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SEMANTIC1~I-IEORY

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RU'TH M, KEMPSON1.I\CT\lltEIt IN I.INGUI~TICS

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Aspects o/ the Theory o/ Synt ax ch. 1, hut Sl'C also C'ltolllsky {,all.t:/wgr (/11I/

Mind (enlarged edition), and Ilach Syntactic TIrt'tJ,y ch. 11. 'I'he prohlelll 01'the nature of linguistic evidence has not hccn ¡:ivt"1l mucl, d('lailnl al/cnlion hytrans(ormational Iinguists hut sce Sampson The ¡'-O'III '1 LfllI.t:/w.t:r ch .. 1,Labov 'Methodology', Fillrnore 'On ¡.;en<:rativity' and I'!ouscholdl'f 'Onargumcnts from asterisks'. The distinction bctwcc.i compcrcncc and pcr-formance is discussed in Chomsky's Aspects of the Tlreo,y 'if Syntax, ami inmore detail in Lyons and Wales [eds.) /'s)'dru/i1lKl/istir l'aper¡ (Sl'C in particularFodor and Garrctt 'Sorne rellections on cUlllpctelln' and IH:rfllflllanec').Chomsky's account of this division has hCCTl attuckcd hy 1Iyrncs 'On cum-municative cornpetence', and more n'el'ntly hy (;. l.akofT amI nthcr s (scc t lu-rccommendcd reading for chapter .¡).

Explanations of word meaning

2

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1n the first chaptcr 1 suggestcd SOl/le prcliminury conditions of udcquucyfor scmantic theories by which particular theories could be tested, andit rnight seem that we are now in a position to consider the detailedmcchanism of some proposed thcory. llut there was one large andunwarrantcd assumption in the way that thcse cOllllitions wcre spccificd ;it was assumcd that the rclationship hctwcen a word ami what it is uscdto imply and that between a sentence nnd what it is uscd to implypresented no problerns, ano were not a matter for debate. But, quite tothe contrary, an explanation of these rclationships - i.e. the problem ofwhat we mean when we rcfer to the rncaning that a word or scntencehas - is the classical problem of scmantics, the problem indeed onwhich scrnantics has traditionally [oundercd. Since any formal represen-tation of sernantics will implicitly present one particular solution to thisproblem, we cnnnot usefully consider the dctuils of such a theory exceptin the light of a eoherent account 01 meaning. •

There are three main ways in which linguists und pliilosophers haveattcrnpted to construct explanations of mcaning in naturallanguage: (o)by defining the nature of word rneaning, (h) by defining the nature ofsentence meaning, and (e) by explaining thc process of eommunication.In the first wa}:, word meaning is taken as the eonstruet in terms ofwhich sentence meaning and communication can be explained; in thesccond, it is sentence meaning whieh is taken as basic, with wordscharacterised in terms of the systernatic contribution they make tosentenee mcaning; and in the third, both sentence and word meaning areexplained in terms of the ways in which sentencés and words are used inthe act of communication. It is no coincidence that there are these threetypes of explanation. In the first place, thcre c1early is a relation betweenwords and objects. We use words lo refer to objccts, and to actions(eonsider such words as ClIP, liorse, tooman, grodllate, cooking, noeeping, •

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1011

2.1 Meaning and refer enc«Thc narning rclat ion hct wccu a word ami it~ ohjL'C! is most

transparent with proper narnes, thc paradiglll case of nallling. llcre

12

Explanations o/ toord mcaning

Ihinkinc), ami the explun.uion of this n-l.u ion is induhitabf y thc t ask ofsemantics. Similarly scntcnces are uscd lo dcscr ihc cvenrs, bc licfs,opinions, ami it is unquestionably t he task of scmant ics lo cxplnin thcnature of the rclation betwccn scntcnces ami the statcs of alfairs thosesentences describe. Finally, since lunguagc is the vchicl« by mcuns ofwhich we effect cornmunication, it is argllahle thut the intcrprct.uion oflanguage should be explaincd in tcrrns 01' its rolc in communication.Moreover these thrce nspects of Illeaning, word mcuning, scntencerneaning, and comrnunication, are reflcctcd in diflercnt uses 01' the wordmean, Corrcsponding to cxplanut ion (11) is :

(1) Supererogatory rncans 'supcrfluous'.(2) Spinster means 'unmurricd woru.ur'.

Corresponding to (11) is :\

(3) The sentenee Ja/lles murdcrrd ,HII,\' mcans t hat somconecalled [ames delibcrntely killcd snmeonc called Mnx.

In these two uses, the word mean has a lIleaning approximaling loindica/f. Butthe word /IIf(lI/ is uscd in a ditlcrcnt scnsc in the [nllowingconversationbetwccn two spcakcrs, A and Il, a sense which corrcspnndsto ~xplanatidn (e):

(4) A: Are yOIl going lo bcd soou?D: Whut d'you mcnn?A: 1 rnean that I'm t ircd , and thc sooner yOIl go lo bcd, thesooncr 1 can.

In this case, mean is attributable lo speukers und has the sume Illeanillgas the expression intend /0 indicate. 'I'hus we have at least thrce possiblestarting points from whieh to construct un explanation of meaning - thesignification of words, the interprctarion of scntcnces, or what a speakeris intending to convey in ucts of conununicatiou. Of thcse thrce uses,most traditional explanations of mcaning constitutc un nttcmpt lo cxplninmeaning in terms of the naming rclurion which holds bct wcen a wordand its object, and it is this that wv shull hr conccrncd with in thischapter.

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2.1 Meaning and rejerence

there is a one-to-one correspondence hctwcen name and object: Iorexarnple the name The j>arllu/I(;ll rcfer s to thc objcct the Parthenon inAthens, the name Ruth Kempsou refcrs lo th~ individual who wrote thisbook. This rclationship betwccn word and objcct is called the rclation-ship of reference, and there is a long tradition of equating the problem ofmeaning with the problem of rcference. According to this view, knownas extensionalism beca use of its trcatmcnt of meuning in terms of theobjects, callcd extcnsions, to which thc items of the language refer,'the meaning of a word can be explained in tcrms of the relation bctweenthat word ami ohject or objccts to which it refcrs. J ust as propcr narnesrcfer to individuals, it has hccn suid , common nouns rcfer to scts ofindividuals, verbs rcfer to aetions, adjcctives rcfer to properties -ofindividuals, and udverbs refer lo propcr ties of actions. Thus, for exarnplc,it would be said that thc rclation bctwccn the express ion Ruth Kempsonand the individual Ruth Kcmpson is directly comparable with therelation betwccn the word mice and the scts of objects which can bereferred to by the use of that word; ami moreover both of these relationsare said lo be siruilarly comparable lo the relation which holds between,say, the word red and the scts of objects which have the property ofredness, and too to the rclation which holds betwccn the word quicklyand the sets of actions which liavc the appropriatc propcrty of speed.

IIowever, assuming for the momcnt that we can acccpt the clnirn ofhornogeneity in connection with thcse difTerent relations, there are anumber of reasons to believe that any theory of meaning which attcmptsto explain all aspects of word meaning in terms of rcferenee is mistaken.1n the first place, there are a nurnbcr of ernbarrassing counter-examplcs:even if the relationship of refcrence can be said to hold between a wordsuch as imagination and sorne cluss of abstract objccts which constituteacts of imagination, therc is no .sense in which words such as and, not,tohether rcfer to anything. And '0111 prepositions present a similar prob-lern, Wliat does o/ rcfer to? What , in this very sentenee, docs the pre-position in rcfer to - or indced uery or toltat] NOl only is there a largeand non-homogeneous c1ass.i)f:exceptions, but there are a number ofanornalies in explaining more straightforward cases. The relationship ofreference which holds betwccn expressions and non-cxistcnt objects willbe the sarne : it is therefore hard for a theory which explains rneaning in

•

I T'he rnost well-knowu.cxposu ion is Russcll I ()OZ. hui chis view has rcccntlybecn expounJcJ 1I~lIin hy Duvidson (ef. Duvidson 196711) within a trurh-bused rheory of meunj ng (cf. J,I below).

13

R:~p'lallaliolls 01 uord I/ltallillg

terms of rcference to uvuid prnlil'lillg SyllOIl)'lIly betwccn ;111 of thefollowing: the pterodactyl, tlte unicoru tlu: [trs! 10(11I1//1/ 'o ///11/1 (J/I themoon, And, for the sarne reason, 0111 cxprvssion SIIl'h ;IS tlte jirst /IUIII loland on thc moon will he prcclictcd 10 he quite diílercnt in k ind frorn theexpression the first tooman lo 1(/11/1011 1!tf./II1J1J/1, hccuusc only in t lie formercase is there a rcferent to which t he cxprcssion cm st.md in a referringrelationship. Prohlerns arise cvcn in un .malys is of common nounswhich refer to a set of ohjccts. ror in what srnsc can t hc rc be s.rid lo be a

,consistent identifiable rclat ionsh ip of rcfcrcncl' bct wccn t hr wor d igunnaand a set of objects to whicl: it rcfcrs in C,) (7r

(5) Iguanas are not very COlll11Il111.(6) Are iguanas cxt inct?(7) .Professor 11ra ncst a \\'1 1I is looking for igllallas,

In {S), the word might be suid to refcr to a class of objccts, viz. igu.mas ;but in (6), the word either refers to a cluss of objccts or a null class,apparently depending on the unswcr to the qucst iou.i And in (7), theproblem is no less acure: for on one intcrprct.uion there lIlay be, say,two specific iguanas that I'rofessor Hruncstuwm is Iuoking Ior, but onanother interpretation he lIlay just be looking without thcrc ncccssarilybeing any such objcct. On this intcrprct.uion, it makes no sensc toquestion whieh objects does thc word igual/a rcfcr to? This problernarises in a large number of cases (culled 'opaque coutcxts'), followingvcrbs such as beliet:e, soan] nnd /1Of>e; ami t hcse present a notor iousproblern to anyonc attelllpting tu providc un .m.rlysis of rcfercnce.

. Furthermore, iC we return to the paradiglll case of rcferring, propcrnames, we fino an important diílcrcncc bctwccn thcse and an)' uthersyntacric category. Thollgh in proper n.uncs thcrc is a OIlC-tO-OIlCcorrespondence betwecn word ami ohjcct , it is 1101 ohvious t h at propcrnarncs have any meaning ut all, ror it m.rkcs no se nse lo ask '\Vhat is themeaning of thc expression NIJIIIII C/IIl/lIsII.l'?': nnc can nnly usk '\V11O docsthe cxpression NOIIIII C/lIJlIIshy rcfer to?' Th is slIggesls al t hc very lcastthat a semantic account of prnpcr n.uncs should not be like that of otherwords, Ilut if this is so, thcn the original ussumpt iun of homogcneity inthe semantie properties of proper nouns uud thc other categories,cornrnon nouns, vcrbs, udjectives, udvcrbs, and so 011, was a mistakc.

I Sentences such as Ihese pose ,',,,asiderahle prohlcrns fnr " rheory ofreference, as WilllCSS 11,,· larg,· a"'''"111 of pl.ilosophi<:al litcr.uu re 011 thesubjrcl.

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2.1 Meaning aud reference

This is not lo dcny that thcre are problema in the nnalysis of refercncc.On thc contrary. the solution tI; -thc prohlcm of opacity in particularrcmains an opcn OI1C, and sonH:thing of an issue for philosophers.But it <loes cast doubt on t hc 'assumption thut any solution to the'problerns of reference autnrnnt ically provides a solution to thc problernof meaning.

2.2 Thc imagc theor y of mcaningAnother solut ion to thc prohlcm of cxplaining the naturc of .

wurd rncaning, which has an cqunlly long 'tradition, is to cxplain themcaning of a word in tcrms of rhc iougc in thc spcnkcr's (or hearcr's)bruin. '¡'he problcm here is to know what form thc imagcs tuke, 'I'hcmost obvious point is that these'illlages cannot be visual. For supposerny image of a triangle is an cquilatcrul: '

Fig. I

If this is said to constitute Cor me the meanmg oC the word triangle, theneithcr triaugle has to mcan cquilatcrul triangles only, or triangle has tobesaid lo be arnbiguous according as the image is cquilateral, isosceles, orscalenc. For cuch of thcse is nuitually exclusive. In a similar vein, anowncr of an alsatian ma)' havc a radically different image of dogs from anowncr of a miniaturc poodlc, but it is not obvious that they thereby'spcak a diffcrent language. Thcrc is no image corrcsponding to what i~.sharcd betwccn dogs, ami none either which has just those fcaturcsshnrcd by all triangles. Ancl this is just one of the m:1I1y problerns Iacinga SImple illlage theory of mcuning. Furthcr problema are prescntcd bythe fact that (a) one Illay llave more than ore image for a single expresa-ion, and (b) two expressions may havc the sarne image. Thus the ex-pression a tlred child may cvoke cithcr an irnage of a child (notice thatthere is no visual image neutral as between a boy or a girl) curlcd up andnearly aslecp, or an image of a child stamping its Coot and screaming.According to an account of rneaning which cquates the meaning a wordhas with an image, any word which relates to more than onc image is

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predicted to be ambiguous. But despitl' t hc prcdict ion, t hc vxprcssinna tired child is not ambiguous. On the othcr hand, sliould t \\'0 cxpressionsbear the same irnagc, the image theory of ll1eanillg prcdicts that they willbe synonymous. Dut many cxpressions hnve the same ill1age: (/ tiredchild, an unliappy child, (/1/ tlngry cluld , (/ [uture tyrant maya" cvoke theidentical image of a child stamping its foot und screarning. Yct thcsecxprcssions are by no mc.ins synOIl)'1I10US, /\s I huvc alrc.uly partlyindicated, an image thcory of meaning faces the ndclirional problcm ofspeaker variation. The ill1ages we havc of what might be rcferred to byany word may not only v;lry fmlll occasioll to occ.isiou, hut since theyarcdepcndent on our expericnce are certuin to dill'cr in lI1any dctuils, ifnot radically in substance from those 01' othcr pcople. 'I'akc t hc wor dlecture for example. To those who give lccturcs, t hc wnrd Illight call IIp

animage of an audience of bctwccn, S;¡y, twenty and one hundrcdpeople staring up at one wretchcd individual who, per haps sclf-con-sciously, walks up and down in front of t hcm. Ilut ror t hosc who havenever lectured, the image is more likcly to be that of one pcrson droningon, often boring, sometimos incomprehensible, with thc accoll1panyingsensation ofhaving to fight feclings of dro\\'siness, Such ditlercnt imagesshould, if they correspond to the ll1eaning associatcd with the word

, lecture guarantee that cornmunicarinn bct wccn two such grollps ofpeople using the word lecture would be impossible beca use cnch group

. , has radically different illlages of Iecturing ami hcnce diílcrcnt concep-" tions of the meaning of the word lert ure, Worst of al/, there are lIlany

words wit,h whieh it is irnpossible to nssociatc any image at all - and,or, because, therefore, cte. Yet they are by no mcnns rncnninglcss.

2·3 :Meaning and conccptsThe standard retrcat Iróm thc extreme [orm of the image

view of méaning is to say that thc ill1ages are not visual; but, if so, it isnot obvious what claim is being m.ulc. Considcr for cxample the sug-gestion that 'the speech clernent 'housc' is thc symbol, Iirst ami Iorcmost,not of a single perception, rior cven of t hc notion of a particular objcct,but of a 'concept', in other words, of a convenicnt capsuh; of thoughtthat embraces thousands of distinct cxpcr icnccs :11)(1 that is ready totakc in thousands more' [Sapir 1921: IJ), \Vhat is involvcd in this clairnthat a word has as its Illeaning a 'eonvcnient eapsule of thought'? If this.is a retraclion from nn im;¡ge theory nf ll1eaning, as it is. then it is ;¡retraction fmm a specilic, fnlse clailll to one that is entirely untestable

i6

2,3 Meaning ami concepts

nnd hencc vucuous. \t docs no more than substituto Ior the problemtcrm meaning thc equally opaque tcrm conrept . It dOl'~ not providc unexplanation of the rcquircd kind (cf. p, I ubovc), If mcaning is to beexplained in terrns of conccpts, it is cssewtial that the term (Ol/tf!>/

itself be given a rigorous dcfiuitiori. 'Sapir's Swiss contcrnporary, de Suussurc, goes sorne \Vay towards

providing such a charaeterisat ion, FOI" though, like Sapir, de Saussurctalks freely of conccpts, he strcsscs that the concept (the word he uses is :signijié) an clement .stnnds for is solcly due to its valuc in the systcrn:'Language is a system of intcrdcpcmlcnt terms in which the valuc ofcach terrn results solcly Iron: the simultancous prcscncc of orhcrs'. Ohthis basis he would have said thnt thc word bachelor, for exumple, has themcaning it docs solcly by virtue nf the ol,hl'r itcms in the systcm towhich it is rclatcd - spinster, tooman, huslmnd, boy, Similar/y, rightacross the vocabulary. 'J'hus eaeh of the mcrnbers of the following sets ofwords stands in a ccrtain rclut ion one to another (Iabclled valeur), whichis itself a determinant of the intcrprctution of thc word:

have criticise angry motherglve pralse h;¡ppy unclelend accuse calm auntborrow assess ' plcascd grandparentrcnt blame annoycd , nephcwhirc rcprirnand upset COUSIIl

It is not of eourse obvious that this observation saves the problem ofdefining concept from vacuity, for it is not clear how the inter-relation-ship of value (valeur) ami mcuning (signifié) can itsclf be tcsted, In anycase, de Saussure's account is 01)CII to objections similar to those .raiscdagainst both a refercnce theory of mcaning and an image theory ofrneaning. In particular, words such as and, because, or, etc., are counter-exarnples lo this vicw, for it is not clear whether their intcrpretation canbe analyscd in tenns of conccpts, 1t will not do to suggest that themeaning of and is thc concept of co-ordination, for what is co-ordinationother than by joining by and] Sirnilar/y with or: it is meaningless toexplain or as having the conccpt of d isjunction for its meaning, when inorder to explain disjunction one nCl'ds to rcfer to oro And the generalproblern remains: to expbin meaning in terms only of concepts isunempirical.

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2.J.1 Componential al/(/!.IIj'is

, The assuuipt inn 01' SYSll'III;ltit: rdatiollships of Illcalling-betwecn words is however indcpcnch-nt orthe prohlcin of cxplaining thebasis ofthese relationships ; ami a considcruhl« .unuunt nf dctailcd workon the structure of the vocabulary has hccu done in rcccnt ycars, Manylinguists have turned lo what has bccn cullcd componcnt ial unalysis togiye an explicit representation of thc systcmut ic rcL,t ions hct wecn words,01\ this view the meanings of words are an.rlyscd /lot as un itn rv conceptsbut as complexes made \11' of componcnr« 01' nll':lning wh ich are t hem-selves semantic primitives.t In this vvin, ,I/>/",I'/n 11Iight he a/lalysed as asémantic complex rnnde \Ir of t hc Ic.uuns (vquivulent lv callcd com-ponents.! or markers) [FEMALE), [!\!E\'I':I{ i'vl,\ IUUED). [A DUL'I'],

. [HUMAN). This form of analysis was uscd in par! icular hy anthropolo-giSts seeking to give an accuunt of kiuship teflni/lology in variouscultures. For exarnplc, the distinetion hetwccn mothrr ami aunt inEnglish might be made cxplicit if the tcrms wcre nnalvsed as contrastingcornplexes of the componcnts [rE 1\r¡\ LE], [1' ¡\ rU~N'I' O F), [Crr [LDOF].) Such componential annlysis is not nI' COIII'$e rcstr ictcd to k inshipterms: it can be applied in many arcas 01' thc vocahularv, Fnr cx.unple,the distinction betwccn murder and !lil/ can be stalcd cxplicitly undeconomically if murder is anulyscd as havillg :1 Illealling which is acornplex of components rcprcscnring intcntion , cnusution, ami dcath,and kill as having a cornplcx of only t hc COlllpOllents representingcausation and death. In a similar \\'ay, g17'r and t alte can be shown'to be distinct by virtue of their cO/ltrasting coruplcxcs of componentsrepresenting causation and change of owncrship. By this mcuns, deSaussure's concept of valeur char;¡cterising the rclationship which aword holds to other words in the svstcm can be stuted cxplicitly in termsof related but distinct componcnt cornplcxcs, ancl indccd thc mainvalue of cornponential analysis lies in t hc econoll1y of st.ucmcnt of thcscrelationships which it allows," However in so stating the intcr-rclationships hel\\'ecll words in terms

1 For a more dctuiled diseussioll 01' 111<' sl"IIIS ,,1' II11'S~ (()IllIHlI'~IlIS, cf, 6.2below.

2 I shall use rhc rcrm srrnnntic ((JIII!UW,.", wit h syst cmut ir arllhiguity, holhto menn rhc sect ion of thc ovcr-u] l grilllul1ar in ",hid. t he scrnunt icgeneralisurions are sturccl, :tnd to nll':ln tlH: (.'Il'flll·ntary sl'fl1:mlic unitsisolalcd hy cOlllponcnl i,,1 '1I\"lysi"

J Cf. Lehrcr 1')74 ,,"d Ll'lTt. "175 1'01' ,kl"iJc.d """I,'St's "r En~lish ,,"dolher kinship lennillol,,!:il'S.

1'8

2. J M fa 11¡IIC a/lll (oIIa!'t,

of more primitive semantic cornponents, one is transferring the burdcnof sernantic cxplanation from word mcaning onto the componcntswhich together, in dilfercnt ccmbin.uions, constitute word 'mcnninga.Indccd what rcrnuins to be cxplaincd in such .ornponcntial analyses, aswe shall see bclow (6.J.2), is the relationship bctwccn the words of :1given language and the apparcntly indepcndcnt components. Wc mayglibly say that thc word spil/sler has a meaning which is a cornplcx of thesernantic componcnts [FEMALE), [HUMA'N], [ADULT], [NE,VERMARIU ED], bUI the central problcrn is the relationship betwcen theword //11/1/(/1/ and the componcnt [HUMAN], and so on for the rcrnain-der of the vocabular y. Unfortunately thc account of the sernanticcornponcnts themsclvcs givcn by linguists using the methodology ofcomponential analysis is often no more substantial than de Saussurc's-orSapir's charactcr isation of word mcaning. For cxample, it has beenclairncd that scmantic fcaturcs are not defined in terms of 'physicalproperties and rclations outside the human organism' but are symbols'for the interna] mechanisms by rncuns of which such phcnornena areconceived and conceptualised' [Bierwisch 1970: 181). Katz, one ofthecentral exponcnts of scmantics within transforrnational grammar, givesa much more detailcd account, but with little more substnnce:

A semnntic murkcr is a thcorcticul cnnstruct which is inrendcd tu rcpf'cscnt aconcept that is part of the scnse M morphernes and othcr constitucnts: of,natural languagcs, By a concept in this cnnncction we do not mcan irnages ormental ideas or particular thou~hts. Concepts ... are abstract entities. Theydo not bclong to the C(J/lSciOIl~cxpcricnce of anyonc, though they' may hethought about , as in our thinki/l~ ahout the concept of a cirelc. Thcy arenotindividuatcd by pcrsons : yOIl and '1 Illay think about the same concepto .(Katz 1972: J8)

...

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Ncither characterisation <loes more. than say that the meaning of a wordis a (complex) concept, and this wc rejected as. vacuous. Ye,t Katzroundly dismisses this rejcction, inaintaining that 'it is quite unreason-able to insist at the outsct ... on a cl.rrification of the ontological under-pinnings of the notions of concept and proposition as a precondirion foraccepting the cxplanations of semantic propertics and relations givcn bya theory employing 'semantic markcr' .. .' (Katz 1972: 39). l loweverKatz' mere disrnissal of the attack is not warranted. In the first place, aswe have already secn in pnrt, difTering accounts of the nature of rneaningmake difTerent claims nbout what constitlltes the proper don,"aiQ ofsemantics. And the setting up of a formal scmantic theory 'as one

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E.\pla1/atiollS o/ uord /l/eol/llIg

component of a gener:Jllinguistic theory, pre:;upposes :J solution to thisquestion: thus any such theory, as indccd t hc one Katz providcs, mustbeirnplicitly prcsenting sorne clairn as to t lie nuture of IlIeaning - and irthis c1aim is unfalsifiablc, thcn the theory itsclf hccorncs unclllpirical..Secondly, in defining me:Jning in tcrrns of mental constructs, Katz''theory has no apparent place for nn cxplunation of the relation betwecnaword and some object that it may be uscd to rcfer lo, or of thc relatianbetween a sentcncc and the sta te of uíluirs it describes. Each of these

.rclations has.been mcrely reduced to un untcstahle rclnt ion bctwecn ancxpression and a mental construct. And in the case of English worrls

-such as human where there is a one-to-one correspondence between thcword and a semantic component, wc are given no explanatíon al all other

. than the bald staterncnt that the rncnninp of human is thc conccpt repre-sented by [HUMAN). 'I'his is not only no! cxplanalory as an account ofrneaning, but it is also quite unfnlsifiablt,. So, while t hc mcthod elllployedin componential analysis may be uscful (and J s!t:J11 indeed be rnakinguse of it in later cha¡Jlers of this book), the theoretical unclcrpinnings

. provided by an account which incorporates a definition of sernanticcomponents in conceptual terrns are not (hose of a falsifiablc thcory. Jfsernantics is to be part of an cmpiricnl scicncc, such an account rnust bernade more substantial.

In attempting to unravel the conccpt of menning in naturnllanguagcsby considering the nature of rneaning, we sccm lo be in a paradoxicnlposition: characterising Illeaning merely in tcrrns of conccpts is unex-planatory, and characterising meaning in terrns of rcference scerns to

.enter into toa many problerns to be a convincing solution, This is not ofcourse to suggest that problema in thc :Jnalysis of rcfcrcncc can bedismissed, but merely that the rclationship of reference does not provide'an adequate basis for an explanation uf word mcaning. We rnust nowturn to the second of tire thrcc lIIain possibilitics that 1 oullined carlicr _anaccount of sentcnce rncaning.

RECOJ\1MENDED HEADING

2.1 THe probJem of iuentifying propcrrics of IlIe~ning \\'itb properties ofreference is almost inv~riahly includcd in int roductions to philosophy oflanguage: see for c:-camplc Ihe introduction lo I'~rkinson (ed.) Tlte Tlteory 11

: Mean;ng. and Alslon Philosophy of LOI1¡:lIogt! ch. I (which ~Iso gives a criticalcxposition of both behavioristic thellries 01' lIle~ning :lnd idealional Ibeorics) .Thc most famous attempt to analyse IIlcanin/j in such terms is Hussell's

20

.:

Recommended rÚII/iIlC

'On denoting' (reprinted in Olslicwsky (ed.) l'roblems ;11 the I'hilosophy' 011,(/IIg/lage); hut this view was until .reel'.IItl)' thought to he untcnnblc Iorrcasons brought [orward 1>)' Frcgt·: seco Frt'gc '01>cr Sin n und Iledcutung'(trunslarcd as 'On sense and r efcrcnce"), and Dummetr's detailcd account ofFrcge in fo'rege: I'hiloso,"¡y 11/ 1.1I11.t:IIII,~I',Russcll's analysis has al so "bccnauacked for indepcndcnt rcasuns hy Strawson : in this connection see therecommendcd rcading for chaptcr 1). 1Iowever the rcduction of the problcm ofmeaning to the problem of reference has becn re-introduced, both by David-son (see Davidson "Truth and mcaning') and within possible-world semantics(sce Hintikka 'Scmantics for propositional auitudes' (reprinted in .Linsky(ed.) Reference and Modalily», On rhe prohlems of analysing sentenccs' suchas Are iguanas extincti , studunt s should r efer to the lirerature on cxistcnce:sce for exnmplc Moorc 'Is cxistcnce a prcdicatc!', I'car s' and Thomson'sarticles of thc sume name (rcprinred in Strawson (ed.) I'hilosopltical'Logic),Quine 'On what thcr e is' (in From a.Logical Point o/ Vietu). On the problemaprescnted tu theories of rcfcr cnce hy opaq.!e contexts sce Linsky (ed.]Reference and Modality, For a linguislie npprouch to the problcm of opacity,sce Hall-I'artce 'Opacity, corcfer cnce .and pronouns' and 'Opacity and scopc',There is considerahle disagreement ovcr the scmanric propcrties 01' propcrnames : [or a representativo set of views sce Searlc .'-)'"eechActs ch. 7, Kripke '.'Nam.ing and ncccssity', Dummctr's rt'ply to Kr ipke in Frege : I'hi/oso/,/'y o/Language, and Mates '011 the scmant ics of proper namcs',

2,2 The classic statcment of an idcuiional thcory of rneaning is g·lvell. byLockc, whose exposition is r epr iutcd in Lehrer ano Lchrer (eds.) Theory ofMeaning . The twentieth-ccntury linguistic represcntative of this view isSapir: see Sapir's La I/gI/agt. .

2,3 De Saussurc's account of semant ics, r,iven in Cours de LinguistiqueGé1/érale, is now mainly remembered for the emphasis he gave to structuralrelationships between lexical iterns. Two Iorrns of semantic description canbe associated with his work: dcscription in terms of so-called lexioal fields,and, much later, description in terrns of componential analysis. An excellcnt .account of work done on lexical fiel¡ls und of componential analysis is 'given inLehrcr Semantic Fields and Le,\'ica/.~'/TIIrtl/re, and she summariscs the work ofTrier who was the mast well-known carly e.xponent of analyses in lcrms ofIcxical fields, For a uscful survey ,of work 0'1\ semantic ficlds, se.e Vassilyev,'Thc theory of sernalllic ficlds: a s\lrvcy'.

2.3.1 A oetailed introduction to lhe analysis of kinship terms is given inBurling's Mal/'s Mal/y Voires, which incluoes an analysis of the set of Englishkinship tcrrns, This hook is illciuelltaJl)' an excellent account of componentialanalysis and the problcrns in its application. Other refcrences inclutle ~9lfn~-bury 'The stnlctural 'analysis of kinship semantics', Goodenough 'Compo-nential analy~is ami the study of mcaning', and Conklin 'Lexicographicaltreatment of folk taxonomics'. For an account of items such as give and /akeand other relateu ilellls sec lIrndix Compol/en/ial Ana/ysis o/ Gel/eral Vocaól/-

.,

¡'

. ,

21

"

~le~'F~.'

.(~ ..•-L'

Explanations o/ word meauing

lar)'. For general problems in thc meth"d"logy of componenrial unalysis seeNida Componential ¡l"alysis (1Mra1/i1/K. 'Th« first application of the methodsof c.omponential analysis within the frarncwork of transforlllational grammarwas Katz and Fodor 'The structure of a semantic theory' (rcprinted inRosenberg and Travis [eds.] Readings in the Philosopliy 01 La1/guage). Themost complete discussion of problems in semantics hy Katz is arguablySemanlic Theory, but for a further detailcd defence of his position that asernantic marker (equivalenl to a pr imirivc component of mt'aning) necds nocharacterisation other than a conceptual onc sce Knt z 'Logic and language:an exarnination of recenl criticisrns of intensionalism' s. {¡o This pos it inn isalso defended, against a truth-hascd rhcorv of IIlcaning, by ll ar mnn in'Meaning and semantics'. For Iurrhcr rcfcr cnccs 011 CO/llpollt'ntial analysis,see the recornmended reading Ior chapt cr (•.

22

~

3-,'.

Meaning and truth

).1 Tarski's truth definition ano scntcnce rncaningThe attempt to cxplain (he hasis of meaning in terrns of the

relationship between a word and the object :t may be used to rcfcr to líasa long tradition in philosophy. Recently however a rather differentstarting point for a theory of mcaning has bcen advocated. In line withwork in logic by Tarski, a logician whosc theory of truth put forwardin1933 is now widely held by philosophers, it has been suggested .that it isthe characterisation of wh»t we mea n by talking of the rneaning of Q

sentence that is the basis for a semantic thcory, and not the characteri-sation of word mcaning. Tarski proposed for formal languages con- .structed by logicians, that a definition of truth could be given .for 'alanguage if for each sentence of the language! a rule schema can predictcorrectly the formula "

, '."

'.'

¡'

S is true if and only ir p

where S is the name of the sentence (i.e. a mere spelling ?ut of thesequence of symbols making IIp the sentence) and p the conditionswhich guarantee the truth of that sentence. The significance of thissuggestion for logic is of course not our concern here. However it hasbeen claimed (Davidson 1967a) that Tarski's formula for a theory ol.·truth can also provide the basis of a theory of meaning for naturallanguages. The suggcstion is that to know the meaning of a sentence-isto know under what conditions that sentence would be true: 1'0 takeTarski's classic example, lo know the meaning of the string' of wordsmaking up the sentence SlIOW is tohite is to know what conditions-have

•...0., ..:', .

'.,In fact he was referring not to sentences of natural Ianguage- but to "staternents ¡¡fa formal logic. Cf. 3.4.1 below for a discussion of rhe dis-tinction between sentence and statement,

23

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"