Final Version: O’Brien, L. (forthcoming), Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research.

Self-knowledge, Agency and Force1

1. Introduction

My aim in this paper is to articulate further what may be called an agency theory of

self-knowledge. Many theorists have stressed how important agency is to self-

knowledge, and much work has been done drawing connections between the two

notions.2 However, it has not always been clear what epistemic advantage agency

gives us in this area and why it does so. I take it as a constraint on an adequate

account of how a subject knows her own mental states and acts, that it construe the

known mental states and acts realistically and as independent of their self-ascription,

and that it deliver genuine epistemic standing to the knower. The main task of the

paper will, then, be to explore how our having rational agency with respect to our

mental states may be able to secure genuine epistemic warrant for our self-ascriptions

of states or acts independent of the ascriptions. This task will be carried out by

focussing on the question of what account we should give of our knowledge of what I

call our acts of judging. In the remainder of this section, I will do a little to clarify

what is meant by that question. Section 2 will attempt to introduce us to elements of

the best way to approach the question by considering some alternative strategies.

Section 3 is devoted to forming some idea of what kind of warrant we are looking for

when considering how agency might give us self-knowledge. Section 4 aims to

present a suggestion as to how agency gives us the kind of warrant identified over our

acts of judging. Section 5 deals with some objections.

1

When we ask about our knowledge of psychological self-ascriptions of the form: I ϕ

that P, there are three aspects of the question that our answers can focus on,

corresponding to the three components of the ascription. I can ask: (i) how do I know

that I ϕ that P? (ii) how do I know I ϕ that P?, and (iii) how do I know I ϕ that P?3

The last question, which asks how I know that P is the content of my attitude, has

been discussed extensively in recent years. It has, for example, been asked how, given

non-individualism about content, do I know that I have an attitude with respect to

water rather than twater? 4 I will for the purposes of this paper simply assume that we

can explain the authority a subject has over the contents of her attitudes by using the

fact that, in knowing what attitude she has, the subject is re-deploying an assumed

ability to think P.5 It is the first two questions, particularly the second, that will

concern me: How do I know that it is me, rather than someone else, who has the

attitude towards P, and more particularly, how do I know that I ϕ, rather than φ, that

P? It is in attempting to answer these questions that I think the agency theory of

knowledge proves its worth.

I will call the relation in which a subject stands to a content, ‘the force’ of the

subject's attitude. There are of course very many relations in which a subject can stand

to a content P. A subject can, for example, believe, think, entertain, judge, question,

doubt, fear, desire, want, wish, fancy, that P. To consider all these different forces

would involve us in more extensive a task than could reasonably be attempted here. 6

My concern will be with only those forces we can call purely cognitive forces. I will

further narrow the focus by considering those forces that characterize mental acts or

events rather than states, and which we can call assertoric.

2

We can divide the purely cognitive acts of mind into three main groups as follows:

(i) Non-committal (acts of mere thinking):

The thought that P can be entertained, apprehended, understood.

(ii) Assertoric (acts of judging):

The thought that P can be judged, denied, questioned, doubted.7

(iii) Supposition (acts of supposition):

The thought that P can be supposed, assumed, fancied, imagined. 8

Acts of merely thinking involve no stance by the subject with respect to the truth of P.

They are, as Frege put it early in his early work, 'mere complex[es] of ideas'.9 Acts of

judging imply a stance on the part of the subject as to the truth of P. In particular, they

imply a commitment on the part of the subject in relation to the actual truth of P: a

commitment to P being true, or not being true, or being unsettled or being unlikely

true. Acts of supposition also imply a stance on the part of the subject to the truth of

P. For, in assuming P the subject treats P as if true. However, in contrast to acts of

judging, they do not imply a commitment on the part of the subject in relation to the

actual truth of P. They are cases in which the subject acts as if they had commitment

with respect to the actual truth of P when they do not.10 The task adopted in this piece

will be to consider the question of how we know the assertoric force of our attitudes.

2. How do we know the assertoric force of our attitudes?

So how is it that we know that we are judging, denying, questioning and doubting?

Do we know by knowing the marks that distinguish them? What marks are those?

3

It is clear that attitudes with different force have different causal roles with respect to

behaviour. I act very differently if I judge P to be true than if I deny it. It is also pretty

clear that the basis of my knowledge that I am judging P, rather than denying P, is not

based on my observing that I am prepared to act as if P, rather than not. While the

immediate authority we have over our mental states may at times have been

exaggerated, it is clear that my knowledge that I am judging that P, rather than

denying that P, does not typically have to await the observation of any action on my

part.

Attitudes with different force also have different rational roles. My judgement that P

will give rise to different future judgements and denials than my denial that P. It

would clearly be circular to suggest that I know that I judged P at time t because of

knowing that I judged Q at time t'. But perhaps my knowledge that I judge, rather than

deny, P is based on my tracking the content transitions: could I know that I judged Q,

by tracking the transition from the contents 'P' and 'P implies Q' to 'Q'? Again,

sensitivity to content alone will not ground such knowledge. I need to know first that I

hold those contents to be true.

The suggestion that we know that we believe P by being sensitive to its

phenomenological marks has never had much appeal. The suggestion with respect to

our mental acts and activities has, I think, more to be said in its favour. It does seem

to be a feature of those mental phenomena we describe using the vocabulary of action

and activity that they are phenemenologically accessible to us, that they figure in the

stream of consciousness. For William James most thought is accompanied by varying

degrees of striving and relief. The attempt on the part of a subject to reach an opinion

4

is accompanied by a feeling of effort, of striving and the resulting judgement by a

sense of triumph, calm or easy relief. Perhaps this way of seeing things provides us

with the marks by which we are able us to know that we are questioning rather than

judging?

James distinguishes three kinds of mental activity:

(a) Bare activity

(b) Directed Immanent Activity

(c) Directed activity with resistance.

Bare activity is described as having 'no definite movement, no actor and no aim. Mere

restless zigzag movement'.11 It is hard to know what in our mental lives is

characterised as 'barely active': perhaps dreaming or random thought impressions.

What is clear is that it is less than idly thinking things through, for of the other two

kinds of activity James says:

activity…is either aimless or directed. If directed it shows tendency. The

tendency may or may not be resisted. If not we call the activity immanent, as

when the body moves in empty space by its momentum or our thoughts wander

at their own sweet will. If resistance is met its agent complicates the situation. If

now, in spite of resistance, the original tendency continues, effort makes its

appearance, and along with effort, strain or squeeze.12

So in thinking, for James, 'the experiencer…feels the tendency, the obstacle, the will,

the strain, the triumph, or the passive giving up'13. In unimpeded rational thought one

5

can assume that the subject moves effortlessly through a series of judgements. In

questioning, and enquiring the subject experiences a tension, and striving that is only

relieved by the forming of a judgement or denial. So, the move from questioning to

judging is a move from restless straining to relief. It might be thought that the

experience of tendency with absence of 'strain or squeeze' is our experience of

judgement, and that it is our experience of this straining and relief that enables us to

know that we move from questioning to judging.

I trust that I will not meet much more resistance, in finding this account of our

knowledge of the force of our attitudes wanting, than I would if rejecting the Humean

suggestion that we could know the force of our attitudes by discriminating the degree

and nature of their forcefulness or vivacity.14 The problems are extensive: what

account am I to give of my knowledge of these marks of my mental activities? Are

they sufficiently tightly correlated with the attitudes themselves for knowledge of

them to secure the authority we have over our judgements? Judgements do not

always come with relief, but can occasion high emotional strain how am I able to

distinguish one kind of relief from another? But it is not my aim to settle against such

an account here. Rather, for all its prima facie problems, I want to suggest that there is

something right about the Jamesian story and that is that the answer to how we know

the force of our attitudes flows from a consideration of them as active.

What of the suggestion that we know the force of our attitudes in virtue of a causal

mechanism that reliably converts the force of a first order state or act to the content of

a second order state or act? So that we know that we are ϕ-ing that P, because

generally, ϕ-ing that P causes the belief that I am ϕ-ing that P. I will not argue against

6

such an account here. I take it that enough critical work has been done elsewhere to

make unnecessary an extensive discussion of this suggestion. It has been a well made

charge that causal models of this kind do not secure the rational authority and control

we have over our mental states. 15 These accounts precisely leave out the rational

agency that is critical to explaining self-knowledge. It is however worth pointing out

that once we make clear that the same content can occur with different forces, it

becomes obvious that the causal theorist will have to postulate a causal mechanism

sensitive, not just to the content of the attitude, but also to its nature. The causal

theorist must explain how we get from questioning that P, rather than, say, denying

that P, to the judgement 'I question that P'. We cannot make do with a simple re-

deployment of content that was operative at the first level and a single self-ascription

operator.

If the causal theorist has in general been found to tell too mechanistic a story about

self-knowledge, what we can call, the conceptualist about self-knowledge tells one

that is too intellectualised.

The conceptualist, as I envisage him, argues that our concepts of our mental acts are

governed by certain rules, the application of which by the subject can secure for them

knowledge of those mental acts. In knowing the concepts 'judge', 'question' and 'deny'

the subject grasps rules that govern the concepts. As such they know that it is

acceptable for someone to judge 'I judge that P' on finding P to be true, to judge 'I

deny that P' on finding P not to be true, and to judge 'I doubt P' on finding the truth of

P to be doubtful. And the subject knows that it is not acceptable for someone to judge

'not-P and I judge that P' or 'P and I deny that P', or 'P, but I doubt P'. So, on this

7

story, one knows, for example, what one judges in virtue of using something like the

following rule: whenever one finds P to be true, one is ipso facto in a position to

judge 'I judge that P'. Let us call this simple rule for the self-ascription of judgement

RJ.

On the face of it applying RJ will do little to help us explain our knowledge of the

assertoric force of our acts of judgement but rather seems to rely on it. The successful

application of the rule by the subject seems to rely on their ability to know that they

have satisfied the antecedent clause. So, it will require the subject to know that they

find P to be true which does not seem very different from what we are trying to

explain. It is also difficult to see how our conceptualist will be able to frame rules that

are supposed to guide our attempts to come to know what we are denying or

questioning, that are not similarly non-explanatory. Suppose the conceptualist were to

offer rules similar to RJ for denying and questioning or doubting, let us say:

(RD) Whenever you find P not to be true, you are ipso facto in a position to judge 'I

deny that P'.

(RDt) Whenever you find the truth of P unsettled or unlikely, you are ipso facto in a

position to judge 'I question or doubt that P'.

However, again, we would then owe an explanation of the subject's knowledge that

she finds P not to be true, or to be unsettled or unlikely. It seems that if an attitude

concept figures in the antecedent clause of the rule, the subject is going to need to

know they have the attitude if they are to apply the rule. To get reference to the

attitude out of the formulation of the rules one is tempted to offer something like:

8

Whenever P is true, you are ipso facto in a position to judge' I judge that P’. But that

is simply false.

It appears that abstract mastery of the concepts and the rules that govern them,

without an assumed capacity to know our judgements immediately and spontaneously

is not sufficient to explain our normal self-knowledge. This can be further brought out

by considering George. George is a conceptual sophisticate, who has full mastery of

the rules that govern his psychological concepts but knows about himself only via

observation of his behaviour. George observes himself asserting P and on that basis

holds that he finds P to be true. Given an application of RJ, George can come to know

'I judge that P'. George does not, it seems safe to claim, know his judgements as we

know ours. Suppose he realises that RJ only gives self-knowledge when applied on

the basis of sincere assertions, and starts to worry about whether his assertion was

sincere. The application of RJ it seems, can only model the way we know our

judgements if it is assumed that we know we are judging in the way that we are

seeking to explain.16

Of course there is a real reason to doubt that George is a genuine possibility, to doubt

that he can properly be said to be judging at all if he needs to appeal to such sources

of self-knowledge. But imagined George does suggest that the source of ordinary self-

knowledge does not lie in the rules that a subject takes to govern her concepts. If

George were possible we might think he would have that source still available.

There is a further worry with the conceptualist as thus construed. It is far from clear

that the abilities to formulate or apply such rules as the conceptualist takes to be the

9

means of self-knowledge, are even necessary for self-knowledge. As long as we are

considering, and for the most part we have been, what allows a subject

knowledgeably to judge 'I ϕ that P' we can assume that the subject has the concept 'ϕ'

and so has some tacit grasp of the rules that govern it. However, such a subject need

not have these rules ready to hand. To think of the application of those rules as the

means by which a subject gains effortless self-knowledge is likely to be a mistake.

Further, we might think that a highly deliberative subject should be granted

knowledge or awareness of her mental states even prior to full-blown mastery of the

psychological concepts of judgement etc. Consider Peacocke's example of a child

who believes that his toy is in the cupboard, on the basis that this is where it is

normally kept. The child can come to find his reason insufficient and revise his belief

by having the purely world directed realization that Auntie is staying and puts toys in

the wrong place. He may not have the conceptual sophistication to be granted full

blown mastery of the psychological concepts of judgement etc. but he clearly exhibits

sensitivity to his reasons and to the nature of his attitudes and may be thought of as

having self-knowledge of some kind.

However, there is clearly something right about appealing to the rules and conceptual

connections that the conceptualist brings in when attempting to give an account of

self-knowledge. The mistake was to think of self-knowledge as the result of the

subject themselves grasping and applying the rules. The important thing is to see the

rules as rules that the subject acts in conformity with. In particular, it is true that when

a subject judges, or finds, P to be true they have, standardly, ipso facto what is needed

to know that they judge P, which they can then express using a self-ascription if they

have the requisite concepts. This is different from when a subject forms an ulcer, or a

10

depression on her chair cushion. In the former case the subject doing something,

judging that P, seems to secure, or be able to secure, knowledge that she did that

thing. This connection is the heart of what I will call 'agency theories of self-

knowledge'. But while this may be in some way right it is not clear how and why

doing ϕ gives us knowledge that we are doing ϕ?

We might, at this point, think of a pared down conceptualist agreeing that, for

instance, while the concept of judgement is governed by rules such as RJ, possession

of the concept of judgement does not require the subject to know or be able to frame

such rules. Rather, they may say, conceptual mastery partly consists in the subject's

being, in general, prepared immediately to self-ascribe her judgements when judging.

Further, the suggestion is, this is all that is needed in order for the subject to be

granted the ability, in general, to know her own judgements.17

I think it is probably right to say that mastery of this kind, with these application

conditions, is sufficient for knowledge of ones judgements. However, unlike in the

case of our earlier conceptualist, it is hard to see that we have here an explanation of

such knowledge or that we have reason to suppose that the subject's conceptual

mastery is the significant source of self-knowledge. We know that having the concept

is sufficient to secure knowledge of her judgements, but it is most natural to assume

that the source of such knowledge lies in facts about the judging itself which are

reflected in the concept. Let is go back to Peacocke's example of the child. It seems

plausible that the phenomenon of reason led judgement puts in place essential

epistemic elements prior to mastery of the concept of judgement, which would

function as part of any subsequent explanation of the child's capacity to know his own

11

states of mind. Whether there is available an account of self-knowledge that is rooted

in the nature of the attitudes known and their relation to the knowing subject, rather

primarily in features of the subject's self-ascriptions will concern as for much of what

follows.

3. Epistemic Framework: Rational Entitlement

Before attempting to explicate what I take to be the core element of the agency theory

of self-knowledge, I want to back up a little to get clear about would count as success

in this area.

The suggestions raised so far have, for the most part, attempted either to provide us

with an account of what justification the knowing subject might have to think that

they are ϕ-ing that P, or have contended that the reliable correlation of the subject's

belief that they are ϕ-ing with their ϕ-ing will suffice for self-knowledge. However, in

recent years perhaps the most significant move to be made in epistemology in general,

and in discussion of self-knowledge in particular, has been the development of the

notion of epistemic entitlement. Theorists have moved towards an epistemology that,

on the one hand, denies that subjects have knowledge only if their beliefs or

judgements are justified by inference or evidence, and on the other hand eschews the

idea that mere reliability, with no rational connection between what is known and the

knower, can secure warrant or knowledge. The key move made is to allow that there

are transitions that are rationally warranted but that are not justifiable with reference

to reasons statable by, or comprehensible to, the knowing subject. 18 I will, following

Burge, take warrant to be the genus under which entitlement and justification fall as

sub-species, and take warrant to be necessary for knowledge. Assuming that warrant

12

will not accrue from justification, the question we can now set us ourselves is: what is

it about the transition from ϕ-ing that P to judging 'I ϕ that P' that makes it one to

which the subject is rationally entitled?19

Let us take any transition from B (Base) to C (Conclusion). B and C are mental states

or acts. Even within entitlement theories there are critical differences in how warrant

is supposed to accrue to C. Some accounts of warrant by entitlement are relatively

conservative in looking for some aspect of B that will play substitute in the role

played by content in warrant by justification. Others allow that warrant by entitlement

does not have to be explicated with reference to B in particular, but can come from

the role played by C. We can call those theories that explain warrant primarily with

reference to B, 'bottom-up' theories, and those that explain warrant with reference to

the rational, epistemic or other role of C, 'top-down'.

1. Bottom-up Theories.

A bottom-up theorist holds that C is warranted in virtue of the content and/or nature

of B. Such an account allows that while the subject might not take B as the basis of

an inference or as evidence for the concluding state, nevertheless the transition from B

to C is explained as warranted due to features of B and its content.20

2. Top-down Theories

The top-down theorist holds that C is warranted either in virtue of in some way

making itself true or in virtue of its conceptual, rational, epistemic or other role.

Accounts such as Wright's (Wright (1998)) that claim that making the judgement that

I ϕ that P is part of what constitutes my judging that P is offering a top-down warrant.

13

What of the pared down conceptualist discussed earlier? He holds that the source of

self-knowledge lies in the fact that mastery of the concept of judgement means being

reliable in ones self-ascriptions. To hold that this fact constitutes the warrant needed

to make her self-ascriptions knowledgeable can be seen as a top-down view. Burge

and Shoemaker hold that the role that self-knowledge plays as a pre-condition of

critical reasoning is itself sufficient to explain what makes our self-ascriptions of

belief states ones to which we are entitled. (Burge (1996), Shoemaker (1996)). A

theorist who held that such entitlement is the only kind of entitlement for our self-

ascriptions would be a top-down theorist. Bilgrami (Bilgrami (1998)) who argues that

we must accord a subject self-knowledge given the role it plays in our being seen as

responsible agents can be seen as offering a top-down warrant for it. So called

'framework judgements' might also be thought to be judgements that accrue top-down

warrant: we are entitled to them in virtue of the role they play in our being critical

epistemic beings at all.

3. Mixed Theories

(a) One kind of mixed theorist holds that the concluding state secures independent and

distinct kinds of warrant: both from its rational, epistemic, or other role in the system

and from the content and nature of the base state. I take it that anyone who recognises

that there are forms both of bottom-up and top-down warrant may think that both

kinds of warrant will play a role in most knowledge states.

(b) A more complex kind of mixed theorist will hold that the concluding state secures

warrant only from the content and nature of the base state, but will hold that the

nature of the base state, and thus its ability to function as giving warrant to the

14

concluding state, depends upon its rational, epistemic or other role in the system. This

is a theorist who does not recognise sources of top-down warrant that are independent

of the warrant conferring role played by the base state. The warrant of the concluding

state accrues only indirectly from its broader role.

In aiming to give an account of rational entitlement in a given case we want to explain

why the transition from B to C is one the thinker is rational in making. We can take it

that a transition is one the thinker is rational in making if it tends (in normal

circumstances) to lead to true beliefs and if its tendency to do so is explained by

constitutive or relatively a priori features of the nature and content of the states or

acts of the subject involved. In aiming to give a bottom-up, or mixed, explanation of

the subject’s entitlement we will want an explanation of the entitlement to hold C to

draw on essential features of the nature or content of B.21

Given the options on offer it is clearly sensible to aim to explore whether there is

available an account of our entitlement to judgements about the force of our attitudes

that is bottom-up. It does not close off the possibility of also developing an account of

top-down warrant, either as additional warrant, or if we are unable to give any

bottom-up warrant. Further, a significant advantage to giving a bottom-up or mixed,

rather than merely a top-down, explanation, of why a conclusion is one to which the

thinker is rationally entitled is that it meets the traditional demand of theories of

warrant by justification, that warranted transitions need to be both truth conducive and

explicable as rational from the subjects point of view. Whilst denying that we need

construe 'being rational from the subject's point of view' as the demand that the

subject have beliefs or evidence that justify her conclusion, the bottom-up entitlement

15

theorist does aim to supply an account of the subject's entitlement to their conclusion

that is rooted in essential features of the state or act that is the grounds of the

transition.

If this is right we need to explain why the subject is entitled to the belief 'I am judging

that P' given that she is judging that P, in terms of features of the nature or content of

the act of judging. As we stressed at the beginning, there are, three components of the

judgement 'I am ϕ-ing that P'. Once one has accepted the demand for some bottom-up

account of warrant by entitlement one is pressed by three questions correlative to

those three components:

(a) What in the content and/or nature of B explains why the transition from it to the

content of C is one to which the thinker is entitled?

(b) What in the content and/or nature of B explains why the first person element of C

is one to which the thinker is entitled?

(c) What in the content and/or nature of B explains why the attitude element of C is

one to which the thinker is entitled?

With a clearer idea of what might count as success when giving an account of our

knowledge of our attitudes I want to turn to what I have called agency theories of self-

knowledge. According to the agency theory of self-knowledge it is the exercise of

agency that secures, or is able to secure for a subject, knowledge that she did that

thing. I want to argue that we can explain how agency gives us knowledge by

16

showing that we can explain how attention to features of agency enable us to provide

answers to these three questions.22

4. Agency and Authority

With the task set of aiming to answer these questions we can now return to ask how

agency is supposed to secure knowledge. What epistemic advantage does agency give

us that automatic self-intimation, or conceptual mastery, does not? The essence of the

agency theory is that the rational connection between the pre-suppositions of rational

agency, and the self-ascriptions we are concerned with, is of a kind that automatically

makes those self-ascriptions ones to which the subject is entitled in the absence of

evidence or reasons.

The puzzle we face in giving an account of why the transition from the act of judging

'P' to the act of judging 'I judge that P' is one to which the subject is rationally

entitled, is not that it is hard to see how the transition is reliable. Given that, on such a

transition, the means by which the self-ascription is reached is that which is self-

ascribed, self-ascriptions made on that basis will track the truth. It is rather that it is

hard to see why it is rational: from the subject's perspective the transition seems to

cross a gap between radically different and unrelated contents. The subject judges,

say, that the sky is blue. How is it in any way rational for her to judge 'I judge the sky

is blue' on that basis. How is it that the transition, from a content about the sky, to a

content which involves the first person and her attitudes, is one that is rational for the

subject? The agency theory aims to step in at this point to show that the supposed gap

between the content 'P' and the content 'I judge that P' can be closed for the subject.

The suggestion is that the gap is closed for the subject when we think of the

17

occurrence of the judgement with the content 'P' as a product of rational agency, that

is, in the context of a process of the subject determining what attitude she will adopt

by a consideration of what is true. The idea is that such a process already pre-

supposes first person and attitude elements in way that makes the subject entitled to

self-ascribe any attitude she forms as the result of such a process. What are the

relevant pre-suppositions? First, it is a pre-supposition of rational agency that the

subject has possibilities available to her such that she is able immediately to exercise

them. Second, it is a pre-supposition of rational agency that, in this case, the subject is

led by a consideration of what is true in exercising one of these possibilities rather

than another. Third, we can assume that a subject has a practical knowledge of these

possibilities in order to be able to realise one, rather than another, on the basis of a

consideration of what is true.

Elements of these three points can be seen as expressed in the following from Moran:

One must see one's deliberation as the expression and development of one's

belief and will, not an activity one pursues in the hope that it will have some

influence on one's eventual belief and will. …Were it generally the case that the

conclusion of his deliberation about what to think about something left it still

open for him what he does in fact think about it, it would be quite unclear what

he takes himself to be doing in deliberating. It would be unclear what reason

was left to call it deliberating if its conclusion did not count as making up his

mind.23

18

Moran talks about deliberation, which may call for more than I have in mind in

talking about being guided by a consideration of what is true. However, setting that

aside, we can see the quotation as suggesting the view that a subject who self-ascribes

an attitude that she formed guided by her consideration of what is true is entitled to

take the attitude to be hers, because hers are the only attitudes that can be taken

immediately on the basis of such a consideration. Further, a subject who self-ascribes

an attitude, guided by her consideration of what is true, is entitled to take the attitude

as being an attitude of ϕ-ing, because ϕ-ing is the attitude, which she has practical

knowledge of as a possibility and which her consideration of what is true immediately

led her to adopt.

Applying these thoughts to the problem with which we are concerned we can say that

one knows that one is judging, rather than denying, questioning or doubting P,

because the following are true:

1. Being a rational agent means determining ones attitudes on the basis of reason.

2. Determining one's assertoric attitudes on the basis of reason means determining

ones attitudes by a consideration of what is true.

3. Determining one’s attitudes by a consideration of what is true pre-supposes that

judging, denying, questioning or doubting are options one can immediately implement

in a given instance on the basis of such consideration.

4. It is only one’s own attitudes that one can immediately form or change on the

basis of such consideration.

5. The force of the attitude, with respect to P, that one immediately forms or changes

on the basis on a consideration of what is true is determined by one's conclusion with

19

respect to the truth of P i.e. by whether one’s conclusion is P, not-P, P is unsettled or

unlikely.

6. A subject exercising reason over her thought must have a practical knowledge of

her options to judge, deny or doubt as (a) things can be done and (b) as things that can

be done by her.24

4.1 Forming a judgement

Let us try to get a clearer view of the position by considering what is going on in a

case where a subject forms a judgement. What is it about the subject's judging that

makes her not only reliable, if she also judges that she is judging, but also entitled to

the second order judgement? What makes the transition from judging that P to

judging 'I judge that P' a rational one for the subject? We can suppose that forming a

judgement subject to reason, that is subject to a consideration of the truth of P, is a

task that makes sense relative to the capacity of a subject to ask herself the question

whether P?

Rational agents can make judgements simply on the basis of perceptions and

memories, and can make snap judgements without any explicit prior interrogative

phase. However, it seems clear that in order for their attitudes to count as subject to

reason, it is permissible to think of them as attitudes formed as an answer to the

question 'whether P?'. A subject who was not able to ask or enquire, but only to judge

or believe could not be thought to be a subject who was guided by her capacity to

reason. 25 And, note, that a subject counts as judging guided by reason, in the sense

being invoked here, just in virtue of forming her attitude on the basis of a

consideration of whether P is true. It does not mean that her reasons for finding P true

20

are good ones or are sufficient to establish the truth of P, nor does it mean that the

reasons she brings to bear are all the reasons she could bring to bear, nor need her

reasons be very sophisticated: they may amount to no more than that she accepts what

she perceives to be true. All it means is that judging that P, rather than denying P,

doubting P, or continuing to question P, is what her considering whether P actually

lead her to do in answering the question whether P.

So, how does this relate to the subject's entitlement to self-ascribe her attitudes?

Suppose X asks herself whether P. X considers whether P is true, and judges P as a

direct result. Her judgement that P is the result of her considering whether P is true.

The exercise of considering whether P is true only makes sense against the pre-

supposition that one can take a view with respect to P, that is, it pre-supposes that one

is engaged in the activity of forming ones own attitudes. The activity of attitude

formation pre-supposes a practical knowledge of the attitudes one can adopt: judging,

denying, doubting and questioning that P. Concluding that 'P is true', on considering

whether P is true, is therefore equivalent to the subject realising the practically known

possibility of judging that P. In judging 'I judge that P', on the basis of her conclusion

that 'P is true', the subject obviously judges something true. However, she also judges

something she is entitled to take as true because her self-ascription is based on her

conclusion that 'P is true' and her conclusion that 'P is true' is the result of a

consideration of whether P, which is a consideration of what attitude to take with

respect to P. If we can assume, as we have, that the subject has knowledge of whether

the content of her attitude is P, or not-P, or P is unsettled or unlikely, and we can

assume that the subject’s judgement is an immediate response to her consideration as

to the truth of P, with the practical knowledge that that is a consideration as to what

21

attitude to hold with respect to P, then in knowing that the content of her attitude is P,

the subject is immediately entitled to hold that she is judging that P.

So, to go back to our earlier three questions, the suggestion is that we can answer the

question as to 'what makes X warranted in judging 'I judge that P?' as follows:

(a) X is warranted in taking P to be the content of her attitude because she can re-

deploy an assumed ability to think P. (Re-deployment)

(b) X is warranted in taking herself to be judging that P because the possibilities of

judging P, denying P, questioning P or doubting P against which her asking herself

whether P makes sense, are possibilities for her to judge, deny, question and doubt P.

It is only her attitudes that are the attitudes that stand to be altered by a consideration

of the truth of P.

A subject with the requisite concepts might be able to articulate an a priori connection

between the project of aiming to the answer the question whether P by the evaluation

of the truth of P, and the power to bring about an attitude change in herself consonant

with the deliverance of such an evaluation. However, the entitlement does not rest on

the subject having the requisite concepts or articulating the connection.

(c) X is warranted in taking herself to be judging that P because X has concluded that

P is true which is, in the context, equivalent to her realising the practically known

possibility of judging that P on the basis of a consideration of whether P. I have

suggested that, for a rational agent, determining whether P on the basis of an

22

assessment of P, is equivalent to determining whether to exercise the practically

known possibilities of judging, denying, questioning or doubting P. In finding P, to be

true the subject realises the possibility of judging P, in finding P not to be true the

subject realises the possibility of denying P, in finding P to be unsettled the subject

realises the possibility of continuing to question whether P, and in concluding that P

is possible, but not likely, the subject is realising the possibility of doubting that P etc.

This means that the following are transitions to which a subject judging, denying,

questioning or doubting as an answer to 'whether P?' is entitled.26

(a) X judging that P (finding P to be true) as an answer to 'whether P?' is entitled to

the judgement 'I judge that P'.

(b) X denying that P (finding P not to be true) as an answer to 'whether P?' is entitled

to the judgement 'I deny that P'.

(c) X questioning or doubting whether P (finding P to be unsettled or unlikely) as an

answer to 'whether P?' is entitled to the judgement 'I question or doubt that P'.

A subject with the requisite concepts would be able to articulate an a priori connection

between the project of aiming to answer the question 'whether P', and the formation of

an attitude change consonant with the result of a consideration of that question.

However, the entitlement does not rest on the subject having the requisite concepts,

articulating the connection or applying (a), (b) and (c) as rules to her thought. A

subject who lacks the requisite concepts can be taken to be knowledgeable with

respect to the content and nature of their attitudes in virtue of the fact that the subject

23

must be assumed to have a practical knowledge of what attitude her reasons can lead

her to adopt and the equivalence between answering whether P and the formation of

one of those attitudes.

4.2 Revision.

A rational subject who reviews her cognitive commitments, say in the light of a newly

made judgement, is led by reason immediately to revise only those attitudes that are

hers, and only those that are in conflict with the new judgement. This means revising

those attitudes consonant with both their content and their force. Different revisions

are required depending on the force and contents of existing attitudes. The

identification of those attitudes that stand to be revised, and the nature of the revision

will be knowable to the subject in a way that correlates with the guidance of the

subject's reason. If, on finding that P conflicts with Q, the subject judges P and denies

Q, she is entitled to judge that she judges that P and now denies that Q because her

judging that P was the possibility she was led by her reasons to realise.

A subject with the requisite concepts would be able to articulate an a priori connection

between the project of aiming to revise her attitudes in the light of her reason and her

prior knowledge of the content and the force of her attitudes. However, a subject who

lacks the requisite concepts can be taken to be knowledgeable with respect to the

content and nature of their attitudes in virtue of the fact that the subject must be

assumed to have a practical knowledge of what attitudes she can form and revise

given that she does form and revise them guided by her reasons.

24

Although the account offered here aims to account for our knowledge of our

assertoric acts, rather than the more commonly dealt with belief, it clearly utilises

elements of extant accounts. Like Evans’ the account holds that one is in a position to

know what one judges with respect to P simply by answering the question whether P

but tries to offer more in the way of an explanation of why that is.27 It is also much

influenced by Moran's account of self-knowledge. In particular, it shares the key

assumption that self-knowledge can be seen in central cases as product of rational

agency. However, the present account has the particular aim of showing how such

agency can provide a warrant by entitlement for self-ascriptions, and insists that a

subject can have such a warrant without any conceptual mastery of the pre-

suppositions of agency on which their entitlement rests. The account also has

elements in common with constitutive accounts such as Heal's (Heal (2002)). We

have such self-knowledge, according to Heal, in virtue of the fact that answering the

question 'what do I believe? constitutes the fact of which we were enquiring. But the

account given here is non-constitutive. It is no part of the story that subjects are

authoritative over their attitudes in virtue of the self-ascriptions of their attitudes

constituting the attitudes they ascribe. It is not our decisions under the title of 'what do

I believe' that lay down our judgements. Rather, it is as common sense tells us,

forming a view with respect to P that determines our judgements. However, forming a

view with respect to P presupposes conditions of agency that are such as to entitle the

subject to the judgement that they are judging, denying, questioning or doubting P

when they are. If they ask the question what they have judged, having judged that P,

the conditions of such judgement mean that they are able to gain a knowledgeable

answer. The account of self-knowledge, and the picture of entitlement adopted, most

obviously reflected here are those offered by Peacocke. However, while Peacocke

25

explains how knowledgeable self-ascriptions are possible, in the absence of evidence

or inference, by appealing to the idea that a conscious state can stand as the basis for

its own ascription, the account offered here tries to explain such a possibility in terms

of the conditions supposed by rational agency.28 While Peacocke's account might

seem to have the advantage of applying to the self-ascription of all of our mental

states (or rather of all those which can be conscious) it is never very clear what

account is being given of consciousness and so not clear how the normative

connections required for warrant are explained. To the extent that the account offered

here has succeeded in showing how the distinct elements of the self-ascription are

warranted by distinct elements pre-supposed by rational agency the account offered

here takes a step forward.

5. Objections

5.1 Voluntarism

It might be objected that in appealing to agency the account adopts an overly

voluntarist conception of judgement. But it is important to stress that the account does

not need to see judgements as something that the agent can merely will to do. The

suggestion is not that the agent knows that they are judging because the agent can

make true, by an effort of will, that fact that they are accurately self-ascribing their

judgement. One way in which one’s being an agent can play a role in explaining ones

knowledge of something is that as an agent one can, in some cases, choose to make

true the thing that one claims knowledge of. I can claim to know that my daughter

will be picked up from school at 3.30pm because it is within my voluntary control to

make it happen. I can know that she will be picked up at 3.30pm by going to pick her

up at 3.30pm. I think, however, that it is entirely implausible to suppose that I know

26

that I am judging that P, because it is within my power to choose to make it true that I

am judging that P (although it may be in my power to make it true that I come to view

with respect to P). My judgements are under my rational control, but not under the

kind of voluntary control the model supposes. And the suggestion as to why we are

knowledgeable with respect to our judgements does not rest on this idea. Agency

plays a role in explaining our knowledge of our judgements not because I can decide

to judge that P, and so make true my belief about what I judge. Rather, agency is

important because in order for it to be the case that I can be guided by a consideration

of the truth of P to judge that P, it has to be that I judge that P against some capacity

to know the attitudes I might be led immediately to form.29

5.2 Judgement without evaluation

It might be objected that the account is able to explain our knowledgeable self-

ascription of assertoric attitudes only in cases where they are made on the basis of a

consideration of whether P. What, it will be said, are we to make of those cases where

we judge, doubt etc. immediately on what seems to be no basis at all?30 How do such

cases affect the story about why we are entitled to claim knowledge of such attitudes?

If the complaint is that there may be creatures who believe or judge in some

attenuated sense in which their judgements are not guided by, or subject to, reasons,

but who simply form representations capable of being veridical and which guide

behaviour, I have made it clear that I am happy to acknowledge that the account may

not deliver self-knowledge in those cases. However, I think, we would not want to

deliver self-knowledge in those cases. So, let us assume that the complaint is that we,

and perhaps less sophisticated reasoners, often form judgements without reasons

seeming to come in to play.

27

It might be supposed that the suggestion offered, in terms of a bottom-up warrant by

entitlement, has the advantage over a top-down story in making the subject's view of

things play a role in explaining the warrant for her self-ascription, but only at the cost

of limiting such cases to those in which the subject is actively reasoning. But I think

that this cannot be quite right. It is a commonplace that even when a subject's

knowledge rests on justification, say when a conclusion rests on her believing the

premises and principles required for its demonstration, she does not actually have to

run through the demonstration, or the premises and principles in order to be credited

with knowledge of the conclusion. Indeed, she does not even have to be conscious of

having any reasons for her conclusion. A subject knows just if her conclusion is one

she could (holding her abilities fixed) have reached had she explicitly brought to mind

what were in fact her reasons. It seems to me that we can say that the case where a

subject asks whether P, and judges accordingly can provide us with a paradigm case

in which the normative connections are clearly manifest. However, we can add that

the normative connections and with it the entitlement, carry over to those cases in

which a subject seemingly forms a judgement on the basis of nothing. If it is

genuinely a judgement that the subject forms then it is a commitment to the truth of P

that is subject to a consideration of whether P. Therefore, it must be such that had the

subject asked herself whether P, while being in the same rational state but having

access to the reasons she in fact has for truth of P, she would have answered as she

did. For this reason we can take the entitlement to hold in cases in which the subject

judges seemingly on the basis of nothing.31

28

5.3 Belief It would be more than unwise to attempt to produce an account of how we know such

dispositional attitude states as belief, as well as attempting to shed light on our

knowledge of such acts of mind as our judgements. A proper account would need to

be given of the relation between the two. For example, there seem to be conditions on

genuine belief that do not hold in the same way for judgement. We doubt that

someone has a belief, even if they declare that they have it, if is not something that

they go on to act on the basis of. While we might think it essential that judgements

normally function to lay down beliefs that will direct future action, we are perhaps

happier to allow cases of fly by night judgement that bring in no long term

dispositional commitments.32 However, that said, an adequate account of our

knowledge of our beliefs may well rest on adequate account of our knowledge of our

judgements conjoined with an account of the causal, rational and conceptual

connections between belief and judgement. The immediacy, authority and spontaneity

known to characterize our knowledge of our beliefs will very likely come from the

immediacy, authority and spontaneity that characterises our knowledge of our

judgements and which seems to follow from them being products of rational agency.

29

References Bell, D. (1987), 'The Art of Judgement' Mind 96:221-224. Bilgrami, A. (1988) 'Self-Knowledge and Resentment' in MacDonald et al. (1998).

Burge, T. (2003), 'Perceptual Entitlement', in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

(1998), 'Reason and the First Person' in MacDonald et al. (1998).

(1996), 'Our Entitlement to Self-knowledge', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96, 91-116.

(1993) 'Content Preservation', Philosophical Review 103: 457-488.

Dretske, F. (2000), 'Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60: 591-606. Frege, G. (1980), Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (ed) Geach and Black 3rd edition. Heal, J. (2002) 'On First Person Authority' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102, 1-19. Hume, D. (1978), A Treatise of Human Nature, Edited by L.A Selby-Bigge and P.H.Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press. James, W. (1976) 'The Experience of Activity' in his Essays in Radical Empiricism Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Gallois, A. (2000), 'First Person Accessibility and Consciousness', Philosophical Topics 28.2: 101-146. Lawlor, K. (2001), New Thoughts about Old Things: Cognitive Policies and the Ground of Singular Concepts. New York: Garland. MacDonald, C., Smith B. & Wright C. (eds.), (1998), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays of Self-Knowledge. Oxford: OUP. Moran, R. (2001), Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pryor, J. (2000), ‘The Sceptic and the Dogmatist’, Noûs 34:4, 517-549 O'Brien, L. (2003), 'Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge', European Journal of Philosophy 11.3: 375-390. Peacocke, C. (1999), Being Known, Oxford: OUP.

30

(1998), 'Conscious Attitudes, Attention and Self-knowledge' in MacDonald et al. (1998). (2002), 'Three Principles of Rationalism, European Journal of Philosophy, 10: 375-397. Roessler, J. (1999), 'Perception, Introspection and Attention', European Journal of Philosophy 7.1:47-64. Shoemaker, S. (1996), The First Person Perspective and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sosa, E. (1991), 'Intellectual Virtue in Perspective' in Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Velleman, J. D. (2000). ‘On the aim of belief’ in The Possibility of Practical Reason, 244–281. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williams, M. (2000), 'Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60:607-612. Wright, C. (1998), 'Self-Knowledge: The Wittgensteinian Legacy', in MacDonald et al. (1998). 1 This paper has been presented at research seminars in Bristol, Nottingham, Stirling, St Andrews and

London. My thanks to audiences for very helpful comments. I have also benefited from written

comments from José Luis Bermúdez, and David Bain and discussion of the paper with Jen Hornsby,

Sarah Patterson and Sarah Richmond. I also owe much to Tyler Burge, Richard Moran and Mark Sacks

for related discussion.

2 Moran (2001) is probably the most sustained treatment of the connections and it is clearly the greatest

influence on the account offered here. But see also Bilgrami (1998), Gallois (2000) and Roessler

(1999).

4 But see Lawlor (2001) for a somewhat different problem about knowing the contents of our attitudes.

5 The suggestion is primarily Burge's. It is developed by others, most notably in Peacocke (1999,

Chapter 5)

6 I will also not consider seeing, hearing, smelling, and so on, that P, nor cases of visually, aurally or

tactilely imagining P. Such cases are likely to be subject to an importantly different account of self-

knowledge to that appropriate to purely cognitive states or acts.

31

7 Although these four basic kinds of assertoric act will be the focus in what follows it is important to

acknowledge that there is significant oversimplification in their identification. There may be categories

that are not represented – degrees of acceptance perhaps – and the cateorogies that are acknowledged

may not pick out only one kind of mental act.

8 I take much of this classification from Bell (1987). I will treat judgement and denial as distinct

attitudes: if there are contents with indeterminate truth-values then denying that P may not be

equivalent to judging that Not-P.

9 See Frege (1980, p.2).

10 On this point see Velleman (2000). 11 James (1976, p.82)

12 James(1976), p.84

13 James (1976), p.84.

14 For Hume "An opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the

nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of its being conceiv'd. But when I would explain this

manner, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am obliged to have recourse to

everyone's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind. An idea assented

to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone present to us: and this different feeling I

endeavour to explain by calling it superior force, or vivacity, or solidity or firmness or steadiness"

Hume (1978, p. 629)

15 See Shoemaker (1996), Burge (1996), Moran (2001), Heal (2002).

16 George is, of course, named after Shoemaker's George (1996, p. 35). However, I am not sure that

they are the same George. Shoemaker's George lacks any capacity for internal self-observation, it is

less clear whether he is also stipulated to gain knowledge of himself only through external observation

and the application of such rules to his behaviour.

17 George, for example, may not be credited with the concept as he is not in general prepared to self-

ascribe his judgements, he is only prepared to when he expresses them.

18 This position has been carved out by Burge in number of papers: Burge (1993) with respect to

memory and testimony, Burge (1996) with respect to self-knowledge, and 'Perceptual Entitlement',

forthcoming, with respect to perception. However, it was already in play in Sosa (1991). It is also

developed in Dretske (2000) and Peacocke (1999) and (2002).

32

19 Note that using 'warrant' and 'justification' in this way is merely a terminological decision. There

would be no substantial disagreement with someone who wanted to insist that one could have

justification for a belief that P that was not justification by reason or evidence. See Williams (2000).

20 Bottom-up entitlement is most familiar from discussions of perceptual entitlement: where it is

claimed that a transition from a perception with non-conceptual content to a perceptual belief with

related conceptual content is warranted in virtue of the nature of perception and perceptual content.

See Burge (2003), Peacocke (2002) and Pryor (2000)

21 I take the essentials of this gloss on rational entitlement from Peacocke (2002). It is also in play in

Peacocke (1999, pp.235-245.)

22 I am assuming that we can explain knowledge in the conclusion if we can explain our entitlement to

such transitions.

23 Moran (2001, p. 94) 24 Note that I do take such practical knowledge to require the subject to have the concepts and beliefs

that would be required to articulate it. Rather, it is plausible to think that the content of our practical

knowledge will be non-conceptual in much the way that our perceptual knowledge can be.

25 Note that we may want to allow that simpler animals can be ascribed beliefs in the form of non-

analogue representational states which control and regulate behaviour without any capacity to wonder

whether P.

26 I have already mentioned the extent to which matters have been oversimplified by talking about only

the four central cases of judging, denying, questioning and doubting. The effects of such

oversimplification become clearer here. First, because it is not clear that finding p unsettled is always

to continue to question P. It might rather be a decision to take up a neutral attitude to P or perhaps to

prescind from taking any attitude to P. Second, we might want to acknowledge acts of mind

corresponding to different conclusions with respect to the likelihood of P. I am supposing that the basic

story will be able to accommodate such possibilities with the appropriate fine-graining.

27However, it is unclear exactly what aspect of agency Moran takes self-knowledge to depend on. See

O’Brien (2003).

28 On a view where a cognitive attitude's being conscious is a matter of its being subject to rational

control, this account comes out as a version of Peacocke's.

33

29 It is not my aim to offer an account of what I called non-committal and suppositional acts of thought

in this piece. However, it is worth noting that we are not similarly inclined to resist the idea that acts of

supposition are voluntary to a significant degree. Unlike assertoric acts of thought that involve an

attitude to the actual truth of P, acts of supposition involve a subject treating P as if true for some

purpose. This suggests that in such a case it may be that I know that I assume that P because it is up to

me to assume P and there is no question of my not being able to do what I will. In contrast, acts of

merely thinking that P seem to invoke agency to a lesser degree than assertoric thought. To the extent

that merely thinking involves mere contents passing through one's mind, with no attitude to their truth

or falsity, one might wonder whether it is the job of a theory of the knowledge of the force of our

attitudes to explain such knowledge. It is tempting to say that whatever explanation we give of how we

answer the question of how we know the content component of our self-ascriptions can do duty here.

Suppose the right account of how we know the content of our attitudes will establish that if I ϕ that P I

can know that I am thinking that P, whatever ϕ . Then knowledge that I am merely thinking that P will

be something I can have by thinking that P and being entitled to the conclusion that I am not taking an

attitude to the truth of P. 30 There is an issue here of what to think about judgement formed on the basis of perceptions or

memories. Are we to think that perceptions and memories, themselves, can be reasons? I will not take a

view on this, but do hold that in so far as subject a subject forms her judgements with the option of

taking, or not taking, her perceptions or memories, at face value, we can count them as knowable by

the subject in the way that judgements guided by reasons are knowable.

31 I am assuming that we can bracket any effects that actually questioning whether P or that explicit

rationalizing may produce.

32 Note that it might also be argued that whether or not a mental action counts as a genuine judgement

that P, rather than a whim, say, will also rest on whether the subject actually forms a belief that P. In

which case if a subject takes herself to have judged P, but has not – in virtue of failing to form any

belief P – then she obviously cannot know that she judged P. It is false. It is worth noting that this is

compatible with denying that she needs to know that she formed a belief in order to know that she

judges when she does and compatible with holding that she knows her belief in virtue of knowing her

judgement. If belief is indeed an essential consequence of genuine judgement this is just what we

would expect.

34

35