Seeing Politics in the Light of Emmanuel Levinass Concept of Ethical ResponsibilityJay Michael L. Cordero3rd Iloilo Philosophical Association (IPA) Inc. ConferenceJuly 30-31, 2014Theme: Ethics in Politics

Emmanuel Levinas, a Jewish born French philosopher is one of the influential contemporary philosopher who made the concern for the Other person the central topic of his philosophy. Ethical responsibility and the concern for the Other are the main themes of his work especially in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence.[footnoteRef:1] According to Levinas, one has a tremendous or infinite responsibility to the Other whose face demands that one should not left the Other alone but one has to respond to the need of the Other. The otherness of the Other is concretized in the face of the other human.[footnoteRef:2] One cannot not respond to the call of the face of the Other. According to Levinas I cannotnot hear the appeal of the Other.[footnoteRef:3] The relevance of Emmanuel Levinas philosophy of ethical responsibility in the political setting can be seen in relation to the background by which his philosophy was developed, which is in a [1: By Other Levinas refers to other human beings aside from ones self. It indicates the ethical rather than just the real object of selfs ethical meaning, see Emmanuel Levinas, Routledge Critical Thinkers by Sean Hand. ] [2: Adriann Peperzak, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1993), 19. Hereafter, Peperzak, To the Other.] [3: Rudi Visker,The Inhuman Condition (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 2004), 10. Hereafter, Visker,The Inhuman Condition.]

millennia of fratricidal struggles, political or bloody, of imperialism, scorn and exploitation of the human beingcentury of world wars, the genocides of the Holocaust and terrorism; unemployment and continual desperate poverty of the Third world; ruthless doctrines and cruelty of fascism and national socialism[footnoteRef:4] [4: Ezekiel Fana Mkhwanazi, To Be Human Is To Be Responsible For The Other: A Critical Analysis Of Levinas Conception Of Responsibility, Phronimon, Vol.14, No. 1 (2013), 133. Hereafter, Mkhwanazi, To Be Human.]

In this paper, I wish to evaluate politics and to situate the philosophy of Levinas in a more concrete and practical way by applying his concept of responsibility as availability and service to the Other. Politics is the concern for the Other. Simon Critchley even described politics as the art of response to the singular demand of the Other.[footnoteRef:5] Politics is not just a personal affair of politicians but rather it is concerned with the welfare of the people, it is concerned with the common good of the society. The main concern of politics is to provide people with a just and humane society. Politics is at the heart of all Levinas work, whether as the traumatic background or as the changing context of his intellectual development.[footnoteRef:6] The concern for the welfare of the people is the basic foundation of politics according to Levinas and that we recognize the Other even before society is formed. Sean Hand wrote: [5: Simon Critchley,Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity (London: Verso, 1999), 276.] [6: Sean Hand, Emmanuel Levinas (London: Routledge, 2009), 94. Hereafter, Hand, Emmanuel Levinas.]

Levinas view of politics and societyis grounded in a primary and never surpassed concern for the neighbor to whom I am connected by an original and non-contractual bondThere is a primary command that establishes this proximity, a preconditional non indifference to the neighbor, who is defined not geographically or biologically, but morally. The neighbor is therefore already all of humanity, even prior to the introduction of the society[footnoteRef:7] [7: Ibid., 55.]

As Levinas is concerned with ones relationship to the Other especially with the Others physical need this led Levinas to consider politics as having the primary duty of promoting peoples welfare. Levinas thinking is greatly influenced and shaped by his concern for the welfare of the people.[footnoteRef:8] Levinas ethical concept of responsibility is intimately connected and applicable to the political context since ethics is not serious if it does not concretize itself in judicial and political institutions.[footnoteRef:9] Ethical responsibility to the Other is concretized in ones responsibility in the face of the Other. The Other is presented by his face.[footnoteRef:10] In the vulnerability of the face of the Other, says Levinas, we experience an appeal: we are being called, addressed. For Levinas the face is the face of destitution and poverty.[footnoteRef:11] The response to the vulnerability of the Other is experienced as responsibility.[footnoteRef:12] Levinas conception of .responsibility has a significant appeal to the marginalized, to the poor, and the excluded people of the world.[footnoteRef:13] The face of the Other is not just expressing a prohibition not to kill the Other but the face of the Other is also expressing a command to give with full hands.[footnoteRef:14] [8: Nigel K Zimmermann, Karol Wojtyla and Emmanuel Levinas on the Embodied Self: The Forming of the Other as Moral Self-Disclosure, The Heythrop Journal, Vol. 50, No. 6 (2009), 984. Hereafter, Zimmermann, Wojtyla and Levinas.] [9: Peperzak, To the Other, 179.] [10: The face is one of the most powerful metaphors that Levinas uses to speak about the character of the human Other (Autrui). The faceprojects a gaze that overwhelms and makes demands of the subject. So, its presence is also intimidatingThe face call the Subject into dialogue...The face has a double character: As that fragile part of the body, it is vulnerable and weak, and as such, calls for help. But the face also command or obligate me against my will, as when the face of the poor person begging for money from me, makes me feel guilty when I dont respond favorably. A footnote from To be human is to be responsible for the Other.] [11: Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco,On Levinas (Belmont, Calif.: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2005), 29. Hereafter, Atterton and Calarco,On Levinas.] [12: Max Manen, Phenomenology Online Ethical Phenomenology, Phenomenologyonline.com, last modified 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://www.phenomenologyonline.com/inquiry/orientations-in-phenomenology/ethical-phenomenology/.] [13: Mkhwanazi, To Be Human, 144. ] [14: Atterton and Calarco, On Levinas, 29.]

Adriaan Peperzak describes the command of the face in the following words:the other imposes its enigmatic irreducibility and nonrelativity or absoluteness is by means of a command and a prohibition: You are not allowed to kill me; as you must accord me a place under the sun and everything that is necessary to live a truly human life. This demands not only the omission of criminal behavior but simultaneously a positive dedication; the others facing me makes me responsible for him/her, and this responsibility has no limits.[footnoteRef:15] [15: Peperzak, To the Other, 22.]

The Other commands us to be responsible and to answer to the call of the Other. One is called to serve the Other and to respond to the Others needs. Responsibility is considered by Levinas as a service to the Other. Politics is one of the most crucial aspect of human society that has the utmost duty of responding to the need of the people. Government officials and politicians are task to be responsible to the Other, who are in need, who are hungry, who are oppressed and persecuted. It is the politicians who are tasked to be responsible for the welfare of the Other. Of course, all of us are responsible for each Other, as Levinas would say, I am responsible for everyone else-but I am more responsible for all Others. However, politicians are elected to the position as having the primary duty to serve the people and to be what Levinas calls being-for-the-other. As politicians they have to serve the people and to make sure that they promote justice and provide the need of the people. Politicians are called to serve the people, to be for others, and not for itself. Levinas ethical philosophy shows that in facing the human Other it inhabits the horizon of ones experience and present themselves as a demand to oneself.[footnoteRef:16] In facing the human Other there is a demand that one must answer the needs of the Other. The face expresses a command, Thou shalt not kill. This command of the face of the Other can be translated as be for me. This command from the face of the Other not to kill the Other is also expressed not just by the persecuted ones or victims of political killing and injustices but it is also echoed by the poor and the destitute. The face of the poor, the widow and the orphan calls us not to let him/her die alone. By turning away from the call of the Other we are also turning away from ourselves. According to Levinas being for the Other defines who I am.[footnoteRef:17] Our relationship with others define us, it is our relation with the others that constitute our very own being. The Other who calls us to be responsible present themselves as a demand to oneself andcall (some)one to get outside the sphere of ones own self-satisfaction and preoccupations.[footnoteRef:18] Being-for-itself according to Levinas is a mode of being in which the Self is preoccupied with itself, and therefore indifferent to the Other.[footnoteRef:19] This is the mode of being that is egoistic since it is simply concerned of itself rather than the welfare of Others. When one becomes a public servant it is where one lives for the Other and no longer for itself.[footnoteRef:20] Levinas tells us, (that) the face of the Other appeals to us and this appeals concerns us.[footnoteRef:21] The call and demand from the face of the Other concerns us and this concern for the Other cannot be simply dismissed as Levinas would describe ethical responsibility as an insomnia or wakefulness precisely because it is a perpetual duty of vigilance and effort that can never slumberlove cannot sleep, can never be peaceful or permanent. Love is the incessant watching over of the other.[footnoteRef:22] [16: Mkhwanazi, To Be Human, 134.] [17: Ibid.] [18: Ibid.] [19: Ibid., 137.] [20: Zimmermann, Wojtyla and Levinas, 989.] [21: Visker,The Inhuman Condition, 29.] [22: Richard A. Cohen, Face To Face With Levinas (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1986), 30. Hereafter, Cohen, Face To Face.]

Politicians are called to serve the Others, they are called to get outside of themselves and not simply to use their position to satisfy ones self satisfaction and desire but as a public servant one must get out of himself and of his personal preoccupations. One cannot see the face of the Other, especially the face of those who are in need if one is simply preoccupied of his personal satisfaction and of his own self. There is a need to recognize the face of those who are in need. Since Levinas characterized responsibility as a service to the Other. A public servant is one who is not only called to serve the Other but to be responsible to the Other. As a public servant one is bind to the people he is serving. For Levinas, responsibility is a place where I (one) bind himself (oneself) to the Other.[footnoteRef:23] [23: Mkhwanazi, To Be Human, 136.]

Levinas pointed out that responsibility is intimately connected with service. Levinas makes an intrinsic link between the words, responsibility and the Other. He maintains that to be responsible means to make oneself available for service of the Other in such a way that ones own life is intrinsically linked with the Others life.[footnoteRef:24] Public servants must make themselves available to the service of the Other, this is the most concrete manifestation of being responsible to the other. In being responsible to the Other one must make himself available for the Other. It is in making ones self available to the Other that one can respond to the need of the other. One cannot respond to the need of the Other if one is not available for the Other. Availability to respond makes one capable of being responsible to the Other. When one is not available, how can one respond to the need of the Other? The giving of oneself demands that one not simply recognize the need of the Other but one must be available to the Other. This is a great challenge to our politicians or public servants who must make themselves always available in order to respond to the need of the people. Perhaps they fail to respond to the need because in the first place they were not available to get to know peoples needs, they do not make themselves available to get out of their comfortable, air conditioned and luxurious offices to see the face of the poor, the orphan or the destitute. Failing to be available for the Other is tantamount to failing being responsible for the Other. Isnt it the case that we often fail to be responsible because we fail to make ourselves available to the Other? We fail to make ourselves available and respond to our obligations and duties to the Other? [24: Ibid., 136.]

This unavailability to the Other and the refusal to acknowledge the face of the Other who is in need is indeed a form of irresponsibility. Cardinal Tagle at the height of the pork barrel scandal admonishes out politicians to at least make themselves available to go to the slums or the squatter areas at night and see the faces of the people who sleep in a piece of cartoon or tarpaulin shivering in the cold night hoping that at least by the faces and situation of these desperate people, the Other, the poor, the destitute, the orphans their hearts will be touched. This is what Levinas means by substitution. It is not simply characterized as compassion for the Other. According to Levinas substitution is not a psychological event of compassion, but it is putting oneself in the place of the Other, who is distinct from me.[footnoteRef:25] The call of the face of the Other does not just remain in the mind but rather it pierces through the heart. The suffering of the Other would be intolerable, not just for him, but also for me.[footnoteRef:26] [25: Ibid., 140.] [26: Visker,The Inhuman Condition, 113.]

The Other is calling us to put ourselves in their place to suffer as they do, to be hurt as they were hurt. We cannot simply turn our back away from the gaze of the Other for our own selfishness is also detrimental and would lead to our own destruction. One always answers to the appeal (of the Other), one cannot escape the responsibility it brings-silence is not an option, it too will be a way to answer.[footnoteRef:27] Our inescapable guilt in toward our lack of responsibility to the Other is best characterized by Levinas in comparison to a Nessus Tunic. Levinas wrote that the irremissible guilt with regard to the neighbor is like a Nessus Tunic in my skin would be.[footnoteRef:28] The Nessus Tunic is from a story in Greek Mythology where Hercules, an ancient Greek hero killed Nessus the centaur by a poison arrow when he attempted to rape Deianeira. Before the centaur dies he told Deianeira that she must kept his blood since it is a powerful love potion that will keep Hercules in love with her forever. She kept a sample of the centaurs own blood and applied it to Hercules own clothing when she was in doubt of his love. Alas, the blood was actually a poison and Hercules clothes began to burn him. This depiction of Levinas wants to tell us that responsibility burn towards our skin that we cannot take it off, the Other burns himself or herself into my skin, and penetrates me.[footnoteRef:29] Responsibility for Levinas is the Nessus Tunic I cannot take off despite the pain it causes me.[footnoteRef:30] This story is also showing us how selfish desires can lead to ones self destruction. Eventually, and perhaps its becoming a reality that by stealing from the government would make a politician send himself to jail. [27: Ibid., 10.] [28: Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, trans., A. Lingis (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 108. Hereafter, Levinas, Otherwise Than Being.] [29: Visker,The Inhuman Condition, 84.] [30: Atterton and Calarco, On Levinas, 68. ]

In seeing the face of the poor one hears the command that is to be responsible to the Other. However, the problem is that we dont see the face of the poor because we either hide from them or that we hide them. We are afraid to see the face of the poor. In turning our back against the face of the poor we are turning our back against our very own human nature Since according to Levinas, I am a human being in the sole measure that I am responsible for the Other (another).[footnoteRef:31] When we fail to treat our fellow human beings as human beings do we not fail to treat too ourselves as human beings? Perhaps the traditional definition of man as rational being that distinguishes as from other beings is best better complemented by Levinas that we are beings who are responsible for each Other. We have the capability to respond to the need of the Other who may not be related to us. [31: Mkhwanazi, To Be Human, 136.]

Levinas concept of responsibility seeks the good of the Other. It does not look for the recognition from the Other.[footnoteRef:32] To be responsible to the Other one must seek the good of the Other. Politics aims towards promoting the common good, it is the common good that every politician must seek to advance and protect. To be responsible to the Other we must protect the Other from harm and that entails that one must be willing to sacrifice for the Other, In responsibility(one) is called to sacrifice his her autonomy.[footnoteRef:33] Public service is not to seek for pleasure and satisfaction of ones desire for power, wealth and influence it is even the opposite. Public service demands sacrifice for the Other. In service one must learn to sacrifice for the Other. Responsibility thus, aside from availability for the Other also entails sacrifice for the Other, sacrifice for the good of the Other. Levinas in Otherwise Than Being even speaks of not just a simple sacrifice for the Other but a sacrifice that one does not simply out of ones abundance. Ones responsibility to the Other entails that one must make sacrifice, he characterizes it as the duty to give to the Other even the bread out of ones own mouth and the coat from ones own shoulders.[footnoteRef:34] Notice that Levinas does not simply speak that one must give ones extra or surplus. This form of sacrifice entails that one must give away the very ones that one has and depends upon.[footnoteRef:35] Ezekiel Mkhwanazi even goes beyond this simple sacrificing of material things by declaring that It extends to sacrificing ones life for the Other.[footnoteRef:36] This surely is a very difficult and may even sound radical to many. Public officials are not in the position in order to enrich themselves but rather to serve the people. Their powers and privileges must be used to promote the common good and welfare of the people. According to Rudi Visker in writing about Levinas says, The rights I have at my disposal, which the State accords me, are only there to allow me to serve the Other better. Just as the cry of the Other will always prevail over all the rules of a justice that cannot serve as my excuse.[footnoteRef:37] The power that a public servant has as granted by the Sate must be used to promote the welfare of the people and must be used in order to serve the Other better. Public office is a service to the Other. The Other, through his or her neediness and vulnerability, invites me to offer myself and what I have in service and sustenance.[footnoteRef:38] In Totality and Infinity Levinas wrote, To recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger. To recognize the Other is to give.[footnoteRef:39] [32: Ibid.] [33: Ibid.] [34: Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 55.] [35: Mkhwanazi, To Be Human, 137.] [36: Ibid., 139.] [37: Visker,The Inhuman Condition, 35.] [38: Bruce Young, An Introduction to Levinas, last modified 2014, accessed June 25, 2014, http://english.byu.edu/faculty/youngb/levinas/levinas3int.pdf. Hereafter, Young, Introduction to Levinas.] [39: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans., Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 75.]

Levinas also reminds us that in responsibility one does not look for the recognition from the Other. This is perhaps strongly and concretely in opposed to the actions of many public servants who are fond of advertising their accomplishments and projects by putting their names in big tarpaulins. This is what we commonly referred to as epal. Levinas reminds us that in responsibility towards the Other bawal ang epal. We are responsible to the Other for the good of the Other not in order to gain recognition or prominence. This is basic since service is something that one does for the Other and in its very nature does not seek for recognition. One does not give service to the Other in order to be simply recognized by the Other. The kind of service that Levinas talks about entails that one must be under the control and authority of another.[footnoteRef:40] Public servants as they are called to serve the Other must make themselves available to the service of the Other. They are not the one who must control and subjugate the people but since they referred to as public servants they must be the one who is under the control and authority of the people. Levinas even describes the subject as the hostage. To be a hostage means one is put under ones own control and held against ones own will. A public servant as a servant of the people is held hostage by the people to serve them and to be responsible for them. When one is in the position of the hostage one under the authority of the Other and thus it is the people who has the authority since it is the people who are being served. [40: Mkhwanazi, To Be Human, 141.]

The responsibility that one has for the Other is describe by Levinas as asymmetrical. We dont become responsible for the Other and expect in return that the Other must also be responsible for us. In giving service to the Other we do not demand that the Other must also be responsible to us. According to Levinas the Others responsibility towards us is not our business but it is theirs. The relation between the Other and me is asymmetrical. Its appeal concerns me. I am whether I like it or not, responsible for this Other.[footnoteRef:41] This relation that I have with the Other is independent of the fact that my appeal would concern her or him, that s/he would in turn, would feel responsible for me.[footnoteRef:42] When we are asked to be responsible to the Other it is not a matter of reciprocity according to Levinas, we are responsible for the Other without expecting or demanding that the Other would also be responsible for us too. This is usually the problem when politicians see their responsibility to the Other not as asymmetrical but as reciprocal because they demand something in return to their service. It is the responsibility of the public officials to improve peoples life, it is the responsibility of the public officials to promote the common good, and it is their responsibility to implement projects for the people. This responsibility they have to the Other is independent of whatever they will receive in return. It is their responsibility to the people thus they must not demand for kickbacks on the projects they implement. For Levinas, To take care of the Others need without remuneration or reward is the very meaning of ethical asymmetry.[footnoteRef:43] They must not demand that their responsibility to the people must also be paid by the people in return. This is what Levinas mean that Ethics is not first of all a matter of reciprocity, I do not owe certain things to the Other only in return for what has been done to me.[footnoteRef:44] Levinas in referring to the act of responsibility declares that virtue is its own reward.[footnoteRef:45] This standard according to Levinas is not to be imposed to the Other, to demand that the Other be also responsible for us is to exploit the Other.[footnoteRef:46] Peperzak in commenting on Levinas concept of ethical asymmetry writes, I can and sometimes must sacrifice my life for some other, but I can never claim that another should sacrifice his or her life for me, for this would be a sort of murder.[footnoteRef:47] [41: Visker,The Inhuman Condition, 156.] [42: Ibid.] [43: Atterton and Calarco, On Levinas, 30. ] [44: Young, Introduction to Levinas, 31.] [45: Cohen, Face To Face, 31.] [46: Young, Introduction to Levinas, 31.] [47: Peperzak, To the Other, 172. ]

Levinas on JusticeLevinas concept of justice is related to his concept of the third party. The concept of the third party is the bridge from which Levinas thought crosses from ethics to politics. We are not only concern before the Other that faces us but we are also responsible to the Others. Our responsibility to the Other who faces us is not simply exclusive to the Other who is facing us.[footnoteRef:48] Our responsibility to the Other reaches to all other human beings and this implies my responsibility for social justice and worldwide peace.[footnoteRef:49] The so called third party is revealed in and through the face of the Other, it follows that I am related to many others who urge me with equal absoluteness to dedicate myself to them.[footnoteRef:50] In response to problem of how we can be responsible to a multiple others (third party) who face us, Levinas talks about justice. How can we respond to all the Others are facing us? According to Levinas, I must divide my time and energy in order to respond to more than one revelation of the infinite.[footnoteRef:51] Levinas notion of justice appeals to those who are in charge of the common good and welfare of the society to be responsible not just to one but to all Others. Political, social and judicial system is the one that balances and guarantees at least the minimum of the absolute demands expressed by the Others presence.[footnoteRef:52] The appearance of the Other reveals ones duty of justice.[footnoteRef:53] It is with the introduction of the third party that necessitates a passage to justice which in turn calls into place the political state, with juridical institutions and bill of rights.[footnoteRef:54] The political state has the primary duty to promote justice, thus, public servants are called too to relate to the Other with justice. Thus, Politics was born as the many others emerged as claimants of responsibility.[footnoteRef:55] Since the introduction of the third party becomes essential to Levinas concept of justice, thus there is actually an inherent relation in Levinas between the ethical and political.[footnoteRef:56] Levinas concludes that the aim of politics is to provide a just and human society. [48: Ibid., 167.] [49: Ibid.] [50: Ibid., 168.] [51: Ibid.] [52: Ibid.] [53: Ibid., 229.] [54: Mkhwanazi, To Be Human, 143.] [55: Ibid., 146.] [56: Hand, Emmanuel Levinas, 94. ]

As a conclusion, Levinas is calling on us to respond to the need of the Other to be a public servant means to be responsible to the Other and to be responsible to be responsible to the Other entails that one must serve the Other. Responsibility towards the Other implies that one must be available for the Other. Public service is a way of serving and being responsible to the Other. This service to the Other is asymmetrical. One is called to serve and to be responsible without demanding that the Other will return the same. The face of the poor, the destitute, the orphan and the widow calls us to respond and to be available. We must heed the call of the face, we must respond to the command of the face, we must be responsible to the Other.

References:

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