securing web services with cas proxy tickets

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June 2010 Securing Web Services Solving the Web Services Security Problem with an XML Gateway

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A solution implemented at Simon Fraser University to use CAS proxy tickets to provide authorization to web services from thick client web applications.

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Page 1: Securing Web Services with CAS Proxy Tickets

June 2010

Securing Web ServicesSolving the Web Services Security Problem with an XML Gateway

Page 2: Securing Web Services with CAS Proxy Tickets

IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About Us

Page 3: Securing Web Services with CAS Proxy Tickets

IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About Us

• Jeremy Rosenberg Developer in IT services since 2004 Identity management strategy Java Developer

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About Us

• Jeremy Rosenberg Developer in IT services since 2004 Identity management strategy Java Developer

• Steve HillmanIT ArchitectWith IT Services since 1987Unix infrastructure

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About SFU

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About SFU

• Named after famous explorer

Simon Fraser 1776 -1862

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About SFU

• Named after famous explorer • Opened on September 9, 1965

Simon Fraser 1776 -1862

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About SFU

• Named after famous explorer • Opened on September 9, 1965• One University - Three campuses

• Burnaby• Surrey• Vancouver

Simon Fraser 1776 -1862

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About SFU

• Named after famous explorer • Opened on September 9, 1965• One University - Three campuses

• Burnaby• Surrey• Vancouver

• 32,000 students • 900 faculty• 1600 staff• 100,000 alumni Simon Fraser

1776 -1862

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About This Presentation

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About This Presentation

• Definitions

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About This Presentation

• Definitions• XML Security Challenges

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About This Presentation

• Definitions• XML Security Challenges• About the Layer 7 SecureSpan XML Gateway

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About This Presentation

• Definitions• XML Security Challenges• About the Layer 7 SecureSpan XML Gateway• Why we chose SecureSpan

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About This Presentation

• Definitions• XML Security Challenges• About the Layer 7 SecureSpan XML Gateway• Why we chose SecureSpan• A little about Public Keys

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About This Presentation

• Definitions• XML Security Challenges• About the Layer 7 SecureSpan XML Gateway• Why we chose SecureSpan• A little about Public Keys• Walkthroughs

• SOAP• REST

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

About This Presentation

• Definitions• XML Security Challenges• About the Layer 7 SecureSpan XML Gateway• Why we chose SecureSpan• A little about Public Keys• Walkthroughs

• SOAP• REST

• Questions

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Definitions

•First, A Few Definitions

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Definitions

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Definitions

Web Service:

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Definitions

Web Service:• An API to a remote procedure

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Definitions

Web Service:• An API to a remote procedure• Typically accessed over HTTP

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Definitions

Web Service:• An API to a remote procedure• Typically accessed over HTTP• Machine-to-machine communications

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Definitions

Web Service:• An API to a remote procedure• Typically accessed over HTTP• Machine-to-machine communications • Allows data source to be loosely coupled to

applications

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Definitions

Web Service:• An API to a remote procedure• Typically accessed over HTTP• Machine-to-machine communications • Allows data source to be loosely coupled to

applications• Makes systems reusable

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Definitions

Web Service:• An API to a remote procedure• Typically accessed over HTTP• Machine-to-machine communications • Allows data source to be loosely coupled to

applications• Makes systems reusable• Very popular with Twitter, Facebook, Amazon, etc

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•SOAP:

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•SOAP:• XML Message passing protocol

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•SOAP:• XML Message passing protocol • Numerous ‘WS-’ standards

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•SOAP:• XML Message passing protocol • Numerous ‘WS-’ standards• Associated with “Big” Web Services

• Most vendor SOA solutions use SOAP

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•REST:

• URL-addressable objects

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•REST:

• URL-addressable objects• “http://maps.google.com/maps/api/geocode/xml?address=Memorial+University,+NL,+CA”

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•REST:

• URL-addressable objects• “http://maps.google.com/maps/api/geocode/xml?address=Memorial+University,+NL,+CA”

• Accessed and manipulated with standard HTTP GET/POST/PUT/DELETE

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•REST:

• URL-addressable objects• “http://maps.google.com/maps/api/geocode/xml?address=Memorial+University,+NL,+CA”

• Accessed and manipulated with standard HTTP GET/POST/PUT/DELETE

• Lightweight client requirements

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•REST:

• URL-addressable objects• “http://maps.google.com/maps/api/geocode/xml?address=Memorial+University,+NL,+CA”

• Accessed and manipulated with standard HTTP GET/POST/PUT/DELETE

• Lightweight client requirements• Stateless (every request is self-contained)

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Definitions - SOAP vs REST

•REST:

• URL-addressable objects• “http://maps.google.com/maps/api/geocode/xml?address=Memorial+University,+NL,+CA”

• Accessed and manipulated with standard HTTP GET/POST/PUT/DELETE

• Lightweight client requirements• Stateless (every request is self-contained)• WS- standards are less mature

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“Put out an A.P.B. on a donut, believed sprinkled.”

!•Web Services Security Challenges

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Web Services Security Challenges

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Web Services can communicate over many transport protocols

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Web Services can communicate over many transport protocols• Commonly accessed over web protocols like HTTP

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Web Services can communicate over many transport protocols• Commonly accessed over web protocols like HTTP• Easy for Web services to bypass traditional firewalls

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Web Services can communicate over many transport protocols• Commonly accessed over web protocols like HTTP• Easy for Web services to bypass traditional firewalls

XMLHTTP

XML

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Web Services Security Challenges

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Web Services Security Challenges

• XML-based messages can be deliberately or inadvertently malformed

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Web Services Security Challenges

• XML-based messages can be deliberately or inadvertently malformed

• Causes parser or applications to break

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Web Services Security Challenges

• XML-based messages can be deliberately or inadvertently malformed

• Causes parser or applications to break• Creates new XML threats and

vulnerabilities. E.g:

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Web Services Security Challenges

• XML-based messages can be deliberately or inadvertently malformed

• Causes parser or applications to break• Creates new XML threats and

vulnerabilities. E.g:• XML parameter tampering

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Web Services Security Challenges

• XML-based messages can be deliberately or inadvertently malformed

• Causes parser or applications to break• Creates new XML threats and

vulnerabilities. E.g:• XML parameter tampering• XDoS Attacks

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Web Services Security Challenges

• XML-based messages can be deliberately or inadvertently malformed

• Causes parser or applications to break• Creates new XML threats and

vulnerabilities. E.g:• XML parameter tampering• XDoS Attacks• Message Replay

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Web Services Security Challenges

• XML-based messages can be deliberately or inadvertently malformed

• Causes parser or applications to break• Creates new XML threats and

vulnerabilities. E.g:• XML parameter tampering• XDoS Attacks• Message Replay• Oversized/overdeep XML nodes

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Web Services Security Challenges

• XML-based messages can be deliberately or inadvertently malformed

• Causes parser or applications to break• Creates new XML threats and

vulnerabilities. E.g:• XML parameter tampering• XDoS Attacks• Message Replay• Oversized/overdeep XML nodes• Code injection

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Web Services Security Challenges

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Transactions are principally machine-to-machine

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Transactions are principally machine-to-machine • New thinking around machine-to-machine credentialing

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Transactions are principally machine-to-machine • New thinking around machine-to-machine credentialing • Login pages won’t work

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Web Services Security Challenges

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Services and clients must agree on security parameters• crypto preferences• standards support

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Services and clients must agree on security parameters• crypto preferences• standards support

• Need for new kinds of policy coordination

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Services and clients must agree on security parameters• crypto preferences• standards support

• Need for new kinds of policy coordination• Incompatibilities have unforeseen consequences

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Web Services Security Challenges

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Web services enable multi-hop composite applications

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Web services enable multi-hop composite applications• Example: Student on boarding process

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Web Services Security Challenges

• Web services enable multi-hop composite applications• Example: Student on boarding process• Message level security and audit that can span multi-

hop SOA transactions end-to-end

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Web Services Security Challenges

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Web Services Security Challenges

Web services expose business functionality through open APIs, requiring new application-aware security measures.

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SecureSpan XML Gateway

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SecureSpan XML Gateway

• Enter the XML Gateway

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SecureSpan XML Gateway

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XML Gateway - What it does

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XML Gateway - What it does

• Parses all Inbound and outbound XML messages

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XML Gateway - What it does

• Parses all Inbound and outbound XML messages• Inspection and modification of XML messages

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XML Gateway - What it does

• Parses all Inbound and outbound XML messages• Inspection and modification of XML messages

• Replace “Username” value in inbound XML message with value extracted from client certificate• Prevent spoofing

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XML Gateway - What it does

• Parses all Inbound and outbound XML messages• Inspection and modification of XML messages

• Replace “Username” value in inbound XML message with value extracted from client certificate• Prevent spoofing

• Blank-out Student Number value in outbound XML messages • Prevent accidental leakage of confidential info

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XML Gateway

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XML Gateway

• Thwart attacks

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XML Gateway

• Thwart attacks• Prevent malicious and inadvertent XML attacks

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XML Gateway

• Thwart attacks• Prevent malicious and inadvertent XML attacks• Prevent other not-so-obvious application-level

attacks - e.g. SQL injection. • Are you sure every one of your developers

sanitizes their inputs?

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Benefits

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Benefits

• Single point-of-entry for Web Services means:

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Benefits

• Single point-of-entry for Web Services means:• Do rate-control/throttling/queueing to enforce SLAs

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Benefits

• Single point-of-entry for Web Services means:• Do rate-control/throttling/queueing to enforce SLAs• Standardized logging of all access

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Benefits

• Single point-of-entry for Web Services means:• Do rate-control/throttling/queueing to enforce SLAs• Standardized logging of all access• Auditing

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Benefits

• Single point-of-entry for Web Services means:• Do rate-control/throttling/queueing to enforce SLAs• Standardized logging of all access• Auditing • Centrally enforced policies

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Benefits

• Single point-of-entry for Web Services means:• Do rate-control/throttling/queueing to enforce SLAs• Standardized logging of all access• Auditing • Centrally enforced policies • Reusable rich set of authentication mechanisms

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Benefits

• Single point-of-entry for Web Services means:• Do rate-control/throttling/queueing to enforce SLAs• Standardized logging of all access• Auditing • Centrally enforced policies • Reusable rich set of authentication mechanisms • Managed by the Infrastructure team on behalf of all

Web Services development groups

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Why We Chose Layer7

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Why We Chose Layer7

• Industry leader in this space

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Why We Chose Layer7

• Industry leader in this space• Very responsive

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Why We Chose Layer7

• Industry leader in this space• Very responsive• Available as either hard or soft appliance

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Why We Chose Layer7

• Industry leader in this space• Very responsive• Available as either hard or soft appliance • Extensible using Java. We have Java experts.

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Why We Chose Layer7

• Industry leader in this space• Very responsive• Available as either hard or soft appliance • Extensible using Java. We have Java experts.• Supports every standard known to Man

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Standards

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Standards

XML 1.0SOAP 1.2RESTAJAXXPath 1.0XSLT 1.0WSDL 1.1XML SchemaLDAP 3.0SAML 1.1/2.0PKCS #10X.509 v3 CertificatesFIPS 140-2Kerberos

W3C XML Signature 1.0W3C XML Encryption 1.0SSL/TLS 3.0/1.1SNMPSMTPPOP3IMAP4HTTP/HTTPSJMS 1.0MQ SeriesTibco EMSFTPWS-Security 1.1WS-Trust 1.0

WS-FederationWS-AddressingWSSecureConversationWS-MetadataExchangeWS-PolicyWS-SecurityPolicyWS-PolicyAttachmentWS-SecureExchangeWSILWS-IWS-I BSPUDDI 3.0XACML 2.0MTOM

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The Gateway Changes Everything

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SOAP Security - Cowboy Style

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SOAP Security - Cowboy Style

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SOAP Security - Cowboy Style

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SOAP Security - Cowboy Style

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SOAP Security - Cowboy Style

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SOAP Security - Cowboy Style

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SOAP Security - Cowboy Style

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SOAP Security - Cowboy Style

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

Definitely Not a Public Key Infrastructure (DNPKI)

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About DNPKI

Definitely Not a Public Key Infrastructure (DNPKI)• Named out of frustration with the phrase:

• “Cool we have PKI now”

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About DNPKI

Definitely Not a Public Key Infrastructure (DNPKI)• Named out of frustration with the phrase:

• “Cool we have PKI now”• Needed a way to manage X.509 certificates for:

• https client certificate authentication• WS-Security Signature Authentication

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About DNPKI

Definitely Not a Public Key Infrastructure (DNPKI)• Named out of frustration with the phrase:

• “Cool we have PKI now”• Needed a way to manage X.509 certificates for:

• https client certificate authentication• WS-Security Signature Authentication

• Store and push RSA public keys into LDAP

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About DNPKI

Definitely Not a Public Key Infrastructure (DNPKI)• Named out of frustration with the phrase:

• “Cool we have PKI now”• Needed a way to manage X.509 certificates for:

• https client certificate authentication• WS-Security Signature Authentication

• Store and push RSA public keys into LDAP• Ability to de-provision certificate access

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About DNPKI

Definitely Not a Public Key Infrastructure (DNPKI)• Named out of frustration with the phrase:

• “Cool we have PKI now”• Needed a way to manage X.509 certificates for:

• https client certificate authentication• WS-Security Signature Authentication

• Store and push RSA public keys into LDAP• Ability to de-provision certificate access • Leveraged existing IdM architecture

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

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About DNPKI

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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SOAP Security - Best Practices

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Gateway SOAP Assertions

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Gateway SOAP Assertions

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Gateway SOAP Assertions

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Gateway SOAP Assertions

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Gateway SOAP Assertions

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Gateway SOAP Assertions

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Gateway SOAP Assertions

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The Zimbra Conundrum

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The Zimbra Conundrum

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The Zimbra Conundrum

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The Zimbra Conundrum

.../courses?user=me

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The Zimbra Conundrum

.../courses?user=me

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The Zimbra Conundrum

.../courses?user=notme

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The Zimbra Conundrum

.../courses?user=notme

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REST Security that Never Rests

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REST Security that Never Rests

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REST Security that Never Rests

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REST Security that Never Rests

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REST Security that Never Rests

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REST Security that Never Rests

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REST Security that Never Rests

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REST Security that Never Rests

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

REST Security that Never Rests

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Gateway REST Assertions

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Gateway REST Assertions

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Gateway REST Assertions

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Gateway REST Assertions

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Gateway REST Assertions

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Gateway REST Assertions

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Gateway REST Assertions

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Lessons Learned

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Lessons Learned

• Security is an enabler

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Lessons Learned

• Security is an enabler• Stick to standards where possible

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Lessons Learned

• Security is an enabler• Stick to standards where possible• A good vendor is huge

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Lessons Learned

• Security is an enabler• Stick to standards where possible• A good vendor is huge• Start small

• Control the service and consumer

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IT Services - Jeremy Rosenberg / Steve Hillman

Lessons Learned

• Security is an enabler• Stick to standards where possible• A good vendor is huge• Start small

• Control the service and consumer• Security can be fun!

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THANK YOU

Thank You !

[email protected][email protected]

!