Section 3

The Chinese American Community

Chinese Americans have made essential contributions to almost every aspect of American

life for over a century. Although they form a vital strand in the social fabric of the United

States, Beijing also views Chinese Americans as members of a worldwide Chinese diaspora

that, whatever the actual citizenship of individuals may be, presumes them to retain

not only an interest in the welfare of China but also a loosely defined cultural, and even

political, allegiance to the so-called Motherland (祖国). Under Xi Jinping’s leadership,

diaspora Chinese have been called on to help achieve the Rejuvenation of the Chinese

Nation—a summons that places growing pressure on ethnic Chinese around the world to

serve the “China Dream” (中国梦). While many overseas Chinese do feel pride in China as a

country and the Chinese as a race, Beijing’s claims on their loyalty can have the untoward

effect of calling into question their devotion to their own home nations.

Under both the Nationalist and Communist parties, overseas Chinese have played an

important role in modern Chinese politics as well as in China’s relations with the outside

world. Diaspora communities worldwide have been key sources of legitimacy and support

for whatever government held power in Beijing, but just as often they have been centers of

antigovernment agitation. With PRC influence-seeking activities now expanding, China’s

long-standing focus on diaspora communities has also intensified to become an important

element in overall US-China relations. Such trends demand not only greater societal

attention and understanding but also an appropriate response from the US government

as well as non-governmental institutions.

As the Chinese Communist Party seeks to encourage, even entice, ethnic-Chinese

communities and individuals overseas to more fully support its interests, the Chinese

Americans in the United States and other free societies need to better inform themselves

as to the nature of this dynamic, and our governmental institutions may need to do more

to defend their freedoms against harmfully intrusive and coercive activities. At the same

time, it is essential that we not allow overseas Chinese as an ethnic group to fall under

any kind indiscriminate cloud of suspicion. Above all, it is important to bear in mind

that while ethnic Chinese can be quite naturally expected to take an interest in things

Chinese, it is the Chinese Communist Party that puts a target on their backs through its

presumption that they are all somehow the “sons and daughters of the Yellow Emperor”

( 炎黄子孙) and thus owe some measure of loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party.

30

The Chinese American Community

Origins and Structure

From the 1950s to the 1970s, when the United States maintained an alliance with the

regime of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan, pro-PRC organizations faced challenges gaining

traction in the United States. During the 1950s, the FBI, aided by pro-Kuomintang security

organizations, closely monitored their activities and participants. This antagonistic state

of affairs began to change after President Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972.1 On

February 24, 1973, more than forty Chinese on the East Coast, most of them immigrants

from Taiwan, established the Washington Association to Promote China Unification to

help advocate for Beijing’s official positions. One of the founders was a professor at the

University of Maryland who was actively involved in organizations that already supported

China’s position on Taiwan and Tibet.2 However, a more beneficial contribution came

in the form of advancing US-China scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges that

started to be promoted by a growing number of preeminent Chinese American scientists,

engineers, and academics who were also advising the Chinese government to launch

reforms in science and education. These Chinese Americans were also personally helping

them establish various programs to bring thousands of talented Chinese students to

American institutions of learning.

Recognizing the achievements, influence, and growth of the Chinese diaspora, Beijing

undertook a systematic program designed to target and exploit overseas Chinese

communities as a means of furthering its own political, economic, and security interests.

The Beijing government used specialized bureaucracies to manage what it called “united

front” activities abroad. Organizations such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office inside

the Communist Party Central Committee’s United Front Work Department3 and the State

Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office led the charge. Almost all of these agencies have established

nongovernmental fronts overseas, including the China Council for the Promotion of

Peaceful National Reunification, the China Overseas Exchange Association, and the China

Overseas Friendship Association.4 Other “united front” organizations, such as the Chinese

Enterprise Association and other Chinese chambers of commerce, are almost always linked

both to the United Front Work Department and to the Ministry of Commerce.

Following the violent crackdown on the prodemocracy movement in Beijing on June 4,

1989, the Chinese Communist Party redoubled its efforts to reach out to overseas Chinese.

Many members of these communities had supported the student democracy movement,

providing funds and safe havens for fleeing dissidents. But senior Chinese leader Deng

Xiaoping was not dissuaded. In 1989 and again in 1993, he spoke of the “unique

opportunity” overseas Chinese offered the PRC. Deng insisted that by drawing on their

help, China could break out of international isolation and improve its international

political standing. Gaining influence over overseas Chinese groups in order to “turn them

into propaganda bases for China” became an important task of overseas Chinese united

front work.5

31

Section 3

In China, all of the organizations involved in outreach to the overseas Chinese community

are led by senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Sun Chunlan, the former

head of the United Front Work Department, is listed as the president of the China Overseas

Friendship Association and the executive vice president of the China Council to Promote

Peaceful Reunification. The head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Qiu Yuanping, also

leads the China Overseas Exchange Association. Madame Qiu has a career background with

the Party’s International Liaison Department. The president of the China Council for the

Promotion of Peaceful Reunification is none other than Yu Zhengsheng, the former chairman

of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and a former member of the

Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.6

Goals and Methods

The key goal of the Party’s united front work with overseas Chinese is to gain support for

the Communist Party’s efforts to modernize the country by convincing members of overseas

Chinese communities that the Party is the sole representative of China and to isolate

competing forces that the Party perceives to be adversarial, or even hostile. For example,

as part of a massive campaign to monitor, control, and even intimidate China’s ethnic

minorities (no matter where in the world they are), Chinese authorities are creating a global

registry of Uighurs who live outside of China. Chinese authorities threatening to detain

Uighur relatives who remain in China if they do not provide personal information of their

relatives living abroad to the Chinese police. This campaign has particularly targeted Uighurs

living in Germany but is now reaching Uighurs in the United States as well.7 Uighurs are not

alone; Tibetan exiles living in the United States have long reported similar campaigns against

members of their families and community. Chinese security officials have even been known

to travel to America on tourist visas to exert pressure on Chinese dissidents living here.8 FBI

agents have contacted prominent Chinese exiles in the United States offering them protection

from Chinese agents who might travel to the United States to menace them.9

For most Chinese Americans, however, China’s efforts to influence them are far more

anodyne. The official description of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO) states

its purpose as: “to enhance unity and friendship in overseas Chinese communities; to

maintain contact with and support overseas Chinese media and Chinese language schools;

[and] to increase cooperation and exchanges between overseas Chinese and China related

to the economy, science, culture and education.” Over the past three decades, the OCAO

has dispatched former reporters and editors from the OCAO-run China News Service to

establish pro-Beijing Chinese media organizations in the West. (Chinese officials have

described such Chinese-language media outlets, schools, and other kinds of organizations as

the “three treasures” (三宝) of united front work overseas.)10

Officials from Beijing have stated clearly that they do not view overseas Chinese as simple

citizens of foreign countries, but rather as “overseas compatriots” (华侨同胞们) who have both

32

The Chinese American Community

historical connections and responsibilities as “sons and daughters of the Yellow Emperor”

to support the PRC’s goals and the “China Dream.” As Xi Jinping11 described it in a 2014

speech to the Seventh Conference of Overseas Chinese Associations, “The Rejuvenation of

the Chinese Nation is a Dream shared by all Chinese” [emphasis added]. In January 2018,

Politburo member and former state counselor and foreign minister Yang Jiechi made this

presumption even clearer when he called upon the government to expand and strengthen

“Overseas Chinese Patriotic Friendly Forces” in the service of the “Great Rejuvenation” of

the Chinese nation.

In addition to appealing to the cultural affinities of Chinese Americans, the Chinese

government has also implemented a wide range of programs to strengthen ties with

elite members of this community. China has appointed hundreds of Chinese Americans

to positions in its united front organizations and provided thousands with free trips to

China, during which they have been feted by senior united front officials. In some cases,

Chinese Americans are offered senior positions in united front organizations. For example,

in 2013, one Chinese American, a native of Guangdong Province, became the first and

only foreigner to become a vice president of the Chinese Overseas Friendship Association

(COFA).12

China has used this tactic of handing out what one senior Chinese American called

“honors” to Chinese Americans as a way for united front departments, and even

espionage agencies, to cultivate contacts in the United States, often to the detriment of

other groups—such as Tibetans, Taiwanese independence supporters, supporters of the

Republic of China, Uighurs, prodemocracy activists, and other independent Chinese

voices with which the Party does not agree. Chinese Americans appointed to such

positions in organizations established by the Communist Party have subsequently led

protests against Taiwan and Tibet and participated in campaigns to silence Chinese

dissidents, such as the exiled billionaire Guo Wengui. For example, a Chinese American

who is a vice president of COFA spearheaded a campaign against Guo that was encouraged

by officials from the PRC. On a video posted to YouTube, this individual is seen railing

against Guo, vowing that he will “not rest” until Guo is returned to China to answer

charges against him.13

United Front organizations in China have been surprisingly aggressive and transparent

in their public tasking of Chinese Americans to carry out activities that support the PRC

policies. One example occurred after the 19th Party congress in October 2017. The state-

owned Fujian Daily reported on November 24, 2017, that representatives of local Chinese

community associations based in the United States, Australia, the Philippines, and Europe

had gathered in Fujian and received letters of appointment from local provincial and city

United Front agencies in China to serve officially as “overseas propaganda agents” on their

return to their home countries. These commissions obliged them to accept responsibility for

promoting the decisions of the Party’s recent national congress in their home countries. The

33

Section 3

article noted that this practice of offering Party commissions to overseas Chinese to work

overseas on united front tasks was not new. The president of the United Fujianese American

Association (美国福建公所) told reporters: “I have received quite a few letters of appointment

on previous occasions, but none for which I have felt such deep significance as the one

today. It’s a heavy responsibility.”14

Peaceful Reunification Councils

A key goal of PRC overseas activities is to convince, and sometimes pressure, Chinese in

the United States to accept that the PRC government in Beijing is the sole representative

of China and Chinese, and that the Republic of China on Taiwan is an illegitimate

government. To this end, in 1988, the Party’s United Front Work Department founded the

China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, and the Washington,

DC, Association to Promote China Unification was folded into the council. The DC

chapter’s assignment was to organize concerts, demonstrations, and other gatherings

to support the PRC.15 Other chapters soon opened, so that by 2018, the council had

established thirty-three in the United States and more than two hundred branches overseas.

In America, these organizations are generally registered as domestic nonprofit community

organizations, even though their leadership in Beijing includes senior members of the

Chinese Communist Party. Indeed, an article in the People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of

the Chinese Communist Party, spoke in glowing terms about how useful the Peaceful

Reunification Councils were in furthering China’s goals of taking over Taiwan, noting

that while chapters of the Peaceful Reunification Council complied with US law by

registering as nonprofits, they were established to support Chinese government policies

and coordinate activities with PRC consulates in the United States.16 “Over the years, the

China Peaceful Reunification Council in Northern California has actively cooperated

with the local Chinese consulate to work against ‘Taiwan independence’ and promote

national reunification activities, and has some influence in San Francisco’s overseas Chinese

community,” the Northern California Council candidly notes on its website.17

Around the United States, the councils count numerous prominent Chinese Americans as

members. For example, one successful California businesswoman was for years the honorary

chairwoman of the council in Northern California.18 While helping promote US-China

educational exchanges, this individual has also consistently advocated on behalf of PRC

policies in the United States, including China’s claims on Taiwan, and has helped to organize

demonstrations against “Taiwan independence.” She is listed as an advisor to the China

Overseas Exchange Association, which is part of the United Front Work Department.19

The Chinese government has also sought to co-opt local Chinese American community

associations to serve its goals.20 In the past, organizations such as regional associations,

known as Tongs (同乡会), had generally been close to the Nationalist government of Taiwan.

In San Francisco, however, that began to change as early as the 1980s when Soon Suey

34

The Chinese American Community

Sing, one of San Francisco’s six major community organizations representing Chinese

immigrants, became the first major Chinese group to fly the flag of the PRC on its building.

Then a second Tong declared its fealty to Beijing, and a competition broke out between the

PRC and Taiwan in San Francisco’s Chinatown to see which side could fly the most flags.

This competition can be vividly seen from the seventeenth floor of a public housing project

overlooking Chinatown, where PRC and Republic of China flags sit atop adjacent buildings

stretching into the horizon. The value of these associations to Beijing can be seen in this

example: When China’s president Xi Jinping visited the United States in September 2015,

one of the leaders of San Francisco’s local Chinese American community associations

was listed as first among twenty prominent Chinese Americans honored by the Chinese

president.21

Chinese Americans and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

Several Chinese Americans are so trusted by Beijing that they are direct participants

in China’s most prominent national united front body, the Chinese People’s Political

Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The preamble of China’s constitution defines the

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference as “a broadly based representative

organization of the united front which . . . will play a still more important role in the

country’s political and social life, in promoting friendship with other countries and in the

struggle for socialist modernization and for the reunification and unity of the country.”

In practice, the CPPCC has served as an important advisory committee to help legitimize

Chinese Communist Party’s rule both domestically and abroad.

Beijing has been appointing Chinese Americans to the CPPCC for years. In some cases,

authorities in Beijing seem to have had problems finding appropriately influential

Americans to take seats on the committee, such as in 2017, when a Chinese property

developer and educator (who appears to still be a Chinese citizen) was one of seven

“Americans” listed as CPPCC members.22

In doling out prestigious positions on the CPPCC, China seeks to show overseas

Chinese that prominent members of their community want to be connected with

China’s government. The American contingent to the thirteenth CPPCC (announced in

March 2018) was no exception. Perhaps the most remarkable in years, the list of thirty-

five overseas representatives included four highly successful Chinese American academics,

scientists, and businessmen.23

The appointment of Chinese Americans to positions on this advisory body to the Chinese

Communist Party raises difficult questions of divided national loyalty. Americans should,

of course, be free to participate in whatever organizations they see fit, since freedom of

association is hardwired into the constitutional DNA of the United States. However, the

CPPCC is not an independent civil society NGO, but an organization controlled, managed,

35

Section 3

and dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. Members are expected to adhere to the

disciplines and goals of the Party and work to strengthen China and the Party’s rule of

China. Members of the CPPCC are expected to write reports about how their activities have

aligned with China’s interests and to detail their work on China’s behalf.24 The potential

exploitation of Chinese American members in this body by the Chinese government not

only risks harming the interests of the United States but also has the potential to harm the

security, reputation, and welfare of these Chinese Americans.

A similar quandary could present itself to those Chinese Americans who have chosen

to accept positions as consultants for another united front organization, the All-China

Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, which also serves the Party’s interests. In 2018,

twelve representatives from the United States, including wealthy businessmen and civic

leaders, were listed as advisors of the Federation’s 10th congress. The Chinese government

picked them in recognition of their prominence and efforts in advocating positions friendly

to Beijing.25

To engender a sense of close support, state-owned Chinese media outlets routinely report

about such contacts made between prominent Chinese Americans and senior Chinese

officials. There are literally hundreds of such reports in the Chinese-language press

about prominent Chinese Americans escorting leading figures from China’s united front

bureaucracy in the United States or being hosted by them in China.26 In May 2017, Li

Kexin, the deputy chief of mission at the Chinese embassy in Washington, praised the

Peaceful Reunification Council’s DC chapter for holding a “peaceful reunification forum”

in Washington and for opposing Taiwan’s independence.27 Officials from China have also

traveled freely to the United States to take part in conferences and activities designed

to further China’s influence operations in the United States. For example, United Front

officials traveled to the United States in November 2016 for the council’s annual executive

meeting, during which the council pledged to renew its efforts to “oppose Taiwan’s

independence.”28

Conclusion and Recommendations

As US citizens, Chinese Americans enjoy the same constitutional rights of freedom of speech,

association, and political participation as everyone else, and their exercise of these rights is

fully legitimate and protected by the Constitution and law. What’s more, it is incumbent

on the United States government and American society as a whole not to demonize

Chinese Americans for their feelings for and pride in China. However, it is also important

that all American citizens be aware that such feelings can sometimes be exploited by an

authoritarian regime to advance its goals and interests. Here it is not Chinese Americans who

are at fault for having an attachment to their “motherland,” but it is the Chinese Communist

Party for cynically attempting to use Chinese Americans to further its own interests in the

process making overseas Chinese communities vulnerable to distrust.

36

The Chinese American Community

While the US government needs to adopt a no-tolerance policy toward attempts by Chinese

security forces to travel to the United States to secretly harass, manipulate, intimidate, and

monitor China’s perceived enemies in the United States, the best antidote to such intrusion

is for federal and local governments to do more to strengthen ties to Chinese American

communities and to give greater visibility into the various inducements and pressures

Beijing exerts on these communities. That the FBI has begun to reach out to prominent

Chinese in the United States, offering protection, is a good beginning.

A sustained education campaign is also urgently needed to inform the members of the

Chinese American community of the potential adverse consequences of involvement with

China’s united front activities. Chinese American organizations also need to do a better job

of informing themselves about the underlying goals of PRC’s united front organizations

as there are potential reputational costs of allying with them and losing independence. It

can be taken as a positive sign that, for example, the Committee of 100, an organization

founded by many illustrious Chinese Americans, has begun to debate the possibility of

barring its leading members from accepting positions with PRC united front organizations

officially aligned with the Chinese Communist Party.29

China’s activities in the United States can also be made more transparent by requiring

spin-off groups from united front organizations in Beijing to register under the Foreign

Agent Registration Act as agents of a foreign power. This would include all of the bureaus

of the Peaceful Reunification Council, the China Overseas Exchange Association, and the

China Overseas Friendship Association, among others that are, in fact, influence-seeking

organizations with political implications run by a foreign state. In addition, Chinese

Americans who accept positions in united front structures—such as the Chinese People’s

Political Consultative Conference—should also be required to register as agents of a foreign

power seeking influence in the United States. China has tried to sell these “honors” to

the Chinese American community as a costfree way of expressing their sincere feelings

of pride in China. However, the reality is that once a person accepts such “honors,” along

with free travel to China and other emoluments, the Chinese Communist Party will always

seek to exact a further price. And where that price creates divided loyalties and results in

actions harmful to American interests and values, the US government must respond with

appropriate legal and regulatory measures.

NOteS

1 For a broad take on the issue of Chinese influence operations, see Mattis, Peter, “An American Lens on China’s Interference and Influence-Building Abroad.” The Asan Forum. April 30, 2018. http://www . theasanforum . org / an - american - lens - on - chinas - interference - and - influence - building - abroad / ; for a more in-depth look at the individuals involved both on the Chinese and American sides, see Eades, Mark, “China’s United Front Seeks to Undermine US Support for Taiwan.” International Policy Digest. September 11, 2017. https:// intpolicydigest . org / 2017 / 09 / 11 / china - s - united - front - seeks - to - undermine - u - s - support - for - taiwan / ; “Florence Fang’s

37

Section 3

‘100,000 Strong Foundation’: Education or Indoctrination?” Foreign Policy Association. May 27, 2016. https:// foreignpolicyblogs . com / 2016 / 05 / 27 / florence - fangs - foundation - china - education - indoctrination .

2 www . chinaqw . com / node2 / node2796 / node2829 / node3243 / userobject6ai5003 . html.

3 See the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee. www . zytzb . gov . cn / html / index . html.

4 The following US chapters of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification carry some content: United States: www . zhongguotongcuhui . org . cn / hnwtch / bmz / mg / qmzgtch / ; one of the two Washington DC chapters. www . zhongguotongcuhui . org . cn / hnwtch / bmz / mg / hsdtch / ; one of the two New York chapters. www . zhongguotongcuhui . org . cn / hnwtch / bmz / mg / nyzgtch / ; one of the three Chicago chapters. http:// www . zhongguotongcuhui . org . cn / hnwtch / bmz / mg / zjgtch / ; the west coast chapter. http:// www . zhongguotongcuhui . org . cn / hnwtch / bmz / mg / mxzgtch / ; the San Francisco chapter. http:// www . zhongguotongcuhui . org . cn / hnwtch / bmz / mg / jjswq / ; the Boston chapter. http:// www . zhongguotongcuhui . org . cn / hnwtch / bmz / mg / bsdzgtch .

5 Wang, Zhongshen. Duiwai xuanchuan chulun [Introduction to Foreign Propaganda]. Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe. 2000. 172.

6 Siu, Phila. “The ‘Down-to-Earth Liberal’ Taking on China’s Top Advisory Job,” South China Morning Post, March 15, 2018. http:// www . scmp . com / news / china / policies - politics / article / 2137217 / wang - yang - down - earth - liberal - taking - chinas - top - advisory.

7 Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany. “Chinese Cops Now Spying on American Soil.” The Daily Beast. August 14, 2018. https:// amp . thedailybeast . com / chinese - police - are - spying - on - uighurson - american - soil.

8 O’Keeffe, Kate, Aruna Viswanatha, and Cezary Podkul. “China’s Pursuit of Fugitive Businessman Guo Wengui Kicks Off Manhattan Caper Worthy of Spy Thriller.” Wall Street Journal. October 23, 2017. https:// www . wsj . com / articles / chinas - hunt - for - guo - wengui - a - fugitive - businessman - kicks - off - manhattan - caper - worthy - of - spy - thriller - 1508717977.

9 Conversations with Chinese exiles and businessmen.

10 吴锐成. “发挥侨务资源优势为建设文化强省服务.” 广东侨. http:// gocn . southcn . com / dzkw2010 / hqyhr / 1 / 201009 / t20100907 _ 116083 . htm.

11 Ching, Frank. “Beijing Seeks Loyalty from Ethnic Chinese with Foreign Passports.” EJInsight. May 3, 2016. www . ejinsight . com / 20160503 - beijing - seeks - loyalty - from - ethnic - chinese - with - foreign - passports .

12 Li, Wei. “梁冠军当选中华海外联谊会副会长” The China Press. October 11, 2013. http://ny . uschinapress . com / spotlight / 2013 / 10 - 11 / 20536 . html.

13 “中共走狗政协委员美东“侨领“梁冠军摊上大事了.” YouTube. August 14, 2017. https:// www . youtube . com / watch ? v = Dgu6FzlI1kA.

14 “36 位闽籍侨领受聘为十九大精神海外宣传员.” 福建日报. November 24, 2017. http:// news . 163 . com / 17 / 1124 / 10 / D40JLF68000187VG . html.

15 “美国华盛顿中国和平统一促进会.” CCPPNR. February 28, 2012. http://www . zhongguotongcuhui . org . cn / hnwtch / bmz / mg / hsdtch / 201309 / t20130916 _ 4889986 . html.

16 “北加州中国和平统一促进会声明：反独促统 再创新局.” People’s Daily. February 27, 2006. http://world . people . com . cn / GB / 1029 / 42355 / 4146500 . html.

17 See Chinese for Peaceful Reunification - Northern California. http:// www . cpu - nc . org .

18 Eades, Mark. Ibid.

19 “方李邦琴.” China Overseas Exchange Association. http://www . coea . org . cn / 472 / 2013 / 1017 / 246 . html; 来自北加州反“独”促统的声音. CCTV. January 2, 2003. http://www . cctv . com / lm / 523 / 51 / 75448 . html.

38

The Chinese American Community

20 The Chinese embassy also targets prominent Chinese Americans through the Committee of 100, an organization of the most elite Chinese Americans in the United States. Committee members report significant pressure from the Chinese consulate on committee members to toe the Party line. Some prominent Committee members are openly sympathetic to the goals of the Chinese Communist Party. One of them is George Koo, who in addition to serving in a senior position on the committee is also listed as an “overseas director” of the China Overseas Friendship Association, based in Beijing.

21 “习近平主席在美过中秋与旅美华人华侨代表当面话家常 二十几位华人翘楚都是谁.” USA Phoenix News. September 27, 2015. http://webcache . googleusercontent . com / search ? q = cache:CaS - Q4Aug00J:usaphoenixnews . com / m / article . php%3Fid%3D115662+&cd = 1&hl = en&ct = clnk&gl = us.

22 “美中交流要从娃娃抓起.” The China Press. March 14, 2016. http://ny . uschinapress . com / m / spotlight / 2016 / 03 - 14 / 90681 . html.

23 “列席今年全国政协会议的 35 名海外侨胞都有谁?” ChinaQW. March 3, 2018. http://www . chinaqw . com / hqhr / 2018 / 03 - 03 / 180466 . shtml; “35 位海外列席代表受邀参加 4位来自美国.” US-China Press. March 2, 2018. http://www . uschinapress . com / 2018 / 0302 / 1127148 . shtml.

24 Conversations with overseas Chinese members of the CPPCC.

25 “第十次全國歸僑僑眷代表大會聘請中國僑聯第十屆委員會顧問名單.” Chinaql . org. September 1, 2018. http://www . chinaql . org / BIG5 / n1 / 2018 / 0901 / c421026 - 30265674 . html.

26 “旧金山中国和平统一美洲高峰论坛 杨毅与会.” China Review News. November 3, 2013. http://archive.fo /KyKB7#selection-493.0-498.0.

27 “華盛頓和統會召開座談會暢談民進黨執政一週年兩岸形勢.” NACPU. May 17, 2017. http://nacpu . org / news / News2017 / 05172017nacpu . html.

28 Zhu, Lia. “Reunification gets big boost.” China Daily. November 15, 2016. http://usa . chinadaily . com . cn / us / 2016 - 11 / 15 / content _ 27388427 . htm; “美西和统会设宴欢迎民革中央代表团.” US-China Press. August 15, 2016. http://www . uschinapress . com / 2016 / 0815 / 1075554 . shtml.

29 Interview with a Committee of 100 executive.