security related research projects at uccs network research lab

1Security Research 2/7/2003 chow

C. Edward Chow

Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Colorado at Colorado Springs

C. Edward Chow

Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Colorado at Colorado Springs

Security Related Research Projects at UCCS Network Research Lab

Security Related Research Projects at UCCS Network Research Lab


Outline of the TalkOutline of the Talk

Brief Introduction to the Network/Protocol Research Lab at UCCS

Network security related research projects at UCCS Network/Protocol Research Lab

Autonomous Anti-DDoS Project

Secure Collective Defense Project

BGP/MPLS based VPN Project

Discussion on Innerwall-UCCS Joint Research Project

STTR N03-T010 TITLE: Intrusion Monitoring, Detection and Reporting

Brief Introduction to the Network/Protocol Research Lab at UCCS

Network security related research projects at UCCS Network/Protocol Research Lab

Autonomous Anti-DDoS Project

Secure Collective Defense Project

BGP/MPLS based VPN Project

Discussion on Innerwall-UCCS Joint Research Project



UCCS Network Research LabUCCS Network Research Lab Director: Dr. C. Edward Chow Graduate students:

– John Bicknell/Steve McCaughey/Anders Hansmat: Distributed Network Restoration/Network Survivability

– Hekki Julkunen: Dynamic Packet Filter– Chandra Prakash: High Available Linux kernel-based Content Switch– Ganesh Godavari: Linux based Secure Web Switch– Angela Cearns: Autonomous Anti-DDoS (A2D2) Testbed– Longhua Li: IXP-based Content Switch– Yu Cai (Ph.D. research assistant): Multipath Routing– Jianhua Xie (Ph.D.): Secure Storage Networks– Frank Watson: Content Switch for Email Security– Paul Fong: Wireless AODV Routing for sensor networks– Nirmala Belusu: Wireless Network Security PEAP vs. TTLS– David Wikinson/Sonali Patankar: Secure Collective Defense– Murthy Andukuri/Jing Wu: Enhanced BGP/MPLS-based VPN– Patricia Ferrao/Merlin Vincent: Web-based Collaborative System Support

Director: Dr. C. Edward Chow Graduate students:

– John Bicknell/Steve McCaughey/Anders Hansmat: Distributed Network Restoration/Network Survivability

– Hekki Julkunen: Dynamic Packet Filter– Chandra Prakash: High Available Linux kernel-based Content Switch– Ganesh Godavari: Linux based Secure Web Switch– Angela Cearns: Autonomous Anti-DDoS (A2D2) Testbed– Longhua Li: IXP-based Content Switch– Yu Cai (Ph.D. research assistant): Multipath Routing– Jianhua Xie (Ph.D.): Secure Storage Networks– Frank Watson: Content Switch for Email Security– Paul Fong: Wireless AODV Routing for sensor networks– Nirmala Belusu: Wireless Network Security PEAP vs. TTLS– David Wikinson/Sonali Patankar: Secure Collective Defense– Murthy Andukuri/Jing Wu: Enhanced BGP/MPLS-based VPN– Patricia Ferrao/Merlin Vincent: Web-based Collaborative System Support


UCCS Network Lab SetupUCCS Network Lab Setup

Gigabit fiber connection to UCCS backbone Switch/Firewall/Wireless AP:

HP 4000 switch; 4 Linksys/Dlink Switches. Sonicwall Pro 300 Firewall 8 Intel 7112 SSL accelerators; 4 7820 XML directors donated

by Intel. Cisco 1200 Aironet Dual Band Access Point and 350 client

PC/PCI cards (both 802.11a and 802.11b cards). Intel IXP12EB network processor evaluation board

Servers: Two Dell PowerEdge Servers. Workstations/PCs:

8 Dell PCs (3Ghz-500Mhz); 12 HP PCs (500-233Mhz) 2 laptop PCs with Aironet 350 for mobile wireless OS: Linux Redhat 8.0; Window XP/2000

Gigabit fiber connection to UCCS backbone Switch/Firewall/Wireless AP:

HP 4000 switch; 4 Linksys/Dlink Switches. Sonicwall Pro 300 Firewall 8 Intel 7112 SSL accelerators; 4 7820 XML directors donated

by Intel. Cisco 1200 Aironet Dual Band Access Point and 350 client

PC/PCI cards (both 802.11a and 802.11b cards). Intel IXP12EB network processor evaluation board

Servers: Two Dell PowerEdge Servers. Workstations/PCs:

8 Dell PCs (3Ghz-500Mhz); 12 HP PCs (500-233Mhz) 2 laptop PCs with Aironet 350 for mobile wireless OS: Linux Redhat 8.0; Window XP/2000


HP4000SWGigibit Fiber to UCCS Backbone&WorkstationDell ServerIntel IXP Network Processor

HP4000SWGigibit Fiber to UCCS Backbone&WorkstationDell ServerIntel IXP Network Processor


Intel 7110 SSL Accelerators 7280 XML Director

Intel 7110 SSL Accelerators 7280 XML Director


DDoS: Distributed Denial of Service AttackDDoS: Distributed Denial of Service Attack

DDoS Victims:Yahoo/Amazon

2000CERT

5/2001DNS Root Servers

10/2002

DDoS Tools:Stacheldraht

TrinooTribal Flood Network (TFN)

Agent(Attacker)

Agent(Attacker)

Agent(Attacker)

Handler(Middleman)

Agent(Attacker)

Handler(Middleman)

Agent(Attacker)

Agent(Attacker)

Agent(Attacker)

Agent(Attacker)

Client(Attack

Commander)

MastermindIntruder


How wide spread is DDoS?How wide spread is DDoS?

Research by Moore et al of University of California at San Diego, 2001. 12,805 DoS in 3-week periodMost of them are Home, small to medium sized

organizations

Research by Moore et al of University of California at San Diego, 2001. 12,805 DoS in 3-week periodMost of them are Home, small to medium sized

organizations


Intrusion Related Research AreasIntrusion Related Research Areas

Intrusion PreventionGeneral Security Policy Ingress/Egress Filtering

Intrusion DetectionAnomaly DetectionMisuse Detection

Intrusion Response Identification/Traceback/Pushback Intrusion Tolerance

Intrusion PreventionGeneral Security Policy Ingress/Egress Filtering

Intrusion DetectionAnomaly DetectionMisuse Detection

Intrusion Response Identification/Traceback/Pushback Intrusion Tolerance


Security Related Research ProjectsSecurity Related Research Projects

Secure Content Switch Autonomous Anti-DDoS Project

Deal with Intrusion Detection and Handling; Techniques:

– IDS-Firewall Integration

– Adaptive Firewall Rules

– Easy to use/manage. Secure Collective Defense Project

Deal with Intrusion Tolerance; How to tolerate the attack Techniques (main ideaExplore secure alternate paths for clients to come in)

– Multiple Path Routing

– Secure DNS extension: how to inform client DNS servers to add alternate new entries

– Utilize a consortium of Proxy servers with IDS that hides the IP address of alternate gateways.

BGP/MPLS based VPN Project Content Switch for Email Security.

Secure Content Switch Autonomous Anti-DDoS Project

Deal with Intrusion Detection and Handling; Techniques:

– IDS-Firewall Integration

– Adaptive Firewall Rules

– Easy to use/manage. Secure Collective Defense Project

Deal with Intrusion Tolerance; How to tolerate the attack Techniques (main ideaExplore secure alternate paths for clients to come in)

– Multiple Path Routing

– Secure DNS extension: how to inform client DNS servers to add alternate new entries

– Utilize a consortium of Proxy servers with IDS that hides the IP address of alternate gateways.

BGP/MPLS based VPN Project Content Switch for Email Security.


Design of an Autonomous Anti-DDOS Network (A2D2)

Design of an Autonomous Anti-DDOS Network (A2D2)

Graduate Student: Angela Cearns Goals:

Study Linux Snort IDS/Firewall systemDevelop Snort-Plug-in for Generic Flood Detection Investigate Rate Limiting and Class Based Queueing

for Effective Firewall Protection Intrusion Detection automatically triggers adaptive

firewall rule update.Study QoS impact with/without A2D2 system.

http://cs.uccs.edu/~chow/pub/master/acearns/doc/

Graduate Student: Angela Cearns Goals:

Study Linux Snort IDS/Firewall systemDevelop Snort-Plug-in for Generic Flood Detection Investigate Rate Limiting and Class Based Queueing

for Effective Firewall Protection Intrusion Detection automatically triggers adaptive

firewall rule update.Study QoS impact with/without A2D2 system.

http://cs.uccs.edu/~chow/pub/master/acearns/doc/


Attack

Attack Attack

Private Subnet192.168.0

Attack Network128.198.61

IP: 128.198.61.12NM: 255.255.255.128

GW: 128.198.61.1

eth0

Pluto

Titan

DMZ

Multi-LevelRate Limiting

Class-BasedQueuing

(CBQ)

as Linux Router

Firewall(iptables)

Security Policy

IP: 192.168.0.1NM: 255.255.0.0

GW: 128.198.61.12

eth1

RealServer

Re

alS

erv

er

Tra

ffic

IDS

Ale

rts

trig

ge

r M

ulti-

Le

ve

lR

ate

-Lim

itin

g

IDS

70

% H

TT

P,

Re

alP

laye

r

15

% S

MT

P,

PO

P3

10

% S

SH

, S

FT

P

5%

SY

N,

ICM

P, D

NS

10 Mbps Hub

eth0

IP: 192.168.0.2NM: 255.255.0.0GW: 192.168.0.1

Public Network128.198

Internet

Alpha128.198.61.15

DDoSAgent

Gamma128.198.61.17

DDoSAgent

Beta128.198.61.16

DDoSAgent

Delta128.198.61.18

DDoSAgent

SimulatedInternet

100Mpbs Switch

Master Client& Handler

DDoS

Saturn128.198.61.11

NM: 255.255.255.128GW: 128.198.61.1

AutonomousAnti-DDoS

Network (A2D2)

Client1128.198.a.195

Real Player Client

Client2128.198.b.82

Real Player Client

Client3128.198.c.31

Real Player Client

100Mpbs Switch


A2D2 Multi-Level Adaptive Rate

Limiting

A2D2 Multi-Level Adaptive Rate

Limiting

IP: 128.198.61.12NM: 255.255.255.128

GW: 128.198.61.1

eth0

Firewall Gateway

Multi-LevelRate Limiting

as Linux Router

IP: 192.168.0.1NM: 255.255.0.0

GW: 128.198.61.12

eth1

IDS

snort.confFloodPreprocessor

Threshold

snort.confFloodRateLimiter

PreprocessorThresholds

rateif.conflevels, rate,expiration,port # etc.

./snort -A UNSOCK

report.c./alert

rateif.pl

Level 4

Open(5 days)

Level 3

100 p/s

Level 2

50 p/s

Level 1

Block(2 hrs)

Level 0

Block(2 days)

Level 1Expires


A2D2 QoS Results - BaselineA2D2 QoS Results - Baseline

10-min Video Stream betweenReal Player &Real Server

Packets Received: Around 23,000

(23,445)

No DDoS Attack

10-min Video Stream betweenReal Player &Real Server

Packets Received: Around 23,000

(23,445)

No DDoS Attack

QoS Experienced at A2D2 by Real Player Client with No DDoS

Playout Buffering to Avoid Jitter


A2D2 Results – Non-stop AttackA2D2 Results – Non-stop Attack

Packets Received: 8,039

Retransmission Request: 2,592

Retransmission Received: 35

Lost: 2,557

Connection Timed-out




Lost: 2,557


QoS Experienced at A2D2 Client

Lost of Packets


A2D2 Results – UDP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy

A2D2 Results – UDP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy


Retransmission Request: 0 Retransmission Received: 0 Lost: 0

Look like we just need plainold Firewall rules, no fancy Rate Limiting/CBQ?


Retransmission Request: 0 Retransmission Received: 0 Lost: 0

Look like we just need plainold Firewall rules, no fancy Rate Limiting/CBQ?



A2D2 Results – ICMP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy

A2D2 Results – ICMP AttackMitigation: Firewall Policy




Lost: 2,101


Just plain old firewall ruleis not good enough!




Lost: 2,101


Just plain old firewall ruleis not good enough!


Packet/Connection Loss


A2D2 Results – TCP AttackMitigation: Policy+CBQ

A2D2 Results – TCP AttackMitigation: Policy+CBQ

Turn on CBQ Packets Received: 22,179


Retransmission Received: 2,641

Lost: 1,449

Screen Quality Impact!

Turn on CBQ Packets Received: 22,179


Retransmission Received: 2,641

Lost: 1,449

Screen Quality Impact!


Look OK But Quality Degrade


A2D2 Results – TCP AttackMitigation: Policy+CBQ+RateLimiting

A2D2 Results – TCP AttackMitigation: Policy+CBQ+RateLimiting

Turn on Both CBQ & Rate Limiting


Retransmission Request: 49 – 1,376

Retransmission Received: 40 – 776

Lost: 9 – 600

No image quality degradation

Turn on Both CBQ & Rate Limiting


Retransmission Request: 49 – 1,376

Retransmission Received: 40 – 776

Lost: 9 – 600

No image quality degradation



A2D2 Future WorksA2D2 Future Works

Extend to include IDIP/Pushback Precise Anomaly Detection Improve Firewall/IDS Processing Speed Scalability Issues

Tests with More Services TypesTests with Heavy Client Traffic Volume

Fault Tolerant (Multiple Firewall Devices) Alternate Routing

Extend to include IDIP/Pushback Precise Anomaly Detection Improve Firewall/IDS Processing Speed Scalability Issues

Tests with More Services TypesTests with Heavy Client Traffic Volume

Fault Tolerant (Multiple Firewall Devices) Alternate Routing


Wouldn’t it be Nice to Have Alternate Routes?Wouldn’t it be Nice to Have Alternate Routes?

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A

net-a.com net-b.com net-c.com

DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

R2 R1R3

Alternate Gateways

DNS

DDoS Attack Traffic

Client Traffic

How to reroute clients traffic through R1-R3?


Implement Alternate RoutesImplement Alternate Routes

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A


DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

R2 R1R3

Alternate Gateways

DNS

DDoS Attack Traffic

Client Traffic

Need to Inform Clients or Client DNS servers!

But how to tell which Clients are not compromised?

How to hide IP addresses of

Alternate Gateways?


SCODSCOD

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A


DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

Proxy1

Proxy2Proxy3

R2

R1 R3

block

RerouteCoordinato

rAttack TrafficClient Traffic

1. IDS detects intrusion Blocks Attack Traffic Sends distress call to Reroute Coordinator

block


SCODSCOD

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A


DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

Proxy1

Proxy2Proxy3

R2

R1 R3

block

Attack TrafficClient Traffic

1. IDS detects intrusion Blocks Attack Traffic Sends distress call to Reroute Coordinator

RerouteCoordinato

r

2. Sends Reroute Command with (DNS Name, IP Addr. Of victim,

Proxy Server(s)) to DNS


SCODSCOD

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A


DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R

R

Proxy1

Proxy2Proxy3

R2

R1 R3


RerouteCoordinato

r

2. Sends Reroute Command with (DNS Name, IP Addr. Of victim,

Proxy Server(s)) to DNS

3. New route via Proxy3 to R3



R

block


SCODSCOD

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A


DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R

Proxy1

Proxy2Proxy3

R1


RerouteCoordinato

r




R

block4a. Attack traffic detected by IDSblock by Firewall

4. Attack traffic detected by IDSblock by Firewall

R R

R3R2


SCODSCOD

DNS1

...

Victim

AA A A A A A A


DNS2 DNS3

... ......

R R R

R

1.distress call

Proxy1Proxy2 Proxy3

4a. Attack traffic detected by IDSblock by Firewall

R2

R1 R3

block


RerouteCoordinato

rAttack TrafficClient Traffic


4. Attack traffic detected by IDSblock by Firewall

4b. Client traffic comes in via alternate route 2. Sends Reroute Command with

(DNS Name, IP Addr. Of victim, Proxy Server(s))



Secure Collective DefenseSecure Collective Defense Main IdeaExplore secure alternate paths for clients to come in; Utilize

geographically separated proxy servers. Goal:

Provide secure alternate routes Hide IP addresses of alternate gateways

Techniques: Multiple Path Routing Secure DNS extension: how to inform client DNS servers to add alternate

new entries (Not your normal DNS name/IP address mapping entry). Utilize a consortium of Proxy servers with IDS that hides the IP address of

alternate gateways. How to partition clients to come at different proxy servers?

may help identify the attacker! How clients use the new DNS entries and route traffic through proxy server?

Use Sock protocol, modify resolver library?

Main IdeaExplore secure alternate paths for clients to come in; Utilize geographically separated proxy servers.

Goal: Provide secure alternate routes Hide IP addresses of alternate gateways

Techniques: Multiple Path Routing Secure DNS extension: how to inform client DNS servers to add alternate

new entries (Not your normal DNS name/IP address mapping entry). Utilize a consortium of Proxy servers with IDS that hides the IP address of

alternate gateways. How to partition clients to come at different proxy servers?

may help identify the attacker! How clients use the new DNS entries and route traffic through proxy server?

Use Sock protocol, modify resolver library?


New UCCS IA Degree/CertificateNew UCCS IA Degree/Certificate

Master of Engineering Degree in Information Assurance Certificate in Information Assurance (offered to Peterson

AFB through NISSC)Computer Networks; Fundamental of Security;

Cryptography; Advanced System Security Design

Master of Engineering Degree in Information Assurance Certificate in Information Assurance (offered to Peterson

AFB through NISSC)Computer Networks; Fundamental of Security;

Cryptography; Advanced System Security Design


New CS691 Course on Advanced System Security Design

New CS691 Course on Advanced System Security Design

Use Matt Bishop new Computer Security Text Spring 2003: With one class at UCCS; one at Peterson

AFB. Enhanced by Demo/Hand-on exercises at Distribute

Security Lab of Northorp Grumman. Integrate security research results into course material

such as A2D2, Secure Collective Defense, MPLS-VPN projects.

Invite speakers from Industry such as Innerwall and AFA?

Looking for potential joint exercises with other institutions such as AFA, Northorp Grumman, Innerwall.

Use Matt Bishop new Computer Security Text Spring 2003: With one class at UCCS; one at Peterson

AFB. Enhanced by Demo/Hand-on exercises at Distribute

Security Lab of Northorp Grumman. Integrate security research results into course material

such as A2D2, Secure Collective Defense, MPLS-VPN projects.

Invite speakers from Industry such as Innerwall and AFA?

Looking for potential joint exercises with other institutions such as AFA, Northorp Grumman, Innerwall.


Joint Research/Development EffortJoint Research/Development Effort


Penetration Analysis/Testing projects?

Intrusion Detection/Handling projects?

Other Cyberwarfare related projects?

Security Forum organized by Dean Haefner/Dr. Ayen

Security Seminar Series with CITTI funding support

Look for Speakers (suggestion?)


Penetration Analysis/Testing projects?

Intrusion Detection/Handling projects?

Other Cyberwarfare related projects?

Security Forum organized by Dean Haefner/Dr. Ayen

Security Seminar Series with CITTI funding support

Look for Speakers (suggestion?)

security related research projects at uccs network research lab

Documents