seizing this moment of hope -...

A POWERFUL VOICE FOR LIFESAVING ACTION

RICK NEAL with

NIGEL PEARSON

TOWARDS

A SECURE

FUTURE IN THE

DEMOCRATIC

REPUBLIC OF

THE CONGO

SEIZING THIS MOMENT OF HOPE

OCTOBER 2006

SEIZING THIS MOMENT OF HOPE: TOWARDS A SECURE FUTURE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGOOCTOBER 2006

Cover photo: This boy and his friends are some of

thousands who have recently returned from refugee camps in Tanzania to their homes

near Fizi in South Kivu Province. Their government

and its supporters have a chance to build on this

moment of hope to make sure they have a

better future.

Credit: Refugees International

Andrea Lari

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report builds on the work of Refugees

International over the past 12 years on the Great

Lakes, all of which depended on countless inter-

views, meetings, and visits with displaced people

and refugees, UN offi cials, NGO staff, and donor

representatives. MONUC has been very helpful

during fi eld visits, particularly with transport, and

the hospitality of friends in the fi eld, too numerous

to mention, is always very much appreciated.

At Refugees International, Andrea Lari and

Sarah Martin laid the groundwork for this report

through their missions to the DRC, and Emila

Brkic contributed through her work on children

associated with armed confl ict, gender, and

disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

Joel Charny guided the project; Megan Fowler

managed the publication; and Nicole Mailman

provided excellent mission support.

For his patience and support, Tom Grote also

deserves thanks.

ABOUT REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL

Refugees International generates lifesaving

humanitarian assistance and protection for

displaced people around the world and works

to end the conditions that create displacement.

Based on our on-the-ground knowledge of key

humanitarian emergencies, Refugees International

successfully pressures governments, international

agencies and nongovernmental organizations to

improve conditions for displaced people.

Refugees International is an independent,

non-profi t humanitarian advocacy organization

based in Washington, D.C. We do not accept

government or United Nations funding, relying

instead on contributions from individuals,

foundations, and corporations. Learn more at

www.refugeesinternational.org.

WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Current Humanitarian Situation and Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Humanitarian Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Priorities for Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Priorities for Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Priorities for Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Towards a Secure Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Refugees International’s Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

A map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo can be found on pages 16-17.

SEIZING THIS MOMENT OF HOPE: TOWARDS A SECURE FUTURE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGOi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For more than a decade, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has struggled with one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Yet, improbably, that situation has improved markedly over the past few years. Seventy percent of the electorate has voted in the fi rst democratic contest for president in four decades; violence in the east has eased, largely due to the presence of the UN peacekeeping force, MONUC; and humanitarian response has improved even as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees begin to return home. No longer is the DRC an intractable quagmire: it has arrived at a moment of hope that must be seized.

The international community must now redouble its efforts to help those still in need and further stabilize the country, to build on the improvements made and protect its already substantial investment. The priority is action—this is no time for efforts to lag or attention to wander. The DRC is vital for strategic as well as humanitarian reasons, with staggering poten-tial as well as tremendous suffering. Its vast natural resources could be a motor for regional development and stability, but instead have fueled regional confl ict following the collapse of the Mobutu regime in the 1990s. Four million people have died as a result, and 1.6 million remain displaced inside the DRC today. Despite the signs of hope brought by the elections, fi ghting and displacement will continue during the year to come, even as a new government takes power and long-term development programs take root.

The most pressing humanitarian priority is increasing security for civilians by reforming the Congolese armed forces, expanding MONUC, and implementing the embargo on arms and natural resources. Pockets of violence, displacement, and need persist throughout the east, internally displaced people live just beyond the reach of assistance, and attempts by the displaced to return home are thwarted by fi ghting. The FARDC—the new Congolese national army—is the most serious threat. Despite a process of integration designed to create a profes-sional defense force, the FARDC’s ill-trained and underpaid troops, a collection of former government and rebel forces, are abandoned by their commanders, forcing them to live off the backs of the population and opening the door to brutal abuse—particularly rape.

Civilians also come under attack from local militias and rebel groups seeking control over natural resources or fi ghting against neighboring governments. Joint operations between the FARDC and MONUC to subdue these groups have displaced hundreds of thousands since January 2006, with little strategic gain. MONUC has come under pressure from the U.S., its largest contributor, to pursue such a military solution, but neither MONUC nor the FARDC has the capacity to implement it.

In addition, the UN Security Council recently extended an embargo on the fl ow of weapons and the natural resources that pay for them to and from the DRC. MONUC again does not have the capacity to monitor and enforce this embargo, despite a specifi c mandate to do so, due to a lack of troops, equipment, and intelligence capabilities. The embargo is crucial to choking off the source of confl ict in the DRC, but has never been respected. Rwanda and Uganda have a particular role to play in this regard, and the ongoing fl ow of arms from their territories into eastern DRC demonstrates their failure.

In the ever-widening areas where peace makes assistance possible, more humanitarian funding and continued coordination between agencies remain critical. Help is needed in areas of crisis and displacement, where lives are in danger, as well as in areas of resolution and return, where lives are being rebuilt. In North Kivu and Ituri, displacement has increased over the past

No longer is the

DRC an intractable

quagmire: it has

arrived at a moment

of hope that must

be seized.

WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG ii

several months, straining the capacity of donors, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to respond. A new initiative, the Rapid Response Mechanism, has performed well by establishing NGO teams that can respond quickly to new displacement crises with shelter and household kits, food, and water. In terms of return and resettlement, however, the response so far has been slow. Given the scale of the problem, donors and agencies need to identify the areas of return that they will assist fi rst, focusing on those that will draw the largest number of displaced or that are most at risk of renewed fi ghting. They will need to meet basic humanitarian needs fi rst, then move swiftly to ensure the ongoing safety of the population as well as access to markets, clean water, education, and health care.

Humanitarian response for both displacement and return is dependent on funding—and funding for the crisis in the DRC is completely inadequate. If the objective is minimum stan-dards of assistance for all who need it, then donors are not providing the required resources. The problem is compounded by the fact that humanitarian action in the DRC is expensive: distances are long, infrastructure non-existent, and corruption endemic. The United Nations laid out the most comprehensive picture to date of humanitarian needs and proposed respons-es for the DRC in its 2006 Action Plan, yet donors have not taken the appeal seriously, supplying only one-third of the requested $680 million. Donors have begun contributing more to long-term development programs, but the shift is creating a gap in short-term assistance that could save lives now. The European Union, in particular, has cut off support for humanitarian assistance before its development funding has become available.

The quality of humanitarian response also depends on coordination. The DRC is a pilot country for the Cluster Leadership Approach and the Pooled Fund, a pair of intertwined initiatives that have improved coordination but may be having a negative impact on funding. The Cluster Leadership Approach has brought together UN agencies and international NGOs (although not local representatives) to set priorities in sectors such as protection or water and sanitation. The Pooled Fund was established to ensure that unfunded projects designed to meet priority needs could indeed be implemented, and a few European donors (in particular the United Kingdom) have contributed substantially. The Fund uses Cluster recommendations in awarding grants, creating a powerful incentive for NGOs to participate, thus improving co-ordination. However, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), in its role as Fund adminis-trator, has not been able to disburse funds in a timely manner. There is also a concern that the Fund favors UN agencies, with their high overhead costs, at the expense of more effi cient (but also more limited) NGO projects.

Improvements in security, assistance, funding, and coordination are humanitarian imperatives for the DRC. The hope fostered by improvements over the past few years, capped by the recent elections, must drive the Congolese people, their government, and the international commu-nity—the United States and other leading international actors, regional actors, donor agencies and appropriators, the United Nations, NGOs, and the media—to redouble efforts to stop the killing and displacement of civilians, meet the basic needs of those affected by the confl ict, and help people get home and rebuild.

Refugees International therefore recommends that:

Improving security

• The DRC request that the United States and other donors invest in the FARDC by increas-ing salaries, extending and improving training, and supporting the prosecution of soldiers and their superiors as necessary for abuses, especially rape.

Improvements in

security, assistance,

funding, and coordi-

nation are humani-

tarian imperatives

for the DRC.

SEIZING THIS MOMENT OF HOPE: TOWARDS A SECURE FUTURE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGOiii

• The new Congolese government request, and the UN Security Council authorize, a twelve-month expansion of MONUC, adding four additional battalions to protect civilians and facilitate humanitarian response; deter armed groups while encouraging their disarmament and demobilization; support FARDC reform; and enforce the embargo on weapons and natural resources.

• Rwanda and Uganda begin enforcing the embargo on weapons and natural resources, with the U.S. and the United Kingdom, as supporters of the two countries, assisting them as well as holding them accountable (through the UN Security Council if necessary) for violations.

Improving assistance

• The new president of the DRC appoint a high-level coordinator for humanitarian affairs; the new prime minister promote the most technically qualifi ed staff to head relevant ministries at both the national and provincial levels; and the new national assembly establish a com-mittee to monitor humanitarian needs and response.

• The DRC government, donors, UN agencies, and NGOs work together to strengthen the Rapid Response Mechanism and improve IDP camp management and assistance to survivors of rape. In addition, donors must resolve current food shortages by increasing contributions to the World Food Programme.

• DRC government agencies, donors, UN agencies, and NGOs accelerate efforts within the Early Recovery Cluster to develop and implement a comprehensive plan to encourage and facilitate the return and resettlement of IDPs, refugees, and ex-combatants.

Improving funding

• Donors increase their contributions for humanitarian response in the DRC, including security and peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and coordination.

• Donors, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC, and the World Bank work to man-age the shift from humanitarian to development funding, ensuring that implementing agen-cies do not have to suspend projects and lay off experienced staff during the transition.

Improving coordination

• The Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and UNDP complete the rollout of the Early Recovery Cluster and link it fi rmly to the Protection Cluster so that IDP and refugee return is voluntary and safe as well as rapid.

• Under the leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, OCHA increase local involve-ment in the Cluster groups, and UNDP improve its coordinating capacity as MONUC withdraws.

For a full list of recommendations, please see page 33.

WWW.REFUGEESINTERNATIONAL.ORG 1

Enhancing security,

providing better

assistance,

increasing funding,

and strengthening

coordination are

the actions that will

make a difference.

INTRODUCTION

The humanitarian crisis in the central African nation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one of the worst in the world—and yet, improbably, the situa-tion there has improved markedly over the past few years. Despite outbreaks of fi ghting during the current electoral process and ongoing displacement in the east of the country, the DRC has arrived at a moment of hope which must be seized. Over the next year, concerted action by the new Congolese government, international agencies, and donor governments can lead to a resolu-tion of the humanitarian crisis, an end to displacement and suffering, and the return home of millions of people. Enhancing secu-rity, providing better assistance, increasing funding, and strengthening coordination are the actions that will make a difference —actions that require commitment and resolve. Donors, the United Nations, and humanitarian organizations have already made substantial contributions to the DRC, and this is no time for efforts to lag or at-tention to wander: now is the time for the Congolese people, their government, and the international community to double their efforts, to build on their investment, and to fulfi ll the hope they have engendered.

The DRC is vital for strategic as well as humanitarian reasons. Its vast natural resources could be a motor for regional development, but instead have fueled regional confl ict following the collapse of the Mobutu regime in the 1990s. With its size, population, and wealth, it could act as the political anchor for Central Africa, but its vacuum of power and leadership has drawn neighboring countries into war in a region wracked by extreme violence and genocide that has required 10 United Nations peacekeeping missions, at a cost of billions of dollars, over the past 45 years. Four million people in the DRC have died since 1998 as a result of the confl ict, 1.6 million remain displaced inside the country today, and almost half a million are refugees in other countries.

Refugees International (RI) has visited the DRC fi ve times since September 2004, building on repeated missions to the region and related advocacy since the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Most recently, RI teams visited central Katanga in the southeast, the eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, and the far northeastern district of Ituri. RI spoke with recent as well as long-term internally displaced persons (IDPs),

SEIZING THIS MOMENT OF HOPETOWARDS A SECURE FUTURE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL’S MAIN FINDINGS IN THE DRC

1. The world must redouble its efforts in the DRC. The Congo is not an intractable quagmire and the situation has improved, but pockets of insecurity and extreme need will persist through 2007. The displaced are returning home, but fi nd little when they arrive. Humanitarian operations in the DRC are expensive, with diffi cult logistics, corruption, and enormous need.

2. Improving security is the most urgent humanitarian priority. Insecurity produces further displace-ment, impedes humanitarian access, and thwarts the return home. Government troops need higher salaries, better training, and tougher penalties for abuse. The UN peacekeeping force, MONUC, needs to be expanded, but also needs to increase peaceful disarmament efforts rather than taking a strictly military approach with armed groups. Rwanda and Uganda must begin enforcing the embargo on weapons and natural resources.

2 SEIZING THIS MOMENT OF HOPE: TOWARDS A SECURE FUTURE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

returning refugees, demobilized combatants, and host community residents, as well as staff members of non-governmental orga-nizations (NGOs), UN agencies, military personnel, and representatives of donor agencies and governments.

Throughout, RI has found tremendous re-silience among the Congolese people. They cast a wary eye on the future, mindful of im-mediate needs related to safety, food, health care, and income, but hopeful that the elec-tions will bring peace and a better life. RI is using this moment of hope to take stock of the humanitarian situation in the DRC and present a set of recommendations for the new government and the international community that will support it.

The challenge for donor governments and their constituents in particular is to grasp the scale of the problem at hand and increase their engagement and assistance accordingly. The contributions to date and the ongoing needs stand in contrast to the invisibility of the DRC on the world stage.

There is a lasting impression that the Congo is a black hole into which money disappears with little impact—and indeed, the DRC is a void in the center of Africa for the Western consciousness, seen as too complex and hopelessly intractable, consistently over-shadowed by other crises in places more mentally and physically accessible.

The relatively peaceful electoral process is helping to disperse some of the shadows, presenting a democratic contest familiar to the world and shedding light on some of the most pressing needs. Elections alone will not bring an immediate end to prob-lems such as the fl ow of weapons into the country, foreign support for armed groups, ongoing displacement, restricted humani-tarian access, and chronically low levels of income, education, and health care. The elections, however, do bring hope that more can be done to deal successfully with these problems. Now is the time, in this moment of hope, to act: to give more, to do more, to secure the future for millions in the DRC and the region.

Displaced women and their families who recently fl ed

fi ghting in Ituri, now live in camps nearby in

North Kivu Province. The displaced in this area

are fi nally receiving the assistance they deserve, as peace takes hold and aid

agencies are able to travel freely to the region. The

threat of violence remains, however, preventing them

from returning home.


Nigel Pearson


BACKGROUND

The DRC is the third largest country in Africa, about the size of the eastern United States, with an estimated population of 60 million. It stretches from the equatorial heat of Kinshasa near the Atlantic Ocean southeast across the diamond mines of the Kasai provinces, to mineral-rich Katanga and its capital Lubumbashi; and northeast up the Congo River to Kisangani and beyond to the Great Lakes region of central Africa, where Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi sit across from Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu. Its rivers represent 10% of the world’s hydroelectric potential; its rainforest is the largest on the continent; it contains 30% of the world’s cobalt; Kilo Moto, in Ituri, is one of the world’s largest gold fi elds; its extensive copper mines in Katanga produce high-grade ore; and its uranium was used in one of the atomic bombs detonated over Japan in 1945.

These natural resources, of strategic and economic interest to the U.S., Europe, China, and South Africa, are at the root of the confl ict that has provoked the current humanitarian crisis. They fi rst drew King Leopold II of Belgium, who was granted full rights to the Congo as his personal domain by European powers and the U.S. in 1885. His exploitation of natural resources, extracted in conjunction with extensive human rights abuses, set the precedent for subsequent rulers; the Belgian colonial state set an additional precedent with its policies of ethnic division. The most visible heir of Leopold and Belgium was Mobutu Sese Soku, who seized power fi ve years after Congo gained independence in 1960, then stripped and sold its resources with no long-term benefi t to the population. Manipula-tion of ethnic animosity, including against the Tutsi minority in the east, created the instability needed to justify Mobutu’s rule and keep the state weak enough to facilitate unregulated plunder.

The genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda in 1994 and the ensuing take-over of Rwanda by Tutsi rebels led more than one million

Rwandan Hutu—including those who orga-nized the genocide—to seek shelter in eastern Congo. Two years later, Rwanda invaded to deny the génocidaires safe haven in the DRC, pushing the Rwandan refugees back into Rwanda and supporting the rebellion of an obscure commander, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, against Kinshasa.

In 1998, Kabila, after deposing Mobutu and becoming president, turned against his Rwandan backers to reduce their infl uence. Rwanda in turn fl exed its newfound might and invaded the DRC for a second time. It was joined by Uganda, with both countries claiming self-defense against attacks from Congolese territory. They were soon battling each other, however, to gain control over mineral resources far from the ostensible threat to their security on their borders. The fall of Mobutu had created a security vacuum in the DRC that its voracious neighbors fought to fi ll, arming local rebel groups in order to keep Kinshasa at bay and ensure a steady supply of coltan, copper, diamonds, cobalt, and gold. In 2001, an independent panel of experts convened by the United Nations established that the armed forces of Rwanda and Uganda were perpetrating war and human rights abuses in the DRC in order to loot its natural resources—becoming, in effect, the new heirs of Leopold, Belgium, and Mobutu.

The humanitarian consequences of the war were catastrophic. As Rwanda and Uganda moved to take control of mineral resources, either directly or through Congolese proxies, local defense forces, referred to generically as the Mai-Mai, sprang up to resist. Through-out the east of the country, men, women, and children were caught in the crossfi re or directly targeted due to perceived sup-port for one group or another. Some joined the armed groups in order to defend their communities or profi t from the mines they controlled; others, including women as well as thousands of children, were captured and conscripted as soldiers, wives, and slaves. Hundreds of thousands fl ed to neighbor-

The Congo’s natural

resources are at the

root of the confl ict

that has provoked

the current humani-

tarian crisis.

SEIZING THIS MOMENT OF HOPE: TOWARDS A SECURE FUTURE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO4

With the expan-

sion of MONUC,

withdrawal of

foreign troops, and

the formation of a

transitional govern-

ment in July 2003,

fi ghting in many

parts of the country

has died down.

ing countries, especially Tanzania, and have lived for years in sprawling refugee camps. Millions more abandoned their homes and fi elds to seek shelter in other villages, in towns, or near military bases, anywhere that could offer a sense of safety and something to eat. While some of the internally displaced created camps for themselves, most found refuge in the local community, living with friends or family members, or renting small plots in exchange for fi eld labor. Even those who stayed home, however, were affected as armed groups looted villages and de-stroyed bridges, health centers, markets, and schools. All of this occurred in the context of general neglect by the government that had kept the DRC in a state of chronic underde-velopment.

In total, four million people have died in the DRC since 1998 from causes related to the confl ict, most because they had no access to simple life-saving medical treatment or disease prevention measures available in even the poorest countries.

International efforts to stop the war in the DRC began almost immediately after the Rwandan and Ugandan invasion of August 1998. The belligerents signed a ceasefi re agreement in 1999, which mandated the organization of an Inter-Congolese Dialogue leading to a transitional government, a new constitution, and elections. This process began in earnest only after the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila in January 2001 and the accession of his son, Joseph, to the presidency. The ceasefi re agreement also called for the UN to establish a peace-keeping mission to the DRC, which it did in November 1999. The UN Mission to the Congo (MONUC) had a limited mandate at fi rst, restricted to observing the ceasefi re, with a small number of troops. This has increased in response to ongoing fi ghting in the DRC (most signifi cantly following

massacres in Ituri in May 2003) and the need to impose a certain measure of security in order to hold elections.

With the expansion of MONUC, withdrawal of foreign troops, and the formation of a transitional government in July 2003, fi ght-ing in many parts of the country has died down. Massacres, which once occurred with sickeningly regularity, have stopped. Armed groups are increasingly confi ned to smaller and smaller areas, over 100,000 combat-ants have entered a formal demobilization program, the number of reported rapes has decreased in areas where MONUC oper-ates, and the displaced have started to return home. Improved security also means better access for humanitarian aid agencies, allow-ing them to provide more assistance more quickly to those who need it most. Seven-teen million people, representing 70% of the electorate, recently cast votes in the fi rst democratic elections since independence, with international assistance overcoming logistical challenges and political resistance.

Renewed violence is possible: individuals and groups that are now part of the transi-tional government, including Joseph Kabila and his rival for the presidency, Vice-Presi-dent Jean-Pierre Bemba, stand to lose their power at the end of the electoral process, and rumors abound that the old armed groups, having never truly disarmed, stand ready to intervene. However, peace in the DRC has grown because the belligerents realize that none of them can control the DRC’s natural resources by force, and that participation in the transitional government gives them their best chance to retain at least some access to the riches. This tacit understanding should hold during the rest of the electoral process and lead to the relatively peaceful installation of a new government.


Almost 450,000

people are refugees

in neighboring

countries, while 1.6

million are displaced

inside the DRC.

CURRENT HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND RESPONSE

The humanitarian situation in the DRC has improved greatly over the past few years, but still remains one of the most serious crises in the world. Almost 450,000 people are refugees in neighboring countries, while 1.6 million are displaced inside the DRC. While calm has returned to many areas, pockets of extreme violence persist. Hundreds of thousands have been displaced since Janu-ary 2006 due to offensives, supported by MONUC, by the Congolese national army (the FARDC) against armed groups in the east. In addition, FARDC troops, under-paid and undisciplined, are now the main perpetrators of human rights abuses in the country. Their extortion of food and labor, and widespread practice of rape, are major causes of displacement, and continue to provoke confl ict with local armed groups.

The fi rst setting which requires humanitar-ian assistance in the DRC is therefore one of crisis and displacement, where lives are in danger; the second is one of resolution and return, where lives are being rebuilt. In the DRC, both of these settings are sometimes found in the same area, requiring agencies to implement different responses at the same time. In addition, despite the elections and the hope for peace, crisis and displace-ment will continue throughout the east in the coming years even as resolution of the crises and returns increase.

Saving lives. Joint operations between the FARDC and MONUC since the beginning of 2006 have pushed hundreds of thou-sands out of their homes; malnutrition rates skyrocketed following displacement in late 2005 among IDPs in central Katanga; 45,000 newly displaced are holed up in the southern part of Ituri, starving because the World Food Programme does not have enough on hand to feed them. These are all examples of displacement where a sud-den infl ux of people requires immediate assistance. Another group on the move,

however, are those on their way home. In the southern part of South Kivu Province, along the shores of Lake Tanganyika, Con-golese refugees returning from Tanzania have been forced to seek shelter on the way, while they earn the money they need to get home, or while they wait as their villages are rebuilt. In Mitwaba, in central Katanga, demobilized Mai-Mai combatants and their families are stuck in camps, waiting for assistance promised by the government in exchange for disarming. Host community residents are also heavily affected by dis-placement and return. In general, these are places where people seek shelter temporar-ily, where humanitarian assistance needs to meet minimum standards for survival with-out encouraging additional displacement.

Rebuilding. In the past few years, as fi ght-ing has died down in the east, former IDPs and refugees, as well as ex-combatants and their families, have started to arrive back in their home villages. Others are resettling elsewhere, having decided that they cannot go home because nothing is left, or do not want to go home because they do not feel safe. Return and resettlement are particu-larly visible in Djugu Territory, the scene of some of the worst massacres in Ituri, but are also happening in northern Katanga, along Lake Tanganyika, and in North Kivu. These people, along with those who never left, need to farm in order to survive, but do not always have the seeds and tools they require. In addition, they want some assur-ance that their villages will be rebuilt, that normal infrastructure, such as sources of clean water, schools, and health centers, will soon be available. Stopgap measures, such as schools in temporary structures, are a necessary fi rst step, but must be carried out in a way that leads to sustainable develop-ment.

Overall, a range of groups needs assistance:

• People who have been displaced for years, but are still looking for a way to go home or resettle permanently.

Women are the

targets of sexual

violence so wide-

spread that they

consider rape as

a harrowing but

expected hazard

of daily life.


• People suffering repeated displacement, of-ten over short periods, either fl eeing from and then returning to their homes or being pushed from one refuge to another.

• IDPs and refugees who are in the process of returning home or resettling elsewhere.

• Ex-combatants, many accompanied by their families, who have been demobilized and are trying to rebuild their lives.

• Residents of host communities that shelter the displaced as well as those who never fl ed in areas of displacement and return.

In addition, there are specifi c groups vulnerable to human rights abuses. Ethnic minorities have been a frequent target of attacks in some areas (prompting them to perpetrate human rights abuses of their own in response); children (both boys and girls) are kidnapped or recruited for armed groups; and women are the targets of sexual violence so widespread that they consider rape as a harrowing but expected hazard of daily life.

Life for all these groups in the eastern DRC is precarious. Most IDPs crowd host communities, living among the population with friends or family members, or putting up temporary shelters on small plots rented in exchange for day labor. This puts enor-mous strain on resources already limited by the lack of social infrastructure such as markets, law enforcement, schools, and health centers, not to mention natural resources such as arable land and water. In the South Kivu village of Hombo, for ex-ample, the resident population of 4,420 has had to welcome an additional 40,000 people displaced from their homes. When a sudden infl ux overwhelms the capacity of a host com-munity, makeshift camps spring up in any safe, open area. Before help arrives, shelters built from branches or reeds and covered with straw crowd together, with just enough space between them for cooking fi res; water is sometimes far away and rarely clean, and latrines usually non-existent. Some may earn money as day laborers or petty traders, but most are obliged to wait for assistance.

The areas most affected by the confl ict, both in terms of displacement and return, are in the east (see map, pp. 16 & 17):

Katanga Province: For humanitarian re-sponse, the province is divided along the ceasefi re line that once separated troops loyal to Kinshasa from those backed by Rwanda. In the central districts, linked with the provincial capital Lubumbashi, 150,000 are displaced in two triangles that connect in the territory of Mitwaba. One, to the west, covers the marshy and inaccessible Lake Upemba area; the other stretches east to Pweto on the Zambian border and north to Manono. To the north, extending west from the main town of Kalemie to Nyunzu and Kabalo, IDPs are starting to return home, but 40,000 remain displaced; overall, the north is largely ne-glected, with poor access and few humanitar-ian agencies. Over 60,000 Congolese from Katanga are refugees in Zambia, waiting for fi nal election results before making a deci-sion about returning.

South Kivu Province: The southern territories along Lake Tanganyika, once almost empty because of fi ghting, have again come alive following the withdrawal of Rwanda-backed troops. Over 30,000 refugees have returned from camps in Tanzania, although 100,000 more are waiting for the outcome of the elections. Almost 200,000 people in the province are internally displaced, many to the northwest and southwest of the provincial capital, Bukavu, where assistance is diffi cult because of ongoing fi ghting; and others to the west, around Shabunda, where assistance is limited because of physical isolation.

North Kivu Province: About 690,000 people are displaced throughout North Kivu, the highest number in the country. The province has been heavily affected by joint operations by the FARDC and MONUC against foreign armed groups, as well as by FARDC offen-sives against local rebel factions. The threat of ambushes and kidnapping prevent aid agencies from helping IDPs to the northwest and southwest of Goma, the provincial capital, in particular. In the northern part


of the province, access is better; some IDPs have fl ed joint operations against a Ugandan rebel group, while others have sought shelter from fi ghting just to the north in Ituri.

Ituri: This district in vast Orientale Prov-ince has seen great improvement over the past few years, but there has been a recent relapse in the south, on the border with North Kivu. Thousands have returned home in Djugu, to the north of the main town of Bunia, while in Irumu, to the south, 150,000 people crowd into small villages as the FARDC and MONUC battle local militias. Security threats make it particularly diffi cult for assistance to reach those in need, and Ituri presents the most challenging crisis in the DRC at the moment.

Rape is an especially serious problem in the eastern DRC. The World Health Organization reported more than 41,000 cases of sexual violence in Maniema, South and North Kivu, and Katanga between 1998 and 2005; given problems with reporting, and especially as Ituri is not represented, the real number is probably much higher. As with other issues, the current situation is contradictory. Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders, or MSF) recorded fewer than 5 cases of rape per week in its Ituri facility in July 2006, down from 40 per week 15 months earlier. In the Rutshuru

area of North Kivu, however, MSF recorded 200 cases in August 2006, far above the average of 64 cases treated each month.

In all areas in eastern DRC, humanitarian needs related to both displacement and return are exacerbated by chronic under-development. Poor roads, diffi cult access to markets, few educational opportunities, inadequate health care, low status of women: all are conditions found throughout the country, due to governmental neglect and mismanagement, that undermine the capac-ity of communities to cope with crises.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the humanitarian situation in the east of the DRC has improved in certain areas if not evenly. Djugu Territory in Ituri and Fizi Territory in South Kivu are largely calm, with those driven from their homes during brutal fi ghting just a few years ago now returning. In the north of North Kivu, many roads are safe to travel again, allowing aid agencies to reach hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Above all, mortality has decreased in places where fi ghting has stopped, not necessarily because people were getting killed directly, but rather because they now have greater access to life-saving medical treatment. These changes demonstrate that concerted international effort can have an impact, that it is indeed possible to make a difference in the DRC.

Congolese refugees return from Tanzania aboard this boat, under the aegis of UNHCR. After making the long trip across Lake Tanganyika, refugees often fi nd their villages and homes destroyed. Increased assistance in clean water, education, and health care will help them rebuild their lives.

Credit: Refugees InternationalAndrea Lari


A young displaced man wheels food back to his

shelter in the central Katanga village of Mitwaba. The UN

responded to an urgent need for assistance by

bringing food in by helicopter during the

rainy season, helping the displaced survive until

the roads cleared and aid agencies could make their

way to the remote site.

Credit:Refugees International

Andrea Lari


“If it is safe, we will

go back, even

without help. If

there is help, it

will follow us.”

CENTRAL KATANGA

In the mineral-rich province of Katanga, the small village of Mitwaba lies far from the boomtown capital of Lubumbashi, but close to a confl ict between government troops and local Mai-Mai militias that smoldered for years before exploding in November 2005. The army mounted an offensive against the Mai-Mai that sent thousands of people fl eeing from their homes, forced to abandon their crops and belongings. If they went back to their villages, the Mai-Mai would attack them, accusing them of col-laborating with the army. If they moved into the safety of Mitwaba, where the army was based, they faced constant abuse: the troops stationed there received no pay, but were expected simply to take what they wanted from the people they were supposed to protect. “They won’t try to grow food,” a resident explained of the IDPs, “because everything is stolen by the soldiers.” While some chose nonetheless to seek shelter in Mitwaba, others kept to the forest, setting up makeshift camps in hidden spots with other families.

The humanitarian community was slow to respond to the crisis, as the agencies based in Lubumbashi were more focused on long-term development projects, and Mitwaba and other affected areas were dif-fi cult to reach. By February 2006, malnutrition rates were soaring, prompting the UN peacekeeping force, MONUC, to dispatch a stopgap delivery of food by helicopter. “The fi rst thing we need,” a group told RI, “is food; the second thing is clothing. Then we ask the authorities to keep in mind our safety.”

Hearing that the UN had arrived, those hidden in the forest around Mitwaba began to emerge, con-fi dent that they would be safe against both the Mai-Mai and the army. A few weeks later, MONUC deployed a team of peacekeepers to Mitwaba, prompting relief agencies to set up projects and draw-ing even more people into the village. It also prompted the army to withdraw its troops so that a new, better-trained unit could be deployed. The Mai-Mai, in turn, came into Mitwaba to lay down their weapons and join the state-run demobilization program. By this past June, families were receiving regular rations of food, and pigs and goats reappeared in the village, their owners no longer worried about looting troops. However, the number of those needing help ballooned as more and more Mai-Mai came in to disarm, with their families in tow. The ex-combatants found little assistance despite promises from the government, and no agency was willing to help their families. They showed the RI team a small tin can they used to measure out fl our given to them every fi ve days: one measure, to be shared by the whole family. For anything else, they would have to scrounge for themselves.

Along with the displaced, however, they hoped to go back soon to their villages: the planting season starts in September, and they wanted to get back to prepare their fi elds. As they told us, “If it is safe, we will go back, even without help. If there is help, it will follow us.” They heard rumors, however, that government troops were still roaming the area, and decided they would not go back until the soldiers were gone. They wait, thousands of displaced people and ex-combatants, in Mitwaba, hoping they will get home in time to plant.


HUMANITARIAN PRIORITIES

Taken together, humanitarian needs in the DRC today related to displacement, return, and underlying underdevelopment constitute a broad challenge to the Congolese govern-ment and the international community. Looking at improvements in the humanitar-ian situation over the past few years as well as present needs, this challenge can be met by focusing on four areas: security, humani-tarian assistance, funding, and coordination. This section presents issues and priorities for all four, starting with security.

Priorities for Security

Security is the most pressing humanitarian issue in the DRC. Effective humanitarian response is not limited by skill or capacity or even funding as much as it is limited by war and the threat of violence. In some areas, displacement has increased in 2006 over previous years; return and resettlement are thwarted because of renewed or ongoing fi ghting; and relief agencies are unable to reach those in need of assistance. In others, however, death rates have gone down as hu-manitarian access increases, fewer people are displaced as peacekeepers deter attacks, and more people return home as militias disarm.

These improvements are largely the result of robust peacekeeping through MONUC, the UN mission to the DRC. First deployed in 1999 as a relatively weak observer force, the UN Security Council strengthened the mission considerably in 2003 in response to looming genocide in Ituri, and again in 2004 to protect the political process, the elections in particular. With 17,500 troops and an an-nual budget of just over $1 billion, MONUC is the largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world. Even so, MONUC has never been adequately funded, considering the size of the country, the lack of infrastructure, and the complexity of the problems. Other mis-sions, such as in Liberia and Sierra Leone, had a similar number of troops, but covered a far smaller area. As a result, despite the large price tag, MONUC has been remark-

ably cost-effective: with a number of troops small relative to the task at hand, MONUC is bringing peace to many parts of the eastern DRC, securing roads so that aid agencies can help displaced people in remote areas, and providing the security guarantees necessary for IDPs and refugees to return home.

Serious challenges remain, however, and require immediate attention.

The FARDC—the new Congolese national army—is the biggest threat to the security of the population. Troops directly attack villages suspected of supporting rebel groups, killing, wounding, and displacing civilians. They are also responsible for countless acts of individual abuse: looting crops, food, and household goods; forcing people to work for them as porters and cooks; and rape. They are underpaid and ill-trained, abandoned by their commanders to live off the backs of the population. The FARDC thus creates enemies of the people they are supposed to protect, prompting local militias to retaliate and increasing support for rebel groups.

The FARDC is in fact the product of an inte-gration process mandated by the 2003 peace agreement, whereby government troops and rebel groups were supposed to merge into a new national force. Preliminary results were encouraging. The First Integrated Brigade, for example, received training by Belgian contingents and performed well in Ituri upon deployment, proud of its status and conscious of its new role. Collaboration with MONUC has also produced good results, with FARDC abuses kept to a minimum and peace maintained in areas patrolled jointly. Overall, however, integration has failed: additional brigades were created in name only to meet political deadlines, training was poor, and troops remain undisciplined and unprofessional.

Civilians also come under attack from local militias and rebel groups, to support them-selves or in retaliation for perceived support of their enemies. Despite a reduction in the

Effective humani-

tarian response is

not limited by skill

or capacity or even

funding as much as

it is limited by war

and the threat of

violence.

operating areas of these groups over the past few years, there is still a range of militias that operates in the eastern DRC, with the potential to expand once again if MONUC and the FARDC cannot provide permanent security. Rebels include as many as 10,000 militia members still operating in Ituri under local insurgencies such as the MRC (the Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais); Mai-Mai groups, which are fragmented, traditional local defense forces; and those affi liated with Congolese rebel general Laurent Nkunda, closely allied with Rwanda and to whom the 81st and 83rd brigades of the Congolese

national army are closely aligned. Foreign armed groups include the ADF/NALU, which is ostensibly fi ghting against the Ugandan government, but 60% of its troops are Congolese nationals; and about 7,500 members of the FDLR (the Forces démocra-tiques de libération du Rwanda), remnants of the Rwandan Hutu forces responsible for the 1994 genocide, fi ghting against the Tutsi-led government since being pushed into the Congo that year. The notorious Lord’s Resis-tance Army from Uganda is allegedly hiding in the far northeast of the DRC, but has not yet been involved in any fi ghting there.

Troops from the UN peacekeeping force in the DRC, MONUC, prepare to deploy a Mobile Operat-ing Base in South Kivu. These temporary bases make small areas safe for displaced people and aid agencies, and prompt militias to lay down their weapons. Once they move on, however, trouble often returns, pointing to the need for more peacekeepers and longer deployments.

Credit: Refugees InternationalNigel Pearson



The ongoing virulence of armed groups stands in opposition to a heavily funded effort in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), designed to draw combatants out of the fi ghting and give them the means to return to civilian life. Some estimate that up to 40% of ex-combatants return to fi ghting, however. While many cite weak reintegration activities as the cause, it would seem impossible for even the best projects promoting farming and fi shing to compete with the benefi ts that armed groups can offer in money and security or with the threat of death made against those who refuse to join.

In its operations against local and foreign armed groups, MONUC provides training and logistical support for FARDC troops, extending sometimes to transport and basic food supplies. Paradoxically, joint operations between the FARDC and MONUC have become the most signifi cant cause of displacement in the eastern DRC since January 2006. Hundreds of thousands of people have fl ed their homes following their offensives against the ADF/NALU, the FDLR, and the MRC. These offensives have had heavy humanitarian consequences but limited strategic impact: the ADF/NALU had been largely dormant but is now remobi-lized, the FDLR has not been affected, and the MRC has retaken its stronghold in Ituri three times from the FARDC.

MONUC and the FARDC have chosen to reduce the threat from armed groups by military means, yet neither has the capacity required to defeat these groups militarily. The foreign armed groups in particular pose a threat, not because of their strength, but because Rwanda and Uganda can use their presence as an excuse to interfere in the DRC in the name of self-defense. For example, Rwanda can use the presence of the FDLR in the DRC as an indicator of the threat that continues to exist, 12 years after the genocide, not only against it as a state but also against Tutsi in general, and Congo-lese Tutsi in particular. Thus, Rwanda feels

justifi ed in supporting local armed groups, like that of Laurent Nkunda, who pledge to protect the Tutsi.

MONUC has come under pressure from the U.S., its largest donor, to pursue a military strategy against foreign armed groups, in particular to deny Rwanda and Uganda the excuse they seek to continue the destabiliza-tion of the DRC. However, the UN Security Council, of which the U.S. is a leading mem-ber, has not given MONUC the resources it needs to implement the strategy. In fact, while MONUC’s funding is now largely as-sured until July 2007, there may be substan-tial pressure to reduce its budget drastically after that—a step that could prove to be very costly if the foundations are not laid for a smooth transfer of power to responsible, disciplined Congolese institutions.

The abundant natural resources found in the eastern DRC are the main cause of the confl ict. Armed groups, including the FARDC, fi ght to control resource conces-sions such as forests and mines, as well as border crossings to get resources out and weapons in. They also must maintain, through targeted attacks, a delicate balance of instability: just enough to prevent the government from extending its authority to regulate and tax, but not so much that open warfare stops resource extraction.

On July 31, 2006, the United Nations Secu-rity Council extended for a year an embargo on the illegal transfer of natural resources from the DRC, as well as an embargo on the transfer of all weapons to the DRC, except those to be used by the FARDC and MONUC. The UN fi rst imposed such an embargo on the DRC in 2003, recognizing the way natural resources and weapons were fueling the confl ict there. Unfortunately, neither MONUC nor the Congolese govern-ment has the capacity to monitor or enforce the embargo.

In the initial resolution establishing the em-bargo, the Security Council specifi cally called

MONUC has come

under pressure to

pursue a military

strategy against

foreign armed

groups. However,

the UN Security

Council has not

given MONUC the

resources it needs

to implement the

strategy.


on Rwanda and Uganda to play a positive role in ending confl ict in the DRC. In subse-quent reports on the transfer of weapons and natural resources, Rwanda and Uganda were cited as complicit. As weapons continue to pour into the eastern DRC, it is clear that neither country is taking steps to enforce the embargo. While the governments of Rwanda and Uganda may no longer be involved di-rectly in these activities, they are responsible for what occurs in the territory they control.

Unfortunately, the U.S. and the United Kingdom, the strongest allies of Rwanda and Uganda, are not publicly pressing them to enforce the embargo nor offering any as-sistance to do so. Unwillingness to hold the two countries accountable may spring from guilt over the 1994 genocide for the former, and the unwillingness to tarnish the designa-tion of the latter as an African success story. Nevertheless, the U.S. at least has the means to do so: its budget for 2007 contains $94 million for Rwanda and $233 million for Uganda.

The U.S. has in fact engaged Rwanda and Uganda over the DRC, but through its facilitation of the Tripartite Plus Commis-sion. The Commission provides a forum for Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi to maintain contact with the DRC on security issues, preventing cross-border incursions and sharing information on troop movements. The direction of the Commission moving forward, however, is not clear, and a new mechanism may be needed to monitor and enforce the embargo.

Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the Congolese state to manage and regulate resource extraction in an open and fair man-ner, and increasing its capacity to do so is a long-range goal. At the moment, however, decreasing the toll of displacement, disease, and death on civilians in the eastern DRC requires choking off access to markets for the natural resources and weapons fueling the confl ict.

To achieve that objective and others related to improving security in the DRC, Refugees International recommends the following actions:

1. Invest in the FARDC. It will be obliged to assume greater responsibility for national security as the U.S. and other contributors grow more reluctant to pay for MONUC, and it will not reform by itself. It must become more professional and more capable, and it must stop abuses by its soldiers of the population.

• Increase troop salaries from the current rate of $25 per month. After years of cor-ruption and mismanagement, a European Union initiative is ensuring that troops receive their salaries, but $25 per month is not enough to support themselves and a family. Substantial oversight would be needed to ensure that commanders would not simply demand part of the salaries for themselves.

• Increase capacity. Current integration efforts involve little more than mixing up and redeploying undisciplined and untrained troops from the different armed groups. Another phase of integration is necessary, including recruiting more quali-fi ed candidates while weeding out current unqualifi ed troops; improving training; and setting a realistic timeline for integra-tion that responds to needs rather than political pressure. Training must include specifi c components to eliminate abuses, particularly rape.

• Punish abusers, especially those guilty of rape. There have been encouraging improvements over the past year in mili-tary justice, but prosecution and punish-ment needs to be fair and across the board. With better salaries and better training, there will be no excuse for loot-ing or conscription of labor; for rape, however, there has never been any excuse. In addition, offi cers must be held account-able for abuses committed by their troops.

Decreasing the

toll of displace-

ment, disease, and

death on civilians

in the eastern DRC

requires choking off

access to markets

for the natural

resources and

weapons fueling

the confl ict.

NORTH KIVU

On May 5, 2006, hundreds of families in the village of Katwiguru picked up what belongings they could and fl ed down the road to the main town of Rutshuru, two hours north of the provincial capital Goma. The UN peacekeeping force, MONUC, had joined with the national army, the FARDC, to move against Rwandan rebels based in the area. These families had been caught in the middle for some time, accused by both the rebels and the FARDC of supporting the other side; the new fi ghting was enough to push them out of the homes in search of safety.

The fi rst families to arrive in Rutshuru crowded into the homes of family members and friends, but the capacity of the village to welcome everyone was soon overwhelmed. New arrivals took shelter in a large church, but after a few weeks were turned out into the yard as the interior was slowly being destroyed. By this time, the “Rapid Response Mechanism,” organized by the UN to respond to these kinds of crises, had started to work. The French NGO Solidarités, which had received a contract to implement the Mechanism when needed, began distributing blankets, plastic tarps, and kitchen uten-sils, and set up a water tap and latrines for the site. More people continued to arrive at the church, however; by the time Refugees International visited in early July 2006, as many as 100 families were sleeping outside, with no shelter, their belongings piled around them.

For MONUC and the FARDC, the solution was simple: the displaced could return to their homes in Katwiguru. The people, however, resisted, saying it was still unsafe; women in particular refused to return, unwilling to go back to a place where they faced rape by armed men while working in their fi elds. In cooperation with the local authorities, Solidarités moved those at the church to a new site, where every family could at least build a shelter for themselves. They planned, however, to go back to Katwiguru, at least for the day, to vote on July 30. They hoped it would bring peace. “If we have goats or sheep,” they told RI, “we will be able to raise them well, without fear of them being stolen or anything.”

This couple was displaced from their home in North

Kivu due to fi ghting between the Congolese national army and a

Ugandan rebel group. Government offensives,

supported by MONUC, have displaced hundreds of thousands since Janu-

ary 2006. Humanitarian access in the area has im-proved, however, and the

UN’s new Rapid Response Mechanism can often

meet basic needs quickly.


Nigel Pearson


Rape cannot be tolerated, and offi cers must be held accountable for the failures of their troops to respect the rights of Congolese civilians.

The European Union military mission to the DRC, EUSEC, has been engaged in reform of the FARDC for some time, and its pro-gram offers a blueprint to which others can adhere and contribute. The United Kingdom is funding an innovative scheme to support FARDC families and the Congolese government is working with the UN to raise $30 million for FARDC logistical support. Reform efforts must also be coor-dinated with other countries such as South Africa and Angola that are supporting the FARDC; training in particular must be standardized, as each country tends to imbue its support with a certain mentality and technique.

2. Expand MONUC in the near term. The fastest and most effective way to end at-tacks on civilians, reduce displacement, and get people home is to increase MONUC’s troops and resources. An additional bat-talion, at least, is urgently needed in each province of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Katanga, as well as in Ituri, with longer deployments to priority areas. MONUC has already had a substantial impact on peace and stability in the DRC, despite its small number of troops relative to the size of the problem, but it is operating at its limits. An expansion, even for just a few months, would allow it to deploy to more areas where fi ghting and abuses continue to take their toll on civilians. A stronger MONUC could:

• Secure more roads, allowing more humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, protect civilians, and encourage returns.

• Deter armed groups more effectively, put-ting more pressure on them to negotiate and accept peace agreements, and provid-ing more muscle to enforce those agree-ments.

• Provide greater assistance and support to the FARDC, thus deterring abuses and speeding MONUC’s reduction and with-drawal.

• Enforce the embargo on the illegal transfer of weapons and natural resources between the DRC and neighboring territories. Be-yond more troops along the border and at customs points, this would require special equipment (especially for nighttime sur-veillance) and intelligence capabilities.

• Increase assistance with disarming and demobilizing foreign and local combatants (see below).

An expanded MONUC would have the most immediate impact in reducing displacement and vulnerability in the Nioka and Tché areas of Ituri, in Walikale and Rutshuru in North Kivu, in the interior of Central and Northern Katanga, and in Bunyakiri, Mwenga, and Shabunda in South Kivu.

Expanding MONUC would entail not only authorizing more troops and allocating more funds. Troop contributing countries such as Bangladesh, Morocco, Uruguay, Pakistan, and Nepal, which have already endured great sacrifi ce in the DRC, would have to make a full commitment to implement all aspects of MONUC’s mandate. In addition, MONUC requires a greater intelligence capacity to execute that mandate, which can only be provided by major Western powers such as the U.S. and Europe.

The UN Security Council recently extended MONUC’s mandate to February 15, 2007. At that time, the new Congolese government should request, and the Council authorize, a short-term expansion of MONUC’s mandate and capacity to ensure a smooth transition to responsible, disciplined Congolese institu-tions through 2007 and beyond.

3. Modify the strategy for eliminating threats from armed groups in the east. Even with increased military capacity, MONUC and

The fastest and

most effective way

to end attacks on

civilians, reduce

displacement, and

get people home

is to increase

MONUC’s troops

and resources.



Ituri: Great improve-ment in security over the past few years, but recent

relapses in the south. Thousands have returned home in Djugu Territory,

scene of some of worst massacres, but 150,000

displaced in Irumu Territory. Most

challenging crisis in the DRC at the moment.

Katanga: Returns begin-ning en masse in the

relatively neglected center and north of the mineral-

rich province. Tens of thousands still displaced

in zones centered on Mitwaba; access is poor

in the north, with few humanitarian agencies.

North Kivu: About 690,000 displaced, the highest in the country. Heavily affected by joint FARDC-MONUC operations. Diffi cult for aid agencies to reach those in need in the south, but access in the north greatly improved.


South Kivu: Southern territories around Uvira alive again with returning IDPs and refugees, but assistance in home villages limited. Almost 200,000 displaced in the province, many due to attacks against civilians near Bunyakiri and Shabunda.

the FARDC should use that capacity to complement peaceful, practical efforts to disarm and demobilize those groups. Options include:

• A special disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process for Congolese members of the ADF/NALU in North Kivu, to balance the amnesty program of-fered by Uganda for Ugandan members.

• Deployment of MONUC troops closer to FDLR bases to facilitate the voluntary demobilization of those wishing to leave the FDLR. Concurrently, Rwanda must do more to draw back FDLR members, clarifying amnesty policies and modify-ing current radio broadcasts aimed at the FDLR to be more positive and consistent. For those who want to disarm but refuse to return to Rwanda, resettlement options must be considered.

• Security guarantees for the Congolese Tutsi minority. The rebel general Laurent Nkunda derives his power partly from his reputation as a champion of the Congolese Tutsi, who were persecuted under Mobutu

and are regarded with suspicion by other, larger tribes because of their links with Rwanda, an aggressor in the 1998-2003 war. Nkunda poses a particularly serious threat to peace in North and South Kivu. Making Congolese Tutsi feel safe would decrease their reliance on and support of Nkunda, as well reduce an excuse for interference by Rwanda.

4. Identify and implement strategies in Rwanda and Uganda for enforcing the em-bargo on weapons and natural resources, and hold them accountable for violations emanating from their territories. Weapons used by local and foreign armed groups in the eastern DRC continue to pour across the lightly guarded borders with Rwanda and Uganda. These two countries must stop the fl ow of arms immediately. The Tripartite Plus Commission could provide the basis for a monitoring and enforce-ment mechanism among countries in the region, including Rwanda and Uganda, but should be expanded so that the U.S., joined by the United Kingdom and other countries, can play a more active role.


Displaced people in Ituri wait for a distribution of household items in

April 2005. Getting aid to people in the DRC

can be very diffi cult. For this isolated group, an

aid agency had brought water containers, cooking utensils, and blankets by

boat up Lake Albert, noto-rious for arms smuggling and vulnerable to armed

groups.

Credit: Refugees Internationa

Sarah Martin

Priorities for Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance in some areas of eastern DRC has reached a point where it will be diffi cult to do more without better security and more funding. In other areas, though, where it is safe to operate and where funding is available, improvements must be made to reach more displaced people, to increase the quality of assistance, and to facilitate return and resettlement.

While the DRC has been the target of devel-opment programs for decades, the infl ux of Rwandan Hutu refugees into eastern Congo following the genocide of 1994 prompted the fi rst massive humanitarian response. Hu-manitarian assistance has ebbed and fl owed since then, always beset by the challenges of working in the DRC. This assistance strives to meet essential needs related to food and nutrition, health care, water and sanitation, and protection from violence and abuse. Donor governments, largely in North Amer-ica and Europe, respond to appeals from the United Nations, the Red Cross, NGOs, and the Congolese government itself for funding. Specialized agencies of the UN play a large role in humanitarian response in the DRC, including the distribution of thousands of tons of food annually through the World Food Programme (WFP), and support for education and public health programs through UNICEF. These agencies rely on NGOs to manage and implement projects; NGOs also receive funding directly from donor governments to meet humanitarian needs. International agencies rely increas-ingly on local NGOs as well, although capacity is limited. The Catholic Church is a particularly strong local partner, with its widespread network of churches and priests and its links to churches throughout the world and the international Catholic develop-ment agency Caritas.

The Congolese government, however, is largely absent. Local government offi cials provide information on needs and facilitate interventions, and local government staff (in the health sector, for example) do what

they can with almost no resources. On a provincial and national level, though, the government plays almost no role in responding to humanitarian needs. This extends to the offi ce of the president: despite the severity of the crisis, President Kabila does not have even one advisor responsible for humanitarian affairs.

Overall, humanitarian response in the DRC is extremely challenging. Beyond problems stemming from ongoing fi ghting, insuffi -cient funding, and the diffi culties of coordi-nating among so many actors with such a wide variety of interests, the DRC is a large country with very little infrastructure. Some IDP sites are accessible by road, allowing for the delivery of food and equipment by truck, but some are not, forcing agencies to spend huge sums to bring in supplies by air. In many sites, there is no electricity, no telecommunications infrastructure, and few people with the skills needed to manage projects. The isolation can be intense, making it diffi cult for agencies to recruit and retain staff, and the distances involved present a challenge for monitoring and evaluation.

To address some of these problems, the UN Offi ce for the Coordination of Humani-tarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNICEF have established the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) to deploy assistance more quickly and effi ciently when faced with a sudden crisis. The key has been the identifi cation of NGOs which receive funding and training upfront to prepare for crises and are then obliged to respond within 72 hours in the face of displacement, natural disasters, or epidemics. Since January 2006, these NGOs have used the RRM to provide household goods, clean water and sanitation, and education for more than 500,000 IDPs throughout the east. The RRM has worked particularly well in North Kivu: NGO staff cited its speed in planning and disbursing funds, crediting a strong network of humani-tarian agencies with several years of experi-ence in the area and well-respected project coordinators at OCHA and UNICEF.

Where it is safe

to operate and

where funding is

available, improve-

ments must be

made to reach more

displaced people, to

increase the quality

of assistance, and

to facilitate return

and resettlement.



Beyond new and ongoing crises of displace-ment, however, looms the mass of more than two million Congolese who are displaced (either internally or in other countries) but beginning to return home or resettle permanently elsewhere. Return and resettle-ment present a particular challenge to the humanitarian community in the DRC. There is a need in these sites for rapid deployment of equipment and personnel to make sure that returnees have food, shelter, health care, and clean water, as well as protection from renewed violence or abuse. These are similar to needs during displacement, and the temporary measures used to meet those needs may also be similar. However, in sites of return and resettlement, needs must even-tually be met in a more sustainable way, and include support for health centers, water sys-tems, agricultural projects, and police forces that are a part of provincial and national gov-ernment systems. Humanitarian agencies are already present in the DRC, with years of experience, and are ready to meet imme-diate needs in areas of return and resettle-ment. Donors may balk, however, wanting to fund agencies with more expertise in sustainable development, despite the time they would need to establish themselves and begin work. While donors should be fl exible, humanitarian agencies must also adapt their methods and approach to build a foundation for sustainability in these communities.

Given the challenges of humanitarian re-sponse in the DRC, Refugees International recommends the following to the Congolese government, donors, and the humanitarian community:

1. Increase government capacity. The new president of the DRC should appoint immediately a high-level coordinator for humanitarian affairs; the new prime min-ister should promote the most technically qualifi ed staff to head relevant ministries on both the national and provincial levels; and the new national assembly should establish oversight committees capable of monitoring humanitarian needs and response.

2. Continue to improve rapid response. The RRM has performed well recently, making it an asset that should be extended and expanded.

• Maintain the RRM in current regions. Although the need should decrease in the coming year, insecurity will continue in certain parts of the east, provoking new displacement. Operations by rebel groups and local militias, abuse by FARDC troops, and fi ghting between armed groups, the FARDC, and MONUC will push people from their homes and fi elds, most likely in the southern part of Ituri, in the Rutshuru area north of Goma, and in the Bunyakiri, Walungu, and Shabunda areas around Bukavu.

• Identify RRM partners and prepare contingency plans in other areas. The Central Katanga crisis of 2005-2006 was a good example of how the humanitarian community was not ready to respond in an area that had previously been consid-ered a low risk for crisis. This is especially important as violence may break out over election results in areas that were largely spared during the 1998-2003 war.

• Expand RRM coverage. Large IDP sites in the east are now covered initially by the RRM, but smaller sites fall through the cracks. While there is a threat of under-mining local survival strategies, needs for all displaced should be assessed.

3. Ensure a more comprehensive response to meeting needs in accessible areas of displacement. Since 2000, minimum standards in disaster response have been defi ned by the Sphere Project, and yet, due to the challenges of working in the DRC, agencies cannot always meet them.

• Prioritize road building. While the long-term economic benefi ts are obvious, road building is crucial for humanitar-ian response, not only for the delivery of assistance but also for protection from violence and abuse. Road work also has

In sites of return

and resettlement,

needs must

eventually be

met in a more

sustainable way.


the potential to employ thousands needing assistance, including ex-combatants.

• Ensure an adequate supply of food. In the DRC, food supply always seems to be ten-uous. In April 2006, WFP was forced to airdrop food into central Katanga after tak-ing too long to bring in supplies by truck, and it is currently struggling to provide suffi cient food for IDPs in Ituri. While this may be due to inconsistent funding and contributions, WFP must also improve its distribution capacity and management.

• Increase capacity in camp management. Almost all the displaced in the DRC are living with host families or renting small plots of land for themselves, and humani-tarian agencies actively fi ght against the establishment of camps, thinking that dis-placed people will be better off integrated into the host community. Nevertheless, camps are sometimes inevitable, but man-agement is scarce: it took three months to fi nd an NGO willing to manage the large airport camp in Bunia that sprang up in May 2003; more recently, in August 2006, several hundred IDP families in North Kivu were moved from a cramped church yard to a new camp, yet it has been impos-sible to fi nd an NGO willing to manage the site properly.

• Expand assistance to survivors of rape. Tens, maybe hundreds, of thousands of women and girls have been raped in the eastern DRC by men associated with armed groups. A few NGOs, such as the Italian agency COOPI in Bunia and DOCS, a local group in Goma, are imple-menting innovative projects that combine trauma counseling and medical care with legal assistance and community support; these projects should be assessed and replicated.

4. Accelerate plans to meet needs in areas of return and resettlement. As noted above, this will be one of the main humanitarian priorities for the DRC in 2007.

• Identify and support model projects. In North Kivu, the Norwegian Refugee Council has developed a project that links (1) rapid reconstruction of village infra-structure through a public works project that will provide returnees with income with (2) specifi c measures to protect them from violence in the still-volatile area. These types of efforts should be supported and emulated, especially as agencies have been caught by surprise at the number of people returning home or are withholding help to see if new violence will erupt as the elections progress.

• Prioritize efforts. As people move into a village, basic humanitarian needs will be the priority to cope with the infl ux. But the main challenge is to induce people to settle by making sure they have what they need in terms of public health, markets, protection, education, and health care. This is an enormous task, however, and some prioritization is needed. Emphasis should be placed on responding in loca-tions with high potential to draw large numbers of people interested in resettling and in locations with high risk of renewed confl ict due to land disputes, proximity of natural resources, or recruitment by armed groups. The UN addressed this issue in the 2006 Action Plan for the DRC, but its proposal to focus on the development of 200 communities critical to peace in the DRC was scrapped due to donor resistance.

• Prepare for land disputes. IDPs and refu-gees are returning home, sometimes after years, fi nding squatters on their land or in their homes, with no legal system that can adjudicate disputes. Temporary land courts would help draw people home and defuse confl icts before they erupt into ma-jor problems. The Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is already looking into dispute resolution options in Ituri.

The main challenge

is to induce people

to settle by making

sure they have what

they need in terms

of public health,

markets, protection,

education, and

health care.

SOUTH KIVU

The Province of South Kivu lies across the eastern Congolese border from Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania, separated in the south by the deep waters of Lake Tanganyika. The towns there emptied in 1996 and 1998 as residents fl ed ahead of invading Rwandan troops, many to seek refuge in Tanzania, others to the interior. The Rwandans eventually withdrew, leaving behind local troops loyal to them, but violently opposed by local Mai-Mai militia. By the end of 2004, the Rwandan-backed forces were gone and the Mai-Mai brigades were incorporated into the new national army. The displaced have started to return, but are fi nding their villages burnt and homes destroyed.

The small town of Fizi lies at the end of four hours of bad road, a main gathering point for returnees. There, the RI team met a woman who had arrived just a few days earlier from the refugee camp in Tanzania where she lived for ten years. She was staying with nine others in the home of her father-in-law because her house was destroyed, although her plot of land had not yet been occupied by squatters, a common risk for those who had fl ed. She had received food and household goods from the local offi ce of the Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, but had no seeds or tools, essential to help her restart her life.

Those who fl ed into the interior of the province instead of crossing the lake into Tanzania were also waiting in Fizi, close to their fi elds but not yet ready to return to their villages. A man with fi ve children explained that he was in Fizi trying to get the means together to rebuild his house, while a girl said she was too scared to go back home because her village was deserted. RI also met a young widow who had resettled permanently in Fizi, refusing to return to her home village because her dead husband’s brother would, according to custom, force her to marry him. None of them had received any outside assistance, as aid agencies were focusing exclusively on those coming back from Tanzania. They managed to cope, though, fi nding land to till, relying on their hosts in Fizi, doing the best they could until they could get home.

This man and his family have just returned to South Kivu after living

for years as refugees in Tanzania. He admitted that life was easier there,

with a wide range of humanitarian assistance, but said he preferred to be

at home, free to live as he wished.


Andrea Lari



5. Increase implementing capacity. NGOs and UN agencies are stretched thin given the breadth of problems and needs in the DRC. In explaining why he had not responded to the crisis in central Katanga in February 2006, for example, the head of one major NGO said that he simply did not have the organizational capacity to manage it, despite the availability of fund-ing from donors. For a country the size of the DRC and a crisis of such duration and impact, the number of implement-ing agencies is appallingly low. Donors, however, have been reluctant to increase funding. In addition, NGOs fi nd it very diffi cult to recruit and retain qualifi ed staff for the DRC, due to the required French language skills and diffi cult living condi-tions. Capacity among local NGOs is also low: many local NGO staff are motivated more by the need to make money than humanitarian concerns, and there is rarely enough time to focus on building local capacity as part of an emergency response project. The Catholic Church has an ex-tensive network of staff, but is not always trusted to act impartially.

6. Improve relationships between donors, UN agencies, and NGOs. Although NGOs often have close contact with communi-ties and a well-developed understanding of needs and constraints, donors and UN agencies tend to regard them as contractors, i.e., skilled labor that they hire to achieve their objectives, instead of partners in a common effort. This relationship must change. Donors and UN agencies have

a role to play in leadership and coordina-tion, but treating implementing agencies as mere contractors precludes the benefi ts of a more collaborative approach.

7. Begin to address chronic underlying prob-lems. Humanitarian crises occur in a context where village infrastructure has deteriorated to the point of uselessness due to decades of institutional neglect. Minimum humanitarian standards are out of reach for people in many commu-nities not directly affected by the confl ict. Humanitarian agencies, however, some-times feel that their response is adequate as long as it matches what they feel is normal for the host community or the region, even if “normal” is in fact unac-ceptable misery. As with returns, identify-ing priority communities and sectors is crucial given the size of the problem.

8. Adapt to manage more successfully the transition from relief to development. Humanitarian agencies are best posi-tioned to meet immediate needs in areas of return and resettlement, and to begin addressing chronic underlying problems. These agencies will attract the neces-sary funding by showing that they can work in a more sustainable way than they would in traditional relief projects. Fewer international staff, less expenditure per community, low start-up costs, and strengthening capacity of local authorities are hallmarks of development funding which humanitarian agencies will have to adopt.

Humanitarian

agencies some-

times feel that

their response is

adequate as long

as it matches what

they feel is normal

for the host

community or the

region, even if

“normal” is in

fact unacceptable

misery.


Priorities for Funding

Humanitarian assistance depends on fund-ing from donors, either bilaterally from indi-vidual governments or multilaterally through international institutions. For humanitarian assistance in the DRC, the main donors are the United States and the European Union. (The World Bank has a portfolio of loans to the DRC totaling more than $2 billion, but these are mostly for long-term development projects.) A great deal of money has already been donated and spent in support of peace-keeping and humanitarian relief in the DRC: MONUC costs more than $1 billion a year, the July 2006 elections cost $450 million, and the U.S. alone gives about $100 million per year for humanitarian assistance, food aid, and preliminary community develop-ment. In a positive sign, contributions have increased in recent years; the United King-dom, for example, is increasing its funding for DRC threefold, allocating £60 million for 2006-2008, and a law proposed in the U.S. Congress would allocate an extra $52 million for the DRC.

It is still not enough. Funding is completely inadequate for a country that has never had a government focused on improving the lives of the people, that suffers from chronic un-derdevelopment and neglect, that has been overrun by invading armies, rebel groups, and government forces seeking to control its vast natural resources, and that has over two million internally displaced people and refugees who need help meeting basic needs for survival. Beyond the scale of the problem, the DRC is also a very expensive place to work: IDPs huddle in isolated and remote areas, where air transport is sometimes the only option for bringing in supplies and equipment; diffi cult working conditions lead to high staff turnover; corruption is endemic; and humanitarian agencies are a steady source of revenue for local authorities through taxes and administrative fees.

The United Nations estimated that it would take $680 million to address humanitar-ian needs in the DRC in 2006, to be spent

according to projects included in the Ac-tion Plan that the UN compiled and then launched in Brussels in February 2006. This was far greater than previous estimates, but still an approximation of the real need. The response so far has been pathetic: with four months left to go in 2006, only 40% of the needed funds had been either contributed or committed, or had been brought forward from previous years.

There is no similar estimate of need for funding for security and peacekeeping, but the substantial needs related to reforming the FARDC and expanding MONUC require hundreds of millions of dollars.

A complicating factor in the DRC is that humanitarian needs are expanding and changing with the improvement in peace and security. People are increasingly acces-sible with the deployment of MONUC and the FARDC, while joint operations between MONUC and the FARDC are also creating more forced movement. Needs continue to arise in areas of displacement while similar needs crop up in areas of return and resettlement, as people begin to go home. Humanitarian funding, often given through specialized mechanisms, is directed to humanitarian implementing agencies that are used to working with short-term budgets and implementing activities quickly in order to save lives. Long-term funding, sometimes through different mechanisms, is directed to developmental implementing agencies and the host government to manage large-scale community development projects. Given the improved security and hopes for peace following the elections in the DRC, donors want to reduce humanitarian funding in favor of long-term work.

This transition is not going smoothly, creat-ing a gap in assistance. Humanitarian needs will continue through 2007, and humanitar-ian agencies with experience, trained staff, and established operations are available to meet returnee needs. However, humanitar-ian funding is being cut before developmen-tal funding is available, and before develop-

Funding is

completely

inadequate for a

country that has

over two million

internally displaced

people and

refugees who need

help meeting basic

needs for survival.


ment agencies are in place. The European Union seems to be having particular trouble in this regard, where funding provided through the European Community Hu-manitarian Offi ce (ECHO) for health care in the DRC has been reduced before the new European Development Fund is available. In Ituri, a major implementing agency with substantial experience in the area had to stop food distributions due to a sudden cut in funding from ECHO; another in North Kivu is unable to start new water and sanitation projects because EU funding is unclear.

In the midst of this transition, and in the face of inadequate funding overall, the new Pooled Fund mechanism shows some prom-ise for fi lling gaps and improving humani-tarian response. The Fund was established to support priority projects in the Action Plan compiled by the UN that were not receiv-ing funds from other sources; controlled by the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, it is also designed to strengthen such coordina-tion in the DRC. The Fund has not attracted contributions from the U.S. or ECHO (the former being barred by law from contribut-ing to such funds for reasons of accountabil-ity, monitoring, and evaluation), but some European donors have made it their main funding mechanism. The UK in particular has contributed generously, with half of its allocation of £30 million for the DRC in 2006-2007 going to the Fund.

To be as useful as possible, the Fund should disburse money quickly, as needs arise. The fi rst round of grants, however, has been mired in a long and bureaucratic process. The Humanitarian Coordinator decides how much money is available from the Fund for each province; provincial coordinating bod-ies then choose priority projects for submis-sion. In 2006, NGOs were forced to revise their proposals three times as management of the process shifted, ending fi nally with control by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) as the Fund administrator. Successful applicants thus become grantees of UNDP, which disburses and monitors the

funds. Some successful applicants, however, had not received any money after several months, and there were widespread wor-ries that UNDP did not have the capacity to monitor the projects properly.

In addition, there is a common perception that UN agencies are benefi ting from the Pooled Fund at the expense of NGOs (and UN agencies already have access to a new source of funding from the CERF, the global emergency response fund instituted in early 2006 and managed by the UN in New York). Some NGOs feel that, in fact, they will receive less money this year because traditional donors are giving to the Pooled Fund, but that money is not going to them. A few NGOs are also uncomfortable with the pressure to become grantees of the United Nations, which through MONUC is a party to the confl ict in the DRC. This overlap be-tween military and humanitarian operations means that armed groups could see NGOs as supporting military operations against them; NGOs could then be targeted or denied ac-cess, reducing their effectiveness.

The Pooled Fund’s largest donor, however, seems committed to working with the UN to overcome these problems, and several European countries are now placing their contributions to the DRC in the Fund instead of funding UN agencies and NGOs directly.

Beyond the promise of the Pooled Fund, however, overall funding for the DRC remains insuffi cient. While the needs are clear, fundraising efforts have been weak. The 2006 Action Plan was designed as both a coordination tool as well as a funding appeal, but it failed to fulfi ll its potential to catalyze funding. Paradoxically, the Plan was compiled at the instigation of donors (led by the U.S. and Belgium) through the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative, but donor response to the Plan has been lack-luster. Part of this, as donor representatives explained, was due to concerns that projects proposed by UN agencies cost too much due

While the needs are

clear, fundraising

efforts have

been weak.

Taabo Dj’eta fl ed from her home in Ituri with her

baby and family to escape abuse by a rogue unit of

the Congolese national army. Commanders fi ght

for control over natural resources, selling ore and

timber in neighboring Uganda to buy weapons

and get cash to pay troops.


Nigel Pearson



Silently, the women

showed us the

classrooms where

they had been

sleeping for the

previous day or so.

ITURI

The greed, exploitation, and abuse that have infested the DRC since the days of Leopold II have reached their nadir in the northeastern district of Ituri. The district seems oddly disconnected from the rest of the country, a microcosm of its ills, a humanitarian catastrophe within a humanitarian catas-trophe. In 1999, Ugandan military commanders stoked a local confl ict over land between majority Lendu farmers and minority Hema cattle owners into a major confl agration in order to take control of the vast Kilo Moto gold fi elds. Tens of thousands of people have died and hundreds of thousands have been displaced. Despite the departure in 2003 of the last Ugandan troops—and the successful national elections in July 2006—war and displacement continue.

For months, MONUC and the FARDC have battled a new coalition of rebels to the south of Bunia, the district’s capital. Three times, the FARDC has taken the rebel’s stronghold at Tché, and three times the rebels have taken it back (the last in July 2006, during RI’s visit to the region). Arms are easy to procure: the fi ghting is taking place near the shores of Lake Albert, which forms a porous border with Uganda, with natural resources crossing to pay for weapons that come back. The UN imposed an arms embargo on the DRC in 2003 but has never been able to enforce it.

For now, 150,000 people have been pushed out of their homes by the fi ghting. The RI team met some who had walked north to Bunia, fi nding refuge in a large high school. Silently, the women showed us the classrooms where they had been sleeping for the previous day or so, benches pushed to the side, mats and pots and jerry cans spread out to mark each family’s spot. The district authorities, however, refused to let them stay, mindful of the sprawling camp that sprang up next to the Bunia airport fol-lowing ethnic massacres in 2003. The men were thus in a fi eld a few miles south of town, struggling to construct shelters of reeds and straw, wondering for how long they might need them.

Many more, up to 45,000, were wedged into the small village of Gety, southwest of Bunia. The new Rapid Response Mechanism, so successful in other parts of eastern DRC, was struggling to assist them as well as thousands more in other sites. By mid-August 2006, food supplies were particularly low, and the UN estimated that 10 people, mostly children, were dying each day. To the north of Bunia, peace had returned and the displaced had returned home; in the rest of the country, people were waiting breathlessly for the results of the recent elections. In Gety, though, the focus was on survival, a scenario that will be repeated again and again as peace takes its time to take hold.


to high overhead costs, and that there simply was not enough capacity available, neither among UN agencies nor NGOs, in the DRC to absorb and spend the requested funds effectively.

Decisions about funding humanitarian as-sistance in the DRC are ultimately made by democratically elected legislators in donor countries, mindful of their constituents, overall public awareness, and political agen-das. Within the United States at least, Africa as a whole does not command much atten-tion, with the possible exception of Darfur, making reaching appropriate funding levels for the DRC unlikely in the face of national priorities such as the war in Iraq and domes-tic security. In addition, appeals come long after funding decisions have been made. While this is to be expected for new emer-gencies, the needs for protracted crises like that in the DRC are more predictable. U.S. offi cials, for example, have already developed their funding proposals for humanitarian assistance to the DRC for 2008; these will be submitted formally to Congress in Febru-ary 2007. In contrast, the 2007 DRC Action Plan compiled by the UN will be launched in November 2006, one month after the start of the U.S. fi scal year for which funding decisions were made months previously.

Increased funding and better management of the funding process would improve humanitarian assistance and help people get home. Refugees International recommends:

1. Increasing funding. Bilateral and multi-lateral donors need to give more to meet basic humanitarian needs in the DRC and to help people return home or resettle elsewhere. The United States, the Euro-pean Union, and individual European countries have given generously to help the DRC, but the full potential of contribu-tions to date will not be realized without a substantial increase in humanitarian assistance over the next year.

2. Filling gaps created by the transition from humanitarian to development funding. Even as security improves, humanitar-ian crises ease, and IDPs start to return home, humanitarian funding must be maintained in order to fi nance transition projects like emergency education, health care, and water and sanitation in villages of return while development funding is approved, a new government is formed, and large-scale development agencies like UNDP establish themselves.

3. Strengthening the Pooled Fund. UNDP must change the way it operates, reducing bureaucratic requirements for applications and speeding the disbursement of funds once approved. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC must also make sure that impact increases through the use of the Pooled Fund, with a critical eye on the possibility that UN agencies are being favored in the process at the expense of the effi ciency, fl exibility, and community collaboration available through NGOs. Pooled Fund contributors should also re-main aware that accepting funds from the Fund could compromise NGO operational effectiveness and security through associa-tion with MONUC, and continue to fund NGOs directly if necessary.

4. Improving collective fundraising strate-gies. The 2006 Action Plan compiled by the UN for the DRC proved to be an effective coordinating mechanism, as it brought UN agencies and NGOs together to identify regional and sectoral priori-ties. However, it has been a failure as a fundraising tool: funding for 2006 had already been determined by major donors, and advocacy around the Plan has not been convincing. In particular, there is an attitude that donors should fund the Plan simply because the UN is asking for it. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC needs to convince donors of the need for as well as the impact of the proposed response, and the effi ciency of the pro-posed management.

Increased funding

and better manage-

ment of the funding

process would im-

prove humanitarian

assistance and help

people get home.


Priorities for Coordination

Coordination in a crisis as complex as that in the DRC has proved to be an almost insurmountable challenge. The country is enormous, with a wide range of humanitar-ian needs and a correspondingly wide range of agencies and donors involved in response, in a wide range of local contexts. The United Nations, through its Offi ce for the Coordi-nation of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), designates itself as the coordinating body in humanitarian emergencies, and the DRC has been no exception. OCHA, with no budget authority, relies on its ability to gather and share information as well as the principle of coordination as a best practice in humanitari-an response to bring NGOs and UN agencies together to plan and manage the response to specifi c crises. For some, however, coordina-tion goes beyond facilitating the response to leading it—a role that OCHA simply cannot play. This lack of authority—and related ac-countability—has extended to the different sectors of response, such as food aid, water supply and sanitation, health care, and the protection of displaced people from violence and abuse. Worldwide, the UN and other humanitarian leaders have struggled with the lack of accountability in coordinating and leading the response in each sector.

To address the former problem, OCHA in the DRC has now been superseded as the main coordinating body by MONUC, under the leadership of its number 2 offi cial, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC. While MONUC still lacks budget author-ity over all UN agencies, the Pooled Fund discussed above is controlled by the Humani-tarian Coordinator, putting him in charge of the largest single fund of money available for humanitarian response. At the same time, there continue to be problems coordinating the military and humanitarian aspects of MONUC. The mistrust and lack of com-munication prevalent during the Ituri crisis in 2003, for example, was again on display during the recent fl are-up of fi ghting and displacement in June 2006.

For the latter problem, the DRC is a pilot country for the Cluster Leadership Approach, an initiative by the United Nations to im-prove coordination and accountability during humanitarian crises. Certain agencies have been designated as worldwide Cluster Leads, to ensure (again without budget authority) an appropriate response in their Cluster to specifi c crises. The DRC therefore has a set of Cluster Leads, which extends down to a provincial level, including UNICEF for water and sanitation, WFP for food security, and UNHCR for protection.

While a promising initiative, the Cluster Leadership Approach is still new. During its mission to the DRC in February and March 2006, Refugees International noticed delays in the establishment of Clusters there with the exception of the Protection Cluster. A few months later, however, during its mission in June and July 2006, RI observed a marked improvement.

Clusters now seem to be up and running for most sectors. While day-to-day coordina-tion between Clusters still occurs through the facilitation of OCHA, the Clusters meet regularly to plan and coordinate sectoral responses. Beyond monitoring and address-ing immediate needs, the Clusters also feed into the national humanitarian planning process led by the UN and compiled into the annual Action Plan, the fundraising appeal discussed in the previous section.

Unfortunately, the Return and Reintegration Cluster (now renamed the Early Recovery Cluster) has had a slow start. This cluster is chaired jointly by UNHCR and UNDP, and needs to move quickly. Displaced people have returned or are starting to return home in Djugu Territory in Ituri, in North Kivu, and in central Katanga, and refugee returns from neighboring countries to Equateur (in the west, north of Kinshasa) and South Kivu will pick up if there is no serious post-electoral violence. There is very little assistance, how-ever, in communities of return, and the Clus-ter should take the lead in assessing needs and advocating for a stronger response.

The country is

enormous, with

a wide range of

humanitarian needs

and a correspond-

ingly wide range of

agencies and

donors involved

in response.

SEIZING THIS MOMENT OF HOPE: TOWARDS A SECURE FUTURE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The Cluster Leader-

ship Approach has

taken root in the

DRC as a coordinat-

ing mechanism

because of its links

to the Pooled Fund.

30

The biggest gap in all the Clusters so far is participation by local actors: local govern-ment and authorities do not seem to be included, nor are local NGOs. In addition, the Clusters are not yet the sort of working groups that can provide leadership and anal-ysis on their particular issues in a province. As one operational NGO working on public health explained, “It is a common agreement among the [local] humanitarian community that the analysis of the humanitarian situa-tion, particularly in the water and sanitation sector, is weak, information is sketchy, there is no attempt to link water and sanitation in-terventions with health statistics (or other in-dicators of environmental health), and there is no attempt to identify underlying causes of the humanitarian crisis in DRC.” Clusters do not have funding of their own for their development, nor do the lead agencies have special funding for their coordinating role, making forceful leadership diffi cult.

In general, though, the Cluster Leadership Approach has taken root in the DRC as a coordinating mechanism because of its links to the Pooled Fund. Participation in provin-cial Clusters, for example, is high because implementing agencies that want money from the Fund must fi rst submit proposals to the appropriate Cluster. The group then decides which proposals best address local priorities and submits them to the overall provincial coordinating committee as well as the national Cluster group. Successful proposals are then sent to the Pooled Fund Board, which makes a fi nal recommendation to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC.

Through its administration of the Pooled Fund, UNDP is starting to play a larger role in coordination in the DRC. UNDP normally acts as the lead agency for the UN’s recon-struction and development efforts in a given country. UNDP’s involvement in the Pooled Fund is at the instigation of the UN Human-itarian Coordinator in the DRC, due to his concurrent role as the head of UNDP and his responsibility for managing the shift from

humanitarian relief to development as the crisis in the DRC eases. While such reliance on UNDP makes sense in order to build its capacity to assume its role over the next year, there are serious concerns about giving it too much responsibility before it is ready.

To build on advances made over the past few years in coordination of humanitarian response in the DRC, Refugees International recommends the following:

1. Ensure that MONUC military command-ers communicate clearly and effectively with their humanitarian counterparts. If MONUC is to coordinate both military and humanitarian efforts in the DRC, its military commanders must not cut off communications with the humanitarian community, as happened in Ituri in June 2006 at the beginning of the ongoing crisis in Irumu Territory.

2. Move quickly to complete the rollout of the Early Recovery Cluster, especially in Katanga, the Kivus, and Ituri. UNHCR, given its involvement in both groups, should ensure a strong link with the Pro-tection Cluster to make sure that durable solutions for displaced people meet hu-manitarian needs without putting return-ing IDPs at risk.

3. Reform the Cluster Leadership Approach to include local actors. While it may not be appropriate in all circumstances to include local authorities and local NGOs in coor-dinating efforts, especially in discussing funding plans and Pooled Fund priorities, local actors are clearly key to an effective response. OCHA and Cluster Leads must fi nd a way to include them.

4. Strengthen UNDP’s coordination capac-ity. There is a clear lack of confi dence in UNDP’s ability to manage the Pooled Fund, much less the extensive coordina-tion required in managing the shift from humanitarian relief to development. Implementing agencies and donors will not participate in coordination without

trust in the facilitator; UNDP and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC (who is also the head of UNDP) must take steps that demonstrate UNDP’s capabili-ties in order to build that trust.


These women were driven from their homes in North Kivu by fi ghting as well as human rights abuses by armed men. The most serious abuse is rape, which many women have come to expect as a normal part of their lives. Very little data are avail-able and perpetrators are rarely punished, although this is improving as the Congolese justice system is re-established.

Credit: Refugees InternationalEmila Brkic

TOWARDS A SECURE FUTURE

As the situation in the DRC stabilizes, the relationship between the DRC and the international community will inevitably change, with the latter approaching the country with a focus on accelerating Congo’s integration into the global economy on more transparent terms. While this is an essential project, the danger is that donors and inter-national agencies will shift their attention too quickly from acute humanitarian needs. The transition in the DRC will be a diffi cult balancing act, but long-term stability de-pends on continuing to reduce violence and meeting the basic needs of communities as the violence subsides.

The humanitarian situation in the DRC has slowly but surely improved over the past few years: a higher percentage of those in need are getting help, the response to crises is more prompt, and the quality of the response is higher. Security is far better: the amount of territory controlled by armed groups has decreased greatly, civilians are under less threat of attack and abuse, and the displaced are starting to return home or resettle per-manently.

The elections provide a particular psycho-logical milestone, and it is important to keep in mind that conditions will not change overnight as a result of the vote and the installation of a new government. Pockets of extreme insecurity remain in the east, humanitarian crises will continue to

occur, and the underlying chronic problems exacerbated by the confl ict will remain.

The international community, however, seems eager to move on. Regarding Africa, Darfur commands more attention among media and policymakers (at least in the U.S.) and Africa itself does not garner much attention. So some prefer to focus on other crises, and all would like to move as quickly as possible to longer-term development assistance, which is less expensive, easier to manage, and more predictable. Large-scale development programs are also more attractive to unscrupulous government of-fi cials, as the assistance is funneled through government agencies and provides greater opportunities for self-enrichment.

A premature shift of focus away from humanitarian concerns in the DRC is not warranted and will not be the best for the millions of people still heavily affected by the violence, displacement, and death that has occurred, and is still occurring, in the DRC. For the Congolese government, the United States and other leading internation-al actors, regional actors, donor agencies and appropriators, the United Nations, NGOs, and the media, now is not the time to withdraw, to slow down, to lose focus. Now is the time to redouble efforts to stop the killing and displacement of civilians, meet the basic needs of those affected by the confl ict, and help people get home and rebuild.


Long-term

stability depends

on continuing to

reduce violence

and meeting the

basic needs of

communities as the

violence subsides.


REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL’S RECOMMENDATIONS

Refugees International recommends that:

Improving security

1. Invest in the FARDC:

• The DRC request that the United States and other donors invest in the FARDC by increasing salaries, extending and improving training, and supporting the prosecution of soldiers and their superiors as necessary for abuses, especially rape.

• All countries and donors supporting the FARDC, including regional actors such as South Africa and Angola as well as MONUC, participate fully in security sector reform coordinating mechanisms, with a particular focus on standardizing training.

• The Congolese military and government offi cials fully commit to the reform of the FARDC and develop a plan for a new phase of integration, including recruiting more qualifi ed candidates while weeding out current unqualifi ed troops; improving training; and setting a realistic timeline for integration that responds to needs rather than political pressure. Training must include specifi c components to eliminate abuses, particularly rape.

2. Expand MONUC:

• The new Congolese government request, and the UN Security Council authorize, a twelve-month expansion of MONUC, adding four additional batallions to protect civilians and facilitate a strong humanitar-ian response; deter armed groups while encouraging their disarma ment and demobilization; support FARDC reform; and enforce the embargo on weapons and natural resources.

• MONUC deploy additional battalions to North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga, and Ituri as soon as possible, with longer deploy-

ments to priority areas, including borders and custom points.

• The U.S. pay its full assessed contribution for UN peacekeeping missions to ensure that the Security Council resolutions it ap-proves will actually be implemented.

• Troop contributing countries such as Bangladesh, Morocco, Uruguay, Pakistan, and Nepal fully implement all aspects of MONUC’s mandate.

• The U.S. and others with the appropriate capacity work with MONUC to increase its intelligence capacity or the information available to it, especially for monitoring weapon fl ows and other support for armed groups.

3. Modify the military strategy in the east:

• MONUC and the FARDC use their in-creased military capacity as a complement to peaceful, practical efforts to disarm and demobilize armed groups.

• MONUC, the Multi-Country Demobili-zation and Reintegration Program, and UNDP organize a special disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process for Congolese members of the ADF/NALU in North Kivu to balance the amnesty program offered by Uganda for Ugandan members.

• MONUC deploy troops closer to FDLR bases to facilitate the voluntary demobili-zation of those wishing to leave the FDLR.

• Rwanda do more to draw back FDLR members to Rwanda, clarifying amnesty policies and modifying current radio broadcasts aimed at the FDLR to be more positive and consistent.

• MONUC, UNHCR, and the Congolese authorities consider resettlement options for FDLR combatants who want to disarm but are unwilling to settle in Rwanda.


• MONUC and the FARDC provide security guarantees for the Congolese Tutsi minor-ity, to reduce support for the rebel general Laurent Nkunda.

4. Rwanda and Uganda begin enforcing the embargo on weap ons and natural resourc-es, with the U.S. and the United Kingdom, as supporters of the two countries, assist-ing them as well as holding them account-able (through the UN Security Council if necessary) for violations.

Improving humanitarian assistance

• The new president of the DRC appoint a high-level coordinator for humanitarian affairs; the new prime minister promote the most technically qualifi ed staff to head relevant ministries both at the national and provincial levels; and the new national assembly establish a committee to monitor humanitarian needs and response.

• OCHA and UNICEF, as the lead agen-cies responsible for the Rapid Response Mechanism, pursue improvements to the system with NGOs, by conducting ongoing risk assessments and contingency plans for new and unexpected crises, and supporting specifi c efforts to assess and meet needs for small, previously unas-sisted groups of IDPs or other vulnerable groups affected by the confl ict.

• Donors continue to fund the Rapid Response Mechanism, either through the Pooled Fund or directly to UNICEF and OCHA.

• Donors, OCHA, and NGOs confer to identify and address needs and trends related to camp management.

• Donors and WFP ensure that there is enough food delivered and distributed in a timely and effi cient manner to meet the needs in the DRC.

• The Congolese government, donors, and implementing agencies expand assistance to survivors of rape, replicating current

projects that combine trauma counseling and medical care with legal assistance and community support.

• Donors, UN agencies, government agen-cies, and NGOs accelerate efforts within the Early Recovery Cluster to develop and implement a comprehensive plan to encourage and facilitate the return and resettlement of IDPs, refugees, and ex-combatants. In particular, those involved need to identify and support model return and reintegration projects and prioritize efforts to deal with the overwhelming number of people and communities needing assistance.

• The Congolese government ensure that an appropriate judicial process is available to adjudicate land disputes as IDPs and refugees return home.

• International NGOs engage more fully in the DRC, in all areas requiring a humani-tarian response: assessing needs, soliciting funds, implementing projects, advocat-ing for the displaced, and building local response capacity.

• NGOs improve recruitment and retention of qualifi ed, experienced staff.

• Donors and UN agencies work to improve their relationship with NGOs, to regard them more as collaborative partners with specifi c knowledge and strategies based on fi eld experience rather than as contractors hired to execute a predetermined work plan.

• Donors begin immediately to channel funding to address the chronic problems of underdevelopment that are exacerbated by the confl ict, without waiting for a new government or large-scale development agencies to establish themselves.

• Humanitarian agencies, as the best placed to meet immediate needs in the transition from relief to development, demonstrate that they can work in a way more sus-

tainable than traditional relief activities require, in order to attract the kind of development funding that will increasingly replace humanitarian funding in the DRC.

Improving funding

• Donors increase funding for humanitarian response in the DRC, including security and peacekeeping, humanitarian assis-tance, and coordination. Current donors must increase their already substantial contributions; other governments must make their fi rst contributions.

• Donors, the UN Humanitarian Coordina-tor in the DRC, and the World Bank work to manage the shift from humanitarian to development funding, ensuring that implementing agencies do not have to sus-pend projects and lay off experienced staff while development funding is approved and development agencies establish them-selves.

• The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC, UNDP, donors such as the UK, and OCHA improve the Pooled Fund. The process must be shortened and made


UN peacekeepers guard road builders in South Kivu. This kind of practical assistance has been vital to the improve-ments seen in the DRC over the past few years. Even more is needed, however, as peace takes hold and the displaced return home.

Credit: Refugees InternationalNigel Pearson

more effi cient; UNDP must revise its procedures to disburse funds quickly.

• The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC make sure that impact increases through the use of the Pooled Fund, with a critical eye on the possibility that UN agencies are being favored in the process at the expense of effi ciency, fl exibility, and community collaboration available through NGOs.

• Donors to the Pooled Fund remain aware that accepting funds from it could compro-mise NGO operational effectiveness and security through association with MONUC, and continue to fund NGOs directly if necessary.

• The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC and OCHA develop a new strategy for increasing donor contributions for projects outlined in the 2007 Action Plan. The strategy should take into account do-nor misgivings over the needs expressed by UN agencies and their ability to man-age funds effi ciently associated with the 2006 appeal.

Improving coordination

• MONUC ensure that its military com-manders maintain professional and open communication with their humanitarian

counterparts, to ensure the best coordina-tion possible between these two parts of the mission.

• UNHCR and UNDP move quickly to complete the rollout of the Early Recovery Cluster, especially in Katanga, the Kivus, and Ituri. UNHCR, given its involvement in both groups, should join with MONUC to ensure a strong link with the Protection Cluster to make sure that durable solu-tions for displaced persons meet humani-tarian needs without putting returning IDPs at risk.

• The Congolese government, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC, and OCHA, with guidance from the IASC, reform the Cluster Leadership Approach to include local actors. Local government authorities, ministry offi cials, and local NGOs should be welcome to contribute to the Clusters, given their potential to help achieve Cluster objectives.

• UNDP, under the leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the DRC (who is also the head of UNDP), take immediate steps to strengthen its coordi-nation capacity and boost the confi dence of the humanitarian community in the DRC in its ability to assume its role as the coordinator of reconstruction and development.



GLOSSARY

DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Offi ce

FARDC Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the D.R. Congo)

FDLR Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)

MRC Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais (Congolese Revolutionary Movement)

IDPs Internally displaced persons

MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des nations unies en République démocratique du Congo (UN Mission to the D.R. Congo)

NGOs Non-governmental organizations

OCHA UN Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

RI Refugees International

RRM Rapid Response Mechanism

UNDP UN Development Programme

UNHCR The Offi ce of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP World Food Programme

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phone: [202] 828–0110 ■ facsimile: [202] 828–0819 ■ e-mail: [email protected] ■ www.refugeesinternational.org ■ 1705 N Street, NW ■ Washington, DC 20036

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