Seminar “Kant: Critique of the Power of Judgment”

University of IcelandSession 72/10/2007

Text: Critique of the Aesthtical Power of Judgment (9-17)

Claus Beisbart

The analysis of the Beautiful (III)

References third Critique: Guyer/Matthews

Summary so far

1. Moment: If I find something beautiful, it has to please me in a disinterested way. Thus, the judgment of taste does not represent objective knowledge.

2. Moment: If I find something beautiful, I have to presuppose that my judgment is intersubjectively valid.

Problem: how does this fit together?How can the expectation of intersubjective agreement

be justified?

An offerIf you don't think that judgments of taste carry the presupposition of intersubjective validity, then you might still find Kant's theory interesting:

1. Other judgments might have the same features: They are somehow more subjective than others, but presuppose intersubjective validity. So Kant's theory of taste might provide a good model for other judgments (cf. Nils' suggestions)

2. As a matter of fact, there is some agreement regarding beauty. One might use Kant's theory to explain this agreement (although Kant himself was not only dealing with some agreement a posteriori, but with an a priori agreement).

Plan

Kant's justification for the intersubjectivity is mainly in par 21 and in the deduction.

This is your homework, so we will bracket it for a while.

But Kant has more to say on judgments of beauty etc. He has something like a theory how judgments of beauty work. This is what we will now focus on.

The theory of the free play (I)

In the Analysis of the Beautiful, first developed in par. 9.

See also Introduction VII.

What is the theory?

The theory of the free play (II)

Kant's theory of the free play. We have, inter alia, the following cognitive capacities:

imagination (task: “composition of the manifold of intuition”, par. 9, p. 102)

understanding (task: unity by application of a concept)

In having the representation of something that we judge beautiful, our mind is in a state in which there is free, harmonious play of these capacities.

The theory of the free play (III)

Clarifications:

1. What does “play” mean? - They don't play against each other (cf. the notion of a match), rather they interact in a playful manner – playful: maybe airiness, effortlessness

2. What does “free” mean? - Unrestricted by a definite rule, concept (Kant always emphasizes that we need not know what kind of thing an object is that is judged beautiful)

3. What does “harmony” mean? - Kant: “they agree with each other as is requisite for a cognition in general”, par. 9, 103

Kant's argument (I)

How does Kant argue for the theory of the free play?

Kant assumes that the presupposition of intersubjective validity is true. From this he derives the theory of the free play.

The argument in nuce: The presupposition can only be true, if the understanding and the imagination engage in free play, whenever we judge something beautiful.

Of course, the argument doesn't help, if the presupposition is false.

NB. Kant's methodology in the “Groundwork” is similar. In Section 2, he derives the content of the Categorical Imperative from the assumption that there is an imperative that commands categorically. Only afterwards, in Section 3, he shows that there is such an imperative.

Kant's argument (II)

Note: “communicate” doesn't mean “verbally communicate” or something like this.

Rather: Something is communicated, if it is made common, i.e. if everbody would have it under certain (presumably ideal) conditions.

Kant's argument (III)

Communication for objective knowledge

a tree

Alice Bob

representation representation

object

via concepts

the same judgment

Communication for judgments of taste

a tree

Alice Bob

representation representation

state of mind(insofar faculties work together

as required for cognition in general)

no concepts

the same judgment

Kant's argument (IV)

“Nothing, however, can be universally communicated except cognition and representation so far as it belongs to cognition. For only so far is the latter objective, and only thereby does it have a universal point of relation with which everyone's faculty of representation is compelled to agree. Now if the determining ground of the judgment on this universal communicability of the representation is to be conceived of merely subjectively, namely without a concept of the object, it can be nothing other than the state of the mind that is encountered in the relation of the powers of representation to each other insofar as they relate a given representation to cognition in general.” (par. 9, 102)

Does it ring a bell for you?

Maybe, this analogy is helpful:

compare the cognitive capacities to parts of your body

In your everyday life, you have a set of tasks for your body (you have to walk to university, you have to open doors, you have to carry bags, etc.). For each of the tasks, the parts of your body have to cooperate in a specific manner.

Suppose now, you are doing some kind of exercise, you are having a run, say. In this situation, the different parts of your body interact in an optimal way. You take pleasure out of this.

A problem

Kant says that the play is harmonious (par. 9, p. 103).

If the understanding and the imagination interact harmoniously, they should produce definite results, i.e. objective knowledge. One possible result might be knowledge about what kind of thing the object judged beautiful is.

Why doesn't the play stop, when we have some result?

Is it compatible with what Kant says otherwise that there is a result?

A hint

Kant emphasizes that there is some connection to “cognition in general” (par. 9, pp. 102-3).

Maybe the idea is not that the object judged beautifully is particularly suitable for cognition of this very object. Rather, the object engages your cognitive capacities in a way that is optimal for cognition in general.

Cf. the running analogy. It might be that the running is not particularly easy for you, but that it engages your capacities in a way that is optimal for your average tasks.

But this only one interpretation.

A warning

It is very difficult to put together everything that Kant says.

So maybe, Kant doesn't yet have a theory, but rather some ideas that might be worked out a bit more.

Task: Construct the theory from the most important points that Kant makes.

The third moment

Result: “Beauty is the form of the purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of and end. ”

(par. 17, 120)

Example: A tulip [footnote 120]

Heuristics: A beautiful thing has some properties that nicely fit together. This cannot just be the result of chance. It is as if somebody had produced the thing with an intention.

Additional thought: It is purposive=fitting for your cognitive capacities

Why does Kant need the third moment?

So far, not much has been said about the thing that is judged beautiful: The analysis in the first moment was mainly about pleasure. The analysis in the second moment was about the presupposition. The presupposition somehow involves the object – the idea is that if somebody else is in appropriate contact with the very thing, he will judge it beautiful as well. But there need to be something about the object that makes the presupposition plausible. For, not all objects are judged beautiful, after all! So more needs to be said about the object that is judged beautiful.

Kant's analysis (I)

Kant's summary after par. 17 implies that

(P) an object is judged purposive, if it is judged beautiful.

But, rather strikingly, Kant does not prove P at all in par. 10 – 17. P is taken for granted there. The third moment is only about how the purposiveness is to be conceived of. But Kant has an argument for P, which is in the introduction, VII.

Kant's analysis (II)

I won't rehearse Kant's argument here, but I'll give you some kind of heuristics that might be behind the argument:

Often, when you think one of your goals/purposes is realized, you feel pleasure.

Maybe, something like the converse is true: Whenever you feel pleasure, you can judge that some purpose has been realized.

From this and the aesthetic character of judgments of taste, P follows.

The structure of Kant's argument

par. 10: Definition purposiveness and purposiveness without purpose

par. 11: Which kind of purposiveness is judged in judgments of taste?

par. 12: How can there be an a priori link between certain representations and pleasure?

par. 13-14: pure and impure aesthetic judgments

par. 15-16: beauty and objective purposiveness (perfection)

par. 17: How to develop one's taste.

Kant's definition of a purpose

“[...] an end is the object of a concept insofar as the latter [the concept] is regarded as the cause of the former [the object] [...] where the object itself as an effect is thought of as possible only through the concept of the latter, there one thinks of an end.” par. 10, 105

Hints: 1. that the concept is the cause, means: the representation of the concept is the cause.

2. For our purposes, we can read the definition as follows: Something is purposive, if it is thought possible only as the result of some kind of action (in which somebody had some conception of the thing)

Purposiveness without purpose

Kant introduces the somehow paradoxical idea of “Purposiveness [...] without an end [purpose]” (par. 10, 105) [he means the same with “the mere form of purposiveness”, par. 11, 106; the notion of “subjective purposinveness in the representation”, ib., is also related]

Definition: You judge an object O purposive without purpose, whenever you can explain the possibility of O only by appealing to some intentional action, but if you don't really think that the object has been produced by a being with a will.

Par. 11

So Kant thinks: whenever you judge something beautiful, you judge it purposive.

But in which sense do you judge it purposive?

Answer: You judge that it is purposive without really having a purpose.

Reason: If you would really think that the object was only possible because somebody wanted to have it, you would judge it good or agreeable, but not purposive.

Par. 12

Since in judgments of taste, a necessary connection between a representation and pleasure is presupposed, there is some a priori element (fourth moment).

But how can there be an a priori connection? Usually, the specific necessary consequences from a thing can only be learned empirically.

Kant's solution: The pleasure is not the consequence of judging the representation purposive, but rather the pleasure is the consciousness of the formal purposiveness of the thing.

Final notes (I)

In par. 13 – 17, Kant takes the opportunity to comment on some related topics. For instance, some people in the Leibniz-Wolff tradition thought that beauty is perfection. In terms of Kant's theory, perfection is objective purposiveness, and thus purposiveness with some purpose. That would not be compatible with Kant's theory. So Kant has to reject the Leibniz-Wolff idea.

Final notes (II)

In Introduction VII (p. 76), Kant slides into the idea that the object is not just judged purposive, if it is judged beautiful, but that it is judged purposive for the judgment of power. He also says that the representation is suitable for our cognitive faculties.

Summary

Whenever I judge something beautiful, the faculties of the understanding and of the imagination engage in a harmonious play.

The object is thereby judged purposive (fitting, if you want).

The pleasure that I take is the consciousness of the fact that the object is purposive.