securing southeast asia's sea lanes: a work in progress

© The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

ian storey is a Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore. He can be reached at <[email protected]>.note u The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and Michael Cognato for their invaluable help in strengthening this article.

Securing Southeast Asia’s Sea Lanes: A Work in Progress

Ian Storey

asia policy, number 6 (july 2008), 95–127

research note

• http://asiapolicy.nbr.org •

keywords: southeast asia; maritime security; malacca strait; piracy; terrorism

asia policy

executive summary

This article assesses the impact and effectiveness of regional and national initiatives to improve sea lane security in Southeast Asia.

main arguments• Thoughpiracyandsearobberyhavealwaysposedathreattointernational

trade, since September 11, 2001, the specter of maritime terrorism hasrefocused attention on the problemofmaritime crime.Despite a recentdropinpirateattacks,violenceatsearemainsaprobleminSoutheastAsia,whereanumberofpolitical,geographic,andeconomic factorsmaketheregion’sseasaparticularlyopportunespaceforsea-bornecriminals.

• Cooperative efforts to address maritime violence in the region havemet with real but qualified success. Though competing priorities andsovereignty concerns have inhibited the full participation of regionalstates in cooperative security programs, the perceived threat of unilateral involvement by the United States has served as a catalyst for improvedcooperation among states in the region. These cooperative efforts in turn haveledtoadeclineinincidentsofmaritimecrime.Significantweaknesses,however,remainintheapproachesofregionalstates.

policy implications

Externalpowers—theU.S.,Japan,China,andIndia—couldplayanimportantroleinfurtherimprovingsecurityintheregion’sseasbytakingthefollowingsteps:

• By better coordinating outreach efforts, external powers could improvethecommunication,surveillance,andinterdictioncapabilitiesofregionalstates’naviesandmaritimelawenforcementagencies.

• External powers could improve maritime security in Southeast Asia byhelping governments address the root causes of maritime violence—specifically through the improvement of governance capabilities and thepromotionofeconomicgrowth.

Statesintheregioncouldalsotakeanumberofstepstoimprovesecurity:

• Increase levels of cooperation among littoral states’ security forces,especiallyinthetriborderseaarea,aswellasconductmorefrequentandjointpatrolsinproblematicareas.

• Mostimportantly,regionalstatescouldimplementlong-termprogramstoaddress thedeeppoliticalandsocio-economicproblemsofwhichpiracyandsearobberyareonlysymptoms.

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storey • securing southeast asia’s sea lanes

M aritime crime in Southeast Asia poses a threat to regional and global security and potentially could impede international trade.

Transnational criminals and terrorist groups already use the region’s seas to operate out of the reach of land-bound law enforcement and militaryauthorities.SoutheastAsiapresentsaninvitingopportunitytobothcriminalsandterroristsforseveralreasons.Importantinternationalshippinglanes,suchastheStraitofMalacca(SOM),passthroughtheterritorialwatersofseveralstatesintheregion.Otherproblematicseas,suchasthoseofthe“triborder”areabetweenthePhilippines,Indonesia,andMalaysia,fallbetweenthecracksof various states’ national security apparatuses.1Internationalcooperationisthus crucial for restoring maritime security to Southeast Asia.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the effortscurrently underway to improve security in Southeast Asia’s waters aresufficienttoproducealong-termbeneficialeffect.Thepaperaddressesthreeinterrelated topics: the nature and sources of maritime violence in Southeast Asia,thesuccessesandfailuresofthevariousattemptsbothbystateswithinthe region andby externalpowers to addressmaritimeviolence, and theopportunities for improved cooperation and security efforts in the future.

The main findings of this paper are as follows: First, not only doesviolenceatsea,particularlypiracyandsearobbery,continuetobeaprobleminSoutheastAsia,but the linkagesbetweenpiracyand terrorism, real andpotential,arecauseforconcern,especiallyintheSOMandthetriborderseaarea.2 Political and economic conditions in many Southeast Asian nations maketheregion’sseasparticularlyvulnerabletosea-basedviolence.

Second, cooperative efforts to address maritime violence in the region havemetwithrealbutqualifiedsuccess.Competingprioritiesandsovereigntyconcernshaveinhibitedthefullparticipationofregionalstatesincooperativesecurityprograms,andinsomecaseshave ignitedsignificantcontroversiessuchaswhentwoexternalcooperativeeffortsoffendednationalsensitivities.At the same time, the threat of overt involvement in Southeast Asian security by theUnitedStatesandotherexternalpowershas servedasacatalyst forimproved cooperation among states in the region. This cooperation in turn hasledtoadeclineinincidentsofsea-bornecrime.Significantweaknesses,however,remaininthesecooperativeefforts.

1 See,forexample,AngelRabasaetal.,Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks(SantaMonica:RAND,2007),xv.

2 Underinternationallawanactofpiracyisdefinedasanillegalactofviolenceordetentioninvolvingtwoormoreshipsonthehighseas(i.e.,outsideacoastalstate’stwelvenauticalmileterritorialwaters);actsofmaritimedepredationthatoccurwithinastate’sterritorialwatersareknownassearobberyandaresubjecttothenationaljurisdictionofthestate.

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Thesefindingsindicatethatamorecomprehensiveapproachtomaritimesecurity in Southeast Asia is necessary. Increasingly broad and effectivesecurityoutreacheffortsbyexternalactorsconstituteonepotentialavenueforfruitfulcooperation;statesoutsidetheregioncouldimprovemaritimesecurityby increasing the scope and intensity of their commitment to solving thisproblem.Additionally,theregionalstatesthemselveshaveroomtoimprovetheirmutualcooperation.Inparticular,SoutheastAsianstatesmustaddressthe political and socio-economic conditions of maritime crime in order to make real improvements to regional maritime security. Though effective in the short term, military and police measures do nothing to address the deeper causesoftheproblem.

This paper is divided into three sections:u pp.98–109examinetheappearance,importance,andsourcesof

maritimeviolence—includingbothpiracy,searobbery,andmaritimeterrorism—intheSOMandthetriborderarea

u pp.109–21describeandassesspasteffortstoincreasemaritimesecuritycooperationinSoutheastAsia,identifyfactorsbehindthemoresuccessfuleffortsthathavebeenmadesince2004,anddiscussweaknessesthatstillremain

u pp.121–27indicatepossibleavenuesforamorecomprehensiveapproach to preventing maritime violence

violence at sea in southeast asia

A Threat to Regional and Global Security

In Southeast Asia violence at sea has been a perennial problem forgovernments and seafarers alike for hundreds of years. In the early 1990s,however,theissueofpiracytookonanewsalienceasaresultofanincreasein attacks, the more systematic collection of maritime crime statistics, and anewfound focusonnontraditional security threats in thepost–ColdWarera.Bothacauseandaneffectofthesedevelopmentswastheestablishmentby the InternationalMaritimeBureau (IMB)—a specialized bureauwithinthe International Chamber of Commerce—of a Piracy Reporting Centre(IMB-PRC)inKualaLumpurin1992.TheIMB-PRCprovidesanumberofservices to themaritime industry,perhaps themost importantofwhich isto disseminateworldwide reports of piratical and sea robbery attacks thatthe center receives from shipmasters to ships and local law enforcementagencies.Statisticsformaritimecrimearethenpublishedinweekly,quarterly,andannualreports.Despiteproblemswiththestatistics, thereportsenable

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theidentificationofimportanttrends.3MostimportantlythereportsshowasignificantriseinpiracyandsearobberyattacksinSoutheastAsiabetween1996and2003 (seeTable 1).

Following September 11, 2001, the issue of piracy has also becomeconflatedwithterrorism.Thoughaccountingforonly2%ofglobalterrorismincidentsoverthepastthreedecades,maritimeterrorismhasbeenfarfromrare in Southeast Asia.4InthePhilippines,theAbuSayyafGroup(ASG)hasbeen particularly active in the maritime domain. One of the group’s firstattacks,occurringin1991,targetedaChristianmissionaryshipinZamboangain the southern Philippines and killed two foreignmissionaries.TheASGlaterachievedinternationalnotorietyin2000bykidnapping21touristsfromaresortontheMalaysianislandofSipadan.In2001thegrouprepeatedthetactic,thistimeabductingtwentypeoplefromaresortonPalawanIslandinthePhilippines.More recently, inFebruary2004 theASGused abomb tosink theMVSuperFerry14 inManilaBay,killing116peopleand injuringmorethan300inwhatisthedeadliestmaritimeterrorismincidenttodate.5 CircumstantialevidencehasalsolinkedtheseparatistFreeAcehMovement(GerakanAcehMerdeka,GAM)inIndonesiatomaritimepoliticalviolence(thoughonamuchlessviolentscaleandwithoutmasscasualties).BoththeWestern Command of the Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional IndonesiaAngkatanLaut,orTNI-AL)andthemarinepoliceinBelawannearMedan,Sumatra,stronglybelievethatGAMplayedanactiveroleinpiracyandsea

3 Althoughhavingbecomesomethingofanauthoritativesource,thefiguresoftheInternationalMaritimeBureau(IMB)havebeencriticizedonatleastthreeaccounts.First,theIMB-PRC’sfigurestendtoconflatepiracyandsearobberyattacks.Criticsarguethatthisisproblematicinthatpiracyisanissuethatdemandsinternationalcooperation,whilesearobberyisadomesticmatterunderthepurviewofcoastalauthorities.Second,theIMB-PRCstatisticsdonotalwaysmakeadistinctionbetweenactualandattemptedattacks.Third,criticshavearguedthattheIMB-PRCfiguresdonotaccuratelyreflectthetrueextentoftheproblembecauseofthephenomenonofunderreporting.ThoughtheIMBacknowledgestheproblemofunderreporting,theorganizationhasrespondedtothefirstcriticismbyarguingthatwhereanattacktakesplacemakesnodifferencetoseafarers.TheIndonesianandMalaysiangovernmentshavebeenespeciallycriticaloftheIMB-PRCstatistics,accusingtheorganizationofundermininginvestorconfidenceintheregionbyoverstatingtheproblemandevenusingmaritimecrimeasa“pretextforforeignintervention.”Nonetheless,wheneverthefiguresdemonstrateadropinattacks,bothJakartaandKualaLumpurareapttocitethem.See,forexample,“PiracyandArmedRobberyAgainstShips:ReportforthePeriod1Jan–31March2007,”IMB,April2007,3;“IndonesiaSlamsWatchdogoverPiracyReport,”AgenceFrancePresse,May10,2007;“NavyChiefPlaysDownStraitThreats,”Straits Times,July20,2004;and“PiracyinMelakaStraitsNotasSeriousasMadeOuttoBe,”Bernama,December9,2004.

4 StatisticfromtheCentrefortheStudyofTerrorismandPoliticalViolenceatSt.AndrewsUniversity,citedinCatherineZaraRaymond,“MaritimeTerrorism:ARiskAssessment,”inThe Best of Times, the Worst of Times: Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific,ed.JoshuaHoandCatherineZaraRaymond(Singapore:IDSS,2005),182.

5 RommelC.Banlaoi,“TheAbuSayyafGroup:ThreatofMaritimePiracyandTerrorism,”inViolence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism,ed.PeterLehr(London:Routledge,2007),121–30.

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robberyattacksaswellasinincidentsofkidnappingforransominthestraitpriortothe2005AcehPeaceAgreement.6

Patchy evidence of other plans for maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia has also surfaced. In December 2001 Singapore’s security servicesarrestedthirteenmembersoftheradicalnetworkJemaahIslamiyah(JI),anorganizationwith close links to al Qaeda.The JImembers were planningsuicideattacksusinghigh-speedboatspackedwithexplosivesagainstvisiting

6 AuthorinterviewwithseniorIndonesiannavalofficers,WesternCommandHeadquarters,Jakarta,September15,2006;andauthorinterviewwiththedirectoroftheIndonesianmarinepolice,Belawan,September18,2006.

TABlE 1

Reported Piracy and Sea Robbery Attacks in Southeast Asia, 1994–2007

Location

Indo

nesi

a

Mal

acca

St

rait

Mal

aysi

a

Sing

apor

e St

rait

Phili

ppin

es

Thai

land

Burm

a

Sout

h Ch

ina

Sea

Cam

bodi

a

Viet

nam

Total

1994 22 3 4 3 5 0 0 6 1 2 46

1995 33 2 5 2 24 4 0 3 1 4 78

1996 57 3 5 2 39 16 1 2 1 0 126

1997 47 0 4 5 16 17 2 6 1 4 102

1998 60 1 10 1 15 2 0 5 0 0 94

1999 115 2 18 14 6 5 1 3 0 2 166

2000 119 75 21 5 9 8 5 9 0 6 257

2001 91 17 19 7 8 8 3 4 0 8 165

2002 103 16 14 5 10 5 0 0 0 12 165

2003 121 28 5 2 12 2 0 2 0 15 187

2004 94 38 9 8 4 4 1 8 0 4 170

2005 79 12 3 7 0 1 0 6 0 10 118

2006 50 11 10 5 6 1 0 1 N/A 3 87

2007 43 7 9 3 6 2 0 3 N/A 5 78

Source:“PiracyandArmedRobberyagainstShipsAnnualReport,”IMB,variousreports,2001–07.

Note:Figuresincludeactualandattemptedattacks.

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U.S.navalvessels.7Ong-Webballegesthatin2001terroristgroupsinMalaysiaandIndonesiaalsoplannedattacksonvisitingU.S.naval ships.8 InAugust2004 the head of Indonesia’s state intelligence agency claimed that senior JI operatives under detention in Indonesia had admitted to contemplatingattacksagainstshippingintheSOM.9InthesamemonththeheadofBritain’sRoyalNavyrevealedthatWesternintelligenceagenciesbelievedalQaedawasplottingattacksonmerchantvesselstodisrupttheglobaleconomy.10Finally,inSeptemberof2004reportssurfacedthatU.S.intelligencehadinterceptedcommunicationsbetweenJImembersallegedlydiscussingplanstohijackashipanduseitasa“floatingbomb.”11

Eventhoughunconfirmed,theabovereportsofterroristplansgeneratedsubstantialinternationalconcernandledtheJointWarCommittee(JWC)ofLloyd’sMarketAssociationtodeclare theSOMa“warriskarea,”alongsideIraq, Lebanon, and Nigeria. The littoral states, particularly Malaysia,sharplycriticizedtheJWC’sdecision,arguingthatnoevidenceexistedofanimminentattack in theSOMandthat the JWC’sprecipitousdeclarationoftheSOMasawarareadamagedregionaleconomiesduetotheimpositionofhigher insurance rates for ships transiting through Southeast Asia.12IntenselobbyingfromthelittoralstatesandanimprovementinthemaritimesecurityenvironmentconvincedtheJWCtoremovetheSOMfromitswarrisklistinAugust2006.CertainportsinIndonesia,however,arestillsubjecttowarriskpremiums.13

MaritimepredationsintheSOMthusremainasourceofconcern.LocatedbetweentheIndonesianislandofSumatraandpeninsularMalaysia,theSOMis the shortest route for ships travelingbetween thePacificOcean (via theSouthChinaSea)andtheIndianOcean(viatheAndamanSea)andhasbeenavitalarteryofworldtradeformanycenturies(seeFigure 1).Approximately

7 Forfulldetailsoftheplannedattacks,seetheSingaporeMinistryofHomeAffairs,The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism(Singapore,January2003),13uhttp://www.mha.gov.sg/publication_details.aspx?pageid=35&cid=354.

8 GrahamGerardOng-Webb,“Introduction:SoutheastAsianPiracy,MaritimeTerrorismandSecurityintheMalaccaStraits,”inPiracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits, ed. GrahamGerardOng-Webb(Singapore:ISEAS,2006),xxviii.

9 “IndonesiaWarnsofMalaccaStraitTerrorPlots,HailsAnti-PiracyPatrols,”AgenceFrancePresse,August26,2004.

10MichaelEvans,“MerchantShipping‘atRiskofAttack,’”Times(London),August6,2004u http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article466301.ece.

11 PhilipSherwell,MassoudAnsari,andMarianneKearney,“AlQa’edaTerrorists‘PlantoTurnTankerintoFloatingBomb,’”Daily Telegraph,September11,2004uhttp://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/12/wterr12.xml&sSheet=/portal/2004/09/12/ixportal.html.

12 “KLSlamsReportCallingMalaccaStrait‘HighRisk,’”Straits Times,July13,2005. 13 “MalaccaStraitIsOffWarRiskListbutPiracyAttacksUpLastMonth,”Straits Times,August11,2006.

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550miles long, theSOMis126mileswideat itsnorthernentrancewherethestraitjoinstheAndamanSeabutnarrowsto9milesatitssouthernmostpoint, connecting with the Singapore Strait. In an increasingly globalizedworldofexpanding internationalcommerceandheightenedconcernsoverenergysupplysecuritytheimportanceoftheSOMisrising.In199943,964vesselsweighingover300grosstons(GT)passedthroughtheSOM.By2006thisfigurehad risen to 62,131.14 If vessels above100GTare included, thevolumeoftrafficpassingthroughtheSOMin2006was94,000,andaJapanesestudyprojectsthatthisnumberwillriseto141,000by2020.15 Estimates hold thatone-thirdofglobaltradepassesthroughtheSOM.TheSOMisaneven

14MarineDepartmentMalaysiawebsiteuhttp://www.marine.gov.my/service/index.html. 15 TomoyasuIzaki,“AStudyofEvaluationofNavigationSafetyattheStraitsofMalaccaand

Singapore”(paperpresentedatSymposiumontheEnhancementofSafetyNavigationandtheEnvironmentalProtectionoftheStraitsofMalaccaandSingapore,KualaLumpur,Malaysia,March13–14,2007).

FIGURE 1

Southeast Asian Sea lanesBeijing

Tokyo

Bishkek

Port Moresby

Hanoi

Kabul

Canberra

Dhaka

New Delhi

Jakarta

Tehran

Phnom Penh

Vientiane

Antananarivo

Kuala Lumpur

Ulaanbaatar

Wellington

Pyongyang

Muscat

Islamabad

Manila

Mogadishu (Mugdisho)

Seoul

Colombo

Bangkok

Ashgabat

Tashkent

Naypyidaw

Astana

Dili

R U S S I A

MADAGASCAR

KYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

QATAR

U. A. E.

IRAN

OMAN

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA

CHINA

KAZAKHSTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

MYANMAR

THAILAND

CAMBODIA

NEPALBHUTAN

VIETNAM

SRI LANKA

LAOS

M A L A Y S I A

PAPUANEW GUINEA

BRUNEI

SINGAPORE

PHILIPPINES

TAIWAN

I N D O N E S I A

JAPAN

MONGOLIA

SOUTH KOREA

NORTH KOREA

AUSTRALIA

NEW ZEALAND

NEW CALEDONIA

FIJI

EAST TIMOR

AndamanSea

South ChinaSea

SuluSea

CelebesSea

Strait of Malacca

Sunda Strait

Makassar Strait

Triborder sea area

Lombok Strait

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morevitaltradearteryforcountriesinNortheastAsiathathavepoornaturalenergyendowments.Itisestimatedthat90%ofJapan’sand70–80%ofChina’senergy imports pass through the strait every year.16

Securityanalystshaveadvancedseveralpossible“doomsdayscenarios”involvingmajorterroristattacksintheSOM.Twoofthemostpopularscenariosinvolveterroristseitherconspiringwithpiratesoradoptingpiraticaltacticstocommitatrocities.InonescenarioterroristsscuttleahijackedshipintheSOMwiththeintentionofdisruptingmaritimetrafficorblockingthestraitaltogether.Inanotherscenarioterroristshijackatankercarryingeithercrudeoilorliquefiednaturalgas(LNG)anddetonatethevesselasafloatingbombinamajorregionalportsuchasSingapore.Bothscenarioshavesignificantflaws.AstheSOMisninemileswideatitsnarrowestpoint,blockingthestraitwouldbevirtuallyimpossible.Furthermore,evenifthestraitwereclosedormaritimetrafficwereseverelydisrupted,vesselscouldbypasstheSOMbyusingtheSundaandLombok-MakassarstraitsinIndonesia.AlthoughtheseroutesarelongerandhencecostlierthantheSOM,theimpactofsuchreroutingontheglobaleconomywouldnotbecatastrophic(thoughSingaporewouldbeverybadlyaffected).Thefloatingbombscenarioisalsoflawedbecausecrudeoil isnotveryflammableandshipscarryingLNGarerobustlyconstructedandincludesignificantsafetyfeatures.

Nonetheless, though security analysts have exaggerated the threat ofamajormaritime terrorist attack in theSOM, the above scenarios cannot,and should not, be completely ruled out in an age of mass terror attacksemployingbothhighandlowtechnology.Thoughterroristsmight lackthespecialist skills needed to operate at sea, there are plenty of nautical engineers, masters,anddeckhandswhomightbepersuadedtoimparttheirknowledgeand experience for a price.17EvenoneterroristattackintheSOMlikelywouldsendinsuranceratesskyrocketing.Moreover,evenifthedoomsdayscenariosareunlikely,thethreatofothertypesofmaritimeterrorismismorecredible.Thesemorecrediblescenariosincludesuicideattacksagainstnavalshipsusingsmall,high-speedboats,atacticusedtodevastatingeffectbyalQaedaandthe

16 SeeKenKoyama,“Japan’sNewNationalEnergyStrategy,”InstituteofEnergyEconomics,August2006uhttp://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/data/pdf/350.pdf.TheChinaNationalPetroleumCorporationestimatesthat70%ofChina’soilimportspassthroughtheSOM.See“China’sOilSupplyFacesRisk,ExpertSays,”XinhuaNewsAgency,May27,2006uhttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/27/content_4609449.htm.TheU.S.DepartmentofDefense,however,estimatesthatthisfigurestandsat80%.SeeU.S.DepartmentofDefense,“AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeople’sRepublicofChina2007”uhttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523-China-Military-Power-final.pdf.

17MarkJ.Valencia,“PiracyandTerrorisminSoutheastAsia:Similarities,Differences,andTheirImplications,”inPiracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses,ed.DerekJohnsonandMarkJ.Valencia(Singapore:ISEAS,2005),85.

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LiberationTigersofTamilElam(LTTE)inSriLanka;attacksoncruiselinersandferriesleadingtomasscausalities;attacksagainstaircraftusingshoulder-firedmissileslaunchedfromsmallships;andminingtheSOM.18

ThoughafocusbysecurityanalystsontheSOMinthepost–September11periodisunderstandablegiventhestrait’simportancetoglobalcommerce,theattentionpaidtothisthreathasdistractedfromanothermaritimeblackspotinSoutheastAsia,namelytheporousseabordersbetweenIndonesia,Malaysia,andthePhilippines.Thisarea—knownasthetriborderseaarea—comprisestwomainsectors.Thefirst is theSuluSea inthesouthwesternPhilippines,a100,000square-milebodyofwaterboundedtothenorthwestbyPalawanIsland,tothesoutheastbytheSuluArchipelago,andinthesouthwestbytheeasternMalaysianstateofSabah.ThesecondsectoristheCelebesSea(alsoknownastheSulawesiSea),a110,000squaremilebodyofwaterborderedbytheSuluArchipelagoandMindanaotothenorth,SabahandtheIndonesianprovinceofKalimantan to thewest, and Indonesia’s Sulawesi Island to thesouth.TheCelebesSeaopenssouthwestthroughtheMakassarStrait,whichisincreasinglyusedbyverylargecrudecarriers(VLCC,typicallyshipsover230,000 deadweight tonnage) that are not allowed to transit the shallowerSOM.

The Sulu Archipelago (comprising the islands of Basilan, Jolo, andTawi-Tawi)andtheMindanaoandSulawesiislandsallhavebeenneglectedby thecentralgovernments inManilaand Jakarta fordecades, resulting inpoor governance, corruption, and stubbornly high levels of poverty andunemployment.InadditionMindanaohasbeenwrackedbyinsurgencyandseparatist conflict forover threedecades.As a result theSulu andCelebesseashavebecomenotoriousforillegalmaritimeactivitiessuchassmuggling,piracy,andtraffickinginillegalnarcotics,guns,andpeople—inshort,theseashavebecomeanungovernedmaritimespace.Whatmostconcernssecurityanalysts is theutilizationof themaritimedomain in this area as a baseofoperations for terroristorganizations.For instance theASG’smainbaseofoperationsisontheislandsofJoloandBasilanintheSuluArchipelago,whilethehomebaseoftheMoroIslamicLiberationFront(MILF)isMindanao.

BoththeASGandtheMILFhavebeenaccusedofconductingpiraticalattacksintheSuluandCelebesseasasameansofgeneratingincomefortheir

18 See,forinstance,CatherineZaraRaymond,“MaritimeTerrorisminSoutheastAsia:PotentialScenarios,”JamestownFoundation,TerrorismMonitor4,no.7,April2006,1–3uhttp://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/TM_004_007.pdf;andMartinMurphy,“MaritimeTerrorism:TheThreatinContext,”Jane’s Intelligence Review18,no.2(February2006):20–25.

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causes.19Becauseaccuratestatisticsarenotavailable,however,thefullextentofthisproblemremainsunclear.PiracyinthesouthernPhilippineshasbeenawayoflifeformanycenturies.BecauseoflanguagebarriersandalackofcommunicationequipmentshipmastersareofteneitherunwillingorunabletoreportattackstotheIMB-PRC.20 As a result the vast majority of maritime depredations in this area go unreported to the IMB. For instance in earlyJanuary2007thePhilippineauthoritiesrescueddozensoffishermenwhohadbeenheld for ransomoffTawi-Tawi. InMarchof the sameyear suspectedMILF operatives held twenty fishermen hostage off Mindanao. Neitherincident,however,appears tohavebeenreported to the IMB.21 In fact, theIMBreceivedjustsixreportsofmaritimecrimeinPhilippinewatersin2007,agrosslyinaccuratefigure.

Furthermore,boththeASGandtheMILFhaveestablishedlinkageswithJI.AccordingtoarecentRANDstudy,theSulawesi-MindanaoarcprovidesJIwith a “key logistical corridor” and “theater for jihadist operations.”22 JImembersUmarPatek andDulmatin, both suspectedofplanning the2002Balibombings,arebelievedtobehidingintheSuluArchipelagoafterescapingfromIndonesianauthorities.AdditionallyJIoperativesareknowntotrainincampsinthesouthernPhilippinesandtotravelfromSulawesitoMindanaoviaSabah,whichisjustashortboatridefromtheSuluArchipelago.Sulawesiconstitutes an important base of operations for JI, as the organization hasgrafteditselftosectarianandcommunalviolenceinPosooverthepastfewyears.SabahisanotherimportantbaseforbothJIandASG.HometooverhalfamillionillegalimmigrantsfromthePhilippinesandIndonesia,Sabahprovidesoperativesfrombothgroupswithaplaceofsanctuary.23

The Malaysian security presence in Sabah was strengthened in thewake of the Sipadan Island hostage incident in 2000.The Indonesian andPhilippinearmedforces,however,arestilllargelyincapableofsecuringtheircountries’sectionsofthetriborderseaarea.TheproblemsfacingPhilippinesecurityforcesareinmanyrespectsmoreseriousthantheproblemsfacingtheTNI-AL,whichwillbediscussedbelow.Starvedoffundingforyears,the

19 “MILFRebelsDetain20FishermeninMindanao,”AgenceFrancePresse,March16,2007. 20 J.N.Mak,“SecuritizingPiracyinSoutheastAsia:Malaysia,theInternationalMaritimeBureau

andSingapore”(paperpresentedattheFordFoundationConferenceonNon-traditionalSecurityIssues,Singapore,September3–4,2004).

21 “PiratesFreeDozensofFishermeninSouthRP,”Mindanao Examiner,January1,2007;and“MILFRebelsDetainFishermeninMindanao,”AgenceFrancePresse,March16,2007.

22AngelRabasa,“CaseStudy:TheSulawesi-MindanaoArc,”inRabasaetal.,Ungoverned Territories,116.

23 “SoutheastAsia’sTri-borderBlackSpot,”Jane’sTerrorismandSecurityMonitor,May11,2007.

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ArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP)istodayoneoftheweakestmilitariesin Southeast Asia. The government’s national security adviser, NorbertoGonzales, summedup theextentof theproblems facing thePhilippines inpatrolling the country’s maritime domain: “We cannot watch and checkeveryboatthattravelsbetweenIndonesiaandMindanao.Over26,000tripsaremadebytheseboats[everyyear]anditisimpossibletomonitoreachofthemgiventhegovernment’smeagerresources.”24 Security analysts fear that thePhilippineNavy’sinabilitytomonitorthesealanesintheSuluSealedtotheescapeofASGoperativesintoMalaysiaandIndonesiafromamajorAFPoffensiveagainstthegroupinearly2007.25

The Sources of Maritime Violence

Threesetsofinterlinkedfactorshavecontributedtotherecentviolence:failures of governance, poor socio-economic conditions, and a diffuse set of technological and geographical factors.26Thefirstsetoffactorsincludesvariousaspectsofweakpoliticalcontrol,poorgovernance,andlackofstatecapacity,allofwhichhaveunderminedtheabilityofgovernmentstocontrolevents outside of their immediate environs. Historically governmentsthat are unable to effectively govern urban and rural areas outside thecapital are even less able to exert control over events at sea, resulting inmaritime domains becoming ungoverned spaces where criminals canoperate unimpeded. Weak political control is closely linked to corruption andpoorgovernance.Corruptioninparticularhascontributedtotheriseofmaritimecrime inAsia,withmembersof thepoliceandarmed forceshavingallegedlycommittedpiraticalattacksbothonandoffduty.Corruptportofficialsandcrewmembersalsoallegedlypass informationonvesselmovements and cargoes to pirate gangs, enabling criminals to choose atargetinadvance.Additionallystateresponsestopiracyaredelayedbyweakregionalcooperationresultingfromtheabsenceoftrust,extremesensitivityovernationalsovereignty,andlackofinteroperability.Whenrobustregionalcooperation is absent, sea-borne criminals find it easy to cross fromonenationaljurisdictionintoanotherwithoutfearofcapture.

24 EdithRegalado,“NSA:RPCan’tPoliceSeaLanesbetweenMindanao,Indonesia,”Philippine Star, October16,2006.

25 “Malaysia,RPStartNavalDrillsalongBorderUsedbyAl-Qaida-linkedGroups,”AssociatedPress,April10,2007.

26ThissectionborrowsheavilyfromAdamJ.Young,“RootsofContemporaryPiracyinSoutheastAsia,”inJohnsonandValencia,Piracy in Southeast Asia,1–33.

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Poorsocio-economicconditionsareoftenbothacauseandaneffectofweakpoliticalcontrolandpoorgovernance.Membersofcoastalcommunitiesfacing economic hardship in some cases turn to maritime crime to supplement meager incomes.Fishermen facedwithbleakeconomicprospectshave theboatsandrequirednauticalskillstoengageinactsofpiracyandsearobbery.Intermsofstatecapacitythe1997–98Asianfinancialcrisisdemonstratedthatwheneconomiesbuckle,governmentspending,especiallydefensespending,suffers accordingly. Defense spending cuts not only force governmentsto cancel new acquisitions but also starve themilitary of funding for fuel,maintenance, and training. Remuneration for active military personnel may also be reduced, giving individuals further incentive to engage in illegalactivities to supplement their incomes.

Technological and geographical factors meanwhile have increasedopportunitiesforpiratesandsearobbersinrecentyears.Maritimecriminalstoday—especiallymembers of organized crime gangs—have easy access tohigh-speedboats, satellitenavigation,cellphones,andtheInternet,aswellastoautomaticandheavierweapons.Atthesametimegeographicalfeaturessuchasnarrowwaterways,smallislets,andriverineaccessprovidepirateswithabenignenvironmentinwhichtoexploitthesetechnologicalcapabilities.

The travails of Indonesia, the locus of the problem in SoutheastAsia,provideanaptillustrationofallthreefactors.AccordingtotheIMB,Indonesiaishometothemostpirate-infestedwatersintheworld(seeTable 2).Between2002and2006approximatelyaquarterofallreportedpiracyandsearobberyattacks around the world, and nearly two-thirds of attacks in SoutheastAsia, occurred in Indonesian waters, frequently in Indonesian ports andanchorages.In2006,forinstance,therewere21incidentsinIndonesianportsandanchorages,representing42%ofallattacksinIndonesia.

Senior security practitioners from Indonesia,Malaysia, and Singaporewhospokewiththeauthorinvariablypointedtosocio-economicdistressonthe islands of Sumatra andRiau linked to theAsianfinancial crisis as theprimary cause of increased piracy attacks in Southeast Asia from the late 1990s to the early 2000s.27TheAsian financial crisis began inThailand inJuly 1997 and quickly spread to Indonesia, resulting in widespread socio-economicdislocationandpoliticalunrest(eventuallyleadingtothedownfallofPresidentSuhartoinMay1998).Unemploymentrosefrom4.7%in1997to

27 Authorinterviewswithseniorsecuritypractitioners,diplomats,andjournalistsinKualaLumpur,Singapore,Jakarta,andBelawan,September2006.

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21%in1998,whilepovertyincreasedfrom11%to40%overthesameperiod.28 This economic and political unrest produced an upsurge in maritime crime in Indonesianwaters.

Atthesametimethefinancialcrisisalsohadadeleteriousimpactonthecountry’s armed forces.Defense spendingcontractedby17% in real termsbetween1997and1998, recovered slightly thereafter,butdroppedanother4.7% in 2001. As a percentage of nominal government spending, defenseexpenditure has yet to recover to pre-crisis levels.29 The reduction of defense spendingdeprivedtheTNI-ALoffundingnotonlyfornewacquisitionsbutalso for training, fuel, spare parts, andmaintenance.By 2003 only 30%ofthenavy’s117vesselswereoperational.30TheMarineSecurityCoordinatingAgency (Bakorkamla),which is headed by the commander-in-chief of thearmedforcesandwhichcoordinatestheeffortsofthevariousagenciestaskedwithmaritimelawenforcement,wasevisceratedthroughlackoffunds.Turfwarsoverresourcesamongthevariousagencies,especiallybetweenthecoastguard and marine police, also intensified.31 Corruption within the armedforces grew more serious as well, especially among non-commissionedofficers,andactivemembersoftheTNI-ALwereaccusedofengaginginactsofpiracyandsearobbery.Thoughevidencetosupporttheseallegationsisnotstrong,onesmallfishingcommunityinMalaysiablamedrogueelementsof

28 “EconomicCrisisWidespread,DeeperbutGlimmerofHopeSeen,”EconomicandSocialCommissionforAsiaandthePacific(ESCAP),PressReleaseno.G/09/00,April2,1999.

29 “DefenceEconomicTrendsintheAsia-Pacific2004,”AustralianGovernment,DepartmentofDefenceuhttp://www.defence.gov.au/dio/documents/det2004.pdf.

30 “PlantoBuySubmarinesHailed,”Jakarta Post,September23,2003. 31 Authorinterview,seniorWesternnavalattaché,Jakarta,September14,2006.

TABlE 2

Reported Piracy and Sea Robbery Attacks in Indonesia, 2002–07

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Number of attacks 103 121 94 79 50 43

As a % of global attacks 28.0 27.0 28.6 28.6 21.0 16.3

As a % of attacks in Southeast Asia 61.0 64.7 55.3 67.0 57.5 55.0

Source:“PiracyandArmedRobberyagainstShips.”

Note:Figuresincludeactualandattemptedattacks.

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theTNI-ALforcarryingouthalfofallmaritimeattacksonthiscommunity,rangingfromshakedownsatseatoransomdemandsforimpoundedfishingvesselsandcrews.32

TheIndonesiangovernment’sbroaderpoliticalcontrolandgovernancecapabilitiesalsoweakenedwiththedownfallofSuharto.Theviolentseparationof East Timor in 1999 emboldened other separatistmovements, includingGAM,whichhadbeencampaigningforanindependentAcehsincethemid-1970s.AsGAMsteppedupitscampaignofviolenceagainsttheIndonesianauthorities, allegations (consistently denied byGAM spokesmen) surfacedthat the separatist group was conducting piratical attacks in the northernapproachesoftheSOMasmeansofraisingfunds.33

the partial success of maritime security cooperation

limits to Security Cooperation

Despiterisingincidentsofpiracyandsearobberyfromthemid-1990sand concerns over the possibility of a major maritime terrorist attack inSoutheastAsiapost–September11,prior to2004 the littoral states showedlittle enthusiasm for pursuing effective trilateral security measures. This lack ofenthusiasmowedtodifferingthreatperceptionsandheightenedsensitivityoversovereigntyissues,particularlyintheSOM.

Though recognizing the same maritime security threats, Singapore,Malaysia,andIndonesiaprioritizethesethreatsdifferently.Singaporeviewsinternational tradeas thecountry’s life-blood,andconsequentlyany threattothefreeflowofmaritimetradeisliterallyregardedasanexistentialthreat.The threat posed by transnational terrorist groups increases this sense ofvulnerability.Singaporebelieves that terroristgroupssuchasalQaedaandJI have targeted the city-state both becauseWestern countries havemajorinterestsinSingaporeandbecauseofthecountry’sclosedefensetieswiththeUnitedStatesandsupportforWashington’s“waronterrorism.”34 Perceiving itselfasatargetofterroristgroupsandviewingthedisruptiontosea-borne

32 J.N.Mak,“Pirates,RenegadesandFishermen:ThePoliticsof‘Sustainable’PiracyintheStraitsofMalacca,”inLehr,Violence at Sea,210.

33 KateMcGeown,“AcehRebelsBlamedforPiracy,”BBC News,September8,2003uhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3090136.stm.

34 See,forinstance,“OsamaBinLadenFootprintsSurround‘Vulnerable’Singapore,”AgenceFrancePresse,October1,2001;and“SingaporeSaysSupportforU.S.MakesItTopTerrorTarget,”AgenceFrancePresse,May24,2003.

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trade as a threat to the country’s survival, the Singapore government has warned that terrorism poses the most serious threat to national securitysincecommunisminthe1960s.35InDecember2003Singapore’shomeaffairsminister Wong Kan Sen made the first explicit link between piracy andterrorismwhenhereferredto“terrorismcamouflagedaspiracy.”36 InApril2004SingaporeandefenseministerTeoCheeHeanwarned:

It isentirelypossiblethatterroristscouldresorttopiratetacticsto hijack supertankers or chemical carriers. They could sink these largevessels in thechoke-pointsofbusy international straitsoreven turn them into floating bombs…The key regional SLOCs[sea lines of communication] are attractive targets for [terrorists] becauseof thepotentially greatdamage that a successful attackcould have on the global trading system combined with thepowerfulpoliticalimpactsuchanattackwouldhave.37

Eventhoughtheevidence(atleastinthepublicdomain)pointingtosuchanattack is not strong, the government continues to urge vigilance. Singapore thustakesthethreatofmaritimeterrorism,andthepotentialnexusbetweenpiracyandterrorism,muchmoreseriouslythanitsneighbors.

Malaysia,bycontrast,seesthemainmaritimesecuritychallengesasillegaltrafficking in people, small arms, and narcotics.38IllegalimmigrationbyseafromIndonesia is regardedasaparticularlyacuteproblem.Thoughpiracyandsea robberyareconcerns for theMalaysianauthorities, thenumberofattacks committed in the country’s territorialwaters has beenmuch lowerthaninIndonesia,asdemonstratedinTable1.Thisisalmostcertainlyduetobettergovernanceandsocio-economicconditionsinMalaysia,aswellastotheprofessionalismandcapabilitiesofthecountry’ssecurityforces.KualaLumpurdoesnotshareSingapore’ssenseofvulnerabilitybutratherhasdownplayedboththethreatofmaritimeterrorismandthepiracy-terrorismnexus,arguingthatthereisnocredibleevidencelinkingpirateswithterrorists.39NeverthelessinJune2007Malaysia’sinspector-generalofpolice,MusaHassan,warnedthatmaritimeterrorismintheSOMwasa“lurkingthreat”andthatamajorattack

35 SingaporeMinistryofHomeAffairs,The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests,2. 36 “PiracyEqualsTerrorismonTroubledWaters:Minister,”AgenceFrancePresse,December21,2003. 37 TeoCheeHean(keynoteaddressdeliveredattheopeningofthesecondWesternPacificMine

CountermeasureandDivingExercises,Singapore,April26,2004)uhttp://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/apr/26apr04_nr/26apr04_speech.html.

38 AuthorinterviewsanddiscussionswithseniorpolicypractitionersfromtheMalaysianArmedForcesandRoyalMalaysianPolice,Asia-PacificCenterforSecurityStudies(APCSS),Honolulu,Hawaii,March2004–March2007.

39 “MalaysiaSaysItHasNotFoundLinkbetweenTerroristsandRegionalPiracy,”AssociatedPress,June5,2005.

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involvinganoilorLNGtankerwouldhave“adevastatingglobaleconomicimpact.”40

FromIndonesia’sperspectivethecentralmaritimesecuritychallengesareillegalfishing,smuggling,and,priortothe2005AcehPeaceAgreement,theactivities ofGAM.41Although sharing responsibilitywith theother littoralstates to provide for safety and security in the SOM, Indonesia, as notedearlier,lacksthecapabilitiestopatrolitsvastarchipelagicwaters.Until2004Jakartawasreluctant toallocatescarceresources toaddresspiracybecausethis problem was perceived as having minimal impact on the nationaleconomy. Indonesia derives less economic benefit from the strait thanSingaporeorMalaysia.Except forBelawan there arenomajorports alongtheSumatrancoast;rather,thevastmajorityofshipsthatentertheSOMareheadingforports inSingaporeorMalaysia.Theperceivedminimal impactofpiracystandsinmarkedcontrasttotheeconomicimpactofillegalfishinginthecountry’s200nauticalmile(nm)exclusiveeconomiczone(EEZ),sandsmuggling, and logging,which together cost the countryanestimated$10billioninlostrevenuein2003.42Maritimesecuritythushasnotbeenhighonthe list of government priorities. In the post-Suharto period, governmentshavehadtograpplewithawiderangeofseriousproblemssuchashighlevelsofpovertyandunemployment;separatist,communal,andpoliticalviolence;thespreadofinfectiousdiseases;andbothman-madeandnaturaldisasters.Incomparison,theproblemsofpiracyandsearobberypaleintoinsignificance.Moreover, asnotedbyForeignMinisterHassanWirayuda, the Indonesiangovernment—despiteitsexperienceswithGAM—doesnotacceptthepiracy-terrorism nexus.43

Another major obstacle to increased security cooperation is extremesensitivity over national sovereignty. Such sensitivity has prevented neighboringcountriesfromreachingagreementon“hotpursuit”rightsinthemaritimedomain,wherebythesecurityforcesofonecountrycancrossintotheterritoryofanotherinpursuitofsea-bornecriminalswithoutthelattercountry’s permission.

40 “TerrorinMalaccaStraitWouldHaveGlobalEconomicShockwaves:KLPoliceChief,”AssociatedPress,June12,2007.

41 AuthorinterviewsanddiscussionswithseniorpolicypractitionersfromtheIndonesianarmedforces,APCSS,March2004–March2007.

42 Stefan Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise: A Modern History of Southeast Asia’s Maritime Marauders (Copenhagen:NIASPress,2006),100.

43 In2005IndonesianForeignMinisterHassanWirayudarejectedthenotionthatthereisanexusbetweenpiratesandterroristsonthegroundsthatthetwoactorshaddifferentgoals:“Whileterroristswanttohaltworldtrade,thesearobberswouldbeoutofbusinesswithoutworldtrade.”See“MalaccaStraitPirates‘UnlikelytoAidTerrorists,’”Straits Times,September8,2005.

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Theexercise of sovereign rights in the SOM is a particularly sensitiveissueforMalaysiaandIndonesia.Whenthe1982UNConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)wasnegotiated,theinternationalcommunityacceptedKuala Lumpur and Jakarta’s demand for a twelve nm territorial sea in theSOM;asaquidproquo,thetwocountriesacceptedatransitpassageregimethatallowsshipsofallnationstopassthroughthestraitunimpeded.InthewordsofJ.N.Mak,thoughMalaysiaandIndonesia“hadestablishedmaritimesovereignty in theStraitsofMalacca, that sovereigntywas incomplete,andthereforehastobejealouslyguarded.”44 That the international community has notrecognizedMalaysia’sEEZclaimsinthenorthernpartofthestrait,thattheseclaimsoverlapwiththoseofIndonesia,andthatbothcountriesseektoexploitpotentiallyvaluablemaritimeresourcesinthosecontestedareasmakethesovereigntyissueintheSOMallthemorevexatious.

Indonesia’ssovereigntyconcerns,however,areevenmoresensitivethanMalaysia’s.In2002theInternationalCourtofJusticeruledinfavorofMalaysiaonthequestionofthesovereigntyofSipadanandLigitan,twosmallislandseastofBorneointheCelebesSea.ThiswasasevereblowtoIndonesia’ssenseofpride,comingjustsixmonthsaftertheformerIndonesianprovinceofEastTimorhadachievedformalindependence.Sincetheruling,theIndonesiangovernmenthasprioritizedsurveyingandnamingthousandsofsmallislandsthroughout the archipelago in order to protect the country’s sovereignty claims.45

Early Cooperative Efforts

In the early 1990s Southeast Asian countries entered several bilateralagreements providing for coordinated naval patrols, i.e., arrangements wherebybothcountrieswouldpatroltheirownterritorialwatersbutmaintaincommunication linkswith theothercountry’snaval forces.These includedagreementsbetweenIndonesiaandSingapore,IndonesiaandMalaysia,andthePhilippinesandMalaysia.Anecdotalevidence,however,suggeststhatduringthe 1990s these coordinated patrol agreements were poorly implemented,largelyineffective,andbecamemoribundduringtheAsianfinancialcrisis.46

44 J.N.Mak,“UnilateralismandRegionalism:WorkingTogetherandAloneintheMalaccaStraits,”inOng-Webb,Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits,145.

45 “IndonesiatoRegisterSmallIslands’NamestoUNonAugust18,”Tempo Interactive,July23,2007uhttp://www.tempointeractive.com/hg/nasional/2007/07/23/brk,20070723-104181,uk.html.

46 JohnF.Bradford,“TheGrowingProspectsforMaritimeSecurityCooperationinSoutheastAsia,”Naval War College Review58,no.3(Summer2005):66.

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In2004nationsoutsideSoutheastAsiaembarkedontwoneweffortstoimprovecooperationintheregion:theUnitedStatesproposedtheRegionalMaritimeSecurityInitiative(RMSI)andJapanorganizedtheestablishmentof theRegionalCooperationAgreementonCombatingPiracy andArmedRobbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Sovereignty concerns andcompetingpriorities limited theeffectivenessofboth initiatives,andRMSIandReCAAPignitedsignificantcontroversies.

ThefirstcontroversycenteredontheroleoftheUnitedStatesinRMSI.On March 31, 2004, Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of U.S. PacificCommand(PACOM),explainedRMSIintestimonybeforeCongressasanewinitiative aimed at helping Southeast Asian countries tackle maritime security threats.AccordingtoFargo,thegoalofRMSIwastoimproveinternationalcooperation against transnational security threats, including the proliferation ofWMD,terrorism,traffickinginhumansandnarcotics,andpiracyinthe“ungoverned littoral regions of Southeast Asia.”47 Fundamentally, RMSIaddressed the need to increase awareness in themaritime domain and tosynchronizeinternationalresponsestofighttransnationalthreats.InaspeechdeliveredinVictoria,BritishColumbia,inMay2004,Fargosoughttofilloutthedetails:“ThegoalofRMSIistodevelopapartnershipofwillingregionalnations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, monitor, andintercept transnational maritime threats under existing international and domesticlaws.”48

BythetimeFargohadoutlinedRMSIinmoredetail,however,theinitiativehad already ignited a firestorm of protest from Malaysia and Indonesia.During his congressional testimony Fargo stated that in operational termsPACOMwasconsidering“puttingSpecialOperationsForcesonhigh-speedvesselssothatwecanuseboatsthatmightbeincorporatedwiththesevesselsto conduct effective interdiction.”49 In Indonesia the press misconstruedFargo’scommentsasannouncingaplantoputSpecialOperationsForcesonhigh-speedboatsintheSOM.KualaLumpurandJakartareactedangrilytothepressreportsforfourreasons.First,MalaysiaandIndonesiaperceivedtheproposaltoputU.S.militarypersonnelintheSOMasafurthererosionoftheirsovereignty.Second,bothcountrieswereconcernedthatthepresenceofU.S.

47ThomasB.Fargo,“RegardingU.S.PacificCommandPosture,”testimonybeforetheHouseArmedServicesCommittee,U.S.HouseofRepresentatives,Washington,D.C.,March31,2004u http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331housearmedsvcscomm.shtml.

48ThomasB.Fargo(speechattheMilitaryOperationsandLawConference,Victoria,BritishColumbia,May3,2004)uhttp://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040503milops.shtml.

49 Fargo,“RegardingU.S.PacificCommandPosture.”

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forcesinSoutheastAsiamightfuelIslamicradicalismintheregion.50 Third, RMSI seemed to imply that the littoral states were incapable of providingsecurityintheirownwaters.Fourth,theinitiativewasananathemabecausebothMalaysiaandIndonesiahadarguedthatthesecurityofSoutheastAsiaisthesoleresponsibilityofregionalcountriesandthusthatexternalpowersshouldnotinterfere.Singapore,bycontrast,havingalwayssupportedamoreactivesecurityroleforexternalpowers,offeredtacitsupportforRMSI. 51 As thefurorunfolded,theUnitedStatestriedtolimitthedamage.InJunethendefense secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated at the Shangri–La Dialogue inSingaporethattheRMSIhadbeenmisinterpretedandthattheUnitedStateshadneverintendedtostationforcesintheSOM.52Thecontroversy,however,hadalreadydamagedtheinitiativebeyondrepair:RMSIhadbecomeatoxicphrase, and PACOM quickly dropped the acronym from its cooperativesecurity lexicon.Nevertheless, aswill be described later, theUnited StatescontinuestoimplementelementsofRMSI.

Thesecondcontroversyin2004centeredonthesitingofthemultinationalInformation Sharing Centre (ISC), the core component of ReCAAP. Thefirst government-to-government agreement designed to tackle piracy andsea robbery,ReCAAPwas proposed by Japanese primeminister JunichiroKoizumi in2001 toenhancemaritime security cooperationamong sixteencountries: the tenmembers of theAssociation of SoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN), Japan, China, South Korea, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.53 AfteraseriesofmeetingshostedbyJapanoverathree-yearperiodReCAAPwasfinalizedinTokyoinNovember2004.

ReCAAPestablishes a framework for cooperationamong thememberstatesbasedonthreemainkindsofactivities:informationsharing,capacitybuilding, and operational cooperation. To operationalize these activitiesReCAAPproposedtoestablishanISCinoneof thesixteencountries.Theprimary purpose of the ISC is to improve incident response by ReCAAPcountries through facilitating communication, information exchange, and operational cooperation amongReCAAPmembers.ThoughReCAAPwashailedasanimportantstepforwardinthefightagainstmaritimecrime,theinitiativesufferedfromonemajorweakness:IndonesiaandMalaysiarefusedtoratifytheagreementlargelyinprotestofthedecisiontoheadquarterthe

50 “S’poreCan’tInviteU.S.toPatrolStraits:KL,”Straits Times,May12,2004. 51 TeoCheeHean(keynoteaddress). 52 “Rumsfeld:AsiaMaritimeSecurityPlanMisreported,”New York Times,June3,2004. 53TheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)iscomprisedofBrunei,Cambodia,

Indonesia,Laos,Malaysia,Myanmar,thePhilippines,Singapore,Thailand,andVietnam.

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ISCinSingapore.AttheTokyomeetinginNovember2004fourcountriesbidtohosttheISC:Singapore,Malaysia,Indonesia,andSouthKorea.Insteadofattemptingtoreachaconsensus,theJapanesehostsputtheissuetoavoteandSingaporewon.Thedecisionpiqued Jakarta andKualaLumpur. Jakarta inparticular felt that as primus inter paresamongASEANcountries,IndonesiashouldhosttheISC.JakartaalsointimatedthattheISCinfringesuponthecountry’ssovereignty,thoughwithouteverexplaininghow.Likewise,Malaysiaexpressed concern that the ISCwouldovershadow the IMB-PRC inKualaLumpur.Bothcountries,moreover,hadreservationsoversharinginformationwithSingapore,acountrywithwhichtheyhaveapricklyrelationship.

ReCAAPwent into effect on September 4, 2006, and by the time theISC had officially opened on November 29, 2006, fourteen countries hadratifiedtheagreement.IndonesiaandMalaysia,however,hadstillnotratifiedReCAAP at the time of writing in March 2008. Singapore financed theentire start-upcostsof the ISC (estimatedat$1.4million)andcontributestowardtheannualoperatingcosts(estimatedat$973,000).54Japanprovidedanadditional$127,000fortheremainderofthe2006financialyear.55 At the firstannualmeetingofReCAAP’sGoverningCouncil,YoshiakiIto,ministeratJapan’sPermanentMissiontotheUN,wasappointedtheISC’sinauguralexecutive director.56ThoughMalaysiaandIndonesiahaveagreedtocooperatewiththeISC,theexactnatureofthiscooperationremainsunclear.

Recent Progress in Increasing Cooperation

AlthoughtheRMSIcontroversywasasetbackfor theUnitedStates inone sense, the furor ultimately had a positive impact in spurring greater security cooperation among the littoral states. For Indonesia andMalaysiathePACOMinitiativesignaledtheintentionoftheUnitedStatestointervene,unilaterallyifnecessary,tosecuretheSOMfromtransnationalthreats.TheprospectofapermanentU.S.militarypresenceinthestrait,possiblysupportedbySingapore,wasanathematoKualaLumpurandJakartanotonlybecauseMalaysia and Indonesiaperceived such intervention as an infringementoftheir sovereignty, but also because the prospect ofU.S. interventionmade

54 “FactsheetontheRegionalCooperationAgreementonCombatingPiracyandArmedRobberyagainstShipsinAsia(ReCAAP),”SingaporeMinistryofTransport,November29,2006u http://app.mot.gov.sg/data/ReCAAP%20factsheet%20_Nov06_%20%5BFINAL%5Das%20of%20281106.pdf.

55 RaymondLim(speechdeliveredatthelaunchoftheReCAAPInformationSharingCentre,Singapore,November29,2006)uhttp://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,3542,.

56 “MalaysiaandIndonesiaUrgedtoRatifyPacttoFightSeaPiracy,”KyodoNews,November29,2006.

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thetwocountrieslookweakandtheirterritorialwatersanarchic.Malaysia’sdeputy primeministerNajib Razak reflected in 2005 that, had the littoralstatesnottakenaction,“Wemight[havebeen]pressuredbytheinternationalcommunitytoletthembringtheirownpatrols intothestraits ifwe[were]notabletotackletheproblem.”57 The perceived threat of outside intervention helpedovercometoanextenttheobstaclestomoreintenseregionalmaritimesecurity cooperation.

EventsmovedsurprisinglyquicklyaftertheRMSIcontroversy.InJune2004IndonesiaproposedtrilateralcoordinatedpatrolsintheSOMtoaddresstheproblemofmaritimecrime.Malaysiaquicklyagreedtotheproposal,asdidSingapore,whichhadpushedforgreaterregionalsecuritycooperationallalong.OnJuly20thefirstoftheMalaysia-Singapore-Indonesia(MALSINDO)coordinatedpatrolswaslaunched,comprisingseventeenwarshipsfromthethree countries. Unlike existing bilateral arrangements the MALSINDOpatrolswereplannedasyear-round.

Inaneffort to increase thecoverageandeffectivenessofMALSINDO,Malaysiaproposedaddingmaritimeairpatrols,andonSeptember13,2005,the Eyes in the Sky (EiS) initiativewas launched.Under the EiS initiativeeachofthethreestatesallocatesmaritimepatrolaircrafttoconducttwoairsortiesperweekalongtheMalaccaandSingaporestraits.Everyflightcarriesacombinedmaritimepatrolteam(CMPT)consistingofmilitarypersonnelfromeachoftheparticipatingstates.TheCMPTreports“suspiciousactivities”tocentersonthegroundineachofthethreecountriesforfollow-upactionbymaritimelawenforcementagencies.Foroperationalpurposes,thestraitsaredividedintofoursectors,witheachpatrolusuallycoveringtwosectors.InApril2006thethreecountriesfurtherstrengthenedtheirmilitarycooperationin the Malacca Strait by signing standard operating procedures (SOP).ThereaftertheinitiativebecameknownastheMalaccaStraitsPatrols(MSP),comprisingtwoelements:theMalaccaStraitsSeaPatrols(MSSP)andEiS.Ajoint coordinating committee made up of officials from the three countries meets twice a year, and three working groups focused on theMSSP, EiS,and Informationand IntelligenceSharingaugment thecommittee’swork.58 InitiallyThailandexpressedaninterestinjoiningMSPbuteventuallydecidednot to join on grounds of cost.59Although inAugust2007PrimeMinister

57 “NajibSeeksJakartaCooperationinFightingPiracy,”Straits Times,April3,2005. 58 AuthorinterviewwithMinistryofDefenceofficials,Singapore,September22,2006. 59 “ThaisRebuffMalaccaStraitJointAirPatrols,”Reuters,May19,2006.

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SurayudChulanontrenewedBangkok’sinterestsinparticipatingintheMSP,to date Thailand has played no operational role.60

Inaddition tomultilateral securitymeasures, eachof theSOMlittoralstates has launched important national initiatives since 2004. Singapore,which,asmentionedearlier,takesmaritimesecuritythreatsmoreseriouslythan its neighbors, has adopted strongmeasures to tighten security in thecountry’sportsandterritorialwaters.Thegovernmentrequiresallvesselsinterritorialwaterstocarryidentificationtransponders,whiletheRepublicofSingaporeNavydeploysarmedsecurityteamsonboardselectedshipsenteringSingaporeanwaters.61 To strengthen inter-agency cooperation and enhance maritimedomainawarenessSingaporeplanstoopentheChangiCommandandControlCentrein2009,whichwillintegrateelementsofthenavy,policecoast guard, and maritime and port authority.

In November 2005 Malaysia’s efforts to tackle maritime crime tookan important step forward with the launch of a national coast guard, theMalaysianMaritimeEnforcementAgency(MMEA).ThoughtheMMEAisresponsibleforlawenforcementinthecountry’sEEZinbotheastandwestMalaysia,theagency’sprimaryfocusistheSOM.EvenasKualaLumpurhasplayeddown the piracy-terrorismnexus, the government randomly placesarmedpolicemenaboardvesselscarryinghigh-riskcargothroughMalaysianwatersorenteringMalaysianports.62

Jakarta meanwhile determined that Indonesia must take decisiveactionagainstmaritimecriminalsoperatinginIndonesianwaters,notonlyto forestall intervention from external powers but also to help restore thecountry’starnishedimage.PresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyonoremarked,forexample,“Wemustnotletourselvesbeseenasbeinghelplessindealingwith thieves, robbers, and smugglers.”63MALSINDO/MSPhas proved oneresponsetomaritimecrime;Indonesiahasalsorespondedtomaritimecrimewithincreasednavalpatrols interritorialwatersandintelligencegathering.Between July and September 2005 the TNI-AL conducted Operasi Gurita (Operation Octopus) in its territorial waters, including the SOM. Guritainvolved six to seven warships, helicopters, and aircraft; a battalion ofmarines;andvariousspecialforces.TheaimofGuritawasnotonlytocrackdownonmaritimecriminalsatseabutalsototackle theproblemonland.

60 “ThailandWillJoinAnti-piracyPatrolsintheStraitsofMalacca,”ThaiNewsAgency,August16,2007. 61 “ArmedNavyEscortsforSuspectShips,”Straits Times,February28,2005. 62 “MalaysiatoPutArmedPoliceonShipsinMalaccaStrait,”Channel NewsAsia,April1,2005u

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/140335/1/.html. 63 “IndonesianLeaderUrgesIncreasedSeaPatrolstoTacklePiracy,”JakartaPost,December16,2005.

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Accordingly the TNI stepped up intelligence-gathering missions in smallcoastal communities along thecoastofSumatraandon theRiau Islands.64 AccordingtoTNI-ALstatistics,forcesparticipatinginOperasiGuritawerehighly active during the three-month operation, boarding 127 ships andmakingtwelvearrests.65TheIMBbelievesGuritahasmadeapositiveimpactonthesecuritysituationinIndonesianwaters.InDecember2005London-based director PottengalMukundan stated, “We believe [the reduction inattacksinthesecondhalfof2005]isattributedtoanincreaseinpatrolsbyIndonesia on its side of the Strait.”66 Since 2005 Operasi Gurita has beenconductedonanannualbasis,andinthefirstquarterreportfor2007theIMBcongratulatedIndonesiaonthecountry’s“proactiveefforts.”67

Both regional and national initiatives thus appear to have reducedmaritimecrimesince2004.Asshown inTable1, IMBfiguresdemonstrateasignificantdownwardtrendinthenumberofreportedcasesofpiracyandsea robbery attacks in SoutheastAsia after 2003. In 2003187 attackswerereported; by the end of 2007 this figure had fallen to 78.The number ofattacks in theSOM increased from28 in2003 to38 in2004,butdroppedtoonly7casesin2007.ThesituationinIndonesianwatersalsohasshownamarkedimprovement:only43attackswerereportedin2007,downfrom121in2003.AsshowninTable2,attacksinIndonesianwatershavedeclinedasapercentageofattacksbothinSoutheastAsiaandworldwideoverthepastfouryears. Malaysia’sdeputyprimeministerNajibRazakhasapplaudedtheMSPforthe“sharpdecrease”inattackssinceJuly2004.68 Singapore has praised the MSPinitiativeaswell,thoughthecountrycontinuestowarnofthedangersof a terrorist strike and reiterate the need for external parties to help secure theSOM.TheUnitedStateshasalsocommendedthelittoralstatesfortheirsecurity cooperation, and the IMB has praised the MSP as an “excellentexampleofhowcooperationbetweenauthoritiescantackleandcontinuetosuppresstheattacks.”69

64 Authorinterviewwithseniornavalofficers,WesternCommandHeadquarters,Jakarta,September15,2006.

65 “TNI-ALPresentation”(paperpresentedattheMilitaryOperations[MILOPS]Conference,KualaLumpur,July19,2006).

66 “PiracyinMalaccaStraitDownThankstoIndonesiaPatrols,”Jakarta Post,December1,2005. 67 “NoRoomforComplacency,SaysIMB,”IMB,PressRelease,April25,2007. 68 “MalaccaStraitMuchSaferfromPirates—Malaysia,”Reuters,December15,2006. 69 “NoRoomforComplacency,SaysIMB.”

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Weaknesses Remain

Nonetheless, the region’s cooperative initiatives still suffer significantlimitationsdespitetheevidentprogress.TheMSP,thoughhailedasamajoradvance in regional security cooperation, possesses a number of majorweaknesses.First,theMSSParecoordinatedratherthanjoint—eachcountryisresponsibleforpatrollingitsownsectorandeachshipremainsundernationalcommand.UntiltheSOPwassignedinApril2006,shipsparticipatingintheMSSPweredeniedhotpursuitrights.UndertheSOPMSSPshipsnowhavetherighttohotpursuituptoamaximumoffivenmintothesovereignwatersof another state.70 Though an improvement over the prior arrangement, the SOP still constrains the operational effectiveness of thepatrols.At presenttherearenoplans toupgrade theMSSP fromcoordinated to jointpatrols.Razakhas indicated that though joint patrols are possible, the littoral firstmustovercomecertain“sensitivities,”whichisaveiledreferencetosovereigntyconcerns.71

Another weakness of the MSP is the efficacy of the EiS component.Owing toa lackofnight-visionsurveillanceequipmentEiSpatrolsarenotconductedatnight,whichiswhenmostpiracyandsearobberyattacksoccur.EiS patrols may only operate three nm from land and do not therefore cover portsandanchorageswherethemajorityofattackstakeplace.Additionallysixsortiesperweekarenotnearlyenoughtocoverthe550-milelongMalaccaandSingaporestraitsgivenestimatesthatatleast70sortiesperweekwouldberequiredtoprovidecompletearound-the-clockcoverage.72 Although the aim of EiS is to report suspicious activity, none of the military officers from the littoral states interviewed by this author could define “suspicious” orexplainhowCMPTmemberscouldgaugetheintentionsofhundredsofsmallboats thatply theMalaccaandSingaporestraits.Asexpected, Indonesia istheweakestlinkintheEiSpatrols:thepatrolaircraftusedbytheIndonesiansare slow and lack modern surveillance and communication systems. TheauthorwasalsotoldthatIndonesianoperativesusebinocularstomakevisualsightings and call in reports to the ground using cell phones.73

TheseweaknesseshaveledcynicstoaccusetheMSPofbeinglittlemorethanapublicrelationsexercisetodefendagainstinternationalpressurerather

70 “TNI-ALPresentation.” 71 “MalaysiaDeputyPrimeMinister:JointPatrolsinMalaccaStraitPossible,”AssociatedPress,April

17,2007. 72 GrahamGerardOngandJoshuaHo,“MaritimeAirPatrols:TheNewWeaponagainstPiracyinthe

MalaccaStrait,”IDSSCommentary,October13,2005. 73 AuthorinterviewwithWesternnavalattaché,September14,2006.

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thanaseriousattempttoaddresstheproblemofpiracyandsearobberyintheSOM.GiventheroletheMSPseemstohaveplayedindeterringmaritimecrimesince2004,thiscriticismisperhapsoverlyharsh.Moreworryingisthesustainabilityof thecooperative initiatives.Sustainedairandnavalpatrols,even incomplete ones, are costly to run in terms ofmanpower, hardware,fuel, and maintenance. This problem is particularly acute for Indonesia,whichhaslimitedfundsandfacescompetingprioritiesforscarceresources.ObserversworrythatIndonesiawilleventuallysuccumbto“patrol fatigue”and participate less in the MSP, especially if international pressure eases.The IMBhas soundedwarningsof this effecton severaloccasions: “At themoment, this is all a positive situation,” stated director of the IMB-PRC,NoelChoong,“butlong-termitisunclearhowlongthepatrolswillbeableto continue.”74 A pertinent precedent exists. In response to internationalconcernovertherisingnumberofpiracyattacksintheearly1990s,IndonesiasignedbilateralcoordinatedpatrolagreementswithSingaporeandMalaysiain1992andconductednavaloperationsdesignedtostampouttheproblemin Indonesian territorialwaters.75 Indonesiamanaged to sustain the tempooftheseoperationsfrom1993to1998butlaterterminatedthemasaresultoftheAsianfinancialcrisis.After1998maritimecrimeinIndonesianwatersflourished.Giventhisprecedent,whenthenumberofreportedattacksbegantofallafter2004,theIMBwarnedofthedangersofcomplacencyandurgedthe international community to continue to apply pressure on the littoral states.76

Security cooperation amongMalaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippinesinthetriborderarea,meanwhile,isasseriouslylackingnowascooperationwas among the SOM littoral states prior to July 2004.The three countrieshave conducted bilateral coordinated patrols with seemingly little impact.IndonesiaandthePhilippinesconductfourcoordinatedpatrolsannuallyintheCelebes Sea, andboth sideshave agreed to strengthen thesepatrols tostemarmssmugglingintoSulawesiwhereJIisknowntobeactive.77Malaysiaand thePhilippines conduct just two coordinatedpatrols a year.AlthoughthePhilippineshasproposedyear-roundcoordinatednavalpatrols,aswellas designated sea lanes for all maritime traffic to facilitate easier monitoring and inspectionby the threenavies, so farnoneof the stateshaveactedon

74 VaudineEngland,“WhilePiratesLieLow,InsuranceCostsDon’t,”International Herald Tribune, November10,2006uhttp://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/24/business/transcol25.php.

75 Eklöf, Pirates in Paradise,136. 76 “NoRoomforComplacency,SaysIMB.” 77 “Philippines,IndonesiaVowtoBoostBorderPatrolCooperation,”Philippine Star,November22,2006.

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these proposals.78Manila,however,recentlyhasannouncedaprogramcalledCoastWatchSouththatisdesignedtoenhancethePhilippineNavy’sabilityto conduct surveillance and interdiction of security threats in the country’s “southern backdoor.” Developed with help from Australia, the conceptenvisagestheestablishmentofseventeenCoastWatchstationsfromPalawantoDavaoProvinceequippedwithfastpatrolboatsandhelicopters.79 Though fundingthe$380millionprogramwillbeachallenge,inFebruary2008thePhilippinedefenseministerwasquotedasstatingthattheUnitedStateshadpledged$20millionfortheinitiative.80

a more comprehensive approach to addressing violence at sea

Giventheselimitations,broaderinitiativestoaddressthelackofmaritimesecurityinSoutheastAsiaarenecessary.TheUnitedStates,Japan,China,andIndiahavealldemonstratedthepotentialimpactofsuchinitiativesthroughrecent attempts at enhanced cooperation on security matters. These initiatives onlyaddressthesymptoms,however;attemptstoredresstherootcausesofmaritime crime are also necessary.

The Potential Role of External Powers

TheRMSIcontroversyunderscored innouncertain terms theattitudeofIndonesiaandMalaysiatowardexternalpowers:maritimesecurityintheSOMisthesoleresponsibilityofthelittoralstates,andneithercountrywouldentertain ideas of naval patrols conducted by other countries. Singapore,as described earlier, ismore flexible on this issue but has deferred to thesensitivities of its neighbors. At the same time, although Indonesia andMalaysiahaverejectedanovertmilitaryroleforexternalpowersintheSOM,bothcountrieshavewelcomedcapacity-buildingoffersofassistance,includinginformation/intelligence exchange, training courses, and the provision of non-lethalequipment.

OneoftheUnitedStates’senduringsecurityinterestsinSoutheastAsiasincetheendofWorldWarIIhasbeensealanesecurity.PostSeptember11this interestbecameconflatedwithconcernsoverthepotential foramajor

78 “RPDiscussingAnti-terrorSeaLaneswithMalaysia,Indonesia,”AssociatedPress,March13,2006. 79 “NavytoSealOffSouthernSeaBorders,”Philippine Daily Inquirer,September25,2007. 80 “PhilippinesSaysU.S.OffersAidtoGuardBorders,”Reuters,February11,2008.

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terroristactintheSOMandforWMDproliferationbysea.TheseconcernsresultedinseveralU.S.-ledinitiatives,includingthe2002ContainerSecurityInitiative(CSI),whichprovidesforselectedcontainerstobescreenedforWMDmaterials before shipment to theUnited States, and the 2003ProliferationSecurity Initiative (PSI), which aims to forge a coalition of like-mindedcountries to interdictWMDtechnologyatsea.MostofAsia’sbusiestportshaveagreedtoimplementCSI.PSIhasprovedtobemuchmorecontroversialinSoutheastAsia,however,becauseofsovereigntyconcerns.ThoughBrunei,Cambodia,andthePhilippinesarePSIparticipants,onlySingaporeactivelyparticipates inPSI exercises.81TheUnitedStateswasalso thedriving forcebehindtheInternationalShipandPortFacilitySecurity(ISPS)Codedesignedto make ships and ports more secure from terrorist attacks.

In addition, the United States still remains committed to the RMSI’soriginal intent—improving the littoral states’ capabilities to monitor andinterdict threats in the maritime domain. Not surprisingly, U.S. effortssince2004havefocusedonIndonesia.AspartofamajorprogramaimedathelpingIndonesiaobtainaclearerpictureofvesselmovementsinterritorialwaters,theUnitedStateshasagreedtosupplytwelvecoastalradarfacilitiesworth$50million:fiveontheIndonesiansideoftheSOMandsevenintheMakassarStrait.82TheU.S.governmenthasalsopromisedtodonateatotalof3025-footDefender-classpatrolboatstotheIndonesianmarinepolice,thefirst15ofwhichweredelivered in January2008.83Additionally theUnitedStates has financed improvements worth $700,000 to the marine policetrainingfacilityinJakarta.84U.S.supportforIndonesiainthisareahasbeenwithout fanfare,principallybecauseof thedomestic sensitivitiesassociatedwithreceivingsecurityaidfromtheUnitedStates.Attheregional leveltheU.S.NavyhasprovidedtrainingopportunitiestoBrunei,Malaysia,Indonesia,thePhilippines,andSingaporethroughannualCooperationAfloatReadinessandTraining(CARAT)exercises. In2002 theU.S.NavyalsobeganannualSoutheastAsiaCooperationAgainstTerrorism(SEACAT)exercisesfocusingon maritime interdiction with Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia,

81 ForalistofPSIparticipants,seetheU.S.StateDepartment’swebsiteuhttp://www.state.gov/t/isn/c19310.htm.

82 AuthorinterviewwithU.S.Embassyofficials,Jakarta,September14,2006;and“RIAgreestoInstall7RadarsfromU.S.inMakassarStrait,”Jakarta Post,January23,2008.

83 AuthorinterviewwithU.S.Embassyofficials,September14,2006;and“U.S.Gives15BoatstoIndonesia,DemandsNoReturn,”Jakarta Post,January18,2008.

84 “U.S.HelpsBuildIndonesianMarineForceTrainingCenter,”U.S.Embassy,PressRelease,December6,2006uhttp://www.usembassyjakarta.org/press_rel/marine_force_training_ctr.html.

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thePhilippines,andBrunei.85TheU.S.CoastGuardhasconductedtrainingprogramswiththevariousmaritimelawenforcementagenciesinSoutheastAsiaaswell.

Japan also has been keen to improve safety and security in SoutheastAsia’s sea lanes, principally to enhance the country’s overall energy security situation.OverthepastthreedecadesJapanhasfinancedtheinstallationandupkeepofnavigationalsafetyaidsintheSOM,andsincethelate1990sTokyohas suggested various measures to enhance cooperation among regional states to alleviate incidents of piracy, culminatingwith theorganizationofReCAAP in 2004.The Japanese coast guard also regularly conducts anti-piracy training exercises with counterparts from Malaysia, Indonesia,Vietnam,Thailand, and Singapore. In September 2007 the press reportedthattheJapanesegovernmenthadpledgedfundstoIndonesia’sBakorkamla,andinJanuary2008Japanagreedtogive$4.7milliontoMalaysia’sMMEAto upgrade radar facilities.86TransfersofJapaneseequipmentandvesselstoregionalstateshavebeenlow-key,usuallyoccurringthroughNGOssuchastheNipponFoundation.YetevenJapanisnotimmunefromcontroversy.In2005anagreementonthetransferofthreepatrolboatswasdelayedbecauseJakartarefusedtoacceptTokyo’sconditions,namelythatthevesselsbothbestationedintheSOMandbeusedexclusively tofightpiracyandmaritimeterrorism.87AlthoughTokyoandJakartaeventuallyreachedacompromise,theincidentunderscoredJakarta’ssensitivities:Indonesiadoesnotwanttobeseenasaregionalmendicantwillingtoacceptaidatanyprice.

TwonewplayersonthesceneareIndiaandChina.Bothcountries’growingeconomies,politicalinfluence,andmilitarycapabilitiessuggestthatitisonlyamatteroftimebeforeIndiaandChinaassumemajorrolesinSoutheastAsia’smaritime affairs. Commensurate with India’s impressive economic growthin recent years and great power aspirations, the Indian Navy is currentlymodernizingandexpanding.NewDelhiislookingbeyondtheIndianOceanin order to advance the country’s economic interests and political influence in SoutheastAsia.Asaresult,Indiahasattachedmoreimportancetostrategicmaritimechokepointssuchas theSOMwhile improvingrelationswiththelittoral states.88In2002IndiaandIndonesiabeganbiannualcoordinatednaval

85 BruceVaughnetal.,“TerrorisminSoutheastAsia,”CongressionalResearchService,CRSReportforCongress,RL34194,September11,2007.

86 “JapantoProvideAssistanceforRI’sMaritimeSecurityAgency;”AntaraNews,September19,2007;and“JapanGivesMalaysiaGrantforMalaccaStraitSecurity,”KyodoNews,January25,2008.

87 “IndonesiaRefusestoAcceptConditionsforUseofJapanesePatrolBoats,”JijiPress,June15,2005. 88 DonaldL.Berlin,“IndiaintheIndianOcean,”Naval War College Review59,no.2(Spring2006):76.

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patrolsintheAndamanSea,andsince2006Indianofficialshaverepeatedlyoffered the littoral states capacity-building assistance.89 India’s offers havebeenwelcomedintheregion,especiallybySingapore,buthavenotyetbeentranslated into concrete programs.90

China’sinterestsintheSOMaremuchgreaterthanIndia’sand,similartothoseofJapan,aredrivenbyanxietyoveroilsupplysecurity.Asnotedearlier,anestimated70–80%ofChina’soilimportstransitthroughtheSOM.Despiteextensivemodernizationefforts, theChinesenavyisnotyetstrongenoughtoprotectthecountry’sSLOCs.BeijingthushastorelyontheUnitedStatesto enforce freedom of navigation at sea, and herein lies China’s so-calledMalaccadilemma.91UnlikeIndia,Chinacannotofferthelittoralstatesmuchin terms of capabilities or experience. China does, however, have greaterfinancial resources,whichBeijing is starting touse.At ameeting inKualaLumpurof theuserandlittoralstatessponsoredbytheIMOinSeptember2006Chinaofferedtofinanceandparticipateinanumberofprojectsaimedat improving safety and security in the strait, including replacement of navigationalaidsdamagedbythe2004tsunami.92Chinahasalsoofferedthelittoralstateshelpwithcapacitybuilding.InApril2005ChinaandMalaysiasigned a maritime security cooperation agreement and have since agreed to increase the exchange of information and intelligence.93 China concludeda similar agreementwith Indonesia inApril 2006. In additionBeijing hasdonatedcomputerequipmenttoBakorkamlaandofferedTNI-ALpersonneltraininginChina.94Chinahasalsocommitted$50,000annuallytoReCAAP’sISC.95Thoughtheseinitiativesarerelativelylimitedatthemoment,ChineseinvolvementineffortstoimprovesafetyandsecurityintheSOMislikelytoexpand in the near future.

Although welcoming this support from India, China, and Japan, thelittoralstatesalsodonotwanttoseetheSOMbecomeanarenaforgeopoliticalrivalries. At the Shangri-La Dialogue meeting in June 2007 SingaporeandefenseministerTeoCheeHeanalludedtothisconcernwhenhestatedthat

89 “RI,IndiatoConductJointPatrolinAndamanSea,”AntaraNews,August22,2007. 90 “IndiatoHelpwithSecurityintheStraitsofMelaka,”Bernama,June27,2007. 91 IanStorey,“China’s‘MalaccaDilemma,’”JamestownFoundation,ChinaBrief6,no.8,April12,

2006uhttp://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=415&&issue_id=368. 92 JoshuaHo,“TheIMO-KLMeetingontheStraitsofMalaccainSingapore,”IDSSCommentary,

October5,2006. 93 “JointCommuniquébetweenthePeople’sRepublicofChinaandMalaysia(FullText),”Xinhua

NewsAgency,December15,2005. 94 “ChinaProvidesTechnicalAssistancetoHelpProtectRI’sSeas,”AntaraNews,February14,2007. 95 “PiracyAttacksIncidentsinAsiaDrops26Pctto100in2007,”XinhuaNewsAgency,February28,2008.

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China’sandJapan’sinvolvementinsealanesecurityinSoutheastAsiashouldbe“constructive”and“consistentwithinternationallaw.”96

The Persistence of the Root Causes of Maritime Violence

Neither regional states nor external powers have yet tackled the rootcausesofmaritimeviolence ina systematicor seriousmanner. Inorder tomakesignificantandsustainableimprovementstosecurityinSoutheastAsia’swatersinthelongrun,bothregionalandextraregionalactorsmustfocusontheunderlyingsourcesoftheproblem.

TheMSP,forinstance,seemstohavebeeneffectivelargelyasadeterrentratherthanasapreventivemechanism.NostatisticaldataexistsinthepublicdomaintogaugetheimpactoftheMSP,thoughbothIMB-PRCandReCAAPstatistics illustrate general trends. Furthermore, senior naval commandersfromthelittoralstateswhospokewiththeauthorwereunabletoprovideanystatisticsforthenumberofvesselsboarded,arrestsofmaritimecriminals,orEiSsightingsleadingtotheapprehensionofpiratesorsearobbers.ThislackofstatisticaldatagivestheimpressionthattheIMB-PRCfiguresformaritimecrimearedownbecausepotentialcriminalsarechoosingnottoriskcapture.

As noted earlier, there is strong consensus among security practitioners in the region that one of the primary root causes of maritime crime is poor socio-economic conditions, especially in coastal communities in Sumatra, the RiauIslands,andthesouthernPhilippines.AlthoughboththeIndonesianandPhilippineeconomieshavebeguntorecoverfromtheAsianfinancialcrisis,thegainshavebeenmadeatthemacrolevelratherthanatthemicrolevelandhavenotyettrickleddowntovillagesincoastalareas.InbothMalaysiaandSingaporehighlevelsofeconomicgrowthkeepthosewhodependontheseafortheirlivelihoodsingainfulemployment.AchievingsimilargrowthlevelsinIndonesiaandthePhilippines,however,willtakedecades.Inthemeantime,projectsaimedatalleviatingeconomichardshipincoastalcommunitieswouldsignificantlymitigatetheproblemofsearobberyandpiracy.

Economic development is a necessary but insufficient condition foraddressingtheproblemofmaritimecrimeinSoutheastAsia.Improvedlevelsof governance, particularly in the Indonesian andPhilippine armed forcesandlawenforcementagencies,isalsoasine qua nontosuccess.IndonesianpresidentSusiloBambangYudhoyonohasmadethefightagainstcorruptiona government priority, enacting several promising initiatives as part of that

96 “KeepingMalaccaStraitSafe,”Straits Times,June4,2007.

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effort.IntheportofTanjungPriokinJakarta,forinstance,all1,351employeesofthenotoriouslycorruptcustomsheadquartersweretransferredandreplacedwith821newemployeeswhosesalariesweredoubledandwhosefuturepayandpromotionprospectsweretiedtoperformance.Asaresult,productivityhas increased and graft is down.97 A major initiative is also underway toimprove governance in the country’s police force.98InculcatinghabitsofgoodgovernanceinIndonesia,however,willtakeagenerationormore,andthereislittle evidence yet to suggest that such a culture has taken root in the country’s armedforceswherecorruptionremainssystemic.

ConflictresolutioninSoutheastAsiaisalsolikelytohaveanimportantimpact on themaritime crime situation. Indeed this is already the case inthe Indonesian province of Aceh. In the wake of the devastating 2004tsunami,theAugust2005HelsinkiPeaceAgreementendedmorethanthirtyyears of separatist conflict.Under the agreementGAMceased demandingindependence and disarmed, Aceh was granted genuine autonomy, andthe TNI significantly reduced its footprint in the province. According toauthorities in Sumatra, the number of piratical attacks in the northernapproachesoftheSOMshowedamarkeddecreaseafterthe2005agreement,thoughseveralex-GAMmembershavesincebeenarrestedforcommittingpiratical acts.99Nevertheless,theIMB-PRCfiguresreflectthisoverallpositivetrend.A tentativepeaceagreementbetweenManilaand theMILF in2008maypaysimilardividendsinthetriborderseaarea—thoughnoagreementwillcompletelyeradicatepiracyinthesouthernPhilippines.

Insum,dealingwiththerootcausesofmaritimecrimewilltaketime.Yetunless regionalgovernments,with support fromexternalpowers, seriouslyaddress these root causes, the danger is that once international pressure eases, and complacency and patrol fatigue set in, there could be a resurgence inviolent maritime attacks in Southeast Asia.

Implications

Theforegoinganalysisindicatesseveralareaswhereregionalstatesandexternalpowers couldadoptmoreeffectivemeasures to improvemaritimesecurity in Southeast Asia.

97 JohnAglionby,“IndonesiaCracksDownonBureaucrats,”Financial Times,August16,2007. 98 DouglasE.Ramage,“AReformedIndonesia,”Australian Financial Review,October12,2007. 99 AuthorinterviewwithofficialsfromTNI-AL,BelawanNavalBase,andthemarinepolice,Medan,

September18,2006.Seealso“IndonesiaNavyArrestsTsunamiAidPiratesinAceh,”Reuters,July26,2006.

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TheUnitedStates, Japan, India, andChina could coordinate efforts inorder to avoid overlap and stem potentially destabilizing rivalries. Theseexternal powers could also assist Indonesia and the Philippines bothwitheconomicdevelopmentprojectsincoastalcommunitiesandwithprogramsaimedatimprovinggovernance.Capacity-buildingefforts,suchasimprovingthecommunication,surveillance,andinterdictioncapabilitiesofcoastguardsandmarinepoliceforces,wouldalsosupportsecurityefforts intheregion,again giving priority to Indonesia and the Philippines. At the same time,supportfromexternalpowerswouldbemosteffectiveifsuchsupportwerekeptlow-keythroughnegotiationswithindividualstates.

Likewise,thestatesintheregionwouldbenefitfromimprovingmutualcooperation among themselves. Joint MSP patrols, for example, wouldallow greater pursuit of sea-borne criminals. The Philippines, Indonesia,andMalaysiawould also dowell to conduct joint patrols in the Sulu andCelebesseasandinvitethemoreadvancednaviesofSingaporeandBruneitoparticipate.JointpatrolsamongthemaritimestatesofSoutheastAsiawouldhaveafourfoldeffect:suchinitiativeswouldimprovesecurityinthemaritimedomain, act as an important confidence-building measure among theparticipating countries, improve interoperability, andhelp realizeASEAN’sgoal of establishing an ASEAN Security Community by 2015. Part of thevision articulated at ASEAN’s summit inNovember 2003, the prospectiveASEANSecurityCommunityhasastrongmaritimecomponent.Jointpatrolswouldallowmemberstatestotranslaterhetoricintoreality.

Tackling the root causesofpiracy, sea robbery, andmaritimeviolencewillmoreover require sustained and long-termprograms both to improvethe livelihoods of coastal communities and to improve governance at the administrativelevelaswellaswithinlawenforcementandsecurityagencies.IndonesiaandthePhilippinesareobviouslypriorities;bothcountriescouldbenefitfromassistancefromSingapore,Brunei,andMalaysia,wheresocio-economic and governance standards are higher.

Internationalpressure,thespecterofmaritimeterrorism,theeffortsofregionalstates,andsupportfromexternalpowershavedonemuchtoimprovesecurity in Southeast Asia’s maritime domain, yet much more remains tobedone.SecuringSoutheastAsia’s sea lanes is, therefore, still awork inprogress.

securing southeast asia's sea lanes: a work in progress

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