securing fissile materials. what are fissile materials and how are they made? u-235 is fissile but...

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Securing Fissile Materials

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Securing Fissile Materials

What are fissile materials and how are they made?

• U-235 is fissile but there isn’t enough pure U-235 anywhere to worry about.

• Why not?

U-235

• U-235 is less than 1% of naturally occurring uranium.

• “Enriching” can increase the concentrations of U-235 to what is called “highly enriched uranium” levels > 20% enriched.

• HEU of 80% or 90% is good for bombs.• Nothing requires 100% U-235 so no large

quantities of U-235 exist.

What are fissile materials and how are they made?

• Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is fissile.• Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) contains more

than 20% U-235• Mined uranium must be enriched to produce

HEU.

What are fissile materials and how are they made?

• Plutonium (Pu) is fissile.• Pu is produced in nuclear reactors when U-238 absorbs a

neutron.

How much HEU is there?

• As of January 2013, the global stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is estimated to be about 1390 tonnes. The global stockpile of separated plutonium is about 490 tonnes, of which about 260 tonnes is the material in civilian custody.

Fissile Material Stocks, 2013Country HEU tonnes Military Pu tonnes Civilian Pu tonnes

Russia 695 128 50.1

United States 604 87 0

France 31 6 57.5

China 16 1.8 0.014

United Kingdom 21.2 3.5 91.2

Pakistan 3 0.15 0

India 0.8 5.2 0.24

Israel 0.3 0.84 -

North Korea 0 0.03 -

Others 15 - 61

Total 1390 234 260

Info from International Panel on Fissile Materials: www.fissilematerials.org

• Numbers for weapon plutonium for the United States and United Kingdom are based on official data.

• Most numbers for civilian plutonium are based on declarations submitted to IAEA and reflect the status as of December 31, 2011.

• Other numbers are non-governmental estimates, often with large uncertainties.

• HEU amounts are 90% enriched HEU equivalent (with the exception of the number for non-nuclear weapon states).

IPFM

Production of military fissile materials continues in • India, which is producing plutonium and HEU for

naval propulsion, • Pakistan, which produces plutonium and HEU

for weapons, • Israel, which is believed to produce plutonium. • North Korea has the capability to produce

weapon-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium.

IPFM

• France, Russia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and India operate civilian reprocessing facilities that separate plutonium from spent fuel of power reactors.

• China is operating a pilot civilian reprocessing facility.

IPFM

• Twelve countries - Russia, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands (all three are in the URENCO consortium), Japan, Argentina, Brazil, India, Pakistan, and Iran – operate uranium enrichment facilities.

• North Korea is also believed to have an operational uranium enrichment plant.

1400 tonnes HEU

• A metric ton (tonne) is about 2200 lbs.• It takes about 50 lbs of HEU to make an atomic

bomb.• One tonne of HEU could make 44 atomic

bombs.

500 tonnes Pu

• It takes about 10 lbs Pu to make an atomic bomb.

• One tonne Pu would make 220 atomic bombs.

Which bomb is easier to make?

• The HEU weapon is much easier to make than a Pu weapon.

• The HEU weapon that destroyed Hiroshima, Japan had never been tested.

How can HEU be permanently eliminated?

HEU + DU = LEUDU is the U-238 discarded during the

enrichment process. HEU can be “downblended” or unenriched to a lower level of enrichment that is not explosive and can be

used to fuel existing nuclear reactors.

Why isn’t this being done?

• It was being done!

Megatons to Megawatts

• In February 1993, the Russian Federation and the United States signed a 20-year, government-to-government agreement for the conversion of 500 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium from nuclear warheads to low-enriched uranium to fuel U.S. nuclear reactors.

• The agreement became known as the Megatons to Megawatts program.

• Over the life of the Megatons to Megawatts program, the low-enriched uranium produced under the agreement provided about one-third of the enrichment services needed to fabricate fuel for U.S. nuclear reactors.

• The program will end in December 2013. • http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13091

What is being done with US HEU?

• For its part, the US government initially declared just over 174 tonnes of HEU (of various enrichments) to be surplus from military stockpiles.

• Of this, USEC took delivery of 14.2 tonnes in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) containing around 75% U-235 and 50 tonnes as uranium oxide or metal containing around 40% U-235.

What is USEC?

• United States Enrichment Corporation• USEC carried out the Megatons to Megawatts

downblending of 500 tons of excess weapons HEU to reactor fuel from 1993 to 2013.

• USEC went bankrupt in 2014.• USEC emerged from bankruptcy as Centrus

Energy.

USEC

• Downblending of the UF6 was completed in 1998, to produce 387 tonnes of LEU.

• Some 13.5 tonnes of the HEU oxide or metal had been processed by September 2001 to produce 140.3 tonnes of LEU. In 2004 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a license for downblending 33 tonnes HEU by Nuclear Fuel Services in Tennessee and in 2005 the first delivery was made to a TVA power plant.

What is Nuclear Fuel Services?

NSF is located in Erwin, Tennessee

• Erwin, Tennessee is just over the mountain north of Asheville.

• NFS. Protecting the Future of Freedom across

the globe

Nuclear Fuel Services

• “Our Erwin, Tennessee operation is committed to manufacturing specialty nuclear materials for the U.S. Navy's nuclear fleet and other customers while protecting its workers, the public and the environment.”

• US Navy submarines use HEU fuel and the fuel assemblies are produced by NFS.

• France’s submarines run on LEU which is better from a nonproliferation perspective.

NNSA

• DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in 2005 announced plans to remove a further 200 tonnes of HEU from military stockpiles.

• Of this, 160 tonnes was retained for naval propulsion, thus postponing the need for building a new uranium high-enrichment facility for at least 50 years.

• An additional 20 tonnes was reserved for space missions and for research reactors.

• The final 20 tonnes was to be downblended to LEU for research reactors, power generation and for 17 tons, the new reliable fuel supply initiative.

• Also in 2005, NNSA said that it was committing about 40 tonnes of off-specification HEU (with elevated levels of U-236) to the Blended Low-Enriched Uranium (BLEU) program.

• This material would be used by TVA.• In 2008 NNSA was negotiating with TVA to release

a further 21 tonnes of HEU under the program, which would yield about 250 tonnes of LEU, some of which might be sold to other utilities.

• In mid-2007 the NNSA awarded contracts to Nuclear Fuel Services and Wesdyne International to downblend 17.4 tonnes of HEU from dismantled warheads to be part of a new international fuel reserve.

• NFS downblended the material in Tennessee to yield some 290 tonnes of LEU (4.95% U-235) by early 2012.

• Wesdyne, the prime contractor, is then storing 230 tonnes of the LEU at the Westinghouse fuel fabrication plant in South Carolina to be available for the American Assured Fuel Supply (AFS)

Wesdyne International?

• Wesdyne International is a Westinghouse Electric Company subsidiary which mainly inspects nuclear power plants.

• They do have a branch in Rock Hill, SC.

What is the AFS?

• This first batch of LEU will be available for use in civilian reactors by nations in good standing with the International Atomic Energy Agency that have good nonproliferation credentials and are not pursuing uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

• It will also now be available to domestic utilities. • The fuel – worth some $500 million – will be

sold at the current market price.

Assured Fuel Supply (AFS)• Access to the fuel reserve will be open to "eligible recipients that meet certain

nonproliferation criteria in the case of supply disruptions in the nuclear fuel market." The notice, however, does not specify what these "certain nonproliferation criteria" are.

• In addition, the Department of Energy would have to confirm that "there is a fuel supply disruption that cannot be addressed by normal market mechanisms.”

• In case all the criteria are met, the recipient would be able to purchase the LEU through a U.S. intermediary.

• The fuel would apparently be considered "U.S. obligated," so the recipient would have to obtain U.S. consent regarding handling of the fuel after it is irradiated in a reactor.

Assured Fuel Supply (AFS)

• Down-blending of 17.4 tonnes will produce about 290 tonnes of LEU, of which about 230 tonnes will constitute the reserve.

• The rest will be used to pay for the costs associated with down-blending and processing of the material.

• Most of the down-blending has been already done, with the rest to be completed in 2012.

• DoE announced that it is ready to accept requests for purchase of the material from the AFS reserve.

• http://www.fissilematerials.org/blog/2011/08/united_states_announces_d.html

• In June 2009 NNSA awarded a further contract ($209 million) to NFS and Wesdyne for 12.1 tonnes of HEU which will yield some 220 tonnes of LEU by 2012.

• This second batch of LEU is to provide fuel supply assurance for utilities which participate in DOE's mixed-oxide fuel program utilising surplus plutonium from US weapons.

• (The AFS scheme is consistent with international concerns to limit the spread of enrichment technology to countries without well-established nuclear fuel cycles. Russia has agreed to join the initiative.)

• In the short term most US military HEU is likely to be blended down to 20% U-235, then stored. In this form it is not useable for weapons.

• http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source-of-Nuclear-Fuel/

How is Pu disposed of?

• Sad question!• Let’s start with the US/Russia “dual track”

program to try and dispose of 34 tonnes of excess weapons Pu belonging to each country.

Dual Track Program

• In June 2000, the USA and Russia agreed to dispose of at least 34 tonnes each of weapons-grade plutonium by 2014.

• The USA undertook to pursue a dual track program (immobilisation and MOX), self-funded, while the G-7 nations were to provide some US$ 2.5 billion to set up Russia's program.

• The latter was initially MOX-oriented for VVER reactors, the high cost being because this was not part of Russia's fuel cycle policy.

• The USA agreed to allow the Russian plutonium to be used in BN-600 and BN-800 fast neutron reactors, and the timeline stretched to 2018.

• However, the G7 funding was not available on this basis and Russia is funding most of the program, with the USA contributing $400 million.

• http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source-of-Nuclear-Fuel/

In Russia• In 1996, the United States and the Russian Federation completed an

initial joint study that evaluated the candidate options for the disposition of surplus weapons-derived plutonium in both countries.

• While Russia advocates building new reactors for converting weapons-derived plutonium to spent fuel, the cost is high, and the continuing joint study of the Russian options is considering only the use of the existing VVER-1000 LWRs in Russia (and possibly in Ukraine) and the existing BN-600 fast-neutron reactor at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant in Russia.

• The BN-600 reactor, which currently uses enriched uranium fuel, is capable with certain design modifications of converting up to 1.3 metric tons (MT) of surplus weapons-derived plutonium to spent fuel each year.

• After environmental and safety reviews, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorised construction of a MOX fuel fabrication plant (MFFF) at the DOE Savannah River site in Sout Carolina.

• Construction started in August 2007.• It would make about 1700 civil MOX fuel assemblies using DU and

34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium unlike other MOX fuel plants which use fresh reactor-grade plutonium having around one third non-fissile plutonium isotopes.

• US reactors using MOX fuel will need to be licensed for it.• The project includes a facility for plutonium pits dismantlement

and metallic plutonium conversion to oxide which is complex and has delayed progress.

• Shaw Areva MOX Services is under contract to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which will own the plant, originally expected to be in operation from 2016, then 2019. The high cost of the plant – $3.5 billion plus $1.3 billion contingency and $183 million per year to operate - is justified on non-proliferation grounds. Annual cost would be offset by revenue.* However, early in 2014 the project was excluded from the DOE budget request for NNSA due to cost escalation, so faces being shut down while 60% complete. This will leave the USA in default on the 2000 bilateral agreement, while Russia has fulfilled its side. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Military-Warheads-as-a-Source-of-Nuclear-Fuel/

• In June 2005 the first four fuel assemblies with mixed oxide fuel made from US military plutonium (plus depleted uranium) started generating electricity in Duke Power's Catawba-1 nuclear power plant in South Carolina, on a trial basis. They incorporated 140 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. The plutonium was made into 2 tonnes of pellets at the Cadrache plant and then fabricated into fuel assemblies at the Melox plant in France. This trial was concluded satisfactorily.

• The steps needed to convert BN-600 to a plutonium-burner core will be discussed. The step involving the hybrid core allows an early and timely start that takes advantage of the limited capacity for fabricating uranium–plutonium mixed-oxide fuel early in the disposition program. The design lifetime of BN-600 must safely and reliably be extended by 10 yr to at least 2020 so that a sufficient amount of plutonium ( 20 MT) can be converted to spent fuel.∼

• http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168900298005245

US MOX did not work

• Duke attempted to use MOX made in France from US excess-weapons Pu and couldn’t make it work in the Catawba Reactor that was modified to burn it.

MOX fabrication plant in SC grew absurdly expensive

• The older study led by John MacWilliams, an advisor to Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, estimated the lifetime cost of the so-called Mixed Oxide (MOX) plutonium elimination project in South Carolina at over $25.1 billion.

• But the new study, conducted by a U.S. Air Force-funded research and development center known as the Aerospace Corporation, says the effort could cost at least $30.7 billion to complete, according to a summary that was presented to lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

• After the summary was obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a nuclear safety advocacy group, Energy Department officials confirmed that the study concluded this cost might even balloon to

$47.5 billion.• The higher pricetag would ensue if, as MacWilliams’ study assumed

last year, annual spending on the program is capped at $500 million annually, which would drag out its completion. If spending were limited to $375 million a year — an amount close to what Congress has recently appropriated — the cost of the overall project could eventually reach $110.4 billion, the summary stated.

• http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/23/17218/projected-cost-governments-most-expensive-nonproliferation-effort-rises-again

Cheaper to downblend and bury in WIPP

• To downblend the plutonium, material would be added to plutonium oxide to inhibit recovery. This downblending process would involve mixing the plutonium with inhibitor materials to reduce the plutonium content to less than 10 percent by weight. Downblending would be conducted at SRS. Two additional gloveboxes would be installed for this option. The containers of downblended plutonium would be characterized (non destructive assay, ‐digital radiography, and headspace gas sampling) to ensure that they meet waste acceptance criteria prior to shipment to a TRU waste repository‐

• . Once shipped to a repository, the packages containing the plutonium would be emplaced in the salt bed. Over time, high pressure on the salt formation would cause the salt to creep, filling in the voids in the disposal rooms, and entombing the packages permanently. This disposal method has been proven and continues to be used to dispose of surplus plutonium from various DOE sites. Approximately 4.8 MT of plutonium that was downblended have been shipped to WIPP, mostly from six sites: RFETS, Hanford, INL, LLNL, LANL, and SRS. http://www.nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/SurplusPuDispositionOptions.pdf

What is WIPP?

• Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, NM

• Bedded salt is free of fresh flowing water, easily mined, impermeable and geologically stable – an ideal medium for permanently isolating long-lived radioactive wastes from the environment. However, its most important quality in this application is the way salt rock seals all fractures and naturally closes all openings.

• Throughout the 1960s, government scientists searched for an appropriate site for radioactive waste disposal, eventually testing a remote desert area of southeastern New Mexico where, 250 million years earlier, evaporation cycles of the ancient Permian Sea had created a 2,000-foot-thick salt bed.