self-governance for climate engineering research...in this context, the case of self-governance for...

Self-Governance for Climate Engineering Research

Implications from rDNA Technology

Stefan Schäfer and Sean Low

Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS)

Berliner Str. 130, 14467 Potsdam

[email protected]

[email protected]

1. Introduction

Technologies capable of intervening in the global climate system are currently being discussed

as a possible contribution to attempts at counteracting climatic changes in the future. These tech-

nologies are collectively referred to as climate engineering or geoengineering technologies. They

aim to counteract rising global mean temperatures either by decreasing the concentration of CO2

in the atmosphere (carbon dioxide removal, CDR) or by increasing the amount of incoming solar

radiation that is reflected away from the earth (solar radiation management, SRM).

There is a wide array of applications within both suites, and while some are more mature than

others, all are still in the foundational stages of risk assessment and technology development.1

During this upstream phase of technological emergence, understanding is largely confined to the

results of laboratory research and modeling. Proposals for small scale field trials have met with

differing degrees of contestation and resistance, such as the Indo-German LOHAFEX ocean fer-

tilization experiment and the UK SPICE project. There has so far been only limited scoping into

1 More detailed discussion of possible typologies for categorizing the various proposed climate engineering

technologies can be found in the various assessment reports on the topic (Royal Society, 2009; Gordon,

2010; House of Commons, 2010; United States Government Accountability Office, 2010a, 2010b; Rickels

et al., 2011). While acknowledging that a large number of technologies are being proposed under the um-

brella term climate engineering, in this study we use ‘climate engineering’ to refer to any technology from

the suite of proposed climate engineering technologies that can be expected to have a significant trans-

boundary impact. The most relevant (since affordable and highly effective) are stratospheric aerosols and

marine cloud brightening, but our argument applies equally to ocean fertilization, large-scale afforestation,

albedo modification of deserts, and mirrors in space (see Zürn and Schäfer, 2013).

mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Self-Governance for Climate Engineering Research: Implications from rDNA Technology

Stefan Schäfer & Sean Low (IASS)

DRAFT - DO NOT CIRCULATE

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public and governmental perceptions of climate engineering technologies (Mercer et al., 2011;

Renn et al., 2011; Borick and Rabe, 2012; Corner et al., 2012; Hiller and Renn, 2012; Kahan et

al., 2012; Pidgeon et al., 2012; Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013). In general, the discourse on

climate engineering technologies is only beginning to emerge, with numerous framings – tech-

nical, political, and ethical – competing for authority.

Accordingly, the governance of climate engineering is a contested subject. Possible governance

options for climate engineering technologies have been discussed in some depth (Barrett, 2008;

Victor, 2008; Victor et al., 2009; Royal Society, 2009; Virgoe, 2009; Morgan and Ricke, 2010;

Banerjee, 2011; SRMGI, 2011; Zürn and Schäfer, 2011, 2013; Parson and Ernst, 2012; Abelkop

and Carlson, 2012). While some existing governance structures might be applicable in later stag-

es (or made applicable through a process of political reinterpretation), there is no protocol for the

governance of these technologies at this early stage.

A common theme in many publications, presentations, and general discussions on the govern-

ance of climate engineering technologies is the assertion that self-governance by the scientific

community – for example, through a voluntary code of conduct that initiates a bottom-up genera-

tion of norms – is a desirable and effective approach to managing the issues associated with re-

search on climate engineering technologies (Victor 2008).

In this context, the case of self-governance for recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology research

during its emerging stage has been mentioned as a model, or source case, based on which self-

governance principles for climate engineering research can be developed (Long and Winickoff

2010). A 2010 conference on the governance of climate engineering was even explicitly modeled

after the seminal 1975 conference on the governance of rDNA technology, and held at the same

location (Asilomar, California). In suggesting similarities between rDNA technology and climate

engineering with implications for governance, the analogy provides a distinct framing for climate

engineering which has, however, not been made explicit so far.




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This implies a claim that we can draw insights for possible governance mechanisms through

comparisons to analogical cases – i.e., that how governance evolved in preceding cases of tech-

nology emergence can provide guidance for how to proceed in similar cases we face today.

However, governance for an emerging technology does not arise as a functional response to the

somehow objectively revealed governance needs of that technology. Rather, governance is itself

embedded in the dominant narrative surrounding a given technology. Governance emerges both

from within and as a response to this narrative. The form of governance, as a social model for

handling and controlling perceived risks (Kasperson et al., 1988; Gottweis, 1998, p. 263; Renn,

2005), is then determined by the dominant interpretation of what issues are at stake in the first

place. The form of governance thus is highly dependent on the framing of its subject.

In this paper, we assess the strengths and limitations of self-governance for climate engineering

research by critically examining the analogy suggested by its proponents: that between the cur-

rent situation with regard to climate engineering and the early developmental stages of rDNA

technology. Our goal is to examine whether the same circumstances that made self-governance

possible for rDNA technology also exist in the climate engineering case. If the framing for cli-

mate engineering invoked by the analogy between rDNA technology and climate engineering is

consistent with the dominant narrative that is currently emerging around climate engineering,

this supports the notion that self-governance for climate engineering is possible. If, however, the

framing provided by the analogy is inconsistent with the emerging dominant narrative of climate

engineering, then the possibility of self-governance for climate engineering- or at the least, the

utility of the analogy as a justification therefore- needs to be questioned.

To this end, we analyze the dominant narrative – from which governance would flow – that

formed around rDNA technology in the US during the time period between 1971 and 1981, and

compare this to the dominant narrative that is currently forming around climate engineering. The

analogy between rDNA technology and climate engineering can only support the notion that

self-governance for climate engineering is possible if the dominant narratives are similar in the

two discourses.




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We find that the dominant narrative of rDNA technology during its foundational stages narrowly

focused on technical risks, while the early climate engineering discourse has seen a more expan-

sive scoping of societal, political, and ethical challenges. We conclude that self-governance by

the scientific community was only possible in the rDNA case because scientists were considered

a natural authority for addressing the technical risks on which the dominant narrative of rDNA

technology centered at the time. From this follows that the more expansive scoping of challenges

that we are experiencing in the case of climate engineering demands that actors and institutions

be involved in the governance of climate engineering whose legitimacy rests on a broader basis

than on the ability to find technical solutions to technical risks. Since scientists are not capable of

legitimately addressing the broader challenges that the dominant narrative of climate engineering

centers on, self-governance by the scientific community as it emerged in the rDNA case is not

possible for climate engineering. However, the scientific community still has the ability to pro-

vide legitimacy to future scientific research, most importantly by voluntarily and outspokenly

refraining from field testing climate engineering technologies in the absence of appropriate gov-

ernance mechanisms. Field testing in the absence of appropriate governance mechanisms would

delegitimize climate engineering research, lead to an increase in societal and political conflict

potential, and impede any future research efforts. Appropriate governance for field tests cannot,

however, come from scientists.

We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews how analogical reasoning has been used in the existing

literature on climate engineering, and develops our own methodology against this background.

Section 3 provides in-depth case studies of rDNA technology and climate engineering. Section 4

systematically compares the two cases and identifies the implications of our analysis for the gov-

ernance of climate engineering.

2. Literature Review and Methodology

Most analogies to climate engineering revolve around the assessment of risks and uncertainties,

and development of early governance arrangements, for ‘emerging’ issues in science, technolo-

gy, or environmental management. These have tended to be antecedent debates in a variety of




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disciplinary issues ranging from warfare to medicine, in which an innovation in technology or

technique was accompanied by a lack of concrete knowledge of the impacts of that innovation on

other systems in the social, political, and/or natural world. Comparisons have been made, with

varying degrees of sophistication and depth, between climate engineering and nanotechnology,

biotechnology, nuclear physics and technology, the railroad system, weather modification, ozone

management, and major dam projects (Matthews and Turner, 2009; Barrett, 2008; Victor et al.,

2009; Allenby, 2010; Fleming, 2010; House of Commons, 2010; Reynolds, 2011; Banerjee,

2011; Blackstock and Ghosh, 2011; Benedick, 2011; Pidgeon et al, 2012).

These comparisons are based on an assumption of similarity between climate engineering and

the analogical case: for example, in the threats it poses to the natural world, its impacts on socie-

tal organization, its ethical implications, its intellectual roots, or in its implications for state inter-

actions at the international level. From these similarities, conclusions are drawn about the do-

main the researcher is interested in, such as the intellectual legacy behind climate engineering

(Fleming, 2010), climate engineering’s effects on ecosystems (Matthews and Turner, 2009), or

the governance of climate engineering (Benedick, 2011).

In this paper, we are interested in examining the conclusions that have been suggested can be

drawn about the governance of climate engineering based on its similarities with rDNA technol-

ogy. We are interested in this specific analogy for two reasons. First and foremost, the rDNA

technology analogy to climate engineering has developed particular traction in the discourse on

climate engineering. In a 2010 meeting on climate engineering, the conveners consciously in-

voked a 1975 meeting on the potential hazards of research on rDNA technology, and how best to

manage them, by choosing as the geographic location for their meeting the same surroundings

where the 1975 meeting had been held (Asilomar, California). The leading figure of the 1975

meeting, Paul Berg, was invited as an advisor and honorary chair. In the brochure to the 2010

climate engineering conference, the organizers write:

‘Scientists in other fields have previously faced public concerns about the risks of experi-

mentation. In February of 1975, scientists studying recombinant DNA recognized that their




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experiments might result in release of modified organisms capable of causing cancer or other

lethal diseases. Paul Berg, who won the Nobel Prize in 1980, co-chaired the historic Asi-

lomar Conference on Recombinant DNA molecules that to this day is recognized as a land-

mark effort in self-regulation by the scientific community. […] Because of the effectiveness

of the ultimate guidelines and procedures, there have been no dangerous releases of organ-

isms modified with recombinant DNA technologies.’2

It is thus important to scrutinize the core claim of the analogy, i.e. that the upstream governance

of climate engineering can and should follow the model of upstream governance of rDNA tech-

nology during the 1970s, in an effort to understand what this claim is based upon – its rationale,

implications, appropriateness, and legitimacy.

The absence of such considerations in the current discourse on the rDNA technology-climate

engineering analogy provides the second reason for our interest in this specific analogy. Even

though the analogy has provided a framing for real-world events such as an international confer-

ence, there is no in-depth reflection on what the relevant similarities between the two cases are,

and whether the implications for governance that are suggested on the basis of the analogy are

legitimate. For example, Long and Winickoff (2010) note:

‘Geoengineering research is not the first case of science requiring government oversight

within democratic societies. Nanotechnology, nuclear technology, and recombinant DNA all

pose hazards to society. Government agencies must have ultimate authority to govern these

technologies, and oversight must evolve through a publicly accountable process. Of course,

researchers can initiate the process themselves. In 1975, the Nobelist Paul Berg organized a

conference at Asilomar in California to discuss the potential hazards of recombinant DNA

(rDNA) research and establish self-governing principles for safe science. […] The vibrant

rDNA research program in this country is, in part, a testament to the success of this process.

The organizers of a meeting on the governance of geoengineering (held at Asilomar in

March 2010) consciously invoked the original rDNA meeting.’

Long and Winickoff argue that because rDNA technology ‘poses hazards to society’ and thus,

like climate engineering today, ‘[requires] government oversight within democratic societies’, it

can be analogically related to climate engineering in a manner that justifies the transposition of

governance principles from the source case (rDNA technology) to the target case (climate engi-

2 Brochure available for download from http://climateresponsefund.org/images/stories/announcement.pdf

[last accessed on 11 October 2012].

http://climateresponsefund.org/images/stories/announcement.pdf




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neering). But what exactly are these hazards? Are the hazards that are today being articulated in

the context of climate engineering really similar to those that were articulated in the context of

rDNA technology during its emerging stage? This question has so far not been addressed.

Defining risks is not a technical question, but rather an act of social construction. Risks do not

come into existence simply because certain scientific developments occur. They come into exist-

ence ‘[…] through complex and multiple processes of inscription, interpretation, and boundary

work carried out by a variety of actors and informed by scientific and political discourses’

(Gottweis 1998, p 77).

Governance for technologies that are associated with certain risks thus emerges from a political

space that defines meanings via authoritative interpretations set forth by dominant actors. These

interpretations then form the dominant narrative surrounding a technology. Accordingly, the

dominant narrative for a technology is a construct that is defined in a struggle between different

individuals or groups who tell different ‘risk stories’ (ibid.). Governance emerges both from

within and as a response to this narrative. Accordingly, it is not enough to assert that technolo-

gies share certain technical risks and thus can and should be governed by similar (technical)

norms and rules. The relevant question is whether risk perceptions and the associated dominant

narrative for a technology are similar in both cases.

This context is often disregarded in ‘technical’ analyses of risks and of the ‘objective governance

needs’ that follow. Thus, suggestions for climate engineering governance that are grounded in

arguments from analogical reasoning are often insufficiently supported by the analogy they draw

upon, and likely to be overly simplistic at best, and misleading at worst.

Methodologically, we thus go beyond technical analyses of risk in an effort to understand the

processes of inscription and interpretation that accompanied the emergence of rDNA technology,

how these processes are currently occurring in the context of climate engineering, the similarities

and differences between the two cases with regard to these processes, and the implications this

has for governance of climate engineering. This is necessary to understand whether the claim




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that there is an analogical relationship between rDNA technology and climate engineering that is

relevant to their governance can be upheld because it is precisely these processes that produce

governance and define its form, rather than isolated considerations of ‘objective risks’.

3. Case Studies

The first case study in this section provides a history of the dominant narrative of rDNA technol-

ogy during its foundational stages, and of the governance mechanisms that were instituted during

this period. The second case study gives an overview of current developments in climate engi-

neering, and of the dominant narrative that is currently forming in this area.

Case 1: Recombinant DNA (1971-1981)

In 1971, plans for an experiment led by Paul Berg, in which rDNA was to be introduced into E.

coli cells via an sv40 vector, were halted after colleagues of the involved researchers voiced con-

cerns over the risks that could result from the procedure. Since sv40 was known to cause cancer

in rodents, and E. coli bacteria are a natural inhabitant of the human intestinal tract (although not

the strain used by Berg), there were concerns that the release of E. coli carrying the sv40 DNA

might lead to the viral spread of a cancer-causing gene in the human population (Berg and Mertz,

2010, p. 13). This was the first act of voluntary self-governance in rDNA research – indeed, the

researchers involved in the planning of this experiment considered their action a self-imposed

moratorium (see Berg and Mertz, 2010, p. 14). As a reaction to the concerns that arose in the

context of the aborted 1971 experiment, a conference was held at Asilomar in January 1973,

which resulted in a set of safety recommendations for scientists working with tumor viruses and

rDNA that contained them (Hellman et al., 1973).

The research community, however, was not monolithic or static. In March 1973, following mul-

tiple, overlapping advancements in the field (described in Berg and Mertz, 2010; Yi, 2008), Stan-

ley Cohen, Herbert Boyer, and their colleagues succeeded in transplanting rDNA into E. coli

bacteria (Cohen et al., 1973). This seminal event would provide physical proof of the field’s the-




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oretical principles – as well as a suddenly more tangible array of technical, social, and ethical

issues.

At the Gordon conference3 held in June of that year, when Herbert Boyer introduced what would

become colloquially known as the Cohen-Boyer experiment, participants produced and sent a

letter to the President of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the President of the Na-

tional Institute of Medicine, suggesting ‘that the Academies establish a study committee to con-

sider this problem and to recommend specific actions or guidelines, should that seem appropri-

ate’ (Singer and Söll, 1973). Immediately, the social and political acceptability of such an exper-

iment was questioned; for example, by a European audience at a NATO molecular biology

workshop in Sicily (as recalled by Berg, quoted in Gottweis, 1998: 83). As a reaction to these

events, Philip Handler, President of the NAS, set up a committee of experts on the topic led by

Paul Berg, which also contained both Boyer and Cohen.4

Indeed, there was an overarching context carried forward from the social movements and politi-

cal upheavals of the late 1960s, characterized by widespread questioning of the roles and rela-

tionships of government, society, and business. Many scientists felt that the emerging rDNA de-

bate needed to incorporate concerns about the role of scientists and novel fields of research, pub-

lic participation, and ‘bioethics’, which had concurrently developed during the early 1970s (Pe-

terson et al., 2010).

However, the key issue that the research community honed in upon was the risk of ‘biohazards’:

the development of unknown characteristics or mutations of various experimental rDNA strains,

the risks of exposure to researchers, and even the public, should samples escape laboratory con-

trols. Biohazards also comprised the thrust of the ‘Berg letter’, published in July 1974 by the

Berg committee in Science and PNAS. It listed four recommendations that included a voluntary

moratorium on certain types of experiments until hazards and safety measures were assessed, as

3 Gordon Research Conferences are being held since 1931 on topics from the biological, chemical, and phys-

ical sciences. For 2012 and 2013, over 500 conferences are planned (www.grc.org). 4 The Berg Committee, or, formally, the Committee on rDNA Molecules Assembly of Life Sciences, Nation-

al Research Council, NAS.

http://www.grc.org/




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well as the suggestion to convene an international meeting ‘to review scientific progress in this

area and to further discuss appropriate ways to deal with the potential biohazards of recombinant

DNA molecules’ (Berg et al. 1974). The letter also called on the Director of the National Insti-

tutes of Health to create an advisory committee on rDNA research. In response, the NIH estab-

lished the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) in October 1974.

However, during this time, separate co-developments in the field would complicate these early

formulations of risk management. Despite some reservations on the propriety of such a move,

Cohen and Boyer, acceding to pressure from Niels Reimer, the head of Stanford University’s

Office of Technology Licensing, in June 1974 filed to patent the method of DNA manipulation

contained in their experiment (Hughes, 2001, p. 550). This would spark a number of personal

and professional disputes. Berg, himself a colleague of Cohen’s at Stanford, was then at the fore-

front of efforts to establish stronger procedures for assessing and governing biohazard risks in

rDNA experiments. A patent application – from within his own institution, no less – could only

undermine the efforts of the rDNA research community to establish rules and responsibilities in

their own field.

Firstly, the method for which the patent was sought had been a patchwork procedure, derived

from the efforts of many scientists whose names were not listed on the patent application – in-

cluding Berg. More significantly, the patenting of a foundational rDNA method signaled a new

trend towards potentially divisive intellectual property battles along with the privatization of

knowledge and its potential use for commercial endeavors (Hughes, 2001; Yi, 2008; Kenny,

1998; Berg and Mertz, 2010). Finally, the patent was singularly ill-timed, coming just ahead of a

seminal conference to explore and address biohazardous risk in rDNA research, to be held in

February 1975 at Asilomar.

The 1975 ‘Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA Molecules’ was another endeavor spear-

headed by Berg, and was the ‘international meeting’ called for in the recommendations of the

Berg letter of 1974 on the need to scope and govern biohazardous risk. In the summary statement

to the Asilomar conference, published in June, principles for dealing with these risks were estab-




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lished: ‘(i) that containment be made an essential consideration in the experimental design and

(ii) that the effectiveness of the containment should match, as closely as possible, the estimated

risk’ (Berg et al. 1975). To this end, types of containment and types of experiments were devel-

oped, constituting a metric of risk assessment and management that allowed participants to as-

sign to a spectrum of experiments matching forms of regulation, as well as preventing discus-

sions from centering on complete freedom of investigation or complete prohibition (Peterson et

al., 2010, p. 11).

However, the Asilomar meeting organizers deliberately sacrificed discussions of societal, geopo-

litical, and ethical challenges in favor of a more focused analysis of the technical risks of biohaz-

ards, although this did not reflect a consensus within the research community (Wright, 1994;

Gottweis, 1998, pp. 87-88; Banerjee, 2011). Berg recalls this decision as purely expedient, and as

a major factor in producing agreement on a complex issue within a diverse community (Berg,

2001; see also Peterson et al., 2010, p. 11). But this action has also been criticized as an attempt

by a smaller subset of the community to narrow the bounds of ‘risk’ to purely technical charac-

teristics, in order to make it more manageable for self-governing initiatives, and to preempt ex-

ternal regulation over what might otherwise have been a much more extensive array of societal

issues and uncertainties (Gottweis 1998, pp. 87-88).

As a result of the conference, the self-imposed moratorium called for in the Berg letter was lift-

ed. It had been in force for 8 months, during which it has apparently been fully observed. Berg,

Cohen, and their respective camps managed to avoid discussion of the patenting attempt

(Hughes, 2001). The NIH would then publish its first version of the ‘Guidelines for Research

Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules’ in 1976, based on a proposal by RAC. The guidelines

explicitly mention that they replace the Asilomar recommendations, published in the conference

summary report, thus conveying quasi-legal status to this document while securing their own

legitimacy in the eyes of the scientific community as the legacy of Asilomar (Gottweis 1998, p

91). However, this involved no legally binding laws and regulations and no formal penalties. The

enforcement of these guidelines relied on scientists’ sense of professional obligation and on their

fear of losing funding from the NIH.




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In between 1976 and 1979, twelve legislative bills were proposed within the U.S Congress for

transitioning the current system of self-governance to stricter external regulation of rDNA re-

search, ranging from mandatory adherence of NIH guidelines, to a commission with govern-

ment-appointed members, to the application of various bodies of federal and local law (Fredrick-

son, 2001). None of these passed. One reason for this might have been the relative unity of the

scientific community in opposing government regulation, due to concerns that this would be too

heavy-handed. In July, an open letter to Congress was published in Science, signed by a large

majority of the attendees of that year’s Gordon conference (137 signatures, 86 percent of the

attendees), opposing regulation of rDNA research that goes beyond the NIH Guidelines (Gilbert,

1977). Scientists tended to cite the many scoping conferences conducted and committees already

in place, as well as the absence of laboratory accidents in the years since Asilomar, as evidence

that self-governance had so far been up to the challenge of managing biohazardous risk (Gott-

weis, 1998, p. 101; Fredrickson, 2001).

However, the climate of caution surrounding the issue had also transitioned to one that favored

further exploration of rDNA’s commercial and industrial applications. This was indeed true of all

novel science and technology fields in the US, whose development was seen by the Carter and

Reagan administrations as a boost to American economic competitiveness (Hughes, 2001 pp.

543-544; Kenney, 1998; Yi, 2008). In 1976, Herbert Boyer and the venture capitalist Robert

Swanson had formed Genentech, catalyzing what would become the emergent biotechnology

industry. This effort would help initiate a business model, capitalizing on the proximity within

the San Francisco Bay Area of corporate establishments, academics who could stock them with

personnel and expertise, and venture capitalists who could fund them (Kenney, 1998; Yi, 2008).

The RAC was expanded to include non-scientists in 1978, and the FDA now required that re-

search it funded comply with the NIH Guidelines, which the biotechnology industry agreed to

(Fredrickson, 2001). However, these guidelines were revised in 1980, and subsequently allowed

most research to be carried out under minimal containment conditions. In 1980, the Bayh-Dole

Act was passed, which allowed universities to patent federally-funded research, in order to gen-




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erate greater innovation in science and technology, and encourage business-science collabora-

tions. In 1981, the RAC recommended that the Guidelines adopt the status of a voluntary code of

practice.

Case 2: Climate Engineering (2006-Present)

While discussions of intentional interventions into the climate system have been going on for a

considerable amount of time (Keith 2000), the current wave of interest was sparked by a 2006

editorial by Paul Crutzen, who won a Nobel Prize for his work on ozone, in the journal Climatic

Change (Crutzen 2006). Publications surged after this, with content often dividing between tech-

nologies that would enhance the reflection of incoming sunlight back into space (Solar Radiation

Management), and those that would capture and sequester atmospheric carbon (Carbon Dioxide

Removal). Both were (and still are) discussed under the umbrella terms ‘geoengineering’ or

‘climate engineering’.5

The early ‘post-Crutzen’ era was marked by grey literature from a number of scientific networks

based in the global North, calling for increased research but typically stressing that climate engi-

neering should not undermine conventional efforts at carbon mitigation.6 The UK Royal Socie-

ty’s 2009 scoping report ‘Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance, and Uncertainty’ is

likely the most well-known of these and included technical reviews of different climate engineer-

ing suites, as well as a discussion of norms for scientific research, a spectrum of scale for tech-

nology evaluation, and the development of future governance structures (Royal Society, 2009).

The first government-sponsored investigations began concurrently. The respective science and

technology committees of the UK House of Commons and the US Congress both released scop-

ing reports in 2010, relying on several months of hearings with some of the field’s foundational

5 Other proposed terms include Climate Remediation (BPC, 2011) or Climate Management (Michaelson,

2010). There are also arguments that SRM and CDR should not be discussed under the same heading, as

they contain different bodies of materials, risk, period of effect, and political actors – indeed, this is true of

techniques within SRM and CDR. Nonetheless, geoengineering or climate engineering remain (the most)

popular terms. 6 For example by the American Meteorological Society, the American Geophysical Union, and the UK Insti-

tution of Mechanical Engineers.




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scientists, as well as exchanging documents and testimony in a collaborative effort that might

indicate an early recognition of climate engineering’s international dimensions (House of Com-

mons, 2010; Gordon, 2010; Bracmort and Lattanzio, 2011). The US Government Accountability

Office (GAO) would follow up with further reports in 2010 and 2011 on emerging technical and

political aspects (United States Government Accountability Office, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). In

2011, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) published an interdisci-

plinary scoping report that spanned climate science, economics, public perception, political sci-

ence, ethics, and law, which it had commissioned from an interdisciplinary group of researchers

(Rickels et al., 2011).

These efforts represent the (published) limit of governmental explorations. Two governments

have since taken formal – albeit brief and preliminary – stances on the issues surrounding cli-

mate engineering: the UK7 and Germany.

8 Still, a number of risks and uncertainties have been

tentatively pointed out in these early reports. Significantly, early scoping efforts have gone be-

yond technical assessments of cost, feasibility, and geophysical mechanics, to assessments of

ethical and political dimensions by the social sciences and humanities.

The exact physical and chemical mechanics of various techniques are not concretely known.

Such technical uncertainties include, for example, the effects of sulphate injections on the ozone

layer (Tilmes et al, 2009), the sedimentation and lifetimes of aerosol particles in the atmosphere

(Benduhn and Lawrence, forthcoming), on interactions and feedbacks with clouds (Thomas et

al., 2011), or how much carbon the phytoplankton blooms generated by ocean iron fertilization

technologies can sequester, as well as associated ecological effects (Strong et al, 2009).

It is also frequently suggested in the discourse on climate engineering that interventions in the

complex climate system would create new, or intensify existing, conflict potentials within and

across societies. Models have indicated that stratospheric SRM would inevitably have a global

7 See the statement by the Department of Energy and Climate Change, available from

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk [last accessed on 19 February 2013]. 8 See the reply by the German government to the Social Democrats’ ‘Kleine Anfrage’ (‘small inquiry’),

available from http://dipbt.bundestag.de [last accessed on 19 February 2013].

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121217150421/http:/www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/about/science/activities/climate_change/ger/ger.aspx

http://dipbt.bundestag.de/




15

climatic effect, but alter regional temperature and precipitation unevenly (Irvine et al, 2010).

Resulting impacts upon lives and livelihoods may escalate into political conflicts, with strong

implications for interstate relationships. A related worry is the potential for unilateral or even

clandestine deployment of stratospheric SRM (Blackstock and Long, 2010; Victor et al., 2009;

Horton, 2011).

Many other fears are associated with climate engineering. A frequently-cited fear in the social

context of climate engineering research is the so-called ‘moral hazard’. This is the fear that re-

searching climate engineering technologies, or even only discussing such research, may siphon

resources from conventional, politically and economically costly efforts at mitigation and adapta-

tion (Royal Society, 2009). Furthermore, if atmospheric carbon concentrations continue to in-

crease during an SRM intervention, models show that a sudden halt to operations would result in

a precipitous warming effect – a potential side effect known as ‘termination shock’ (Royal Socie-

ty, 2009). Nor would SRM address ocean acidification, a long-standing effect of carbon emis-

sions. Ethical concerns have arisen over the ‘burden-shifting’ in addressing climate change, from

the largest carbon-emitting nations to the populations projected to suffer from the side effects of

climate engineering (Suarez et al., 2010); or, on a longer time scale, from our current generation

to future ones (Burns, 2011). Another frequently articulated fear is that of a slippery slope effect

from research to more research to deployment. The rationale behind this line of argument is that

scientists and institutions engaging in research on climate engineering might develop vested in-

terests in their research, pressing to continue research even if previous results do not necessarily

warrant this. This could then lead to the deployment of a technology in a situation in which this

would not have been warranted from today’s perspective.

Meanwhile, the patenting of preliminary technologies and techniques is nascent but growing.

One early estimate indicates that the United States Patent and Trademark Office had in 2010

recorded 181 patents covering climate engineering technologies (Parthasarathy et al, 2010). Nor

might patents be limited to physical inventions. An application from Benaron (2012) cites a

‘business method for providing an emissions trading approach value to products and services that

provide active cooling of the Earth that provides a sustainable means for global cooling strategies




16

to achieve commercial value…’. There are further concerns, especially from vocal NGOs

(ETC), that a fair amount of funding for climate engineering research and technology develop-

ment comes from private philanthropy. For example, Bill Gates’ Fund for Innovative Climate

and Energy Research (FICER) has at least partially funded the efforts of prominent researchers

of CDR technologies (this information is also made publically available on the webpages of Ken

Caldeira and David Keith).

It is important not to extrapolate a trend that leads from early patenting efforts towards commer-

cialization, but equally important not to discount the potential out of hand. In the early 2000s, a

US-based company, Planktos, had planned to use ocean iron fertilization (OIF) techniques to

generate carbon credits for sale. Planktos also attempted to circumvent potential regulation by

the US Environmental Protection Agency under the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuar-

ies Act, by proposing to fly a non-US flag from deployment vessels (Hearn, 2007).

As a result, following a report and recommendations made by the International Maritime Organi-

zation (IMO), a 2008 resolution that emerged from a Conference of the Parties to the London

Convention (on the Prevention of Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters) declared that OIF out-

side of ‘legitimate scientific activity’ would not be exempt from strictures against ocean dump-

ing (Resolution LC-LP.1, 2008). Though this particular manifestation of commercial interest

would appear temporarily dormant, there exist warnings that ‘[w]e will need to protect ourselves

from vested interests [and] be sure that choices are not influenced by parties who might make

significant amounts of money through a choice to modify climate, especially using proprietary

intellectual property’,9 as well as for patents to be banned for SRM-related technologies, given

its high potential risk and leverage.10

In the absence of governmental positions, the strongest positions on governance come from with-

in the research community itself. In a direct reference to the rDNA technology debate, around

9 This quotation is attributed to Jane Long, cited by Vidal, 2012.

10 See Mulkern and ClimateWire, 2012. Keith also holds patents in Direct Air Capture (a form of CDR) tech-

nology, but this is a different body of risk from stratospheric aerosol injections (a type of SRM).




17

200 practitioners and academics from the natural and social sciences gathered in March 2010 for

the Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies. The attendants

produced a set of five recommendations for reducing risk and improving transparency in re-

search and small-scale field testing (MacCracken et al., 2010). These principles were strongly

based on the Oxford Principles, a prior set of principles developed by a number of academics at

the University of Oxford for the UK House of Commons 2010 report (Rayner et al., 2011).

While no mandatory or enforceable strictures were derived (indeed, this was not the conference’s

intent), Asilomar 2010 was a visible effort to assess and bridge technical risks and societal is-

sues, and to ascertain the shape and scope of future governance (See MacCracken et al., 2010;

Kintisch, 2010). The UK Royal Society also launched the Solar Radiation Management Govern-

ance Initiative (SRMGI) in 2010, in partnership with the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)

and the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World (TWAS), as a knowledge broker for

international institutions, civil society organizations, and national governments in SRM methods.

Yet, it should not be inferred that the research community is united. Some are far more pessimis-

tic about the potential impacts of climate engineering, and tend to argue for severe limitations on

field tests and prohibition of large-scale deployment (Robock, 2008; Fleming, 2010; Hamilton,

2011). Even among those who hold that deployment should be maintained as a potential option,

there is a wide spectrum of opinion on how to calculate the allowable risks for field-tests,11

on

whether to situate governance for testing (or deployment) within one or a combination of interna-

tional environmental organizations and agreements or within the research community under var-

ious forms of self-governance, and on specific mechanisms of funding, risk assessment, liability,

enforcement, and communication of results and best practices.12

Efforts to regulate climate engineering have also been ongoing amongst environmental NGOs.

Mainstream ‘green’ organizations such as Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, and Friends of

the Earth have thus far not taken leading roles in the debate. However, the Canadian-based Ac-

11

See www.srmgi.org 12

A number of proposals exist in the academic literature, for some examples, see Parson and Ernst, 2012;

Victor, 2008; Virgoe, 2009; Blackstock and Ghosh, 2011; Royal Society, 2009, 2011; MacCracken et al.,

2010.

http://www.srmgi.org/




18

tion Group for Erosion, Technology, and Concentration (ETC Group) has played a dispropor-

tionate role in opposing the development of climate engineering technologies or policy options.

It has described climate engineering as ‘Geopiracy’ (ETC Group, 2010a), spearheaded a ‘Hands

Off Mother Earth’ campaign advertised as a ‘coalition of international civil society groups, in-

digenous peoples organizations and social movements’ (www.handsoffmotherearth.org), and

strongly opposes all field testing of the technologies.

The ETC Group also lobbied the Convention on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) 10th

Conference

of the Parties (COP) at Nagoya in 2010 (Sugiyama and Sugiyama, 2010, p. 8), contributing to the

adoption of a non-binding ‘decision’ that set criteria on the allowable limits of large field-tests:

[The Conference of the Parties […] invites Parties and other Governments […] to […]

ensure] that no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity

take place, until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities

and appropriate consideration of the associated risks for the environment and biodiver-

sity and associated social, economic and cultural impacts, with the exception of small

scale scientific research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting in ac-

cordance with Article 3 of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the need to

gather specific scientific data and are subject to a thorough prior assessment of the po-

tential impacts on the environment.13

While this decision has been lauded by the ETC Group as a UN-backed ‘moratorium’ (ETC

Group, 2010b), it has been criticized for its brevity, non-binding nature, inapplicability outside of

biodiversity impacts, and for the fact that the US is not a signatory (Bodansky, 2011, p. 16). Cur-

rently, only the CBD and the aforementioned London Convention and Protocol have taken deci-

sions on climate engineering governance at the level of international institutions. The IPCC in

2011 held a scoping meeting in Peru to discuss the details of including climate engineering in the

upcoming Fifth Assessment Report (due in 2013-14). Yet this, by itself, is no indication that the

issue will make it onto the agenda of future UNFCCC COPs. Concrete trends at this level of

governance are still too nascent to be pinpointed.

13

UNEP/CBD/COP10 Decision X/33.

http://www.handsoffmotherearth.org/




19

There are, perhaps, two late developments of significance. The first is the cancellation of the

‘test-bed’ stage of the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering Project (SPICE)

in May 2012. A joint endeavour by a number of prominent UK universities that was funded in

large part by the UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, the SPICE Project

was intended to test the mechanics of aerosol delivery for SRM via a hose connected to a bal-

loon. The environmental impacts of this field test were known to be negligible; yet even a pre-

liminary version of the testing mechanism was cancelled in early 2012 due to public opposition

and the fact that one of the involved scientists had taken out patents on a related technology.

The second development is the rogue demonstration of ocean iron fertilization (OIF) by Ameri-

can businessman Russ George. In the summer of 2012, George dumped 100 tons of iron filings

into international waters off the western coast of Canada, after convincing a local aboriginal

community to sponsor this as an effort to replenish local salmon stocks, while earning credits

from global carbon markets. The public only became aware of this act in November 2012,

months after the deployment. While the environmental and legal repercussions are still being

assessed, George may have violated a number of Canadian laws and international guidelines, and

has sparked renewed discussion at the London Convention and Protocol on OIF as a form of

waste dumping at sea (Fountain, 2012, in the NY Times).

The SPICE ‘test-bed’, despite its premature end, contained a degree of public engagement as

well as careful structuring and communication of the test’s goals and impacts. In contrast,

George conducted a secretive act of vigilantism. Yet, it is telling that both events received rough

treatment in the press as ‘experiments gone wrong’, and may exemplify a number of challenges

described earlier: the power of NGO-driven public concerns regarding climate engineering tech-

nologies, the importance of whether patenting of climate engineering technologies should be

permitted, public fear of unilateral actions by individuals as well as governments, and the ambi-




20

guities surrounding the legitimacy or adequacy of regulatory and public consultation frame-

works.14

4. Analysis

In the following, we compare the results of the above case studies with regard to the dominant

narrative of each, and the demand for governance that emerges from this. Of course, for climate

engineering these observations are limited to what is discernible at this early stage. However, as

we show below, a consistent narrative is currently emerging, the contours of which are clear

enough to make statements about the legitimacy of transposing the rDNA governance model to

the issue area of climate engineering possible.

4.1 Dominant narratives of rDNA technology and climate engineering

In the case of rDNA technology, the scientific community largely succeeded, from 1971 to 1981,

in retaining control over the technology it had developed. Although there were some disagree-

ments about how to proceed, agreement was negotiated on the desirability of guidelines for re-

search and the undesirability of external regulation that goes beyond what had been set forth by

the scientific community itself. Influential members of the community coordinated action and

steered developments in this direction.

How, then, does this history suggest we should proceed in the quest for governance of climate

engineering? Three points emerge from the case study. First, in the absence of a classification

scheme for experiments, members of the scientific community should constrain themselves on a

voluntary basis from conducting potentially hazardous field tests (self-imposed moratorium).

Second, scientists should develop a classification scheme for experiments that is aimed at reduc-

ing technical risks. This classification scheme should feed into the development of guidelines

through an external agency, whose enforcement, however, should not be based on legally bind-

14

For SPICE ‘test-bed’, see Wilsdon (2012) and Matthew Watson’s weblog, entry of May 16, 2012 (available

from www.thereluctantgeoengineer.blogspot.ca [last accessed on 19 February 2013]). For the Russ George

OIF demonstration, see Fountain, 2012.

http://www.thereluctantgeoengineer.blogspot.ca/




21

ing laws and formal penalties but rather on scientist’s professional sense of obligation and the

fear of losing funding. Third, there should be no strict external regulation that goes beyond the

issuance of guidelines that have the status of a voluntary code of practice, and which were large-

ly developed by the scientific community. This is, in essence, self-governance by the scientific

community. What made self-governance possible? Is it also possible for climate engineering?

The domain of actors involved in the upstream development of rDNA technology was largely

confined to natural scientists. Although discussions on the broader societal, political and ethical

implications of rDNA technology surfaced during early discussions, such framings never came

to dominate the discourse, and risk perception remained limited to technical aspects. This, in turn

reinforced the natural authority of scientists to deal with these risks, and made the inclusion of

other actors supposedly superfluous. The RAC, as the origin of early regulatory action, was only

opened to participation by non-natural scientists in 1978. Regarding decision making, scientists

remained highly influential throughout the upstream governance of rDNA technology. Govern-

ance never became stricter than the NIH guidelines, which had in fact been drafted by the scien-

tists of the RAC.

This is fundamentally different in the case of climate engineering. Not only has a more diverse

group of researchers – including economists, political scientists, lawyers, ethicists, philosophers,

and psychologists – been involved in the discourse on climate engineering from the very begin-

ning, this has even been demanded and furthered by the majority of natural scientists. The Asi-

lomar 2010 conference included in its final report a call for broadening the spectrum of risks that

is associated with climate engineering, to ‘include assessments of the full range of potential im-

pacts, including environmental, economic, legal, and socio-political consequences’. If risks are

perceived as not only technical, but also including economic, legal, and socio-political conse-

quences, then scientists are no longer the natural locus of authority for dealing with them. Inter-

estingly, Asilomar 2010 may have undermined the capacity of scientists to devise governance for

climate engineering and reinforced the claim that governance needs to come from actors outside

of the scientific realm.




22

This circumstance is not widely recognized. For example, one commentator reported on the Asi-

lomar conference under the heading ‘Climate Hackers Want to Write Their Own Rules’ (availa-

ble from www.wired.com); a perception that perhaps stems from the framing of the conference

against the background of the analogy to rDNA technology. Other actors seem to have been

similarly unaware of the contours of the emerging discourse, and expected a very different out-

come from Asilomar. Before the Asilomar conference took place, the ETC Group composed an

‘Open Letter Opposing Asilomar Geoengineering Conference’. The letter concluded that ‘[t]he

priority at this time is not to sort out the conditions under which this experimentation might take

place but, rather, whether or not the community of nations and peoples believes that geoengi-

neering is technically, legally, socially, environmentally and economically acceptable’ (letter

available from www.etcgroup.org). Somewhat ironically, the Asilomar conference has contribut-

ed to and strengthened this aspect of the discourse, rather than to circumvent it, as did the origi-

nal Asilomar conference on rDNA technology in 1975.

Accordingly, perceived risks differ strongly in both cases. For rDNA technology, fears centered

on the possibility of creating DNA strains that pose health hazards (such as a cancer causing vi-

rus), the potential exposure of researchers to such strains, and threats to public health from modi-

fied organisms that escape the laboratory. This technical risk was also the conscious focus of

deliberations at the Asilomar 1975 conference, where social, political, and ethical challenges

were deliberately bracketed. Scientists then offered technical solutions, such as physical and bio-

logical barriers that were intended to prevent the escape of modified organisms into the environ-

ment, which were instituted in various outlets – the safety regulations of Asilomar 1973, the

Berg letter, the Asilomar 1975 recommendations, the RAC proposal for the NIH guidelines, and

finally the NIH guidelines themselves.

This was complemented by a story of scientific progress. During its upstream phase of technolo-

gy emergence, rDNA technology was framed as a breakthrough in science with great potential

benefits for society (Wright, 1994; Gottweis, 1998). As Paul Berg and his colleagues write in the

summary statement to the Asilomar conference in 1975:

http://www.wired.com/

http://www.etcgroup.org/




23

‘The use of the recombinant DNA methodology promises to revolutionize the practice of

molecular biology […] there is every reason to believe that [the new techniques] will have

significant practical utility in the future’ (Berg et al. 1975, p 1981).

This framing dominated the discourse on rDNA technology during its emergence. Where contes-

tation did occur, the ‘technical risks story’ emerged as the narrative that dominated the discourse

and around which governance was constructed. Within the context of the economic deregulation

of the early 1980s, this allowed the biotechnology industry to flourish.

For climate engineering technologies, perceived risks have long been expanded beyond the tech-

nical aspects of the individual technologies by a more diverse field of early participants in the

scoping process, and a number of social and political concerns have been widely legitimized. In

addition, besides fears of ‘termination shock’, international conflict resulting from uneven tem-

perature and precipitation impacts, unilateral action, ‘moral hazard’, and slippery slope dynamics

, climate engineering is deeply embedded in an already fractious ‘parent’ discourse, unlike the

rDNA discourse during its foundational stage. The climate engineering debate – even on model-

ing and research – is intimately tied to the highly politicized debate on climate change. Thus, it

does not carry the positive connotation of technological advancement and progress that was

transported in the early days of rDNA technology. Rather, it is heavily burdened by its associa-

tion with the conflict laden topic of climate change.

A level of technological optimism similar to that surrounding rDNA technology during its emer-

gence is mostly absent in climate engineering. Physicist David Keith, who advocates carrying

out climate engineering field tests as soon as possible, likely holds the position closest to that

held by the dominant rDNA scientists of the 1970s. Yet, Keith makes his case by referring to

caution and restraint:

‘Active planetary management may be an inevitable step in the evolution of a technological

society, but I urge caution. We would be wise to practice walking before we try to run, to

learn to minimize impacts before we try our hand at planetary engineering’ (Keith, 2010, p.

500).




24

More optimistic positions can be found on the fringes of the debate (Levitt and Dubner, 2009;

Lomborg, 2009), but rarely among the issue area’s established academic community. It is a mat-

ter of debate whether our current period is characterized by greater politicization, and more pes-

simism and scepticism, over science and technology issues than existed in earlier decades.15

The

lack of widespread public and governmental exposure to the issue does not allow for quick con-

clusions to be drawn on this front. Yet, the idea that climate engineering might signal a desirable

trend towards deliberate planetary management, or that deployment could act as a boost or sup-

plement to a nation’s economic competitiveness, are not commonly raised.

There are more isolated opinions that to manipulate the climate is to consciously do what human

agriculture and industry have already been unwittingly doing for centuries (Brand, 2011); or that

climate engineering, as a less costly action than carbon mitigation, could allow continued hydro-

carbon-fuelled growth (See Gingrich, quoted in Vidal, 2011). However, rDNA was seen as an

enabling, bottom up technology that would push the boundaries of medicine, agriculture, science,

and an entire raft of societal endeavours, while climate engineering was conceived of as a specif-

ic backstop – a ‘Plan B’ – to the problems associated with rising global mean temperatures.

Commercialization of the technologies, therefore, came to be seen as a necessary impetus to the

growth of biotechnology, but has so far not played a prominent part in proposals for the devel-

opment of climate engineering, and is seen with more concern than enthusiasm.

All of the above concerns have been discussed in widely visible fora, and can be said to be part

of an emerging dominant narrative of climate engineering. This narrative is shaped by the strong

involvement of a diverse set of actors. It is characterized by a broader context in which skepti-

cism, restraint, and caution dominate, and by a focus not only on technical, but also on social,

political, ethical, and other issues. Climate engineering thus requires an approach to its govern-

ance that takes these factors into account, making a simple transposition of the self-governance

approach pursued during the upstream period of rDNA technology development to the climate

engineering case impractical.

15

See, for example, Ezrahi and Mendelssohn, 1994.




25

4.2 Implications for Governance

The analogy between climate engineering and rDNA technology suggests a framing of climate

engineering that centers on technical risks that can be controlled through technical measures.

Yet, the above analysis shows that the emerging dominant narrative of climate engineering is

very different from that which gave meaning to rDNA technology. If the dominant narrative of

an issue area provides the context in which its governance emerges, then the rDNA ‘model’ –

technocratic self-governance of technical risks – should not significantly influence considera-

tions of appropriate governance mechanisms for climate engineering. Since assessments of cli-

mate engineering have been widened beyond technical risks to include a wide spectrum of non-

technical issues, the scientific community cannot insist upon the rDNA governance model with-

out invalidating their own legitimacy amongst policy–making and public audiences. Hence, the

early scientific community has created – wittingly or otherwise – certain contours by which their

attempts to shape future governance forums and mechanisms must abide in order for them to be

successful.

Firstly, field tests in the absence of appropriate governance would only undermine their own

purpose to explore – and therefore, presumably, to enhance capacities to manage – the issues

involved in climate engineering deployment. To conduct field tests without some governmental

or public sanction is to attempt to explore technical risk as if they existed in a vacuum. This is

essentially what the early rDNA community did – but the current dominant narrative of climate

engineering has been constructed by and exposed to more than just scientists, and encompasses

potentially expansive impacts on societal and political systems with difficult ethical questions

involved. The SPICE project indicates that even if scientists were able to ‘manage’ the technical

risks of small-scale field tests, they would not forestall opposition that stems from concerns

about the social, political and ethical impacts of climate engineering. Another way of putting this

is that even insignificant physical risks are associated with the much larger platform of societal

dangers posed by climate engineering- however proportionate or plausible such dangers might

be. Future field-tests, regardless of scale, may be associated with the narrative, and all its imagi-

naries, as a whole. Thus, even if one were in favor of a rapid research effort on climate engineer-




26

ing technologies with the prospect of rendering climate engineering a valid policy option as soon

as possible, one would be well advised to refrain from conducting field tests in the absence of

governance mechanisms that are deemed appropriate for such activities within the general dis-

course on climate engineering.

This raises a second question of what governance structures might be ‘appropriate’. One quality

is clear: the scientific community must cede governance of the issue – not just regulation of field

tests – to external processes. Self-governance by the scientific community cannot ensure that

research will proceed smoothly. Of course, scientists and technical experts do play strong roles in

risk assessment as part of advisory bodies in many international regimes, governments and sub-

state processes, and a similar role is warranted in this case. However, governance of a form that

allows research to proceed can not only address technical risks of field-tests, but must also reflect

the extensive and varied nature of climate engineering’s potential impacts and the questions that

it raises. Our analysis shows that in the emerging dominant narrative of climate engineering,

there is an indistinct boundary between technical risks and wider societal consequences and is-

sues. We therefore argue against any notion that the current stage of issue-framing, theoretical

studies and small tests can be self-governed by the scientific community, and that only later sce-

narios of large scale testing and deployment require the entry of governmental actors. Govern-

ance must thus strengthen a trend begun during the early scoping of the issue – for example, at

the multidisciplinary Asilomar conference of 2010.

In its most elementary form, the governance architecture would need to be international in scope,

and integrated with the broader context of climate policy. This would make the geographical

reach of deployed climate engineering technologies, as well as the discursive reach of the debate

itself, consistent with the political reach of the forum that addresses them. Perhaps a natural insti-

tutional ‘landing-site’ might be the UNFCCC, given its universal membership and its status as

the locus of global climate governance, though there would be issues about political will or the

need to change the legal language of the Convention.16

Nor should a complex of regimes be

16

For papers that see the UNFCCC as a preferred forum for climate engineering governance, see Lin, 2009,

and Zürn and Schäfer, 2013.




27

ruled out, given the decisions taken by the London Convention and Protocol, and the Convention

on Biological Diversity (for a study of a regime complex, see Keohane and Victor, 2011). Pin-

pointing the exact institution, or complex of institutions, as well as specific mechanisms of rule-

making, membership, assessment, and management, is beyond the scope of this study. Yet, we

would resist recommendations for networks of scientists in technologically capable countries to

generate bottom-up governance (for example, see Victor, 2008; Keith, 2010). Such proposals are

self-defeating since they are not capable of addressing the wider issues associated with climate

engineering, and will rather lead to a de-legitimization of climate engineering research and to an

increase in conflict, rather than contribute to building a framework that allows research to pro-

ceed.

We point out also that the perceived legitimacy of climate engineering research carried out ac-

cording to norms and rules that were formulated under the aegis of an external architecture of

international scope would be higher than would be the case in the absence of such governance,

and that the aim of such a governance architecture would be to enable, rather than to hinder, re-

search on climate engineering technologies. This is important to note, since often governance is

perceived by the scientific community as a restrictive measure that reduces the freedom of scien-

tific inquiry. However, in this case a certain governance architecture simply is necessary to en-

sure that research can proceed and is perceived as legitimate. Otherwise, research would further

societal and political contestation and resistance, thus undermining the possibility of future re-

search and possible applications of climate engineering technologies, and accordingly defy its

own purpose.

5. Conclusion

Our analysis has shown that the dominant narrative of climate engineering and the issues on

which it centers differ strongly from that from which governance mechanisms for rDNA tech-

nologies emerged during its upstream phase. We thus do not expect governance outcomes to be

similar in both cases. Rather, since issues are perceived as international in scope and as affecting




28

not only the natural realm, but also the social, political, ethical, and other realms, we conclude

that governance for climate engineering technologies, including small scale field tests, needs to

address these issues in order to be considered legitimate and appropriate. In the absence of legit-

imate and appropriate governance, we expect, from our examination of the dominant narrative of

climate engineering, social and political conflict over climate engineering research. This would

undermine future research efforts and thus make a potential implementation of a climate engi-

neering technology impractical. Thus, especially those scientists who are keen to continue their

research, and to conduct field tests in the future, would be well-advised to refrain from testing

technologies in the absence of appropriate governance mechanisms.

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