AIRCRAFT

WAAF A MEMBER OF THE ROYALAIR FORCE’S WOMENS AUXILIARY AIR FORCE

WACK ATTEMPT, TRY

WACKED OUT TIRED OUT

WACKING OVERDRAWN AT THEOVERDRAFTS BANK

WAD A BUN, A PIECE OF CAKE OR A SANDWICH

WAFFLED AN AIRCRAFT ZIGZAG-GING IN FLIGHT

WAG A WIRELESS/RADIO OPERATOR GUNNER ABOARD AN RAF BOMBER AIRCRAFT

WALLAH A PERSON

WALLOP A BEER, AN ALE OR OTHER LIQUOR DRINK

WASTAGE POOL A PERSON IN TRANSIT,AWAITING POSTING/ASSIGNMENT

WATCH TOWER/ AN AIRFIELD CONTROLOFFICE TOWER

WATER CLOSET A TOILET/A LAVATORY

WEB FOOT A BRITISH FLEET AIR ARM AIRCREW MEMBER

WELLINGTONS, RUBBER BOOTSWELLIES

WHIFF BREATHE OXYGEN

WHITE KNUCKLE IN A TIGHT OR TOUGHSTUFF SITUATION

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WILDE SAU CODE NAME FOR LUFT-(WILD BOAR) WAFFE TACTIC OF FREE-

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WIND SCREEN A COCKPIT WINDSHIELD

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A Dying Breed: The True Story of aWorld War II Air Combat Crew’s Cou-rage, Camaraderie, Faith, and Spirit.By Neil B. Dillon. Grant’s Pass, Oregon:Hellgate Press, 2000. Pp. xi, 330. $15.95ISBN: 1-55571-529-8.Silent Heroes: Downed Airmen andthe French Underground. By SherriGreene Ottis. Lexington: The UniversityPress of Kentucky, 2001. Pp. 235. $24.00ISBN: 0-8131-2186-8.Refuge from the Reich: American Air-men and Switzerland During WorldWar II. By Stephen Tanner. Rockville Cen-tre, N.Y.: Sarpedon, 2000. Pp. x, 262. $25.00ISBN: 1-885119-70-4.

I would like to like these books morethan I do, especially the two that are clear-ly a labor of love. Unfortunately, it is pre-cisely their partisanship that makes all ofthem less useful than they might be ascontributions to the history of World WarII. Dillon, Ottis, and Tanner all deal withthe stories of American (and in Ottis’s case,British) airmen shot down over continentalEurope, but the heroes of their books aredifferent. In Dillon’s case, the heroes arethe ten crew members of a B–17 FlyingFortress; in Ottis’s, the men and women ofthe French and Belgian underground whoorganized escape routes out of Nazi-occu-pied Europe for downed Allied airmen; andin Tanner’s case, the Swiss government.

The most honest of the three authorsis Dillon, who makes no secret of the factthat his book is an homage to his latebrother-in-law, TSgt. Sam Honeycutt, andhis nine fellow B–17 crewmen. Dillon’spublisher, unfortunately, was less honest insubtitling the book on its cover, “TheCourage of the Mighty Eighth Air Force”;the book is not a history of the Eighth AirForce, but the story of one B–17 crew, asthe author’s subtitle makes clear.

This is not a critical discussion of airpower in World War II. In some respects, itis a scrapbook. Dillon made a promise to hisbrother-in-law, who battled Parkinson’s dis-ease and died in 1992, to tell the story of hiscrew’s wartime experience. They trainedtogether, fought together, and were POWstogether in Germany for the last year of thewar. From the personal recollections of sur-viving crew members, relatives of thosewho have died, and their published and un-published letters and reminiscences, Dillonhas compiled a record of their training,combat, and captivity.

Dillon recounts their experiences as ahome scrapbook would record it, and as ascrapbook, there is a good deal that is rightwith this book. It contains many pho-tographs of the interior of a FlyingFortress, pictures of life at an air base inBritain, excerpts from letters home andfrom official telegrams, and abundantquotes from crew members describingtheir experiences in the air and as POWs.

But as with any family’s scrapbook, thestory that this one tells is one-sided.

People do not compile scrapbooks toremember the bad times, but to preservethe high points of their lives. In lookingback at the records we keep of our ownlives, we do not find photos of shoutingmatches or tearful encounters—that is notwhat we wish to remember; and thoseshades of gray will not be found in thisbook, either. For Dillon, there was no gray.These men wore the white hats in a battlebetween good and evil; that is how he seesthem and how he unabashedly portraysthem. And of course, in the overall scope ofthe war against Nazi Germany, he is right.But he would have done these men a ser-vice by portraying their flaws, fears, andfailures. As history, that would have been abetter and more interesting book.

But the comment is idle. Dillon wasneither willing nor able to write such abook. That is not what he set out to do.These men have been his heroes since as avery young boy he watched them go off towar. He fulfilled his promise to T/Sgt.Honeycutt by paying tribute to them witha scrapbook recording the great adventurethat ten young men shared together—asthey and he wish to remember it.

As history, Sherri Greene Ottis’s booksuffers from much the same problem.Although of a much younger generationthan Dillon, she, too, has found her heroesin the men (and, in her case, women) whofought in World War II on the Allied side.Her admiration for the personal courage ofmembers of the Belgian and French under-ground is not misplaced, but it has led her,like Dillon, to write an homage to people towhom she feels a strong personal connec-tion, rather than a history. Indeed, al-though she is less up front than Dillonabout her relationship to these people, shethanks her mother, Claudette, for her helpwith hours of French translation, and itmay be that Ottis, too, is telling a familystory.

Ottis has compiled the personal sto-ries of numerous airmen and their res-cuers, and she recounts them fully, includ-ing “where are they now.” But her admira-tion for these individuals gets in the wayand leads to sweeping generalizations. Shehas less than a nuanced view of the con-flicting pressures on those living underGerman occupation, writing, for example,that “the feeling of compassion that arisesin most people confronted by someone lostand alone, wounded, or frightened com-pelled the people of France to help air-men.” Both parts of this statement areopen to question. Do “most people” feelcompassion for total strangers? Those whocarried out Nazi occupation policies clearlydid not. And “the people of France” did nothelp airmen. Some individuals helped;some looked away; some helped theGerman occupiers. Ottis could usefully

have analyzed what motivated the res-cuers she so admires to behave differentlyfrom the mass of their countrymen, butthis would have required focusing onshades of gray that she apparently doesnot see.

Instead, she gets caught up in her zealto tell what she seems to think is anuntold—or at least, out-of-print—story,maintaining that “few competitive worksare available to compete with this study[sic].” In her bibliography, she is quick tocriticize other books and to praise her own(“the research done for this book is of muchwider scope”). This is at the least irritatingand unbecoming—especially from an au-thor who does not have the French lan-guage skills to do her own primaryresearch.

Despite the book’s shortcomings, itsindividual stories deserve to be told.Although one might wish for a more skill-ful and less self-absorbed author (an over-ly long epilogue focuses more on Ottis thanon her subjects), the book will still rewardthose interested in the experiences of aver-age men and women on the front lines ofWorld War II.

While Dillon and Ottis are perfectlyfrank about their personal affection forand commitment to the subjects of theirbooks, the motives behind Stephen Tan-ner’s ode to Switzerland are far less clear.He has written a very curious book, a storyhe describes as “a fascinating panorama ofheroism from the personal to the nationallevel,” in which “a small democracy wasable to offer safety to individual fightingmen of a larger one.” Well, yes; sort of.

For American air crews, internment inSwitzerland was clearly preferable tobecoming a POW in Germany. The tortuousambiguity of Swiss neutrality did not con-cern them, but it should concern Tanner.He has a greater responsibility than Dillonand Ottis, who are trying to convey theirsense of admiration for ordinary people.Tanner puts his hyperbole in the service ofa nation with a wartime record that is farmore checkered than he is prepared toadmit. He persists in referring to theUnited States and Switzerland as “sisterrepublics,” admiring the “courage [that]was displayed by an entire nation...alonein the very center of the continent,unbowed and defiant.” Claiming that neu-tral Switzerland was “a unique case inNazi-held Europe” (Sweden? Portugal?Spain?), he also waxes lyrical on the con-temporary Swiss: “handsome but notostentatious in clothing or behavior;scrupulously honest but always exacting intransactions; hardworking but unaggres-sive.” What bill of goods is being sold here?

This book is unpalatable in manyrespects. Here is Tanner on Britain’s“finest hour”: “In retrospect, the Battle ofBritain can be viewed not as a life-and-death struggle for national survival, but as

Book Reviews


simply the most visually spectacular of anhistoric string of colorful battles betweenEuropean states in which both sides wereevenly matched.” Too bad that Tanner wasnot there to tell the young RAF pilots fly-ing without rest for weeks on end that theywere merely engaged in a visual spectacle.Not that they would have believed him.Unfortunately, today’s younger readerswith little previous exposure to the historyof World War II might.

Imbedded in Tanner’s political agen-da, which is apparently the rehabilitationof the American image of Switzerland afterwhat he euphemistically calls “the ‘gold’controversy of the late 1990s” are stories ofindividual air crews and their experienceof Swiss internment. Like the personal sto-ries recounted by Dillon and Ottis, theydeserve to be told. Had Tanner stayed fo-cused on those tales of individual courage,he might have fallen victim to the heroworship that colors Dillon’s and Ottis’swritings, but it would have been a morenoble flaw than the one to which he suc-cumbed.

From 1995-2001, Edwina Campbell was aprofessor of grand strategy at theIndustrial College of the Armed Forces,National Defense University.

Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese WarCrimes Trials. By Tim Maga. Lexington:The University Press of Kentucky, 2001.Photographs. Notes. Bibliography. Index.Pp. xiv, 181. $25.00 ISBN: 0-8131-2177-9.

Bradley University history professorTim Maga has chosen as his subject arather neglected aspect of the history ofpost-World War II prosecutions of Axis warcriminals. All of these war crimes trials areof interest to specialists in and generalreaders of military and legal history. Andbecause many of these trials involvedcrimes against Allied airmen, they are ofparticular interest to aviation historyscholars and enthusiasts.

Dr. Maga’s too-short book offers small,often fragmented snapshots of a large,complex picture, and his study is bothbroader and less exhaustive than its titlewould suggest. His focus is diffuse, and hischapters offer general discussions of a fewof the early U.S. Army trials; the Inter-national Military Tribunal for the Far East(IMTFE) trial; some of the U.S. Navy trials;the influence of the trials on postwar rela-tions between Japan and the UnitedStates; and recent efforts to establish aninternational permanent war crimes court.

Maga aims not at providing “an ency-clopedic account” of all of the trials; his

emphasis is, rather, on the trials conductedby the IMTFE and the most important mil-itary courts. (p. xii) Because he focusesalmost exclusively on American militarycourts and the U.S. trial program, he virtu-ally ignores the efforts of other nations tobring Japanese war criminals to justice.

Unfortunately, Maga has neglected toplace his story in clear historical context.Beginning as early as 1941, the Allied pow-ers began to develop policies to holdaccountable two types of Axis war crimi-nals—the “major” offenders and the“minor” offenders. The major offenderswere high-level civilian and military lead-ers, policymakers whose crimes had noparticular geographical location; the minoroffenders were those, often lower-level,civilian and military personnel who com-mitted crimes in a particular location, forexample, in a prisoner of war or concentra-tion camp. Eventually, both major andminor Axis war criminals were tried. Theminor trials constituted the vast majorityof postwar proceedings and were conduct-ed in a great number of locales, by a largenumber of nations, in a variety of tri-bunals, national and international, mili-tary and civilian. Maga’s story belongs inthe wider context of the history of post-World War II war crimes trials.

Maga’s presentation of these trials,their controversies, and their legacies ismore impressionistic than systematic, andhis book is at times marred by question-able organization and footnoting, disrupt-ed lines of argument, awkward writing,and even factual errors.

Examples of some of these problemscan be found in the author’s discussion ofthe IMTFE case against former minister ofwar and premier Gen. Hideki Tojo. Magacoherently and without interruption pre-sents the arguments of the defense (pp. 45-50, 51). But he then divides the argumentsof the prosecution, thereby diluting them.Maga begins with a seven-line paragraphon prosecution arguments on the aggres-sive war charge and atrocity allegationsagainst Tojo (p. 51). The seven paragraphsthat follow provide a rambling discourse onTojo’s relationship with his eldest daugh-ter and concerns for his family, his respectfor Hirohito, his views on gardening and onthe success of the new Japanese yen, hisstatement of sympathy to the family ofHermann Goring, his criticisms of theaggressive war charge, and the Japaneseatomic bomb project. Buried at the end ofthe seventh paragraph are two sentencesin which Maga finally returns to the pros-ecution argument that linked Tojo to “spe-cific battlefield atrocity accounts...actionsso ghastly that the tribunal was physicallydisturbed by them.” (p. 52)

Maga’s “general thesis” is that therewere “good intentions behind the Tokyo tri-als” and that the trials did “good work”. (p.ix) But how is one to judge the work of any

trial court? In his outstanding analysis ofthe work of the International MilitaryTribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, Bradley F.Smith wrote, “To assess the judgment in atrial, we must first know who is doing thejudging, who is being judged, and what arethe charges and the system of law in use.”[Bradley F. Smith, Reaching Judgment atNuremberg (New York: Basic Books, Inc.,1977), p. 3.]

Regrettably, Maga does not discussany of these basic—but essential—ele-ments in a systematic or complete way.Who were the judges who sat on theIMTFE? Maga waits until page 43 toreveal that eleven men sat on the court,including presiding judge Sir WilliamWebb of Australia. The reader must waituntil page 60 to learn the names andnationalities of three of the other judges;the final seven are not mentioned. Here, aselsewhere, an appendix would have beenhelpful.

Who were the defendants who facedthe IMTFE? Twenty-eight “Class A” defen-dants were originally indicted; three ofthese escaped judgment through death ormental collapse. The remaining twenty-five Class A defendants, sitting together inone dock—as Goring, et al., did at the IMTNuremberg proceedings—received judg-ment by the IMTFE tribunal. The IMTFEproceedings constituted one trial—as didthe IMT Nuremberg proceedings—in spiteof Maga’s persistent use of the word “tri-als” to describe the work of the Tokyocourt. Class A Japanese war criminalswere the equivalent of “major” Germanwar criminals and faced similar charges;Class B and Class C Japanese war crimi-nals were the equivalent of “minor” Ger-man war criminals and faced similar char-ges, though there were slight differencesbetween the two classes. Maga mentionsnone of this, nor does he give a full defini-tion even of Class A criminals or thecharges that they faced in court. He doesnot mention the Class B or C criminal cat-egories until page 128, and he does notdescribe the types of individuals who fellinto those categories or the types ofcharges that they faced.

Maga does reveal that the IMTFEfound all twenty-five defendants guiltyand sentenced Tojo to death (p. 53) and six-teen others to life imprisonment (p. 60).But we must wait until pages 134-35 tolearn about the specifics of some of the sen-tences the IMTFE passed. An appendixlisting this information in a complete formwould have been helpful and might alsohave corrected the multiple errors that thereader will encounter on those pages.

Maga believes that the postwar prose-cution of Japanese war criminals should beinvestigated as a topic sui generis, inde-pendent of the trials of German war crimi-nals “in Nuremberg.” (p. x) Here, Magapresumably means the IMT trial at

◆◆◆◆◆◆


Nuremberg, though he does not say so.Maga maintains that his book is about “theTokyo trials”, and he makes note of“Nuremberg...when it makes sense to doso.” (p. x) His point is well taken, but it isprecisely on the question of basic defini-tions, jurisdictional parameters, types ofdefendants, rules of evidence, trial proce-dure, and sentence review that a Nurem-berg-Tokyo compare-contrast model mighthave been most helpful. Such an approachwould have been particularly effective inrefuting the critics who believe that the tri-als of Japanese war criminals were racial-ly motivated.

Dr. Priscilla D. Jones, Air Force HistorySupport Office

Battle Stations: Decisive Weapons ofthe Second World War. By Taylor Dow-ning and Andrew Johnston. Barnsley, UK:Pen & Sword Limited, 2000. Photographs.Index. Pp. 223. £19.95. ISBN 0-85052-749-X

The authors of this book provide a well

researched and easily read overview of fourmajor Allied weapons of World War II—theBritish Submarine Spitfire and the Ame-rican DC—3 (C—47 Dakota), Shermantank and the amphibious truck, DUKW,known as the “Duck”. Given the book’s title,a reader might expect to find a comprehen-sive review of most of the “decisive”weapons of the greatest and most cata-strophic conflict in human history, a con-flict that saw the introduction of many newweapons. At the very least, it could havehad a number of representative “decisive”weapons from both Allied and Axis coun-tries. Some readers might believe any bookabout “decisive weapons” would be, atworst, presumptive and, at the very least,selective—why were these four weaponsselected over “obvious” others. Additionally,the book does not look at any enemyweapons, such as the German 88mm anti-aircraft artillery that also served as a veryeffective antitank weapon or the Japanese“Zero” that dominated Far East skies dur-ing the opening years of the war in thattheater. Finally, the book does not reviewany weapons of the Soviet Union—forexample, the Soviet T-47 tank, touted asthe best all-around tank of the SecondWorld War.

Fortunately, given all of these issues,the authors do provide a very readable andinformative account of the four “decisive”weapons that they chose, that helped turndefeat to victory for the Allies during WorldWar II. All of these weapons were the prod-uct of Allied technology, production, andingenuity and, in their own way, greatlycontributed to the ultimate Allied victoryover Nazi Germany. Although less numer-ous than the Hawker Hurricanes duringthe Battle of Britain, the Submarine Spit-fire came to exemplify the bravery of “thosefew who gave so much for so many” duringBritain’s “finest hour” against the GermanLuftwaffe in the summer of 1940. The pre-war commercial Douglas DC—3 becamethe military C—47 that saw service inevery theater of operations and droppedthousands of paratroopers over occupiedFrance in the early morning hours of June6, 1944, paving the way for the greatestinvasion force in history. The Shermantank, although inferior in gun caliber andarmor to its German counterparts, madeup in numbers what it lacked in quality tospearhead the Allied breakout from theNormandy beaches. Finally, the funny lit-tle amphibious truck, known as the “Duck,”well demonstrated its ability to deliver

◆◆◆◆◆◆


supplies from offshore ships to inlandareas, a capability that the U.S. Army didnot initially want.

The authors cover each weapon in alengthy chapter that takes the reader fromthe weapon’s genesis to its employment incombat. For each weapon the authors startwith an in-depth background on the gene-sis of the weapon as an idea, continuethrough the weapon’s design and produc-tion phases, and then end with the use ofthe weapon in a major campaign of WorldWar II. A good portion of each chapter cen-ters around the battle or operation inwhich the weapon particularly made itselfknown. For example, the center of the storyabout the Submarine Spitfire is the Battleof Britain, and, for the C—47, it is thetransport of the Allied paratroopers overNormandy just after midnight June 6,1944. For the Sherman tank, the centralbattle was the Allied breakout fromNormandy where the Sherman’s speed andsheer numbers made it a significant oppo-nent to the better gunned and armoredGerman panzers. Finally, the Duck proveditself at Anzio and other beachheads whensupplies and equipment had to be movedquickly from offshore ships to men ashoreand in the heat of battle.

In addition to the regular commentaryabout each weapon system, the book alsohas other virtues. For example, the authorsprovide additional highlights in side sto-ries about various personalities and othercontemporary weapons without distractingthe reader from the main story. For exam-ple, the reader gets a look at Air MarshalDowding and his German counterpart, AirMarshal Goering. In the chapter on theSherman tank, the authors give a “short”on the Detroit Arsenal. Also, the book isfilled with numerous photographs thatillustrate the stories about each of theweapons. Overall, Battle Stations is a wellwritten, easily read, and profusely illus-trated book whose only vice, at least to thescholar, is the lack of documentation.

Lt. Col. Robert B. Kane, USAF, Air WarCollege.

To Hanoi and Back: the USAF andNorth Vietnam, 1966-1973. By WayneThompson. Washington, D.C.: Air ForceHistory and Museums Program, 2001.

Maps. Tables. Photographs. Notes. Glos-sary. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiii, 416.

Wayne Thompson is currently Chief ofAnalysis at the Air Force History SupportOffice. He served as an Army draftee dur-ing the War in Southeast Asia, and subse-quent to earning his doctorate in history,joined the CHECKMATE staff on the AirStaff in August 90. He also served as thesenior historical advisor on the Gulf WarAirpower Survey. More recently, he hasstudied air operations in the Balkans.

As implied in the title, this book dealswith the use of air power against NorthVietnam. Little attention is paid to the sev-eral other air wars being flown in SouthVietnam and Laos. It concentrates on theRolling Thunder, Linebacker, and Line-backer II operations.

The author skillfully develops the airwar over the north chronologically, whilesimultaneously mixing in the develop-ments on the home front. Not only are thepolitical aspects of the planning and deci-sion making discussed, but also the devel-opment of the antiwar movement and howthat affected the decisions made.

Thompson also devotes quite a bit oftime describing the technical aspects of the

◆◆◆◆◆◆


air war: ECM pods, the Wild Weasel mis-sion, Operation Bolo, the attacks againstthe Thai Nguyen Iron Works, attacksagainst the Dourmer Bridge and, finally,against the Phuc Yen MiG base. He dis-cusses Combat Skyspot and Site 85,EC–121 operations, and during Line-backer, Teaball.

He also develops topics that are notwell covered in other sources, for example,the June 2 incident where a flight ofF–105s strafed the Soviet ship Turkestan; asituation that was later compounded whenWing Commander Col. Jaskal Broughtondestroyed gun camera film of the incident.

Thompson also fleshes out the book byproviding brief biographical informationabout the main figures involved, politicaland military, on both sides. For example, heprovides details on the careers of politicaladvisor Walt Rostrow, Seventh Air Forcecommander Gen. William Momyer, andNorth Vietnam’s Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap andpolitical leader Ho Chi Minh.

He also devotes an entire chapter tothe Gen. John D. Lavelle incident. Whencommander of the Seventh Air Force earlyin 1972, General Lavelle was relieved ofcommand by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen.John Ryan for employing a system of false

reporting to cover up unauthorized protec-tive reaction strikes into North Vietnam.The air war between Rolling Thunder andLinebacker was characterized by theseprotective reaction strikes, under veryrestrictive rules of engagement. The con-troversy centered on how to interpret thoserules of engagement. Lavelle claimed thathe had been encouraged by his bosses toconduct raids outside the rules of engage-ment, and that the false reporting was aresult of misunderstanding and overzeal-ousness on the part of subordinates.

Thompson provides a balancedaccount of the events portrayed in thebook. For example, he discusses both sidesof the argument for how successfulLinebacker I was as an interdiction cam-paign. He also deals with such sensitiveAir Force topics as training, tactics, per-sonnel assignment and rotation policies,and comparing Air Force versus Navy per-formance. He also discusses the organiza-tional morass that hampered efficientapplication of air power during the war.While Thompson does not go as far in crit-icizing Air Force operations as did MarkClodfelter, Marshall Michel, or Earl Til-ford, he goes much further in discussingthe good and the bad of Air Force opera-

tions than the “rah-rah” boosterism ofWalter Boyne.

To Hanoi and Back has an extensivebibliography, covering an impressive list ofsources of information on the subject.However, I thought the number of mapsand photos was skimpy. Only three mapswere provided, although the detailed one ofthe Hanoi area was not one that I had seenbefore and I thought was quite useful.There were forty-eight photos in the twophoto sections. For a war so widely open tothe media, I think more photos could havebeen provided. I also found the index a bithard to use.

These last points are minor criticisms.The book was well written, and provided avery complete account of the air waragainst North Vietnam in a single volume,covering the controversial topic from themilitary, technical, human, and politicalaspects. I recommend it to readers whoseek a deeper understanding of the eventsof the era.

Colonel Stetson Siler, Director of TestSupport, AFOTEC, Kirtland AFB, NM

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Winter Journey through The Ninth:The Story of Tactical Air Power asIllustrated by the Exploits of theNinth Air Force in Europe. By Harry A.Franck, with Charles O. Porter. Tucson,Ariz.: Prince of the Road Press, 2001.Tables. Diagrams. Illustrations. Photo-graphs. Appendices. Glossary. Index. Pp.xii, 304. $21.95 Paperback ISBN: 0-9705948-0-1 [www.harryfranck.com]

Winter Journey Through the Ninth is along overdue addition to our record of theU.S. Ninth Tactical Air Force in the SecondWorld War. It finds its niche between offi-cial histories, like Condensed Analysis ofthe Ninth Air Force in the EuropeanTheater of Operations, and accounts byindividual participants, such as BillCogan’s World War II Fighter BomberPilot. A veteran of the Great War andauthor of numerous travel books, HarryFranck was commissioned a 62-year oldmajor and charged, “to write for the man inthe street the story of tactical air power asillustrated by the exploits of the Ninth AF.”He brought to his assignment the experi-ence of a seasoned traveler and keenobserver, as well as the storyteller’s art.Franck’s comprehensive treatment of fly-ing and living conditions, and his coverageof both successes and “snafus” make this auseful book for specialist and non-special-ist alike. Along the way the reader is treat-ed to a colorful travelogue of northwestEurope and the author’s opinions on every-thing from the weather to concentrationcamps and the plight of displaced persons.

Appointed the semi-official chroniclerof the Ninth, Major Franck had unlimitedaccess and he made a point of visiting everytype of Ninth unit, often twice, once in thewinter of 1944-1945, then later that spring.He began his journey on the eve of theBattle of the Bulge with the first of sixmedium bomber groups. Here he estab-lished his practice of interviewing a widerange of participants, from the top brassand aircrews to the enlisted men who sup-ported the operations. Using lengthy quotes,he allows the men to speak for themselveson the intricacies of box formation tactics,Pathfinder operations, the unromantic lifeof the bombardier, and the curse of “grosserrors,” among other subjects, beforeadding his own insightful commentsframed by personal vignettes.

Harry and his small team also visitedthe engineers who built the Ninth’sairstrips, the service teams who suppliedthem, and the air defense antiaircraft bat-teries that defended them. He correctlyemphasized their vital supporting role thatensured the Ninth’s vaunted mobility. Healso spent time with two often overlookedflying units, the P–61 “Black Widow” nightfighter squadron and the 10th Reconnais-sance Group. While the intrepid BlackWidows had too few aircraft to seriouslyforestall nighttime German supply move-

ments, the recce pilots had begun function-ing as airborne controllers for close sup-port missions.

The highlight of Winter Journey isfighter-bomber operations, the Ninth’s cen-tral mission. Each Allied army inNorthwest Europe was assigned its owntactical air force. “Pete” Quesada’s IXTactical Air Force, for example, supportedHodge’s First Army, while “Opie” Weyland’sXIX Tactical Air Force spearheadedPatton’s Third. Quesada was the innovator,who first convinced General Bradley toplace Army Air Forces radios in tanks sothat supporting pilots and controllers inthe tanks could communicate and makepossible the celebrated armored columncover tactic of the Normandy breakout anddash across France. Franck’s interview ofQuesada captures the air commander’scharisma, outspokenness, and focus onmaintaining control of his air assets.Weyland, who arrived in-theater afterQuesada, benefitted from established pro-cedures, yet proved a resourceful air com-mander in his own right whose partner-ship with Patton set the standard for air-ground pairings and cooperation. Tacticalair doctrine called for centralized air con-trol, the concentrated use of air power, andtactical missions flown in the prescribedorder of air superiority, interdiction, andclose air support. Both airmen demonstrat-ed the flexibility of tactical air power andshowed that doctrine must serve only asguide, not rigid formula.

Harry Franck directly confronted theissue of doctrine and air-ground relation-ships by raising the “seduction” charge,whereby a news reporter had accused theair arm of violating doctrine by acceding toarmy requests for close air support in lieuof interdiction requirements. Weyland’sresponse was characteristic: “I run my out-fit—he [Patton] runs his.” Patton became achampion of air-ground cooperation andcould not compliment his air commanderenough. “We get along famously, don’t we,Weyland?” And they did. Weyland madeevery effort to fulfill Third Army requests,but stood his ground and refused to attacktargets he considered unsuitable for fight-er-bombers or compromise his control ofhis air elements. On the other hand, theachievement of air superiority made it pos-sible for Weyland to focus more of his airpower on close air support needs. DespitePatton’s strong personality, the ThirdArmy commander never violated the pre-rogatives of his air commander or themutual trust they had established early inthe campaign.

After interviewing the commanders,Franck continued his odyssey with visits totwo of the elite XIX TAC fighter bombergroups, the 354th “Pioneers” and 362d“Maulers.” There he received a primer oninterdiction and close air support flyingand praise for the air-ground relationship.Franck followed up his theme of air power

effectiveness during interviews at the 5thand 90th Infantry Divisions, where heobserved air-ground operations with airand ground liaison officers. Althoughacclaim for the air-ground relationship wasthe order of the day, no one avoided dis-cussing two of the most controversialissues in the campaign— friendly fire inci-dents and bombing accuracy and assess-ment. Frank’s coverage of these sensitive,complex subjects is superb and correctlydispels conventional wisdom that friendlyfire casualties and pilot reporting accuracyelicited little concern or attention from airand ground officers.

Winter Journey notes the overallstrong cooperative relationship betweenair and ground personnel, the importanceof centralized control of air resources by anair commander, and the effectiveness oftactical air power on ground operations.These lessons often seemed forgotten inthe acrimonious atmosphere of the post-war years, which witnessed the creation ofthe independent Air Force and controver-sies over roles and missions. They had tobe relearned in the Korean conflict, whereWeyland, the Far Eastern Air Forces com-mander, faced enormous problems in coor-dinating air-ground operations and cen-tralizing control of Air Force, Naval, andmarine air. The Second World War’s centrallesson for tactical air power is that airsuperiority, sufficient resources, and cor-rect doctrine will not produce a successfulair-ground program without the coopera-tion and good will of air and ground com-manders and their staffs. Winter Journeyalso affirms this basic requirement.

Had Franck’s manuscript been pub-lished shortly after the war, as originallyintended, it might have charted newground. But General Vandenberg and WarDepartment censors had reservations,which likely reflected concerns about theauthor’s strong criticism of Americanbehavior in defeated Germany, rather thanrevelations about tactical air power proce-dures and problems. When the governmentcleared the manuscript in March 1946, itrefused to publish it, and Franck could notfind an interested commercial publisher.The manuscript gathered dust untilrecently, when family members succeededin publishing it without revision. Despitethe passage of time, Winter Journey Throughthe Ninth retains its sense of immediacy. Itis an accurate, vivid tale of tactical airpower in Northwest Europe. This is a storyworth retelling, and one told by a superbstoryteller.

Dr. David Spires, Colorado Springs,Colorado

The Infinite Journey: EyewitnessAccounts of NASA and the Age of

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Space. By William E. Burrows. New York:Discovery Books, 2000. Photographs.Index. Pp. 240. $40.00 ISBN: 1-56331-924-1

At first glance, one might categorizeThe Infinite Journey by William Burrowsas simply another colorful, coffee tablebook. Prepared in collaboration with theNational Aeronautics and Space Admini-stration, this large-format volume containsapproximately 200 eye-catching pho-tographs. The spectacular images invitecasual observers to flip through the pageswithout paying serious attention to adja-cent text. Viewing the product at this level,one might dismiss it as intellectually shal-low and, therefore, of little scholarly worth.This would be a mistake.

The author, with editor Mary Kala-maras’ assistance, has crafted a truly infor-mative history that combines introductorytext, first-hand recollections of various par-ticipants, and images to explain the signifi-cance of thirty human and robotic NASAmissions. Flight controllers, physicians,administrators, engineers, secretaries, andpublic affairs officers, as well as the astro-nauts themselves, supply thought-provok-ing, insightful reflections on key Mercury,Gemini, and Apollo flights. Others sharememories of Skylab and the Apollo-SoyuzTest Project of the early 1970s. Of course,the shuttle Columbia’s inaugural flight in1981, the Challenger disaster of 1986, andthe shuttle program’s revitalization withDiscovery’s return to space in 1988 receivedue attention. Coverage of human spaceflight concludes with establishment of per-manent outposts—shuttle missions to theRussian space station Mir, the prelude toconstruction of the International SpaceStation.

Fully half of The Infinite Journeydeals with robotic space missions—somelooking outward, others earthward. Thesehighlight the exploration of Mars from theMariner and Viking flights of the 1960sand 1970s to the spectacular Pathfinderand Global Surveyor adventures of the1990s. Other selections include Pioneers10 and 11, Voyager’s grand tour of theouter solar system, the Hubble SpaceTelescope’s and Cosmic BackgroundExplorer’s study of the farthest reaches ofthe universe, Magellan’s examination ofVenus, and Galileo’s exposure of Jupiterand its moons. The remaining sectionfocuses on how NASA’s development ofearth-orbiting satellites, especially forcommunication and multi-spectral imag-ing, have directly benefited humans.

Burrows brought a wealth of experi-ence to the crafting of this piece. He previ-ously authored several volumes on spacehistory, from Deep Black: Space Espionageand National Security (1987) to This NewOcean: A History of the First Space Age(1998), which won the American

Astronautical Society’s prestigious EmmePrize and was a finalist for the PulitzerPrize. His introduction to The InfiniteJourney escorts the reader through theroots of space flight and establishment ofNASA. His narrative, at the beginning ofeach of the book’s ten sections, providessufficient context for readers to under-stand and appreciate the significance ofboth the accompanying photographs andfirst-hand recollections. The epilogue, a col-laborative effort that includes remarks byRay Bradbury, Arthur Clarke, the late CarlSagan, Homer Hickam, and Daniel Goldin,frames the past as prologue to America’scivil space activities in the 21st century.

If anything is required to generate sup-port for new space adventures throughreflection on past achievements, this vol-ume answers the call. It is a wonderful ret-rospective on what we have accomplishedduring the past half-century and an inspi-rational treatise on why we should do evenmore in the decades to come.

Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, Deputy Director ofHistory, HQ Air Force Space Command

The War for South Vietnam, 1954-1975.By Anthony James Joes. Westport, Ct:Praeger, (revised edition), 2001. Notes.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 199. $18.95.ISBN: 0-275-96806-5.

Joes, a professor of political scienceand director of the international relationsprogram at Saint Joseph’s University inPhiladelphia, has written a useful over-view of the war in Vietnam, from 1954-1975. As with most overviews, it should notbe considered the final word on any topicdealing with that war. While avoiding thedetails and intricacies of battle planningand implementation, the author has pro-vided a highly readable survey of the polit-ical events of the period. His work wouldmake an excellent college survey textbookfor a course on the history of the VietnamWar.

Arranged chronologically, the textbegins with a discussion of French colonialinvolvement in Indochina. The authornotes that the root cause of the revolutionagainst the French lay with disgruntledVietnamese intellectuals who were thwart-ed in their efforts to achieve equal statuswithin the civil bureaucracy run by Frenchofficials. When Vietnamese did find workin the civil service or in private enterprise,they were often subordinates of less welleducated French citizens, and theyreceived one-half to one-fifth of the salarypaid to Frenchmen in similar positions.The principles of the French Revolution

liberty, equality, and fraternitywere notextended to the Vietnamese, who were, atbest, second-class citizens in their owncountry.

In discussing the assassination ofDiem in 1963, Joes, assesses the leader’sweakness and strengths. The author notesthat despite his faults, Diem came from anold, distinguished family and certainly pos-sessed an impressive resume as an ardentnationalist. Joes argues that those whosucceeded Diem could not match his politi-cal credentials nor his national and inter-national prestige. Acknowledging thatVietnam needed military leadership fol-lowing Diem’s demise, the author arguesthat the talents of his eventual successor,Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu, lay not in the lat-ter’s skill on the battlefield, but rather as askillful politician in an army uniform.

Another poignant issue for Joes wasthat members of the highly educatedARVN (Army of the Republic Vietnam) offi-cer corps, mostly from the middle class,were out of touch with and unsympatheticto the country’s peasant majority, “amongwhom and over whom the war was beingfought.” The author addresses the resultsof the 1968 Tet Offensive for both sides andhe concluded that it was a victory for theUnited States and its allies. TheCommunists’ anticipation that Tet wouldresult in a massive popular uprising tooverthrow the puppet regime utterlyfailed, and the death of so many Viet Congultimately delivered much of the country-side into the hands of the Saigon govern-ment. Some Viet Cong even charged thatthe Tet Offensive was a plot by Hanoi notonly to destabilize and discredit the ARVN,but also to engineer a massacre of the VietCong, “Killing two birds with one stone,”thereby removing all obstacles to Hanoi’seventual takeover of the South. But it wasU.S. public opinion following Tet that even-tually handed victory to the soundlydefeated Communists. The U.S. public sawthat the promised end of the war wasnowhere in sight and thus turned againstthe conflict. This caused President LyndonJohnson’s decision not to seek reelection.The Democrats would subsequently losethe 1968 election to Richard Nixon, whopromised to end U.S. participation in andresponsibility for the war through Viet-namization.

Nixon’s pledge to Vietnamize the warcame to fruition during the Easter Offen-sive in 1972, when the North Vietnamesearmy suffered some 100,000 casualties andsmashed their conviction that the majorityof South Vietnamese wanted the North towin. The ARVN had developed into aproven fighting force that with U.S.replacement supplies and air support,especially B–52s, could indefinitely defendthe independence of the South.

But Nixon twisted Thieu’s arm toaccept an unfair peace, pledging that the

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United States would intervene with itsmighty air force if the North openly violat-ed the inequitable accords, and U.S. partic-ipation in the actual fighting came to anend. However, with Watergate and Nixon’sresignation, the promise of air interven-tion, along with a continued pipeline ofsupplies to the Thieu government, evapo-rated. After a Northern attack into the cen-tral highlands at Ban Me Thuot in 1975,the South panicked, and its once re-spectable Army uncontrollably dispersedamong the retreating body of hystericalcivilians—splintered, and disintegrated.

So, the real defeat of the South lay inthe departure of U.S. troops and suppliesand an invasion by the North’s convention-al armies. The author notes that the ques-tion of who was at fault for the defeat ofthe South will be debated for generationsto come. His book will provide an excellentbasis to start any such future discussion.

Dr. George M. Watson, Jr., Air Force HistorySupport Office, Bolling AFB, Washington,D.C.

MacArthur and the American Cen-tury: A Reader. By William M. Leary, Ed.Lincoln and London: University of Nebra-ska Press, 2001. Illustrations. Maps. Chro-nology. Bibliography. Pp. 522. $40.00.ISBN:0-803-22930-5

General Douglas MacArthur willnever fade away. Commemorations of WorldWar II and the Korean War have spurred anew wave of interest in MacArthur’s careerand its controversial aspects. This “reader,”edited by Prof. William M. Leary, a histori-an of America’s military experience in Asiaand the Pacific, is intended as an introduc-tion to MacArthur’s impact on the“American Century.”

The volume easily falls into five parts:Growth to Maturity, World War II, Japan,Korea, and Assessments. Within each ofthese sections, Leary has selected a pieceby MacArthur himself, along with views ofscholars, some critical of MacArthur, oth-ers favorable to the general, and still oth-ers providing a more balanced perspective.Also included are insightful essays by offi-cials who served with MacArthur duringvarious points in his career. The strengthof this approach resides in the breadth ofviewpoint, the weakness in the inherentuneven quality and style of the contribu-tions.

The World War II section is one of thestrongest, featuring Duncan Anderson,David Horner, Stanley L. Falk, StephenTaaffe, D. Clayton James, Edward Drea,Clark Reynolds, and Gerald Wheeler. Thepicture that emerges here, as one might

expect, is mixed. David Horner, historian ofAustralia’s role in World War II, paintsMacArthur as “a brilliant political gener-al,” whose influence on the political-mili-tary sphere in Australia was enormous.

Stanley L. Falk, a noted historian ofthe war in the Pacific, and a former chiefhistorian of the U.S. Air Force, argues thatafter 1943, when Japanese forces had beenstopped in the Southwest Pacific theater,the American commitment to this areashould have been ended. After this point,“the continued Southwest Pacific commit-ment was an unnecessary and profligatewaste of resources, involving the needlessloss of thousands of lives, and in no signif-icant way affecting the outcome of thewar.” He concludes, however, that interser-vice rivalries and General MacArthur’sinfluence and reputation “made inevitable”continued military operations against theJapanese in the Southwest Pacific.

Other outstanding contributors areJohn Killigrew [“The Army and the BonusIncident”]; Ikuhiko Hata [“The Occupationof Japan, 1945-1952”]; D. Clayton James[“Command Crisis: MacArthur and the Ko-rean War”]; and Russell Weigley [“MilitaryBiography Without Military History”].Leary even includes an essay on “genderanalysis,” by Laura Belmonte, thatattempts to probe MacArthur’s masculini-ty.

Overall, this volume succeeds as anintroduction to MacArthur and the unend-ing controversies surrounding his career. Itshould stimulate interest and research bya new generation of historians. As Learyemphasizes, although “MacArthur can becriticized, he cannot be ignored.”

Herman S. Wolk, Air Force History SupportOffice, Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C.

Golden Legacy, Boundless Future:Essays on the United States Air Forceand the Rise of Aerospace Power ByRebecca H. Cameron and Barbara Wittig,eds. Washington, D.C.: Air Force Historyand Museums Program, 2000. Notes.Glossary. Index. Pp. 358.

This is the proceedings from a sympo-sium, held in May 1997, that marked thefiftieth anniversary of the United StatesAir Force. If I could have only one book inmy library on who we in the Air Force areand how we got here, Golden Legacy,Boundless Future would have to be it.

The symposium’s eighteen papers,four speeches, and roundtable discussionlay out a superb history of the USAF fromits earliest days in the U.S. Army SignalCorps through modern times. They cover

not just our glorious operational history,but the less celebrated areas of logistics,technology, doctrine, and people. The con-ference begins with the roundtable.Individual presentations then fall into sixmajor categories: the road to indepen-dence, roles and missions, combat support,doctrine for strategic air attack, the AirForce at war, and advances in technology.

Interspersed are the four addresses.At some symposia, attendees hear a fewpapers that are real standouts—interest-ing, thought provoking, and dynamic—while others are fillers. There was not onedud among the papers here. The eighteendistinguished historians kept their topicstight and to the point and had little over-lap with other presentations. While it isdifficult to select favorites from superblywritten, top-notch papers on fascinatingtopics, my personal interest leads me to thefour dealing with the road to an indepen-dent USAF. Flying in the face of Air Forcelore, the reader will find little here on BillyMitchell. While certainly the loudest andmost flamboyant of the early advocates ofair power, Mitchell may have done as muchharm as good. These papers clearly showthat Mason Patrick, Hap Arnold, DwightEisenhower, Lauris Norstad, and GeorgeMarshall were the real architects of today’sAir Force, often operating quietly—buteffectively—in the Washington bureaucra-cy.

Also found in the papers are concisehistories of Air Force logistics, airlift,reconnaissance, and space operations, aswell as new looks at World War II’sCombined Bomber Offensive, commandand control, and the changes in the USAFover the past several decades. Again, everypaper is first-rate and well worth reading.Eight distinguished former USAF leadersparticipated: Gen. Bryce Poe II (Air ForceLogistics Command) moderated the round-table with Gen. Bernard Schriever (AirForce Systems Command), General JacobSmart (EUCOM Deputy Commander), Lt.Gen. Devol Brett (Commander, Allied AirForces Southern Europe), and Lt. Gen.Thomas McInerney (Assistant Vice Chiefof Staff). Discussing the topic of “turningpoints,” their views were varied and per-haps surprising, but all were fascinating.Former Secretary of the Air Force EugeneZuckert, Gen. John Chain (Strategic AirCommand), Gen. Ronald Fogleman (Chiefof Staff), and General Poe addressed sever-al historical perspectives as well as thefuture of aerospace power.

Whether enlisted, officer, or civilian;active duty, Air National Guard, or AirForce Reserve; active or retired; this is abook that is a must read for every memberof the USAF’s Total Force.

Col. Scott A. Willey, USAF (Ret), Docent,NASM’s Garber Facility

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Gorn, Michael H. Expanding the Envelope:Flight Research at NACA and NASA.Lexington: The University Press of Kentu-cky, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Appendices.Glossary. Index. Pp. xii, 472. $35.00 ISBN: 0-8131-2205-8

Hammond, Grant T. The Mind of War: JohnBoyd and American Security. Washington,D.C. and London: Smithsonian InstitutionPress, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Index. Pp.xiii, 234. $29.95 ISBN: 1-56098-941-6

Johnson, Herbert A. Wingless Eagle: U.S.Army Aviation through World War I. ChapelHill and London: The University of NorthCarolina Press, 2001. Maps. Tables. Photo-graphs. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvi,298. $34.95 ISBN: 0-8078-2687-8

Logsdon, John M., ed., Exploring theUnknown: Selected Documents in theHistory of the U.S. Civil Space Program.[Vol. V: Exploring the Cosmos]. Washington,D.C.: NASA History Office, 2001. Notes.Glossary. Index. Pp. xxviii, 792.

Martel, William C., ed. The TechnologicalArsenal: Emerging Defense Capabilities.Washington, D.C. and London: SmithsonianInstitution Press, 2001. Photographs. Notes.Glossary. Index. Pp. xix, 284. $29.95 ISBN:1-56098-961-0


Armstrong, R. E. and Terry P. Rizzuti. Vete-rans’ Benefits: A Guide to State Programs.Westport, Ct. and London: GreenwoodPress, 2001. Appendix. Index. Pp. xii, 329.$59.95 ISBN: 0-313-31905-7

Bednarek, Janet R. Daly. America's Air-ports: Airfield Development, 1918–1947.College Station: Texas A&M Universitypress, 2001. Photographs. Notes. Bibliogra-phy. Index. Pp. viii, $39.95 ISBN: 1-58544-130-9

Deaver, Michael V. Disarming Iraq:Monitoring Power and Resistance. Westport,Ct. and London: Praeger, 2001. Tables.Illustrations. Notes. Glossary. Bibliography.Index. Pp. viii, 151. $62.00 ISBN: 0-275-97261-5

Eisendrath, Craig, Melvin A. Goodman andGerald E. Marsh. The Phantom Defense:America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion.Westport, Ct. and London: Praeger, 2001.Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Index. Pp.xix, 190. $24.95 ISBN: 0-275-97183-X

Furze, Anthony. Wilfrid Freeman: TheGenius behind Allied Survival and AirSupremacy, 1939 to 1945. Staplehurst, UK:Spellmount, 2000. Maps. Photographs.Notes. Appendices. Glossary. Bibliography.Index. Pp. 384. £25.00 ISBN: 0-9536969-4-4

PROSPECTIVE REVIEWERS

Anyone who believes he or she is qualified to substantively assess one of the new books listed above isinvited to apply for a gratis copy of the book. The prospective reviewer should contact:

Dr. Michael L. GrumelliACSC/DES225 Chennault CircleMaxwell AFB, AL 36112Tel. (334) 953-3060e-mail: [email protected]

Books Received


Morrison, Wilbur H. Birds from Hell:History of the B–29. Central Point, Ore.:Hellgate Press, 2001. Photographs. Biblio-graphy. Pp. x, 274. $34.95 ISBN: 1-55571-550-8

Pelletière, Stephen. Iraq and the Inter-national Oil System: Why America Went toWar in the Gulf. Westport, Ct. and London:Praeger, 2001. Map. Notes. Index. Pp. xi,239. $69.95 ISBN: 0-275-94562-6

Samuel, Wolfgang W. E. I Always Wanted toFly: America's Cold War Airmen. Jackson:University Press of Mississippi, 2001. Maps.Tables. Illustrations. Photographs. Glossary.Bibliography. Index. Pp. xix, 363. $30.00ISBN: 1-57806-399-X

Thomas, Ward. The Ethics of Destruction:Norms and Force in International Relations.Ithaca, N.Y. and London: Cornell UniversityPress, 2001. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x,222. $16.95 Paperback ISBN: 0-8014-8741-2

Trest, Warren and Donald Dodd. Wings ofDenial: The Alabama Air National Guard’sCovert Role at the Bay of Pigs. Montgomery,Ala.: South Books, 2001. Maps. Illustrations.Photographs. Notes. Appendices. Biblio-graphy. Index. Pp. 160. $17.95 PaperbackISBN: 1-58838-021-1

Watson, George M., Jr. Secretaries andChiefs of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.Washington, D.C.: Air Force History andMuseums Program, 2001. Illustrations.Photographs. Appendices. Bibliography.Index. Pp. 278. $46.00 ISBN: 0-16-050847-9.GPO Stock No. 008-070-00771-1

Zenter, John J. The Art of War Leadershipand Aircrew Morale in Combat. [CadrePaper No. 11] Maxwell AFB, Ala.: AirUniversity Press, 2001. Tables. Illustrations.Notes. Bibliography. Pp. xi, 110. Paperback.Website: http://research.maxwell.af.mil (Seeresearch papers, special collections)

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Volume 1, Two Hundred Years of Flight in America: A BicentennialSurvey, E.M. Emme, ed., 326p., 3rd printing, hard cover $25 $17.50; softcover $25 $12.50.Volume 2, Twenty-Five Years of the American Astronautical Society:Historical Reflections and Projections, 1954-1979, E.M. Emme, ed.,248p., hard cover $25 $12.50; soft cover $15 $7.50. Volume 3, Between Sputnik and the Shuttle: New Perspectives onAmerican Astronautics, 1957-1980, F.C. Durant III, ed., 350p., hard cover$40 $20.00; soft cover $30 $15.00.Volume 4, The Endless Space Frontier: A History of the HouseCommittee on Science & Astronautics, 1959-1978, by K. Hechler,abridged and ed. by A.E. Eastman, 460p., hard cover $45 $22.50.Volume 5, Science Fiction and Space Futures, E.M. Emme, ed., 278p.,hard cover $35 $17.50; soft cover $25 $12.50.Volume 6, First Steps Toward Space (1st and 2nd IAA HistorySymposia), F.C. Durant III and G.S. James, eds., 318p., hard cover $45$22.50; soft cover $35 $17.50.Volume 7, Parts I & 11, History of Rocketry & Astronautics (3rd-6th IAAHistory Symposia), R.C. Hall, ed., Part I, 250p, Part II, 502p., sold as set,hard cover $100 $50.00; soft cover $80 $40.00. Volume 8, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (7th and 8th IAAHistory Symposia), K.R. Lattu, ed., 368p., hard cover $50 $25.00; softcover $35 $17.50.Volume 9, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (9th-11th IAA HistorySymposia), F.I. Ordway III, ed., 330p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover$35 $17.50.Volume 10, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (12th-14th IAA HistorySymposia), A.I. Skoog, ed., 318p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $40$20.00.Volume 11, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (15th and 16th IAAHistory Symposia), R.D. Launius, ed., 236p., hard cover $60 $30.00; softcover $40 $20.00.Volume 12, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (17th IAA HistorySymposium), J.L. Sloop, ed., 252p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Volume 13, History of Liquid Rocket Engine Development in the UnitedStates 1955-1980, S.E. Doyle, ed., 176p., hard cover $50 25.00; soft cover$35 $17.50.Volume 14, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (18th and 19th IAAHistory Symposia), T.D. Crouch and A.M. Spencer, eds., 222p., hardcover $50 $25.00; soft cover $35 $17.50.Volume 15, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (20th and 21st IAAHistory Symposia), L.H. Cornett, Jr., ed., 452p., hard cover $60 $30.00;soft cover $40 $20.00.Volume 16, Out from Behind the Eight-Ball: A History of Project Echo,by D.C. Elder, 176p., hard cover $50 $25.00; soft cover $30 $15.00.Volume 17, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (22nd and 23rd IAAHistory Symposia), J. Becklake, ed., 480p., hard cover $60 $30.00; softcover $40 $20.00.Volume 18, Organizing the Use of Space: Historical Perspectives on aPersistent Issue, R.D. Launius, ed., 232p., hard cover $60 $30.00; softcover $40 $20.00.Volume 19, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (24th IAA HistorySymposium), J.D. Hunley, ed., 318p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Volume 20, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (25th IAA HistorySymposium), J.D. Hunley, ed., 344p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Volume 21, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (26th IAA HistorySymposium), Philippe Jung, ed., 368p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Volume 22, History of Rocketry and Astronautics (27th IAA HistorySymposia), Philippe Jung, ed., 418p., hard cover $60 $30.00; soft cover$40 $20.00.Special Price for Complete Set (Volumes 1-22): Hard Cover $475.00plus $20.00 postage and handling (U.S.) Soft Cover $345.00 plus $20.00postage and handling (U.S.).

Postage and HandlingPlease add $5.00 for the first book ordered and $l.00 for each additionalbook ordered (U.S.), $8.00 for the first book ordered and $3.00 for eachadditional books ordered (non-U.S.).

Ordering Information:All orders from individuals must be prepaid by check or money order inU.S. funds. Visa and Mastercard accepted. California residents should addsales tax.

Order from Univelt, Inc., P.O. Box 28130,San Diego CA 92198

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2002January 3-6

The American Historical Association will hold itsannual meeting in San Francisco, California. This year’stheme will be “Frontiers.” Contact:

Philippa LevineDept. of HistoryUniversity of Southern CaliforniaLos Angeles CA 90089-0034Tel.: (213) 740-1670, fax –6999e-mail: [email protected]

January 24-25

The Department of History at New Mexico StateUniversity and the New Mexico Farm & RanchHeritage Museum are co-sponsoring a World War II homefront symposium entitled Labor in the Southwest, 1943-46:A Symposium to be held in Las Cruces, N.M. Contact:

Dr. Jon Hunner Department of History P.O. Box 30001, MSC 3H New Mexico State University Las Cruces, N.M. 88003-8001 e-mail: [email protected]

February 13-17

The Southwest/Texas Popular Culture Association andAmerican Culture Association will host their annualAtomic Culture in the Nuclear Age at the AlbuquerqueHilton Hotel in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Contact:

Scott C. Zeman, Assistant Professor of History Humanities Department New Mexico Tech 801 Leroy Place Socorro, New Mexico Tel.: (505) 835-5628, Fax x5544 e-mail: [email protected]: http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~swpca/

February 14-15

The Department of History at the National Universityof Singapore will present a conference entitled Sixty YearsOn – The Fall of Singapore Revisited. Contact:

Dr Brian P. FarrellDept. of HistoryNational University of SingaporeSingapore 119260Tel.: 65-8743845, fax 65-7742528e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.nus.edu.sg

February 14-15

The Air Force Association will host its annual AirWarfare Symposium at the Wyndham Palace Hotel in WaltDisney World Village at Lake BuenaVista, Florida. Contact:

Air Force Association.1501 Lee HighwayArlington, VA 22209Website: http://www.afa.org

February 15-16

The 4th Annual Society for Military and StrategicStudies’ Student Conference is entitled “War &Security: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Inter-pretations, and Science & Technology: Missing Dimen-sions.” The Conference will be held at the University ofCalgary, in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. Contact:

Jillian Dowding / Chris Bullock Centre for Military and Strategic Studies University of Calgary 2500 University Drive NW Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 Tel.: (403) 220-7091Fax 282-0594e-mail: [email protected]

February 15-16

The Center for the Study of the Korean War will hostits 3rd annual symposium on “War and Memory” at theGraceland University-Indepedence Campus in Indepen-dence, Missouri. Contact:

Paul Edwards Center for the Study of the Korean War 1401 W. Truman Rd.Independence, MO 64050-3434 Tel.: (816) 833-0524e-mail: [email protected]

March 6-9

The American Association for History and Compu-ting will hold its annual meeting at the Nashville MarriottHotel, Nashville, Tennessee. This year’s theme will be“Reading Clio’s Compass: Assessing Where We Are withHistory and Instructional Technology.” Contact:

Ken Dvorak, Secretary and Director of PublicityAAHCLansing Community CollegeLansing, Michigan, 40010Tel.: (517) 483-1280e-mail: [email protected]

March 7-9

The U.S. Military Academy will host a conference,“Making History: West Point at 200 Years,” in commemo-ration of its bicentennial. Contact:

Capt Kevin ClarkDept. of HistoryUnited States Military AcademyWest Point NY 10996Tel.: (845) 938-5083e-mail: [email protected]

March 7-9

The Citadel will host a Conference on American Womenand the Military in Charleston, South Carolina. Contact:

Catherine Clinton17 Sheephill RoadRiverside, CT 06878Tel.: (203) 637-7507e-mail: [email protected]


Compiled by George Cully

March 13-15

The Women in Aviation International 2002 Conferencewill be held at the Opryland Hotel in Nashville, Tennessee.Contact:

Women in Aviation, InternationalP.O. Box 11287 Daytona Beach, FL USA 32120-1287 Tel.: (386) 226-7996, Fax 226-7998 e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.wiai.org

March 14-16

The Society of Experimental Test Pilots will hold its32nd San Diego Symposium at the Catamaran Resort inSan Diego, California. Contact:

SETPP. O. Box 986Lancaster CA 93584Fax (805) 940-0398e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.setp.org

March 14-17

The 20th Annual Mephistos Conference on Scienceand Technology History Studies will be held on the campusof Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia. Contact:

Mephistos 2002 Graduate Program in Science and Technology Studies Virginia Tech 131 Lane Hall Blacksburg, VA 24061-0227 Tel.: (540) 231-6547, Fax x7013e-mail: [email protected]

March 16-19

The National Air & Space Museum will host its 15thAnnual Mutual Concerns of Air & Space MuseumsSeminar in Washington, DC. Contact:

Jane PisanoNational Air & Space Museum - MRC 310Smithsonian InstitutionWashington DC 20560-0310Tel.: (202) 357-4473, Fax x4579e-mail: [email protected]

March 19-20

The American Astronautical Society will host its 40thAnnual Goddard Memorial Symposium at the GreenbeltMarriott Hotel in Greenbelt, Maryland. Contact:

The American Astronautical Society6352 Rolling Mill Place, Suite 102Springfield VA 22152-2354Tel.: (703) 866-0020e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.astronautical.org

Time in April to be Determined

A symposium on the Falklands War and its consequencesentitled The Falklands/Malvinas Conference: TwentyYears On will be held in Portsmouth, England. Contact:

Dr Lucy Noakes, faculty of Media, Arts and Society Southampton Institute East Park Terrace Southampton, Hampshire SO14 0RF United Kingdome-mail: [email protected]


April 4-7

The Society for Military History will hold its 69thannual meeting at the Monona Terrace in Madison,Wisconsin. This year’s theme is “War and Remembrance:Constructing the Military Past and Future.” Contact:

Jerry CooperDepartment of HistoryUniversity of Missouri-St. LouisTel.: (314) 516-5735Website: http://www.smh-hq.org

April 11

The Society for History in the Federal Governmentwill hold its annual meeting at the Library of Congress,Jefferson Building, Washington, DC. The program will be“A Dynamic Relationship: The Federal Legislature,Executive and Judiciary in Operation.” Contact:

Ray Smock, SHFG President 6824 Nashville Road Lanham, MD 20706 Tel.: (301) 552-3907, Fax x4907 e-mail: [email protected]: http://shfg.org/index.htm

April 11-12

The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronau-tics will co-host the 1st AIAA/IAF Symposium on Future Re-usable Launch Vehicles in Huntsville, Alabama. Contact:

AIAA1801 Alexander Bell Dr, Ste 500Reston VA 20191-4344Tel.: (703) 264-7500, (800) NEW AIAA,Fax 264-7551Website: http://www.aiaa.org

April 11-14

The Organization of American Historians and theNational Council on Public History will co-host theirrespective annual meetings at the Renaissance Washing-ton Hotel in Washington, D.C. The theme of their joint ses-sions will be “Overlapping Diasporas: Encounters andConversions.” Contact:

Convention ManagerOrganization of American Historians112 North Bryan AvenueBloomington IN 47408-4199Tel.: (812) 855-7311, fax –0696E-Mail: [email protected]: http://www.oah.org/meetings/index.html

April 18-20

The 44th Annual Missouri Conference on History willconvene at the Marriott Crowne Plaza Hotel in KansasCity, Missouri. The program will include a special sessionon the Korean War. Contact:

Tim Rives National Archives-Central Plains Region 2312 E. Bannister Rd.Kansas City, MO 64131 Tel.: (816) 823-5031, fax 926-6982e-mail: [email protected]

April 19-21

The Annual Meeting of the Business History Con-ference will be held at the Hagley Museum & Library inWilmington, Delaware. This year’s theme will be“Corporate Governance.” Contact:

Roger Horowitz, Secretary-TreasurerBusiness History ConferenceP.O. Box 3630Wilmington DE 19807Tel.: (302) 658-2400, x244e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.hagley.org

April 24

The U.S. Naval Institute's 128th Annual Meeting and 12thAnnapolis Seminar will be held in Alumni Hall at the U.S.Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Contact:

U.S. Naval Institute291 Wood RdAnnapolis MD 21402Tel.: (410) 268-6110, Fax 269-7940e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.usni.org

April 26-28

The 11th Annual Seminar of the Great War Society willbe held at the Sheraton Newton Hotel in Newton,Massachusetts. This year's theme is "The RussianRevolution, 1917-1921." Contact:.

Mike HanlonThe Great War SocietyBox 18585Stanford CA 94309Website: http://www.worldwar1.com/tgws

May 8-9

Topics for the Nat’l Naval Aviation Museum’s 2002Symposium will include “Naval Air War in Korea,” “SpacePioneers: The Mercury Astronauts,” “Naval Aviation:Issues and Answers,” and “Fighters!” Contact:

National Museum Of Naval Aviation1750 Radford Blvd.N.A.S. Pensacola, FL 32508Tel.: (850) 452-3604 or (850) 452-3606, Fax x3296e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.naval-air.org

May 11-15

The Army Aviation Association will hold its annual con-vention in Nashville, Tennessee. Contact:

AAAA National Office49 Richmondville AveWestport CT 06880e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.quad-a.org

May 16-19

The Historical Society will hold its third national meet-ing in Atlanta, Georgia. This year’s theme is “HistoricalReconstructions.” Contact:

The Historical SocietyAttn: 2002 Program Director656 Beacon Street, MezzanineBoston MA 02215-2020

May 20-22

The American Institute of Aeronautics and Astro-nautics will host its 1st Annual Conference and Workshopon Unmanned Aerospace Vehicles, Systems, Technologies,and Operations in Portsmouth, Virginia. Contact:

AIAA1801 Alexander Bell Dr, Ste 500Reston VA 20191-4344Tel.: (703) 264-7500, (800) NEW AIAA,Fax 264-7551 Website: http://www.aiaa.org

May 30

The Journal of Policy History will host a Conference onPolicy History to be held in St. Louis, Missouri. Contact:

Policy Conference Journal of Policy History Saint Louis University 3800 Lindell Blvd. P. O. Box 56907 St. Louis, MO 63156-0907e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.slu.edu/departments/jph

June 6-7

Siena College is sponsoring its 17th Annual Conferenceon the 60th Anniversary of World War II. The focus for2002 will be 1942. Contact:

Professor Thomas O. Kelly, IIDepartment of HistorySiena College515 Loudon RoadLoudonville, NY 12211-1462Tel.: (518) 783-2512, FAX 786-5052e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.siena.edu/sri/wwii/

June 11-13

The American Helicopter Society will hold its annualconvention and exhibition at the Montréal ConventionCenter, Montréal, Quebec, Canada. This year’s theme is“Vertical Flight Technology: Building Global Consensus.”Contact:

AHS International - The Vertical Flight Society 217 N. Washington Street Alexandria, VA 22314-2520 Tel.: (703) 684-6777, Fax 739-9279 e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.vtol.org/index.html

July 9-11

The Association For Unmanned Vehicle SystemsInternational will hold its annual symposium and exhi-bition at the Disney Coronado Springs Resort in Orlando,Florida. Contact:

AUVSI3401 Columbia PikeArlington VA 22204Tel.: (703) 920-2720, Fax x2889Website: http://www.auvsi.org

July 10-14

The Council on America's Military Past will hold itsannual meeting at the Wyndham Old San Juan Hotel inSan Juan, Puerto Rico. Contact:

CAMPP. O. Box 1151Ft. Myer, VA 22211 Tel.: (703) 912-6124; (800) 398-4693, Fax x5666 e-mail: [email protected] or [email protected]: http://www.campjamp.org/


September 5-8

The 45th Annual Tailhook Convention and Symposiumwill be held at the Nugget Hotel and Casino in Sparks(Reno), Nevada. Contact:

The Tailhook Association9696 Business Park Ave.San Diego CA 92131Tel.: (858) 689-9223/(800) 322-4665e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.tailhook.org

September 16-18

The Air Force Association will hold its annual NationalConvention & Aerospace Technology Exposition at theMarriott Wardman Park Hotel in Washington, D.C.Contact:

Air Force Association.1501 Lee HighwayArlington, VA 22209Website: http://www.afa.org

October 2-5

The Society of Experimental Test Pilots will hold its46th Annual Symposium and Banquet at the WestinBonaventure Hotel & Suites in Los Angeles, California.Contact:

SETPP. O. Box 986Lancaster CA 93584Fax (805) 940-0398e-mail: [email protected]: http://www.setp.org

November 7-9

A Conference on Cities as Strategic Sites: Militar-ization, Anti-Globalism, and Warfare will be held inManchester, England. Contact:

Stephen Graham Professor of Urban Technology School of Architecture, Planning and Landscape 3rd Floor, Claremont Tower University of Newcastle upon Tyne Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 7RU, U.K.e-mail: [email protected]> Tel. +44(0) 191 222 6808, Fax +44(0) 191 222 8811 Website: <http://www.ncl.ac.uk/cut/>


If you wish to have your event listed, contact:

George W. Cully230 Sycamore Creek DriveSpingboro, OH 45066-1342(513) 748-4737e-mail: [email protected]


The readers of Air Power History know theirairplanes—and their helicopters, too. Once again,readers correctly identified last issue’s “What Is It?”flying machine. But only about a dozen sent post-cards, compared with the usual forty-five to fifty.Aren’t readers interested in helicopters?

Well, okay, maybe there’s another reason for thelow turnout. How can we put this? We goofed.Although the photos are different, the aircraft usedas our Fall 2001 History Mystery was an unin-tentional repeat, having previously appeared in theWinter 1998 issue of this journal.

The Sikorsky R-6 helicopter was developed in1944, and was powered by a 255-hp Lycoming O-435 piston engine. Sikorsky and Nash Kelvinatorbuilt 193 for the Army Air Forces, the Navy and

Coast Guard (as the HOS-1) and the Royal AirForce (as the Hoverfly Mk. II). The R-6 was replacedby the R-5 (redesignated H-5 in 1948), whichbecame a familiar sight in the Korean War.

Our Fall 2001 mystery photo showed a CivilAir Patrol member in the cockpit of Nash R-6A no.43-45399 at Bellows Field, Oahu, in 1948.The photocame from Lincoln Higa, historian for the 15th AirBase Wing at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii—butthe photographer’s name is not known. Can anyoneprovide further details?

Our follow-up illustration is a Coast Guardphoto of an HOS-1 model.

Our “History Mystery” winner is ThomasHitchcock of Washington, Utah. Thanks to all whojoined in our “name the plane” exercise.

Once again, we challenge our ever-astute readers.See if you can identify this month’s “mystery” air-craft. But remember the rules, please.

1. Submit your entry on a postcard. Mail thepostcard to Robert F. Dorr, 3411 Valewood Drive,Oakton VA 22124.

2. Correctly identify the aircraft shown here.Also include your address and telephone number,including area code. If you have access to e-mail,include your electronic screen name.

3. A winner will be chosen at random from thepostcards with the correct answer. The winner willreceive a recently-published aviation book as aprize.

This feature needs your help. In that attic orbasement, you have a photo of a rare or little-known aircraft. Does anyone have color slides?

Send your pictures or slides for possible use as“History Mystery” puzzlers. We will return them.This

Issue’sMysteryPlane

History Mystery by Robert F. Dorr


Medals Are Earned!

I was amazed to see Air Power History[“Air Force Historian Wins Silver Star,”page 38, Vol. 48, No. 2] use the term “wins”for a combat medal! Yikes. I do hope youput something into your style manualabout this to prevent future mistakes.

MSgt. David W. Menard, USAF (Ret.),Huber Heights, Ohio

Editor’s reply: Of course you are correctthat combat medals are earned. In thiscase Bob Phillips earned the medal duringthe war, but it took him fifty years to winrecognition.

Which P–51?

For your information, the NorthAmerican P–51 depicted [APH, Fall 2001,Vol. 48, No. 3, page 24] is an XP–51, one oftwo taken from the British order atWright Field, Ohio, in the Spring of 1942.As you know, VII Fighter CommandMustangs were P–51Ds.

Michael P. Jungers, North Las Vegas,Nevada.

Another Angle

I was somewhat amused by one of Dr.Sherwood’s comments in his review of

Walter Boyne’s book, Aces in Command:Fighter Pilots as Combat Leaders. Dr.Sherwood wrote that “Fighter pilotexcesses also hurt careers. Blesse’s wom-anizing sealed his fate quite early.” Afterthirty years, “Boots” Blesse retired in1975, as a major general and DeputyInspector General of the Air Force. I won-der what Sherwood thinks Blesse mighthave accomplished were it not for his“womanizing?”

John M. Fitzpatrick, McLean, Virginia.

The F-15 Eagle

Reading Jacob Neufeld’s excellent arti-cle on the F–15 development [Air PowerHistory, Vol.48, No. 1] brought back a lot ofold memories and explained some of whathappened long before I joined the [F–15]program on December 17, 1969, or thingsthat I had forgotten about as the yearshave passed.

Since I was involved in the enginework, I am compelled to point out a coupleof technicalities. In the engine section, ref-erence is made to the TF-30. Turbineengines never use a dash in the designa-tion; it is TF30. I have been trying to tellpeople for thirty years that there is a lot ofdifference between an F-100 Super Sabreaircraft and an F100 engine.

Also, the author notes the common coreengines, F100 and F401, “differed in thefan, afterburner, and compressor sec-tions.” Actually, it was the fan, afterburn-er (or augmentor in its official designa-tion), and turbine sections. The commoncore was the compressor, combustor, andhigh-pressure turbine. The Navy’s F401

had a larger fan (low-pressure compres-sor) to give it the extra thrust. It also hadan extra stub stage to match it to the com-mon high-pressure compressor. With thelarger fan, they needed a larger, low-pres-sure turbine (one of five modules) to driveit.

Finally, two observations regarding thefirst F-15B flight: (1) the two-seater was aTF-15A for several years, as I’m sure theauthor knows. He probably used the laterand current “B” designation for those whotoday would have no idea of what a “TFwas, and (2) the reference to the “F-15Bflight in July,” which coming right afterthe PFRT date of February 1972, impliesJuly 1972. The first TF flight took place inJuly 1973.

Col. Scott Willey, USAF, (Ret.)

Rex Barber Dies

Rex T. Barber, a famous World War IIairman, died on July 26, 2001, in Terre-bonne, Oregon. He was eighty-four.

On April 18, 1943, piloting specially-equipped Lockheed P–38 Lightnings, six-teen U.S.Army Air Forces fliers took off ona 400-mile mission to intercept JapaneseAdmiral Isoroku Yamamoto—the master-mind of the December 7, 1941 attack onPearl Harbor. Intercepted over theSolomon Islands, Yamamoto’s plane wasshot down and the admiral killed.Historically, the shootdown was shared

Letters

News


between Thomas Lanphier and RexBarber. In 1986 the American FighterAces Association embarked on a quest toassign sole credit to Barber. However, theU.S. Air Force denied the claim and in1996 a federal appellate court upheld theAir Force’s ruling.

Confederate Air Force Renamed

On October 5, 2001, members of theConfederate Air Force (CAF) voted on anew name for the organization. A year agomembers of the CAF voted by a margin offour to one to change the name. More than1,000 names were proposed. Of these, fournames were chosen for the ballot: Heri-

tage Flying Museum, Ghost Squadron,Heritage Air Force, and CommemorativeAir Force. The winner will be announcedon December 7th and become effective onNew Years Day 2002.Note: See the story in Air Power History,Summer 2001, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 60-61

Look it Up!

In his review of Laurie Mylroie’s book,Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein’sUnfinished War Against America, [AirPower History, Summer 2001, Vol 48, No.2, pp. 52-54] Dr. Mark Mandeles wrote:

This reviewer believes that Mylroie hascorrectly pinpointed Saddam Hussein as

the source of terrorist attacks on Ameri-cans, including the World Trade Centerbombing and the attempted assassinationof former President George H. W. Bush.The Clinton Administration, wittingly orunwittingly, has chosen the path of self-delusion: to not investigate the matter seri-ously. In this way, unpleasant policyoptions have not been articulated and dis-cussed. Yet, the failure of U.S. officials toaddress the question of state sponsorshipof terrorism will have significant conse-quences. It encourages future terroristattacks by eliminating the costs of retribu-tion from the calculations of leaders suchas Saddam Hussein.

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Canadian Society for theHistory and Philosophy of Science(CSHPS) is holding its annual conferenceat the University of Toronto, May 26-28,2002. The program committee invites his-torians, philosophers, and other scholarsof the social sciences and humanities tosubmit paper, panel or session proposals.The proposals and papers may be inEnglish or French, and should have atitle, a brief abstract of 150 to 250 words,and the complete information for corre-spondence. We strongly encourage e-mailsubmissions. Information about registra-tion and accommodations can be found atthe Humanities and Social SciencesFederation of Canada website.

Please note that the CSHPS meeting,which takes place as part of the Congressof the Social Sciences and Humanities,overlaps with the meeting dates of a num-ber of other societies, including theCanadian Society for the History ofMedicine (May 24-26), the CanadianPhilosophical Association (May 25-28),the Canadian Society for the History andPhilosophy of Mathematics (May 24-26),and the Canadian Historical Association(May 27-29). The CSHPS program com-mittee welcomes suggestions for joint ses-sions with these and other societies.Program Website:http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/r20430/schps_toronto_2002 Canadian Society for History andPhilosophy of Science:http://www.ukings.ns.ca/cshps

Notices


Congress of the Social Sciences andHumanities:http://www.hssfc.ca

Centennial of Flight Commission

The U.S. Congress has chartered aCentennial of Flight Commission, chargedwith leading, coordinating, and publiciz-ing public activities to celebrate theachievements of Wilbur and OrvilleWright and commemorating a century ofpowered flight. Made up of senior govern-ment officials, the Commission is chairedby Gen. John R. Dailey, USMC (Ret.),director of the Smithsonian Institution’sNational Air and Space Museum (NASM).Other members represent the First FlightCentennial Foundation of North Carolina,the Inventing Flight: Dayton 2003 Com-mittee of Ohio, the Experimental Aircraft

Association, the Federal Aviation Admini-stration, and the National Aeronauticsand Space Administration. The FirstFlight Centennial Federal AdvisoryBoard, which will support the Com-mission, is composed of nineteen membersand is chaired by Dr. Thomas D. Crouch ofthe Smithsonian Institution’s NASM.

The Commission encourages nationaland international participation. It seeksto publicize and encourage programs, pro-jects, and events to involve, educate,enrich, and inspire the maximum numberof people. One of its primary goals is topromote awareness of the centennial andof related centennial events. To assist inachieving that goal, the Commission hascreated a public web page that includesactivities related to the centennial offlight celebration and the history of avia-tion. One can visit at:http://www.centennialofflight.gov

Air Combat LegendsNew book by aviation artist

NICHOLAS TRUDGIANPrice: $55.00 + tax

(phone orders welcome)

THE MILL STREET GALLERY125 Mill Street

Occoquan, Virginia 22125(703) 490-0782 • www.cliftonart.com

Air Power HistoryList of Referees,

Dec. 2000-Dec. 2001

David G. AllenWilliam H. BartschDonald R. BaucomAugust BlumeGeorge BradleyRebecca CameronGeorge W. CullyRichard G. DavisRon DickRobert F. DorrStanley FalkPaul C. FritzAlan GropmanBrian S. GundersonR. Cargill HallRichard P. HallionGrant T. HammondPaddy HarbisonVon HardestyI. B. HolleyPerry JamiesonWilliam M. LearyDonald S. LopezMark MandelesThomas ManningEdward MaroldaRoger G. MillerDaniel R. MortensenBernard C. NaltyJeff RuddDavid N. SpiresRick W. SturdevantWayne W. ThompsonEarl H. Tilford, Jr.Philip A. TrueGeorge M. WatsonKenneth P. WerrellHerman S. WolkWilliam T. Y’BloodJames YoungTommy Young


We seek quality articles—based on sound scholarship, perceptive analysis, and/or firsthand experience—which arewell-written and attractively illustrated. The primary criterion is that the manuscript contributes to knowledge. Articlessubmitted to Air Power History must be original contributions and not be under consideration by any other publicationat the same time. If a manuscript is under consideration by another publication, the author should clearly indicate thisat the time of submission. Each submission must include an abstract—a statement of the article’s theme, its historicalcontext, major subsidiary issues, and research sources. Abstracts should not be longer than one page.

Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate, double-spaced throughout, and prepared according to the ChicagoManual of Style (University of Chicago Press). Because submissions are evaluated anonymously, the author’s nameshould appear only on the title page. Authors should provide on a separate page brief biographical details, to includeinstitutional or professional affiliation and recent publications, for inclusion in the printed article. Pages, including thosecontaining illustrations, diagrams or tables, should be numbered consecutively. Any figures and tables must be clearlyproduced ready for photographic reproduction. The source should be given below the table. Endnotes should be numberedconsecutively through the article with a raised numeral corresponding to the list of notes placed at the end.

If an article is typed on a computer, the disk should be in IBM-PC compatible format and should accompany the man-uscript. Preferred disk size is a 3 1/2-inch floppy, but any disk size can be utilized. Disks should be labelled with thename of the author, title of the article, and the software used. WordPerfect, in any version number, is preferred. Otherword processors that can be accommodated are WordStar, Microsoft Word, Word for Windows, and AmiPro. As a lastresort, an ASCII text file can be used.

There is no standard length for articles, but 4,500-5,500 words is a general guide.Manuscripts and editorial correspondence should be sent to Jacob Neufeld, Editor, c/o Air Power History, P.O. Box

10328, Rockville, MD 20849-0328, e-mail: [email protected].

Guidelines for Contributors

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