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Securing IT Systems with the Consensus Benchmarks

andScoring Tools

Clint Kreitnerwww.cisecurity.org

ckreitner@cisecurity.org

THE CENTER FOR

INTERNET SECURITYSM

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Unfortunate, but true…

“Through 2005, 90 percent of cyber attacks will continue to exploit known security flaws for which a patch is available or a preventive measure known.”

• Gartner Group, May 6, 2002

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What is causing the vulnerabilities that are being exploited?

Software defects Fixed with vendor patches

Lack of technical security controls Security settings made to enable or

disable security features of the OS software

Think of them as software switches

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Examples of security settings

Password length, complexity Account lockout after X attempts Audit what system events? Idle time before logoff Users allowed to install print drivers? What unneededservices to disable? File system to use?

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Aren’t these standards adequate to improve user security practice?

ISO 17799 COBIT from ISACA SysTrust, WebTrust from AICPA FISCAM from GAO Principles and Practices for Security

of IT Systems from NIST Standard of Good Practice from ISF

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These standards are helpful, but incomplete

They describe “what” to do, but not “how”

These standards are effective only when accompanied by details on how to implement their requirements

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An Example from ISO 177999.7.1 Event logging

Audit logs recording exceptions and other security-relevant events should be produced and kept for an agreed period to assist in future investigations and access control monitoring.

Audit logs should also include:a) user IDs;b) dates and times for log-on and log-off;c) terminal identity or location if possible;d) records of successful and rejected system access attempts;e) records of successful and rejected data and other resource access attempts.

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One of several actions needed to implement event logging on Sun Solaris systems:

cat <<END_SCRIPT >/etc/init.d/newperf#!/sbin/sh/usr/bin/su sys -c \"/usr/lib/sa/sadc /var/adm/sa/sa\`date +%d\`"END_SCRIPTchown root:sys /etc/init.d/newperfchmod 744 /etc/init.d/newperfrm -f /etc/rc2.d/S21perfln -s /etc/init.d/newperf /etc/rc2.d/S21perf/usr/bin/su sys -c crontab <<END_ENTRIES0,20,40 * * * * /usr/lib/sa/sa145 23 * * * /usr/lib/sa/sa2 -s 0:00 -e 23:59 -i 1200 -AEND_ENTRIES

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Why has it been so difficult to proliferate good security practice?

Vendors have been shipping unconfigured systems to users with technical security controls turned off

Users don’t know how to properly configure their systems

Users are afraid to disrupt operations With patches or security settings

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Microsoft Issues Patches, but Users Don’t Apply Them

Forrester Research Report

April 3, 2003

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Responding to the challenge Cosmos Club meeting Aug 2000 Need to develop and proliferate

detailed technical best practicesThe only true solution is try to raise the

bar everywhere--globally Employ a consensus process to define

best practices that is driven by security savvy users from the public and private sectors

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The Center for Internet Security (CIS)

Formed in October 2000 Modeled after other community

initiatives, e.g., transportation safety A not-for-profit consortium of users Convenes and facilitates teams that

build consensus benchmarks

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Some of the participants in the consensus effort:Government:

Nat’l Inst Stds & Tech. Infocomm Development

Authority of Singapore Naval Surface Warfare

Center US Treasury Financial

Management Service Washington State Dept.

of Health Defense Info Sys

Agency (DISA) Federal Reserve System NASA

US Dept of Justice Library of Congress Royal Canadian Mounted

Police Communications Security

Establishment (Canada) Canadian CERT NSA GSA FedCIRC Dept Homeland Security State of Maryland

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Participants (cont’d):Commercial: Eastman Kodak SASKTel LG&E Energy Hallmark Intel Deutsche Telecom Caterpillar Baylor College of Medicine NCR Batelle U.S. Central Credit Union VISA

Thomson Holdings Pitney Bowes First Union Corporation Intuit Union Bank of California Swiss Reinsurance Co Elemica Online Resources Agilent Technologies Shell Info. Tech. Int’l PeopleSoft News Corporation

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More (cont’d):Consulting/Service:

IBM Business Consulting Grant Thornton Deloitte Touche ISS Symantec BindView NetIQ SecureNet Solutions RDA Corp

CSC Procinct Security Solutionary Polivec Mobile Automation ConfigureSoft GFM Consulting

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More (cont’d):Universities:

Institute for Security Tech. Studies at Dartmouth Virginia Tech Monash University (Australia) Illinois Institute of Technology University of Missouri William & Mary Utah State University University of California, SF New York University

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Auditing Participants

Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)

Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)

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What has thispublic/private partnership

produced so far?

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Currently available: Level I Configuration Benchmarks

Solaris Linux HP-UX Windows NT Windows 2000 Cisco Router IOS

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A Level I Benchmark:

Can be implemented by a sysadmin of any level of security expertise

Can be monitored by a compliance tool

Is not likely to “break” any function Represents a baseline level of

security

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Currently available:

Gold Standard Benchmarks W2K Professional Level II W2K Server Level II CISCO Router IOS Level I/II Solaris Level I

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Also currently available: Configuration Scoring Tools

Solaris Linux HP-UX Windows NT Windows 2000 Server Windows 2000 Professional Cisco Router IOS

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Under development: Benchmarks and Scoring Tools for:

Oracle databases Apache Windows IIS Windows XP Windows Server 2003 Catalyst Switches PIX Firewalls Check Point FW-1 SQL Server Juniper Routers

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How is this work being done? Teams are formed with security experts

from member organisations An initial benchmark draft is obtained or

developed Consensus is established via email and

conference call discussion A scoring tool is developed They are made available free to all users

globally via the CIS website (www.cisecurity.org)

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The good news…

Case studies show that 80-90% of known vulnerabilities are blocked by the security settings in the consensus benchmarks…….

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Case Study Methodology

(1) Scan a system “out of the box” and list identified vulnerabilities

(2) Configure the system with the appropriate benchmark

(3) Rescan the system and note the vulnerabilities remaining

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Vulnerability Assessment Case studies

Study System Benchmark% of Vuls

EliminatedSolutionary W2K Server Level I 85

Citadel W2K Pro Level I 81

NSA W2K Pro Level II 91

Mitre W2K Pro Level II 83 (CVE)

Citadel W2K Server Level II 99

Citadel RedHatLinux Level I 100

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Encouraging progress: U.S. government promulgation of CIS

benchmarks and tools via FedCIRC VISA adoption of CIS benchmarks for its

Cardholder Information Security Program’s Digital Dozen

Progress at the vendor level Dell now delivering pre-configured systems Top security experts from Microsoft, Sun, HP,

Cisco, and Oracle are active on the benchmark consensus teams

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Benefits of using benchmarks and tools Substantially reduce the risk of

unauthorized intrusion Following a recognized patching and

configuration standard demonstrates due care against legal liability

Provides a basis for ongoing measurement and reporting of security status to management

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Recommended policies: Use govt purchasing power to buy only

benchmark configured systems from vendors

Encourage corporate and other institutional buyers to do the same

Establish benchmark compliance as an audit requirement

Encourage users in all sectors to download and use the consensus benchmarks and tools

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Thank you!

ckreitner@cisecurity.orghttp://www.cisecurity.org