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by ZEINI MOULAYE

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND ISSUES IN THE SAHELO-SAHARAN REGION

THE MALI PERSPECTIVE

Copyright: © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bamako Office, 2016. Editor: Jan Henrik Fahlbusch, Residing Representative Editorial Committee: Countel Kanne, Jan Henrik Fahlbusch

Ordering our publications: Medias published by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) may not be used for commercial purpose, except with prior written consent from FES. The ideas and opinion expressed in the current study are those of the author. They do not reflect necessarily the viewpoint of FES.

SECURITY CHALLENGES AND ISSUES IN THE SAHELO – SAHARAN REGION

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CONTENT

FOREWORD 4

INTRODUCTION 5

I. MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES IN MALI 6

II. THE STATE RESPONSE TO MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES 17

III. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE STATE 19

IV. BILATERAL, SUB-REGIONAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION REGARDING SECURITY ISSUES 21

V. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24

BIBLIOGRAPHY 26


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FOREWORD The recent Malian and Libyan crises have exacerbated the multidimensional insecurity (at personal, economic, political, social, environmental, healthcare, etc. levels) that affects the populations living the Sahelo-Saharan region, and have showcased not only the weakness of the States but also the necessity for regional cooperation, especially between the Maghreb and West Africa. Together, they may face up to similar challenges. The project called "Dialogues about Security in the Sahelo-Saharan Region" stems from this observation. It was initiated by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Office in Mali, in partnership with its counterparts in Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia, in order to underscore the strong interdependences that exist between North and West Africa regarding security matters, and to promote national and sub-regional dialogues about the security challenges and issues that prevail within the States and across borders. It aims at assessing the overall situation in the region, in light of the concept of human security. This is why country-based studies were conducted in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad and Tunisia. Each country-based study went through a validation process led by a committee of human security specialists from the country in question. Also, each country-based study was discussed by experts during a workshop that was organized for the purpose of not only identifying shared issues, but also agreeing on the top political actions that must be carried out in the Sahelo-Maghrebian region. These country-based studies represent the first phase of an on-going multiyear project. They are also the intellectual basis on which some upcoming activities will be based, such as a regional conference that will focus on the priority issues that the experts have defined during their respective workshops. The outcomes of the project will be used by all the key players involved in the various aspects of human security across the region. They will also be important sources of information and guidelines for the policy-makers and the members of the civil society, as well as for national and foreign researchers and university staff members. Bamako, July 2016 Jan Henrik Fahlbusch Countel Kanne Residing Representative Program Leader


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INTRODUCTION

The Sahelo-Saharan region is a major geopolitical and geostrategic concern in today’s context of globalization. It represents the sum of extremely complex issues, and Mali lies right in the middle of such issues. In fact, for the past thirty years or so, the country has been experiencing a noticeable rise in the number of security threats that have plagued the overall geopolitical and geostrategic parameters, and also impacted a good part of its geographic surrounding. These threats can be linked to various forms of urban and peri-urban criminal activities, conflicts between communities, and instability. They also include criminal activities across borders and organized crime, such as the trafficking of cigarettes, alcohol, fake drugs, weapons, human beings, rebellion, terrorism, etc. These threats, that are less and less predictable, have become sources of anxiety for the leaders and the People of Mali, of danger for the neighboring States, and of worries for the international community. This study aims at analyzing the security challenges and issues that prevail in Mali. Here, the word "security" has a holistic meaning. It relates to human security, i.e., its meaning includes the economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political dimensions of security. The study is about conducting a precise, concise and concrete assessment of the situation, so its conclusions may be used as political and strategic guiding tools by national and international decision-makers. For this reason, the study is based essentially, but not exclusively, on qualitative research. It should facilitate the capitalizing of efforts with regard to using similar studies in order to provide a clear picture of the overall security situation in the Sahelo-Saharan region, as well as relevant solutions to the challenges that the Sahelo-Saharan peoples are confronted to. In this regard, the study looks into the biggest challenges among the numerous risks, threats, vulnerabilities and fragilities that affect the country. It categorizes them into internal and external challenges, and it discusses, in a succinct manner, their causes and consequences. It tries also to identify the main State and non-State key players that are most involved in dealing with these challenges, before it examines the response of the Malian State to some challenges that have sub-regional, regional or international dimensions. Then, the study tries to determine what international cooperation may contribute, what strategic interests are at stake for Mali and some of its foreign partners, and whenever possible, it assesses the outcome of certain bilateral and multilateral strategies. Finally, after a global analysis of the situation, the study ends with some suggestions and recommendations, so as to contribute to the improvement of the security situation in Mali and in the Sahelo-Saharan region.


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I. MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES IN MALI

The overall security situation, in its holistic sense, in Mali reveals some enormous shortcomings, abysmal irregularities, and

considerable deficits that are highly detrimental to the standing of the nation. The country is, in fact, overexposed to a

multitude of risks, threats, vulnerabilities and fragilities that impact considerably the current position, as well as the political,

economic, social, cultural and confessional status of the country in the near future. These phenomena, that affect both the

State institutions and the populations, constitute security challenges that must be dealt with. Some of them are exclusively

internal in nature, while others are external in nature.

1.1 Internal challenges The internal security threats can be associated to the following challenges in particular:

• Numerous criminal activities in urban and peri-urban sectors;

• Everlasting conflicts between communities and all the violence they generate1;

• Religious conflicts (deviation, intolerance, conservatism, violent extremism);

• Inherent conflicts between customary/traditional and modern/State legal practices;

• Endemic unemployment, poverty, impoverishment, misery and sometimes the marginalization of some segments of the

society;

• Social crisis (pressing demands from professional organizations);

• Illegal economic and financial activities (fake money, money laundering, illicit trafficking of artifacts and fake medicines,

printing of fake documents, cyber-crime, etc.);

• Epidemics and pandemics, food and nutrition insecurity;

• Violations of human rights;

• Social injustice and a culture of undue leniency;

• Corruption, illegal economic and financial transactions;

• Plethora and proliferation of small arms and of small caliber weapons;

• Insecurity tied to the means of transportation (road, railroad and river boat);

• Natural disasters, drought, desertification and other effects of global warming;

• Illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings;

• Illegal migration;

• Rebellions, tribal and clan-based warfare in the northern part of the country, etc.

Though they are internal in nature, some of these challenges may easily expand beyond the borders of Mali and impact the

surrounding area. This is due to the fact that it is a geographic and social continuum, to the porosity of the borders, and to

the existing policy of free movement of persons and goods. The same thing can be said about conflicts between

communities, rebellions, different types of trafficking in drugs, weapons and human beings.

1.2 External challenges The external security threats can be associated to the following challenges, essentially:

1 KORNIO Ousmane, Gestion des conflits communautaires au Mali, Bamako, Editions Friedrich Ebert, 2004.


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• Transnational organized crime across borders: armed groups that came from elsewhere, and that are linked to the

expansion of Salafist terrorism (foreign branches of AQMI, of Al Mourabitoune led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar), to the foreign

component of illegal migration, to the foreign networks of drug, weapon and human being traffickers;

• Targeting of natural resources by external forces/companies, etc.

A fine analysis of these challenges reveals that some of them are vulnerabilities, and others are fragilities.

In the context of this study, the concept of vulnerability is tied to the weak points within the State system, to areas in which

the State has failed and can hardly defend itself, where insecurity is caused altogether by internal and external threats of

geographic, sociological, environmental, socioeconomic and political nature. This paradigm, which aims at the «Achilles’

heel» of the Malian State, is of the interdisciplinary, polymorphous and polysemous kind. It refers to the likelihood of being

subjected to a random risk, difficulty, deterioration, irregularity, dismantling, destabilization, destruction, partition or

disappearance even. This concept of vulnerability also includes the potential, the possibility and even the capability to face

up to the multiple challenges that have been identified. As such, vulnerability comes close to meaning resilience, but it does

not merge with it.

This being said, Mali suffers from many vulnerabilities:

• Vulnerability due to the immense size of the national territory (1,241, 328 km²), to the distance it spans over (7,240 km)

and to the porosity of the borders it shares with seven other countries. The surface area of the country and the limited

logistical means available make it impossible to have an effective control over the territory and the borders. This makes it

easy for many to engage in illicit and criminal activities;

• Vulnerability due to the lack of qualified human resources and of adequate equipment for the security forces. For

example, the recommended ratio at world level is 1 security officer per 300 inhabitants, but in Mali, this ratio is 1 security

officer per 3,000 inhabitants. The limited human resources available are heavily concentrated in the capital-city and other

big towns. This leaves entire portions of the national territory without security infrastructure, and they become niches for

all types of trafficking and for organized crime. The equipment and other logistical means do not always meet the needs and

the international standards;

• Vulnerability due to inadequate resources. The forces available and sometimes the law are not always adequate, with

regard to the new types of criminal activities: cybercrime, corruption, illegal economic and financial activities, money

laundering, illegal funding of political parties, various types of trafficking, etc. Thus, the State and the citizens suffer from

the consequences of such criminal activities;

• Vulnerability due to the lack of an institutional framework that facilitates cooperation and harmonization when it comes

to the actions of the security and armed forces2 ;

• Vulnerability due to the lack a formalized framework that coordinates the work of the key players involved in security

matters: security and defense forces, public authorities, State administration, local authorities, private security companies,

civil society, political parties, urban and rural communities, technical and financial partners, etc.;

• Vulnerability due to the everlasting problem of conflicts between communities, which damages social cohesion and

weakens, or even destabilizes, the State system;

• Vulnerability due to political instability (coups d’état, pressure from the opposition political parties) and social instability

(pressure from the unions, student organizations) that, like tectonic plates do, affects negatively the long term stability of

political regimes, weakens the ability of the State to deal with adverse conditions, and so accentuates its destabilization;

• Vulnerability due to the indifference of a large portion of the population, with regard to the huge security issues. The

authorities are sorry to notice that a large portion of the population does not get involved enough in the fight against

insecurity and crime. The populations complain about the fact that security agencies do not consult them, except when

2 Cf. MOULAYE Zeïni, NIAKATE Mahamadou, Gouvernance partagée de la sécurité: expérience malienne, Abuja, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, décembre 2011, 25 pages.


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these agencies are in need of investigation leads, or only when a problem arises. When it comes to managing security issues,

exclusion leads to the emergence of more threats.

Other challenges are fragilities, i.e., a state of physical and moral weakness that does not offer any warranty in terms of

duration, reassurance, and so leads to a situation that is essentially precarious. These fragilities are also influenced by

political, economic, social, socio-cultural, cultural factors, by the lack of a stable security environment that would allow one

to enjoy fully all the fundamental human rights, by the weak ability of the State to assume fully all its responsibilities. Such

cases are all contributing factors to the risks associated with internal and external threats, and to the pressures from external

forces that covet our natural resources.

From this perspective, we will talk of just three well-known fragilities3:

The fragility of the State that manifests itself via:

• The declining of the authority of the State, and sometimes the total absence of the State, which gives the impression to

citizens that the central authorities have abandoned them, and which leaves them as easy preys to the solicitudes of the

criminal gangs;

• The lack of responses to social demands and the inability to provide basic services to communities across the entire

country, which discredits and delegitimizes the State in the eyes of the population;

• The quasi-failure of the military to deal with the attacks led by terrorist groups, and the inability to provide basic security

in parts of the northern region of the country, due to the presence of occupying narco-terrorists, irredentist war lords, and

brigands;

• The conflict dynamics, especially in the northern region, that weaken the authority of the State, disrupt social cohesion,

slow down the implementation process of the Peace Agreement signed on May 15th and on June 20th, 2015, and that aims

at reconciliation, at restoring social cohesion and at reaffirming national unity.

The fragility of the ecological environment that shows through:

• Desertification, cyclical droughts and famines that often lead to social crisis, caused revolts in the past, heightened conflicts

and helped the resurgence of rebellion in the northern region of the country;

• The impact of climate change on the populations in rural Mali, on social cohesion, and on economic stability.

The fragility of the system of governance that shows through:

• The lack of a comprehensive vision regarding the development of the country, effective planning, rigorous follow-up and

perspectives that appeal to the populations, especially to the youth;

• The deficit in formulating a clear military doctrine, a formal policy in terms of internal security and of reforming the security

sector. This has contributed greatly to the crumbling of the authority of the State and to the emerging of negative forces

that destabilized the State institutions in 2012, disrupted social cohesion, and undermined national unity;

• The limited control exercised over religious doctrines. In this respect, it must be understood that the main argument of the

Salafist jihadist terrorists being a confessional doctrine, the true answer to terrorism should be found at the doctrinal level

then. Thus, one needs to invest in education, reinforce the intellectual abilities of the populations, provide appropriate tools

to the youth. Furthermore, the Sunni scholars and Sufi Muslims must fight against the ideas spread by terrorists through

exposing the contradictions that such ideas do represent at the doctrinal level4. Here is the key role of the Ulemas. With the

assistance of community leaders, sensitization and awareness actions should be carried out, so people would reject the

3 Regarding these three fragilities, cf. « Paix et sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest: la CEDEAO à l’épreuve des attentes régionales » of Professor Massaer Diallo presented during the regional Conference about violent extremism and threats to security in central Sahel and West Africa, held in Niamey, Niger, on 22-24 April 2013. 4 Cf. AMGHAR Samir, Le salafisme d’aujourd’hui, mouvements sectaires en Occident, Paris, Editions Michalon, 2011, 284 pages.


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notion of using violence as a means to conquer or to stay in power, to bring about political change or to get a new social

position5, etc. When communities will understand the issues at stake and will be empowered, they will fight against

insecurity and organized crime within the security framework that a shared system of governance does provide. This will be

the most decisive combat, and a triumph that will ensure the best and lasting security conditions for all to enjoy.

As one may notice, the security challenges are numerous and diverse in Mali. Though they may be nuanced and their impacts

may be kept in perspective, they continue to be incapacitating factors when it comes to the development of the country. In

fact, insecurity is a dissuading factor for investors. It runs counter to development, which is first and foremost about

investment.

Surely, the overall situation of Mali today is better than the situation in 2012-2013, but vulnerabilities, fragilities and deficits

in the governance system do persist. They sometimes have devastating effects on the political, economic, social, cultural

and confessional contexts and on the internal and external credibility of the country.

1.3 Causes and consequences of insecurity and of criminal activities

1.3.1. Causes Opinion polls that were conducted in 2015 by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), during the fifth edition of the "Mali-mètre"

project, showed that the majority of people who participated to the polling would have liked the fight against the

unemployment of young people (56%), and against corruption and injustice (52.2%) to be the top priorities for the

Government. These issues are, without any doubt, the security concerns of the moment. It is true that, in Mali, injustice is

highly visible, corruption is endemic and unemployment gets thousands of young people to take part in revolts only so they

feel validated, or in delinquency acts, violence, and sometimes illegal migration and organized crime.

Apart from the individual cases, the Malian State also suffers from an asphyxiating debt. It faces the diktat of globalization,

the pressures and ambitions to dominate from coveting forces based outside the country, the ferocious competition

between the powerful countries about accessing the country's natural resources, the over-exploitation of its limited natural

resources by voracious multinational corporations. One must also mention the lack of economic opportunities, with regard

to adding value to the resources of the country, and to the egoistic attitude of financially rich countries and well-endowed

institutions that have reduced drastically the public funds they allocate to assistance and development programs.

However, it must also be said honestly that Mali has suffered for a long time, and continues to suffer, from a bad system of

governance in which counterproductive policies sometimes predominate, and from a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy,

with leaders who care little about the national interest and good governance, a plethora of careerists, and a proliferation of

opportunists who are solely interested in making money quickly, who gravitate around the center of the power, and

sometimes take it hostage. The country continues to suffer also from a spectacular collapse of the education and training

systems, a structural depletion of the State, an on-going impoverishment of the populations6, etc.

These factors represent challenges to be met. They have enormous effects on the political, economic, social, cultural and

ecological contexts within the country.

1.3.2. Consequences Insecurity and crime are scourges that slow down the overall development of the country and block regional integration.

They have an impact, due to their transversal nature, on the standing of the entire nation.

The consequences at the political and economic levels:

The impact of insecurity and crime on the political context is undeniable. It shows as forms of corruption and large scale use

of 'dirty money' in order to secure state contracts, to buy votes during elections, to recruit thugs, militias or even armed

groups and private armies. Naturally, this contributes to the surging of violence in the political arena. Some unscrupulous

politicians even fall in with all kinds of traffickers, who then rely on such politicians to further their dirty business interests.

5 COLLECTIF, Instabilité institutionnelle et sécurité humaine, Dakar, Editions Gorée Institute, 2012, 362 pages. 6 Société civile et gouvernance de la sécurité, Bamako, Coopération technique belge, 2007, page 14.


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These politicians, who are always in need of money, prestige and top-raking positions in the State system, often become

the puppets of the mafia networks that fund their campaigns and secure their places within the institutions of the Republic.

None of the West African countries is free from the impacts of organized crime, because the mafia networks transcend

borders and operate in flexible and subtle manners. Here is a recent example: On February 1st, 2016, the authorities in

Mauritania seized two tons of cocaine that were hidden in a touristic camp located 200 km north-west of Nouakchott by the

Atlantic Ocean, and from where the illicit drug was likely to be shipped to Europe by sea. Among the arrested drug

traffickers, there were Mauritanians, Algerians, Senegalese, Western Saharans and ... Malians7. The traffickers often hide

behind fake names and commercial titles that one would deem above suspicion at first. Crime money that is generated

through diverse illicit means, including ransoms collected from the kidnapping of hostages, is generally recycled into the

economic system (buildings in the cities, livestock in the rural areas).

The criminals sometimes affect a portion of this crime money to what is now called « moral laundering» (sponsoring of sport

or humanitarian activities, building mosques, churches or schools). The large scale of organized crime may be explained by

a culture of impunity, a weak riposte from the State that could be likened to a lack of political will8.

The financial might/influence of narco-traffickers and terrorists is such that they are capable of destabilizing a Government,

remove a regime from power, place their puppets within State institutions, create a conflict, fund a rebellion, dismantle

given economic sectors, or destroy social structures and fundamental values in a country.

Obviously, one cannot build a country with 'dirty money'. Criminal activities weaken both the economy and the institutions

of the country. This situation is worrisome due to the fact that, in the northern region of Mali in particular, a process of

hybridization has often created very strong ties between the key players involved in organized crime and terrorist networks

with the traffickers in illicit drugs, arms, and clandestine migration.

The consequences at the social and cultural levels:

Some young people participate in the trafficking and the consumption of illegal drugs, a phenomenon that is dismantling

the structure of Malian society. Already the victims of structural poverty in their social milieu, thousands of illiterate,

irresponsible, and unemployed young people live in the streets of our towns and villages, roam the sandy footpaths across

the desert and fall easily prey to the mafia networks. For the past ten years, dozens if not hundreds of young Malians lost

their lives to illegal migration, as victims of the trafficking in human beings. Also, the violent eruption on the religious scene

of Salafism, in 2012, represented a real shock or even a trauma for many Malians.

The political and religious leaders must pay close attention to the evolution of the faith movements in the country, to their

impacts and to their contributions, with regard to the political changes that took place in the last twenty years9 . The battle

cry has not resounded yet, but it is certain that, from a strict doctrinal point of view, the type of Salafism10 that was advocated

by the jihadists who invaded northern Mali in 2012 runs counter to the type of Sufism that is most practiced in the country.

If the religious leaders do not initiate a doctrinal debate at this particular moment, so the political leaders may

delineate/understand its contours clearly, there is a risk that the cultural context, singularly the confessional arena, catches

on fire one day and becomes a battlefield for opposing Sufi and Salafist Muslims, Sunni Islam and Shia Islam, etc. Also, the

aggressive proselytizing of all types that Evangelical churches with ties to the United States have been leading for the past

twenty years could irritate Catholics and Muslims alike, and add to the prevailing level of violence.

The consequences at the governance level:

In Mali, the impact of insecurity and crime on governance was strongly felt in the 2000's. Indeed, the year 2003, which

coincides strangely with the ending of the negotiations that led to the liberation of 33 German and Austrian hostages mostly,

became a post-sign of a decline in the quality of governance in the country. These hostages were kidnapped in Algeria, but

were set free in northern Mali. Considered a safe haven then, kidnappers of hostages developed in Mali a so-called « industrie

7 Information provided by VOA (Voice of America). 8 « La drogue au coeur du pouvoir ATT: la véritable raison de sa chute. Comment le Qatar et l’Arabie Saoudite sont-ils devenus les parrains de la rébellion au Mali ? », L’Inter de Bamako, 6 mai 2013. 9 MOULAYE Zeïni, La problématique de la criminalité transfrontalière et le contrôle démocratique du secteur de la sécurité, Bamako, Editions Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, février 2014, p. 11. 10 AMGHAR Samir, Le salafisme d’aujourd’hui, Paris, Éditions Michalon, 2011, 284 pages.


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du rapt »11. The hostage takers and their accomplices received millions of euros and dollars in order to set the hostages free12,

and it seems the regime in place at the time benefited from this situation through kick-backs paid to intermediaries and to

some political decision-makers, undue influence and corruption. The personal involvement of the Head of State and of some

national and local leaders in negotiating the liberation of the hostages leads one to think that the quality of governance was

negatively affected afterwards. During the same period, one could observe a high degree of leniency when it came to facing

up to traffickers of all sorts, and even terrorists who blithely crossed the border with Algeria in order to settle down in

northern Mali. Twaregs who came from Libya with quantities of arms and ammunitions, in the aftermath of the killing of

Colonel Kadhafi, were warmly welcomed by the central authorities before they would merge with the groups of rebels and

jihadists, and turn their weapons against the People and the Republic of Mali.

1.4 Key players most involved in the fight against insecurity and crime

1.4.1. Key players at State level:

The institutions that are most involved in handling the security sector are essentially the President of the Republic, the

Government, the National Assembly and the Haut Conseil des Collectivités Territoriales, or High Council of Territorial

Authorities. The most involved bodies are the security and armed forces (Direction Générale de la Police, Direction Générale

de la Gendarmerie, Direction Nationale de la Protection Civile, État-major de la Garde Nationale), the local authorities

(governors, préfets, mayors). Other bodies, that are not necessarily tied to the security services, do intervene in the field.

This is the case, in particular, of the Commission Nationale de Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères, or National

Commission against the Proliferation of Small and small caliber Weapons, and of community-based organizations that deal

with peace, security and human rights issues. The roles and responsibilities of these institutions, executive bodies and others

are defined in a number of documents like laws, decrees, ministerial orders or administrative decisions. Given the changes

that took place in recent years, non-governmental key players have also appeared on the security scene.

1.4.2. Non-governmental key players

• Private security companies: These private companies proliferated, starting from March 1991 essentially. That year, a

popular uprising led to the dismantling of some security services because they were seen as the tools used by the military

regime to suppress the popular will. Completely overwhelmed and without appropriate means, leadership and political

support, these security agents abandoned their jobs/positions. This situation led some State institutions, the diplomatic

missions and even some regular citizens to rely on the services of private security companies in terms of surveillance, night-

watch, transport of funds, and protection of people. Today, there are numerous companies. They are regulated by a

presidential decree13 and several ministerial decisions14. These texts organize their activities and try to harmonize them with

the missions that the Constitution prescribes to the national security services.

• Community-based organizations: Today, there are many community-based organizations, relatively speaking, that deal

with security, peace, and human rights issues. However, for a long time, the collaboration efforts between security bodies

and civil society organizations were marred with suspicion and mutual distrust, or hostility even. In fact, the security forces

have always considered that security matters should be their exclusive domain, and civilians should not be involved in it.

Ten years ago or so, there was no direct collaboration, each side being suspicious of the other. However, since the beginning

of the democratization process and of the training sessions about human rights in the context of reforming the security

sector, the relations between civilians and the military have improved. Also, the painful events of 2012 and 2013, the invasion

of northern Mali by rebellious and obscurantist forces, the terrorist acts that occurred in the central and southern parts of

11 DANIEL Serge 12 « La drogue au cœur du pouvoir ATT : la véritable raison de sa chute. Comment le Qatar et l’Arabie Saoudite sont-ils devenus les parrains de la rébellion au Mali ? », L’Inter de Bamako, 6 mai 2013. 13 Décret N° 96-064/P-RM du 29 février 1996 portant réglementation des activités des entreprises privées de surveillance, de gardiennage, de transport de fonds et de protection de personnes. 14 Arrêté N° 96-00620/MATS/SG of 19 April 1996 ; Arrêté N° 96-00621-MATS/SG of 19 April 1996 ; Arrêté N° 96-0565-MATS/SG of 15 April 1996.


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the country demonstrated that the civil society also has a role to play in managing security issues15, particularly when it

comes to informing, sensitizing and educating local communities. There is no doubt that in implementing the Agreement

for Peace and Reconciliation, its institutional and security dimensions will create new relations between civilians and the

military that will break the wall of distrust and create a synergy of actions for a safer and more peaceful Mali.

• Taking gender into account: It is well known that one of the main demands formulated by the civil society, and women in

particular, is the chance to exercise fully their citizenship rights. From this point of view, the active and effective participation

of women to the governance of the security sector could be considered as the pinnacle of the democratization process in

Mali. If insecurity seems like a brake/hold on the development of the country, gender equity does represent an essential

indicator of peace and security, a contrario. This was underscored in Resolution 1325 of the Security Council of the United

Nations. Experience shows that the contributions made by women benefit the entire population, and improve the peace

and security situations. Thus, the State authorities, security and armed forces, civil society, political groups, local authorities,

and communities must all take gender into account, with regard to the governance of peace and security. This was

recommended in the conclusions of the États Généraux, or National Convention on Security, too.

To achieve this goal, the recommended strategy regarding gender is about giving a bigger role to women and about

reinforcing their individual and collective abilities, when it comes to handling security matters.

1.4.3. Key players most involved in insecurity and crime

Among the non-State key players, one cannot ignore the people who caused insecurity and who organized criminal

activities. They are many. We will refer to the most harmful to society, and the best organized criminal networks.

Out of these groups, four are relatively tied to each other. They are:

Groups tied to organized crime:

• Al Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI), or Al Qaida in Islamic Maghreb. The first terrorist group to settle in

northern Mali, it grew from about 20 members in the early 2000's to more than 300 members in 2012. Much

weakened after the forceful interventions of the French troops in the context of the Serval and Barkhane missions,

its membership is reduced today to a few dozens of Mauritanians and Malians principally. AQMI has lost almost all

its leaders in Mali, especially Abou Zeïd. One of its first members is Mokhtar Belmokhtar. He has created in 2013 a

splinter movement called Al-Mourabitoune, and has resettled in Libya, it seems.

• Al-Mourabitoune. It was founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar when he fell in disgrace in AQMI, and when the

supreme chief of the terrorist movement, Abdelmalek Droukdel, favored Abou Zeïd in directing the affairs of the

organization in the Sahel region. In the case of Mali, Al-Mourabitoune claimed that it has carried out the following

terrorist acts: a suicide attack near Gao that caused the death of a French soldier, on July 14th, 2014, a date that

commemorates the French Independence Day; the first terrorist attack in Bamako, on March 7th, 2015, that

targeted Westerners at the Bar-restaurant « La Terrasse », during which five people lost their lives (3 Malians, 1

French and 1 Belgian); the attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, on November 20th, 2015, during which 22

people died, including two terrorists; and more recently the attack of March 21st, 2016 on Hotel Nord-Sud, where

the European Union Training Mission resides.

• Ançar Eddine. A terrorist group created by Iyad Ag Ghali16 in December 2011, it belongs to the Salafist movement

and is affiliated to AQMI. For now, it is used only to fulfill the personal ambitions of its founder17. Its program and

objectives are not very clear, but in July 2012, it has inflicted a blow to the Mouvement National pour la Libération

de l’Azawad (MNLA), or National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, a politico-military organization of

15 MOULAYE Zeïni (directeur), Société civile et gouvernance de la sécurité, Bamako, Coopération technique belge, 2007, 103 pages. 16 Iyad Ag Ghaly is a member of the prestigious tribe of the Ifoghas who reign over all the other Twareg in the area surrounding Kidal, especially in the Adrar mountains. Their current Amenokal (spiritual and temporal Chief) is Mohamed Intalla Ag Attaher Ag Illy. Iyad was trained in Libya, and belonged to the famous Green Legion of Mouammar Kadhafi. He is known as a brave warrior and a fine strategist. After he failed in his attempt to take over the leadership of Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), he created, by the end of the year 2011, his own movement (Ançar Eddine) and became an ally of AQMI. 17 AG EGLESS Mohamed, KONE Djibril, Le patriote et le Djihadiste, Bamako, Editions La Sahélienne, 2012, 30 pages.


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Tamashek secessionists who launched violent attacks against the Government of Mali on January 17th, 2012. With

the assistance of AQMI and MUJAO members, Iyad Ag Ghaly has attempted, in January 2013, to spread his

influence over the south of the country, but he was stopped in his progression in Konna by French forces that have

come to assist the Malian defense troops. On the ground, it has two allies that deepen his terrorist actions: the

Front de Libération du Macina (FLM), or Masina Liberation Front, and the Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en

Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), or Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.

• Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO). Its members come mostly from Mali,

Mauritania, Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast). The MUJAO was meant to be the West

African segment of AQMI. However, it became just a subsidiary branch of Ançar-Eddine and AQMI, their armed

and zealous executioner of the most violent type of Sharia18 during the occupation of the northern region of Mali,

and particularly when the terrorist groups ruled the towns of Gao and Tombouctou (Tinbuktu)19. It grouped mostly

traffickers of all types who, in a very opportunistic and circumstantial manner, affiliated themselves to AQMI, in

order to preserve their « illicit affairs ». Its creation seemed to be an answer to two questions that preoccupied

AQMI then: First, how to set a clear demarcation between the original AQMI and the new affiliates, and second,

how to use the new affiliates as a springboard to widen the influence of the terrorist movement in Mali and across

West Africa.

Rebel movements

• Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (CMA), or Coordination of Azawad Movements. It is a politico-

military alliance that was created on May 9th, 2014 in Algiers. It groups the Mouvement National pour la Libération

de l'Azawad (MNLA) or National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, the Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de

l'Azawad (HCUA) or High Council for the Unity of Azawad, a branch of the Mouvement Arabe de l'Azawad (MAA)

or Arab Movement of Azawad, the Coalition du Peuple pour l'Azawad (CPA) or People’s Coalition for Azawad, and

a branch of the Coordination des Mouvements et Front Patriotique de Résistance (CM-FPR2).

MNLA was created on October 16th, 2011 in Zakak, in the administrative region of Kidal, from the

merging of the Mouvement National de l’Azawad (MNA) and of the Mouvement Touareg du Nord

Mali (MTNM). These two movements held meetings from the 7th to the 15th of October 2011 in

order to create a politico-military Twareg organization. This coming together was a consequence of

the Libyan crisis.

Indeed, after the killing of Colonel Kadhafi, on October 20th, 2011, the situation turns quickly for the

worst. The Twaregs who had been serving in the Libyan army, for many decades in some cases, and

those who were called to the rescue by the Libyan regime after the 2011 NATO-led aggression had

started, took huge quantities of arms and ammunitions in the now open depots of Colonel Kadhafi,

then run with their families back to the ancestral land of Mali. Warmly welcomed by the regime of

General Amadou Toumani Touré, who thought he could use them to fight terrorism, they rallied

other Twaregs from the region, especially the members of the Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali

(MTNM), in order to constitute the MNLA. The goal of this movement is to secure the autonomy, or

even the independence, of Azawad, an imaginary space that the movement makes correspond with

the three administrative regions of the Malian North (Tombouctou, Gao and Kidal), and to which it

tends to add the administrative Cercle (county) of Douentza, in the region of Mopti.

Its motus operendi is armed conflict, media propaganda, mobilizing all the Twaregs in the Sahel as

well as Berbers from North Africa. It has established ties with the HCUA and Ançar-Eddine. It has

the support of former military men who served in the now disbanded Libyan army, of deserting

Twaregs who were integrated previously into the armed forces of Mali, of some intellectuals among

the Twareg diaspora in Europe, mostly in France. Its main leaders are: Bilal Ag Achérif, Mahamadou

18 Several summary trials and executions were conducted by this violent group that amputated the hands and feet of some young people accused of stealing, and whipped other persons accused of committing adultery, etc. Organizations that promote human rights, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have published damning reports on this subject. 19 AG MOHAMED Houday, Tombouctou 2012 : la ville sainte dans les ténèbres du jihadisme, Bamako, Editions La Ruche à Livres, 2012, 197 pages.


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Djéri Maiga, Mohamed Ag Najim, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, Nina Wallet Intalou, Moussa Ag

Assarid, Hamma Ag Sidi, Mossa Ag Attaher. As time went on, the personal ambitions of these

leaders led to clashes, and the MNLA went through a first scission that led to the creation of the

Coalition pour le Peuple de l’Azawad (CPA) under the leadership of Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh

and Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoune. Then, there was a second scission that occurred under

the leadership of an ex-Colonel of the Malian army by the name of Hassane Ag Medhi, also known

as « Jimmy-le-Rebelle », who created the Front Populaire de l’Azawad (FPA). These two movements

have very much weakened the MNLA due the defection of hundreds of combatants. But the

ultimate blow to the MNLA came from the newly created Haut Conseil pour l'Unité de l'Azawad

(HCUA).

HCUA was created on May 19th, 2013 by the reigning family mostly of the powerful Ifhogas tribe,

i.e., the current Amenokal (traditional chief of the Twaregs of Kidal), Mohamed Ag Intalla, who

serves as President, and his younger brother, Al Ghabass Ag Intallah, who serves as Secretary

General. Called initially the Mouvement Islamique de l’Azawad (MIA) or Islamic Movement of

Azawad, it became the Haut Conseil de l'Azawad or High Council of Azawad, then the Haut Conseil

pour l’Unité de l’Azawad (HCUA) or High Council for the Unity of Azawad.

A political but non-separatist organization that seems to support the cause of moderate Islam, it

was created out of the will of some Twaregs to solve the crisis through pacific means. Indeed, on

May 2nd, 2013, some representatives of the Twareg communities, under the leadership of

Mohamed Ag Intalla, rejected armed conflict as an option and decided to engage in a dialogue in

order to come up with a negotiated political solution to the crisis that is affecting the country. They

created the HCUA. It operates within the region of Kidal essentially. Its main leaders are: Amenokal

Mohamed Ag Intalla, traditional Chief of Ifoghas Twaregs, and his younger brother, Alghabass Ag

Intalla, who dismantled his own organization called the Mouvement Islamique de l'Azawad (MIA) in

order to join the HCUA. The reigning family of the region of Kidal took the crème/cream of MNLA

with her then, and included these people in the negotiation process that started in June 2013 in

Ouagadougou. In July 2013, Alghabass Ag Intalla, the Secretary General of the HCUA, led a

delegation of about thirty representatives of MNLA, MAA and HCUA to Algiers to take part in the

negotiations that ended with the signing of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, one

year later.

Coalition du Peuple pour l’Azawad (CPA) or People's Coalition for Azawad. It is an alliance between

dissident members of MNLA and Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA) that was created on March

18th, 2014 in Hassi Labyad, a place that is located 350 km North-west of Tinbuktu, at the initiative

of Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, a former deputy/representative at the National Assembly of Mali

and a former eminent leader of MNLA, who no longer agreed with the other leaders of this

movement. They held divergent viewpoints with regard to the negotiations that the Government of

Mali was proposing in order to achieve peace and reconciliation. After it was created, the CPA joined

the Plateforme and participated eagerly to a campaign in favor of implementing the Ouagadougou

Agreement and of pursuing the peace consolidation process. Its main leaders are Ibrahim Ag

Mohamed Assaleh, Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoun and Souleymane Ag Akli.

In 2015, just before the signing of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, the CPA got

split into two factions: the first one was led by Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, who later joined the

CMA, and the second one was led by Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mohamedoun who had ties to the

Plateforme, but did not become a member officially. This half-held position got Mohamed Ousmane

Ag Mohamedoun to sign, on May 15th, 2015, the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation (a signing

that was contested immediately by the CMA). Following several goodwill missions, face-to-face

meetings, mediation and reconciliation efforts, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh and Mohamed

Ousmane Ag Mohamedoun signed, on December 21st, 2015, in Bamako, a document that attested

to the ending of all disagreements and to the re-establishing of the CPA, which would not be

affiliated to the CMA or to the Plateforme. It seemed they wanted to participate to the

implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation on the basis of the principle of

inclusion.


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The splinter MAA. It is a branch of the original MAA which had decided, for a variety of reasons, to

adopt the thesis of the so-called « autonomists » or even « independentists » within the membership

of CMA. It is led by Sidi Brahim Ould Sidati, the former mayor of Ber. He was delegated by the CMA,

though he has only a limited influence within the organization, to sign the Agreement for Peace and

Reconciliation, on June 20th, 2015.

The self-defense groups

• The Plateforme. It is a conglomerate of politico-military self-defense groups that proclaimed their republican

spirit and their being loyal to Mali. It counts some of the groups that were set up during the rebellion of the 1990's.

Their objective, as in the cases of the separatist rebels and of the islamists, is to participate in the peace process

while preserving the interests of the populations they defend. They want to benefit from the dividends of such

operations as humanitarian assistance and recruitments by the army, the security services and the State

administration via the Disarmament, Demobilization and socioeconomic/professional Reinsertion program (DDR).

The outcome of an initiative launched in June 2013, while the Ouagadougou Agreement was still on the way, the

Plateforme was created formally in June 2014, in light of the then upcoming all-inclusive negotiations to be

conducted in Algiers by the various Malian stakeholders. The aim was then, for several self-defense groups from a

number of towns in northern Mali, to come together and harmonize their positions in order to better defend their

interests. It includes four armed groups essentially: the Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA originel) or original

Arab Movement of Azawad, the Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Résistance (CM-FPR

originel) or original Coordination of the Patriotic Movements and Forces of Resistance, the Groupe d’Autodéfense

Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA) or Self-defense Group of Imghad Twaregs and Allies, and the Coalition du Peuple

de l’Azawad (CPA dissidente) or splinter Coalition of the Azawad People.

Mouvement Arabe de l’Azawad (MAA originel) or Arab Movement of Azawad. It is a politico-

military movement that was created on April 1st, 2012 by Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed, in Tinbuktu,

in the wake of the rebellion that the MNLA had started. It is in favor of national unity, proclaims its

republican nature and its being in favor of the types of autonomy and decentralization that the

Government is proposing. But this ideological position is not shared unanimously. Some members

have radical views and are in favor of a greater autonomy for the region of northern Mali. In 2013,

the movement went through a first scission during which the branch led by Sidi Brahim Ould Sidatti

joined the MNLA and HCUA rebels.

In 2014, another splinter group appeared. It was called Mouvement Populaire pour le Salut de

l’Azawad (MPSA) or Popular Movement for the Salvation of Azawad. This armed group, led by

Ahmed Al-Ansari supposedly, defined itself as a national movement that acknowledges the flag and

the sovereignty of Mali over the North of the country, but it demands also « une autodétermination

de l’Azawad20» (self-determination). In 2015, this group joined the Coordination des Mouvements

pour l’Inclusivité des Signataires de l’Accord du 15 Mai 2015 (COMPIS-15) or Coordination of the

Movements that are Signatories of the Agreement of May 15th, 2015. These movements felt

underrepresented in the Comité de Suivi de l’Accord (CSA) or Committee in charge of the Follow-

up of the Agreement. They are, next to the MPSA, the splinter CPA led by Mohamed Ousmane Ag

Mahamedoun, the Front Populaire de l’Azawad (FPA) or Popular Front of Azawad led by Colonel

Hassane Mehdi and the Ganda Izo led by Mohamed Attayoub Sidibé. It should be noticed that, on

January 25th, 2016, Mohamed Ousmane Ag Mahamedoun announced his reconciliation with his

former rival, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, his withdrawal from the COMPIS-15 and his rejoining

the CMA.

* Coordination des Mouvements et Forces Patriotiques de Résistance (CM-FPR) or Coordination

of the Patriotic Movements and Forces of Resistance. It is the grouping of several self-defense

groups (Ganda Koy, Ganda Izo, Ganda Lassarizo, Bouctou…) that was created on June 18th, 2013

20 GUINDO Abdoulaye, « Groupes d’autodéfense du Nord: qui sont-ils et que veulent-ils ? », Procès-verbal N°328 du 25 avril 2016, p. 5.


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within the context of negotiating the Ouagadougou Agreement. It grew bigger and stronger under

the leadership of its President, Maître Harouna Toureh, a lawyer and the spokesperson for the

Plateforme, as the all-inclusive dialogue between Malians went on in Algiers and elsewhere, and led

to the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation. A small splinter group called «

CMFPR2 » joined the CMA in 2013. The CM-FPR1 and the original MAA constitute the majority and

the leading forces within the Plateforme. Their leadership position got consolidated through the

support provided by a new group that had demonstrated successfully its capabilities on the ground,

the Groupe d'Autodéfense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA).

* The Groupe d'Auto-défense Touareg Imghad et Alliés (GATIA) or Self-defense Group of Imghad

Twaregs and Allies. It is a self-defense politico-military movement that was created on August 14th,

2014. Counting a majority of Imghad (in singular form, Amaghid) Twaregs as its members, it grew

stronger due to a subtle alliance on the ground with other Twareg, Arab, Songhay, Fulani groups

from the northern region. From its inception, it became clear that its goals are to defend the

interests of its member communities, but most importantly to keep the northern region an integral

part of the Republic of Mali. Adamantly opposed to any form of independence, federalism or

autonomy, it works at ensuring the failure of any attempt to partition the country, which means that

it is preserving the national unity of Mali. This position made it a very popular organization in the

north, the center and the south of the country. An ally of the Plateforme, it quickly became its armed

branch also, without declaring this officially. Since 2015, it is the main military force in the northern

region of Mali. Quietly and sometimes in a surprising manner, it took back from the MNLA the towns

of Tessit, Tallataye, Menaka and Anefis, before it imposed itself, to everyone's surprise, to the CMA

in their fief of Kidal. Its main leaders are Fahad Ag Almahmoud and Haballa Ag Amzata. Many

internal and external sources suspect General Elhadj Gamou, a loyal high-ranking officer who serves

in the Malian army, to be its founder, or at least its strategist.

« [Officially, the Government of Mali denies its being involved in the creation of GATIA. But, in

January 2015, the MINUSMA observed that many militiamen of the GATIA, who were wounded

during the fighting in Tabankort and were treated in Gao, were, in reality, soldiers in the Malian

army. The GATIA, that is considered the strongest military component of the Plateforme, has often

created difficulties for the CMA before they work out a deal at the beginning of February 2016. Since

then, the political standing of the GATIA has become unclear, given the fact that nobody can now

tell whether it is defending its own interests or those of the Malian State. GATIA has accused the

Malian State of betraying its cause and of embracing instead the CMA rebels21]. »

According to some analysts, these self-defense groups « [intend to resist to the supremacy of the

CMA rebels and to the domination of these rebels over the northern region of Mali... to weigh on

the implementation of the Peace Agreements and to benefit, in such a context, from the same

favors that the rebels would receive, particularly when it comes to the socioeconomic "reinsertion"

aspect. They also want, in the meantime, to be well represented in the local administrative councils

and transition bodies22] ».

This being said, there are crucial geopolitical and geostrategic issues for Mali to handle, with regard to crime and insecurity.

The issues of crime and insecurity

In the current context, there are at least seven types of issues pertaining to security challenges (vulnerabilities, fragilities and

governance deficits) in Mali:

• the issue of social peace and human rights;

21 GUINDO Abdoulaye, « Groupes d’autodéfense du Nord : qui sont-ils et que veulent-ils?», Procès-verbal N°328 du 25 avril 2016, p. 5. 22 Ibidem, p. 5.


17

• the issue of democracy;

• the issue of political stability;

• the issue of sustainable development;

• the issue of accessing natural resources;

• the issue of the internal sovereignty of the state;

• the issue of international peace and security.

II. THE STATE RESPONSE TO MAJOR SECURITY CHALLENGES

During the past twenty years, the Government of Mali and the non-governmental organizations have undertaken numerous,

and sometimes pertinent, initiatives in order to create a climate of peace and security that would enable the development

of the country.

2.1 Moratorium on Small Caliber Weapons Already in 1992-2002, under the regime of President Alpha Oumar Konaré, the authorities were concerned with the

proliferation and the plethora of small arms and small caliber weapons, within the context of the rebellion launched in July

1990 in the northern region by Arab and Twareg movements that had come mostly from Libya. President Konaré had

expressed such a concern to the United Nations Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and had requested his assistance

in order to determine the scope of the phenomenon and the best options to eradicate it.

An ensuing mission led by the former Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), William Eteki

Mboumoua, reached two conclusions. First, the proliferation of illicit weapons is a reality in Mali and in all the surrounding

countries, and second, the solution lies within a sub-regional cooperation framework, which involves the international

community also. From then on, President Konaré engaged in a series of exchanges and discussions about an integrated and

gradual approach to security and development issues. This led, first, to organizing a Conference on the Prevention of

Conflicts, Disarmament and Development in West Africa (25-29 November 1996 in Bamako), and second, to initiating a

Declaration for a Moratorium on the Fabrication, Importation and Exportation of Small Weapons in West Africa, signed on

October 31st, 1998, in Abuja, Nigeria, by the 16 West African countries. A self-regulating measure, the Moratorium is,

according to President Konaré, « [an act of diplomatic intelligence that makes self-censuring, moderation, the simple and

temporary abstention on the part of the States of the sub-region to fabricate, receive and export arms, the preliminary but

necessary step in reinforcing the means for effective security, and in taking positive steps for micro-disarmament during

ulterior phases] ».

Thus, the Moratorium should be understood as an act of preventive diplomacy, a strategy to prevent conflicts. It was meant

to be the expression of a political will of the West African leaders, regarding the creation of a climate of trust between the

States of the sub-region, and of an environment that enables development. In order to enforce the effective implementation

of the Moratorium, the ECOWAS Heads of States and Governments adopted on December 10th, 1999, in Lomé, Togo, a

relatively stringent Code of Conduct. In 2009, the Moratorium was turned into a Convention and one of the tools available

for preventing conflicts in the ECOWAS zone. To make it operational, each country had to set up a National Commission in

charge of Fighting against the Proliferation of Small Caliber Weapons, and to proceed with micro-disarmament practices

linked to its development efforts. Most of the ECOWAS States did not abide by the Convention. The final outcome is mixed.

The Malian experience has been relatively successful in the region of Tinbuktu23 , but not so in the rest of the country.

In 2002-2012, under the regime of General Amadou Toumani Touré, the Government initiated several programs in order to

fight against insecurity and organized crime. Two such programs caught our attention.

23 POULTON Robin-Edward, AG YOUSSOUF Ibrahim, La paix de Tombouctou: gestion démocratique, développement et construction africaine de la paix, Genève, Institut des Nations Unies pour la Recherche sur le Désarmement (UNIDIR), 1999, 424 pages.


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2.2 Programme de Gouvernance Partagée de la Sécurité et de la Paix (PGPSP), or Program about

Shared Governance of Security and Peace. The aim of this program was to contribute to the creation of a climate of security, peace and sustainable human

development in Mali. The specific objectives were the following ones:

"[Assist the Government in elaborating the national security and safety policies;" "Assist in the implementation of a shared governance of security and peace at national and local levels; "Assist with the consolidation of security and peace in the northern region of Mali]."

This program was an effort to implement the recommendations that came out of the États Généraux de la Sécurité et de la

Paix au Mali, or General Convention on Security and Peace in Mali, that got organized in November 2005 by the Ministère

de la Sécurité Intérieure et de la Protection Civile, or Ministry of Internal Security and Public Safety. It was meant to be a tool

in implementing the national policies pertaining to security and safety, and that were adopted on October, 20th, 2010 by

the Government. They mentioned nine strategies, regarding the fight against insecurity and crime:

"Preventing situations that represent security risks;

"Consolidating the capabilities of the forces;

"Consolidating the capabilities of the State in preventing and managing disasters;

"Fighting against the risks associated with road and fluvial transport;

"Creating proximity police forces;

"Implementing an inclusive governance of security;

"Fighting against terrorism;

"Consolidating bilateral and multilateral cooperation;

"Implementing a communication strategy that enables attitude and behavior changes."

2.3 Programme Spécial pour la Paix, la Sécurité et le Développement au Nord-Mali (PSPSDN) or

Special Program for Peace, Security and Development in North Mali. The overall goal of this program was to reduce significantly the causes of insecurity and terrorism in the North of Mali

through a combination of security, governance, local development and communication actions. Specifically, it aimed at five

objectives:

"To reinforce the national security system in place in North Mali;

"To improve governance through the delivery of better services by state and local authorities;

"To promote economic and social development activities;

"To inform, sensitize and develop people's abilities to grasp national security threats;

"To create a management and coordination structure that would handle the program activities.

This program was meant to be a tool in implementing the national strategy to fight against insecurity and terrorism. Such a

strategy was based on eight fundamental points:

"To ensure the presence and the operational functioning of the general administration branches at all levels;

"To lead, protect and assist the populations in high-risk areas;

"To provide access to high-risk areas, ensure the free movement of people and goods, and intensify control efforts along the

roads;


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"To understand fully the phenomenon in order to prevent it, to dissuade and to intervene effectively;

"To cooperate internationally in order to better intervene locally;

"To fight against the proliferation of small weapons;

"To fight against illicit drug trafficking and organized crime;

"To coordinate, follow up and evaluate strategies of combating insecurity and terrorism."

In principle, the implementation of these two national defense and security programs should have provided minimum

security conditions, and prevented the collapse that occurred in 2012. But in reality, they were initiated when it was too late.

Also, they were not inclusive enough, and they were not coherent. It could be noticed that, on one hand, there was almost

a total lack of coordination between the armed forces and the security forces, and on the other hand, between those forces

and the other key players in the security sector, particularly the community-based organizations. Consequently, the two

programs were inefficient. They need to be updated and included into the defense and security mechanisms that are

envisioned by the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, which resulted from the Algiers process.

2.4 Community-based initiatives

From their end, the civil society organizations, local authorities and communities have created numerous structures that

deal with peace, security, human rights, and local development issues. They have initiated many actions that were

sometimes effective in preventing, managing and ending conflicts and in enabling local development. A judicious usage of

such local initiatives could help frame a new defense and security architecture in Mali.

III. THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE STATE

The main strength of the State is its being the State, i.e., the only legitimate repository of the public authority, with the exclusive right to use violence legitimately, according to the Constitution. One of the structural weaknesses of the State, with regard to security, comes partly from the fact, since Independence, that security has never been « repensée », or analyzed thoroughly from the inside, in an inclusive manner. It has always been considered a unique prerogative, or an aspect of State sovereignty, that belongs exclusively to the security services. Also, the security sector has, for a long time, suffered from a lack of vision, strategy, communication method and, generally speaking, good governance. It needs to be reformed. The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation that resulted from the Algiers process24 has now imposed such a reform as a political necessity. In light of the multidimensional crisis that has affected the country, and from which Mali is now emerging painfully, it would be useful to build a new and shared security infrastructure out of an inclusive process. It would be based on consulting and dialoguing amid and with security and defense forces, as well as other key players in the security sector like the public authorities, the general administration, the political leadership, the civil society, the armed groups that signed the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation, the private sector, the local authorities, the nomadic and urban communities, the development partners, etc. This new security infrastructure should be rooted in an enlightened leadership, a new governance of the security sector, an innovative approach to managing security questions, a new vision, a new internal security policy, a new national defense strategy and a relevant communication strategy. It should allow the Malian authorities to: "Mitigate or even neutralize the structural causes of the prevailing insecurity; "Influence the individual and collective mindsets and behaviors in order to eliminate any irresistible propensity to use, or even overuse, violence; "Strengthen the capabilities of institutional and non-institutional key players, so they may contribute to maintaining a lasting and favorable security environment; "Provide the opportunity to strategic key players to emerge in order to impulse a vigorous alternative to the current way of managing security issues;

24 « Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali issu du processus d’Alger », Bamako, Editions Ministère de la Réconciliation Nationale-US-AID, août 2015, 264 pages.


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"Take into account the multiple dimensions of human security as well as the standards of good governance in the security sector; "Make security a central and priority component of the emergence strategy of the country. For this, one needs to reform the security sector on the basis of new paradigms, vision, strategy, management and communication approaches, and to develop a new and innovative tool for national security, backed by a regional strategy for collective security. The new security infrastructure should take into account some fundamental parameters, as follows: • The first is the necessity to build a security infrastructure based on a participative and inclusive reform process that keeps the Person/Human Being at the heart of security matters, i.e., that focuses on human security; • The second is to create the required security governance that respects human dignity and the universal values which represent the foundation of democracy; • The third is the necessity to harmonize security and development priorities, so development becomes a fundamental dimension of security, and the costs associated with security are a component of development. All key players involved in the security sector should bear such costs through a judicious sharing of their roles and responsibilities; • The fourth is the necessity to take into account the gender and youth dimensions; • The fifth is the necessity to take into account the global dimension of security issues, and to include national security and defense strategies into sub-regional, regional and international frameworks; • The sixth is to work towards collective security, given the fact that no single country can face up to all of its security concerns, particularly when it comes to organized transnational crime. The reform of the security sector is a process that requires of one to adopt the following fundamental principles25 : • Decision-makers must give priority to security issues, i.e., one may talk of political will; • Security must be included in the overall democratic process and development agenda; • Security forces must adhere to universal values that represent the foundation of democracy; • Civilian authorities and security forces must accept the legitimate hierarchy, and the subordination of security forces to the democratically elected and legitimate civilian authorities; • Resources allocated to the security sector must be managed according to the standards that apply to public expenses and to good governance, such as transparency, responsibility, accountability, control and obligation to report/justify; • Security forces must be given the opportunity to go through the required professional training and to adjust to democratic rules; • Resources must be allocated rationally to the institutions and technical branches of the security sector; • Competent and professional security forces must be trained and held accountable (especially through parliamentary overseeing and control by citizens); • Civil society organizations and communities must participate in the management of security matters, and contribute constructively to debates about security policies; • The roles and responsibilities of the civilian key players and of the security forces must be defined clearly, regarding the governance of the security sector. Finally, with regard to the expected outcomes, this new Malian security infrastructure should induce26: • The creation of a strategic framework that is likely to facilitate the inclusion of the security sector in the democratic process and in the country's development agenda; • The qualitative transformation of the security and defense forces through such actions as massive recruitment, good training, maximizing ethics and deontology, professionalization, and specialization; • The creation of new executive bodies that would improve the management and performance levels of the institutions in charge of security and defense; • The setting up of an efficient system of democratic overseeing that involves the effective and active participation of all key players in the security sector, and the control exercised by the parliament, communities, and citizens; • The setting up of institutional and non-institutional security mechanisms, especially a National Security Council and its branches which should extend to the levels of communes, neighborhoods and nomadic camps, so there would be an efficient security web all over the country; • The revitalization of some internal mechanisms of social regulation and of conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Then, we could expect, on one hand, security and defense forces that are rehabilitated, credible and efficient and, on the other hand, a general security context that enables the political, economic, social and cultural development of Mali.

25 MOULAYE Zeïni, Gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali, Bamako, Friedrich Ebert, décembre 2005, p. 155. 26 L’architecture sécuritaire dans le Sahara central: quels rôles pour les acteurs sociopolitiques?, Bamako, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, juin 2014, 51 pages.


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IV. BILATERAL, SUB-REGIONAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION REGARDING SECURITY ISSUES

One must underline the fact that since the beginning of the Malian crisis in 2012, even before it started in some cases, several countries, organizations and international institutions had demonstrated their willingness to assist with solving the crisis. Given the repercussions of the Libyan crisis across the Sahelo-Saharan region, some international organizations came up with strategies to end the crisis in a manner that would be favorable to the Sahelian countries. These strategies were focused on five countries, in particular: Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. These countries created, in the end, a new intergovernmental organization called « G5 Sahel ». Out of the said strategies, we will mention those of the European Union, United Nations, and African Union, which seem to be the most elaborate, in our judgment. There is the Strategy for Development and Security in G5 Sahel, known as « la stratégie des stratégies Sahel », or the strategy of Sahel strategies. The G5 Sahel member States are trying to get all their technical and financial partners to refer to it now.

4.1. Bilateral Partnership Mali has a full array of bilateral partners. With regard to its neighbors, particularly Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal and Niger, it has implemented a beneficial and mutually advantageous policy of maintaining friendly relations. In this context, multiple agreements were signed and several mechanisms were put in place, particularly joint committees charged with managing border areas, fighting against transnational crime, and using joint security and defense forces. In the cases of Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso most recently, these mechanisms gave satisfactory results. In the case of Algeria, the Malian security and armed forces get specialized training opportunities and receive equipment from time to time. The Comité des Mécanismes d’Opérations Conjointes (CEMOC), or Committee of Joint Operations Mechanisms, that was set up by Algeria, Mali and Mauritania, and charged with fighting terrorism, became a means to reinforce and to diversify bilateral cooperation. The G5 Sahel helped to expand such gains and to undertake initiatives against crime in a distant country like Chad.

4.2. Multilateral Partnership

The European Union Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel

The European Union's Strategy of Security and Development in the Sahel was adopted in March 2011. Based on a shared

understanding of the situation in the Sahel and a shared vision by European Union member States, it combines security-

related activities with development activities in three areas: security, resilience and development. It uses several cooperation

instruments to secure an adequate amount of resources in order to carry out its mission.

• It aims at three objectives: "Consolidate political stability, security, good governance, social cohesion, and promote education and economic activities, in order to create the conditions for sustainable development and prosperity in the Sahel region; "Limit terrorist attacks and kidnapping cases in the Sahelian countries, in order to weaken the capabilities of AQMI and other criminal networks; "Improve the security level in the conflict zones across the Sahel. • It focuses its interventions on three priorities: "Preventing and fighting against radicalization; "Creating more opportunities for young people; "Controlling migration and the movements of populations, managing border areas, fighting against illicit trafficking and organized crime. In its action-plan, adopted on April 20th, 2015, the European Union intends to carry out the following activities in the region:

• Development, good governance and internal conflict resolution: "Political and diplomatic activities; "Security and Rule of Law; "Prevention and the fight against radicalization and violent extremism.

• Consolidation of the integrated global approach: "Collective action through joint programs;


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"Positive and tangible results; "Development of systemic information sharing and reporting; "Dealing with the structural causes of instability and under-development; "Management of security issues across borders; "Fight against illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime; "Prevention and fight against radicalization and violent extremism.

The United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel

Elaborated in June 2013 at the request of the Security Council, it stands on the following four pillars: security, governance,

resilience and development. It attempts to follow the priorities set by the Governments and the Peoples of the Sahelian

region. It emphasizes the « soft » aspects of development, especially education, training, capacity building, justice,

democracy, human rights, gender and youth. Given the multitude of initiatives undertaken on behalf of the Sahel, a

ministerial Plateforme was set up in November 2013 in Bamako, in order to coordinate the different Sahel strategies and to

create a synergy of actions during their implementation. Specifically, the Plateforme aims at: (i) keeping the attention of

the international community focused on the Sahelian issues; (ii) Ensuring the implementation of long term solutions to the

challenges that exist in the Sahel; (iii) Ensuring the follow-up of progress made and of accomplishments, particularly with

coordinating the assistance provided by the international community.

The Plateforme operates through a technical Secretariat that is co-chaired by the United Nations and the African Union. Its

main office is located in Bamako, Mali, and it holds presidential and semester-based meetings. Mali was appointed to its

head during the first turning presidential term, from 2013 to 2015. This past November, it was replaced by Chad. In March

2015, the Plateforme put in place a framework for dialogues between the Sahelian countries and their partners regarding

four areas of concern: security, governance, resilience and development. The groups involved in such dialogues worked on

ways to improve the coordination mechanisms between various strategies for the Sahel.

The African Union Strategy for the Sahel (MISAHEL)

The African Union Strategy for the Sahel was adopted by the Peace and Security Council on August 11th, 2014, in Addis-

Abeba. It is based on three points: governance, security and development. These are areas of concern where the African

Union feels « [it has undeniable comparative advantages due to its continental mandate, experience in dealing with crisis,

and deep understanding of the issues ». This strategy, which facilitates the implementation of certain regional tools, aims

at consolidating the initial mission of the African Union and of its overall strategy called « Agenda 2063 ». Its final goal is to

help the Sahelian States solve the structural problems they are currently facing.

The priorities set in the African Union Strategy for the Sahel are to be implemented by the Mission de l’Union Africaine pour

le Mali et le Sahel (MISAHEL) or the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel, and they are as follows:

Governance: "Consolidation of the rule of law and democratic institutions; "Administrative decentralization and the sharing of successful experiences; "Fight against corruption and promotion of international managerial norms; "Promotion of human rights and humanitarian activities; "Assistance with dialogue and reconciliation processes; "Assistance with electoral processes in the region; "Promotion of peace and social cohesion, in partnership with religious and traditional leaders; "Conflict management, and the inclusion of nomadic communities. Security: "Promote regional cooperation with regard to security; "Participate to the enriching of the Nouakchott Process; "Participate to the DDR program, regarding the armed groups in northern Mali; "Participate to the RSS programs in Mali and in the Sahel; "Cooperate with all partners involved in the security sector. Development: "Regional collaboration, with regard to infrastructure building and development; "Socioeconomic activities for young people and women; "Develop the agro-pastoral sector and reinforce the resilience capabilities of the populations.


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The involvement of the AU in the Sahel region goes back to the 2011 Libyan crisis. Its repercussions pushed the continental

organization to assert its presence in the Sahel region.

From December 7th to 23rd, 2011, the AU and the UN led a joint evaluation mission in the Sahel, followed by a meeting of

experts in Addis-Abeba, which was held on March 14th and 15th, 2012. On March 20th, 2012, a ministerial meeting was

organized in Bamako, and it formulated some recommendations that aimed at addressing the numerous challenges then

identified. These recommendations have largely inspired the terms of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel,

as well as the G5 Sahel Strategy for Development and Security.

The G5 Sahel Strategy for Development and Security (SDS)

The G5 Sahel is an intergovernmental organization that was created on February 16th, 2014. Its founding text, or

Convention, was signed on December 19th, 2014, in Nouakchott, by the Heads of State of the five countries that launched

the initiative, i.e., Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad.

The goal of the G5 Sahel is to fight effectively against poverty and insecurity in all their aspects, in order to create the

conditions for development and security in the area shared by member States and to establish a framework for strategic

actions that improve the living standards of the populations.

The vision of the Group includes security, economic and social development, in a context of democracy, good governance,

mutually beneficial regional and international cooperation. The G5 Sahel wants to be an appropriate response to the

structural and circumstantial challenges that hinder sustainable development in the region.

The priority sectors mentioned in its strategy are essentially security (fight against terrorism and organized crime),

infrastructures (transport, water, energy, telecommunication), governance (elections, justice, rule of law, decentralization,

deradicalization) and resilience (food security, pastoralism/livestock herding).

The approach behind the implementation of the Strategy for Development and Security (SDS) combines the construction

of basic infrastructures and the consolidation of the institutional capabilities of the States, of security and armed forces, and

of other non-institutional key players, such as members of the civil society and of the local communities. These actions will

take place in the context of political and social dialogues that aim at promoting the concept of human security, especially

when it comes to its components about democracy and good governance (participation, transparence, responsibility,

accountability). The final objective, over time, is a radical change in the mentalities and behaviors of citizens, so as to induce

a qualitative transformation of the security and development contexts in the five countries in question.

The Strategy for Development and Security (SDS) refers to four areas:

•Security: "Setting up a Collège Sahélien de Sécurité (CSS), or Sahelian Security College; "Create a Centre sahelien d'analyse des menaces et d'alerte précoce (CSAMAP), or Sahelian center for the analysis of threats and for early prevention; "Operate effectively the Plateforme de coopération en matière de sécurité (PCMS) or Mechanism for cooperation in the security sector; "Establish a mobile technical system of borders surveillance/security; "Setting up mobile special police units; "Create a military school (War School) for the region; "Setting up a joint force charged with fighting crime; "Operate effectively the Charte de partenariat militaire de coopération transfrontalière (CPMCT), or Charter for military partnership and cross-border cooperation.

• Governance: "Assist with the electoral processes; "Assist with the promotion of justice and rule of law; "Assist with decentralization, deconcentration and the promotion of community development (local and regional); "Fight against radicalization and violent extremism (constitute a database), and promote intra and intercultural dialogue; "Promote community security and social cohesion; "Consolidate the capabilities of non-State key players.


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• Resilience: "Provide assistance to pastoralists and increase their resilience capabilities; "Provide assistance to rural women in order to reinforce their economic resilience; "Provide assistance to mobile populations in order to reinforce their resilience capabilities; "Fixing and securing rural roads, particularly when they cross state borders.

• Infrastructures: "International road and railway networks linking Mauritania and Mali; "International road and railway networks linking Niger and Mali; "International road and railway networks linking Burkina Faso and Mali; "International road and railway networks linking Burkina Faso and Niger; "International road and railway networks linking Niger and Chad; "Airports in Mali, Niger and Chad.

To these projects, one must add others that pertain to agriculture, food industry, renewable energy, electrification of rural

areas across all the five countries and through the use of solar energy.

It should be noticed that some of these strategies have just come to their terms, as in the cases of ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel

strategies. Others are just starting, as in the cases of the EU, AU, and UN strategies. The latter cases do not yet allow one to

conduct a pertinent evaluation of their impacts. Nevertheless, they bring hope to the Sahelian populations despite their

complex nature and the multiple and diverse interests they generate. The near future will tell of their relevance or not.

Foreign missions in Mali

Since the beginning of the 2012 multidimensional crisis, foreign troops have been operating on the national territory. They

are Barkhane French forces, and other international forces grouped under the United Nations umbrella as Mission des

Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA), or United Nations Multidimensional Mission for Stabilization in Mali.

The Barkhane operation has been effective in fighting terrorism and in neutralizing a great number of jihadists, most of

whom were handed over to Malian authorities. But, the MINUSMA is regularly criticized for its inefficiency in the northern

region. In both cases, even though they were called to the rescue by Malian authorities, their presence on Malian soil does

represent a problem with regard to national sovereignty.

V. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Given the multiple facets of insecurity and organized crime, the Malian populations must be well informed, sensitized, aware

of, and trained in order to better protect themselves. Young people, in particular, need to be pulled out situations of

unemployment and precariousness. In order to achieve this goal, one needs to get the civil society involved27, especially the

local communities. To date, there is no strategy to fight against insecurity and organized crime that mobilizes effectively

and that defines clearly the responsibilities to be assigned to the youth, women, representatives28, local elected officials,

community leaders, all of whom could play some decisive roles. Such a mobilization is necessary because ignorance,

endemic unemployment, poverty, misery and frustrations do turn the populations into easy prey for the narco-traffickers

and terrorists.

In a concrete manner, a post-conflict Mali requires the implementation of the following plans:

On the part of the Government:

"Provide defense forces with aircrafts and drones in order to combat effectively terrorists and jihadists;

27 MOULAYE Zeïni (directeur), Société civile et gouvernance de la sécurité, Bamako, Coopération technique belge, 2007, 103 pages.

28 MOULAYE Zeïni, KEITA Amadou, L’Assemblée nationale sous la troisième République, seconde édition, Bamako, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008, page 116 et suivantes. See also: Contrôle parlementaire du secteur de la sécurité, principes, mécanismes et pratiques, Genève, DCAF-Union interparlementaire, 2003, 195 pages.


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"Come up with better strategies to secure the Tegargar mountains (a portion of northern Mali that has become the top

refuge for terrorists) through the presence on the ground of special security units that would occupy all the niches now used

by organized crime;

"Bring back local administrative authorities (sous-préfets, gendarmes, mayors, etc.) and build/renovate the basic social

service infrastructures (schools, health centers, water, electricity) in the rural areas;

"Recommend to the international community to provide « service après-vente », or follow-up/customer service, when it

comes to controlling arm sales and the movements of people, and to dealing with trafficking across borders;

"Restore the authority of the State and the prestige of public service through a system of good governance in the security

sector, an operational intelligence service, an adequate air force, a flexible and mobile defense force;

"Get the populations involved in dealing with security issues through civic engagement;

"Develop a relevant vision of security and an effective military doctrine;

"Create a permanent framework of dialogue and cooperation between all key players involved in the security sector

(Government, citizens, public and private sectors, civil society, political entities, local authorities, urban and nomadic

communities, opinion leaders, technical and financial partners, etc.);

"Control borders and manage border areas effectively.

"Restore the relevance of intelligence services, via their gathering operational information with the assistance of local

communities;

"Consolidate the capabilities of defense and security forces, and turn them into professional groups that specialize in fighting

specific types of threats;

"Create a draft system, or a national service system for young people, that would generate a large pool of reservists;

"Set up some special units to fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration and all forms of transnational and

organized crime across borders;

"Create dialogue/cooperation mechanisms between security forces and other key players involved in the security sector

(youth, women, urban and nomadic communities, civil society organizations, elected officials at local and national levels,

private sector, etc.);

On the part of the Civil Society:

"Create centers dedicated to preventing and fighting against violent extremism;

"Set up regional or even local monitoring centers that would collaborate with all key players involved in the security sector,

in order to fight against transnational organized crime;

"Set up monitoring civic groups linked to civil society organizations across the national territory, in order to create a security

and safety environment that enables development.

In Mali, the international community is doing a gigantic effort, in terms of fighting against insecurity and terrorism. However,

such a fighting cannot be their responsibility only. One must count first and foremost on Malian potentials, capabilities and

forces, then seek the assistance of the neighboring countries, of the sub-region, of the African continent, and of the

international community.

Thus, the Sahelian States must improve their own capabilities to meet the expectations of their populations in terms of

security. They must also increase their response level in terms of democracy and good governance, particularly when it

comes to participation, responsibility sharing, and democratic control in the security sector. These are the necessary

conditions to be met, so they may build a future based on social cohesion, political stability, justice, cooperation, mutual

respect and solidarity.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

•AYISSI Anatole (sous la direction de), Coopération pour la paix en Afrique de l’Ouest: agenda pour le 21ème siècle, Genève, Institut des Nations Unies pour la Recherche sur le Désarmement (UNIDIR), 2001, 158 pages. •AYISSI Anatole, SALL Ibrahima (sous la direction de), Lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères en Afrique de l’Ouest, Genève, Institut des Nations Unies pour la Recherche sur le Désarmement (UNIDIR), 2003, 134 pages. •BRYDEN Alan, N’DIAYE Boubacar, OLONISAKIN Funmi, Gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest: les défis à relever, Genève, DCAF, 2008, 428 pages. •EBO Adedeji, N’DIAYE Boubacar, Contrôle parlementaire du secteur de la sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest: opportunités et défis, Genève, DCAF, 2008, 287 pages. •GREGOIRE Luc-Joël, KANE Abdoulaye Racine, KACOU Albéric, L’Afrique et les défis de la gouvernance, Paris, Editions Maisonneuve et Larose, 2008, 851 pages. •GUIDERE Mathieu, Al-Qaïda à la conquête du Maghreb: le terrorisme aux portes de l’Europe, Paris, Editions du Rocher, 2007, 281pages. •LAIDI Zaki, La norme sans la force: l’énigme de la puissance européenne, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, collection nouveaux débats, octobre 2005, 159 pages. •MOULAYE Zeïni, Gouvernance démocratique de la sécurité au Mali, Bamako, Friedrich Ebert, décembre 2005, 197 pages. •MOULAYE Zeïni, NIAKATE Mahamadou, Gouvernance partagée de la sécurité au Mali, Abuja, Friedrich Ebert, septembre 2011, 117 pages. •MOULAYE Zeïni (directeur), Société civile et gouvernance de la sécurité, Bamako, Coopération technique belge, 2007, 103 pages. •MOULAYE Zeïni, KEITA Amadou, L’Assemblée nationale du Mali sous la troisième République, seconde édition, Bamako, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008, page 116 et suivantes. •MOULAYE Zeïni, DIABATE Amidou, Gouvernance de la justice au Mali, Bamako, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, novembre 2007, 192 pages. •POULTON Robin-Edward, AG YOUSSOUF Ibrahim, La paix de Tombouctou: gestion démocratique, développement et construction africaine de la paix, Genève, Institut des Nations Unies pour la Recherche sur le Désarmement (UNIDIR), 1999, 424 pages.


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Copyright © Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bamako Office, 2016 Editor : Jan Henrik Fahlbusch, Residing Representative Editorial Committee : Countel Kanne, Jan Henrik Fahlbusch

Adress Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Badalabougou Est BP. 428 Bamako - Mali Tel. : +223-20 22 44 24 • Fax +223-20 22 91 13 Email : [email protected] Website : www.fes-mali.org

Biography of the author Dr Zeini MOULAYE has a doctorate degree in Political Science, and is a specialist in International Relations and in Communication. A former Minister in the Mali Government, he has been appointed recently as the Ambassador of the Republic of Mali to Saudi Arabia. He is the author of several works dealing with security issues.

Summary The country-based studies highlight the nature of the State and the key question of governance in the Sahelo-Saharan region. The types of relations that the State maintains with the populations become a crucial issue when one considers the identity/ethnic dimensions of the demands that minority groups often express at the risk of destabilizing the entire region. The issues of violent extremism and of crime organized across borders are also discussed.

security challenges and issues in the … · security challenges and issues in the sahelo ... human...

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