sectarianism in pakistan the radicalization of shi'i and sunni identities

8/11/2019 Sectarianism in Pakistan the Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities

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Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni IdentitiesAuthor(s): Muhammad Qasim ZamanSource: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Jul., 1998), pp. 689-716Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/313163 .Accessed: 09/06/2014 01:02

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Modern sian tudies 2, 3 (1998), pp. 689-716. ? 1998CambridgeUniversity ressPrinted n the United Kingdom

Sectarianism n Pakistan: TheRadicalization

of Shi'iand Sunni dentities

MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN

BrownUniversity,rovidence,hodesland

Introduction

This essay s an enquiry nto the context, ature, nd significance fmilitant ectarian onflict n Pakistan. The parties o the conflict rethe Sunnis,who constitute he majority f Muslims n Pakistan, ndthe Shi'a, a small but influential minority.' onflict etween thesetwo religious ommunities as deep roots n the history f slam andof South Asia. In Pakistan, which aspires to be in some sense an'Islamic state', sectarian conflict s part of, and interacts with,broader ssues concerning heplace of slam in public ife.This essayseeks to analyse some of factors which have contributed, speciallyin the past twenty-five ears or so, to militant ectarian conflict nPakistan nd to assess the significance f this rather neglected ormof slamic radicalism.

While the history f conflict etween the Shi'a and the Sunnisextends ver more than a millennium, will try oshow n this paperhow a remarkable onfiguration f political, social-economic, ndreligious evelopments as given t a new significance n contempor-ary Pakistan. ectarian dentities re in the processof being not ust

1 There are no precise figures n the number f the Shi'a: estimates bout thesize of the Shi'i population angefrom s much s a quarter to less than 2%of thepopulation f Pakistan For the ower figure, ee anon.,Pakistanmainmawjuda hi'aabadi n.p.,n.d. c. 1980], 16 pp.) Moojan Momenestimates he Twelver hi'i popu-lation of Pakistan to have been about 12,000,000 in 198o, i.e. about 14-5% of thepopulation 82,952,000). See An ntroductionoShi'i slam NewHaven: Yale Univer-sity Press, 1985), 278, 282. All discussion f the Shi'a in this essay refers o theIthna ashari, or 'Twelver' Shi'a. Though there are important, nd often mutuallyhostile, ubdivisions ithin he Sunnisof Pakistan, ust as there re those e.g., the

Ahmadis)whoconsider hemselvesMuslimsbut are not recognized s suchby itherthe Shi'a or the Sunnis, his study s concerned nly with the conflict etween heShi'a and the Sunnis;and it is this conflict hich, orwant of a better haracteriza-tion, s designated s 'sectarian' here.

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69o MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMANrevived but, in many ways, also constructed and redefined. Some ofthe means of imparting a sense of a sectarian identity re relativelynew. With vast quantities of sometimes scurrilous polemics alwaysready at hand, a print culture makes it possible, for instance, todiscover a sectarian identity by perceiving, or imagining, the exist-ence of threats to it. In recent years, the production and dissemina-tion of their own literature, and variously combating that of theirrivals, have become major concerns of sectarian organizations in Pak-istan. These organizations have emerged since the early 198os andthus are themselves a new and powerful means at once of fosteringsectarian identities and of expressing them, frequently with the

threat or the actual use of violence.Other influences on sectarian identities are not new: mosques andmadrasas, or seminaries of traditional Islamic education, play a cru-cial role in this regard. But even these long-standing institutionsoften bear on matters of sectarian identity n new ways: mosquesand madrasas not only have their own exclusivist sectarian affili-ations, many of them are also intimately associated with particularsectarian organizations. Much of the leadership of such organizationscomes from madrasas and comprises people who began their careersas preachers and prayer-leaders in their neighbourhood mosques.The establishment of new madrasas is likewise often sponsored bythese organizations, and it is scarcely fortuitous that a remarkableproliferation of madrasas and the growth of sectarian conflict havetended to coincide in recent years.

Mosques, madrasas, the impact of print, and the emergence ofsectarian organizations have all interacted in a milieu of consider-able social and economic volatility to radicalize a long-standing but

often dormant sectarian conflict. Though the purpose here is to tracethe roots of sectarian radicalism, primarily n the Punjab, the mostpopulous of Pakistan's four provinces, this study should also shedsome light on the importance of sectarianism as a major vehicle ofreligious change. The effort of urban sectarian organizations toextend their influence in the countryside by sponsoring the growthof new madrasas and mosques and 'reforming' tyles of religious lifethere signifies, t will be suggested, the growth of a new, urban, text-based and relatively standardized religious identity among peoplehitherto acquainted only with local forms of religious belief andpractice.

At issue between the Shi'a and the Sunnis has historically been adispute over questions of legitimate authority. To the Shi'a, most



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 691of the Companions of the Prophet, the Sahaba, conspired after theProphet's death to dispossess Ali (his son-in-law), nd after him hisdescendants, the imams, of their divinely ordained right to theMuslim community's eadership. n the Shi'i view of history, heseCompanions, nd their uccessors,were hypocrites nd usurpers whonever ceased to subvert slam for their own interests. Conversely,the Sunnis revere the Sahaba, and especially the Khulafa' al-Rashidun, the four pious successors'of the Prophet of whom Aliwas the last), as second only to the Prophet n religious uthority.2The hostility f the Shi'a to the Sahaba (especiallythe first hreecaliphs) is the single most mportant ssue on which he Sunnis and

the Shi'a have clashed, ometimes iolently.3

Aspects of Sectarian Discourse in Pakistan

Issues of sectarian significance were not prominent in the course ofthe Pakistan movement.4 But it was not long after the creation ofPakistan that they forcefully urfaced. Of the factors which directlybear on issues of sectarian identity n Pakistan, two may be singledout here.

First, in the 'sectarian upbringing'5 of several leaders of radicalSunnism in Pakistan, the Ahmadi controversy has played a consider-able role. Anathematized by most Muslims for their belief that MirzaGhulam Ahmad, the founder of the Ahmadi community, was aprophet, the Ahmadis have been the target of several campaigns ofreligious violence as well as of governmental persecution.6 n 1974,

2 On the history f the emergence, rowth nd crystallization f Sunni and Shi'iteIslam, see, inter lia, W. MontgomeryWatt, TheFormative eriod f slamicThought(Edinburgh: dinburgh University ress, 1973); Momen,Shi'i Islam.

3 Cf. Etan Kohlberg, Some Imami Shi'ite Views on the Sahaba',Jerusalem tudiesin Arabic and Islam, V (1984), 143-75-

4 W. C. Smith's ustification orhaving ittle to say on the Shi'a in his study fmodern rends n Indian slam is worth uoting here: We have not given he Shi'ahgroup eparate treatment n our study f the changeswrought n Islam by modernsocialprocesses, ecausethere s nothing n the differences etween unni and Shi'ifundamentally elevant to those processes. The two groups diverge over whatanswers re to be given oquestionswhich o-day o not arise.' Modernslam n ndia(Lahore: Minerva, 1947), 399-

5 The phrase comes from Bryan Wilson, The Social Dimensionsf Sectarianism(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 18o.

6 On the Ahmadis, ee Yohanan Friedmann, rophecyontinuous: spects fAhmadiReligious houghtnd ts Medieval ackgroundBerkeley:University f California ress,1989). For a description f the most violent agitation gainst the Ahmadis, ee



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692 MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMAN

the government apitulated to a long-standing emand of the reli-giousparties o declare the Ahmadis non-Muslim minority n Pakis-tan.7Religious eaders have continued o agitate for further estric-tions on the Ahmadis, some of which were imposed by thegovernment n 1984. The Ahmadi controversy ears on sectarian,Shi'i-Sunni, onflict n Pakistan n at least two ways.First, houghcertain prominent eaders of the Pakistani Shi'a are known o havesupported he persecution f the Ahmadis, the history f violenceagainst the latter has supplied the anti-Shi'a rontwith ome of itsmost vigorous eadership. Manyof the eading ctivists f the Sipah-iSahaba Pakistan, the militant Sunni organization which will be

described ater n this ssay,began their olitical areers n agitatingagainst the Ahmadis.8 econdly, he constitutional efinition f aMuslim so as to exclude the Ahmadis has led to demands, pear-headedby the Sipah-i ahaba, further odefine slam so as to excludethe Shi'a too. In a state which professes o be guided by the funda-mental principles f slam, the Ahmadi controversy as contributedto sectarian discourseby forcefully aising, nd keeping live, suchquestions s who a Muslim really' s (irrespective f one's own claimsin that regard) nd what positionhe (and those who are not Muslim,or are not recognized s such) will have in that state.

Islamization, r the introduction f 'Islamic' norms and institu-tions through overnment olicy r decree, s another factor whichhas often provoked nd defined ectarian ontroversies n Pakistan.That Pakistan professes obe an Islamic state means, o the religiouscircles t any rate, that slamic laws will be not merely bserved nthat state but enforced y t. Which chool of slamic aw wouldholdsway, and how that would affect hose who do not recognize ts

authority, re questions never dequately resolved n Pakistan; theywere raised with unprecedented igour nd alarm, however,when awide-ranging rogramme f slamizationwas initiated n early 1979by the government f General MuhammadZia ul-Haqq (1977-88).9

Report f heCourt f nquiry .. into he unjabDisturbancesf 1953 (Lahore: Govern-ment Printing, 1954).

7 On these developments, ee Friedmann, rophecyontinuous,0-6.8 See Mawlana Muhammad lyas Balakoti,Amir-i Azimat: azrat MawlanaHaq

Nawaz Jhangavi Shahid (Jami'a 'Uthmania, Jhang Sadar, n.d. [c. 199o?]), 29-31;Khilafat-i Rashida (Faisalabad), vol. 4, nr. 7 (December 1993), 5-

9 On some aspects of this programme f slamization ee Anita M. Weiss (ed.),Islamic eassertionnPakistan: he Applicationf slamic aws n a Modern tate Lahore:Vanguard, 1987); S.Jamal Malik, slamisierungn Pakistan 977-84; Untersuchungenzur Aufldsung utochthoner trukturen Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1989);



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 693A highlight of the military regime's programme of Islamization

was the imposition of Zakat, an Islamic tax which, the government

decreed,would be

automaticallycollected from

people'sbank

accounts. But Shi'i and Sunni schools of law differ uite markedly ntheir stipulations on Zakat, as in many other areas of law."' Thegovernment's decision to impose this tax according to the prescrip-tions of the Hanafi school of Sunni law thus created intense resent-ment among the Shi'a and proved to be a powerful timulus towardstheir political mobilization in Pakistan. This development coincidedwith the spectacular success of the Iranian revolution of 1978-79,which has also had a profound nfluence n sectarian reassertion nPakistan, nd not ust of the Shi'a.

The Radicalization of Sectarian Identities

a. TheShi'a

Efforts to mobilize Shi'i opinion began soon after the government's

programmeof slamization was launched in

early 1979. InJuly 1980,the Shi'a from all over the country onverged in Islamabad, the cap-ital, and marched on the government ministries to express theirgrievances; this show of strength was unprecedented and wasdeemed sufficiently hreatening o extract, even from a militaryregime, promises that the protestors' demands would be met. Thesedemonstrations were led by a new but highly-organized movement',the Tahrik-i Nifaz-i iqh-iJa'fariyya Movement or he mplementa-tion of the Ja'fari Law [hereafter NFJ])." As articulated by theTNFJ, the principal demand of the Shi'a was that Zakat not beimposed on them by the state, or according to the stipulations ofSunni law. The Shi'a were to be left alone to regulate their religiouslife through heir own eaders. The TNFJ also demanded effective'representation or the Shi'a at the highest evels of the state,

Rudolph Peters, The Islamization of Criminal Law: A Comparative Analysis', ieWelt des slams, 34 (1994), 246-74, especially 256ff.

10 On the differencesetween Sunni and Shi'i schoolsof aw, see N.J. Coulson,A History f slamic aw (Edinburgh: dinburgh niversity ress, 1964), 113-19." Formative evelopments n Shi'i law are believed to have taken place in the

time, and under the guidance, ofJa'far al-Sadiq (d. 765), the sixth mam in thereckoning f the Twelver Shi'a. Shi'i law (fiqh) s therefore ften designated as'Ja'fari'.



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including representation in bodies advising the government on mat-ters of Islamization itself.12 Though the TNFJ was able to have theShi'a exempted from Zakat, it soon came to represent a much moreambitious vision than is suggested by the principal demand whichhad brought it into existence (the manifesto of the TNFJ will bediscussed later).'" As its very name proclaimed, this was a movementfor the implementation f Shi'i law. Opponents alleged that the TNFJsought to have Shi'i law enforced on Sunnis too, and that this goalwas only an extension of Iran's commitment to 'export' its Shi'irevolution. The TNFJ has always denied this,14 though the allegationwas damaging enough eventually to force a change of its name to

the more politic 'Tahrik-i Ja'fariyya Pakistan' (Movement of theJa'fari-Shi'a of Pakistan).The TNFJ was founded by MuftiJa'far Husayn (1916-83), one of

the more prominent of Shi'i religious scholars of Pakistan. Born inGujranwala in the Punjab in a noted Shi'i family, Ja'far Husaynstudied in a local Sunni madrasa before proceeding to Lucknow andlater to Najaf, in southern Iraq, for further tudies.'" Besides teach-ing at Shi'i madrasas in his native Gujranwala for most of his life,he actively represented the Shi'a in public life. He served on govern-ment committees involved n proposing Islamic provisions for Pakis-tan's first onstitution 1956) and on the Council of slamic Ideology,both in the time of General Ayub Khan and of General Zia ul-Haqq.Alarmed by the latter's Islamization, he resigned his membership ofthe Council in 1979 and was in the same year chosen as the 'Qa'id-iMillat-i Ja'fariyya' (leader of the Ja'fari [Shi'a] Community). The

12The demand for adequate' or effective' epresentation n the politicalystem,irrespective f the actual numerical trength f the people on whose behalf that

demand was made, was of course a familiar heme of Muslimpoliticaldiscourse nBritish ndia. See Farzana Shaikh, Communitynd Consensusn Islam: MuslimRepres-entation n Colonialndia (Cambridge:Cambridge University ress, 1989).

'3 See anon., Allama hahid SayyidArif usayn l-Husayni, z wiladat a shahadat(Qumm: Sazman-iTablighat-i slami, 1369A.H), 6ff. nd passim. lsosee Munir D.Ahmed, The Shi'is of Paksitan', n Shi'ism, esistance, ndRevolution,d. M. Kramer(Boulder,Colorado:Westview ress, 1987), 281ff.; AfakHaydar, The Politicizationof the Shias and the Development f the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafarian Pakis-tan', in Charles H. Kennedy ed.), Pakistan 992 (Boulder, Colorado: WestviewPress, 1993), 75-93-

14Interviewwith Allama Sajid Naqvi, chief of the Tahrik-i a'fariyya akistan,in Takbir Karachi: 30 March 1995), 27-35-

'5 On institutionalized hi'i learning n Najaf, see Chibli Mallat, TheRenewal fIslamic aw: Muhammad aqeras-Sadr,Najaf and the Shi'i International Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1993).



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 695TNFJ came into being the following year and was led by Mufti Ja'farHusayn until his death in 1983.16

His successor, 'Allama 'Arif Husayn al-Husayni (1946-88), was ayoung cleric from Parachinar in the tribal areas of the North-WestFrontier Province. Unlike Mufti Ja'far Husayn, whose career untilthe beginnings of Shi'i activism had typified hat of many a religiousscholar coopted by the state, al-Husayni came of age in a markedlydifferent ocial milieu. Najaf in the 196os was much more than amajor centre of Shi'i learning, as it had been for MuftiJa'far Husayn.By the time al-Husayni went to study at the madrasas of Najaf in1967, a new generation of Shi'i scholars was well-advanced along the

path of drastically redefining their role as one of active social andpolitical engagement in society, a role which was a conscious depar-ture from the reclusive political quietism of the elder mujtahids.17Al-Husayni stayed in Najaf for six years, and, among others, cameinto contact there with Ayatullah Ruhullah Khumayni.18 hat he wasinfluenced by some of the implications of what Chibli Mallat hascharacterized as the 'Renaissance' of the 196os19 is best attestedperhaps by his being expelled by the Iraqi authorities from Najaf forpolitical involvements (of which no details are known, however).20Al-Husayni later went to Iran and spent another four years inQumm, which, like Najaf, was not only a major centre of learningbut also of Shi'i political opposition.21 He returned to Pakistan in1978, on the eve of the revolution in Iran. Involved in the politicalmobilization of the Shi'a from the start, and with such impeccablecredentials as studying at the premier institutions of Najaf andQumm and, not least, counting Khumayni as a mentor, he was soonprominent enough to succeed Ja'far Husayn as the leader of the

TNFJ in 1983. He led the Shi'a through 1988, in which year he wasassassinated.22

16 On MuftiJa'far Husayn, ee Sayyid Arif Husayn Naqvi, Tadhkira-yiUlama'-iImamiyya-i akistan Islamabad: Markaz-i Tahqiqat-i Farsi-yi ran wa Pakistan,1984), 73-6; anon., Allama hahid ayyid ArifHusayn l-Husayni,43ff.

17Mallat, TheRenewal f slamic aw, 1-58 andpassim.'8 'Allama Shahid Sayyid ArifHusayn l-Husayni, 24-5-'9 Mallat, TheRenewal f slamic aw, 4ff. nd passim.20 'Allama Shahid ayyid ArifHusayn l-Husayni, 5.21 Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: FromReligious ispute oRevolutionCambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).22 On the life and career of al-Husayni, ee 'Allama hahid Sayyid Arif usayn

al-Husayni, assim;Naqvi, Tadhkira-yiUlama'-i mamiyya, 83-91; Maleeha Lodhi,'Pakistan's Shia Movement:An Interviewwith Arif Hussaini', ThirdWorld uarterly(1988), 806-17. Alsocf. Mallat, TheRenewal f slamic aw, 188f.



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696 MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMANThe manifesto of the TNFJ, formally ssued in 1987, is a document

of some interest and deserves a brief consideration.23 t prescribesthe Qur'an and Sunna as the fundamental sources of Pakistan's con-stitution and of all laws, but lays down that 'each recognized Islamicschool of thought' s to be governed by its own interpretation of whatthe Qur'an and the Sunna mean.24All 'schools of thought' are to begiven 'effective' representation in the Council of Islamic Ideology, abody charged by the constitution of Pakistan with the function ofadvising the government on all matters pertaining to Islam in publiclife.25The demand for religious freedom figures prominently, ndit is stated to include the right to the unhindered observance of

Muharram-when the Shi'a commemorate the martyrdom ofHusayn, one of their imams-as well as the right to proselytize forone's faith.26 here is no dearth of rhetoric on the need for a com-plete overhauling of Pakistan's economic, social, and political'system'; and the lack of any true commitment to Islam on the partof the ruling elite and the state's subservience to the 'imperialistpowers' are among the factors the manifesto emphasizes as thecauses of Pakistan's problems. Finally, a significant aspect of theTNFJ's proposed mechanism for change is to create a 'PopularIslamic Army': based on compulsory military training for all able-bodied males, this army is seen as helping to reduce the distancebetween the military nd the people (the military regime of GeneralZia ul-Haqq was still in power in 1987) and as reviving the spirit ofholy war.27

The emergence of a Shi'i organization in Pakistan in the wake ofthe Iranian revolution caused considerable consternation to manySunnis, and though the manifesto of the TNFJ is not explicitly ectar-

ian it is not difficult o visualize how many a wary Sunni would inter-pret it. That Islam and its fundamental sources are to mean differentthings to different eople is disquieting, for nstance: it takes awaythe Sunni majority's ability to prescribe what the religious law of theland would be, and perhaps even more grievously, t suggests that'Islam' can, and should, have several competing yet equally valid-

23 For the text of this manifesto, ntitled Hamara Rasta' (Our Path), seeMuhammad Usman and Mas'ud Ash'ar

eds),Pakistan i

Siyasi ama'atain Lahore:Sang-iMilPublications,988),774-811.24 Ibid., 83.25 Ibid., 86.26 Ibid., 05-27 Ibid.,802-4.



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 697because officially recognized-forms. The proposal concerning a'Popular Islamic Army' can scarcely fail to raise suspicions about themilitant ambitions of the Shi'a; and though Sunni religious partiesusually also compete with each other in denouncing the 'imperialistpowers', the TNFJ's condemnation of them is strongly reminiscentof Iran's revolutionary rhetoric and, to many Sunnis, yet anotherconfirmation of the Shi'i party's ideological indebtedness to Iran.Freedom of religious observance means, to those hostile to the Shi'a,the freedom to vilify he Companions of the Prophet and hence toattack the Sunni view of Islam itself; the Shi'a are known, after all,to vent their hostility owards many of the Prophet's Companions in

the course of the Muharram observances and it is during these thatsectarian tensions have often turned nto rioting. On the other hand,the right to propagate one's faith is liable to be understood as theright to preach Shi'ism in what is a predominantly Sunni country.There is in fact considerable evidence of Shi'i proselytization espe-cially in rural and small-town Punjab.28 This activity predates theinfluence of the Iranian revolution but does certainly form part ofthe broader scene in which Shi'ism is seen as threatening to under-mine Islam in Pakistan.

An aggressive, confrontational style of politics was characteristicof the party under the leadership of al-Husayni. His assassination inAugust 1988 was a major setback to the party, and since then it hasprogressively moved towards a more moderate, pacifist stance. Theaforementioned change of its name to Tahrik-i Ja'fariyya Pakistan(TJP) is part of this development. But the TNFJ/TJP s not all thereis to Shi'i political activism. Even as the Tahrik-i Ja'fariyya now cul-tivates an image of moderation, of trying to defuse sectarian ten-

sions, several other Shi'i organizations, which are associated with theTJP or are its splinter groups, do have a clear preference for militantactivism. The most important of these is the Sipah-i MuhammadPakistan.29

28 Biographical otices f the Shi'i ulama' of Pakistan re replete with laims ofsuccessful roselytizing: ee Naqvi,Tadhkira-yiulama'-iImamiyya-iakistan, , 9, 24,26, 28, 33, 34, 38, 39, 41, 45-6, 48, 51, 53, 55, 56, 65, 69-70, 71, 94, 109, 118,122, 123, 125, 131, 135, 150, 156, 159, 164, 170, 173, 199, 206, 209, 211, 213,218, 222, 232-3, 246, 252, 262, 265, 278, 291, 298, 299, 305, 306, 310, 323, 324,

330o,343, 346,349, 371, 400, 420, 422, 449, 463, 474-5-

29 On the Sipah-i Muhammad, see Aamer A. Khan, 'The Rise of SectarianMafias', Herald (Karachi: June 1994), 27-37; M. Hanif et al., 'In the Name of Reli-gion', Newsline Karachi: September 1994), 24-41. Zindagi (Lahore: 25 May 1995),interview ith Allama Murid Abbas Yazdani, Chief Commander' Salar-iA'la) ofthe Sipah-iMuhammadPakistan, 5-8.



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Though not a 'youth wing' of the TJP, the Sipah-iMuhammad svery much a young men's organization. rural or small-town ack-ground, ome education n the government-school ystem, eligiousstudies t madrasas n the Punjab or elsewhere n Pakistan and, notinfrequently, n Iran,30 nd participation n the war in Afghanistan,is fairly ypical of the leadership of the Sipah-i Muhammad. Theorganization s based in Thokar Niaz Baig, a traditionally hi'istronghold n the suburbs of Lahore. 'Allama SayyidGhulam RizaNaqvi (b. 1960), one of the principal eaders of the Sipah-iMuham-mad, preaches n a Shi'i mosque, the Masjid-i Ali, there. Born indistrict Khanewal in the Punjab, he attended college in Jhang,

studied at madrasas n Multan and Lahore, and then went to Iranfor further eligious ducation.He has fought n Afghanistan uringthe Soviet occupation, n experience to which he, like many Shi'iand Sunni militants, wesmuch of his military raining.Naqvi laterestablished madrasa nJhang nd was involved n sectarian onflictthere. Since 1993, he has lived,preached, nd led his organizationin Niaz Baig.31

Since ts nception n 1991, the Sipah-iMuhammad has frequentlybeen linkedwith much nti-Sunni iolence n the Punjab, n Karachi,and elsewhere n the country. he organization s mildly ritical fthe TJP for what it sees as the latter's failure o protect he Shi'afrom unni militancy.32 or its part, the TJP had generally endedto maintain discreet istance from heSipah-iMuhammad, houghwithout xplicitly ondemning ts militancy. o Sunni radicals, thedifference etween the TJP and the Sipah-iMuhammad s onlyoneof strategy, nd both are taken to stand for undermining Sunnism'in Pakistan. Few Sunni or Shi'i militants wouldagree, however, hat

their wn rival ectarian organizations xhibit onsiderable imilar-ities with each other too. In its recourse to violence, the Sipah-iMuhammad's methods match those of the Sipah-i Sahaba, as doesthe social background f many of its leaders. Networks f mosquesand especially f madrasas re crucial means for oth Shi'i and Sunniradical groups to exert and extend their nfluence, nd both have

30 Ghulam Riza Naqvi of the Sipah-i Muhammad (see below) claimed in July1995 that nearly wothousand Pakistani Shi'a were studying n the madrasas ofQumm alone: see his interview n Zindagi (20oJuly 1995), 21.

31 On the career of SayyidGhulam Riza Naqvi, see M. Zaidi, 'The Godfather',Newsline February 1995), 52-3; and the interview with Naqvi in Zindagi (20 July1995), 20-3-

32 Herald (June 1994), 37; Newsline February 1995), 50-4-



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 699profusely sed the medium of print to disseminate their creed.Finally, nd not surprisingly, ach blames the violent activities fthe other as the reason for ts own existence.

b. The Sunnis

The Sipah-iSahaba was established n September 1985 in Jhang,middle-sized ity n the district f the same name in the Punjab.33The founder of the organization, Haqq Nawaz Jhangawi (1952-90)was, as his name indicates, native of the district. orn in a poor

rural household, e attended government choolfor ome time butsoon settled for madrasa-education. n 1973, he began his careeras a preacher (khatib) nd prayer-leader imam) n a Deobandi34mosque of urban Jhang, roles in which he was to continue till hisassassination n 1990o.That mosque s now known y his name, as isthe town-quarter mahalla) n whichhe lived. The Sipah-iSahabawasfounded n the same mosque.35

Like many of those who were later to play a leading role in theSipah-iSahaba,Haqq Nawazhad participated n the agitation whichled, in 1974, to the Ahmadis being declared non-Muslims n Pakis-tan. Many Sunnis had all along regarded the Shi'a too as non-Muslims, and the precedent set by the excommunication f theAhmadis was not lost on them; nor did Shi'i political activism nPakistan in the wake of the Iranian revolution nd Zia ul-Haqq'sIslamization contribute o sectarian harmony. Militant confronta-tions of the Shi'a and the Sunnis began from the early 198os.

3 According o the Census of 1981, the total population of the district was1,978,263,of which22.6%lived n urban areas. The city fJhang ad a populationof 195,558.PopulationCensus Organization, Government f Pakistan, 98i DistrictCensusReport f Jhang Islamabad: Statistics Division, Government f Pakistan,1984), 5, 19.

"3 The Deobandis are one of the major sub-groups f Sunni slam in the Indiansubcontinent. hey are so called on account of their ssociationwith the reformistprinciples nd practices ypified y a madrasa established n 1867) at Deoband inthe United Provinces. he other major groups f SunniMuslims n India and Pakis-tan are the Barelawis and the Ahl-i Hadith. On the madrasa t Deoband, and onother nineteenth-century uslim religious movements, ee Barbara D. Metcalf,Islamic evival n British ndia:Deoband, 86o-i9oo (Princeton: rinceton UniversityPress, 1982).

3 See Balakoti,Amir-i Azimat. he author f this book s the editor f the Sipah-iSahaba's monthly ournal, the Khilafat-i ashida, nd the brother f Mawlana Ziaal-Rahman Faruqi, a former ead of the organization. he book may therefore econsidered s the Sipah-iSahaba's 'official' iography f ts founder.



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Sectarian violence was not confined toJhang, though t is not fortuit-ous (at least according to radical Sunnis) that the Sipah-i Sahabaemerged here. The following account comes from a biography ofMawlana Haqq Nawaz by one of his close associates. It is simplisticand tendentious, yet not without some factual validity; and in anycase, it is revealing of this Sunni organization's own worldview:

Jhang was a backward district dominated by feudal lords (jagirdars) .. Theyfound icense n Shi'ismfor he ife f pleasure and libertinism hey esired,and so the rural gentry ad becomeShi'i. Under their nfluence, he peas-ants and other members f the lower astes' also went over to Shi'ism. Buteven those who didn't had remained neither hi'i nor Sunni, and had nosense of shame at beingdevoid f religious dentity. unk n ignorance, heyretained some of their traditional customs in the name of Sunnism(sunniyyat), hile in other respects they had become assimilated with theShi'a. They knewnothing f their beliefs, or of their religious rientation(maslak); hey id not practise heir aith, orwere they othered bout notpractising t. All they had were certain rites of gnorance rusum-ijahiliyyat)and nothing lse. In all matters f happiness nd grief n life, heywere asone ... If anyone ried to reform his ituation nd to indicate o them thedifferences etween he Shi'a and the Sunnis,he was accused of fomentingdiscord, f being a sectarian; he would be deemed undesirable, nd wouldnever again be allowed in the area ... Mawlana Haqq Nawaz, after hebecame convinced f what the truth was,began preaching; nd he was defi-ant in the face of all opposition.36

The ignorance of 'true' Islam in the countryside has remaineda major theme of much reformist iterature in the nineteenth andtwentieth enturies, and not ust in Deobandi discourse." The aboveaccount is of interest, however, for explicitly inking such ignoranceto the influence of Shi'ism. Jhang is indeed dominated by rural mag-nates who profess Shi'ism, and the latter do wield considerable social

and (as pirs) religious influence on the lower classes, as the aboveaccount suggests. In the Sipah-i Sahaba's view of things, this landedgentry not only exploits the peasantry in social and economic terms3"but has also led them astray even in matters of the faith. The aboveaccount, and much else in the Sipah-i Sahaba's rhetoric, seems also

36 Balakoti,Amir-i Azimat, 0-3 (abbreviated n translation).3 Cf. Metcalf, slamic evival, 8ff, 52ff andpassim; his theme s strikingly on-

spicuous n the speechesdelivered t the second annual convention f the Nadwatal-'Ulama' in Lucknow, 895: see Madamin-i halatha Kanpur: ntizami Press, n.d.[c. 1895]), 25ff and passim. Also see n. go below.

38 Cf. MalcolmDarling, ThePunjab easant n ProsperityndDebt London:OxfordUniversity ress, 1925); some of the themes n this description f the peasant'splight n the early twentieth entury ontinue o resonate n the Sipah-i Sahaba'srhetoric.



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 701

to evoke the image, tendentious yet powerful, of an 'original' Sunn-ism: the people of the area were once committed to Islam and should,by being rescued from the influence of Shi'ism, be brought back toit. Religious reform must in this context mean making people awareof a sectarian identity ('the differences between the Shi'a and theSunnis') they are presumed to have lost. They must, in short, bemade (or re-made) Sunnis. Conversely, there is evidence too of Shi'iproselytizing n the countryside, nJhang as elsewhere in the Punjab,and it is not ust Sunni madrasas but also Shi'i ones whose numbershave grown dramatically."9 t is tempting to interpret the allusionin the above account to people coming under the influence of Shi'ism

as a recognition of some inroads Shi'i preachers may have made inthe countryside.Though the Sipah-i Sahaba's rhetoric necessarily equates local

forms of religious belief and customary practices with the influenceof Shi'ism (even as it equates Sunnism with 'high cultural', text-based, urban Islam), there seems little reason to believe that therural audience to which radical sectarian organizations now addressthemselves have had any but the most perfunctory rior acquaint-ance with urban or literate Islamic traditions. mparting a sectarianidentity is therefore less a case of 'converting' rural peasants toSunnismfrom hi'ism (or the reverse) and much more of confrontinglocal practices with the Islam of the urban religious scholars andinstitutions. t is this local Islam, combining Shi'i', 'Sunni', and 'sufi'elements, which the Sipah-i Sahaba sees, in part at least, as 'Shi'ism',and which it seeks to combat. This struggle is of course also a wayof resisting the influence of pirs many of whom in the Punjab arenot only rural magnates but also adherents of Shi'ism.40

The Sipah-i Sahaba's formal goals are easily defined: to combatthe Shi'a at all levels, to strive to have them declared a non-Muslimminority n Pakistan, to proscribe Muharram-processions (which itregards as a major cause of sectarian riots) and to make Sunni Islam

9 There were only 13 Shi'i madrasas in the Punjab in 1971 but 0oo in 1994. Onthe other hand, Deobandi madrasas grew from 173 in 1971 to 972 in 1994 andBarelawi madrasas from 93 in 1971 to 1216 in 1994. I have compiled these figuresfrom: Hafiz Nadhr

Ahmad,Ja'izah-yiadaris-i

'Arabiyya-i aghribiakistan

Lahore:Muslim Academy, 1972), 693; The News (Islamabad: 7 March 1995), 11; Zindagi(17 February 1995), 38-9. Also see Table 1, below.

40 I owe this uggestion o Professor avid Gilmartin. n 'the structure f ruralIslam' in the Punjab see DavidGilmartin, mpire nd slam: unjab nd the Making fPakistan Berkeley:University f California ress, 1988), esp. 39-72.



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the official eligion f the state.41 he ideal polity s taken to be thatof the 'rightly-guided Rashidun) caliphs' of early slam, and it isthat modelwhich he organization ledges to emulate n Pakistan.42But it is not enough to draw nspiration rom hat golden age. As amark of affirming ymbolic ommitment o it, the Sipah-i Sahabawould have the death anniversaries f the Rashidun caliphs as wellas of everalother prominent ompanions f the Prophet) nstitutedas days of national commemoration, nd have the highest honoursof the state designated by the names of these caliphs.43 hese areamong the signs of a Sunni, hence truly slamic state, a state whosecommitment o Sunnism ought to be as visible as it is profound.

Though an unmitigated hostility owards the Shi'a defines thestance of the Sipah-iSahaba, its own symbolism howsunmistakablesigns of Shi'i influence. ealous adoration f the Companions f theProphet has manifest imilarities with the Shi'i veneration f theirimams. One may even detect a conscious effort ere to claim forSunnism ts share of charismatic' eaders who will be the object ofintense personaldevotion-a tendency orthodox' unnism has tradi-tionally esisted gainst both the Shi'a and the sufis.44 evotion tothe Companions s inscribed, iterally, n the Sipah-iSahaba's multi-colouredflag,whichfeatures tradition hadith) f the Prophet 'Mycompanions re like stars; you will find uidance n whomsoever of

41 In July 1992, MawlanaMuhammad A'zam Tariq of the Sipah-i Sahaba initi-ated a bill in the lower house of the Pakistani parliament which proposes to makeany attack on the honour' namus) f the Companions Sahaba) of the Prophet ndof members f his family ahl al-bayt) criminal ffence unishable by death. Thebill is yet to be debated. See Khilafat-i ashida the officialmonthly rgan of theSipah-i Sahaba), vol. 3, nos 9-10o (September-October 1992), 25. InJuly 1994, thesame bill was

moved,ut

defeated,n the

upperhouse of the Pakistani

parliament.For the text of this bill, and of the debate on it in the Senate, see al-Haqq(Peshawar), vol. 29, no. 11 (August 1994),2-15. The bill does not say that the Shi'aare unbelievers or vilifying he Companions, nly hat to vilify he Companions san offence unishable ydeath. The Sipah-iSahaba's position as, n fact, een thatthis bill would uaranteeectarian harmony n Paksitan, because the cause of sectar-ian riots-vilification f the Companions-would be eliminated.

42 Cf. W. C. Smith, slam n Modern istory Princeton: rinceton niversity ress,1957), 245-6, on the fascination ith his deal polity specially n Pakistan's earlyyears.

43For the goals of the Sipah-iSahaba see Balakoti,Amir-i Azimat, 39-52; alsosee the following ollection f speeches

bythe

organization'sounder:Mawlana

HaqNawazJhangawi ipandara a'rikh-saz aqrirain Lahore: Idara-i Nashriyyat-i slam,1991), passim.44Followinghis assassination, Mawlana Haqq Nawaz has himself been givensomething f a saintly mage: see Balakoti,Amir-i Azimat, sp. 317-18, for dreamsin which he is seen in heaven n the company f the Sahaba.



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them] you follow'),with crescent nd five tars.45More generally,the Sipah-i Sahaba's symbolism s also interpretable s a responseto the ceremonials f Muharram. n the past, and occasionally vennow, such processions nd ceremonies would be joined in by localSunnis, both because the latter too revere the memory f Husayn,and because these processionshave often provided olourful nter-tainment o the people. The Sipah-i Sahaba aspires to substitutenew set of commemorative ccasionsfor he Shi'i ones. The counterceremonies re intended not so much to attract he Shi'a as to pre-vent Sunnis from eing attracted oShi'i gatherings, nd, more gen-erally, odemonstrate hat the Sunni tradition as no dearth f occa-

sions to commemorate.46 ultural hi'ism is in fact more of achallenge hanShi'i militancy, ormany putative) unnis re unsus-pecting victims f it or exposed to its lure. In the Sipah-i Sahaba'sworldview, othing s more urgent, herefore, han to make people'rediscover' heir Sunni identity, nd to define for them, n termswhich re both negative 'Muharram rocessions re unIslamic') ndpositive 'The Sahaba must be rescued from hi'i vilification, heirhonour uarded, heir memory evived nd revered'), what this den-tity onsists n. The death anniversaries f certain Companions ofthe Prophet have sometimes een celebrated n the past as well, ndthe virtues of the Companions are known t times to have beensymbolically xtolled s a response o Shi'i vilification. hat disting-uishes the Sipah-i Sahaba's symbolism rom arlier celebrations fthe Companions' memory s the former's ffort o appropriate hestate itself o the cause of Sunnism. t is crucial, yet not sufficient,to make peopleconscious f their unni dentity. unnism must uf-fuse the institutions f the state, and Sunni celebrations must

45Four of the stars have the names of the four Rashidun aliphswritten n them,and on the fifth ppear the names of Hasan, Husayn two sons of Ali) and Mu'a-wiya.The latter, lso a Companion f the Prophet,was the founder f the Umayyaddynasty 661-750) which he Shi'a hold responsible or he tribulations f no fewerthan six of their twelve mams (including Ali, Hasan and Husayn). ConjoiningHasan, Husayn, nd Mu'awiya s of course not an initiative owards ectarian har-mony, ut only vividreminder hat Mu'awiya s no less venerable o Sunnis thanHasan and Husayn, nd that the latter, s well as 'Ali, belong properly ith otherfigures evered y the Sunnis,not with he ater mams of the Shi'a. For the Sipah-iSahaba's flag s well as other ymbolism, ee Balakoti,Amir-i Azimat, 47-52.

46 Muharram rocessions ave been known o attract much Sunni, nd even non-Muslim participation n the past. SeeJ. N. Hollister, TheShi'a of ndia (London:Luzac, 1953), 177ff; Sandria B. Freitag, Collective ction nd Community: ublic Arenasand the mergencef Communalismn North ndia (Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress, 1989), 249-79.



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become part of state ceremonial. The inspiration or this sectarianvision f an 'Islamic state' seems, ronically, o be indebted bove allto post-1979 ran, where Shi'i Islam enjoys central position s the

legitimating deologynd official

eligionf the state.

No event has indeed created a sense of greater urgency mongradical Sunnis to combat Shi'ism than the Iranian revolution.Though the revolutionary egime was keen to forge ties with the(Sunni) Muslimworld nd to win the support f Sunni slamists, tsprofoundly hi'i character isillusioned nd alarmed many Sunnis.47At the same time, he spectacular uccessof the revolution ncour-aged the Shi'a outside ran to assert a more active, ven aggressivepresence n their ocal communities. major expression f this sser-tion was the massive production nd dissemination f pro-Iranianand specifically hi'i literature, n Urdu in case of Pakistan. raniancultural centres have had some involvement n this activity,48 utmore frequently, hi'i scholars, reachers, nd madrasas of Pakistanhave taken the initiative n their own hands, producing workswhich--depending n the taste, audience, and level of the writer'seducation-can range from he scholarly o the most rabidly nti-Sunni and specifically nti-Sahaba.

While suchworks ad,ofcourse, een written nd read n the past,their proliferation, ot to mention he suspicion hat the resources fa revolutionary hi'i state were behind these, antagonized manySunnis n Pakistan. To have such writings roscribed s a major con-cern of the Sipah-i Sahaba.49To mobilizeSunni opinion and bringhome the horrors f the Shi'i threat, t has also ensured that uridaccounts f sacrilegious hi'i writings n the Companions eachwideaudiences,"50 nd not ust in Pakistan.5' n 1994, Mawlana Zia al-

47 E. Sivan, Sunni Radicalism n the Middle East and the Iranian Revolution',International ournal f Middle ast Studies, 1 (1989), 1-30; Werner Ende, 'SunniPolemicalWritings n the Shi'a and the ranian Revolution', n D. Menashri ed.),The ranian Revolutionnd the MuslimWorld Boulder: The Westview Press, 199o),219-32.

48Such centres have consequently been targeted for sectarian attacks. InDecember 199o, an Iranian diplomat whowas the director f the ranian CulturalCentre in Lahore was assassinated by militants rom he Sipah-i Sahaba. Newsline(April 1991), 44. Also cf. Balakoti, Amir-i Azimat, 144-5-

49Balakoti,Amir-i Azimat, 9.50 Jhangawi would often ace his fiery peeches with detailed quotations from

Shi'ibooksto document uch sacrileges. or some nstances, eeMawlanaHaqNawazJhangawi ipandara a'rikh-sazaqrirain, 9ff, 22ff, 278-94. These speechesare alsoavailable on cassette.

"' The Sipah-iSahaba, as well as Shi'i organizations, ow have branches n theMiddle East, and even in Europe and North America. Cf. Khilafat-i ashida, ol.3,no. 4 (April 1992), 50, 52; and see n. 52 below.



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 705Rahman Faruqi (d. 1997), the then head of the Sipah-iSahaba andowner f the publishing ousewhere most of the organization's iter-ature s produced, nnounced lans, nter lia, to bring ut a massive

compendiumf

(selections from?)no less than one hundred and

sixty-five hi'i books. This will be something ewin Pakistan, ndindeed in the history f Islam,' Faruqi asserts, probablywith somejustice. We will take this document o urisconsults muftis) f fifty-eight [sic] [Muslim] states, and obtain, on the basis of t, the atwathat the Shi'a are infidels. bviously, hen o many ookscharacter-izing the Sahaba as unbelievers nd apostates are brought o theattention f the ulama' of every Muslim]country, o mufti ouldany onger be able to consider he Shi'a to be Muslims.'52

The publications f the Sipah-iSahaba, and especially ts monthlyjournal, aptly called the Khilafat-i ashida ('The Rightly-GuidedCaliphate'), seek to forge sectarian bond not only by informingtheir readers about what the Shi'a, or Iran, might be doing againstthem, but also what the Sunnisare, at last ( ), doing for hemselves.The Khilafat-i ashidakeeps ts readers nformed f the Sipah-iSah-aba's activities, ften n minute detail: its combating he Shi'a andtheir nfluence n different arts of the country; ts catering o the

social and economic needs of the ndigent unnis nd, especially, hefamilies of Sunnis killed, disabled, or imprisoned n sectarian viol-ence; and the uninterrupted xtension, n Pakistan but also abroad,of its organizational etwork.53 ll this has helped create an 'ima-gined community' f sectarian Sunnism n Pakistan,54 communityunited n devotion o the Companionsbut one brought ogether ymuch more than the symbolism f the Sipah-iSahaba.

Social and Economic Bases

Much of the support for sectarian organizations omes from themiddle classes. Sectarianism is largely an urban phenomenon,

52 Khilafat-i ashida, ol.5, no. 6 (November 994), interview ith Mawlana Ziaal-Rahman Faruqi (part v),30.

53 MawlanaZia al-RahmanFaruqi, the head of the Sipah-iSahaba, stated n late1994 that 'about 14,000 party units' were then functioning n Pakistan and abroad,

compared oonly bout 300 such units' at the time ofJhangawi's ssassination nFebruary 1990. See Khilafat-i Rashida, vol. 5, no. 5 (October 1994), 6.54 For the phrase imagined ommunity' nd on the role of print n forging he

ties which onstitute t, see Benedict Anderson, magined ommunities:eflectionsntheOrigin ndSpread fNationalism,ev. dn. London:Verso, 1991).Forwide-rangingobservations n the impact of print on Muslim societies, see Francis Robinson,



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though, as noted, it is part of the Sipah-i Sahaba's purpose tocombat agrarian magnates (who are all too often also influentialin the adjoining urban centres) and to bring an aggressive Sunniidentity to the countryside. In Jhang, where the Sipah-i Sahabawas founded, much of the support for this organization comesfrom urban Sunni businessmen who are believed to handle a largepart (nearly 80 per cent according to some estimates) of commer-cial activity in the district.55 This Sunni bourgeoisie includes asubstantial number of migrants from India, who came to settle inurban Jhang at the time of the partition of the subcontinent in1947.56 Jhang's predominantly agricultural economy is dominated

by a landed elite which is believed to control nearly 65 per centof all land in the district.57 hough the Shi'i rural magnates are'native' to the region, sectarian affiliations are not clearly drawnalong urban/rural or native/settler lines: there are urban Shi'a(often with considerable stakes in business) and rural Sunnis too;and Mawlana Haqq Nawaz, the founder of the Sipah-i Sahaba,was himself a 'native'.58 Nevertheless, a commercial (and, to alesser extent, industrial) bourgeoisie59 is clearly the most import-ant source of

supporton which the

Sipah-iSahaba draws in

Jhang,and in other urban areas. Associations of local traders (anjuman-itajiran) are known to respond actively to the Sipah-i Sahaba's calls

'Technology nd Religious Change: Islam and the Impact of Print', Modern sianStudies, 27 (1993), 229-51; on the media other than print, see Lawrence A. Babband Susan S. Wadley (eds), Media and the Transformationf Religion n South Asia(Philadelphia:University f Pennsylvania ress, 1995).

55 Cf. Newsline September 1994), 36.

56The most famous and successful f

businessmen rom hang are the Chini-otis, known s such by association with Chiniot, town n the district. Chiniotibusiness families had migrated to Calcutta and elsewhere, but returned ormigrated back) to the Punjab after the establishment f Pakistan to become oneof the most mportant usiness groups n Pakistan's economy. ee Stanley Koch-anek, Interest Groups nd Development:usiness nd Politics n Pakistan (Delhi:Oxford University ress, 1983), 23-4. For one early nstance of the support ofChinioti businessmen or Sunni madrasas of Jhang and elsewhere), ee Al-Jami'a(the monthly ournal of the Jami' Muhammadi), vol. 1, no. 3 (December 1948),5.

57 Newsline September 1994), 36.

58 Balakoti, Amir-i Azimat, 15.59 Mian Iqbal Husayn, a leader of the Sipah-i Sahaba, who was assassinated nJhang in August 1991 owned a textile mill in Jhang. The Muslim, 14 August 1991;also cf. TheHerald March 1995), 57. On the Punjabi ndustrial ourgeoisie n gen-eral, see Anita M. Weiss, Culture, lass, ndDevelopment:heEmergencef n IndustrialBourgeoisien Punjab Boulder: Westview ress, 1991).



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 707for general strikes and protest marches, and the latter often ori-ginate in the main bazaars.60

Though urban Jhang is dominated by a Sunni bourgeoisie, theShi'a too are part of the bourgeoisie in Jhang, as indeed elsewhere.In fact, the Shi'a probably comprise a much greater proportion ofthe urban middle class than they do of the Pakistani population as awhole. Some of the very prominent business families, especially ofKarachi, are also Shi'i. Many urban middle class Shi'a profess to be'secular', which is often nterpreted as their response to the percep-tion that Islamization in an overwhelmingly Sunni country mustmean the privileging of Sunni institutions over the Shi'i.61Yet the

proportion of 'secular' Sunnis is surely no smaller than that of theShi'a, and much of the support for the Shi'i sectarian organizationscomes from the middle class too.62

Though it is in places like urban Jhang, as well as in numeroussmall towns (qasbat)of the Punjab, that sectarian conflict has tendedmost often to take place, it is noteworthy hat many urban supportersof sectarian organizations have a not too distant rural background.Many urban migrants bring with them memories of the highhand-edness of the rural magnates, and it is not difficult o visualize thembeing attracted to calls for combating the latter's feudal oppress-

60 Newsreports bout protests nd strikes n the assassination f Sipah-iSahabaleaders Haq NawazJhangawi nd Isar al-Haq Qasimi, both nJhang, n February1990 and January 1991 respectively, rovide much illustrative material n thisregard. See TheMuslim Islamabad), 26 March 1990; TheNation Islamabad), toApril 1990o; Dawn (Karachi), 12 January 1991; The Muslim, 12 January and toFebruary 991; Nawa-i-Waqt Lahore), 12January 991; The rontier ost Lahore),

9 February 1991. (Iam

gratefulo Shahina Shaikh of TheNews

Islamabad]for

enabling me to consult ome of these materials).61 Cf. Nikki R. Keddie, ran and theMuslimWorld: esistance nd Revolution New

York: New York University Press, 1995), 2o8f.62Keddie, bid., exaggerates the 'secular' attitudes of the middle-class hi'a of

Pakistan. To consider nly he case of one of the most recent asualties of sectarianviolence n Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Naqvi (d. 1995), the secretary-general f theTahrik-i a'fariyya, as a professor nd medical practitioner t a teaching hospitalin Lahore. He is not typical f other middle lass Shi'a in the extent f his involve-ment with hi'i sectarian mobilization ut maynevertheless ypify iddle-class hi'isupport or uch organizations. n Naqvi,whowas assassinated n Lahore n March1995, see The News (8 March 1995); The Herald (March 1995),

57-8.The

followingstatement yGhulam Riza Naqviof the Sipah-iMuhammad s also instructive: Wedo not need any financial] ssistance from ther ountries read: ran], for ur ownpeople are very generous n helping us. Indeed, f our people pay all the Khums aShi'i wealth-tax] hey re obliged to, there will be so much money s to create anew Pakistan.' (Zindagi (20oJuly 1995), 23.)



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708 MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMANiveness nd to the deological egitimation ffered or t. n an urbanmilieu where administrative nd judicial authorities re inefficientand corrupt, nd are widelyheld to act in concert with the landedelite, the Sipah-i Sahaba's appeal to the interests f the 'commonman' and its challenge to established but corrupt uthority-ruralmagnates, pirs, urban administrators-also carries force. MawlanaHaqq Nawaz,himself man of humble origin, had a reputation orbeing much concernedwith hewelfare f the poor and the helpless,and was known ospend time regularly t government ourts helpingout poor, lliterate itigants. As the Sipah-i Sahaba began to gainincreasing prominence, nd often came into conflict ith the local

administrators nd the Shi'i gentry, he organization's eroic magesteadily grew ogetherwith hat of ts eader.Olivier Roy has remarked n another context on the role of the

Shi'i clergy n resocializing hi'i migrants rom tribal-rural milieuinto an urban setting."6 n Pakistan, uch a function s not confinedonly o the Shi'a. Sunni ulama', madrasas, nd especially n organ-ization such as the Sipah-i Sahaba play a similar role. But it is notonly to marginalized rban migrants hat the Sipah-i Sahaba, andno doubt Shi'i madrasas and sectarian organizations, ffer upportand anchorage. They appeal as well to the upwardlymobile middleclass and especially o the commercial ourgeoisie r those aspiring(often without uccess) to oin their ranks. t is such people, oftenthemselves f a rural background, ho are the principal upportersof the sectarian rganizations oth of the Sunnis and the Shi'a.

The numbers s well as the resources f thosewho sawthemselvesas the middle lass,especially n the Punjab,grew remendously romthe mid-197os through he mid-198os.One of the principal easons

for this was the influx f Pakistani labour overseas during theseyears. This remarkable movement f labour, the dramatic changesin status and expectations t entailed, nd, not least, the social andeconomic dislocations many labour migrants suffered on theirreturn, re also part of the context n which adicalsectarianism asemerged n Pakistan. According o one estimate, [a]pproximatelyto million people or 11 per cent of the total population a figurewhich ncludesdependants) have benefited irectly rom he exodusto the MiddleEast. The vast majority f the beneficiaries ome from

63Olivier oy, TheFailure f olitical slam Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard UniversityPress, 1994), 187ff. Alsocf.Martin Riesebrodt, iousPassion:The mergencefModernFundamentalismn the United tates nd ran Berkeley:University f California ress,1993), 185ff-



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SECTARIANISM IN PAKISTAN 709low-income ouseholds. On average, heir alaries ncreased between600 and 800 per cent.'64Most of the labour migrants ame with arural background,65hough majority f them returned o settle nurban areas."" uch migrants, f whom hePunjab contributed bout70 per cent,67 ypically orked broad for only four or five years,however; nd by the mid-1980s, migration broad was in decline,and the number f returnees was at its peak.68

Much work needs to be done to show a definite ink or the lackof one) between abour migration verseas and sectarian conflict.Yet the fact that the emergence f sectarian organizations ates tothe same time as the return, n increasing numbers, f the labour

migrants s probably not without ignificance. t is not far-fetchedperhaps to suppose that the emergence of sectarian organizationshas responded o the search ofmanypeople-including, but not only,returning abour migrants rom broad-for an urban religious den-tity whichwould accompany, nd perhaps facilitate, heir quest fora middle-class tatus. A shared sectarian dentity ot only cementsother bonds--common business interests, ural or kinship ties, ashared experience f working n the Middle East and, on return, fexperiencing imilar problems of assimilation nto a new urbanmilieu-but helps also in forging he sense of belonging o a newand distinct ommunity. he bonds of this community re constantlyreiterated: raying n the same mosques,behind prayer-leader homay also be one of the leaders of the sectarian organization nesupports; ointly earing he financial urdens nvolved n the main-tenance and growth f mosques69nd madrasas see Table 1) as wellas in supporting amilies f those whohave fallen victim o sectarian

64OmarNoman, The Impact of Migration n Pakistan's Economy nd Society',in H. Donnan and P. Werbner eds), Economynd Culture n Pakistan:Migrants ndCities n a Muslim ocietyLondon:Macmillan,1991),83.

65Jonathan ddleton, Undermininghe Centre: he Gulf Migration nd Pakistan(Karachi: Oxford University ress, 1992), 88ff. My discussion here of overseaslabour migrants s largely ased on Addleton's indings.

66Ibid.,19o, 197.67Noman,Impact of Migration', o.68Addleton, Undermining heCentre, 87-201.69Oneresidential olony f about ten thousand people inJhang was reported n

April 1991 to have thirty-five osques,many f them of recent rigin. ee Newsline(April 1991), 45. A survey conducted in August 1994 reported the existence of 16omosques in Okara city n the Punjab which belong to the Barelawis alone; therehad been only one Sunni mosque there n the early 195os: NewslineSeptember1994), 33. The larger towns nd cities can have several thousand mosques:Herald(March 1995), 71 (report on Faisalabad city in the Punjab).



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710 MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMANTABLE

Growth fMadrasasn the unjab, 975-94

Division 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994

Bahawalpur 278 417 598 795 883D. G. Khan 153 217 297 363 411Multan 45 102 179 212 325Lahore 75 120 170 219 323Rawalpindi 58 85 119 157 169Sargodha 75 98 130 148 149Gujranwala 52 66 96 131 140Faisalabad ? ? ? ? 112Total 2512Sources:Zindagi Lahore: 17 February 1995), 39; TheNews Islamabad: 7 March1995), 11.

violence;subscribing o the publications f madrasas and sectarianorganizations, nd, n case of businessmen, dvertising n them too;7oand being constantly made aware, through hese publications, utalso through he mosque-preacher, f how other members of thissectarian community lsewhere re engaged n activities imilar otheir

own.71The career of Mawlana Isar al-Qasimi (1964-1991), a leader ofthe Sipah-iSahaba, illustrates ome of the social and economic on-text of sectarian ommitments. sar al-Qasimi's family ad migratedfrom mbala n eastern Punjab to settle n a village n rural Lyallpur(now Faisalabad) at the time of the partition f India. His fatherspent many years in the Middle East, as have many activists ndsupporters f the Sipah-i Sahaba. After ompleting his education,which nvolved tudies at three different madrasas in Lahore, Isaral-Qasimi tried to set up his own business but failed. n 1985, hebegan preaching n a mosque in Okara in the Punjab besides teach-ing n a madrasa he had established here. After he Sipah-iSahaba

70A andom ample of the monthly r fortnightly ournals (each usually round50 or so pages) published by madrasas, religious ssociations, r various sectarianorganizations hows that almost all carry numerous advertisements rom hop-keepers nd small merchants, ut also from arger businesses.My sample includesthe following monthly ournals: al-Balagh Dar al-'Ulum, Karachi); Al-Bayyinat(Jami'at al-'Ulum al-Islamiyya, Karachi); Al-Haqq (Dar al-'Ulum Haqqaniyya,Peshawar);Al-Sa'id (Jami'a AnwarAl-'Ulum,Multan); Zia-iHaram Lahore);Misaq(Tanzim-i slami, Lahore); Ishraq al-Mawrid, ahore); Khilafat-i ashida Sipah-iSahaba, Faisalabad);Majallat l-Da'wa(al-Da'wawa'l-Irshad, ahore).

71Cf.Anderson, magined ommunities,7; compare the mechanisms f integra-tion' n the making f Shi'i fundamentalism n ran: Riesebrodt, iousPassion, 6off.



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was founded, sar al-Qasimi came to Jhang, on the bidding ofMawlanaHaqq Nawaz,to preach n one of the market-towns qasba)of the district. fiery rator, sar al-Qasimisoon came into conflictwith Shi'i magnates of the area, denouncing hem for their high-handed dealingswith heir peasants, speciallywith unni peasants,and mobilizing unni opposition gainst them. Many of those whorallied to the Sipah-i Sahaba's cause as represented y him weresmall peasants who doubtless felt empowered by the aggressiveSunni identity he helped them acquire.72But his supporters lsoincluded uccessful hopkeepers nd businessmen. t was no accidentthat, n what became a familiar attern, heShi'i agrarian magnates

of the area responded to his challenge by having shops owned bySunnis attacked and burnt."7After the assassination of Mawlana Haqq Nawaz in February

1990, Mawlana Isar al-Qasimi became the deputy eader of theSipah-i Sahaba and, as the symbolicmark of his succession, lsothe prayer-leader nd preacher t Haqq Nawaz's mosque in Jhang(MawlanaZia al-Rahman Faruqi, the publisher rom yallpur, waschosen to head the organization74). he same year, sar al-Qasimicontested elections to both the National and Punjab assemblies;he won both seats, defeating, or the National Assembly eat, apowerful hi'i rural magnate of the Sial family of Jhang75 ndbecoming the very first member of the Sipah-i Sahaba to enterparliament. Haqq NawazJhangawi had contested lections o theNational Assembly n 1988, but had lost to one of the mostinfluential andlords f the area."76)t was not ong, however, eforesectarian tensions took their toll, as they had for many otherleaders of radical sectarianism, nd in January 1991, Isar al-

Qasimi was assassinated n Jhang.7772SeeMark uergensmeyer, heNew Cold War? Religious ationalism onfrontshe

Secular State (Berkeley: University f California Press, 1993), 167ff. on theempowering f marginal peoples' in religious nationalism, nter lia, through hesanctification f religious iolence.

73Khilafat-i ashida, vol. 4, no. 1 (January 1993), 20; Mawlana Haq NawazJhangawikipandara ta'rikh-saz aqrirain, 32, 136.

74It is worth noting hat one of Zia al-Rahman Faruqi's brothers lso works nSaudi Arabia; another s the editor of the Sipah-i Sahaba's journal, the Khilafat-iRashida. ee Khilafat-i ashida, ol. 5, no. 3 (August 1994), 6.

75On he Sials ofJhang, ee L. Griffin nd C. F. Massy,Chiefs ndFamilies fNotein the unjab Lahore: Government rinting, unjab, 1940), II, 365-71.76Mawlanaaq NawazJhangawi ipandara a'rikh-sazaqrirain, 66-79-77This ccount s based on a biographical otice n Khilafat-i ashida, ol.4, no. 1

(January 1993), 20.



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TABLE 2Sectarianiotsn the unjab, 989-94

Year Incidents Personsnjured

Persons killed

1989 67 102 101990 274 528 321991 18o 263 471992 136 240 441993 90 247 381994 115 249 37Total 862 1629 2o8Source: TheNation Islamabad: 1 September 1994).Note: The figures or 1994 include ncidents p to but not later than 17 August

1994. Note that these are official nd thus probably ather onservative stimates;the actual number f casualties may have been much higher.

As is typical of radical religious movements, the fact that theirleaders themselves frequently fall victim to such violence does noth-ing to dampen either the zeal of their followers or the attractions ofthe resort to violence. For the Sipah-i Sahaba, as indeed for the Shi'iorganizations, violence by sectarian opponents only reinforces theirperception of the threat from the 'other', and hence their raison d'itreof 'safeguarding', often through violent retaliation, their sectariankin from that threat. Like mosques, madrasas, print, a shared socialbackground and common economic interests, religiously sanctionedviolence and growing lists of martyrs78-comprising eaders no lessthan ordinary devotees-also contribute to the sense of community.Such sacrifices of blood seldom fail to reinforce and sanctify theshared sectarian identity and give it an added, and unrelenting,dynamic.79

Sectarian violence has exacted a heavy toll in the Punjab (seeTable 2), but it is not limited only to this province. Though it isin the Punjab that the principal sectarian organizations (theSipah-i Sahaba, the Tahrik-i Ja'fariyya, the Sipah-i Muhammad)are based, their activities also extend to other parts of the country.The social and economic contexts in which sectarian conflict takesplace can, and often do, differ from one region to another. Yet thenetwork of mosques and madrasas, the proliferation of sectarian

78As ne example among many, ee Balakoti,Amir-i Azimat, 2-4, for a list of'the martyrs ofJhang' (till 19go?).

79Onreligiously anctioned violence and its place in religious nationalism, eeJuergensmeyer, The New Cold War, 153-70.



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publications and of party-cells all ensure that a supra-local sectar-ian community now exists whose members can relate, and react,to the tribulations of their sectarian kin

anywhere, irrespectiveof

local context.8o This network also provides members of the com-munity with remarkable mobility. The career of Mawlana Muham-mad A'zam Tariq (b. 1961), who has represented the Sipah-iSahaba in the lower house of the Pakistani parliament, spans boththe Punjab and Sind, for instance, and thanks in part to him, sodoes the influence of his organization. He was born in the Sahiwaldistrict of the Punjab but studied at a madrasa in Karachi andlater established a mosque for himself in that city. After thefounding of the Sipah-i Sahaba, this mosque became its principalorganizational unit. Beginning with his position as the prayer-leader and preacher of this mosque, A'zam Tariq rose to lead theSipah-i Sahaba first n Karachi, then in the province of Sind as awhole, and finally, s the deputy leader of the organization, at thenational level. On the assassination of Mawlana Isar al-Qasimi,he was elected from a constituency in Jhang to fill the latter'sposition in the parliament."8 The sectarian community is supra-

local even as it is constantly reinforced by local conditions andgrievances.Conversely, as the case of Karachi in particular illustrates, sectar-

ian radicalism can also serve as one among several simultaneousforms of social conflict."82n this city of more than 12 million people,of whom nearly 2.5 million are illegal immigrants83 nd two millionlive in illegal squatter settlements,84 arious kinds of urban conflict

80Cf. tanley J. Tambiah, Reflections n Communal Violence in South Asia',

Journal ofAsian

Studies, 49 (1990), 741-60.81On he career of Mawlana A'zam Tariq, see Khilafat-i ashida, ol. 3, nos 9-10(September-October 992), 27-8. Also see the detailed nterview ith him n bid.,vol. 4, no. 7 (December 1993), 5-8; ibid., vol. 4, no. 8 (January 1994), 4-10.

82Accordingo figures eleasedby the government, total of 1,134 people werekilled and 1,705 injured in Karachi between the beginning of October 1994 andthe end of May 1995 alone.Among hosekilled, herewere 103 Sunni activists nd10o4Shi'i ones. For these figures, ee the report f the Human Rights Commissionof Pakistan,Karachi-Buhran e hal ki talash Lahore: Human Rights Commission fPakistan, 1995), 17-18.

83NewslineFebruary 1995), 95.84Frits

elier, Familynd Rural-Urban

Migrationn Pakistan:The Case ofKara-

chi', in J. van der Linden and Frits Selier, Karachi:Migrants, ousing nd HousingPolicy Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), p. 5; Jan van der Linden, Security nd Value:Squatter Dwellings n Karachi', in Donnan and Werbner, conomynd Culture nPakistan, 2-76.



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and rioting have taken place since the early 1950s.85 Sectarian con-flict, ince the early 198os, is in large part explicable in terms of thesame configuration f urban problems which also generates riots overethnic, linguistic and other issues. The nature and background ofurban conflict n Karachi, or the question of its resonance in otherregions and contexts and vice versa, deserve a separate treatment,however, and must be left aside here.

Conclusion

The Sipah-iSahaba's effort o create a community f sectarianSunnism, n the way omaking akistan 'Sunni tate', s doubt-less nterpretable s a form f religious ationalism.n an import-ant recent tudy,MarkJuergensmeyer as argued hat Religiousnationalism.. may eviewed s oneway f reconciling eretoforeunreconcilable lements-traditional eligion nd modern polit-ics.'86 he question, owever,s whether t is appropriate o thinkof the religion, r the religious ommitments, f such peopleassupport the

Sipah-iSahaba as 'traditional'? he differences

between he Sunnis nd the Shi'a have existed or more than amillennium. But professing to make Sunnism the ideology of amodern nation-state (a state which already declares itself to be'Islamic'), celebrating the death anniversaries of certain early fig-ures of Islamic history as national days, promoting a sectarianconsciousness through highly organized parties, dexterous and pro-fuse use of print, and the use of mosques and madrasas as mediaof recruitment and organization, do not conjure an image of a

'traditional' religion. One must be careful not to exaggerate the'modernity' of sectarian radicalism: its leaders, the 'ulama', havebeen reared on styles of learning which are often centuries old,and the madrasa, where their intellectual formation takes place,is itself an institution of medieval origins. Yet radical sectar-ianism is no more a 'traditional' religion than the empowering,by Sunni and Shi'i preachers and scholars, of the middle class,

85For brief eview f the major nstances f rioting n Karachi till the mid-198os,see Fareeda Shaheed, The Pathan-Muhajir Conflict, 985-86: A National Per-spective', n Veena Das (ed.), Mirrors f Violence:ommunities,iots, nd SurvivorsnSouth Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 194-214-

86Juergensmeyer, heNewColdWar, 191.



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the rural populace, and, above all, themselves, in terms of amilitant sectarian ideology, is a 'traditional' religious role.87

A combination of social and economic factors, ambiguities aboutthe place of slam in public life, and international developments suchas the Iranian revolution have all contributed to the making of sec-tarian conflict n Pakistan. Yet the significance of sectarianism doesnot consist only n its being an expression of these (and other) devel-opments, or even in its being a form of radical Islamism which hasreceived rather scant attention from cholars interested in the latterphenomenon. Radical sectarianism is also a medium of religiouschange (not just an expression of it) and important for that reason.

As noted earlier in this study, Sunni and Shi'i activists and scholarsare alike eager to win adherents in the countryside. This activity nfact predates the radical sectarianism of the past quarter century,though it has no doubt contributed to it. Shi'ia tend to view theirpotential converts as rural Sunnis, while activists of the Sipah-iSahaba define their goals in proselytism s rescuing people from theinfluence of Shi'ism to which they have been subjected by ignoranceor by virtue of subservience to Shi'i rural magnates. The veneer ofeither Shi'i or Sunni religious traditions is extremely thin in thecountryside, however, and both are usually components of a broadermix of locally accepted practices. The significance of sectarianismlies in bringing traditions of an urban, text-based Islam to the coun-tryside in the form of an aggressive and self-consciously Sunni orShi'i Islam.

As an agent of religious change, sectarianism is a medium not onlyfor a revival of the 'ulama's influence but also for ts extension n areaswhere previously such influence was minimal. The Sipah-i Sahaba's

effort o bring a Sunni identity o the rural populace of the Punjab-whose religious attitudes have hitherto been (and, in large measure,continue to be) dominated by sufi nfluences, as the lives of many ofthem are dominated by Shi'i agrarian magnates-means introducingthem to a very different orm of Islam than what they are familiarwith. The nerve centres of this 'new' Islam are not sufi shrines butmadrasas and sectarian organizations; and the feudal pirs are nolonger the guardians of rural Islam, but, in this worldview, he enem-ies of the true faith. Among Shi'i religious scholars and preachers

87Cf.MawlanaHaqNawazJhangawi ipandara a'rikh-sazaqrirain, sp. 268-94, forJhangavi's nsistence hat the ulama' must assume an aggressive olitical role inthe defence' of Sunnism.



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716 MUHAMMAD QASIM ZAMANlikewise, there are indications of the effort to acquaint rural orrecently urbanized people, professing some devotion to certain Shi'iceremonies and rituals, to an Iranianized form of Shi'ism88 ustainedby madrasas, sectarian organizations, and Shi'i literature.89 Since'Islam' is understood as an aggressive devotion to either Sunnismor Shi'ism to the exclusion of the other, but also as signifying herenunciation of local customs in terms of the literate cultural tradi-tion of the 'ulama' and the madrasas, a sectarian identity is thevehicle through which whatever is taken to constitute an Islamic den-tity s imparted, acquired, asserted-in a word, magined. This Islamhas a starkly ectarian face, but it is the basis of a new community;

and for all their mutual antagonism, the Shi'a and the Sunnis haveshared roots in this community.

880nthe Iranianization' f non-Iranian hi'ite clergy n the Middle East (but alsoelsewhere), ee Roy, ailure f olitical slam, 185ff.

89Cf.Naqvi, Tadhkira-yi Ulama'-i Imamiyya-i akistan, 291, 320, 340, 403, 411 forinstances f Shi'i preachers triving o reform' ocal beliefs nd customs.

An earlier version f this article was presented t a colloquiumof the TriangleSouth Asia Consortium, uke University, urham, North Carolina, n December

1995.I am grateful othe participants n the colloquium, nd to Professors harlesJ. Adams, M. Rafique Afzal,Arthur . Buehler, Carl W. Ernst, SeyyedVali RezaNasr, and, aboveall, DavidGilmartin, or omments n earlier drafts.

sectarianism in pakistan the radicalization of shi'i and sunni identities

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