selective intervention in kassala's town centre

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Cities, Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 311-325, 1995 Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd

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Selective intervention in Kassala' s town centre

Johan Post Institute of Planning and Demography, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands

This article aims to show how the authorities interfere in the fight for central space, using the medium-sized town of Kassala (in the Sudan) as an example. The analysis of various government interventions in the Kassala town centre indicates that decision makers generally have little concern for the interests of the most vulnerable groups, especially under the present administration. They are led by ill-considered, class based ideas of what a 'modern' city should look like. This implies that 'unsuitable' forms of activity (street vendors, craftsmen) and shelter (old houses, mud shops, simple sheds) are removed to allow for the construction of new, multistorey shops, offices, hotels and apartments. Although the government tries to provide the victims with an alternative outside the central area, they usually overestimate their financial capacity, while underestimating their attachment to the centre. Furthermore, the 'unofficial' users of the zones intended for redevelopment are either completely disregarded for compensation or have to make do with a mere pittance.

In an attempt to improve the streetscape of the town centre of Kassala - a city with some 300 000 inhabitants in the eastern part of the Sudan bordering Eritrea (Figure 1) - the local government in 1993 ordered shopkeepers and restaurant owners to paint their buildings using the standard colours of white (for the walls) and green (for the doors). Those who did not obey the summons were threatened with a loss of their trade licence. This action is symptomatic of the mentality of the majority of decision makers in the Sudan with respect to urban development affairs. Their thoughts are dominated by the pursuit of modernization, city beautification and orderly layouts.

Too often, decision makers do not much care about the effects of their decisions on the urban poor or even deliberately take punitive action against the poor because the latter are engaged in 'unlawful' activities. This paper aims to improve the awareness of biases in actual urban policy at the expense of those who are politically and economically marginal- ized. At the outset it must be admitted that this tendency is not very surprising, for Sudanese society has a strongly ingrained hierarchy. A yawning gap

The author would like to thank Professor G A de Bruyne, Mr J van Dijk and Mr E van Walsum who commented on an earlier draft of this paper.

exists between the political leaders and allied commercial class on the one hand, and the mass of ordinary citizens on the other (Khalid, 1990; Nib- lock, 1991). In the Sudan, changes of power usually take place within the circles of the elite and do not lead to important shifts in the structure of society, nor to a change in the ruling ideas regarding policy and administration.

For development experts it is both bewildering and alarming to see that most local and regional level administrators and executive officers are hardly acquainted with the sort of ideas which have become common denominators within the international development establishment. New ideas, such as community self-help, 'informal sector' promotion or strengthening of local government, often leave a lot to be desired when it comes to actual policies. Harper puts it like this (1992, p 144):

The academic community tends to believe that a battle has been won when the issue has been concep- tualized, analyzed and has formed the subject of numbers of conferences and papers. Fashions change and new topics are taken up, even though the world outside the university has been relatively unchanged by what went before.

Awareness of the gap between the development of ideas and their practical implementation is central to

311

Kassala's town centre: J Post

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the urban management approach that has been advocated by major international institutions since the mid-1980s (UNCHS, 1987; World Bank, 1991). The challenge taken up by the new approach is to define 'appropriate roles and responsibilities in spe- cific urban situations for all the actors involved, notably the public sector (at different levels), the private sector and social, non-governmental sectors' (Sailer, 1993, p 8). The new convention boils down to creating a situation in which the private sector takes initiative, while the government primarily per- forms a coordinating and facilitating task (instead of focusing on the direct provision of services and the application of negative control measures). However, a move to such a division of tasks is far from simple. It requires, among other things, that private actors have more control over planning and decision making with respect to the arrangement of their own working and living environment. Apart from that, both the management structure and the procedures of (local) government must be adapted to the chang- ing roles it is supposed to fulfill. Last but not least, a complete reversal in the minds of urban planners and managers has to be brought about (Devas and Rakodi, 1993).

The inertia in the diffusion of innovative ideas in countries such as the Sudan should be at least partly attributed to the lack of communication. Most decision makers, especially at the local level, simply do not have access to the sort of information which could benefit their thinking on urban development affairs. Communication concerning new ideas is often limited to the top layer of government officials ie to the capital, Khartoum. More important, however, is the fact that most decision makers are culturally estranged from the poorer sections of society. They are neither accustomed nor inclined to look after the needs of low income groups. Needless to say, they readily pretend that their actions reflect the government's role as promoter of the general interest, protector of the weak, keeper of peace and public order and deliverer of progress. However, in real life situations these ideals are overshadowed by more trivial, class based ideas which usually boil down to negative designations of the 'urban poor' (Bromley, 1985). Administrators and high ranking officials generally do not buy the goods and services of the small enterpreneurs who flock to the town centre. In their eyes street vendors, porters and horse drawn carts clutter the streets and hinder the

312 Cities 1995 Volume 12 Number 5

public's mobility ie officials in their government cars. Furthermore, they believe that unlicensed and unplanned activities 'unfairly' compete with those officially recognized. As this paper aims to illustrate, although Kassala is still very much a rural town, elitist views such as these clearly affect policy re- sponses.

The setting With 2.5 million km 2 the Sudan is the largest country of Africa. The total population was estimated at 25 million in 1990 with about a quarter living in urban centres. Although the people of the Sudan are diverse (with no fewer than 19 major ethnic groups) the main schism that besets the country is that between the Arab north and the African south. While the north, especially central riverain Sudan, has managed to increase its wealth, the south has suffered from poignant economic neglect. Furth- ermore, the south, being partly Christian and partly animist, has always felt excluded from the country's political system which is dominated by northern Islamic groupings (Woodward, 1990).

Sudan has been a very unstable state since Inde- pendence (1956) with governments having oscilli- ated between liberal democracy and military rule. Successive governments have been hampered by internal discord and lack of administrative power. Just like the previous ones, the last democratic government, headed by prime minister Sadiq al- Mahdi (1986-89) was paralysed by harmful rivalries, factionalism and corruption (Salih, 1990). It was replaced by the first Islamic 'fundamentalist' government in Africa. Since Lieutenant-General Omar al-Beshir, backed by the powerful National Islamic Front, took over power in 1989 the country's social and political climate has changed dramatically. The law and order mentality of the present regime has made itself felt in every aspect of public life. It criminalizes all who oppose their idea of an Islamic state and are, for that reason, a potential threat to public order (De Waal, 1993).

In the late 1970s the Sudan economy ran into disarray. Although the causes of the crisis are com- plex three factors stand out: (1) the inheritance of a very one-sided economic structure with heavy dependence on agriculture and especially on a few principal cash crops (cotton, gum arabic, sesam); (2) the failure of the so-called 'bread basket strategy', the ambitious development programme of the 1970s that aimed to turn the Sudan into the major food supplier of the Arab world but in fact made the country dependent on foreign investment and credit at a level the economy could not afford; and (3) the adverse effects of a massive influx of refugees, a prolonged period of drought (1982-85) and especially the renewed outbreak of civil war in 1983. The country became heavily indebted and, since 1978,


has been subject to a series of IMF supported adjustment programmes. Unfortunately, these programmes failed to yield any appreciable effect with commentators blaming the failure either on inadequ- ate implementation (IMF and World Bank) or in- appropriate diagnosis of the crisis (Brown, 1992). The Sudan is virtually bankrupt and poverty is becoming increasingly widespread.

Kassala, the place where this study was carried out, is basically a rural town, judged both from its appearance and its agricultural entrep6t function. It has developed on the east bank of the seasonal River Gash at the crossing of the trade routes northwards to the Red Sea and to the east across the Sudan- Ethiopian border which is a stone's throw away. Kassala is the centre of an important agricultural and horticultural area that actually penetrates into the heart of the settlement. Many of its inhabitants depend on the primary sector, either through permanent or seasonal agricultural work or through trade and services. Being the capital of the Eastern State, government is another major employer. Large-scale industry is absent, except for a fruit processing factory.

The population of Kassala has grown spectacular- ly from 40 000 in the mid-1950s to approximately 300 000 at present. Rates of increase, however, have fluctuated sharply (4-9% per year), mainly because of the unpredictable influx of Ethiopian and Erit- rean refugees, who have left their country because of war, persecution or famine. Although the political changes in Ethiopia and Eritrea have stopped the flight, an estimated quarter of the present inhabitants of Kassala are still refugees.

Kassala may be called a typical northern Sudanese town. Nevertheless, the sort of displacement discus- sed in this paper is by no means peculiar. Similar removal efforts may be observed all over the world, for example, the street clearance in Nigerian cities in 1984 as part of the 'environmental sanitation' programme, the replacement of the central market in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) by a modern market building in the early 1980s forcing thousands of market traders to move to the edge of town, and the bulldozing of the main market of Accra (Ghana) about a decade ago (Trager, 1987). The importance of the present discussion therefore goes beyond this particular case study.

Government involvement One of the consequences of continuous urban growth in Africa is an intensified competition for urban space. This fight is evident, for example, in town centres, where modern shops and offices compete with the more traditional users of the area such as market traders, street vendors, craftsmen and the original inhabitants. The growing pressure on the land market puts up the value of land and thus leads

Cities 1995 Volume 12 Number 5 313


to a displacement of 'uneconomic' users. Low income groups in particular find it increasingly difficult to secure adequate and cheap housing in the centre, as well as a recognized place to work.

The commodity being competed for is land. Usually land is a primary source of wealth and power and, therefore, an object of political action. This paper seeks to identify the winners and, especially, the losers in the fight for central space during the last decade. In doing so the focus of attention will be on the role of the government. Not only does most of the urban land in the Sudan belong to the government (putting it out to lease), but the government also intervenes in the urban land market directly and/or indirectly through infrastructural investments, development of sites for different uses, land- use control, and through its application of building regulations and by-laws. It should be noted here that the effectiveness of such spatial interventions often leaves a lot to be desired. Referring to the capital Khartoum, Haywood (1985, p 192) concludes that:

the lack of approved plans, skilled staff and appropriate administrative systems means that there is no systematic control of development and little immediate prospect of a forward planning system being developed. What planning control does operate is through general land-use zoning supported by a rudimentary system of building by-laws, both of which are applied in an arbitrary manner often reflecting the status of the applicant. Land-use control is not enforced at the local level and new developments or changes of use may be permitted which create considerable conflict with existing uses.

In the Sudan urban land-use policy often proves to be essentially politically motivated and fails to take proper account of technical, administrative and societal limitations (EI-Sammani et al, 1989). Adil Mustafa Ahmad (1992, pp 42, 44) argues that the inadequacy of the planning machine, especially since the mid-1970s, has left decision making about urban development heavily encumbered by the incessant interference of 'unqualified' individuals, such as mayors, ministers, businessmen and speculators whose personal ideas and interests run counter to sound planning.

These authors claim that urban land-use planning in the Sudan is both ineffective and politically motivated. Regardless of the way one looks at it, however, it can be said that government policy leaves a firm mark on the types of development which are carried out. This is especially true of the inner city area which is extremely dynamic and attracts a great deal of government attention.

Kassala town centre

Kassala town centre has witnessed a sharp increase in economic activity during the last decades, partly

as a result of the influx of refugees. At present the number of economic businesses in the area are estimated to exceed 4 000. More than half of the enterprises can be categorized as semi-mobile, rang- ing from petty traders and tea-sellers who work in the streets, to craftsmen who occupy the verandas of shops and from bicycle repairmen to porters and horse drawn cart drivers. Some 30% of the entrepreneurs operate from a (work-)shop or office and the remainder rent a space in one of the municipal market halls. In 1985 59% of businesses in the town centre were run by a single person (the so-called self-employed), while only 6% had more than five employees (Post, 1987).

In the course of time, the old centre of Kassala has acquired a dominant position in terms of production, distribution and services. Up until now, entrepreneurs have always strongly favoured settlement in this area. This preference is quite understandable. The town centre combines several obvious advan- tages: it attracts a large number of potential customers; it contains the most employment opportunities and urban services; the location is easily accessible, not least because all lines of public transport lead to the area; and suppliers are located nearby (especially relevant for micro entrepreneurs who frequently place small orders, which they collect themselves on foot). This explains why virtually all plots of open land in the area have now been put into use. In the residential zone bordering the central souk (main market), on the east and south dwellings are gra- dually being replaced by commercial properties in order to satisfy the growing demand for central locations (Figure 2). The question is, however, whether the increased activity and functional changes occurring in the town centre can continue without problems. Up until now, congestion and environmental damage have not reached alarming proportions - but the threat should not be underesti- mated. There is already a noticeable tension between form and function (Figure 3). The layout of the area dates from the time when there was no modern traffic, only pedestrians, mules, camels and horse drawn carts. Furthermore, an ever growing number of street activities take place on the sides of public roads and on the verandas in front of shops, thus contributing to the defective circulation of traffic.

In the early 1980s local authorities were worried about the negative effects of uncontrolled growth of activity in the town centre. Measures were taken to contain the growth of mobile trading. People who wanted to obtain a local licence (issued to small entrepreneurs who are not tied to fixed premises) were consequently referred to the district markets, leaving locations in the centre only to those able to secure a (work-)shop in the area. Apart from this, plans were conceived, and partially implemented, to relocate activities which caused a 'nuisance', ie


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pollution, noise, heavy traffic etc. However, this generated little enthusiasm among the entrepreneurs involved, who seemed to prefer working 'illegally' in the town centre instead of having a recognized site elsewhere.

The study In the period 1985-87 the author carried out several investigations on the development of Kassala's town centre and its subcentres. The project was part of the advisory work of the Department of Planning and Demography, University of Amsterdam, on behalf of the Eastern Region Ministry of Housing and Public Construction. The local authorities were worried about the adverse effects of an ever increasing number of activities in the town centre and wanted to find out about measures to improve the situation. The investigations resulted in an area plan for the town centre (Post, 1987) and suggestions about promoting the decentralization of economic activity (Post, 1989).

Although several recommendations were adopted by the Kassala authorities, the most important mes- sage did not get across. The needs of the most vulnerable operators in the town centre, many of whom strongly depend on this particular location for

their survival, were painfully neglected. Actual decisions and interventions by the authorities demon- strate instead an intolerant attitude, something which is unfortunately quite common all over the developing world (cf. Dewar and Watson, 1990).

In 1993 we had the opportunity to evaluate several removal efforts on the part of the government. Similar forced removals of street and market vendors have been observed in Port Sudan and Gedaref, suggesting something of a more general line of policy in the Sudan. The investigations are mainly based on observations and numerous open interviews with members of the state town planning board, senior officials from the municipality and entrepreneurs affected by government action. Information gathered during earlier research is also included. The resulting picture provides a good approximation of the actual situation and its development.

The conversion process in the central residential area At the beginning of the 1970s the central souk could no longer accommodate the increasing demand of private entrepreneurs for new business outlets. At the same time the owner-residents in the area adjacent to the central souk, eager to benefit from the



Figure 3 The streets in the central residential area are not really suited for (heavy) traffic (1986)

increased commercial value of their property, press- urized the Kassala authorities to allow them to use their premises for commercial purposes (Figure 2). However, they adamantly opposed the original idea to replan the entire zone in order to suit it better to the needs of modern traffic. The plot owners bluntly refused to give up any part of their highly treasured property for public purposes. Such a major opera- tion, requiring massive expropriation, was also considered to be too costly and time consuming. There- fore, the authorities 'agreed' to individual, plot-by- plot conversion. The plot owners were only required to pay a minimal conversion tax which was even officially reduced to stimulate the process still furth- er.

The conversion process has made fast progress, especially during the first decade (Table 1). Many old houses were demolished and replaced by modern commercial properties. Most of these new buildings accommodate shops, restaurants or storage spaces at the ground floor level, while the upper floors are used as hotel, office or apartment space. As a result of these transformations the area became more crowded and noisy and the number of inhabitants decreased by one-quarter (about 2 000).

Nevertheless, both the inhabitants and the owners of commercial properties are in favour of a con- tinuing commercial development of the area. This preference is motivated by the considerable financial profits such a change might bring. Although they are

aware of the danger of increasing congestion, they think the problems can be curbed by control measures such as a one-way traffic system, improved roads, street cleaning, better drainage and, not least, the curtailment of street activities.

The local authorities are under increasing pressure from both inhabitants and investors to extend the conversion zone southward up to the Mirghanya district. However, enthusiasm for leaving the development completely to private initiative has dimi- nished. The state planning board - the decision making body - is now more aware of the adverse consequences of the area's layout. It has already suggested to the owners that they relinquish 2.5 metres of their plots in order to broaden the roads and improve traffic circulation. So far, however, the inhabitants have refused to accept this proposal.

Table 1 Development of the conversion process in the CRA

Type of use 1986 1993

Residential 130 101 Mixed residential/commercial 110 117 Commercial 72 94 Services 6 6 Other 7 6

Total 325 324 a

a Two plots have been joined Source: Jaarsma and Kuiper (1993, p 19).



Figure 4 The selling of grain products by street vendors in the central residential area (1993)

And although the authorities are able to compulsori- ly purchase the desired part of the plots, this has been a very uncommon practice in the Sudan (a situation which could change under the present stern administration).

Almost all the owners in the central residential area who could afford to build, have in the meantime done so. Furthermore, building has become so expensive that the local building industry has virtually collapsed. Supply is therefore stagnant, while the demand for suitable places to work is on the increase. For some years now, new tenants have had to pay huge 'deposits' in order to obtain a (work- )shop in the town centre. Of course this alternative is not open to most of the self-employed. While rents in the area more or less followed inflation in the 1980s (increasing on average about 25% per year), real incomes have lagged far behind (Post, 1987). This is one of the main reasons for the sharp increase in the number of street activities in the town centre (from 1 456 activities in 1985 to 2 318 in 1993; Jaarsma and Kuiper (1993, p 23)). The exacerbated crowding in the streets has, in turn, resulted in a call for sanctions against these 'illegal' activities both by settled entrepreneurs (notably those directly com- peting with street vendors such as the grain mer- chants (Figure 4) and the fruit and vegetable sellers (Figure 5) in one of municipal market halls) and by the local government (see below).

Another group to suffer are the less affluent

families still residing in the area. The quality of their living environment has deteriorated sharply and their privacy, such a cherished good in this Islamic city, has been severely encroached upon now that their courtyards can be viewed from neighbouring premises. Most of them are reluctant to sell their properties hoping to capitalize on it in the future, but even if they wanted to, the revenues produced would never match the cost of buying a new home away from the centre.

Forced relocation: the old souk

The replanning of the old souk, an area of some 2 hectares in the northeast corner of the central souk (Figure 2), has been a long and heavily debated issue in Kassala. The authorities considered this area not to suit the idea of a modern business centre. It consisted of 124 mud shops which were originally handed out to 28 blacksmiths, 24 dura (sorghum) traders, 38 saaf and straw sellers (saaf is a fibre made from the leaves of the dome palm and is used as building material), 24 bedmakers and 10 charcoal sellers (Figure 6). Most shops were seriously dilapi- dated because owners stopped investing after they heard about the idea to replan the area. At first (some 15 years ago) the authorities simply wanted to bulldoze the area and replace it with a huge central bus terminal for intraurban public transport. Those entrepreneurs in the area in possession of a trade



Figure 5 The area north of the central market hall was used for the intermediate trade in fruit and vegetables (1985). The traders have been removed some years ago and the site is presently being used as a taxi stand

Figure 6 Charcoal selling and bed making on the old souk (1986)


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licence (the owners and old tenants) were eligible for compensation by way of a cheap lease elsewhere.

The implementation of this redevelopment plan was frustrated for several reasons. First of all, the number of independent entrepreneurs working in the old souk area had significantly increased. In fact, many shops accommodated several craftsmen (up to six per shop) working separately and 'informally' renting part of the premises. While there were only 28 blacksmiths with a licence, the committee repre- senting the tenants numbered as many as 80 independent blacksmiths in 1985 and no fewer than 156 in 1989. At first the government refused to do anything for the people working without a licence. The injustice of the government's decision was exacerbated by the fact that compensation was only offered to the original owners of the mud shops, many of whom were no longer working in the area.

Another important obstacle is that powerful individuals have been in a position to block any 'unde- sired' proposal by using their personal, tribal or political ties within the system to influence the decision making process. As far as the old souk is concerned, this social mechanism was successfully applied by the (absentee) owners of shops. As the sites offered for compensation could not match the location qualities of the old souk, most owners simply refused to relocate. Only some of the official tenants-cum-licence holders were willing to move because it gave them the opportunity to pursue their activities on a highly valued piece of land of their

own. However, their places on the old souk were immediately taken over by new tenants eager to obtain a place to work in the centre.

In 1986, due to the fierce resistance on the part of the owners, the authorities decided to give up part of the area intended for parking in favour of the construction of two double rows of shops (108 standard units) which were to be used for commercial purposes exclusively. During the allocation of the new plots, it was the shop owners, in the first instance, who received preferential treatment, followed by the early tenants who had not yet accepted compensation elsewhere. They all obtained their plots (mostly 30 m 2) for a minimal price (the so- called nominal rate), which is normal practice in cases of compensation. A second list was drafted for the actual users of the area who were supposed to get a piece of land in the craftsmen's centre in Shahabya near the cattle market (Figure 7). There was much deliberation about the composition of this list and no final solution was found. Furthermore, objections were raised by people who had been compensated in an earlier stage with a plot somewhere outside the town centre. They claimed to have been discriminated against. In fact, the replanning was not carried out during the whole democratic period of 1986-89. What did happen was that the government capitulated to merchant pressure and added a third row of shops on the former old souk area (at the expense of space for the terminal). Some 50 shops have been allocated to friends of the

Cities 1995 Volume 12 Number 5 3 1 9


Figure 8 The old souk area soon after the demolition of the mud shops (1989)

previous government (especially members of the Democratic Unionist Party). This was an unlawful act not only because it involved an unacceptable degree of favouritism, but also because the land was sold for a nominal fee, although the law requires a public auction for commercial land.

With the arrival of the new government in 1989 the old souk was finally demolished (Figure 8). In 1993 almost half of the new plots were actually built. Interviews with some of the new investors in the area showed that some of the owners who had been compensated, unable to pay for the construction of a shop themselves, had sold the land at a large profit. Other beneficiaries stick to their property waiting for a more auspicious time to invest. Strangely enough, almost one-third of the shops that have been erected have still not opened for business. This points to the existence of an important financial threshold for access to the shop market, for at the same time the number of street activities in the town centre has grown substantially.

The major victims of the replanning of the old souk were the actual users (and their businesses), especially those who settled there as sublessees in the 1980s. The new authorities reasoned that people who settled after the decision to replan the old souk had no rights. They simply had to find a new place to work themselves. Most of the small traders now flock to the streets of Kassala's town centre. The craftsmen have all moved to the centre in Shahabya

where they settled spontaneously. In the meantime, the blacksmiths, as a group, have succeeded in obtaining 78 small plots in the Shahabya area (for an amount equivalent to $US90 per plot) each of which is shared by two entrepreneurs. The bedmakers are still calling on the local government to do something on behalf of some 75 entrepreneurs who are still landless.

When asked about their present position, the blacksmiths (5 interviews) and bedmakers (7 interviews) generally admit to the fact that the Shahabya location is not really that bad. The old advantage of having all the crafts together in one area has been restored. Being adjacent to the cattle market, they have good access to the rural people for whose needs many of them cater. However, the area is not located near the town centre. As public transport is generally overburdened, visitors face problems get- ting to the Shahabya centre. Although all claim that incomes have dropped, it is unclear whether this is due to their transfer to the new site, or due to the country's economic crisis.

The problems affecting the small entrepreneurs concerned, are all related to their poverty and lack of power. If anything is done for these traditional professions, it is because their representatives continue to trouble the local authorities appealing for social justice. However, the objective of such 'be- nevolent' decisions is also to control the sector. Entrepreneurs are expected to work in permanent



Figure 9 Arrangement of the terminal for intra-urban public transport. The terminal site has been expanded at the expense of the former old souk (1993)

shelters and obey the rules (ie regarding licensing and taxation). They are rewarded with a cheap lease, provided they build their own workshops. A business licence is only issued after the accommodation has been finished. Unfortunately, the majority of craftsmen are too poor to build. They therefore remain in a position of pseudo-legality and face the continuous threat of expulsion.

Forced relocations: souk EI-Shabi

In the early 1980s, a new transport souk was opened in Khartoum. This centre, the souk EI-Shabi, is a combination of regional bus terminal and popular market (Figure 9). Formerly, these activities were located in the modern business centre of the capital. The transfer was motivated by the desire to decon- gest the commercial heart of Khartoum. Despite the initial scepticism of those directly involved, the new centre soon turned out to be a success.

Several years ago, in a somewhat forced attempt to create a more unified approach to urban development in the Sudan, the National Town Planning Board suggested employing the principle used in the souk EI-Shabi more generally. Several cities have taken up the idea, such as Port Sudan and Gedaref . Kassala also followed in the same footsteps and reserved an area along the feeder road for this purpose (Figure 7). The terminals of the regional

bus companies in the town centre were dismantled and moved to the proposed site. At the same time a new line of public transport from the town centre to the bus terminal was opened.

The relocation and clustering of regional public transport was also used to settle the 'problem' of some 300 k o u s h o u k s (market sheds) in the town centre. These k o u s h o u k s mushroomed in the 1970s. They were intended as temporary accommodation for small entrepreneurs unable to erect a (work-) shop of their own. In principle the issue of licences for k o u s h o u k s was dependent on the applicant's social circumstances. At first the municipality con- structed the kiosks itself and rented them out. Soon after construction was left to the new licence holders, thus excluding the truly poor. It is a public secret that there was a lot of favouritism in the allocation of koushouk licences. During Nimeiri's reign one of the military governors of the Eastern Region helped many members of his tribe to obtain the required documents. Most of them never intended to use their k o u s h o u k s themselves. In fact, most k o u s h o u k s in the centre were managed by employees or rented out.

At the time when the k o u s h o u k licences were issued, no attention was paid to the considerations of town planning. The sheds were scattered around the central souk area, located either alongside major roads or on sites which were officially intended for



Table 2 The number of plots planned, issued, built and used on souk El-Shabi

Plots Plots Plots Plots Use planned issued built ~ used b

Bus agencies 42 30 27 15 Restaurants 44 33 9 6 Shops 672 282 94 30

Total 758 345 130 51

a Including plots under construction b The actual number might be slightly higher because the inven- tory was carried out later in the morning while, for example, some bus agencies are only open at certain times of day. Source: Jaarsma and Kuiper (1993, p 48)

public gardens or parking space. As a result of the growth of activity in the town centre, koushouks came ever more to be regarded as obstacles. Apart from this, many decision makers in Kassala thought these temporary sheds did not fit into the image of a modern business centre. However, in the past the municipality has been reluctant to terminate koushouk licences because, on the one hand koushouk owners could mobilize political forces, and on the other the municipality did not know where else to put them. The political setting, however, was completely changed under the EI-Beshir administration, which wanted to break away from the half-hearted policies of previous governments. Thus, in 1990 the Kassala authorities decided to remove all the privately owned koushouks from the town centre. Some owners managed to obtain a piece of land in the central souk, albeit at market prices. They were given preferential treatment in the auction of some 30 plots (formerly used for koushouks). Most of the less wealthy owners were compensated with a plot in the souk E1-Shabi.

On the new terminal site, 758 plots were drawn, 315 of which were allocated to former koushouk holders in the centre and 30 to bus companies. The compensated people have obtained the right to use the land, but the municipality will remain the owner. They all had to pay for the lease and for basic services (depending on the size of the plot, between $US250 and $US600). The beneficiaries are expected to construct a permanent (work-)shop in compliance with present building regulations. In 1993 the municipality was charging a modest month- ly rent equivalent to $US3 for a shop or restaurant and $US8.50 for a ticket office (Table 2).

Three years have now passed since the plots were issued. Exactly 130 units have been erected, 65 of which are closed (most of them never opened), 14 are under construction and only 51 actually in use (predominantly as ticket offices, restaurants and shops selling spare parts). After the buses have left early in the morning the area looks quite disconso- late. The entrepreneurs complain about a lack of clients. Those who used to work in the town centre

have all seen their income drop sharply. It is symptomatic that there are only about 10 mobile traders working in the area, for the size of this group of entrepreneurs is usually a good yardstick for the success of a market (Post, 1989). The neighbouring district New Banat South is virtually uninhabited (no water; construction increasingly unaffordable). Only the bus owners are reasonably satisfied, for they are now based in one location and more able to service the passengers effectively.

The building of the souk EI-Shabi has definitely helped to reduce the quantity of traffic in the town centre. The former dispersed location of bus companies was very confusing and made the traffic situation more dangerous. The removal of the koushouks, however, had little effect. Most operators of koushouks have not taken up business in the souk E1-Shabi and still work in the town centre, albeit as street vendors. This is true, for example, of the sizable group selling cheap shoes and clothes, and now working on tables under the burning sun (Figure 10). For the time being, they are condoned but only until the construction of the new Islamic Bank to be built on that site.

The idea of souk EI-Shabi in Kassala suffers from two essential weaknesses. First, the location does not meet the basic requirement of significant local demand. The authorities have neglected the general experience that services follow demand instead of vice versa. The fact that the formula was successful in Khartoum had much to do with the souk's location in the middle of an extensive residential area. Furthermore, it is the owners of koushouks who have been compensated and not the actual users (managing employees or tenants). Due to both improper allocation and the practice of reselling, most koushouks were not in the hands of the original target group. Thus the idea of helping poor entrepreneurs to obtain a legal site from which to work has been eroded. Apart from this, for some the requirement to build with permanent materials and an official building permit is an insurmountable threshold. The emptiness of the souk EI-Shabi de- monstrates that most of the owners who were compensated, despite continuous pressure from the authorities, cannot build (too expensive) or will not built (poor investment). In relation to this it should be mentioned that only 2 out of 12 randomly chosen entrepreneurs in the souk EI-Shabi were owner occupiers, one of them having bought the shop only recently. In other words, investors seem to use the shops for rental purposes, not for their own activities. Most importantly, they do not depend on the shop for their livelihood.

Recent developments The present administration has shown a strong de- termination to modernize the town centre of Kassa-



Figure 10 Street vendors on the central souk (1993). The area used to be occupied by koushouks (stalls) that have been removed in 1990. In the near future the street vendors have to make way for the construction of a new bank

la. Consequent ly, the position of small entrepreneurs working the streets is increasingly unstable, especially while they are unorganized and politically marginal. Plans are being prepared to transfer all of them to a new souk (souk EI-Amaria; Figure 6) somewhere at the edge of the Soriba district, a site which is lacking in any generators of population movement. In the meantime all sorts of actions are undertaken by the local authorities to reduce the street vendors' room to manoeuvre. For example, the open area north of the central market halls (the malaja), where small farmers and middlemen (who buy their produce at the farm gate) used to sell their fruits and vegetables to a crowd of retail traders, has been cleared. The traders concerned have been offered a strip of land east of the light industrial area for temporary use. They now sit in their provisional shelters (rakoobas) waiting for a more permanent solution, because their present site has already been allocated to some others.

Indirectly, the position of entrepreneurs working the streets is harmed by the new government practice of selling all pieces of open land in the town centre by public auction in order to fill the empty treasury. Although these areas are usually ear- marked as public gardens or parking space, in reality they are 'illegaly' used for street vending. This ill-conceived practice, which is executed by the highly politicized and powerful land department,

clearly contributes to the crowding of public roads and subsequently reinforces the plea for repressive action.

The reluctance to deal with street activities in a more benign way is also noticeable in the reaction to a proposal launched after our previous investigations. The idea was to install a regional bus terminal (for all buses coming from the area east of the River Gash for which parking is not arranged) with a popular souk attached to the area north of the stadium and the light industrial area (Figure 2). This proposal was instrumental in the idea to develop the centre in the most suitable direction (eastward) and at the same time to create an appropriate work location for the important group of street operators. A popular souk is basically an open market area with linear selling runs, simple (publicly or privately provided) shelter and small but fixed selling and display spaces to be let out by the municipality to individual entrepreneurs who are unable to erect their own (work)shop. So far the authorities have been reluctant to take up this suggestion. They claim that the area under consideration has been promised to the police for housing a long time ago. However, apart from the fact that the government is in no financial position to erect new houses for its staff (the area is still empty and no investments have been made), there is no convincing reason to build them right here. The police promise is used as a screen



when in reality the proposal to create a popular souk simply does not sit well with the prevailing ideas regarding the development of the downtown area.

Considering the above, the prospect for vulnerable operators seems rather grim. Still, there is a slight possibility that things will improve somewhat in the near future. With the enactment of the 1991 Local Order, the Town Council has acquired a more powerful position. In the past the local government, responsible for the implementation of urban policy, has proved to be more sensitive to the people's complaints. After some years of straightforward, technocratic rule at local level (1989-92) town coun- cils have once more become operative and although they are perhaps not completely representative, they are at least in a position to raise objections to higher authority decisions which are too selective.

Conclusions

Changes in the form and function of inner city areas must be considered normal processes within a dynamic town. Inevitably, there are winners and losers in the fight for central space. The main question in this article was how the authorities adapt to this process. The examples of actual interventions in the Kassala town centre all show that the authorities have little concern for the interests of the most vulnerable groups. Most senior officials at regional and local levels seem to approach the problems of the centre of this rural town from the perspective of large metropolises like Cairo, Jeddah and Khartoum. As a result of ignorance and prejudice, many have a rather distorted view of their own urban reality. They fail to recognize, for example, the mutual dependence between wholesalers and street vendors and between manufacturing and retail functions. Especially in situations with high levels of poverty and limited mobility there is a great need for physic- al proximity. The interdependence of big and small businesses should persuade the authorities to make a point of reserving space in the centre for market and street trade, handicrafts and small-scale services (as customary in a not too distant past), next to shops, banks and offices. This space is, however, being increasingly reduced and released to the market for big investors.

Insofar as the government actively intervenes in the town centre, these actions usually relate to the removal of 'unsuitable' forms of activity. Although it tries to make the pill less hard to swallow for those concerned by offering compensation, this approach falls short in several respects. First of all, only the owners/licence holders are compensated, although they are often not the actual users (and usually do not belong to the category of the needy). A significant percentage of the actual users of the old location are pushed out because they do not possess the right documents and are, therefore, without rights.

If they rented the place before, they are often not able to return to the new premises, either because the rents have been put up, or because the type of use is (forcefully) changed. Many of them end up somewhere on the streets.

Second, the allocation of alternative plots is cou- pled to the requirement to build using permanent materials. This is only possible for wealthy owners and thus leads to improper resale.

Finally, the choice of alternative locations is often unfortunate. The 'beneficiaries' are forced into peripheral areas where the potential for profit gen- eration is slight, at least for the time being. As far as the less affluent owners of residential plots in the centre are concerned, the government does nothing to ease their departure from the area (for example, by giving them preferential treatment in the allocation of new residential plots).

An essential prerequisite for the neglect and dis- crimination of small and micro-enterprises to be corrected is that the needs of the operators involved are better understood by those who manage the city. This requires a heavy dose of training which indeed is, next to institution building, one of the corner- stones of the urban management approach advocated by the major international development institutions. Urban planners in the Sudan can contri- bute to the required change of mind because they are charged with providing information to the fora in which decisions are taken. Their work - carrying out social surveys and coordinating the implemention of area plans - brings them into daily contact with poor people. Being in a subordinate position themselves - town planning has not established itself firmly within the government structure - they more readily associ- ate with the needs of powerless groups. Besides, they have a professional inclination to look for appropriate compromise.

A practical proposition urban planners might raise is for the municipality to make use of the legal possibility of claiming pieces of land for public purposes, like the installation of a popular souk in the town centre. Such a facility is badly needed in Kassala, for markets are almost the only way in which very small operators can obtain access to central, viable locations in town. The popular souk should preferably be combined with other amenities to attract customers like a bus terminal and/or the intermediary trade in fruit and vegetables. This proposal is instrumental to the government's desire to control (an official market with recognized sites) but at the same time recognizes the legitimate wish of small entrepreneurs to work in the town centre. However, whether or not such forms of appropriate compromise will be accepted is ultimately a question of political will.


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selective intervention in kassala's town centre

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