secularism and the governance of religious...

ConceptPaper

SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligiousDiversityTariqModoodandThomasSealy,UniversityofBristol

May2019

https://www.grease.eui.eu

Thispaperseekstodevelopananalyticalreflectiononthenormativebasisforstate-religionrelationsandthegovernanceofreligiousdiversity.Itisalsoasociologicalreflectiononviableformsofreligiousdiversitygovernance.TheaimofthisConceptPaper–oneofthreeinaseries-istoprovideaconceptualcornerstonefortheresearchbeingconductedinGREASE,anEU-fundedprojectinvestigatingreligiousdiversity,state-religionrelationsandreligiouslyinspiredradicalisationonfourcontinents.

TheGREASEprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion'sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementnumber770640

SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligiousDiversity ConceptPaper GREASE

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TheEU-FundedGREASEprojectlookstoAsiaforinsightsongoverningreligiousdiversityandpreventingradicalisation.Involving researchers from Europe, North Africa, theMiddle East, Asia and Oceania,GREASEis investigatinghowreligiousdiversity isgovernedinover20countries.Ourwork focuses on comparing norms, laws and practices thatmay (ormay not) proveuseful in preventing religious radicalisation. Our research also sheds light on howdifferent societies cope with the challenge of integrating religious minorities andmigrants. The aim is to deepen our understanding of how religious diversity can begovernedsuccessfully,withanemphasisoncounteringradicalisationtrends.Whileexploringreligiousgovernancemodelsinotherpartsoftheworld,GREASEalsoattempts tounravel theEuropeanparadoxofreligiousradicalisationdespitegrowingsecularisation. We consider the claim that migrant integration in Europe has failedbecause second generation youth have become marginalised and radicalised, withsometurningtojihadistterrorismnetworks.Theresearchersaimtodeliverinnovativeacademic thinking on secularisation and radicalisation while offering insights forgovernanceofreligiousdiversity.TheprojectisbeingcoordinatedbyProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidoufromTheEuropeanUniversityInstitute(EUI)inItaly.OtherconsortiummembersincludeProfessorTariqModood fromTheUniversityofBristol (UK);Dr.H.A.Hellyer from theRoyalUnitedServices Institute (RUSI) (UK); Dr. MilaMancheva from The Centre for the Study ofDemocracy (Bulgaria); Dr. Egdunas Racius from Vytautas Magnus University(Lithuania); Mr. Terry Martin from the research communications agency SPIA(Germany);ProfessorMehdiLahloufromMohammedVUniversityofRabat(Morocco);Professor Haldun Gulalp of The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation(Turkey); Professor PradanaBoy of UniversitasMuhammadiyahMalang (Indonesia);Professor Zawawi Ibrahim of The Strategic Information and Research DevelopmentCentre (Malaysia); Professor Gurpreet Mahajan of Jawaharlal Nehru University(India);andProfessorMicheleGrossmanofDeakinUniversity(Melbourne,Australia).GREASEisscheduledforcompletionin2022.Formoreinformationpleasecontact:ProfessorAnnaTriandafyllidou,[email protected]

http://grease.eui.eu/GREASE-Radicalisation,SecularismandtheGovernanceofReligion:BringingtogetherEuropeanandAsianPerspectives


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TableofContentsSECULARISMASTHEGOVERNANCEOFRELIGION 4‘CRISISOFSECULARISM’? 4WHATISPOLITICALSECULARISM? 6HISTORICALTRENDS 8A.FromtheWest 8B.Alternativetrends 9

MODERATESECULARISM 11CHALLENGESAND(RE)ORIENTATIONS 141NewHardliners 152NewAccommodationists 153.MultipleSecularisms 15

SIXPRO-DIVERSITYCONCEPTS 161.Freedomofconscienceand‘opensecularism’ 162.Non-Othering:Jansen 173.Non-AlienationandEstablishment 184.MulticulturalisingModerateSecularism 215.‘Respectall,PositiveCooperation,PrincipledDistance’Model 226.RespectforDeepDiversity 23IterativeContextualism 24

CONCLUSION 26REFERENCES 27


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SecularismastheGovernanceofReligionThis paper seeks to develop an analytical reflection on the normative basis for state-religionrelationsandthegovernanceofreligiousdiversityandasociologicalreflectiononviableformsofreligiousdiversitygovernance.Tothisenditdevelopsadiscussionofthinking aroundmodels and varieties of secularism (the governance of religion) andreligion-politics relations, and then considers a seriesof concepts relating to religiousdiversity. ThepaperthuspresentstheconceptualframeworkforoneofthecentralaspectsoftheGREASE project, namely the relationship between secularism and the diversity ofreligiousgovernance.TheprojectisaEuropeanengagementwithcertainotherpartsoftheworld.ThusweofferacharacterisationofamainstreamWesternEuropeanmodeofpolitical secularism, so thatwemay then askhowwell it canbe adapted tomeet thegovernance of the new post-immigration multi-faith diversity of Western and otherparts ofEurope, and towhat extent it illuminates and/or canbe adapted tomeet thecircumstancesofsomeotherpartsoftheworld.Equallyimportantly,whatcanbelearntfrom other parts of the world that can be helpful for the governance of religiousdiversityinEurope?We address these questions by explainingwhatwemean by political secularism andthen go on to briefly offer a history of the emergence, development and diffusion ofpolitical secularism aswell as resistance to it and consequent adaptations. It sets outcharacteristicsoftrendsofsecularismandatypologyofvarietiesofsecularismthatcanbediscerned.Wethenpresentthedominantcontemporaryversionofthegovernanceofreligion inN.W.Europe. Turning todiversity, it explores six pro-diversity concepts; itsuggests that while each is important, three are insufficient. It, however, goes on toidentify three that canoffer anunderstandingof thegovernanceof religiousdiversityandsoonwhichtheGREASEprojectcanbebuilton.Thisleadstothequestionofhowconceptscanbeappliedindifferentregionsoftheworldbybrieflyoutliningamethodofiterativecontextualismorcross-contextualism.

‘Crisisofsecularism’?Theremay be various reasons to rethink political secularismbut themost significanttoday, certainly in Western Europe, is the multicultural challenge. It is clear WestEuropeanstatesarenowhighlyexercisedbythechallengesposedbypost-immigrationethno-religious diversity and that, despite a long history of Muslim presence on thecontinent, it is thenewMuslimsettlementsof the last fiftyyearsor so thatareat the


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centreofit.1Forsomethepivotaldateis9/11,but1988-89bettermarksitsoriginsasthatwastheperiodofTheSatanicVersesAffairintheUKandl’affairefoulardinFrance(Modood 2012).Moreover, emerging out of processes precipitated by the collapse ofCommunism in Europe in 1989, coupled with, and fuelled by, recent socio-economiccrises in Europe “fears and suspicion towards minority claims are coupled with arenewed emphasis on the nation state as the most important geopolitical and socio-economic unit” (Triandafyllidou, 2017: 28). This brings nation and religion into a“dangerousliaison”,where“nationprovidesforsolidityandsafetyinaglobalisedworldwhile religion provides for a convenient Significant Other at the national and globallevelsagainstwhomtoascertainculturalandpoliticalsuperiority”(ibid:29).Moreover,itisduringthisperiodthatpoliticaltheoristsfromoutsidethewestbegintomake prominent contributions to political thinking and theorising on debates aboutsecularism, many bringing an alternative perspective to western debates and issues.These contributions themselveswere provoked by both issues arising in thewest aswellasinthecountryorregionofthewriter.ThiscanbeseenintheworkofTalalAsad,whosegenealogicalinterestwasasmuchinthecolonialsecularismofEgyptaswithhowcountries likeBritainandFranceweremanaging theirnewMuslimpopulations (Asad1993 and2003).RajeevBhargava (1998)was one of the first to spark thenormativedebate,bringingaperspectivederivedfromIndia.Hisinterventionwasprovokedbothby considerations and debates in India, notably the Shah Bano case in 1985 and thedemolition ofBabriMasjid inAyodha in 1992 (marked in India asmajor blows to itsstatesecularism),aswellasaddressingtheperceived ‘crisis’ofsecularisminthewestthat Bhargava highlighted and that underpins his contributions to the Anglophonedebates.InEurope,especiallyWesternEurope,secularpolitiesanddeclineinbeliefinandscopeofreligion,showsnosignofreversingthelongtermfadingawayofChristianity.ManyEuropeansarehappy to thinkof their countries and their continent aspost-Christian.There-thinkingofsecularisminEuropeislargelyduetothefactofreligiousdiversityina context of pro-diversity sensibilities and ethics rather than a reversal of previousdeclines.Groupsandcontroversiesdefined in termsofraceor foreignnesscametoberedefined as well as self-define in terms of religion and how the accommodation ofMuslims came to be the dominant issue in relation tomulticulturalismhas nowbeenwellestablished(Modood,2005and2007/2013).Suchdynamicshavebeencapturedbywhat Levey refers to as three intersecting ‘fault-lines’; these being, religion-politics,religion-multiculturalism, and Islam-Muslims/multiculturalism2(2009: 2), which haveemerged subsequent to each other but continue to dynamically intersect rather thanrepresentsequentialreplacement. It is importanttonoteherethoughvariationwithinEurope, where countries in Eastern and Southern Europe report higher degrees ofreligiosityandhigherlevelsofimportanceforreligionasacorepartofnationalidentity

1 As Akbar Ahmed nicely put it, these settlements mark a Europe-Islam ‘encounter of the third kind’, the previous two being the centuries when Muslims ruled over parts of Europe -Spain and the Balkans – and when Europeans ruled over nearly all the Muslim world (Ahmed 1989). 2 It should be noted that in this section ‘multiculturalism’ is meant in its descriptive sense, denoting ethnic and religious diversity, rather than its substantive theoretical sense, on which see p.16 below


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thandoWesternEuropeancountries(Pew,2018),whilealsoexhibitingearlystagesofthe secularisation that characterises Western Europe. At the same time there hasemerged a backlash against multiculturalism, which sometimes harks back to aChristianEuropeanidentityandsometimesassertsasecularEuropeanism.

WhatisPoliticalSecularism? Asastartingpoint,wecandistinguishbetweenthreeanalyticallydistinctlevelsofwhatmightbemeantwhentalkingaboutthesecular:metaphysics,sociology,andpolitics.Thefirst,metaphysics,relatestobeliefsaboutwhatultimatelyexists,e.g.,theismoratheism.Thesecond,sociologicallevel,relatestowaysofliving,socialorganisation,personalandfamily activities and religious practices. The third, politics, relates to politicalarrangementsandtheplaceofreligionaspartofthesearrangements.Itiswiththislevelthatthispaperisdirectlyconcerned.Notably,youcanbeasecularistinanyoneofthesewithoutbeingsowithregard to theother two.Forexample,a theistcanbeapoliticalsecularist;or,anatheistoranagnosticmaylikeattendingreligiousservicesforculturalreasons.EveninthecommunistRepublicofChina,forexample,“religiousactivityseemstobeembeddedinafullysecularlife”(vanderVeer,2012:725). Withthis focusandtowardtheaimsstatedabove,weadoptaminimalistdefinitionofpolitical secularism. This minimalist definition offers two distinct advantages. Otherstendtostartwithfreedomofreligionortoleration.buttheythencannotexplaininwhatways plainly secularist regimes like the former USSR and China are secularist states.Moreover, too thick a definition of secularism with, for instance, a focus on a strictchurch-stateseparationmayfailtoseestateswithstate-religionconnexionsofvariousextentsandtypesas‘properly’secular.Thisissignificantnotleastbecause“nocountryworldwidecanbeclassifiedasadoptingthepure,theorized‘separation’model”(Perezand Fox, 2018: 2). Indeed, nearly a third of all western democracies have an officialreligion and more than half of all 47 democracies in the Polity data-set officially orunofficiallygivepreferencetoonereligion.Mostoftheothersgivepreferencetomorethan one religion (Perez and Fox, 2018). It is better, then, to start with what allsecularisms have in common and then build up a normative account of, for example,liberal secularism, democratic secularism, moderate secularism, or multiculturalistsecularismetc.Itisclearthatallofthesearebasedonprinciplesandvaluesthatcanbemade compatible with a version of secularism but that each goes beyond baresecularism.Thiswayalsoallowsustoseethatthereisavarietyofpoliticalsecularisms–bothnormativelyandacrosstheworld-andthewaysinwhichtheydiffer.Theminimalistdefinitionofpoliticalsecularismofferedis:“The core idea of political secularism is the idea of political autonomy, namely thatpolitics or the state has a raisond’etre of its own and should not be subordinated toreligiousauthority,religiouspurposesorreligiousreasons”(Modood,2017:354).


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Thiscoreideaofpoliticalsecularismthoughisaone-waytypeofautonomy.Secularismcan additionally be supportive of autonomy of organised religion and freedom ofreligion too, as in the USA, but it does not have to be. Where there is a two-wayautonomy, it does notmean strict separation of the type characterising theUSA. It isconsistent with some government control of religion, some interference in religion,somesupportforreligion,andsomecooperationwith(selected)religiousorganisationsand religious purposes. Nevertheless, state control and support of religion must notcompromise the autonomy of politics and statecraft: it must be largely justifiable inpolitical terms, not just religious reasons, and itmust not restrict (butmay support)politicalauthorityandstateaction(Modood2012).Mutual autonomy – but not strict separation – has historically emerged as the liberaldemocratic version and the one that is most widespread today. For such secularists,religious freedom is one of the most essential and cherished political values. In thatsense, secularism is a secondary concept, dependent on the concept of religion.However,oncethereisaconceptofsecularism–withadvocates,promoters,supportivemonarch,armedmilitants,andsoon–thenithasadialecticalrelationshipwithreligion.Secularism is not merely defined as ‘the other’ of religion. It also redefines religion,intellectuallyandpolitically,tosuitsecularistvaluesandpurposes(Asad2003).Inthisway,insecularistcountrieswhatweregardasreligiontoday(an‘innerlife’,a‘belief’,aprivatematter) is amuchmore socially restricted set of activities, relationships, andforms of authority thanwas the case before secularism’s rise to power, or thanwhatprevailsinnon-secularistcountriestoday.Onceanoutgrowthofreligiousarrangements(‘secular’ordersofmonkswerethoseunconfinedtomonasteries),secularismhascometodefineorredefinereligionanditsproperplaceinmanycountriesintheworld.New thinking about political secularism has suggested that secularism is, in itsessentials,reallyabout‘managingdiversity’(Taylor2009;alsoTaylor2014).Thishasacontemporarypertinence; indeed, itemphasiseswhat iscentralyetunder-appreciatedtoday, but it cannot be right as a definition of political secularism. If there was noreligiousdiversity inacountryor in theworld, ifonlyonereligionwaspresent, therewould still be a question about the relationship between religion and politics and‘politicalautonomy’wouldstillbeasuitableanswer.Moreover,secularismisnotananswertoquestionsaboutanykindofdiversity(suchaslinguistic diversity). It arises specifically in relation to religion, to the power andauthority of religion, and the challenge it may pose to political rule or, say, equalityamongstcitizens(Bilgrami2014).Weshouldnotattributeliberals’concerntonottreatreligionasspecial(EisgruberandSager2009)tosecularism.Forsecularistsreligion isspecial; their concern to delimit the sphere of religion is not extended to economics,science,theartsandsoonbutissingularlytargetedonreligion.Thespecialdelimitingofreligionisalsoevidentinliberals’callsforreligiousidentitytobedepoliticizedinawaythatwouldnotbeaskedofethno-cultural identitieswhen it comes to theadvocacyofrespectfor‘difference’(e.g.Kymlicka,1995).


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TalalAsad–whocanperhapsclaimtobethefounderofaninfluentialapproachtothestudy of secularism in the Western academy – has argued that the very concept ofreligionasabounded,legallytoleratedandregulatedactivityisaninventionofWesternelites, first imposed onWestern societies and then imposed on the rest of theworld(Asad, 1993, 2003). Indeed, there does seem to be a point here.While philosophers,scientistsandartistsdefinewhat isandisnotphilosophy,scienceandartrespectively(evenwherethatisinternallycontestedwithintheseactivitiesandchangesovertime).Yet, at least in the modern West, the state and political movements are involved indefiningandregulatingwhatisandisnotreligion.IfrelationsbetweenthestateandtheeconomyisadefiningquestionoflatermodernityintheWest,itspredecessorquestion– the question of early modernity – is that of the relation between the state andorganisedreligion. It isaquestionwhichbythethirdquarterofthetwentiethcenturyseemedmoreorlesssettledintheWestbutwhichhasre-emergedtowardstheendofthetwentiethcentury.

Historicaltrends

A.FromtheWestHistorically, at least in theWest, religion and politics, church and state have enjoyedvariouslinkagesandtheemergenceofdemocraticEuropewasgradualandevolutionary(shorn of the teleological connotation sometimes associated with this term). Theselinkagesbegan tobereduced in thenineteenthand twentiethcenturiesandwemightsee four related developments (Casanova, 1994). The long-term origins of thismovementcanbetracedbacktotheReformation(seealso,forexample,Gregory,2012).Initially, the linkages between religion and politics became more intense as religionbecame the basis for rebellion, civil war and international conflict for more than acentury.TheTreatyofWestphalia(1648),buildingontheTreatyofAugsburg(1555),ismarkedasthemomentwhenitwasrecognisedthatpeaceinWesternEuropewasonlypossibleifeachcountrywasallowedtohaveanofficialstatereligionwhileatthesametime desisting from persecuting dissenters and minorities. The formation of nation-statesandnormalisingofstatereligionswas insomewaystheoppositeofsecularism,butitestablishedthatstateshadarighttoregulatereligionwithintheirbordersandledtoaprocessofreligiousandculturalhomogenisation,thenormsofwhichprevailinthepublic domain today (Mahajan, 2017: 79). From theWestphalian settlement of cuiusregio, eius religio a trajectory thatwould pass through ideas of religious tolerance, tostate neutrality and privatised religion was set in motion. The third and fourthdevelopments related here are the growth of modern capitalism (and the ‘spirit’ ofcapitalism), and the earlymodern scientific revolution. Together, these developmentsresultedinthegradualandincreasingcircumscriptionofreligionfromareasofpoliticsandsociallife.Secularismproper–oratleastamoredevelopedversion-emergeswiththeAmericanrevolution(1776)whichledtothedisestablishmentofastatereligioninthe name of religious freedom; and the French revolution (1789), with its ideal offreedom from religion, at least in the public sphere. Nevertheless, most of WesternEuropefollowedagentlerpath,neitherthestrictstate-religionseparationoftheUS,northedenudingofthepublicsphereinthemannerofFrenchlaïcité.


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Laïcité,however,becamepartofsocialism,especiallyrevolutionaryMarxism-Leninism,whichlegitimisedthesuppressionofreligion,aswellasoftheTurkishstatefoundedin1923. The latter’s approach to modernisation involved control and utilising of Islamrather than a communist eradication of religion. In Western Europe, state-religionconnexionspersistedbuttheyweregraduallylessenedasontheonehandchurcheshadlessinfluenceonpoliticalaffairsand,ontheotherhand,disabilitiesagainstChristiansofthenon-dominantdenominationandagainstJewswererelaxedandfinallyabolished.

B.AlternativetrendsEuropeanpowerstookthesesecularistideasandpracticeswiththemastheyinstitutedglobalempires.Insomecases,suchasEastAsia,thecategoriesofreligionandsecularitybegan entering non-western contexts in the mid-sixteenth century, even if theirdefinitionsremainedcomparativelyunformedfromwhattheywouldlaterbecome,andtheseearlymoderncolonialencounterswouldplayanimportantroleinthesecategoriesenteringnon-westerndiscoursesmoreprominentlyfromtheendofthe18thcenturyandthe period of western colonial hegemony (Casanova, 2018). India’s development ofsecularism owes something to the British colonial administration’s entrenching ofreligiousdifferencesbasedontextualsources,ratherthanthediverseandoverlappingpatterns of practices (Mahajan, 2013: 71-72). Subsequent anti-colonial movementsincluded the radically secularist, as in the case of Mao in Communist China, but alsoresistancetosecularism.Gandhi, for instance, infusedIndiannationalism,especiallyatthe level of the masses, with an ethical or spiritual Hinduism or religious pluralism,becomingthefirstnationalisttomobilisemasses throughareligion.MohammedAliJinnah, not a strictly practising Muslim, responded with a religious nationalismspecificallydesignedforIndianMuslims,whichledtothecreationofPakistanin1947,the firstmodern state based on a religious identity. Yet, at independence IndiandebatesovertherelationofreligionandthestateinIndiareflectedarangeofviewsthatin some ways drew on a framework of a liberal democratic imaginary but which,importantly, mediated these through alternative frameworks of understanding andmeaningdrawingonIndia’shistory, itspresentanddistinctivechallengesinmanagingmulti-dimensional diversity, and an imagined for future (Mahajan, 2013). Thiswouldproduce a distinctive model of secularism and contributions to political theory onsecularism.Thereare,then,importantcontextualdifferencesbetweennon-westernandwesternmodels thatbeardirectlyon thedebatesand formsof secularism indifferentregionsandcountries.IntheWest,followingtheTreatyofWestphalia,politieshadbeen(made)religiouslyhomogenous toasignificantextent.Bycontrast, India, forexample,wascharacterisedbyadeepreligiousdiversityanddifferencesuchthatat the timeofIndependence the issueofcommunity-specific rights for religiousgroupscouldnotbeignoredinthewritingoftheconstitution(Bhargava,2009).AyearafterPakistan,asecondreligious-identitystate,Israel,wasfounded,andnotablyby secular Jews, albeitwithnumerous concessions to leadersofOrthodox Judaism. Inthese states, a religious identity has been used as a form of collective identificationaround which to organise for purposes of statecraft or political mobilisation and,


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moreover,maybemobilisedassuchbythoseforwhomitoperatesinasecularratherthanreligiousway.Thatis,theweightofreligiousidentitymayfallasmuch,ifnotmorethan or even totally, on ethnic and cultural aspects as distinct from any particularlyreligiousmeaning. It isworthnotingherealso, that this is thecase forbothareligion(here Islam) conceived as universal as well as one (Judaism) conceived in moreboundedandnationalterms.Thiscounter-secularist trendof theoppressedcouldbesaidtoreach itsapogee intheIranianrevolutionof1979.Ledbyacleric,theAyatollahKhomeni,itwasthecompleterepudiation of the Westphalian idea that the state should assert its authority bychoosing and regulating an official religion. Khomeni instituted the doctrine of thevilayat-i-faqih, that the supreme religious authority (himself) should be the supremestateauthority,withavetooverthedecisionsofparliamentandgovernment.Thisformoftheocraticcontrolofamodernstateapparatus(Juergensmeyer,1996)wasareligiousrevolution based on Shi’a Islam which was the mirror-opposite of the Westernprogressivism,whichassumed thatmodernitymeant the fadingawayof religion fromhuman affairs and emancipation meant the overthrow of religious authority. Whilesharing some of the goal of justice and democracy of secular progressivism andrevolutionary movements, the Iranian revolution ended up with a state ruled by atheocratic elite from the majority religion – what may be called theocraticmajoritarianism – even though many of the features it took owed to contextualfeaturessuchasantagonismswiththeUSandthewarwithIraq.FromthereonithasseemedtosomeWesternobservers,thattherehasbeena‘returnofGod’ or a ‘worldwide rise of religious nationalism’ (Juergensmeyer, 1996). Furtherexamples of this have beenmovements since the 1990s that have sought to bring in‘Islamismthroughtheballotbox’,althoughusuallythwartedbythemilitarysupportedor acquiesced in by the West, as in Algeria and Egypt. A religion-identity basedmajoritarian nationalism (Hindutva) has become a powerful force in India, andaccompanied by violence against minorities, especially Muslims, challenges India’sconstitutional secularism (vanderVeer2012).While these counter-trends aremostlyfromoutside theWestandoftenareanti-imperialistoranti-Westernhegemony, therehave also been counter-secular trends andmovementswithin theWest. Two notableexamplesaretheReligiousRightintheUnitedStatesfromthe1970s,andthesignificantroleplayedbytheCatholicChurchinPoland,notleastitsroleinbringingabouttheendofcommunism.Suchmodels are of course subject to change and contestation fromwithin.Over timeJinnah’sidentity-nationalismhashadtocompetewithanIslamismforwhomidentityisnot enough and seeks institutionalisation of aspects of shari’a. This swing to a moreideological form of religious nationalism has, for example, led to the exclusion of theAhmadiyyacommunityandtoapersecutionoftheShiaandChristiansthattheStateisunable tostampout (SSaeed,2007). Israel,asa “Jewishdemocracy” (Cohen-Almagor,2017) isanexampleofastatethatmayhaveaformofreligiousnationalism, inwhichOrthodox Judaism exerts considerable power and influence, producing complex andblurredboundariesbetweenthereligiousandsecular,andtheerosionofbasicrightsfor


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non-Orthodox Jews and non-Jews (Cohen-Almagor, 2017; Ben-Porat, 2017). AnotherexampleisAtaturk’sTurkey,whichsoughttocontrolandutilisereligion;through,forexample, the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) the state defined whatconstituted Turkish Islam and wrote Friday sermons to be delivered by the imams.Turkish secularism has been variously described by commentators as ‘militant,‘authoritarian’, ‘oppressive’, ‘pathological’, and ‘assertive’, although history is moreambivalent about this (Gülalp, 2017; Sevinc et al. 2017). At times, such as in the firstdecadeofthemillennium, ithasbeensomeIslamists,suchastheAKP,whohavebeenable to frame their political project in liberal terms of human rights and freedoms,although again swings are evident between a more open, and as in recent years,authoritarian and assertive tendencies, all these trends operating within the sameinstitutionalframework(Gülalp,2017).InlookingattherelationbetweenreligionandpoliticsoutsidetheWestwe,then,needto distinguish between: i) diversity-friendly critiques and adaptations ofsecularisms,ontheonehand,andii)anti-secularismontheotherhand;andbetweeniii) identity-based religious majoritarianism nationalism and iv) a theocraticmajoritarianism. This is in addition to the earlier distinction made between v)authoritarian secularism as the political control of religion and vi) ‘mutualautonomy’, which includes vii) Western Europeanmoderate secularism from viii)other versions of liberal democratic secularisms, suchas theUSandFrench,allofwhicharebeingchallengedbythe issueof thegovernanceofanew,post-immigrationreligious diversity. This is not meant to be a comprehensive typology covering allcountries and nor is it to imply that a country must fit only one category. It is tointroduce some key distinctions, some ofwhich are often overlooked,we believe areusefulinunderstandingthecomplexlandscapeofstate-religionconnexions(SRCs).

ModerateSecularismWe now turn to a detailed characterisation of contemporary Western Europeangovernanceofreligion,whichunfortunatelyhasbeenbadlyservedbypoliticaltheorists(Modood, 2010). For many intellectuals, especially political theorists, secularism orWesternsecularismhasbeenunderstoodintermsofthereligious-libertysecularismoftheUSAand/ortheequalityofcitizenshipsecularismorlaïcitéofFrance.Asamatteroffact,neitherofthesemodelsapproximatesparticularlycloselytochurch-staterelationsamongstWestEuropeancountriesbeyondFrance,whereavarietyofpatternsoflegal-constitutional and non-legal constitutional regulation and relations can be found. InGermany, the Catholic and Protestant Churches are constitutionally recognisedcorporations, forwhom the statedoesnotonly collectvoluntary taxesbut the churchwelfareorganisations,takentogether,arethelargestrecipientsoffundingtonon-statewelfare providers (Lewicki, 2014). Denmark has a system of classes of recognition,producingatieredsetofrightsandprivilegesinrelationtothestate(Laegaard,2012).In Belgium, a number of religions have constitutional entitlements and a nationalCouncilofReligionsenjoysthesupportofthemonarch.Norway,DenmarkandEnglandeachhavean ‘established’Church (even ifonly ‘weakly’established),Swedenhadonetill 2001 and Finland has two. In Italy, Ireland and Poland the Catholic church is


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powerfulandinfluential,albeitdistinctfromstatestructures(foralternativetypologies,see Koenig, 2009, Madeley, 2009, Stepan 2011 and Ferrari, 2012). Yet despite theseconnexionsbetweenstateandreligion,itwouldbedifficulttodisputethatthesestatesarenotamongsttheleadingsecularstatesintheworld–moreprecisely,onecouldonlydisputethatifonehadsomenarrow,abstractmodelofsecularismthatoneinsistedonapplyingtothevarietiesofempiricalcases.So,weneedaconceptionofsecularismthatfits this European, in particular N.W. European reality, with a partial exception ofFrance.We term this West European governance of religion, ‘moderate secularism’ andcharacteriseitintermsoffivefeatures,whichincombinationleadtoitsdistinctiveness,including from US and French models (Modood 2017). Some scholars furtherdifferentiatewhatweunite, butour level of analysis at this stageworks is to identifywhat they have in common.3It is important to stress that these features describe thenormative character of aspects of themost liberal democratic states of contemporaryEurope,thatis,thesearenotfeaturesofanarchaicorilliberalprivilegingofreligion:1. Mutual autonomy, not mutual exclusion or one-sided control. This is notdistinctiveto ‘moderatesecularism’,asit iscentraltoUSliberalsecularismtoo,andtosomeextentFranceaswell,whichleansmoretowardsone-sidedcontrolthantheUSorotherWesternEuropeancountries.2. Religion is a public good, not just a private good.Organisedreligioncanplayasignificant role in relation toethical voice (Habermas2006)general socialwell-being,cultural heritage, national ceremonies, and national identity. This can take variousforms,suchas:havinginputintoalegislativeforum,suchastheHouseofLordsintheUK,oronmoralandwelfareissues;beingsocialpartnerswiththestateinthedeliveryofeducation,health,andcaringservices;ormoreintangibly,inbuildingsocialcapitalandthe production of attitudes that create, for example, family stability, a compassionatecivil society or economic hope. Of course, the public good that religion contributes iscontextual;religioncan, inothercontexts,besociallydivisiveandcanleadtocivilandinternationalwars.Hencereligioncanalsobeapublicharm.Thepointisthatreligion’scontributions are not confined to private lives; they are socially and politicallysignificantinmanydifferentways,andneedtobeaddressedbythestate.3.ThenationalChurchorchurches(organisersofthispublicgood)belongstothepeopleand thecountry,not just to its religiousmembersandclergy.Allcitizens,regardlessofmembership,canfeelthatthenationalchurchshouldmeetcertainnationalstandards not expected of religious organisations in general. For example, when theChurch of England’s ruling body, the Synod, failed in 2012 to achieve the two-thirdsmajoritynecessarytopermit femaleBishops,manysecularcommentatorsfelt thattheChurch of England had let the country down, while the absence of female Catholic3 Stepan (2011), for example, distinguishes between two models within what we call moderate secularism, namely ‘The “Established Religion” Model’ and ‘The “Positive Accommodation” Model. We do not quarrel with this helpful distinction (equally helpful are the other models that Stepan identifies). Moderate secularism encompasses the two and so characterises what they have in common.


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priests or female imams is not part of a national conversation. The loud criticism bythosewhoarenotactiveAnglicansdidplayapartintheChurch’sreversalofitsdecisionin 2014. The Lutheran Church inDenmark, as another example, is almost universallythought by Danes to be an element, perhaps a central element of Danish nationalidentity, even thoughonlyaminority say theybelieve in itsdoctrinesandeven fewerworshipintheChurch(Jenkins2011).Intheseandother‘moderatesecular’countries,even atheists feel that they have a right to use the national Church forweddings andfunerals.Relatedly, theAnglicanChurch’ssensethat ithasadutytoservethecountryhasmeantthatithasinrecentyearsoftenspokenuponbehalfofethnicandreligiousminorities.The latterhavecometoappreciatethat itspresencesignifies thatreligiousidentities – including those of minorities – may be a feature of national belonging(Modood1997).4.Itislegitimateforthestatetobeinvolvedinelicitingthepublicgoodthatcomesfrom organised religion, and not just to protect the public good from dangersposed by organised religion. If recognised as public goods, then, depending on thecircumstances, it may be decided that they are best achieved through some state-religionconnexions(SRCs)ratherthanstrictseparation.Thisisacontingentmatter,butthe experience of Western Europe is that some connexions are better than none. Ofcourse,ashasbeensaid,religioncanalsobea‘publicharm’,sinceitmayserveasabasisforprejudice,discrimination, intolerance, sectarianism,social conflict,violence,andsoon, so the state has a responsibility to prevent harm as well as enhance the good(Modood2010).Aswithpublicgoods,sowithpublicharms,theinterestofthestatewillnot be primarily theological, or taking preferential sides for or against one religionregardless of consequences; the statewill bemotivated by fostering andmaintainingtangibleandintangiblepublic–or‘secular’–goods.Thekeyconsiderationforthestatewillnotbesecular ‘purity’. Instead,thestateshallensurethatthemeansandendsareconsistentwith,andeffectivelyserve,secularrationales,withoutconstraintbya fetishfor‘separation’(Bhargava2009partlybuildsthisfetishforseparationintohisdefinitionof political secularism). In recent years, concerns about Islamist terrorism and‘radicalisation’ have led states to extol and condemn certain kinds of Islam, to co-optcertainMuslimgroupsintogovernance,andtoengageinmattersofimamtrainingandthe schooling of Muslim children (in relation to England, see O’Toole et al. 2013).Moreover, if religiousorganisationsare supportedwithpublic funds,or taskedby thestatetocarryoutsomeeducationalorwelfareduties,thenthestatewillwanttoensurethat theydonotcompromisekeypolicygoals.That iswhyreligiousorganizationsareincreasingly subject to certain legal requirements such as equal access or non-discrimination–atleastinsomeEuropeanstates,suchasBritain,moresothanotherssuchasGermany(Lewicki2014)-andwhenreligiousorganisationsarepubliclyfundedto deliver social services, citizens have options to receive the same services by non-religiousorganisations.5.Moderatesecularismcantakedifferentformsindifferenttimesandplaces,andnotallformsofreligiousestablishmentshouldberuledoutwithoutattendingtospecific cases. State-religion connexions take different forms in different WestEuropean countries depending on their histories, traditions, political cultures, and


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religiouscomposition,whichallmaychangeovertime.Oneoftheformsitmaytakeis‘establishment’. Formal establishment is only found in a minority of countries, yetneverthelessitisoneoftheformsthatmoderatesecularismtakes.Evenwhenitdoesso,this complex of norms andpracticesmay be called ‘moderate secularism’ rather than‘moderate establishment’ (as Dworkin 2006 labels Britain; see also ‘modestestablishment’ of Laborde 2013) because it is secularism not establishment that is incharge:theplaceforreligionandestablishmentisdependentonsecularist institutionsanddecision-makersreferringtosecularistvaluesandprinciples.It isclearthatthisiswhat exists in practice. Both in relation to the church-state relations narrowlyconceived,or intermsofanexpansivesociologicalanalysis,governingpowerlieswithsecularistinstitutions,networks,andindividualsemployingsecularidentities,interests,and goals.Moderate secularism is not something to contrastwith religion; religion isalreadya componentof it; it is thegovernanceofaparticularwayof relating religionwithstatepowerandpolitics.So,moderatesecularismisnotanabstractpoliticaltheorymodel but is a conceptualisation of a historically evolved set of arrangements andpractices,formalandinformal.It should be clear, then, moderate secularism does not promote the idea of political authority/autonomy in an anti-religious way, rather it allows organised religion and religious motives to play their part in contributing to the public good (Modood, 2010). This may be taken to be a form of privileging religion and of course it is. What must be borne in mind is that few if any states uniquely privilege religion. Whether our criteria is the expenditure of tax revenues, management by the government or symbolic status as ‘national’ or teaching in state schools, most states privilege various sectors of the economy, science and universities, museums, areas of natural beauty, the arts and sport and so on – all matters strictly outside the sphere of political authority (see Modood, 2016). So apart from extreme libertarians and anarchists, most people rightly have no problem with the idea of state privileging various social activities and judge each case on its merits – what has been called ‘multiplex privileging’ (ibid). The term multiplex conjoins multiple and complex in order to get at the complex ways in which “the state typically engages in not merely multiple cases of privileging, but moreover [that] the privileging is not all of one basic kind” Modood, 2016: 192).

Challengesand(Re)orientationsHavingpresentedanaccountofsecularismasthegovernanceofreligion,culminatingina characterisation of the main West European model as moderate secularism, andpointing out its virtues, in themanner of aWeberian ideal type,we now turn to thequestion of how itmight normatively relate to religious diversity. Beforewe directlyengage with this, we will place our approach on a larger map of how scholars andpublics have been thinking about secularism in the recent period. In the currentchanging social and political context three (re)orientationswith regard to secularismcanbediscerned.


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1NewHardlinersSome (re)assert a hard/radical/muscular secularism. This has been prominent, forexample, among US constitutionalists, New laïcité, and New Atheist movements. InEurope, these new hardliners have frequently been occupied with a refusal of theaccommodationofMuslimsandIslam,which“bec[a]methenecessaryEuropeanOther”both internally and externally (Trinadafyllidou, 2017: 29; see also Hellyer 2009),reinforcingarejectionofmulticulturalism.

2NewAccommodationistsLiberaltheoristshaveatleastinpartacceptedthechargeofsecularistdominationandthatsuchdominationisnotmerelyapoliticalambitionbutbuiltintotheveryconceptsofliberalism.JohnRawls,theleadingliberalphilosopherofthelasthalfcenturyhadinhisearlyworkexpoundedapurelyrationalconceptionofjusticebuttowardstheendofhis life felt itnecessary torevisit theconceptofpublic reason toshowthat itwasnotideologicallysecularistandaccommodatedreligiousvoicesinthepublicsquare(Rawls,1997). Jurgen Habermas has engaged in similar revisionary accommodation and hasdescribed the current epochas ‘post-secular’ (Habermas,2006).By ‘post’ hedoesnotmeanitasin‘post-feminism’or‘post-racial’,somethingthatwehavegonebeyondandleftbehind.Rather,his‘post’isambiguouslysuggestiveofanew,reflexivephaseofthesecular (here the ‘post’ is as in ‘postmodern’ and as in ‘post-colonial’), whichemphaticallymeanswehavenotgonebeyondtheepochmarkedbythesuffix.CharlesTaylor disavows the vocabulary of ‘post-secular’, preferring to describe the relevantperiodof revisionasoneof rethinkingsecularismashe is clear thatours is ‘a secularage’(Taylor,2007).

3.MultipleSecularismsA more historical/national identity sensitive interpretation of ‘multiple secularisms’,especiallyregardingaccommodationofnewdiversityhasalsoemerged.Scholarstodayare increasingly locating themselves within not just a perspective that demands werethinkpoliticalsecularisminthelightofdiversitywithinandacrosssocieties,butthatweacknowledgethatsecularismishighlycontextual.Ashasbeguntobeevident fromthehistorical sketchabove, secularism takes adifferent shapedependingon the statetraditionsandpoliticalcultureofasocietyaswellasofwhichreligionorreligionsitiscontouredaround–secularandreligionbeingcorrelative,mutuallyinformingconceptsandmutuallyshapingeachotherinvariedpermutations.Itisinpartforthisreasonthatpath-dependent formations of state-religion relations and governance of religiousdiversitybasedonhistoricalcontingencyandcontextualismareanemphasisedfeatureoftheliterature(Bader,2013;Stepan,2011;Enyedi,2003).Thismeans thatwe are talking of ‘multiple secularisms’ both bywidening our scopeoutsidetheWest,butalsowithintheWest(Taylor1998,Casanova2009,Calhounetal2011, Stepan2010).Taking thispoint further,we recognise thatmultiple secularismsare an aspect of the wider theoretical and sociological understanding that the veryphenomenon of modernity has to be understood in terms of ‘multiple modernities’(Eisenstadt 2000). This approach rejects the association of modernisation with


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Westernisation,thattobecomemodernallsocietieshavetofollowthepathoftheWestand become like the West. Eisenstadt recognises that Western modes of modernitycontinueto'enjoyhistoricalprecedence'andserveas'abasicreferencepointforothers',butthelasthalfcenturyhasmadeplainthat“Westernpatternsofmodernityarenottheonly ‘authentic’modernities” available for concrete societal expression (ibid). Rather,differentpartsoftheworldaremodernisingintheirownwaysandthisrefersnotleastto developments concerning religion, secularity, diversity and governance. This raisesno small challengewhen it comes to abstractly determiningwhat some contexts andmodelsmaylearnoradoptfromothersuchmodels(Parekh,2017),apointwewillpickuplater.TheapproachofthispaperandofGREASEfallsclearlyintothisthirdcategory.Weshalltherefore take theargument forward in twoways.Firstly,wewillexploresuggestionsthat have been made by some theorists on how secularism should govern religiousdiversity.Weshall in thisregardconsidersixpro-diversitynormativeconcepts.Thesedeal with the diversity internal to a polity. Our project however is a mapping andexplorationofthediversitythatexistsacrosscountries,indeedeightdifferentregionsoftheworld. So, secondly and briefly,wewill present ourmethod for conceptually andnormativelyengagingwiththisglobaldiversityofmultiplesecularisms.

Six Pro-Diversity Concepts We now consider six pro-diversity normative concepts. We shall argue that the firstthreearetoo limited,whilst theotherthreeareresources for thinking–sociologicallyandnormatively–aboutthegovernanceofreligiousdiversity inEuropeandtheotherregions included in this project (for a fuller discussion of the first four concepts, seeModood2019).Theyofferabasis fordialogicalorcross-contextual learningabout thepossibilitiesofthegovernanceofreligiousdiversitytoday,positivelyandnegatively.4

1.Freedomofconscienceand‘opensecularism’‘Opensecularism’(BouchardandTaylor2008;Maclure&Taylor,2011)positsamodelwhichseeksthestate’sneutralityinrelationtoreligiousdiversitywhilstrecognisingthesignificance of the spiritual dimension so central and important for many religiousadherents. To recognise the spiritual dimension central tomany people’s lives, at thecentre of this model is the protection of individuals’ freedom of conscience. Fourprinciplesof secularismarebalanced:1) themoralequalityofpersons;2) freedomofconscienceandreligion;3)theseparationofChurchandState;and4)stateneutralityinrespectof religious anddeep-seated secular convictions. (BouchardandTaylor, 2008:21).Thebalancedistinguishesbetween1)and2),whichformthe“essentialoutcomesofsecularism” (ibid) and the institutional structures, 3) and 4), for achieving 1) and 2).

4 We must make it clear that our discussion of the various authors below is not a discussion of their mode of secularism as a whole; our interest is in picking out one concept that we think is central to that position and fruitful to discuss, given the objectives and space limitations of this paper.


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Thisdowngradingoftheseparationofchurchandstatetoaninessentialrequirementofsecular principles is amovement towards the historic secularism ofWestern Europe,but it falls short of moderate secularism. For Taylor and McLure, SRCs are judgedprimarilyintermsofamoralindividualism,whereasinmoderatesecularism,theymayserve the public good in material or symbolic terms, eg., contributing to a sense ofnationalidentity.Moreover, the admirable appreciation of the profound moral character of religiousindividuals it isnotextended togroups that sustain thismoral character, thus fallingshortof the typeofpositiverecognitionadvocatedbymulticulturalsecularism,aswillbeseenshortly.5Furthermore,itisnotclearthatthedesiretomaintainstateneutralityinrelationtoreligiousconsciencecanbeachieved.Claimsofconscience–eg.,thatone’sreligionrequirestimeofffromwork-requiresthecourtstoadjudicateonthesincerityofareligiousconvictionofan individualand thusunavoidablyruleonwhatcountsassincerityofbeliefbasedonsomeinterpretivestandards.For these reasons we conclude that here equality is principally conceived to meanequalityofindividualsinordertoensureandprotectthelibertyofsovereignindividualswithinastatestrugglingtobeneutralandsothisistoolimitedaconceptionofdiversity.Moralequalityofpersonsand freedomofconscienceare importantconstraintsonthegovernanceofreligiousdiversitybuttheydonotthemselvesconstituteamodelforthelatter.

2.Non-Othering:JansenYolande Jansen explicitly defends a multiculturalist secularism (Jansen 2014). With a focus on French laïcité, she shows how even in a context of republican universalism, the process of incorporating Jews led French society and the French state to demand that the Jews surrender their communal lives, an extraordinary pressure not experienced by most other French people in the nineteenth or early twentieth century – but faced by Muslims today. On her interpretation, Jansen’s solution is a multiculturalism opposing the ascriptive and stereotypical images that French society creates for groups such as Jews and Muslims, while demanding of individual Jews and Muslims that they publicly distance themselves from these imagined undesirable groups by distancing themselves from their communities. Opposition to such demands upon minorities about how they should live is the multiculturalist opposition to what Jansen calls ‘secularisation’. We endorse Jansen’s conclusion that such ‘secularisation’ is a form of coercive assimilation incompatible with multiculturalism, but this does not in itself make it compatible with multiculturalism. Anti-ascription and anti-assimilation are not sufficient for multiculturalism. Merely opposing othering is not institutional accommodation, yet the latter is crucial to multiculturalism – in just the same way that accommodation is a defining feature of moderate secularism.

5AndthereforefallingshortofthekindofrecognitionthatTaylorhasmadefamousandwhichhethinksisnecessarytounderstandwhymanyQuebeckersfeeltheyarenotrespectedwithinCanadianfederalism(Taylor1994).


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3.Non-AlienationandEstablishmentBhargava’s interpretation of a multiculturalist sensibility has judged that moderatesecularismis‘irretrievablyflawed’–whileithasaccommodatedChristians,itwillnotbeabletoaccommodateMuslims(2015).ForBhargava,moderatesecularismispartoftheproblem,notthesolution,sinceitcannotbereformed.HeclaimsthattheChristianbiasinherent to any established religion, something akin to the Anglican Church’sestablishment in Britain, indicates that even a reformed version will alienate BritishMuslims.6Cecile Labordemakes a similar argument. She argues ‘all citizens shouldbeabletonottofeelalienatedbytheirpoliticalinstitutionsinlightoftheirdeepestbeliefs,and that institutions should consequently be framedwith that aim inmind’ (Laborde2013:84).AfundamentalproblemwithBhargava’sandLaborde’sargumentshereisthattheydonot supply any empirical evidence. If we look at the relevant data from the well-documentedcaseofBritain,weseethattheevidencedoesnotsupporttheirargument.Forexample,theevidenceisofastrongsenseofBritishidentificationandnationalprideamongstMuslimsinBritain.AnanalysisoftwoCitizenshipSurveyshasconcluded,‘Wefind no evidence that Muslims or people of Pakistani heritage were in general lessattached to Britain than were other religions or ethnic groups’ (Heath and Roberts2008).’ This has in fact been the finding of many surveys, with one concluding that‘overallBritishMuslimsaremorelikelytobebothpatrioticandoptimisticaboutBritainthan are the white British community’ (Wind-Cowie and Gregory 2011). In lateFebruary, 2015 95% ofMuslims in a BBC survey said they felt loyal to Britain (BBC,2015).BritishMuslims do includemany vociferous political groups, and they havemountedmanyarguments,nottomentioncampaigns,inrelationtosocio-economicdeprivation,religious discrimination, incitement to religious hatred, various foreign policies, anti-terroristpolicies,andsoon(Modood2010).SoitisthecasethatMuslimsinBritaindoseem to feel excluded and alienated by certain aspects of British society, and indeedEuropean society – and this is a critically important datum for multiculturalism toengage with. Yet there is no record of any criticism by a Muslim group against theAnglican Church’s establishment. On the other hand, many Muslims complain thatBritain is too unreligious and anti-religious, too hedonistic, too consumerist, toomaterialist, and so on. Muslims protest farmore vigorously about secularist bans onmodest female clothing, such as the headscarf (banned in French state schools since2004) and the face veil (banned inpublic places in France and elsewhere inEurope),thantheydoabout‘establishment’orChristianprivileges.

6 Unlike, Bhargava argues, India. The subsequent and sustained success of the BJP’s Hindutva politics suggests that a question mark hangs over Indian secularism no less than over any other. India has its own scale of communal domination and violence, especially against Muslims and lower castes/harijans (untouchables) which go far beyond anything encountered in the Islamophobic west.


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Muslimsandotherreligiousminoritiesappreciatethatestablishmentisarecognitionbythestateof thepublicandnational significanceof religion.That recognitionholdsoutthe prospect of extending state-religion connexions. Disestablishment, by contrast,would foreclose that prospectwithout conferring any benefits to religiousminorities.Thisappreciationofestablishmentbyreligiousminoritiesispartlytheresultofthefactthat the Church of England takes its mission to serve the country quite seriously,includingthegoalofincorporatingnewminorityfaithcommunitiesintoitsvisionforthecountry and for the Church’s own sense of its responsibilities (Modood 1997).WhenPrimeMinisterDavidCameron,duringthe2011Christmasseason,saidthatitshouldbeassertedthatBritainis‘aChristiancountry’(BBC,2011)–thefirsttimeaBritishPrimeMinisterhadspokenlikethatinalongtime–itwaswelcomedbyIbrahimMogra,thentheChairmanof theMosqueCommittee of theMCB, and later theAssistant SecretaryGeneral(ibid.).ThesemattersdonotargueforthemistakenviewthatIslamophobiaisnotanissueinBritain,orthatMuslimsdonot feelalienatedinBritain,butonlypointtothewaythatthese concerns make very little reference to Christianity, let alone the Anglicanestablishment.ReligiousminoritiessuchasMuslimsaremorelikelytobealienatedbythekindofsecularstate thatLabordeargues for,onewhichshe thinks isunavoidablymore suited to non-religious citizens than religious citizens (Laborde 2008: 88), andequallyalienated–indeedaggrieved-bythekindofsecularstatethatactivelyseekstoreformaspectsof IslamasBhargavaadvocates(Bhargava2014).Bhargavathinks thatmoderate secularism, which is supposedly unreformable, should be replaced by thediversity-friendlysecularismthatdevelopedinIndia.GiventhathedoesnotdiscusshowtheIndianstatehasfailedtoeradicatethehighlevelsofreligiousviolenceinIndia,andfailed to protect Muslims from massacres and systematic discrimination, thisrecommendationmustbetreatedwithcaution(Sutton2014;Blacketal2014:.2).In her important new book, Laborde attempts to circumvent the need for empiricalevidence by contending that “what matters is not what governments intend tocommunicate, nor how citizens subjectively perceive it but, rather, whethergovernmental messages express objectively appropriate attitudes toward people”(2017:135).Shenowstatesclearlythat‘[w]hatmattersisnotthesubjectivefeelingofalienation but, rather, whether the social meaning of particular displays can beobjectivelyconstruedasdisparaging[ofcivic/insiderstatus].Objectivesocialmeaningiscontext-dependent but not individual-dependent; it turns on how a reasonable (andreasonably well-informed)member of a community would understand the actions ofpublicofficialswhoundertaketodisplaymaterialthathasreligiouscontent’(ibid,p.85).Yet,what if there isnota consensuson the socialmeaningof establishmentamongst,say,Britishcitizens?Thereferencetothereasonablepersonbeingreasonablyinformedsuggests that(s)heneedsto take intoaccountsomeempiricaldata,andpresumably itwould be reasonable that this should include the view of Muslims (and others). Weknow that at anyone time there canbedisagreement on for examplewhat counts assexual and racial harassment, andwomen andminorities sometimes have to educateothers. Giving voice to minorities and encouraging the majority to be genuinely


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dialogicallyopen is certainly themulticulturalistpositionhere (Parekh2000;Modood2017b).ReturningtotheMuslimcase,manypeoplethinkthattheniqab(thefaceveil)and/orthehijab(theheadscarf)isoppressiveofwomenandsostateactiontobantheminpublicplaces is liberatingand isnot alienating.But thiswouldnotbea reasonableview if it did not seek evidence fromMuslimwomen. Indeed, given that they are theobjectoftheanalysisandthatstateactionisbeingcalledforontheirbehalf,itwouldbereasonable togive specialweight to theperspectiveofMuslimwomen, rather than tothe reasonable person. So, similarly in case of theAnglican establishment andBritishMuslims. Yet this presumes that the negative status of minority religious identity issustained by symbolic establishment and not, for example, by racialization, cultural‘othering’,ormuscularformsofliberalsecularismthatwouldsqueezereligionfromthepublic sphere. Disestablishment without some institutionalised religious pluralismwouldmeanthegeneralpublicdevaluingofreligionandcouldmakegroupslikeBritishMuslims more alienated than the status quo. So, we should not assume that staterecognition of one or some religions is the only potential source of alienation on thismatter; strict state-religion separation can alsomake alienatedor aggrieved those forwhom their religious identity is especially important to them and subjectively andobjectively diminish their civic standing. Which is a further reason why minorityperspectivescannotbeassumedtobeunderstoodbysimplyengagingina ‘reasonableperson’exerciseandwithoutallowingtheminoritytospeakforthemselves.Importantly,thepositionoftheestablishedChurchremainssignificantasitmeansthereisaspace forreligion inpublic life,and thusapossibleresourceagainstalienationonreligious grounds (Modood, 1997; Rothschild, 1997; Singh, 1997). Indeed, theestablishedChurchhasprovedavaluableinter-faithallyforminorityfaithsingainingafoothold in the public sphere, providing institutional access to make claims forrecognitionand for cooperationbetween the stateand religiousgroups.That calls fordisestablishmentcomeoverwhelminglyfromsecularistsratherthanfromminorityfaithgroups is telling. In fact, rather than the extant institutional arrangements that haveemerged historically being an insuperable barrier to inclusion and accommodation ofminorityfaiths,thehistoricalprecedentofthestateeventuallyaccommodatingreligiousminorities has proved an advantage and reference point for Muslims seeking suchrecognition.In relation to diversity, then, we should not assume without empirical inquiry thatestablishment or existing SRCs are a barrier to multi-faith equality and should bedismantled.ItmaybethecasethatwhatisbestisnotdismantlingbuttheinclusionofminoritiesintoexistingandnewSRCs.ThisisaveryimportantargumentthatisignoredinpoliticaltheoryandsowehavegoneintotheBritishcaseinsomelengthtoshowhowoutoftouchthepoliticaltheoristsinquestionarewithempiricalrealities.Asithappens,it turns out ‘there is no cross-country empirical data demonstrating that religiousminorities in states, democratic or otherwise, that support the majority religion (viavariouspolicies)growresentfulofthestateoritsorgans’(Perez,FoxandMcClure2017:441).


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Fromthethreepro-diversityconceptswehavediscussedsofar,wecomeawaywithtwoconclusions. Firstly, that these three concepts are largely about righting a negativeaspect of diversity (not interfering with conscience, overcoming ‘othering’ andalienation) and so provide an insufficient normativity for the governance of religiousdiversity. Secondly, however, each has some value that should be features of anormative account. We now turn to the three concepts that we believe rectify thatinsufficiencyandsoarefruitfulforthisproject.

4.MulticulturalisingModerateSecularismIn a number of countries since the 1960s, a new way of thinking and organisingminority-majority relations has emerged. Initially associated with the new socialmovementsandidentitypoliticsofgender,race,andsexuality, inWesternEuropeit isidentified with the institutional accommodation of post-immigration ethno-religiousminorities, which we shall call ‘multiculturalism’ (Modood 2007). It marks a newconceptionofequality.Multiculturalismisnotjustanti-discrimination,thesamenessoftreatment, and the toleration of ‘difference’, but also a respect for difference. Thisrespect is not simply about equal rightsdespitedifferences, but about equality as theaccommodation of difference in the public space, which can be shared rather thandominatedby themajority. Insteadof creatinga sharpdistinctionbetween thepublicsphereofrightsandcivicrelationsandaprivatesphere(ofmale-femalerelations,sexualorientation, or religious belief), the public sphere reflects various norms and theinterestsofall.This genuine equality requires dropping the pretence of ‘difference blindness’, andallowsmarginalisedminorities to also be visible and explicitly accommodated in thepublicsphere.7Thisequalitywillsometimesrequireenforcinguniformityof treatmentandeliminatingdiscriminationagainst(forexample)religiousaffiliation,anditmayalsorequire therecognitionofdistinctivedisadvantages (suchasmeasures to increase thenumberofwomeninalegislature)orspecialneeds(suchastheprovisionofhalalmeatin state schools). Finally, multiculturalism as amode of post-immigration integrationinvolves not just the reversal of marginalisation but also a remaking of nationalcitizenship,sothatallcanenjoyasenseofbelonging.InthecaseofFrance,therecouldbeawayofbeingFrenchthatJewsandMuslims,aswellasCatholicsandsecularists,canpossess(Modood2007).Thismulticulturalistchallenge8,atonetimeseentogowiththe flowof liberalism–ofhuman rights, racial equality, decomposition of collectivities such as the nation – isproperly understood as requiring not just the reform and extension of liberaldemocratic institutionsbut a re-thinkingof liberalism. In this it contrastswith liberal

7 Will Kymlicka rightly argues that the ‘state unavoidably promotes certain cultural identities, and thereby disadvantages others’ (Kymlicka 1995: 108), but he excludes religion and ethnoreligious groups from ‘cultural identities’ (see also, Werbner, 2012 and Wieviorka, 2012). 8 As distinct from the ‘multicultural’ challenge outlined above; that is, one stemming from the mere fact of diversity.


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approaches in so far as it isnot aiming toderiveor justifyaposition from liberalism,althoughiscontextuallyconsistentwith liberal-democratic-constitutionalism(Modood,2016).Thisegalitariandifference-sensitiveaccommodationofreligiousidentitieswithinmoderate secularism is what is meant bymulticulturalising moderate secularism (ormulticulturalisedsecularism,forshort).Amulticulturalist recognitionof ethnoreligious identitiesdoesnot however consist ofendorsingthetruthofanyreligion(s)(Modood2007/2013).Itisidentityrecognitionasa form of equal citizenship and inclusion but without any strong evaluation orendorsementofanyidentitiesorwaysoflife.Insofarasthereisanendorsement,itisanendorsementof co-membership, including the identitiesof thegroupsendorsedasbelonging,notendorsementofbeliefsorpractices.Forexample,aPresidenttattendinganiftar,theeatingofamealtobreakthedailyfastinRamadan,isnotendorsingIslaminpreference to non-Islam or raising those who fast above those who do not. She isendorsingthatIslamispartofthecountry,notaskinganyonetofollowitoruncriticallyendorsinganyandeverybelieforpracticethatsomeonesaysisIslamic.Itisinthissensethatmulticulturalismdoes not simply seek freedomof conscience, non-othering, non-discriminationorareligion-neutralstate:equalcitizenshiprequirespositiveinclusivitythrough identity recognition and institutional accommodation, so that all can have asense of belonging to the national citizenship without having to privatise ethnic orreligiousgroupidentitiesimportanttothem.

5.‘Respectall,PositiveCooperation,PrincipledDistance’ModelOur fifth and sixth pro-diversity concepts both stem from considering cases of thegovernance of religion from outside the West. Significantly, these models and theirreligiousdiversityhaveemergedoutofquitedifferenthistoricalprocessesandpatternsfromthoseofWesternEuropeandthediversityinquestionishistoricandnotformedby recent immigration. In these countries, negotiating a model to respond to thecircumstancesandchallengesofnewlyindependentandreligiouslyheterogenousstatesmeantquitedifferent“innovativeformulasofaccommodation”(Stepan,2011:140)andavarietyofpolitics-religionrelationsnecessarilyemerged.Stepan (2011), designatingmodels from concrete contextual cases, presents amodel,whichlikemoderatelysecularcountriesisbasedon‘mutualautonomy’(seep.3above),yetcontrastswiththeminimportantwaysinthatitrepresentsamorepronouncedformof religionandreligiousdiversityoccupyingamoreemphasisedposition in thepublicsphere. He outlines this model with reference to Indonesia, Senegal and India andoutlinesthreefeaturesthatdistinguishit.Thefirst isrespectforminorityandmajorityreligionsinthepublicsphere. InIndonesia,for example, based on the doctrine of Pancasila the state recognises the five largestorganised religions in addition to themajority religion, Islam, andpositively supportsandprotects themandrequiresall citizens to identifywithoneof them. It,moreover,mandatesmoreholidaysforminorityreligionscombinedthanfortheMuslimmajority


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(also,onIndia,Mahajan2017:82).InSenegal,likewise,Catholicreligiousholidaysmakeup a disproportionate share of the state’s compulsory holidays and bothMuslim andCatholicfaithleadersattendstateevents(Stepan2011).Thisformofrespectcontrastswith the patterns of majority privilege in this regard found in moderately secularEurope. The second feature, positive cooperation, denotes not just positiveaccommodation, but forms of policy cooperation (ibid: 131). This promotes themultivocality of religions, which in turn provides scope for religious reasons andreligiousarguments inpublicdebateson thebasis thatwhere, forexample,humanorcitizens’rightsviolationsaresupportedbyreligiousargumentsfromsome,thesecanberesponded to and countered effectively by religious reasons and religiously basedarguments. Religionsandreligiousreasons are therefore valued as a public good, as asource of that good, and as dialogical partners and shapers in policy. We are not,therefore, just talking about the governance of religion by a secular politics, or ofstrugglesbetweensecularandreligiousreasons.The third feature is thatofprincipleddistance,which Stepanborrows fromBhargava, andwhichposits both support for allreligionsalongsidelegitimatestateinterferencetocontendwithbothinterreligiousandintrareligiousdomination.Whilestateactionmustbebasedonsecularprinciples,itcanoffermoresupporttodisadvantagedreligions;butalsolegitimatelyinterferemorewithonereligionthananotherifthatreligionisviolatingcitizens’rights(Bhargava2009).

6.RespectforDeepDiversityOurfinalpro-diversitymodelisthatdescribedbyGurpreetMahajan,withreferencetothecaseofIndia,whoalsoidentifiesanhistoricalprocesswith“alonghistoryoflivingwithreligiousdifferencesandtheabsenceofahomogeneouspublicsphere”,whichhasresultedinfarmorefamiliaritywithvisibledifferencesandculturaldifferences,bothofwhichhavebeenactivelypresentinthepublicdomainforcenturies.Thisfamiliarityinturnhasresultedinthedevelopmentofareligiousliteracyandcompetence,forexamplein decoding symbols, so that differences do not appear immediately strange orthreatening(Mahajan,2017:80).MahajanarguesthatamoderateformofsecularismiscertainlypreferabletotheUSorFrenchmodels, at least as an ‘enabling condition’ (Mahajan, 2017:85), and in severalwaysappears close tomulticulturalised secularism.Yet forMahajan,multiculturalisedsecularismisnotenoughforaccommodatingandvaluingreligiousandculturaldiversityif it does not embrace the idea that the state assist (often by making necessaryarrangements) for thecollectiveobservanceof religiouspractices forall communities,includingthemajority.InadditiontothefeaturesaboveoftheIndiancontext,Mahajanhighlights that it is also characterised by “a weak and incomplete process ofsecularisation” and religion enjoys a unique personal and social significance, and theright to religious practice as well as worship has been preserved in Article 25 of theIndianConstitution(ibid:83/86;2013;2015).Thishasresulted indifferentiated legalandpolicyoutcomesfordifferentreligiousgroupsandtheirindividualmembers(2013:84) and, rather than individual freedom liberating the individual from the group,“individualsenjoyedthelibertytoliveinaccordancewiththecustomsandpracticesoftheir community. In fact, the statewasexpected toensure that facilitiesnecessary for


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theexerciseofthislibertywereprovided”(Mahajan,2007:331).Significantly,whilethestatedoesholdcompetence intheareaofreligion, throughthe ‘essentialpractice’ test(2013:92),andbasiclibertiesareprotected,MahajannoteshowtheSupremeCourt,onbalance,hastendedtowardsreligiousratherthanindividualliberty(2013;2015).Thereisthenarespectfordeepdiversitythat“hasstructured[India’s]polityandnurtureditsmulticulturaldemocracy”(2007:330-331).Subsequently, Mahajan argues that “while [western secular states] help to securefreedomofbeliefandconscience forall, theirattitudetowardsreligiouspractices is,atbest,ambiguous…theyconsiderthemtobelikeanyotherlifestylepreferenceorsetoffreelychosenbeliefs, ignoring thatreligiousobservancesareclosely tied toaperson’ssense of dignity and respect, a constitutive element of their very self, and hence[experiencedas]somethingmorethan[merely]aninfringementofone’sbasicfreedom[of ‘choice’]” (Mahajan, 2017: 76-77, emphasis added). Religion then is ‘more thanidentity’,itsconstitutionalplaceinthepublicdomainaverypartofthe“fabricofIndia”(2013:83-86).Thisthen,representsadifferentsocialethicwithregardstoreligionanditsvaluationthaninWesternEurope;avaluationofreligionwhichmayexceedthevalueplaceduponpoliticalautonomyinthesentimentsthatgovernsociety.Itmaybethatthissocialethic,togetherwiththehistoricexperienceofdeepdiversityiswhatdifferentiatesthissixthpro-diversityconceptfromaEuropean-derivedmulticulturalisedsecularism.

IterativeContextualismAllsixoftheabovepro-diversityconceptsarecriteriaforidentifyingandevaluatingthegovernanceofreligiousdiversityandcanbeusedforthispurposeintheeightregionsofGREASE investigation.Even those– suchas the first three–whichwearguedare toolimited, are still important. Other things being equal, their absence is likely to limitegalitariandemocracyormulticulturalism.This is particularly the case ifwe considerthe issueofnon-alienation(the thirdconceptabove)not just in termsofavoidanceofreligious bias but also the grievances that radical secularism can generate amongstthosewhosereligious identity isofparticularsignificancetothemselves.Wethereforemust askourselveswhether the conceptsweare identifying as resources forGREASEwill‘travel’,andifso,how?Thelastthingwewanttodoistoimposeasinglenormativeconceptionuponallthecaseswestudy,not leastgiventheemphasisoncontext inthethreepro-diversityconceptualisationswehavearguedforpositively(6.4,6.5,6.6).Yet,this clearly is a normative project and so there must be normative evaluation andnormative learning.We propose, therefore, amethod of cross-contextual inquiry thathasbeenoutlinedinarecentpaperunderthenameof‘iterativecontextualism’(ModoodandThompson2018). It isanapproach that isnot tied toa singlenational contextorpoliticaltraditionorculturebutitgivessignificantweighttothesecontextsandculturesinitstheorisinginatleastthreeimportantways.Firstly,itinsiststhatpoliticalideasand‘isms’, includingtheprinciplesofacademicpoliticaltheory,gettheirmeaningfromthecontextstheyhavebeenextrapolatedoutoforengagedwith.TheconceptoflibertyhasasimilarbutdifferentmeaningintheUSA,FranceandBritain.Atheoristwhosethinkingwasformedinoneofthesecontextswouldreflectthatcontext.Whentheyappliedtheirconcept tooneof theother countries theywouldhave an imperfectunderstandingof


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thatcontextortheycouldproductivelyrevisetheirconceptofliberty.Doingthelatterisclearlythewayforwardbutitmeansthatthecontexthaschangedtheconcept.Indeed,everyengagementwithacontext,everytimetheconceptoflibertyistakenonanouting,itwillhave toundergosomechange to reflect thecross-contextualvariety.Thusevenabstractprinciplessuchaslibertyarereflectiveofthecontextsthathavebeenengagedwith. So the search for generality is hollow unless it is about accommodating therichnessofcontextualdifferencesratherthanabstractingthemout.Second,theoristsshouldtakecontextsseriouslyasthenetworkofnorms,practicesandinstitutionsthatconstituteacontextareoneswhichpeoplehavecometoidentifywith–they are not just bits of organisational machinery but are a socio-cultural ecology inwhichpeoplehavemadeandacrossgenerationsdevelopedidentityinvestments.Whilethis does not mean that contexts cannot be criticised, the fact of those identityinvestments impliesadutyofcareon thepartofcritics.Whilst therewillalwaysbealimit to how far this can be practiced, the point applies to majority and minoritypractices alike. The last point to mention from this article is how to understand thepossibility of reform and deliberate change. Oakeshott argues that political traditionsare ‘neither fixed nor finished’, have ‘no changeless centre’ and no part of them is‘immune fromchange’ (Oakeshott1962:128).Sometimesmisunderstoodasachange-aversetraditionalist,Oakeshott’spointistheopposite:nopracticeisstaticandthereisno fixed, singular direction of change or progress. Rather, he argues, every politicalcontext,givessomeindicationor‘intimation’ofwhatchangesarepossible,appropriate,necessaryandsoon.Thesearemattersofjudgementnotofrationaldeductivesolutionsbut again they point to the importance of understanding the specificity of a context:reformation means a deeper understanding of the specific case and of what isproblematicwithinit(ModoodandThompson2018).The theoriston thisaccountpasses through fourmethodological and iterativephases,which together build towards the formulation of principles: generating principles,refiningprinciples,revisingprinciples,andapplyingprinciples.Asintheoriginalpaper,toillustratethemethodwecanusetheexampleofhatespeechandequality,beginningwiththequestionofwhether legislationonhatespeechshouldbeextendedto includehatred on the grounds of religious belief as well as racial hatred in the context ofEngland Wales. In the first phase, generating principles (ibid: 346), the theorist willbeginwith the legislationconcernedwithhatespeechandothercognate legislation inordertodeterminethenormornormsmostrelevant.Inthiscasethenormofequalityisseen as the best guide and, assessing the question of the extension of hate speechlegislation, determines that on grounds of equality it should be extended to includereligioushatespeechinthecontextofEnglandandWales.Inthesecondphase,refiningprinciples (ibid: 347), the theorist begins by applying the principle of equality to analternative context. Applying this to examine hate speech in France, the theorist willnotice that an important aspect of the legislation in the French context is that ofreputationaldamage(fromArticles32and33oftheLawoftheFreedomofthePressof1881).Considerationof this leads the theorist toconcludethathatespeech legislationshouldbeextendedtoprotectgroupsdefinedbytheirsexualorientationalso.ThiscanthenbeappliedtotheoriginalcontextofEnglandandWales.Thisprocesssofarcanbe


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repeated by looking at other contexts, following which the theorist may add furtherrefinementsanddetails.This circularprocess, avariationofCarens’s (2004)reflectivedisequilibrium,may leadnotjusttotherefinementofaprinciplethroughadditionsofnuanceanddetailbutmayalsoleadtoarevisingoftheprinciple.Thetheorist inourexamplewilldeterminethattheEuropeanConventionofHumanRightsand thecase lawof theEuropeanCourtofHuman Rights is relevant as a regional legal regime. Here she will consider how theCourt considers a balance between the right to freedomof expression andwhether acase of hate speech constitutes an abuse of that right because it negates other of theConvention’sfundamentalvalues.Here,shemayfindthatthevaluesoftolerance,socialpeaceandnon-discriminationoverridefreedomofspeechincertaincases.Inthiscase,afurther objective of hate speech legislation is to protect these fundamental values.Revising the concept in this way may mean she also decides to drop the earlieradjustmentofgroupdefamationandthus thescopeof theprinciple is furtherrevised.The revised principle may then be used to make revised judgements of the pluralcontextsbeingconsidered.Inthefourthphasethetheoristapplies(ibid:349)theprincipleinawaythatgainssomecritical distance from a particular context in order to critically assess the contextualnormsunderconsideration.Thisismadepossibleasthroughtheprocessofgenerating,refining and revising the principlemeans that the general principle no longer simplymatchesanyoneof thecontextsunderconsideration, itwillbeatvariancewithalloftheminsomewayandasaresultprovidesacriticalstandardofjudgementforeach.Inapplying the principle, however, the contextualist theorist is subject to three types ofconstraintsuchthatthepeopleinanyonecontextarenotobligedtobringnormsinthatcontextinlinewiththegeneralprinciple.Practicalconstraints(ibid:351)meanthatthefeasibilityofdifferentcoursesofactionthatmayderivefromtheorisingmustbetakenintoaccountinacontext-sensitiveway;behaviouralconstraints(ibid)requirethathowwecan reasonablyexpectpeople tobehaveandchange theway theybehavemustbeconsidered; and normative constraints (ibid: 352) require that the ideals and valuesoperativeinacontextandvaluedbythepeoplewholivetherearealsoconsidered.Suchlimits are significant in that ignoring themwill affect the feasibility of implementingchanges to existing normative practices, values and behaviours, and therefore theefficacyandrelevanceofnormgeneration.This,then,providesuswithamethodwhichrecognisesthatwehavetobeginwithsomeconceptsandnormativeprinciples,suchasmoderatesecularismandthepro-diversitysix concepts above and yet is context-sensitive, It provides a method of applyingconceptstodifferentcontextswhilstexpectingthattheconceptswillinevitablyhavetoberefinedandrevisedintheprocessofapplication.Yet,finally,thatitispossibletobothrecognisethateachgovernanceof

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Insum,wehavearguedthatitisnecessarytobeginwithaminimaldefinitionofpoliticalsecularism, namely, political autonomy vis-à-vis religion. This has distinct advantagesforGREASE.Itisabletoencompasswithinitsscopestateswhicharerightlythoughtofas secular, but which would fall outside too thick a definition based on a lack ofseparation, as well as those states which are extremely restrictive of religion andreligious freedoms.With this width of contextual appreciation of secularism and thegovernanceof religiousdiversity inmind,weengagewith theempiricalvarietyof theeightregionsofthestudywiththedistinctionsthatwerearrivedatinthefirsthalfofthepaper.Theseare i)diversity-friendly critiques andadaptationsof secularisms,onthe one hand, and ii) anti-secularism on the other hand; and between iii) identity-basedreligiousmajoritarianismnationalismandiv)atheocraticmajoritarianism.We went on to identify moderate secularism as our Western European point ofdepartureaswecastawidegeographicalnetinordertoinquireintothegovernanceofreligiousdiversity.Wedo sobynoting thatnormativelyweare seeking to gobeyondfreedom of conscience , non-othering and a focus on state-religion connexions orseverances as the source of minority alienation. Positively, we shall use themulticulturalising ofmoderate secularism, the ‘respect all, positive co-operationandtheprincipleddistancemodel’andrespectfordeepdiversityasournormativeguides.Withthesebasesinmind,amethodologicalprocessofiterativecontextualismhasbeenproposed,designedtoallowsociologicalcross-contextually-sensitivitysothatwecananalyticallyidentifynormativeconceptsandresourcesforaprojectofdialogicalor cross-contextual learning about the possibilities of the governance of religiousdiversitytoday,positivelyandnegatively.

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Reference:GREASED1.1Thesoleresponsibilityofthispublicationlieswiththeauthors.TheEuropeanUnionisnotresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformationcontainedthereinAnyenquiriesregardingthispublicationshouldbesenttousat:[email protected];thomas.sealy@bristol.ac.ukThisdocumentisavailablefordownloadathttps://grease.eui.eu/

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