THE SEA-RAIDERS OF MALAYA

Piracy, Trade, and Authority on the Malay Peninsula, 1819-1914

By Scott Abel

A Thesis submitted to the

Graduate School-Newark

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

In partial fulfillment of requirements

For the degree of

Masters of Arts

Graduate Program in History

Written under the direction of

Professor Amita Satyal

and approved by

_______________________

_______________________

_______________________

_______________________

Newark, New Jersey

May, 2011

Abstract of the Thesis

The Sea-Raiders of Malaya

Piracy, Trade, and Authority on the Malay Peninsula, 1819-1914

By Scott Abel

Thesis Director: Professor Amita Satyal

For centuries ‘piracy’ and ‘marauding’ plagued the Straits of Melaka causing the

capture of countless vessels, along with the death or captivity of many passengers and

seafarers. The practice and suppression of piracy in the context of Malay society and

British imperialism during the 19th century reveals its impact on British and Malaysian

history. The study employs secondary historical sources for the argument regarding

imperialism and piracy in the Straits of Melaka during the 19th century. The

decentralized structure of authority and reliance on maritime trade in Malaya during the

19th century contributed to the flourishing of piracy. Previous studies on piracy in

Malaya by Tarling and Anderson focused on its political and economic impact, but

generally neglected the pirates themselves and the development of a colonial economy.

The pirates were economically and politically powerful by raiding throughout Southeast

Asia. The marauders from Malaya composed of diverse socio-economic and political

backgrounds contributing to extensiveness of the plundering throughout the region. By

the 19th century Great Britain became an established power in Malaya with an interest in

suppressing what its administrators perceived as piracy to protect the lives and property

of British subjects, but the diversity of the pirates made that difficult.

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Perceptions on authority varied in each ethnic and political group, but the 19th

century witnessed the transformation from a decentralized political structure to a more

centralized one under British domination. British authorities actively suppressed piracy

and marauding more than the Malay sultans. Piracy preyed on maritime trade, but also

existed because of trading and societal conditions. Malay and Chinese seafarers seized

vessels for supplemental income without consequence because a lack of centralized

political leadership. Furthermore, many seafarers possessed the maritime and martial

skills necessary to become marauders during times of strife and conflict. Great Britain

reduced the amount of piracy in the Straits of Melaka through a variety of methods

including extending political control along the straits, creating state mechanisms for

limiting piracy, sustaining economic development, and deploying military power to the

region. British domination shook Malaya from its traditions into a territory with a

radically different economic and political system.

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Introduction

The Malays of the 19th and 20th centuries witnessed an unprecedented

transformation of their land and society with changes for most of the population ranging

from a more structured system of authority to alterations in the ethnic makeup of the

population. ‘Piracy,’ ‘sea-raiding,’ and ‘marauding’ restricted trade when left unchecked

by authorities. European authority crept over the previous state structures in Southeast

Asia over a period of centuries, lacking a single cause for expansion throughout the

centuries. Rather, the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British held portions of Southeast

Asia from 1511 to 1974 with different ideas about administration and trade than

indigenous powers. The pirates and sea-raiders of the Straits of Melaka and the South

China Sea came from a variety of socio-economic and political backgrounds and acted

outside European authority. The study will focus on the British presence on the Malay

Peninsula from the establishment of British Singapore in 1819 to 1914, along with the

effects and responses to piracy by the British authorities. During times of political

uncertainty and weakened state authority, pirates and sea-raiders grew in numbers and

influence. The campaign against piracy by Great Britain was merely the first step in

turning the various Malay states into European-style Industrial Age colonial states with

some adjustments based on the British perception of the Malays’ culture. The sea-

raiders’ influence in Malaya declined significantly by the 20th century in large part

because of the establishment of British-influenced institutions.

‘Pirate,’ ‘sea-raider,’ or ‘marauder’ describes an attacker of unknown and known

support from a sultan or legitimate political leader in the study. The term “pirate” will

not necessarily reflect the morality of the action at sea in the study, but the lack of

4

support from a sultan or other significant state leader. Pirates and sea-raiders sailed

along the coast, pillaging trade in search of slave labor for sale elsewhere causing

disturbances throughout Southeast Asia.

1.1 The Argument

The pirates and sea-raiders impacted Malaya immensely during the 19th century,

contributing to shifts in native populations by displacing coastal villagers and sea-traders

through raiding. Native states in Malaya employed sea-raiders to patrol the coasts and

collect additional revenue for the local rulers. The sea-raiders became symbols of

authority in some instances, patrolling the sea for the state in maintenance of a local

ruler’s power. Sometimes distinguishing between a pirate acting without the consent of

the sultan or a legitimate agent of the state was difficult.

The development of the British Straits Settlements altered the economic landscape

of the region and brought naval forces into action against native seafarers. British

authorities employed incidents of piracy as excuses for an intervention within the affairs

of indigenous states in the name of fighting piracy. British authorities differentiated

rarely between the sea-raiders acting on orders from a legitimate authority and those

acting on their own. “Counter-piracy” denotes the British attempt to monopolize

violence at sea against any action perceived as piracy by them regardless of native

perceptions. The British perception generalized all sea-raiders as pirates, while British

forces assaulted suspected pirate stronghold without discrimination between those

responsible for raiding and those apart of the raiding economy. The virtual elimination of

sea-raiding either supported or abetted by native states restructured the authority of the

Malay states in favor of Great Britain.

5

Aside from the cause of piracy on the part of British intervention in British Malay

in of itself, the condition of the Malay states encouraged sea-raiding during the 1860s and

1870s and also contributed to the intervention by Great Britain into the same territories.

Piracy flourished during periods of weak states, conflict, poor interstate cooperation, and

immense poverty. Malaya’s geography made piratical behavior much easier and

provided plenty of hiding places for sea-raiders along the coasts. The social, economic,

political, and geographic conditions of the Malay Peninsula during the 19th century made

the ‘suppression of piracy’ by any power difficult. For the weakening of sea-raiding a

regional or global power required a strong political presence, while also creating

economic development and a social policy that discouraged piracy. The Royal Navy’s

attempt to destroy pirates within the Straits of Melaka marked the first step in the British

government’s attempt, not necessarily consciously, to consolidate control over the Malay

Peninsula.

The military policies of the British and East India Company governments sought

the destruction of the sea-raiders through armed force. The Royal Navy and private

navies in coordination with land forces assaulted marauder strongholds, along with firing

upon suspected sea-raiders throughout the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea.

The navies patrolled the seas to protect commerce and coastal populations from

marauders throughout the 19th century. The Royal Navy bombarded fortifications and

British infantry attacked local rulers for allegedly harboring suspected pirates. The

military operations made sea-raiding more difficult but failed to stop its perpetrators

completely because of the marauders integration within Malaya’s political, economic,

6

and social structure. The employment of nonmilitary means by British authorities to

weakened the sea-raiders and their supporters to find income through other means.

The nonmilitary policies enacted by British authorities included the establishment

of various institutions that strengthened the British colonial system in Malaya at the

expense of the sea-raiders’ influence. The limits of military action became apparent

through the hit-and-run tactics of the sea-raiders and the inability of the naval forces to

kill or capture more of them. Even the destruction of entire marauder villages and fleets

simply pushed the marauders to hide elsewhere throughout the East Indies Archipelago.

The Malay Peninsula possessed plenty of hiding spots in mangroves and forests along its

coast for sea-raiders. To eliminate the sea-raider threat, Great Britain and other European

powers needed the full cooperation of local rulers. Civil administrators convinced local

rulers to adopt policies favorable to British interests and enhance economic development

through public policy. The development of various institutions in Malaya connected

segments of society to the British authorities through political, economic, and social

policy.

Diplomatic and political pressure on Malay states and Chinese factions weakened

the support for marauders. British authorities employed strategies of gunboat diplomacy

for the application of political pressure on native leaders, along with cooperation with

native leaders through advisers and official residents as state administrators. Alliances

with pro-Great Britain leaders in Malaya developed British authority there. The British

intervention in Malay politics reformed the government through centralization and

weakening piracy. Advisers’ and residents’ tax collection reform redirected state revenue

from tribute, marauders, and stockades to centralized European-style custom duties. The

7

political and diplomatic actions of British authorities isolated marauders effectively from

the rest of society despite their previous significance in society.

British economic and social policy turned Malay society away from its reliance on

piracy for income to more peaceful and compliant toward British to earn a living.

Chinese firms grew through exports of tin to the West and improved efficiency with the

importation of European and Australia techniques. The development of infrastructure by

British colonial authorities permitted the shipment of greater quantities of natural

resources from Malaya. The importation of rubber tree seedlings came through the

British government, which also encouraged their growth before the en masse

development of rubber plantations. The development of an English-style education

system brought the youth of Malaya under the influence of British authorities. The

development of civil administration more centralized than prior to the British intervention

weakened sea-raiding as an institution.

The development of a legal system with English influences prohibited sea-raiding

by severing the bonds between marauders and native rulers. The sea-raider became a

pirate in the eyes of the law because the state no longer sanctioned their actions. Stricter

laws and regulations of maritime commerce, along with stricter enforcement contributed

to the decline of piracy within the Straits of Melaka. Judicial reforms for the Straits

Settlements for piracy trials resulted in higher conviction rates. Political alliances and

anti-piracy clauses in treaties with native states assisted British authorities weaken their

political opponents and the institution of sea-raiding in Malaya. British authorities in

Malaya also weakened the Chinese secret societies significantly through the development

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of police stations and anti-secret society laws. British law and its enforcers weakened the

once-powerful marauders throughout Malaya.

1.2 Organization and Structure of the Study

The study contains four main sections, each with a subject important to the history

of maritime Malaya. Authority throughout the Malay Peninsula, the first chapter,

decentralized gradually after the collapse of the Melaka Sultanate in the 16th century until

the consolidation of British power in the 19th century. The second chapter on trade and

society establishes the important links between piracy and the economy. Explanations of

piracy and marauding within the third chapter will contend that various segments of

society committed piratical acts for additional income. The fourth chapter will explain

the counter-piracy strategies employed by the British authorities during the 19th century.

The first chapter examines how a legitimate faction wielded its power into rightful

authority and perception differentiated between pirate and official state warship. The

decentralized and fractious nature of indigenous Malay politics increased the amount of

piracy often because of conflict. When no clear leader emerged after the death of a

sultan, factional splits in the state left the Straits of Melaka vulnerable to piratical

assaults. The transition to British authority took decades while elements of the old

political system remained in place. Eventually British officials dominated Malaya

politics through treaties and force, deploying armed forces and other colonial machinery

to clear the Straits of Melaka of opponents to British authority including suspected

pirates.

The second chapter on trade in Malaya will examine the trading patterns and their

influences on the region. Maritime trade sailing through the Straits of Melaka tempted

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seafarers into becoming sea-raiders even though sea-raiders were often traders

themselves. The sea-raiders targeted vessels and their crews usually of non-European

origin because of their numbers and vulnerability. Alterations in trade patterns also

shifted toward and away from piracy, which ultimately pulled many inhabitants of

Malaya away from work at sea to work on land. Developments in infrastructure and the

exploitation of the land resulted in the profitability for working within the British system.

Malaya as a British colony instituted secular education to prepare children for the

workforce and maintain loyalties to the British crown. The employment of economic and

social strategies made Malaya more valuable to Great Britain as a colony by making it

wealthier and more powerful.

The third chapter on sea-raiding will examine the reasons why seafarers risked

their lives in capturing other vessels and their implements to accomplish such tasks. The

political context revealed a relationship between marauders and political leaders.

Marauding possessed a long history within Southeast Asia stretching into the colonial

era, but the early decades of the 19th century witnessed particularly brutal raids. The

increase of sea-raiding during this period related to the policies of British colonies along

the Straits of Melaka. The rampant poverty and intermittent conflicts exacerbated

piratical trends resulting in the capture and deaths of an untold amount of people. Pirates

within the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea became the first serious resisters of

British expansion into Malaya, although their goals were primarily economic rather than

political. The marauders in that region came from a variety of backgrounds, whether

poor fishermen in need of supplemental income or the members of the ruling class

desirous of extra income.

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Great Britain and other nations developed their counter-piracy policy to protect

their interests. The counter piracy chapter will examine the methods employed by the

British authorities to minimize piracy in the Straits of Melaka and the South China Seas.

British authorities employed military and non-military means to weaken the marauders

that ultimately reduced the impact of sea-raiders on Malaya. The Royal Navy and private

navies hunted pirates in defense of maritime commerce, while administrators and law

enforcement made piratical activities more difficult. British authorities employed

military strategies to destroy the marauders and their bases of power while isolating them

from native rulers. Civilian officials promoted non-military means such as the

development of a more effective justice system and developing infrastructure to deter

potential pirates. Although British authorities never fully destroyed the pirates of the

Straits of Melaka, they diminished the strength of the marauders until their impact was

minimal.

1.3 Historiography of 19th Century Malaya and British Colonialism

The historiography of the British involvement in Malaya tended to explain that

British forces intervened in Perak and Selangor to end the civil disorder and eliminate

“anarchy,” within a global trend in colonization.1 The disorder of the conflict spread 1 Sugta Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006); C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control, (New York: Oxford UP, 1961); J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya AD 1400-1959, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1962); Frank Swettenham, British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya, (New York: John Lane, 1907); C. Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877, (Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur University Press, 1964); K. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, (New York: David McKay, 1964); Philip Loh, The Malay States: Political Change and Social Policy, 1877-1895, (New York: Oxford UP, 1969); Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World, (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1963); Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); Carl Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007); Barbara Andaya, Leonard Andaya, A History of Malaysia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001); ? J. L. Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 1750-1850: Some Economic Implications,” Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by David J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997).

11

from land unto the sea, disturbing people of various backgrounds and means with piracy

causing the suffering of innocent people. According to Sugta Bose, the British and

Chinese capitalists lobbied the Colonial Office to alter policy to allow for greater

protection of their tin-mining investments.2 Charles D. Cowan wrote specifically about

the reasons for British intervention in Malaya, arguing that the British abandoned the

policy of non-intervention because the potential for economic development with trade

shifts in Malaya’s favor, the fracturing of the native Malay authority, along with the need

for protection of British property and trade. Cowan also argued that Whitehall

considered the previously mentioned issues, along with the actions of foreign powers.

Finally, Cowan argued that Straits Settlements officials and governors acted on their own

volition against the will of the policymakers in London, but upon the action of those

officials, London did not concede its political gains.3 The mentioned historiography

discussed the importance of political and economic factors that contributed to the British

intervention in Malaya, but neglected the social aspects of the period that are important to

understanding piracy in the Straits of Melaka.

The British expansion throughout the Malay Peninsula resulted from a series of

rapid economic, political, and social changes from the mid to late 19th century that shook

the fabric of Malay society. The Malay Peninsula witnessed great change during the 19th

century in large part because of the Industrial Age and the demand for goods that

prompted a change in Malay society. The land witnessed an enormous influx of

immigrants moving to Malaya and capital for development, exacerbating the societal

2

? Sugta Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2006), 50-51.3

? C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control, (New York: Oxford UP, 1961), 263.

12

problems and political tensions.4 Such issues, along with economic grievances

contributed the flourishing of piracy in the region. Aspects of Malay society and cultural

constructions contributed to the forcible seizure of vessels as part of a larger historical

context of traditional sea-raiding. Pirates composed of no single group, but rather

composed of a variety backgrounds and professions.

The historiography in regard the history of Malaysia initiated with little focus on

social history but included gradually more historical works with social history. Initially,

social history of British Malaya and modern Malaysia initiated with the anthropological

perspective because historians wrote about their own experiences during their stay in the

territories. Frank Swettenham wrote about Malays during his time with them in Malaya

through an anthropological manner. Charles Donald Cowan in 1961 and C. Northcote

Parkinson in 1964 focused mostly on the politics and economics of the British

intervention in Malaya, neglecting any significant note toward social history. That trend

changed slowly as historians included more social history in their studies of Malaya such

as K. G. Tregonning in 1964, who wrote about aspects of social. Philip Loh focused on

British efforts to make Malaya a peaceful and productive colony by establishing a social

framework through a variety of policies. Although social history became an important

aspect of the historiography in time, the social history approach to piracy remained rare.

The pirates and marauders operating from Malaya received some attention almost

entirely within the context of British imperialism within the 18th and 19th centuries.

Cowan and Parkinson focused on the domination of Malaya through the British

perspective with piracy as a means for native factions to gain an advantage over the

others. Cowan and Parkinson regarded piracy within the context of British imperialism

4 J. Kennedy, A History of Malaya AD 1400-1959, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1962),187-188.

13

but not as a topic in itself. Nicholas Tarling wrote about piracy mainly within the

political context of the native Malay states and the encroaching British imperialism.

Tarling examined piracy within a social and economic context by placing first-hand

accounts within his work, but provided little analysis on the social impact or causes of

piracy and marauding. Eric Tagliacozzo focused on piracy as a means of resistance

against the European-style state and colonial mechanisms. Pirates freed themselves from

the constraints of the modern state by operating outside of it according to Tagliacozzo.

Carl Trocki defined the Malay perception of piracy effectively, but focused mainly on

their relationship with Johor and Lingga rather than the pirates themselves. The

aforementioned works placed piracy within relation to the presence of British authorities

because the primary sources were mostly within that context.

Other historians focused more on the economic impact regarding piracy and how

changing economies eventually weakened the prominence of pirates within Malaya.

Leonard and Barbara Andaya placed marauding in the Straits of Melaka within the

economic context of shifting demand for goods from Southeast Asia from China to

Europe. Also, the Andayas wrote about the weakening marauding through political

changes regarding the increased power of British Singapore and the shifts away from

trade through native merchant vessels toward an increase of trade with Chinese and

European vessels. J. L. Anderson evaluated the economic costs of piracy overall

weakening the economy of the region through the massive inefficiencies brought about

through forcible redistribution of goods and labor without adding any value to them. The

Andayas and Anderson examined the British authorities’ efforts to counter piracy

effectively through a combination of military operations and administrative actions.

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Much of the historiography neglected the pirates themselves and their personal

origins in much detail. Although a few historians explained the causes of piracy, only

Tarling and Anderson to an extent looked extensively at the variety of ethnic and socio-

economic identities of the pirates and marauders but neither really focused on the reasons

for the variety groups to risk their lives to loot other vessels. The socio-economic

statuses and ethnic backgrounds of pirates were evident from the types of vessel and

equipment they used to attack merchant and fishing vessels. Pirates rarely left witnesses

to reveal their actions, so many accounts were witnesses of piratical attack from other

vessels. Although Tarling most precisely placed the significance of piracy within the

context of British imperialism through the deployment of naval forces, British authorities

used a variety of administrative and economic tools to minimize piracy and other

nuisances throughout British Malaya. The expansion upon the state social and economic

mechanisms of control written by Loh and Tagliacozzo would reveal more about counter-

piracy strategies.

1.4 The Geography of the Malay Peninsula and the Establishment of the

Melaka Sultanate in Relation to Foreign Powers

The geography of Malaya greatly influenced its politics, warfare, and economy

throughout its history. A series of hills arose throughout the north and center of the

Malay Peninsula forming the river valleys. Most inhabitants resided within the coastal

flat areas along the river banks and the land between the sea and hills. Throughout the

Malay Peninsula average rainfall ranged between 75 and 125 inches, although Perak

witnessed around 175 inches of rain a year. A tropical rainforest covered the land from

the coastal mangrove swamps to the hills further inland. The rainforests were so thick

15

that walking through them required immense amounts of effort making travel by river

preferable particularly before 1870. Once people removed the forest cover, rain quickly

eroded the soil often pushing into pockets of fertile land.5 With the thickness of the

rainforest residents of Malaya looked to the sea to make a living. The rivers and sea

provided more opportunities for most of the people of the Malay Peninsula, whereas

rainforest restricted movement and made grain agriculture more difficult.6

Prior to the presence of the European powers, the Malay Peninsula cradled one of

the great kingdoms of Southeast Asia, the destruction of which and others similar to it

contributed to the shaping of the development of the archipelago’s seafaring peoples.

Parameswara established the port-state of Melaka circa 1400 CE from a small village on

the Melaka River populated by fishermen, who reputedly pirated foreign vessels on

occasion. Melaka’s strategic location offered arable and defensible land, while being

along the shortest oceanic route between Indian Ocean and China at a potential

chokepoint in the Straits of Melaka.7 Threatened by foreign powers in the region such as

Sukhothai and Majapahit, Parameswara negotiated with the Yongle emperor of Ming

China after Admiral Zheng He’s 1403 expedition becoming a tributary state to Ming in

1405 in return for protection.8 Parameswara converted to Islam around 1409, assuming

the name Muhammad Iskander Shah, although his descendants used both the Indic and

5 J. M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, (New York: Humanities Press, 1965), 3-5.

6 See map (Figure 1).

7 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 2; Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: Expansion and Crisis, Vol. 1, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 205.8

? Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 206; Lea Williams, Southeast Asia: A History (New York: Oxford UP, 1976), 47.

16

Islamic names until 1446.9 Melaka established itself with Ming protection in its early

years as a regional power that eventually became extraordinarily wealthy.

Melaka became the dominant power of the straits during the 15th century as trade

flourished throughout the region. At the peak of its domination of the straits, Melaka

annually imported Indian cloth valued at 460,000 cruzados, nearly the value of twenty

tons of silver according one estimate. The city’s population swelled to between 100,000

and 200,000 inhabitants according to contemporary accounts with 45 kilometers of

continuous settlement from the Melaka River to the River Muar.10 Melaka’s power and

the mass of trading vessels floating through its surrounding waters proved that the region

once possessed a stable trading system where are a majority of merchants could trade

peacefully without the harassment of state or piratical powers. Melaka provided political

stability and economic influence that limited the effect of pirates in the straits.

1.5 The Arrival of the Europeans and the Disintegration of the Melaka

Sultanate

The fall of Melaka to a new power to the region sent shockwaves throughout the

region, contributing to a gradual political disintegration on the Malay Peninsula and

around the Straits of Melaka. Alfonso de Albuquerque brought new tactics and strategies

from the Mediterranean Sea regarding warfare and trade. As the Portuguese governor, he

conquered Melaka in 1511 in an attempt to control the Indian Ocean with its trade for

Portugal by capturing key ports.11 The Portuguese failed to maintain the economic

control of the Straits of Melaka that their predecessors managed, resulting in a fracturing

9

? Williams, Southeast Asia: A History, 48.10

? Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 27, 69-7011 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750, (New York: Cambridge UP, 1985), 64, 69.

17

of political power and the strengthening of their opponents’ power. Johor, Pahang,

Pantani, and Aceh replaced Melaka as regional powers with Aceh in particular

challenging Portuguese authority in the region with the assistance of the Ottoman

Empire.12 Sultan Mahmud formerly of Melaka sought the conquest of his old capital with

Malay help from his state of Johor. The sultan retreated from the Portuguese to Pahang

and lived as his old vassal’s guest, to make matters worse, Ming China refused to help

restore him to his capital. Mahmud campaigned from Bintang and later from an advance

position by 1517 from a stronghold on the Muar River, assaulting Melaka from 1515 to

1519, 1523, and 1524 with no success. Portuguese forces retaliated, capturing the Muar

stronghold and Bintang in 1526.13 Portugal shattered the power of old Melaka and its

sultanate never recovered its prestige or control of the straits with the fall of its

cosmopolitan capital.

Unfortunately for Johor with the old Melaka dynasty at its head, the Portuguese

were not the only threat the sultanate as other indigenous empires sought to take

advantage of the power vacuum. Sultan Ala’ud’din, Mahmud’s son and heir, made peace

with Portugal in 1536 and sought Aceh’s defeat through alliances of convenience with

various other powers. Conflicts composed of brutal seaborne assaults on the enemy,

during one of which Johor, allied with Perak and Siak defeated an Achinese fleet of 160

vessels in 1540 in the Straits of Melaka. Aceh revived, destroying Johor Lama and

taking the sultan prisoner in 1564, but failed to dominate the region.14 Despite it naval

power, Portugal failed to command the seas around Southeast Asia.15 The collapse of

12

? Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 146.13

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 35, 44.14 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 46-47.15

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Melaka’s power resulted in the inability for the sultans to command formerly loyal and

obedient vassals and high ministers.16 Neither Portugal nor any of the indigenous powers

brought peace to the Straits of Melaka, leaving it plagued with decades of war and

discouraged trade. Without a sustained peace, the Malay Peninsula could not regain its

position as the home to a great trading entrepôt.

Even the entrance of a new power, the Dutch, in the region failed to fully

consolidate power over the Straits of Melaka, rather, actions by the Dutch contributed to

the addition of the migrants making a permanent home on the Malay Peninsula. Johor

made a treaty with the Dutch to force the Portuguese from Melaka in 1606, but failed to

do so for a few decades. Eventually under the leadership of Governor General Antonio

van Diemen, Dutch forces captured Melaka in January of 1641 from the Portuguese.17

The Dutch controlled the old entrepôt, but actions in Sulawesi, otherwise known as

Celebes, such as the capture of Makassar contributed to the arrival of a new group, the

Bugis who the local Malays hired them for their seafaring and martial skills, despite

being initially disliked as newcomers. By 1680, some of the Bugis settled in Selangor on

the Malay Peninsula and survived through piracy, along with trading tin and gambier. In

the 18th century the Bugis gained power over various Malay sultans and despite being

nominally Johor vassal, they became so powerful that the Dutch generally left them in

peace.18 Dutch did not unify the region under single authority or create a regional

entrepôt open to all trade, leaving the Malay Peninsula politically fractured.

? K. Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, (New York: David McKay, 1964), 47.16

? Barbara Andaya, Leonard Andaya, A History of Malaysia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 112.17

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 48; Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean, 84-85.18 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 58-61.

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1.6 The Arrival of the English East India Company in Malaya

The Malay Peninsula had a British presence since the later 18th century given its

strategic significance, but limited its foreign policy in regard to native affairs. The

ancient Malay State of Kedah ceded the first bit of territory on the Malay Peninsula to the

British in hope of protections from foreign powers, particularly from the Kingdom of

Siam on its northern border. Sultan Mohammed Jiwa of Kedah negotiated with Francis

Light in 1770 to gain military support from the English East Indian Company, although

initial attempts failed to reach an agreement for any company support. Francis Light

befriended the new sultan, Abdullah, who hired Light to lobby the East India Company

for their military support. The East India Company annexed Penang on August 11, 1786

for a settlement in the region, commencing the era of the British presence in Malaya.19

The East India Company intended to use Penang as a base that would not likely come

under a large attack from the Dutch to assist in trade with China for the tea. Soon after its

establishment, Penang attracted trading vessels from prahus to East Indiamen.20 Thus

began the British territorial presence on the Malay Peninsula that eventually consumed it

territorially.

British intervention in the region did not automatically bring security to the region

for all trade, but started their territorial presence on the Malay Peninsula. The transition

of power over to the East India Company did not go over well given certain

misunderstandings and perceived or actual breaking of agreements, making the

Honorable Company’s initial territorial acquisitions more forceful than perhaps originally

19

? D. J. M. Tate, The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, Vol. 1 European Conquest, (New York: Oxford UP, 1971), 102, 104-106.20

? Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 70-75.

20

expected. Light fought against an alliance of various Malay and Bugis factions, defeating

them in battle and later acquired more territory from Kedah in 1800, which became

known as Province Wellesley.21 The Directors of the East India Company created a non-

interventionist policy for the Malay Peninsula that lasted for decades and aimed to

maintain the presence on Penang on the cheap.22 The East India Company sought a

trading post at Penang and generally neglected taking on a stronger role in the Straits of

Melaka, permitting most of the Malay states to remain sovereign and resulting in a

general lack of centralized authority in the region.

The leasing of Singapore in January 1819 by Temenggong Daing Abdul Rahman

of Johor permitted for the establishment of a British factory there. Stamford Raffles

ensured that Singapore remained a port administered through free trade policies with

William Farquhar stayed in Singapore as a British administrator. Generally, the East

India Company gave substantial freedom to its territories along the Straits of Melaka,

while foreign powers left the colonies alone. The Honorable Company wanted to

minimize the cost of the territories in the Straits of Melaka, but Singapore grew anyway

to become a major trading entrepôt for global trade routes. Penang, Melaka, and

Singapore became the Straits Presidency in 1826 as an effort to consolidate

administrative control.23 Despite the increase in trade, the straits trade remained

vulnerable to piracy without significant political control along the coasts.

Penang and Singapore were not the only British settlements on the Straits of

Melaka, but even with additional trading ports, no one power possessed the willpower

and ability to unify the peninsula yet. British forces captured Melaka from the Dutch in 21 Tate, The Making of Modern Southeast Asia, 105, 107.22

? Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 83, 87-88.23 Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 100-104, 106, 113-114.

21

August 1795 without casualties and administered it until 1804 when Penang took over,

whose officials wanted to destroy the port to eliminate competition. Ultimately,

Stamford Raffles convinced the authorities otherwise, who ultimately demolished the fort

in 1807 but spared the town. The 1814 Anglo-Dutch Convention returned Melaka to

Dutch control, but the city reverted to British authorities because of the Anglo-Dutch

Treaty of 1824 exchanged Melaka for Fort Marlborough on the Sumatran side of the

straits and declared that the two nations would not intervene on their counterpart’s side of

the Straits of Melaka. In the Naning War of 1831 to 1832, Governor Fullerton engaged

in an absurd conflict, although ultimately accomplished his mission in subduing his

opponents ultimately cost the East India Company ₤100,000 with little gain.24 The treaty

effectively limited Dutch control in the Straits of Melaka, granting security for the British

possessions from the only other European power along the straits. The East India

Company learned from the futility of the land military operations and avoided them when

possible.

24

? Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 93-97, 102, 111-112.

22

Map of Modern Western Malaysia (Figure 1)

McGinley, Mark. “Mark McGinley’s Fulbright in Malaysia: Penang-‘The Pearl of the Orient, ’” January 3, 2011, http://markinmalaysia.blogspot.com/2011/01/penang-pearl-of-orient.html (accessed April 2011).

23

Map of the Straits Settlements: Extent of British Influence Prior to Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 (Figure 2)

Bartholomew, John and Company, “Straits Settlements,” The British Empire, http://www.britishempire.co.uk/images3/straitsmap.jpg (accessed April 2011).

24

Chapter 1: Authority in 19th Century Malaya: The Establishment of Centralized

Authority through British Influence

Authority in the Malay Peninsula underwent a transformation because of the

British intervention in the 19th century as part of its transformation from a traditional

Malay political system to a more Europeanized governmental organization. British

domination facilitated the transformation of the peninsula, while also creating

mechanisms for the ‘suppression of piracy.’ People throughout Malay society felt the

new system of authority in Malaya from common peasants to the sultans. Various Malay

institutions and professions possessed no place in British Malaya according to the

bureaucratized administrators who replaced the indigenous Malay authorities. New

authorities gained legitimacy as state administrators while the old authorities faded but

often did not fully disappear. Maritime marauders lost the most legitimacy of any group,

those formerly in the service of a chief or sultan became villainous pirates in the eyes of

Europeans.

1.1 The River State: Malay Geography and Politics

The indigenous Malay political system relied upon the river as its geographical

focus, political authority flowed outwards from the rivers because of the mobility allowed

from them. The mouth of the river possessed the capital of the Malay state because of

strategic nature of the location as a place to collect tolls and taxes while controlling

communication to the sea and beyond. The capital usually had a palace and a mosque as

the two most dominant structures. Command of the river gave the ruler the ability to

marshal forces in conflict and control his subjects, while the mountains and jungles

provided for boundaries with other realms. In 1850, the population of Malaya remained

25

only around 300,000 inhabitants scattered throughout the peninsula, usually answering to

a high degree of decentralized authority.25 The geography and politics of Malaya made

its inhabitants highly reliant on the river and sea for survival. The rivers were the means

of authority, whoever possessed its mouth controlled transportation and communication

throughout the river valley.

The hierarchy of the Malay political system relied heavily on the power on a few

individual officials with the sultan usually as the leader of the state with a variety of

supporting chiefs. In the early 19th century, autocratic politicians led Malay states

through their personal power with their sultan as the leader who usually came from the

royal family and appointed the major state officials. Negri Sembilan and Pahang were

the two Malay states without a sultan, with a yang-di-pertuan besar and a bendahara as

their respective heads of state. The sultan possessed power over life and death while

unifying the state under his rule.26 The yellow umbrella composed of either silk or

cotton, symbolized the power of the Malay sultans. The sultan, rajah class or the Malay

nobility, and the chiefs commanded absolute power over the common people and

commanded them to do their bidding.27 The leaders in society possessed absolute power

over the common Malays, creating a society with immense political stratification.

The sultan distributed authority throughout some of his constituents who became

his officials, but the sultan lacked complete authority in matters of succession. The

concept of kingship was not native to the Malays, but rather imported from India

centuries before European contact. The Indian travelers conferred the hereditary title of

25 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 123.26

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124-125.27

? Frank Swettenham, British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya, (New York: John Lane, 1907), 135, 142, 142.

26

“rajah” upon the river-state chiefs of the Malay Peninsula who formerly ruled by

consensus, but a tenet of the ancient consensus system remained within the 19th century

Malay system of kingship in regard to the succession of the ruler. The chiefs possessed

the right to pass over the rajah muda, or heir apparent, to a candidate deemed more

competent to rule. Such debate in regard to the succession of the ruler had potential for

an armed dispute upon the old ruler’s demise, but despite such risks the system endured

for centuries.28 The Malay kingship left a structure that granted power based on a

hereditary succession in combination with political and military skill. The decentralized

Malay political system mixed with a geography that emphasized the use of waterways for

travel created a system that partially enabled maritime maundering.

A cadre of royal officials helped sultan in the administration of his state dating

back to more centralized administrations. The chief minister to the sultan was the

bendahara, a Sanskrit title that translated to prime minister or commander-in-chief, who

wielded significant power in government affairs. During the period of interregnum, the

bendahara became the caretaker to the royal regalia until the new sultan ascended the

throne. The temenggong, an ancient Malay title translated as chief of police or chief

judge enforced laws, oversaw prisons, and even enforced the standardization of weights

and measures during the Melaka Sultanate years.29 The sultan had other high officials at

his disposal, including the laksamana or admiral, who defended the sultanate from the

sea and guarded the river from state navies and pirates alike. The laksamana advised the

sultan how far up the river to build his capital depending on the threat from invasion.

Another maritime position was the shahbandar, which translated from Persian to harbor 28 Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 15, 38.29

? Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 39; C. Northcote Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-1877, (Kuala Lumpur: Kuala Lumpur University Press, 1964), 43.

27

master, who collected tolls and customs duties from vessels.30 Malay heritage

bequeathed a framework of titles to the various leading subjects in the typical Malay

sultanate. The significance of the most powerful officials below the sultan often related

to maritime control, whether it was defense or revenue collection.

The powerful ministers and other officials revealed the organization within the

Malay political system as an essentially decentralized with significant amount of power

placed within the hands of lesser authorities. Other important ministers to the sultan

included the maharaja lela or “general” in English, the orang kaya besar meaning

“treasurer” and the mantri, which translated to “adviser.”31 To assist the sultan in daily

affairs the penghulu bendahari, or chief secretary, dealt with court correspondences and

managed the royal household. The term “penghulu” derived from an earlier Malay

administrative officer of the kampong, the most basic administrative unit in Malay

society. Other important posts included the mandulika or governor, who possessed

jurisdiction over local issues including the administration of justice and paid tribute to the

sultan with the assistance of his chiefs.32 The Malay political system organized along

administrative units each controlling various parts of the state, but the state generally

remained decentralized with the sultan unable to command sufficient taxation or military

might as displayed by the payment of “tribute” and the lack of direct control throughout

the sultanate by the 19th century. In reality, the sultan was usually the most powerful

chief rather than the executive or supreme authority of a centralized government.

30 Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 40.31

? Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 43.32

? Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 5, 40.

28

Political decentralization altered the previously mentioned state structure, making

it more factional than during the height of the Melaka Sultanate. By the 19th century the

old offices of the Melaka Sultanate that once consisted of a structured hierarchy became

decentralized system with former high offices becoming the de facto rulers of a

designated territory. The old title positions became virtually irrelevant to their actual

duties by the time of the British intervention.33 The sultan still conferred the old titles to

the aristocrats, which in combination with military power gave the holder significant

status within Malay society. Although members of the aristocracy usually knew each

other even when distantly related, the old unified Melaka Sultanate nonetheless

decentralized over centuries.34 The decentralized political systems of Malaya fractured

the military power of the old sultanate permitting chieftains to wield significant military

power. Marauders either worked with permission chieftains or operated outside the

political influences because of the weakness of the central state.

1.2 Political Administration within the Malay State

The Malay system of taxation in the mid 19th century was informal and irregular

with the rajah or chief making arbitrary demands from his populace regarding revenue

while expecting absolute obedience and loyalty from his people. According to Frank

Swettenham, the rajah expected absolute loyalty and obedience from his people as part of

Malay tradition, failure to do so result in drakha, which translated to “treason.” The

rulers taxed irregularly and possessed no accounting of the revenues. The rajahs taxed

the people on their land as they pleased and charged a percentage of minerals from

mining communities. The taxation method discouraged common folk from saving

33 Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, 19,34

? Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, 134.

29

because the rajah could simply seize any savings of food or material.35 Much of the

taxation to support the state was tribute collected by the orang laut or “sea people” from

vessels passing by the coast. Europeans often viewed these taxation methods as piracy.36

Malay chiefs and rajahs took materials within their territory expecting absolute

compliance in a state system that many Europeans described as piratical.

Chiefs and rajahs exercised great amounts of authority over the rest of society in

regard to people’s lives on land, which left the commoners with virtually no opportunities

to improve their lives. The rights between the rajahs and the raoyat or peasant class of

subsistence farmers and fishermen were immensely disparate. Authorities had the right

to demand labor from their people, called kerah, who worked on a variety of projects

from constructing houses, mosques, and even accompanying their leader on long

voyages. The village headmen usually brought the laborers to the work site, while Malay

tradition suggested the laborers receive compensation through food, but this was not

always the case.37 The common Malays possessed few rights, authority rested with the

chiefs and rajahs who ruled with limited state structure often convincing people to live

outside of their authority in regard to a life at sea.

The Malays used debt-bondage as another means for a rajah or sultan to have the

labor needed for various tasks. The Malay ruling class had the right to hold a debtor in

bondage, which the formed the ranks of the rajahs’ retainers and servants because nobody

received regular wages. Islamic law prohibited the enslavement of fellow Muslims so

35 Swettenham, British Malaya, 136-137, 142-143; Kennedy A History of Malaya, 127.36

? J. L. Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas, 1750-1850: Some Economic Implications,” Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by David J. Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 89.37

? Swettenham, British Malaya, 143; Kennedy A History of Malaya, 127.

30

rajahs captured aboriginals or purchased Africans as slaves, but their numbers were few

and treated little differently from debt-bondmen.38 The bondman remained such until he

could pay off the debt, while carrying out the orders of the rajah or chief he owed. The

debt also passed to his wife and descendants until paid, but the services rendered did not

count toward eliminating the debt. If the debtor proved to be particularly valuable, the

chief could provide him with food and clothing making it virtually impossible to pay off

the debt. The chiefs also reserved the right to trade the bondman to other chiefs,

requiring the bondman and his family to move elsewhere.39 The common Malay, the

raoyat, possessed few rights and had the possibility of living as a virtual slave with little

chance of ever becoming free. The treatment of the common Malays demonstrated the

relative indifference Malay rulers and administrators had often toward their people and

the vast amount of power they possessed over their people.

There was an option of passive resistance for the common Malay to escape the

chiefs or rajahs should conditions become unbearable. If the chiefs or other authority

figures oppressed the common Malays by demanding too much or were unable to

respond to a disaster, the chief risked losing his labor. Sometimes in the event of war or

some calamity, the common folk left en masse to another district and the chief lost his tax

base without labor or food.40 Moving was not as difficult prior to the presence of the

British authorities because land was open to settlement. Land possessed little or no

commercial value, if a particular plot was more productive than others, a chief could

claim it for himself. Otherwise most Malays simply settled on unclaimed lands to grow

38 Swettenham, British Malaya, 141-142.39

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 127.40

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 127.

31

palm trees, fruit trees, and an acre or two of rice.41 Common Malays essentially

expressed their power or rejected the legitimacy of authority with their feet by moving to

a new district. Relocating to another district did not require the purchase of new

property, making the move less difficult than with fixed properties.

1.3 The Autonomy of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya

Not all authority rested within the traditional Malay authority by the 19th century

because a new wave of immigrants refused to integrate within the traditional Malay

societal structure. Chinese secret societies refused to add a layer to the diverse political

heritage of Malaya, but rather developed their own relatively sovereign sphere of parallel

political structure. The waves of Chinese immigration in the nineteenth century

answered not to their Qing emperor, but to ritualistic secret societies that combined

spiritual fulfillment with militancy. The Triad Brotherhood was the basis of the

Chinese-Malay secret societies and had its basis in the 17th century as a group of rebels

bent on overthrowing the Qing Dynasty. These societies eventually turned into bullies

who extorted businessmen and traders of all levels to gain funds. Such groups became

popular in the immigrant communities of Malaya with the offers of kinship to those of

the same linguistic dialect in replacement of their old clan life that sometimes included

non-ethnic Han Chinese.42 The parallel authority within each immigrant community

throughout Malaya created new powers within the Malay Peninsula that challenged the

status quo and ultimately threatened to derail the system of authority within the Malay

states.

41 Swettenham, British Malaya, 136.42

? Wilfred Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 1, 21.

32

Chinese immigrants in Malaya joined secret societies that rejected the Malay

power structure and gave authority to their secret society leaders, which accepted their

authority as the most legitimate. Taking a blood-oath of loyalty in a secret ritual for

membership in a secret society offered protection and kinship in a foreign land with

different customs, languages, and religion. Even if the immigrant initially refused to join

a secret society, the societies often compelled an individual to do so. The secret societies

possessed great power, even to execute an individual within the Chinese community,

which accepted the secret societies authority. The Chinese secret societies fought each

other for economic gains and territory usually in preference to fighting with other parallel

authorities such as the British administrators, whom they did not generally carry a

personal grudge against.43 The development of the Chinese secret societies as a parallel

system of government and justice alongside that of the Malay and British factions

showed a territory where no single power controlled the others completely.

1.4 The Development of British Authority in Malaya

Emanating from Singapore, Melaka, and Penang, British influence in native

Malay states generally increased since the establishment of the Straits Settlement as a

Crown Colony in 1867 until the outbreak of World War I. The Malay Peninsula states

fell into three political categories depending on foreign influences with the transfer of the

Straits Settlement to the Colonial Office. The first group of states fell under Siam’s

sphere of influence such as Kelantan and Terengganu, along with Kedah and Perlis to a

lesser extent given their proximity to Penang. Johor fell into the second group of being

under the British sphere of influence because of its proximity to Singapore and its

maharajah’s anglophile tendencies. The third group composed of independent states that

43 Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 2-3.

33

Great Britain had influence over at times but maintained sovereignty in a de jure sense.44

No native Malay state on the peninsula clearly dominated the rest by the mid 19th century

permitting foreign powers to vie for influences within the indigenous states.

After a few decades since the establishment of the Straits Settlements as a Crown

Colony, the British administration gained authority over the Malay Peninsula. By 1875

the British established the first residency system in the region, which left nominal

sovereignty with the sultan or state leader while letting the British resident govern in all

manners except those of native religion and customs. The process of taking over

governing was gradual until authority in most issues shifted to the residency. By 1895,

the four Malay states with residents, Perak, Selangor, Pahang, and Negri Sembilan

formed the Federated Malay States. A year later, authorities instituted the Straits

Criminal Procedure Code as the laws of the federation. The Resident General led the

Federated Malay States and answered to the Governor of the Straits Settlements.45 The

1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty transferred Siam’s authority over Kelantan, Terengganu,

Kedah, and Perlis to Great Britain. Johor fell into the British sphere of influence

officially and received a General Adviser in 1914, but Johor and the other states

maintained a degree of independence while under British protection.46 Great Britain

dominated Malaya by 1914, removing all other foreign claims to the territory and making

it the dominant authority there.

1.5 Conflict over Authority in Malaya between the Factions

44 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 41.45

? Thomas Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 22, 23, 40, 42. 46

? Tregonning, A History of Malaya, 171-173.

34

By becoming the greatest power within the Malay Peninsula and by exerting

pressure on indigenous states, Great Britain gained a high degree of de facto power

within the region. Great Britain exercised power in states before taking actual control

over them through sympathetic princes within the Malay world. Tengku Zia’u’ddin or

Kudin, the younger brother of the Sultan of Kedah, married Arfah the daughter of Sultan

Abdul Samad of Selangor after Raja Mahdi, her former fiancée, failed to pay tribute to

the sultan. Sultan Abdul Samad appointed Tengku Kudin as the Representative of the

Sultan, which Europeans interpreted as the “Viceroy,” much to the chagrin of Selangor

chiefs.47 The appointment of Tengku Kudin, despite being from Kedah, as an important

figure in Selangor politics brought him into the complex political system without many

allies. To help finance his participation in the Selangor Civil War, Kudin received

support from his friend and financial backer J. G. Davidson of Singapore. Kudin used his

financial backing in the assistance of Rajah Ismail to besiege the port city of Klang,

employing five hundred supporters from Kedah. The assistance of Lieutenant De

Fontaine, former French navy midshipman, provided expertise in the deployment of

eighteen pounder carronades through dense jungle, which help annex the city in 1870.48

Kudin owed much of his success to foreign powers rather than native support, eventually

foreigners with Kudin’s support played a much larger role in the state.

The role of the British as an authority in Selangor increased because of Kudin’s

successes during the war. Sultan Abdul Samad confirmed the opening of his territory to

formal British influence on November 18, 1874. Governor Andrew Clarke recommended

Frank Swettenham to the position of Resident to Selangor, but Lord Carnarvon overruled

47 Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 70-71.48

? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 73, 76.

35

the installment because Swettenham was only 24 years old and nominated J. G. Davidson

as resident on December 30. The appointment delighted Kudin because it secured

Selangor from further war and probably his position, too.49 His appointment in Selangor

was short-lived and Blomfield Douglass replaced him despite his need for a translator

with Malay-speakers in 1876. Kudin became the dominant figure in politics as the

President of the State Council formed in 1877, but resigned within year for a pension for

him and his wife. Rajah Muda Musa, the son of Sultan Abdul Samad, took Kudin’s place

as president, pleasing the chiefs of Selangor. Musa worked well enough with Douglass

and remained in Langat with the sultan.50 The transition from native sovereignty to

becoming a British residency took years and was complex but the perception of

legitimacy or at least the passive acceptance on the behalf of chiefs consolidated British

authority while minimizing armed conflict.

The Malay opposition faltered against British domination throughout the Malay

Peninsula, resulting in the establishment of British authority in certain states. In

Selangor, years of war wore down the populace and the placement of a resident did not

face much resistance. Rajah Mahdi gave up the war, spending his days in Singapore with

tuberculosis. In Negri Sembilan, the state of Sungei Ujong received a resident for the

whole of the confederation after the defeat of the Dato Bandar and the establishment of

the Dato Klana as the undisputed ruler of the state.51 In these instances, Malay chiefs

played a role in the establishment British authority without the Straits Settlements

resorting to a full-scale British invasion.

49 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 184-185, 193-194.50

? Philip Loh, The Malay States: Political Change and Social Policy, 1877-1895, (New York: Oxford UP, 1969), 13-20.51 Swettenham, British Malaya, 190, 197.

36

The Malay state of Perak, however, experienced the wrath of the British Empire

in ways that the other Malay states did not. The Pangkor Engagement of January 20,

1874 established the residency system in Perak, which gave the right of the British

resident to collect taxes. The assassination of Resident James Birch on November 1,

1875 and the subsequent conflict nominally led by Sultan Abdullah prompted the Straits

Settlements Governor William Jervois requested reinforcements that helped end the

conflict by February.52 After the war, Davidson became Perak’s resident but resigned

shortly thereafter in March 1877. Hugh Low replaced him and sympathized more with

Malay culture more than Davdison. Low attempted to make Yusuf, who Malay chiefs

passed over twice for becoming sultan, an effective ruler for both the Malays and the

British authorities. The Perak government also contained other Malays such as Rajah

Dris and Dato Rajah Makhota who helped make decisions in what became a

constitutional monarchy, but with the resident clearly in charge of state affairs by 1880.53

After the Perak War, the British colonialists possessed authority over the local

government and rulers.

The Chinese secret societies evaded the authority of the British administrators

over a long period of time and through a variety of techniques. Making a deal with a

central governing organization was impossible because the only centralized secret society

existed in Singapore under the Ghee Hin Triad, but even that society left room for public

disputes. Most organizations fought through murders, street riots, and other acts of

violence for territory and economic gains making it impossible for the British authorities

to deal with a single secret society to resolve the violence. Chinese secret societies often 52

? Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 36, 68,53

? Loh, The Malay States, 3-13.

37

avoided the criminal justice system by making court testimonies difficult and subjecting

potential opponents to pressure. The Chinese community feared the repercussions of the

secret societies. The Malay states taxed the Chinese societies but could not control them

as displayed by the civil wars.54 The secret societies managed to remain fairly

independent from British control for years, but maintaining such abilities proved difficult.

The British administrators gained a degree of authority over the Chinese secret

societies, bringing the Chinese community in line with English Common Law. Initially,

Straits Settlement governors considered the secret societies an issue for local police, but

by 1866, Governor Cavenagh decided that dismantling the secret societies required more

effort than that of the municipal police. An 1867 Penang riot resulted in the enactment of

the “Act for the Better Preservation of Peace,” which prohibited the carrying of weapons

and gave the governor the right to expel non-British subjects from the colony, along with

other powers to disperse mobs. W. A. Pickering arrived in Singapore in 1872 as a

translator for the Chinese and a year later became the “protector” who intermediated

between the Chinese community and the colonial government. Pickering had some

success, but the societies went underground. In 1888, Governor Clementi-Smith required

all societies with ten or more people to register with the government and reserved the

right to declare certain societies unlawful. Membership in an illegal secret society was

punishable by six months in prison and three years in prison for managers. The

government banned ownership of Triad paraphernalia and set up branches throughout

Malay to settle disputes among the poor for the reduction of conflict. Despite such

efforts, the secret societies continued to extort businesses.55 The colonial forces

54 Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 1-4.55 Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 4-7.

38

consolidated their authority within the cities with a degree of success that controlling

secret societies remained important to maintaining British power.

A degree of authority from the British administrators came from a lack of

personal bitterness that inhabitants of Malaya felt at the time in regard to falling into the

British Empire. The Chinese secret societies living in British territory usually did not

personally resent the British government, but wanted to be left alone.56 During the

bombardment of Kuala Selangor in 1871 by HMS Rinaldo, British targeted Rajah

Mahmud and later British officials requested Sultan Abdul Samad hand him over to

them.57 Rajah Mahmud fought against British forces in service of the Dato Bandar.

Despite fighting against British forces, Rajah Mahmud joined the services of the

Englishman Frank Swettenham and probably saved his life in the aftermath of Resident

Birch’s assassination in Perak. For his complicity in Birch’s murder, the British

government banished former Sultan Abdullah to the Seychelles, but he relocated

eventually to Singapore.58 Mahmud and Abdullah lived amongst British subjects even

after fighting them, and therefore they probably did not hate the British authorities. If a

majority Malays and Chinese personally resented British authority, the colonial

government could not have established a successful colony in Malaya.

1.6 Identity and the Civil Service within the Politics of Malaya

British authority stemmed from its administrators and members of the armed

forces who turned Malaya into a territory developed along European lines. The Malay

Civil Service played an essential part in making Malaya a success story by acting

56

? Blythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 3.57

? C. D. Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 86-88.58

? Swettenham, British Malaya, 190, 203.

39

independently to a large degree from Whitehall. The backgrounds of members of the

Malay Civil Service were from relatively diverse social backgrounds. Her Majesty’s

government dispatched Hugh Clifford, the nephew of the Seventh Lord and Governor

Weld’s cousin’s son, to Perak. Frank Swettenham and William Maxwell graduated from

minor Public Schools, whereas Tristram Speedy was the son of soldier serving in India

before becoming a Sergeant Major in the Penang police force with Sikhs. Most of the

Malay civil servants admired the Malays and their culture.59 Frank Swettenham advised

Malay civil servants to participate in Malay culture and learn from it by participating in

everyday life and speaking the Malay language in efforts to understand the culture while

listening to opinions to earn the trust of the Malay people. In return, Swettenham

explained, Malays placed loyalty, generosity, and hospitality to person who earned it

even if they were a foreign agent.60 A significant degree of authority and legitimacy with

the Malay people came from the ability of the Malay Civil Service to listen and work

with them on the issues they cared about.

A part of giving the British colonialists authority required a sense of common

identity or purpose in Malaya. During the era of British colonialism in Malaya, the

inhabitants of the land became British subjects in law when born in British Crown

territory, but being born legally a British subject did not necessarily equate to being

British culturally. The British Empire tied diversity of ethnic groups, especially in

Malaya, in a manner much more challenging in nation-state system because the imperial

system gave a sense of legal equality under the crown. A subject in a British protectorate

allowed the individual to own a British passport. Though many Englishmen rejected 59 J. de Vere Allen, “Malay Civil Service, 1874-1941 Colonial Bureaucracy/ Malayan Elite,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 2 (1970), 149, 155-156, 157; Loh, The Malay States, 72.60

? Swettenham, British Malaya, 133-134, 140.

40

concepts of equality, a number embraced Malay culture such as police inspector Hubert

Berkeley of Perak, who rode elephants, wore traditional Malay clothes, spoke fluent

Malay, and often attended Malay shadow puppet shows. By 1907 in Singapore, the

nationalism of Chinese-British subjects pleased the Duke of Connaught who was glad to

see unity with the crown. In Perak and Singapore, pride in accepting British authority

took some time to develop as during Queen Victoria’s Jubilee in 1887, the populace

appeared less enthused regarding the event than ten years later during the Diamond

Jubilee. The 1897 celebration showed greater national pride in Singapore, Penang, and

Perak with parades, Union Jacks, fireworks, and Jubilee memorabilia.61 The acceptance

of a British identity legitimized British colonial authority and integration within the

empire.

Conclusion

Authority in the Malay Peninsula underwent a transformation from the

establishment of the Straits Settlements as a Crown Colony in 1867 to the domination of

Malaya by Great Britain by the end of the century. The independent Malay states

possessed decentralized governments with local chiefs having a great deal of autonomy

and independence from their leaders. With such a large number of relatively independent

chiefs, pirates thrived in the Straits of Melaka when tolerated by the local rulers. British

authority united the land in an unprecedented manner, placing constraints on local power

while strengthening the central governments. Restrictions on factional power did not

limit themselves to the Malay indigenous states, but also affected the Chinese secret

societies, whose power weakened over the years. According to Emily Sadka, the newly-

61 Lynn Hollen Lees, “Being British in Malaya, 1890-1940,” The Journal of British Studies 48, no. 1 (2009): 76-101.

41

centralized authority based in Kuala Lumpur with executives focusing more on economic

development rather than preserving the traditional way-of-life.62 The movement of the

capital away from the mouth of a river symbolized the loss of authority once enjoyed by

the river-state chiefs to the imperial administrators of the British Empire.

The decentralized manner of native Malay politics and the harshness of political

rule by the ruling class contributed greatly to the prevalence of marauding around

Malaya. Political decentralization mixed with internal strife or conflict created

conditions where marauding thrived, whereas coordination between various rulers and

peace limited the extent of piracy. The increased power of British authorities in Malaya

weakened the strength of the marauders greatly by the 20th century through greater

centralization and coordination within the British political structure. British

administrators managed political relationships with the relatively autonomous Chinese

community through intermediaries and the ruling class of Malaya through residencies and

councils. The management of formerly independent states in Malaya by British civil

servants eroded the support marauders once enjoyed. A collective British identity

emerged in Malaya during the late 19th century altering many perceptions regarding

authority and consolidated British power. The increased centralization and coordination

brought about by British authorities in Malaya weakened the marauders’ base of support,

decreased the opportunities available to them during periods of conflict, and increased the

opposition to the marauders until they became much less consequential by the 20th

century.

62 Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay States: 1874-1895, (Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968), 373, 380.

42

Chapter 2: Trade and Society in Malaya: The Development of a Colonial Economy

through Resource Extraction and Education

Malay society composed of many different ethnic groups and possessed a

tradition of maritime trade in region at an important crossroads of the world. Seafaring

was an essential form of travel throughout the Malay Archipelago as an important form

of transportation. Therefore, many Malays possessed the seafaring skills necessary to sail

effectively, along with the martial experience and equipment necessary to seize vessels.

Traditional professions within the Malay world such as fishing and agriculture relied on

nature, which was not always reliable. There was no single trade or societal issue that

pushed people toward violence at sea rather an amalgamation of issues drove people to

piratical activities, but changes in authority incurred punishment for committing such

actions. Trends in the global economy and politics turned many Malays and other groups

to new work within the sphere of British authority corresponding to its ascendancy in

Malaya as it became more integrated into the British imperial system.

The economy and society of Malaya during part of the 19th century created an

environment where piracy thrived because the types of skills required for the economy

and the variety of societal factions fighting for their interests. An economy dependant on

fishing and sea trade gave seafaring skills to a large proportion of the workforce.

Ethnicity partially delineated various factions with in Malaya’s politics and economy,

which played an important role in determining the dominant political powers within

Malaya. The economic development of Malaya came with increased foreign intervention

ultimately leading to a degree of unification among the various Malay states. The

economies of the British Straits Settlements altered the economy of the mainland by

43

increasing demand for native products creating imbalances within the societies of the

Malay Peninsula. The imbalances created fertile ground for conflict between the various

factions. The British economic policy and foreign-born businessmen influenced Malaya

through improved mining, large plantations, and a secular education system built on

imperial values. The increased economic and social influence of the centralized authority

weakened the strength of pirates until they became a mere nuisance.

2.1 Early Malay Economy: Subsistence Farming, Trade, and Fishing

Malays relied much of their economy prior to the 19th century on the growth of

crops for subsistence agriculture as part of a centuries-old tradition. By the 15th century

rice became the dominant staple crop of Southeast Asia, with Melaka importing large

quantities of rice during its days as a great entrepôt. At the end of that century, thirty

Siamese junks transported rice to Melaka a year, while Java exported between fifty and

sixty junks with cargoes of rice a year as the region’s largest producer of rice. The

Malays of the region, especially after the fall of Melaka, became less reliant on rice as

staple crop. Sumatrans consumed wild roots, leaves, and herbs when their rice crops

failed, making them less vulnerable to famine than other more stratified cultures in China

and India.63 For some of the other agriculture on the Malay Peninsula prior to the 19th

century, farmers sold crops for export such as in Kedah that produced pepper during the

17th century for export.64 For Malays, rice remained an important staple in their diet and a

significant part of their agricultural economy, but also relied on the maritime trade of

agricultural products for their economy.

63 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680: Vol. I The Lands Below the Winds, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 18-23.64

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 201-202.

44

Besides agriculture, fishing was of great importance as the Malay fishermen

remained the most renowned part of the economy of the Malay Peninsula for centuries.

Fish and rice were the two most important staples in the Malay diet and Malays often

drank fresh water as their chief drink.65 In John Crawfurd’s 1820 History of the Indian

Archipelago, he noted the significance of fish, usually either dried or pickled for storage

and commerce as part of the Malay daily diet. Crawfurd praised how effectively Malays

caught their fish and the fishing trade’s importance to the overall economy. Malay

fishing boats worked in teams by dragging seine nets together and in another technique

set up nets on bamboo and cane enclosures to trap fish. Virtually all coastal families

possessed small nets and lines for fishing. The extent of fishing astonished foreigners,

even the Zheng He expedition noted the inexpensiveness of fish and that fishing was the

most common male profession in Melaka.66 The importance of fishing was essential to

the daily lives of the coastal and riverside settlements of the Malay Peninsula,

contributing the seafaring ability of many Malays. With many Malays capable of sailing

along an important trade route, there remained the possibility that fishermen in need of

supplemental income resorted to piracy.

2.2 Ethnicity in Malaya: Power through Trade and Warfare

Halfway through the 19th century, variety of ethnic groups from throughout the

world inhabited the Malay Peninsula and sometimes allied with each other in various

political struggles. Various groups composed of what became a collective Malay

identity, composing of foreign Malays from Sumatra and natives alike. Some of the

Sumatrans belonged to the Minangkabau people, who formed the confederacy of Negri

65 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 5, 36.66

? Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 29, 243.

45

Sembilan.67 The Bugis, formerly of Celebes or Sulawesi, migrated to the Selangor

estuaries by the 1680s and established their own sultanate in 1742 with its capital at

Kuala Selangor.68 Other influential groups included the Arabs and the resurgent Chinese

who established mining settlements starting in the 1820s. Indians remained a small

community on the peninsula’s west coast at the time.69 The ethnic groups of Malaya

were not usually unified but usually then in turn divided into further groups, which

sometimes fought each other despite relatively similar heritage. In many instances,

friction between various groups led to conflict that often spilled over into the sea.

The sea traders of the Straits of Melaka and beyond relied on maritime trade to

survive, relying mostly on their own labor to collect goods. Much of the population

composed of linguistic Malays, orang laut, and Bugis who relied upon the sea for their

economic, social, and political way-of-life. These maritime peoples sailed in search of

trading commodities along the various rivers, straits, islands, and swamps up to the

coastline to live through maritime trade of various small goods.70 Maritime traders

generally collected goods for trade between February and May financed if necessary

through local chiefs who provisioned them in exchange for a percentage of their profit

from trade with China.71 Traditionally, relatively small-scale trade for the orang laut and

other maritime groups provided for relatively little demand without excessively depleting

natural resources for long-distance trade over several months. The orang laut, Malays,

67 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124; Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 156.68

? Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 270-272.69

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 124.70

? Carl Trocki, Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore 1784-1885, (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007), 58.71

? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134.

46

and Bugis were remarkable seafarers capable of sailing long distances with great skills at

sea.

Groups formed makeshift alliances to leverage their power for economic and

political advantages, sometimes repeatedly switching sides within the same conflict. One

group of Sumatran miners switched sides twice during the seven year Selangor Civil War

seeking better conditions. The miners sided with Rajah Mahdi when he revolted against

Rajah Abdullah in hopes of better mining conditions in 1866. Rajah Mahdi and his allies

besieged the port city of Klang for control of the mines upriver taking it within the year.

The Sumatran miners deserted Rajah Mahdi because of the equally poor conditions under

his rule. During the second siege of Klang in 1869, the Sumatran miners allied with

Tengku Kudin to attack Rajah Mahdi and his forces. Kudin allied with Yap Ah Loy, the

Capitan China or leader for the Hai Sen Chinese of Kuala Lumpur, who also once allied

with Mahdi.72 The Sumatran miners fought in their own interests but pledged loyalty to

the faction that offered the best deal, fighting for their own interests as a group. The

Sumatrans also displayed their independence with Malay society overall by pledging

allegiance to the most favorable leader.

2.3 Singapore: The Emergence of an Entrepôt in Malaya

The re-emergence of Singapore as a trading entrepôt brought the shifts in trade

and in Malay society that brought British authority deeper into Malay affairs. Singapore

developed along the lines of the traditional commercial port like Melaka, but with

different political loyalties. Thomas Stamford Raffles wanted an open a route to China in

the hopes of reaching that market for British exports. Singapore offered an abundance of

drinking water and being at the opening of the Straits of Melaka, its establishment in

72 Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 284, 285.

47

1819 prevented any revival of native Malay kingdoms through its competition as an

entrepôt. Raffles created an economic policy that ensured free trade in Singapore, which

made the port competitive in a world with protectionist tariffs commonplace.

Furthermore, the perception of legitimacy regarding the acquisition of Singapore made it

more difficult to justify its destruction through military action by native forces.73

Singapore offered great prospects for its inhabitants, bringing trade from throughout the

world under the auspices of British authority. The presence of the port in British hands

greatly shifted the balance of power in the region.

The development of trade through Singapore brought British trade interests,

among others, into the Malay world but did not intervene extensively within its societal

and political structure for a few decades. At the time of its annexation in 1819 in accord

with the Johor Sultanate, Singapore possessed between one hundred and two hundred

inhabitants who were not numerous enough to transform the small fishing hamlet into a

bustling port. Johor eventually became economically tied to Singapore, integrating the

state to Singapore to the point when they became important parts of each others

economy. The Straits Settlements of Penang, Singapore, and Melaka became the main

centers of trade for the Malay Peninsula but operated outside of its traditional political

structure.74 During its initial decades under the East India Company, the Straits

Settlements focused generally on economic growth and trade to increase its importance

and influence rather than dominate the peninsula militarily, leaving a power vacuum that

piratical factions and sea raiders filled.

73 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 114-117.74

? Milton Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History, (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2004), 86, 117.

48

The population of Singapore was not of the traditional Malay composite, but more

cosmopolitan with its inhabitants of various backgrounds and cultures. A large number

of the immigrants sailed from India and China to work in Singapore, eventually

overshadowing the native Malay population. Five years after its establishment,

Singapore composed of over 10,000 inhabitants with Malays composing of over 4,500

and the Chinese accounting for 3,500. Twenty-five years after its incorporation, Chinese

inhabitants achieved a majority of the population. By the mid 1840s, the overall

population of Singapore reached 52,000 inhabitants with approximately 32,000 Chinese

residents filling most of the trades throughout the port. In Singapore, many Chinese

immigrants found commercial prosperity with some becoming wealthier than

Europeans.75 The numbers and wealth of the Chinese allowed members of that

community to have a significant amount of power within the region. Chinese maritime

trade came to account for a significant component of the overall trade within the region

giving or revealing Chinese seafarers’ skill in sea travel.

The administration of Singapore under British authority coincided with shifts in

trade patterns, particularly in regard to maritime trade. Native seafarers declined

proportionally in Singapore with fewer native vessels calling there. From 1829 to 1830

Malay prahus composed of 23% of Singapore’s maritime trade in contrast to 1865-6

when prahus composed of 8% of vessels calling at Singapore.76 Besides European

vessels, Chinese merchant vessels docked increasingly at Singapore, jumping from four

large junks in 1821 to 143 in 1856-7. Rather than acting as a major port for English

products for export to China as Raffles initially hoped, the Chinese importers purchased

75 Osborne, Southeast Asia, 117-118.76

? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135.

49

goods native to Malay lands, which became known as “Straits Produce” by the English.

Chinese merchants usually purchased products from the marine and forest environments

of Southeast Asia, such as camphor, beeswax, rattan palms, bird’s nests, and seaweed.

Demand for forest goods resulted in a closer relationship between collectors of the

products and the merchants, altering the traditional systems and straining the local

ecology. The orang laut once sailed the seas of Southeast Asia as traders became agents

for collecting forest resources by the mid 19th century, while the aboriginal forest

dwellers extracted resources in greater quantities than before.77 The maritime economy

of the Straits of Melaka changed from Malay domination to domination by other groups.

Changed times brought certain traditionally maritime groups away from the sea to find

work on land.

2.4 Agriculture and International Trade: The Changes in Malaya’s Economy

The economic changes were not limited to Singapore Island, but spread

throughout the Malay Peninsula, increasing the influence of the Chinese in the region

initially through agricultural products. Johor developed economical links with

Singapore’s merchant community given its close proximity, which allowed Johor to

export fresh water and food to Singapore. Chinese agricultural settlements in Johor

planted crops including gambier and pepper.78 Gambier helped develop Singapore during

the 1830s especially with elimination of its duties in Great Britain in 1834, permitting the

purchase by tanners for tanning leather black and others for dying in general. Chinese

planters had more success than their European counterparts who attempted to grow

coffee, cotton, and tea. In Melaka, Chinese planters combined gambier and pepper with

77 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 136-137.78

? Osborne, Southeast Asia, 119.

50

tapioca in concert with each other to improve the overall ecological and financial success

of the plantations. The demand in China accounted for a higher proportion of revenue in

Singapore of 19% in 1848-9 as opposed to 16% for Europe, although Chinese demand

revenue later dropped to 12% and Europeans rose to 25% in 1868-9.79 Early Chinese

planters helped Singapore succeed as a viable settlement and port while independently

making inroads in Malay territory, thus growing foreign influence there. The commercial

shift to Europe made piracy more difficult because the increased difficulty regarding the

seizure of European vessels.

The demand overseas for exports through the Straits Settlements shaped Malay

society and trade even without the necessary presence of British authorities within the

Malay states. The demand for products shipped through Singapore contributed to the

accumulation of capital by Singapore residents including those originally from China.

Europe and America increased demand for gutta percha, a type of tree used similarly to

the rubber tree decades latter. The rise in demand came around the 1840s, the resin of

which easily conformed to molds when heated and became particularly useful for the

manufacture of buggy whips. Gutta percha rose even higher in demand with the

discovery that processed resin sealed the submarine telegraph cables effectively. Malays

and the orang asli80 of the forest brought much gutta percha to port for sale, for some as a

substitute income for trading and piracy in the former group, creating revenue important

for the survival of the Straits Settlements. The cultivation of the plant resin was deeply

79 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 137, 139.80

? Orang asli, translates to “original people,” descend from the ancient inhabitants of the peninsula and live in isolated communities throughout the forests. Malays considered them “savages” and hunted them as slaves particularly during the 18th and 19th centuries. Slave traders hunted them down, killing all adult males and then selling the women and children into slavery or presented them as gifts to local rulers. Colin Nicholas, Orang Asli, http://www.magickriver.net/oa.htm.

51

flawed because the orang asli, often slaves held by Malays, harvested it directly from

nature and usually in a manner that killed the tree, forsaking their animist ideals of

appeasing the spirits to meet the demands of Malay and Chinese middlemen.81 The

demand for gutta percha displayed the shift in demand for goods from the Straits

Settlements toward Europe, which exemplified the economic and social shifts occurring

in the Malay Peninsula. Former maritime Malay maritime traders and pirates found

different ways to earn a living more in line with European economic demands.

The mismanagement of the gutta percha plant suggested that Malay society failed

to reach the demands of the European market on its own, rather requiring huge changes to

the overall administration of Malay society if it were to meet that demand. Rather than

cultivating gutta percha on a plantation and extracting the resin slowly in a relatively

controlled process, harvesters of the plant caused ecological and economical problems by

destroying too many gutta percha trees. Collecting enough resin for one pikul, roughly

62.5 kilograms required the destruction of ten full grown trees. The export sales of gutta

percha to Singapore jumped from $5,239 in 1848 to $139,317 in 1866. British and

Chinese investors shied away from investing in gutta percha enterprises mainly because

of their reliance on the orang asli to collect the substance and the forced labor used by

Malays to gain their services.82 The Malay business model was unworkable for the

demands of the Europeans because it yielded too little and required the employment of

morally questionable labor sources. To meet the demands of the foreign market,

investors needed a new economic model that required a different labor source and more

effective resource extraction methods.

81 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 137-8.82

? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 138, 139.

52

2.42 Mining in Malaya: The Development of an Industrialized Economy

The need for a foreign business model became clear with the increased demand

for the mining and extraction of tin, which native Malays generally devoted less of their

lives to. By the 1850s politics and economics changed sufficiently with the Malay rulers’

recognition of the value of the Chinese laborers and the realization of Chinese financiers

of the potential value of the tin deposits in the Malay Peninsula.83 Financiers found too

few Malays willing to quit their lives as subsistence farmers for a new life in the tin

mines. The mining settlements were relatively far away from traditional Malay villages

during the 1840s and 1850s, leaving little reason start over as fulltime miners.84 The

traditional Malay method for tin extraction required the digging of channels, filling it

with a stream of water, and then the hauling of the soil into running water. The water

washed away the soil and the miners collected the remaining tin, a process which

permitted extraction on a small scale useful for subsistence farmers and fishermen. The

Malay chiefs benefitted from the increased production of tin as the traditional methods

yielded them little revenue, because the Chinese financiers promised mining rights fees

and other forms of income.85 The invitation of foreigners to work on Malay land

represented potential incomes that the indigenous Malays could not offer, letting the

Chinese in appeared to be in their self-interest, but that was often not the case in the long

term.

The Chinese immigrants became quite successful by filling the tasks other groups

neglected to do in large numbers, turning the economy of Malaya into a more

83 Osborne, Southeast Asia, 119.84

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 129-130.85

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 192.

53

economically-developed society. A large number of the Chinese immigrants found

employment in low-paying basic labor positions such as coolies at the mines. Others

took positions as kitchen hands and gardeners, while more skilled laborers took careers in

carpentry and as clerks. Few other groups filled positions such as small shopkeepers,

which often succeeded because by moving into the rice industry.86 The Chinese method

of extracting tin ore, know as the Lombong method, which started with trial boring in

search of the mineral. After a successful trial, miners dug a large hole in the ground with

tin bearing soil brought to the surface in baskets and dumped it into a water-carrying

trough. In the trough, workers, sometimes women and children, separated the tin ore

from other minerals with smelting sometimes done elsewhere. On site smelting included

alternations of mangrove wood and coal under a brazier connected to pipes which drained

away the molten metal.87 The Chinese techniques increased productivity but required

dedicated miners rather than traditional Malay part-timers, along with a substantial

amount of capital to pay for equipment and labor. The sheer numbers of workers

required for mining molded the demographics of Malaya.

Malay states possessing substantial tin deposits brought in more Chinese to

extract the tin for sale on the global market, bringing in large numbers of fairly

independent foreigners for work. In Perak, a minor chief named Long Ja’afar brought

Chinese miners to Larut to extract tin, which made him the wealthiest Malay in Perak and

expanded his political power and independence greatly. His son, Ngah Ibrahim

succeeded him in 1857 and the sultan confirmed his position a year later, along with

receiving $200,000 a year by the early 1860s in tin revenues. Ibrahim’s income

86 Osborne, Southeast Asia, 122-123.87

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 192-3.

54

permitted him to own a European-style bungalow, purchase two steam-powered yachts,

and hire a Penang lawyer, along with enough power to convince the sultan to appoint him

Mantri of Perak. At one point 40,000 Chinese resided in Larut in connection with the

mining industry, to help control such a large population Ibrahim hired Penang’s

superintendant of police T. C. S. Speedy for security.88 The rapid rise of Larut and large

increase in a population without a single political authority powerful enough to keep a

peaceful society created social, economic, and political imbalances throughout the state

leading to a significant amount of violence.

Selangor also possessed an abundance of tin reserves within its lands leading to

great opportunities in trade and society for that state. Rajah Juma’at attracted miners to

extract tin in his district of Lukut, bringing in $120,000 a year in revenues with 2,000

miners. Rajah Abdullah, brother of Juma’at, received the Klang valley in place of Rajah

Mahdi. Juma’at also pushed his candidate, Rajah Abdul Samad, successfully for sultan.

In 1857, chiefs voted down a proposal for a centralized treasury and uniform tariffs to

prevent income inequality. The development of mines in Klang valley flourished while

miners exhausted the Lukut mines by 1860. Abdullah’s new mines developed at Ulu

Klang, a short distance from the river port and storage center at Kuala Lumpur. The

populations swelled to five times that of the whole of Selangor in the 1840s with two

prominent Chinese groups being Ghee Hin centered in Kanching, and Hai San around

Kuala Lumpur and Ampong. Foreign financiers also partook in the Selangor economy

with Abdullah renting tax farms to businessmen Tan Kim Cheng and W. H. M. Read.89

The indigenous chiefs refused to reform their political and economic system despite its

88 Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 273-274.89

? Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 282-284.

55

obvious problems. The arrival of foreigners in Selangor in large numbers created an

imbalance in trade and society leading to problems of violence throughout the state in

time with no native force capable of controlling all the factions without significant allies

and a long war.

Chinese labor and mining techniques helped but did not fully solve the mining

problems and therefore used British help and technology to boost productivity and safety.

To prevent flooding of the mines, Resident Hugh Low of Perak introduced the steam

engine and centrifugal pump to the Chinese miners. Yap Ah Loy purchased two steam

engines for greater depth of mining and improved safety for the miners, along with

importing the techniques of hydraulic sluicing and gravel pumping from Australia.

Furthermore, techniques such as tin dredging also increased the productivity on the mines

in Malaya. Smelters developed in Singapore and Penang in 1887 and 1897 respectively

made transport much more efficient.90 The development of the tin industry created great

disparity within Malay society before the British intervention contributing to war and

piracy in the region. The relationship between Yap Ah Loy and Europeans showed a

degree of cooperation under the mantle of a centralized British authority.

Improved logistics through a centralized planning made possible by the state

made shipping more efficient during the late 19th century. The development of railroads

permitted the transport of the metals from the mines to the ports much faster and in

greater quantities than previously possible. The development of the steamship enabled

much faster transport of goods from Malaya to Great Britain, a steamship sailed from

Singapore to London in five weeks, which the Suez Canal cut even further upon its

completion in 1869. The British tin plate manufacturing that increased dramatically since

90 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 193-194.

56

the 1850s powered economic growth for the Malay Peninsula.91 The success of Chinese

miners through the adoption of European techniques helped certain factions become

extraordinarily powerful and wealthy. Development of Industrial Age infrastructure

required a centralized government system to facilitate long-distant trade of high volume

goods and coordinate protection against raiders.

2.43 Plantations: British Authorities and a Developing Economy

Rubber became a symbol for British Malaya and modernization because British

botanists brought the rubber plant to Malaya for plantation agriculture. After the Kew

Botanical Gardens collected rubber plant seedlings in 1876 twenty-two seedlings arrived

at the Singapore Botanical Garden in 1877 and eventually Hugh Low’s Residency in

Kuala Kangsar, Perak. Planting the rubber trees required substantial patience because

rubber trees required five to six years before tapping. Henry Ridley, Director of the

Gardens of Singapore, set out to convince planters to grow rubber as early as 1888. In

1896, Tan Chay Yan of Melaka agreed to plant four acres and a British coffee estate

agreed to plant five acres of rubber. By 1905 the production of rubber throughout

Malaya reached 200 tons, while Ridley improved the tapping methods to increase output

while minimizing damage to the tree. By World War I the demand for rubber

skyrocketed and production in Malaya soon followed.92 With the help of British

botanists, Malaya became an exporter of rubber throughout the global market and became

a valuable resource provider to Great Britain increasing its wealth immensely.

Foreigners introduced many new types of flora through the plantations,

particularly after the British intervention in Malaya. By 1875 palm oil arrived in

91 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 139, 194.92

? Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 203-204.

57

Singapore as seeds to be planted in botanical gardens and by the 1900s planters grew it

around Kuala Lumpur. Europeans also brought the pineapple to Singapore in 1888 from

where it spread to Johor, Selangor, and Perak.93 Around 200,000 Indians migrated to

Malaya by 1913, many from South India particularly as plantation laborers. Tamils

sometimes worked on the plantations, but also worked in other positions than basic

laborers such as clerks and overseers. Sydney W. Moorhouse, a planter from Ceylon,

started a rubber growing company in 1905 and eventually grew to 16,000 of rubber trees

by 1916.94 Foreigners brought new plants to Malaya to grown for export on a scale not

seen before on the Malay Peninsula, the revenues from which helped develop a British-

Malay territory with industrial infrastructure and a significant education system.

2.5 Education: The Imperial Influences in Society

The development of a British-style education system in Malaya revealed Great

Britain’s intended societal and economic objectives. Governor Cavenagh secured funds

for schools from the British India Office in London to develop a school system without

the brutal punishments suffered in indigenous Malay religious schools. The construction

of schools before the interventions displayed how the Straits Settlements considered

public education important. The number of secular Malay schools and pupils increased

from 596 pupils in sixteen schools in 1872 to 7,218 students in 189 schools in 1892. The

Malay schools taught pupils the British Industrial Age “habits of industry, punctuality,

and obedience,” along with the basic skills necessary to be a part of an industrializing

society.95 The British-Malay education system reinforced British values in a society

93 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 205-209.94

? Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 51-52.95

? Loh, The Malay States, 156, 161, 162, 167.

58

mostly alien to them in order to develop a society integrated into the British imperial

system.

The British colonialists implemented the Malay school system in part to weaken

the old Malay power structure and reinforce British authority. By 1879 British

authorities in Selangor made education mandatory to increase attendance, an idea that

Rajah Mahmud rejected by refusing to send his children or any of his people to the

government Malay schools. To enforce such dramatic changes on Malay society

administrators threatened fines and summonses to the parents of children who failed to

attend school. Frank Swettenham refused the teaching of English in Malay public

schools in Selangor, which the next acting resident discontinued. William Maxwell,

Resident of Selangor starting in 1889 offered the sons of the Malay nobility an English

education to make future leaders sympathetic to Great Britain.96 British authorities

sought to control the power of the old nobility, which basically possessed most of the

political power prior to British intervention.

The development of English-style education in Malaya helped modernize Malay

society but in a manner that protected British imperial power. According to Swettenham

prior to the introduction of the British education system, boys finished school often

became troublemakers in accordance with Malay beliefs regarding the suitable showing

of a spirit. Wealthier sons at times committed violent acts and robbery in particular.97

British authorities developed a “safe” education to prevent the application of ideas

contradictory to British imperial power. Not every aspect of education in British Malay

developed around pragmatic political goals, because British administrators possessed 96

? Loh, The Malay States, 163, 165-168.97

? Swettenham, British Malaya, 135-6.

59

some genuine humanitarian concerns by believing the utility of education had the means

to improve the lives of ordinary Malays. The education system maintained political

stability in Malaya with the old social order in place but with significantly less power,

while developing the Malayan economy.98 Swettenham summed up the transition

through describing Malay boys in 1874 as armed “with two or three weapons” but carried

books and slates by the 20th century.99 The preservation of British authority required that

the children of chiefs and rajahs keep the social statuses of their parents when they came

of age and develop the Malayan economy with British ideas to maintain social stability.

British authorities employed education to maintain their perception of order within

Malaya to keep children out of trouble such as piracy.

Conclusion

The westernization of the Malay society by British authorities maintained the

social structure while mostly eliminating the roots of forms of unrest such as piracy by

economic development. The indigenous systems of trade proved inadequate for the

demands of the industrialized world, whereas the traditional Malay society failed to

provide the labor or techniques required to meet the enormous economic demands of the

West. The development of an industrialized economy in coordination with political

reforms reduced acts of piracy in the Straits of Melaka. The development of a colonial

education system increased productivity of the common Malays while teaching the sons

of rajahs and chiefs to accept British culture and domination. The introduction of ideas

from Great Britain regarding trade and society demilitarized the once powerful Malay

chiefs and rajahs, while giving other ethnic groups economic value within Malaya. 98

? Loh, The Malay States, 169-170, 174-175.99

? Swettenham, British Malaya, 135.

60

The economy and society of Malaya made piracy a likely profession for a

significant proportion of the seafarers within the Straits of Melaka during the early

decades of the 19th century. Most people within the peninsula lived directly from the land

or sea, whether harvesting in agriculture or collecting fish from the sea. Farmers and

fishermen alike usually lived near the coast or on a river, making sea-raiding a possible

alternative during years when nature failed to provide a good harvest. In the event of a

famine, foreign trading vessels provided a stopgap measure to allow indigenous Malays

to provide food for themselves and their families at the expense of sea traders.

Furthermore the decentralized politics of Malaya meant commoners rarely received

outside help in the event of a catastrophe. Commoners rarely possessed any personal

storage for their own food by the early 19th century because chiefs and rajahs simply took

it, therefore making starvation difficult to avoid without a generous ruler to alleviate

famine. Resorting to piracy presented a risky, but plausible alternative for commoners

watching their families starve or die of diseases associated with malnutrition.

The fractious and diverse nature of society in Malaya contributed to intermittent

but intense warfare and piracy. Some ethnic groups established their own states

independent of foreign powers to an extent such as the Bugis of Selangor. Many of these

various factions posed a potential threat to peaceful commerce within the Straits of

Melaka in the event of war or some crisis, which held a strong potential for piracy

because of the multiple authorities created within each ethnic group. Various factions

often based on ethnicity, sometimes loosely, fought for their own interests, switching

sides when convenient and possessing little solid political loyalty to any single faction.

Some ethnic groups, including the orang laut specialized in maritime skills for trading

61

purposes giving them a great amount of skill in regard to seafaring, while only trading for

some months of the year. A variety of factions each with their own political goals often

composed of many of people with an expertise in seafaring as part of their culture, which

made piracy a means to achieve individual wealth or collective dominance.

The emergence of the Straits Settlements under British control and an increase of

demand of products from Malaya helped weaken native piracy but strengthened Chinese

pirates. Malays and other groups found the exploitation of land resources as profitable,

making a life at sea less attractive. The exploitation of resources including tin and

rubber, along with other products increased the wealth of many, especially certain

Europeans and Chinese who possessed interests throughout the Malay Peninsula by the

beginning of the 20th century. The wealthy merchants and financiers possessed a grave

interest in the economic development of Malaya. Their opponents included native rulers

who restricted trade or failed eventually to keep up with infrastructure development and

especially the sea-raiders who pushed up shipping costs by threatening vessels and

cargoes. Armed conflict presented the financiers with particular difficulties regarding

their investments in warzone with limited trade, which encouraged British intervention.

Economics and society played an important role regarding the sea-raiders and

their supporters, but also their opponents once the economy of Malaya shifted from the

favor of the sea raiders. The economic presence of the British colonies depressed the

power of other states in the region by attracting trade from other ports while applying

minimal protection of vessels at sea for years. Sea-raiders and pirates filled the political

vacuum of in the Malay world and attacked the most vulnerable craft and communities.

The strategically important Straits of Melaka and South China Sea needed centralized

62

authority for the flourishing of peaceful trade or at least coordination between various

authorities to prevent piracy.

63

Sampan (Figure 2)

Pearson Scott Foresman, “Sampan,” Jul, 24 2010, http://www.cliparts101.com/free_clipart/19139/sampan_ship.aspx (accessed April 10, 2011).

64

Chapter 3: Piracy and Marauding: Piratical Seafarers in Straits of Melaka and the

South China Sea

The Straits of Melaka created a maritime chokepoint between China and India,

along with a significant opportunity for traders throughout Southeast Asia. The

abundance of trade in a politically fragmented region offered many opportunities for

Malay and Chinese seafarers to engage in violence for the sake of capturing a prize

vessel. The Malay and Chinese groups used their respective political groups as cover for

their actions depending on the political circumstances. Piracy and marauding grew out of

particular social, economic, and political conditions counter to the ideal structure of an

industrialized European state. The marauders became numerous because of an

uncoordinated plurality of political authorities, ample economic targets of opportunity,

and large quantities of skilled seafarers willing to commit violent acts at sea. Piratical

behavior in the Straits of Melaka around formed out of opportunism in the absence of a

capable authority in an economic system that offered maritime merchants and fishermen

the option of being a maritime predator, too.

Piracy was not unique to any particular location along the Straits of Melaka by the

beginning of the 19th century, because pirates targeted victims sailing through the

gauntlet. The profession of the inhabitants of Singapore prior to Raffles according to

Swettenham was “probably, piracy,” citing Hiyat Abdullah, which also depicted Colonel

Farquhar disposing of the vast amount skulls under his command at Singapore. Pirates

prowled the Straits of Johor particularly from 1819 to 1840 to steal cargo and capture

men, women, and children for sale as slaves. Even when pirates misidentified warships

for peaceful traders, the pirates often fought to the death in the fury of their assault rather

65

than surrender. Swettenham admitted to the lack of sources in evaluating the effect of

piracy on commerce as he lacked the evidence to determine whether it was a nuisance or

strategic threat.100 Milton Osborne suggested a combination of pirates and fishermen

inhabited Singapore prior to 1819.101 The few inhabitants of pre-modern Singapore likely

fished for daily food, but also resorted to piracy when opportunities arose because they

possessed the necessary skills and little other economic opportunity. Regardless of the

commercial significance of piracy, the political ramifications for the perception of the

region being infested with pirates resulted in great political repercussions and changes

even to the most powerful of rulers.

3.1 Who Were the Pirates? Class and Ethnicity in Piracy

Various segments of society composed the vaunted sea-raiders of the Straits of

Melaka, coming from a variety of social structures within Malay society. The orang laut

partook in piracy after their seasonal trading expedition financed by local chiefs for

victuals in exchange for an investment return. The annual monsoon provided the wind in

the direction necessary for sailing up the Straits of Melaka to ambush trading vessels for

their cargo, along with the passengers and crew for sale as slaves.102 Seafarers conducted

regular trade until the Southeast monsoon winds in June when they conducted piracy

throughout the Straits of Melaka until October, often with the tacit support of local rulers

in return for a percentage of the profit.103 The orang laut or other groups not under any

legitimate chief in the Malay world became perompak or pirates who sailed as renegades

100 Swettenham, British Malaya, 81.101

? Osborne, Southeast Asia, 117.102

? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134.103

? Presgrave to Murchison, December 5, 1828, Straits Settlement Factory Records 159, quoted in Nicholas Tarling, Piracy and Politics in the Malay World, (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1963), 39-40.

66

while some orang laut became hereditary outlaws without a fixed home. At times, a

chief or rajah in economic need or a foreigner enlisted perompak to reverse their fortunes.

In economic slowdowns, piracy became worse because more rulers resorted to plunder to

make up for revenue shortfalls.104 In the waters around the Malay Peninsula, traders and

chiefs became sea-raiders during particular seasons and periods of economic distress,

which revealed piracy often not as a permanent profession but rather a temporary means

to alleviate financial problems or to supplement existing income.

Many rulers financed pirate expeditions, perpetuating piracy as a means to

supplement their jurisdictions’ labor and supply of materials.105 Sultans also supported

raids, particularly in the Sulu Archipelago the raiders from which became the most feared

raiders of the Malay world by the mid 19th century.106 In particular, the Sultan of

Terengganu likely supported piracy, while the Bendahara of Pahang likely turned a blind

eye to orang raoyat piracy according to a British commentator.107 The Johor Sultanate,

for example, enacted legitimate naval operations because of the hereditary right to

enforce their traditions. Traditionally, the sultan delegated tax collection, cargo

investigation, and intelligence gathering to his laksmana or temenggong.108 In many

cases actions by sultans possessed legitimacy because they exercised their rights as

leaders of a sovereign state to patrol their waters for recognized purposes. Chiefs also

104 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 68.105

? L. Mills, “British Malaya 1824-1867,” Journal of the Malayan Branch o the Royal Asiatic Society, (Oct. 1923), 216-217.106

? Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 88-90.107

? Presgrave to Murchison, December 5, 1828, Straits Settlement Factory Records 159, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 40.108

? Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 60, 69.

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participated in maritime activities of less legitimacy by supporting piratical missions

without the overt support of the sultan or his chief ministers.

The ruling class did not monopolize marauding at sea as people of a variety of

classes became pirates to increase their incomes, often through joining less-renowned

members of the ruling class. Pirates also acted without the consent of the local ruler in

their operations, the raoyat plundered vessels without their leadership or consent of the

ruling class and often sought patronage from another ruler. The pirates sold their plunder

in ports such as Singapore and hid in other ports such as Pahang, Terengganu, and

Kelantan to evade capture by authorities.109 Orang laut became pirates or perompak

through following poorer rajahs and foreigners in their attempt to gain wealth through

raiding.110 Although less-reputable rulers raided for their own economic gain in search of

goods and scarce labor, obtaining such assets enhanced the prestige of the raiding leader.

By 1825, merchants and rulers alike participated in raiding to improve their incomes

through, in their perception, an honorable manner.111 The decentralized political

authority permitted pirates’ operations without the sultan’s support to survive so long as

the various states refused to tackle piracy in a concerted effort.

Chinese merchant vessels also partook in piracy to supplement the income of their

crews and owners. Emerging after 1840, Chinese pirates menaced the Straits of Melaka

and increased their attacks significantly by the 1860s while other pirate groups declined.

Chinese pirate vessels occasionally included Europeans to provide expertise in

armaments and serve as officers, while European crewmembers were virtually

109 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80, 83, 86.110

? Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 68.111

? Mills, British Malaya, 216.

68

nonexistent in Malay pirate prahus.112 British officials meanwhile recognized that

suspected Chinese pirates adapted to the British legal system to avoid hanging from the

gallows. Depositions placed Chinese junks attacking other vessels, but officials hardly

made arrests lacking specific evidence against particular owner or crew while pirate

vessels outfitted in Singapore. Chinese pirates gathered arms and intelligence regarding

shipping in Singapore by exploiting loose laws and poor enforcement. Even if British

authorities accused a Chinese merchantman of piracy, the Chinese community in

Singapore defended Chinese merchants through the law with great success generally

because a lack of evidence. Therefore, Chinese pirates challenged the prosecution more

than the Malays because of their adept use of the legal system.113 The existence of

Chinese pirates in the Straits of Melaka based in Singapore revealed how virtually any

person with adequate capital or maritime experience possessed the potential to be a pirate

in the region regardless of national origin.

For the inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula, nearly any person regardless of class

or ethnicity could potentially become a pirate, particularly with the necessary maritime

skills, which amounted to a significant proportion of the population because much of

Malay society relied on fishing and maritime history. Impoverished fishermen

coordinated their attacks on unsuspecting vessels and quickly disengaged upon capture of

their target vessel. Pirates also included traders, merchants, and less-fortunate noblemen

who seized their target vessels to supplement their incomes. Even the heads of state

supported raiding missions of questionable legitimacy to improve their own status.

Foreigners to Southeast Asia also conducted piracy with the assistance of Singapore as an

112 Mills, British Malaya, 223.113

? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 207-08, 215-217, 224.

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open and economically liberal port. Piracy gave any person, virtually regardless of social

status, a means to express their political authority, albeit often unrecognized by most of

society, over the crew of another vessel for economic gain.

3.2 Tools of the Trade: Vessels and Weapons of the Pirates and Sea-Raiders

Some fishermen in the Straits of Melaka also raided foreign vessels to gain a

supplemental income based on opportunism. Sampan piracy was perhaps the most

difficult form of piracy to eradicate. According to Governor Butterworth of the Straits

Settlements a flotilla of fifteen to twenty sampans, small low-draft vessels, with four to

seven crewmen fished and hunted for turtles until their prey came leeward of the

sampans. The sampans attacked the vessel with fish darts and spears normally used for

fishing and hunting to suppress the crew while stealing the cargo. If the sampans came

under attack, the vessels fled through a shoal where deep-draft vessels ran aground. After

beaching the sampans, the crew fled into the jungle with the plunder. If sampans sailed

into jungle-lined rivers or creeks, authorities had great difficulty determining their

location after they entered the waterways because of the mangroves and the forest.

Sometimes the crew of sampans used the rivers as cover upon ambushing unsuspecting

craft and then quickly retreated into the forest. Malay villages along the coast usually

possessed the sampans necessary for such piratical missions.114 Sampan pirates were

usually common fishermen supplementing their income through a highly decentralized

level of organization. Sampan piracy revealed that pirates were also common folk

searching to improve their lives at the expense of vessels and their crews. Armed with

114 Butterworth to Beadon, December 21, 1844; Congalton’s memo, December 17, 1843, East India Company and India Board’s Collections 103298, 17, 21, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 209, 210.

70

basic fishermen’s equipment, even the humblest of seafarers in the Straits of Melaka

participated in piracy during the 19th century.

The sampans lacked of firepower providing for a significant weakness regarding

their viability as a pirate vessel and making other vessels preferable for marauders. The

crews of other native pirate vessels and warships in the Malay world armed themselves

more effectively. In the early 19th century Malay prahus were maritime vessels almost as

effective their European counterparts of similar size. According to one account, eighty

seafarers operated prahus by sail and oar, permitting the vessels to sail faster than their

British counterparts in the early years of British-controlled Penang. Pirates and states

armed their prahus with guns, impressive arsenals, and towing lines for capturing prizes.

The low-draft prahus cleared shoals much easier than their European counterparts, while

possessing planking and shields for some protection against enemy fire.115 Thomas J.

Newbold gave a similar description of the war prahus as being fast particularly because

of skilled paddlers. Usually weighing eight to ten tons burthen, prahus used low-caliber

swivel guns capable of long range at the bow, center, and stern with musket shot resistant

wooden bulwarks called apilans to protect the crew in combat. The crew armed

themselves with a variety of close-combat weapons such as krises, spears, and hatchets,

but also firearms such as muskets and blunderbusses.116 Malay war prahus possessed the

speed and the equipment to pose a threat to most vessels sailing the Straits of Melaka,

save heavily-armed European ships.

115 Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 112.116

? Thomas J. Newbold, Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 37-39.

71

The largest war prahus posed a great threat to the shipping of the Straits of

Melaka and the villages along the coast. Some of the largest native pirate vessels sailing

through the Straits of Melaka were over ninety feet in length with a double-tiered set of

oars with a sharp bow and wide beam. Builders placed a gun port for a six to twenty-four

pounder usually brass gun at the bow of the vessel with numerous swivel guns elsewhere.

When needed the crews lowered or raised the mast with its large mainsail and an ensign

with great speed. The largest prahus possessed an armed crew from the ruling class

numbering fifty to eighty seafaring warriors. The large native raiding vessels in the

region possessed a hold for captured victims from the Straits of Melaka and elsewhere

often for months before sale as slaves in a far-off land.117 The large war prahus

devastated the coast of Malay lands, proving more than a match for the native seafarers

throughout the region. To successfully resist the large sea-raider vessels states required a

centralized state to coordinate a navy and fight the marauders.

Malays possessed a variety of specialized vessels each designed to complete a

specific purpose relevant to piracy. Malay seafaring communities usually possessed three

types of vessels with specific uses known as the penjajaps, kakaps, and paduakans.

Malay marauders used the penjajap prahus as a light but long vessel capable of hiding in

the mangroves creeks of Malaya. The vessel usually possessed two masts without a deck

and the only cover from the sun being an awning for the headman. Marauder crews

armed their penjajaps with swivel guns for considerable firepower against other vessels.

Malay flotillas employed patrol vessels or kakap prahus as a one mast small vessel

steered by one rudder. A crew of eight to ten skilled warriors sailed small patrol vessel to

117 Horace St. John, The Indian Archipelago: Its History and Present State, (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1853), 119, 120, 149.

72

gather intelligence for a larger vessel or a flotilla. The paduakan possessed a single mast

with one lateen sail and weighed twenty to fifty tons burthen that a helmsman steered by

two rudders.118 Being the largest of the three vessels, Malays sailed the paduakan for

long-distance voyages with significant cargoes. The combination of vessels gave the

marauder a variety of options for raiding with vessels capable of specialized tasks making

the seafarers of Malaya formidable and versatile.

The participation of Chinese merchant junks in piracy showed that large infusions

of capital went into pirate voyages, permitting the capture of medium-sized vessels.

Chinese pirate junks in the region displaced seventy to one hundred fifty tons, but the

largest weighed 200 tons. As for armaments, vessels possessed up to twenty-five large

guns with a crew ranging from one to two hundred seafarers. The size of the vessels and

number of the crew made them formidable opponents for most vessels.119 The Cantonese

trading junks looked exactly like the pirate junks, making distinguishing the pirate

vessels from peaceful traders nearly impossible for patrolling Royal Navy warships.120

Petty Chinese pirates, those not organized into large fleets, usually supplied from one

port, which was likely Singapore for 19th century Chinese pirates in Southeast Asia.

Particularly in expeditions with low overhead, Chinese pirates used basic fishing

implements including knives and bamboo pikes. Most attacks by Chinese pirates

depended on swift attacks with the pirate crew quickly stealing their objective and then

retreating to avoid capture, relying on chance for a prize and economic survival.121

118 St. John, The Indian Archipelago: Its History and Present State, 183, 184.119

? Mill, British Malaya, 223.120

? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 215.121

? Dian Murray, “Living and Working Condition in Chinese Pirate Communities, 1750-1850,” Pirates and Privateers: New Perspectives on the War on Trade in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, ed. by

73

Chinese pirates operating around the Malay Peninsula capitalized on the laws and politics

of the Straits Settlements to survive. The pirate junks distinguished little from the

merchant vessels because the merchants and the pirates were often one in the same

alternating between trade and piracy as enterprises.

3.3 Causes of Piracy: Societal, Economic, and Political Contributions

No single aspect of Malaya and the Straits of Melaka or its history caused piracy

to thrive there during most of the 19th century, but rather a variety of factors contributed

to its development. Traditionally, historians cited the oppressive policies of the

Portuguese and Dutch overlords as being a significant cause of piracy for centuries in the

Straits of Melaka. William Dampier blamed Dutch economic policies for pushing

Malays toward piracy by 1689.122 Swettenham blamed the Portuguese and the Dutch

partially for driving the Malays to piracy, along with Anderson who placed Portuguese

and Dutch monopolistic trading policies for squeezing the Malays out of peaceful trade

and into piracy.123 Although there may be some truth to such a statement, the historians

risked over simplification through notions that Europeans for centuries gave natives no

alternatives than piracy. Piracy in the Straits of Melaka was an economic and political

action that sought to enrich or even empower the perpetrator using a long tradition of

maritime experience including military operations.

3.31 Maritime Traditions: Sea-Raiding, Trade, and Warfare

By the 19th century Malays possessed centuries of experience regarding naval

warfare and a tradition of raiding by seafarers. Traditional Malay warfare involved quick

David Starkey, E. S. van Eyck van Heslinga, and J. A. de Moor, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997), 58-59, 61.122

? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 10-11.123

? Swettenham, British Malaya, 140; Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 93.

74

attacks, looting, and withdrawals while the local population and ruler retreated into the

jungle. When Portuguese Governor Albuquerque captured Melaka in 1511, the sultan

and the court retreated into the jungle when defeat appeared imminent, expecting the

Portuguese to loot the city and depart, but the Portuguese remained in Melaka.124 The

heritage of sea-raiding remained in the 19th century and played into piracy, giving

prestige to the most successful raiders such as the orang laut from Galang Island. Sultan

Husain of Johor explained to Raffles that piracy brought no disgrace to its perpetrators in

defense of the raiding tradition, which generally targeted native vessels.125 Governor Sir

Andrew Clarke of the Straits Settlements considered the entire Selangor royal family as

“thoroughbred pirates,” during the 1870s particularly in regard to the pirate activities off

their territory.126 The Malays, Bugis, and orang laut, elites considered raiding an activity

based on centuries of tradition as a means to obtain wealth and prestige. The European

belief regarding the evilness of piracy contrasted greatly with Malay concepts of wealth,

raiding, and respectability.

Hardly distinguishable at times, native merchants sometimes operated as pirates

to provide supplemental income through less-peaceful means. The Chinese merchant

vessels were not the only to alternate between peaceful trader and violent pirate. Being

opportunistic, Malay seafarers switched between piracy and peaceful trading depending

on their best interests at any given time.127 Malays and other Southeast Asians relied on

maritime trade for the basis of their economies since before colonial times. The monsoon

winds permitted vessels to sail up the Straits of Melaka for pirate raids on native vessels

124 Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 89.125

? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 133-134.126

? Sadka, The Protected Malay States, 48.127 Mills, British Malaya, 218.

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for loot and slaves. Governor Fullerton of the Straits Settlements commented in 1828

that a Malay sailor could practice both peaceful trade and piracy. Trade competition

became more difficult by the 19th century particularly with the increased presence of

foreign trade and the introduction of steam-powered vessels.128 In the face of increased

competition, native merchants potentially sought alternative means such as piracy to earn

a living. The annual monsoon brought a wind that permitted sea-raiders to sail into the

Straits of Melaka, but the change in winds meant an end to the season and the resumption

of regular trade. Pirates raided in one season and traded peacefully in the next, revealing

that the same merchant vessels and crew engaged peaceful trade, but in also in violent

raids.

3.32 Pirates and Authority: Raiding as a Power Grab

The Malay political states system relied on piratical raids as an expression of

power for rulers and those seeking political power. Political figures used piracy as a

means to gain authority over people.129 One example of leaders using pirates for

conventional war was the 1869 siege of Klang already mentioned, but besides the

Sumatran miners under Dato Dagang joining Tengku Kudin, Ilanun pirates from Riau

also joined the surprise assault on forts surrounding Klang.130 Piracy became a means for

princes and petty nobles to gain power, the anak rajah, literally “child king,” pirates

thrived particularly with a decentralization of authority. Anak rajah piracy became

particularly prevalent during succession disputes, such as Kedah and Siak, while Riau

failed to control its anak rajah particularly after 1784. By the late 18th century many

128

? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 134-136.129

? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 11,130

? Charles D. Cowan, Nineteenth- Century Malaya, 72, 73.

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Malay states experienced succession disputes including Negri Sembilan and Perak.131

The decentralization of Malay states contributed greatly to the increase of sea-raiding

during the 18th and 19th centuries particularly with succession disputes, along with the

royalty and nobility fighting for more power and wealth through piracy. According to the

British perception, pirates challenged centralized authority directly, which required a

response to protect the colonial trade system that was less effective with a variety of

chiefs vying for power.

Sea-raiders came into the service of the sultans or other recognized rulers to

reinforce their authority, making them an extension of the state prior to the increased

influence of Great Britain. The Johor Sultanate employed roughly a third of orang laut to

protect their traders, while harassing the shipping of other states.132 The orang laut

constituted a significant proportion of the temenggong’s power-base by patrolling the

coast of Johor and contributing flotillas of ten to twenty prahus each with a crew and a

nakhoda, master of the vessel, in times of war.133 By the early 19th century sultans no

longer possessed the power to defend against piracy and therefore used permission to raid

as a payment to their supporters.134 The patronage of the orang laut not only increased

the power and prestige of Johor, but also bought off a large segment of the otherwise

dangerous seafarers from damaging Johor’s interests. The failure to limit the sea-raiders’

power brought devastation to the lands and merchant fleets of Johor, severely limiting the

ability of the state to function.

131 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 113.132

? Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 89.133

? Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 58-59.134

? Mills, British Malaya, 218.

77

Piratical power limited the authority of the rulers of Johor by defying their

authority and wrecking the Johor economy. By 1784, Johor’s population suffered

gravely from the piratical raids leaving entire areas bare of populations particularly in the

west coast of Johor. In 1824, maritime peoples numbered between 6,000 and 10,000

within the temenggong’s jurisdiction, many of whom took advantage of the power

vacuum with Temenggong Daing Ibrahim rise to his father’s old position in 1826 at the

age of fifteen, which contributed to ten years of rampant piracy. Not all chiefs

recognized the legitimacy of Ibrahim’s authority or even that of the Sultan Husain of

Johor and rather split into factions claiming loyalty to the Sultan of Lingga instead.135

The early 19th century Malay chiefs used sea-raiding to achieve political power and

prestige as part of the state system. Europeans regarded private warfare between factions

for greater authority as piracy.136 Native chiefs, nobles, and members of royal families

used piratical behavior and sea-raiding as their chief expression of political power with

raiding more common in years of political upheaval. Raiding and piracy worked within

the Malay state system that placed authority within decentralized chiefs, whom raiding

often supported.

3.4 Raiding Economy: Economic Causes for Piracy and It Results

Seafarers used piracy and sea-raiding ultimately for economic survival or gaining

more political prestige. Economic hardship forced Malays to find alternative means to

survive making piracy a tempting alternative to starvation. A murrain killed most

buffaloes in Selangor, making rice cultivation extraordinarily difficult and forced people

to either starve or survive as pirates during the early years of Sultan Abdul Samad’s

135 Trocki, Prince of Pirates, 58-59, 71, 76.136

? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 10-11.

78

reign.137 Economic hardship contributed to piracy with people left with little alternative

for survival, economic hardship was hardly unique to the Malay Peninsula during the 19th

century. David Starkey provided an economic framework for understanding piracy in

general and J. L. Anderson wrote an analysis regarding types of Malay piracy.

Starkey’s market approach, though intended for the Atlantic economy, revealed

the pirates and sea-raiders’ economic reasons for risking their lives for the chance of

capturing vessels at sea. The supply perspective regarded land, capital, and labor for the

basis of overall productivity of the pirate, while the demand perspective offered the pirate

compensation for his services often for a “good” otherwise difficult to obtain. Pirates

needed land to construct, maintain, and beach or dock their vessels, along with adequate

amounts of capital such as vessels, victuals, and arms required for capturing other

vessels. For an enterprise a nakhoda or anak rajah required a crew capable of rowing,

sailing, and fighting, which required plenty of manpower.138 The Malay pirates were also

enterprising businessmen who usually pirated native trading vessels rather than large

well-armed European merchantmen for a share of the cargo and slaves.139 Therefore,

Malay pirates possessed similarities with their European pirate counterparts an ocean

away because the market framework applied to Southeast Asian piracy, too.

Pirates needed adequate land, capital, and labor, along with a demand for their

services for successful enterprises. Raiders and pirates possessed no lack of land to hide,

the numerous estuaries, river, and other hiding spots on the Malay Peninsula offered

plenty of foliage for cover. With centuries, if not millennia of maritime experience native

137 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 42.138

? David Starkey, class lecture notes, Piracy and Privateering in the Atlantic Economy, c. 1560-1856, 2007.139

? Mills, British Malaya, 214.

79

seafarers were extraordinarily skilled, while the archipelago possessed plentiful amounts

of vessels for transport. Maritime vessels were not a luxury but a necessity for large

proportions of the coastal populations reliant on fishing and trade. Prior to the British

intervention in Malaya, Malay men carried weapons around all the time, usually arming

themselves with daggers, spears, a gun, and a sword. The most prized Malay weapon

was a kris, a type of sword, which a Malay man took with him wherever he went.140 Such

accounts showed that heavy weaponry, but also basic fishing equipment was easily

available as a form of capital. The amount of skilled labor for seafaring was a likely

substantial part of the overall labor market, but the amount of available labor varied. In

instances of natural disaster, piracy flourished because labor from farming and petty trade

needed work in other professions. Warfare forced labor away from peaceful tasks

because trading became difficult, if not impossible, especially with prohibitions or

blockades against it. The demands for labor increased in regard to seafarers to enact

blockades or raids on the enemy during periods of conflict. Chiefs possibly considered

followers of rulers with questionable legitimacy as pirates.

A high degree of demand for piracy as a service revolved around the demand for

slave labor and additional revenue particularly in times of war. The early 19th century

witnessed an increased demand for labor so rulers resorted to enslavement because of the

scarcity of labor. The Sulu Sultanate encouraged slave-raiding by the Iranun and

Balaging sea-raiders during the 19th century, making them the most feared raiders in the

Malay world.141 Malay chiefs often taxed the profits of the pirates operating from their

territory142 and therefore possessed little reason to counter it. During times of war, rajahs 140 Swettenham, British Malaya, 146.141 Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 88.142

? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 26.

80

encouraged plundering for taxation to fund their own war efforts, which needed more

revenue than in peacetime to pay for additional costs. The decentralized political system

of the pre-colonial Malaya led by chiefs seeking power and prestige pushed the peninsula

into intermittent conflict, which increased piracy. The demand for goods and the

weakness of the state resulted in piratical behavior of astonishing proportions, including a

naval blockade of Pahang by pirates costing traders $200,000.143 The pirates’ ability to

operate tied with the weakness of the state and the demand for revenue by local chiefs or

the demand for slaves by foreign ones.

J. L. Anderson described three types of piracy within the Malay context of 1750

to 1850, parasitic, episodic, and intrinsic in an attempt to understand the costs of piracy to

an economy. Parasitic piracy grew off the trade, particularly off European expansionist

trade but usually indirectly as function of trade. The parasitic piracy redirected trade and

increased costs for merchants who needed more protection against raiders for more

weapons, making trade less efficient. Another type of piracy included episodic piracy

when seafarers resorted to raiding as opportunism when other seagoing activities failed to

support them.144 Anderson defined intrinsic piracy as raiding was intrinsic to the

functioning of the native states because piracy provided the necessary revenue for the

running of the state because little other ways to tax. The revenue contributed to the

economic productivity, political power, and prestige for the state and its leaders.

Anderson concluded that piracy increased costs for overall production, causing market

prices to increase and taking money out of the economy, along with threatening maritime

trade with annihilation.145 The underlining factor in Anderson’s analysis remained the 143

? Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 95.144 Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 88-89.145

81

tendency to toward warfare and sea-raiding, whether legitimate or illegitimate, as a

means for seafaring people of Malaya to survive regardless of the cost to the maritime

trader.

Conclusion

The seafaring Malays used raiding at sea for economic, social, and political gains

from the ranks of petty fishermen to the most powerful sultans, which increased during

political decentralization, wartime, and other calamities. The geography of the Malay

Peninsula and its surrounding seas provided cover for raiders with plenty of hiding places

from even the most powerful of enemies, including the Royal Navy. Sultans and chiefs

deployed sea-raiders as political patrons who patrolled the local trade routes in exchange

for goods. The difference between a legitimate sea-raider and a perompak or pirate was

not always clear because of the constant ambiguity regarding the legitimacy of the

supporting chief. Malays distinguished between illicit actions at sea and the practice of

recognized authority, but difficulty with such distinctions coincided with an overall

decentralized political authority. Times of openly and violent questioning of authority

witnessed an increase of piracy and raiding. British authorities needed a native partner to

negotiate and acquiesce when necessary, whereas piracy inherently created a plurality of

authority and hampered trade by increasing costs for merchants. Piracy represented the

prime naval challenger to British naval authority and inhibited trade necessary for the

Straits Settlements to be profitable.

? Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 89-90, 92-94.

82

Chapter 4: Breaking the Sea-Raiders: The Establishment of British Authority in

Malaya through the Destruction of the Sea-Raiders’ Power

The implementation of anti-piracy policies by Great Britain arose with the

contradictory interests of pirates and the British Empire. Pirates created much trouble for

the East India Company by depriving their settlements of trade income requiring counter-

piracy efforts by British forces. The Royal Navy and private navies implemented

strategies to weaken the impact of the pirates, including patrolling sea lanes and

destroying pirate bases. British authorities also implemented technological advantages

and developed infrastructure to weaken pirates and other opponents of Great Britain. The

technological advancements permitted faster communications and transport resulting in

rapid responses to armed opposition. The Straits Settlements employed a judiciary to

process suspected pirates and pressured native states to prosecute those accused of piracy.

The variety of strategies employed by British authorities took their toll on the sea-raiders

making the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea safer from pirates over the course

of decades.

Raiding as a form of political power consolidated the dominance of particular

rulers in Southeast Asian through systems of political patronage that held up the remnants

of the traditional Malay political system during the early 19th century. British authorities

conceived of sea-raiding as a form of piracy regardless of the legitimacy of the action in

Malay eyes and sought its suppression to replicate their own worldview of trade and the

state in Southeast Asia. By the 19th century inability of the Malay trading system to

produce enough raw materials to meet the industrial demand of Europe and America

became apparent, requiring large changes to the political system dominated by the raiding

83

policies of local chiefs. Malays failed to extract enough tin to meet foreign export

demands leading to the introduction of Chinese laborers and techniques. The destruction

of raiding as an important Southeast Asian institution became vital to British authorities

to protect their settlements and the trade necessary for their survival. Eventually

economic prosperity and military force secured the settlements. The further destruction

of the institution of raiding became necessary for the strengthening of British dominance

and the further integration of the Malay Peninsula into the West-led global economic

system. Sea-raiders increased costs for all producers, created greater uncertainty in

marketplaces, and challenged British authority. To break the power of the sea-raiders,

British authorities developed a strategy involving military force, foreign political

pressure, imposition of a judiciary, and eventually domination of Malay territory.

4.1 Consequences of Piracy: The Effects of Pirate Raids on the British

Settlements of Balambangan and Penang

The effectiveness of raids in Southeast Asia posed a threat to the existence of the

European colonies with renewed British interest in the region by the 18th century. The

English East India Company expanded its role in Southeast Asia, receiving the island of

Balambangan off northern Borneo from the Sultan of Sulu in 1762 and finally inhabited

the settlement in 1773. Sailing to Dutch ports became expensive with heavy tolls on

company vessels in the China trade. Balambangan offered a potential port-of-call for a

route to China used in 1757-8 by Commodore Wilson. Pirates raided the colony within

two years, destroying it as a useful port.146 The destruction of Balambangan showed that

piracy posed a threat to British colonies, requiring military protection for future

settlements, regardless of the land grants by local sultans. Pirate raids represented a

146 Kennedy, A History of Malaya, 73-74.

84

strategic threat to British interests in the region, reducing the amount of commerce

through looting and raiding, which presented British authorities with policy difficulties

for decades.

Penang also suffered from piracy although it survived through a higher trade

volume and by adopting policies that made business more difficult for pirates. Pirates

usually attacked smaller vessels near Penang, seizing them in significant numbers. The

evening proved a particularly difficult time for seafarers to conduct business at sea

because the cover of darkness provided pirates with the opportunity to plunder. Pirates

kidnapped seafarers anchored within Georgetown’s jetty and captured some within one

hundred yards of the shore at night, selling them into slavery elsewhere. Pirates usually

operated close by from various islands or from the Prye River as staging points for raids

on Penang. The purchase of mainland territory in 1800 denied the operating space for

pirates to operate and provided the inhabitants of Georgetown with a closer food supply.

The land became known as Province Wellesley, which after 1821 Malay refugees fleeing

Siamese military might populated the province significantly.147 The purchase of more

territory represented the willingness of the Honorable Company to deal with piracy

through the purchase of more territory. Controlling land on the Malay Peninsula

provided an effective means to control the levels of piracy in the surrounding seas.

4.2 Naval Strategies: Attempts to Eliminate Piracy by the Royal Navy

The most obvious response to repel seaborne raiders was the deployment of

warships to the East Indies to engage and destroy suspected pirates, because armed force

was the only way to protect property and lives directly from armed raiders. The support

of warships in the region cost British taxpayers and the East India Company a significant

147 Tregonning, A History of Modern Malaya, 84-85.

85

amount of funds, making the deployment of sufficient warships a challenge. The

destruction of Malay war prahus or Malay sailing vessels required the presence of strong

European naval forces armed well enough to combat experienced Malay seafarers.

British officials ordered the engagement of sea-raiders fully aware of the complicity of

local rulers in their safe harbor if not outright support. British policy sought the

protection of peaceful trade and British interests, permitting the Straits Settlements to

thrive and grow.

The deployment of naval forces meant an armed conflict between British forces

and sea-raiders often of unclear political loyalties. Governor Bonham noted that with the

death of Sultan Husain in 1835, various chiefs supported the Sultan of Lingga placing

unfriendly marauders in a potentially threatening position south of Singapore in places

such as Galang. Bonham viewed the “pirates” switch of allegiances from the houses of

his allies to Lingga as a need “to place the inhabitants under the restraint of some chiefs

who can be made responsible for their behaviour.”148 The Straits Settlements Governor

wanted the elimination of marauding as part of breaking the power of the various chiefs

in the region by placing them under authorities friendly to the East India Company. The

raiders posed a threat to the commerce of Singapore with their bases so close to the port,

which required British naval forces to weaken their power for the safety of commerce.

4.21 Counter-Piracy Naval Operations and the War on Piracy

British forces launched military operations against the suspected pirates despite

the questionable legal right to do so without the full consent of the Dutch administrators.

Captain Chads of Andromache a British 28-gun frigate sailed into the Straits of Melaka to

148 Bonham to Murchison, June 4, 1836, East India Company and India Board’s Collections 69433, 53, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80; Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 80.

86

find and destroy suspected pirates. Andromache and a few gunboats successfully

destroyed five prahus that attacked them in June 1836, freeing some captive Vietnamese

seafarers in the process.149 Chads deemed Galang the largest pirate center in the region

and sought a victory with the destruction of its harbor because he believed all its

inhabitants participated to the pirate trade somehow. Despite the Dutch refusal to

participate, Chads and the flotilla of British vessels attacked Galang anyway, destroying

three villages, fourteen large prahus, thirty to forty smaller prahus, and numerous smaller

vessels. During the raid, an officer and his crew of a gunboat recognized the prahus that

earlier burned an English brig after stealing her cargo. The action saw two British

seamen wounded and a few Malays dead, but most suspected pirates and villagers

managed to escape the attack. The British flotilla rescued a Vietnamese junk and crew,

saving the Vietnamese from certain slavery.150 The British raid weakened the suspected

pirates by destroying their vessels, but also limited their ability to trade peacefully and

fish. British naval actions such as the raid on Galang made living as a seafarer much

more difficult than prior to the stepped-up military presence.

British authorities implemented a variety of strategies to eliminate suspected

pirates, along with establishing naval dominance and protect less-threatening traders.

Between 1825 and 1850 authorities rewarded Royal Navy and East India Company

warships crews for killed or captured pirates. In a few years during the 1840s, British

warships received ₤42,000 for the killing and capturing of suspected pirates.

Unfortunately for the seafarers of the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea, the

crews of the warships proved overly effective and likely destroyed peaceful traders along

149 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 81, 83, 244.150

? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 84.

87

with pirates in the region. A Singapore newspaper proclaimed that native shipping

declined because of the naval operations that destroyed vessels indiscriminately. An

orang laut seafarer lamented the destruction of his vessel in Tuhfat al-Nafis at the hands

of a British warship.151 British strategies eliminated many of the native prahus, whether

peaceful traders or violent raiders, effectively wresting agency at sea from traditional

seafarers. Though brutal and probably unfair, the strategy of ransoming suspected pirates

reduced piracy in the region, but also decreased trade in Singapore as a side-effect.

4.22 The Royal Navy and the Chinese Pirates of Malaya

The Chinese in Malaya grew to a large population, which also contributed to

piracy in the region, resulting in retaliation by British forces against hostile Chinese

forces and their Malay allies. The Chinese population of Malaya resorted to piracy and

spared no nationality or ethnicity as its target. Perhaps the most famous instance of

Chinese piracy in the straits prompted a significant response by British forces. Kim Seng

Cheong with a cargo of piece goods and foodstuffs departed Penang on June 14, 1871

and disappeared prompting an owner Ong Hong Buan to sail for Singapore with a letter

from Lieutenant-Governor Arthur Birch regarding the owner’s plight. En route to

Singapore onboard the steamer Historian, Ong Hong Buan spotted a vessel remarkably

similar to Kim Seng Cheong and believing that the vessel was his, complained to Colonel

Anson in Singapore that pirates stole his vessel. Anson dispatched Pluto, a government

steamer, to search for the missing junk with a police detachment on board. The

detachment spotted the missing vessel in the Selangor River on June 28 and confirmed

the identity of the vessel through inscriptions reading “Kim Seng Cheong,” along with

151 Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135.

88

finding the captured helmsman.152 Pirates slaughtered much of the crew, along with

passengers totaling thirty-four people after sneaking aboard as passengers. The junk was

worth around $1,500, while the cargo was worth $7,000, so finding the cargo was also

important.153 The police detachment remarkably found the stolen vessel but investigated

further without fully comprehending what they stepped into. Suppressing piracy proved

too important for the British policemen because the severity of the crime warranted

justice regardless of whom they antagonized, but the consequences of their actions

caused more difficulties.

The following actions by the Straits Settlements and Royal Navy revealed the

depths of their determination to destroy pirates’ hiding places without fully understanding

its consequences. Although Rajah Musa, the son of the sultan, assisted Captain

Bradberry of Pluto and Inspector George Cox of the police detachment to recover the

stolen goods, Syed Mashor and Rajah Mahmud opposed the British detachment. Forced

to swim to Pluto the landing party received further humiliation at the guns of a stockade

but suffered no casualties.154 The Britons learned the difficult way that Rajah Mahdi

controlled Kuala Selangor, but arrested nine Chinese suspected pirates and retrieved part

of the cargo.155 The British detachment achieved much of their mission, but decided that

capturing the suspected pirates, the cargo, and the missing vessel was not enough.

For the British authorities to demand that the port no longer harbor pirates

became important enough to risk military action against native rulers. An attempt to

152 Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 85-86.153

? Parkinson, British Intervention, 48.154

? Parkinson, British Intervention, 48-50.155

? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 86-87.

89

negotiate with the local rulers failed, resulting in a firefight that killed one Briton. On

July 4, HMS Rinaldo opened fire upon the Selangor forts in retaliation, steamed past the

fort, and eventually silenced the native guns. The engagement cost one British seaman

his life because of heatstroke during the engagement. The 19th Madras Native Infantry

from Penang landed to disabled the guns and destroyed much of the town for the sake of

denying safe haven to pirates.156 British forces essentially went to war for the sake of

defeating piracy, along with directly challenging the de facto native ruler to achieve this

purpose. But the destruction at Kuala Selangor in the name of suppressing piracy was

only the beginning of an increased role of British authorities within native Malay politics.

The possibility that the Selangor Civil War encouraged piracy by forcing local

rulers to grant safe have to pirates for funding their war chests disturbed the British

authorities enough to apply direct pressure to local rulers to isolate unfriendly chiefs.

Colonel Anson ordered Colonial Secretary Wilfred Birch and Auditor General C. J.

Irving to Langat to speak with Sultan Abdul Samad and delivered his letter regarding

piracy. Anson demanded the surrender of pirates, along with Rajah Mahdi and Rajah

Mahmud, but also the promise never to harbor pirates again. Birch also demanded the

reappointment of Tengku Kudin, which Anson did not request. The guns of HMS Teazer

pressured Sultan Abdul Samad to favor British demands, which were against the policies

of London. Anson and Birch made their own policy decisions regarding Selangor and

neglected to consult Sultan Abdul Samad before the actual bombardment.157 Straits

Settlement officials employed gunboat diplomacy to fight piracy and their alleged

156 Parkinson, British Intervention, 50-52.157

? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 87-92.

90

supporters among the chiefs. British imperialism initially attacked suspected pirates and

their alleged safe haven as part of an attempt to increase British influence in Malaya.

Further piratical actions within the Straits of Melaka increased Great Britain’s

presence within Malay and Chinese politics. Unlike with the ‘Selangor Incident’ in 1871,

the Chinese of Larut required no safe harbor with local Malay rulers because their power

was overt as the local rulers failed to dislodge them. The strategy employed by both

sides during the Larut war focused on cutting off enemy trade through stockades and

blockades to weaken them. In one instance, Ghee Hin junks fired upon Fair Malacca,

hitting her thirty-five times, reports of which convinced Governor Ord to dispatch

gunboats to the coast of Perak.158 Pirates plundered vessels of all nationalities almost

daily, while British gunboats patrolled the coast of Perak but possessed too heavy a draft

to navigate the shallow waters, resulting in a miserable campaign with brutal heat and

heavy rains. Pirates easily escaped through mazes of mangroves or hid in seemingly

peaceful villages and even plundered vessels within sight of British crews, often waiting

until darkness to attack.159 In one particular instance in 1873, pirates slaughtered the

crews of two Penang junks within view of HMS Avon and even managed to escape.

Governor Clarke realized that he needed more naval forces to fight the sea-raiders, but

even Colonel Anson opposed direct intervention within Perak.160 Piracy proved itself as a

formidable extension of Ghee Hin power that British forces found difficult to eliminate.

Breaking the power of the Ghee Hin pirates would restore the peaceful traders to sail

safely through the Straits of Melaka.

158 Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 113-118.159

? Swettenham, British Malaya, 125, 126.160

? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 179.

91

The destruction of the stockades guarding the Larut River proved most difficult,

but was important for the destruction of the Ghee Hin’s power in Malaya. The boats of

HMS Midge came under fire from Ghee Hin pirates in the Larut River’s estuary, resulting

in a battle that injured half the boats’ crews while wounding two officers seriously

without the capture of any pirate vessels. The British gunboats successfully destroyed the

stockade and multiple junks. In response, the Ghee Hin faction assaulted various British

police stations and destroyed the mantri’s house during the night.161 Even during the

1870s, pirates proved themselves worth adversaries of the Royal Navy through clever use

of the surrounding waters. The power that secret societies possessed came under attack

directly through naval actions because of their threat to peaceful trade and British power.

The nature of piracy and raiding made naval force a limited solution to the

political challenges for British authorities. The destruction of Malay vessels during the

attack on Galang symbolized the fate for many of the orang laut forced from their

maritime traditions in the name of counter-piracy. The reduction of piracy by force and

the increased competition from Chinese, Indian, European, and Arab traders placed the

native traders in decline. Changes in technology made native seafarers less competitive

against the steamships that traveled against the wind with remarkable speed. The orang

laut witnessed the decline of their role in the maritime world during the 19th century,

which forced changes in their way-of-life perhaps previously unimaginable.162 Naval

power was the most overt form of counter-piracy used by the British Empire and the

destruction wrought by the Royal Navy and the East India Company was only one part of

161 Swettenham, British Malaya, 126.162

? Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 135-136.

92

an imperial system bent on destroying sea-raiding and bases of power unfriendly to

British interests.

4.3 Imperial Technology: Industrial Age Equipment and Policy

British administrators brought in new technology to the Malay Peninsula to

increase their power in the region, because industrial technology brought key advantages

to British forces over Malay and Chinese forces. By 1837, steamships provided

firepower in an effective manner that previous more traditional warships failed to

accomplish. Previously, pirates attacked trading vessels within sight of the British

warships without recourse. Steam-powered vessels attacked and destroyed raider

strongholds throughout the Malay world, proving more effective than a number of wind-

powered sloops-of-war despite often being relatively small.163 Steam launches in

particular supported the British colonial effort in the Straits Settlements, providing

valuable services including transportation for various purposes. The steam launches

proved themselves as multipurpose vessels for supplying lighthouses, maintaining

beacons, and surveying bodies of water for the purpose of maintaining a British

presence.164 Steam-powered vessels gave British naval forces a huge advantage over

native prahus, permitting warships to sail against the wind without an entire deck of

oarsmen who constantly needed water and food. Steam-power also provided services for

civil functions necessary for the maintenance of the state and commerce.

Improvements in communications technology permitted imperial authorities to

suppress unwanted activities. Before the advent of the telegraph, Singapore and Penang

communicated via maritime vessels that took some time to deliver and varied with sea

163 Mills, “British Malaya,” 225-226.164

? Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 59.

93

and weather conditions. The development of the telegraph system between Singapore

and Penang in 1870 and its connection Madras a year later certainly made

communication much faster than before. Wireless communication in the 20th century

made tracking piratical actions and other illicit activities easier.165 The rapid mobilization

of British forces from India to Malaya in less than one month permitted the quick

destruction of native forces during the Perak War.166 British forces displayed the

effectiveness of communication and steam transportation technologies with the quick

deployment of military might, which would not have been possible without the new

technologies.

Navigation equipment potentially disrupted piracy by allowing authorities to

better see into the darkness and enforce laws. Aside from guiding vessels through the

Straits of Melaka safely during the night, lighthouses provided a means for the authorities

to look out for piracy and smuggling. Other navigational equipment such as buoys and

beacons illuminated the straits as tools for both navigation and state control.

Watchtowers along the coast provided the colonial authorities with a means to observe

vessels and report misbehavior.167 The navigational tools provided Great Britain with

additional power at sea by permitting foreign traders to safely navigate treacherous

waters without fully knowing the straits. Away from the main ports and their garrisons,

lighthouses were static and vulnerable to assault, but their presences at strategically

important locations were prominent reminders to people of Great Britain’s power. The

lighthouses in particular acted as symbols of the British presence, permitting the

165 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 78-80.166

? Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 68.167

? Tagliacozzo, , Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 82-84.

94

enforcement of British laws and a degree of control by illuminating the darkness used for

hiding actions deemed illicit by British authorities.

4.4 British and Selangor Judicial Machinery: The Courts and the

‘Suppression of Piracy’ through Legal Processes

The British legal system prevented the unjust detainment of individuals suspected

of committing crimes and therefore government officials did not possess the right to

arbitrarily arrest people or detain property. The legal system processed suspects based on

the merits of each case rather than on mere accusation in theory, but the legal system of

the Straits Settlements initially made trials for suspected pirates difficult. Lawmakers

and politicians reformed the local judicial system to better process and convict suspected

pirates to reduce the overall crime within and around the colony. The British legal

system showed that the state took serious offense to piratical actions as an extension of

the British Empire. The lines between judicial and political were not always clear in

cases of piracy because politicians used the judicial system to weaken their political

opponents and convince native Malays, particularly rulers that they best side with the

British authorities in disputes. Politically slanted policies weakened the impartiality of

the legal systems in Malaya but weakened the bonds between political rulers and

marauders.

British authorities sided with politicians deemed friendliest to their goals in

Malaya rather than creating a justice system that prosecuted any individual suspected of

harboring pirates. Throughout the Selangor Civil War both factions participated in

piratical acts including the forces of Tengku Kudin, who ultimately won the war with

military assistance from neighboring Pahang.168 British authorities did not side with

168 Parkinson, British Intervention in Malaya, 57, 71.

95

Kudin because he was innocent of supporting pirates, but rather because he was friendlier

to British interest and needed outside support to hold his gains in Selangor. The Straits

Settlements administrators were pragmatic in their war against piracy because finding

pirates and limiting their impact required the assistance of native leaders. Suppressing

piracy within the principles of equality in any justice system was simply unrealistic

because pirates hid throughout the west coast of Malaya often with the support of native

rulers. The Straits Settlements required the support of the local states to weaken the

impact of the marauders, while the implementation of a judiciary became a tool to deter

piracy.

The inadequacies of the Straits Settlements judicial system for admiralty cases

particularly in cases of piracy made enforcement of admiralty laws difficult to prosecute.

The merchants of Singapore throughout 1835 petitioned the Indian government and

Parliament to deal with the suspected pirates. Although piracy affected European

shipping substantially less than the devastated native shipping, Singapore needed the

native traders to an extent for its prosperity. Singaporean petitioners with the support of

Governor Bonham of the Straits Settlements requested the permission of the local courts

to prosecute suspected pirates. The older system required the authorities to ship the

suspected pirates and the witnesses to Kolkata for an Admiralty trial, which too often was

beyond the capacity of the local governments. Even if the suspected pirates arrived in

court across the Bay of Bengal, the prosecution had difficulty receiving convictions with

a lack of evidence because many of the witnesses refused to travel such a long distance to

court. The Straits Settlements finally received its own Admiralty courts through act of

Parliament in 1837.169 The presence of an effective judiciary permitted greater

169 Mills, “British Malaya,” 231-232.

96

prosecution by the government of suspected pirates, making conviction rates higher

because more witnesses spoke in court. Admiralty jurisdiction brought more seafarers

effectively under British legal influence after 1837 for the Straits Settlements because

trials became much easier for the prosecution. Witnesses to piracy in the Straits of

Melaka and the South China Sea found traveling to Straits Settlements courts much easier

than sailing to Kolkata to testify, which made convictions much easier.

4.41 The Straits Settlements Legal System and Piracy

British authorities in the Straits Settlements wrote laws that made it more difficult

to conduct piratical operations, particularly aimed at suspected Chinese pirates using

Singapore as their homeport but local officials had great difficulty in receiving

permission to enact rather draconian laws. As already mentioned, the Chinese

community adeptly defended themselves against accusations of piracy despite reports of

Chinese junks illegally seizing other vessels. Reports of Chinese piracy up and down the

coast persuaded Governor Blundell of the Straits Settlements to pursue a more aggressive

policy against them. Blundell wanted more authority from the Indian government in

regard to the search and seizure of suspected pirates at sea, but his requests were

unacceptable because its enforcement would breach international law. The governor

permitted government officials to board vessels and detain suspected pirate vessels for six

months without evidence of piracy in 1854. Though the orders gave much power to

officials within the harbor, Blundell wanted even more power to defeat the pirates at

sea.170 The effort to weaken and destroy pirates in the Straits of Melaka and the South

China Sea required stronger legal measures by various governments. The Straits

170 Edmonstone to Blundell, February 28, 1856, East India Company and India Board’s Collections 189619, 48, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 224-225; Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 224-225.

97

Settlements government possessed a large number or restrictions on its aims to eliminate

piracy because of constraints set by the Indian government and international law.

The Straits Settlements required stronger anti-piracy laws to scale down the native

and Chinese piratical acts to strengthen the British presence while building their vision of

commerce in the region. In 1856 officials discovered four Chinese junks heavily armed

for combat, giving reason for temporary detention. British officials dismounted the guns

of the vessels, leaving five or six guns mounted for defensive purposes while placing the

excessive dismounted guns below decks. The British officials released the four junks to

go about their business without meeting legal or physical opposition from the owners for

the temporary seizure of questionable legality.171 The laws permitting the detention of

excessively armed merchant vessels passed in May 1857, but British lawmakers

minimized the legal hassles to merchants to avoid risking loss of trade in Singapore to

other ports in the region.172 The laws in Singapore made obtaining excessive amounts of

arms more difficult while maintaining liberal economic policies to keep Singapore

competitive as the major shipping hub in the region. The merchant community of

Singapore showed willingness to accept anti-piracy laws to an extent that did not severely

interfere with regular business, making a political alliance more feasible between British

officials in Singapore and the merchant community composed of Europeans and Chinese.

British laws targeted the pirates’ support in British-held Singapore as part of a

strategy to break marauders away from their political and economic support. Police

enforced laws to weaken the power of the Chinese secret societies and piratical

171

? Blundell to Secretary, May 27, 1856, East India Company and India Board’s Collections 189619, 50, quoted in Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 225-226.172

? Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 225-228.

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marauders. The “Ordinance for the Suppression of Piracy 1866” permitted greater

punishments for the suppliers of pirates and for the purchasers of goods stolen by pirates.

The ordinance increased the cost of victuals for pirates while selling pirated loot became

more difficult.173 Singapore’s police stations existed along the coasts initially and spread

later to the island’s interior to enforce laws particularly regarding pirates and secret

societies. Eventually British authorities placed hundreds of streetlamps by the docks to

assist police prevent illegal actions there.174 Authorities in the Straits Settlements focused

on the elimination of support of pirates to break their power and convince them to work

within the sphere of British legality. The development of ordinances and infrastructure

increased the challenges for pirates convincing a significant number to cease piratical acts

revealing the increasing strength of British authorities.

4.42 The Prosecution of Piracy within the Native States

Piracy occurring outside of British jurisdiction presented legal problems for its

administrators who possessed no right to prosecute suspected perpetrators. In November

1873, pirates seized a Chinese vessel from Melaka off the Jurga River near the sultan’s

residence in Kuala Langat, Selangor. Piracy became such a problem that crews found

supplying the North Sands lightship difficult.175 Other attacks included the seizure of

vessel on December 3, 1873 and an assault on the Cape Rachado Lighthouse in January

1874. Governor Sir Andrew Clarke headed to Kuala Langat with six Royal Navy

warships as support to demand justice for the recent piratical attacks.176 The raids

emanated from the domain of Sultan Abdul Samad of Selangor, who previously agreed

173 Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 102.174

? Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 62-64.175

? Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 189-190.176 Tate, The Making of Modern South-East Asia, 288, 304.

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not to harbor pirates. Clarke wished the imposition of British ideals of the era regarding

piracy by cutting the ties between the state and the sea-raiders. British administrators

pressured sovereign states to prosecute suspects within their own legal system despite the

dubious credibility of native trials.

The piracy trials at Kuala Langat in 1874 symbolized the imposition of British

power over the sultan came through an attempt of bringing suspected pirates to justice.

Aside from the overwhelming firepower from warships bearing down upon the sultan, the

threat to his power became particularly obvious because the most important prosecutor.

People generally believed that the sultan’s son organized the raid while receiving the

protection of the sultan and who responded when learning of the accusation that his son

was a pirate by calling the actions “boys’ play.” The China Squadron under Sir Charles

Shadwell took Clarke to Kuala Langat and also picked up Tengku Kudin for the trial.

The sultan agreed to Clarke’s demands that the suspects be tried with Kudin and three

other chiefs as prosecutors, along with the destruction of various stockades along the

river. The accused received a lecture on the severity of disrupting the “lighthouse

system” with British representatives Macnair and J. G. Davidson, Kudin’s backer at the

trial. The sole survivor of the attack identified the trial’s defendants as the pirates

resulting in their conviction. The sultan dispatched a kris for the executions, leaving

Kudin with greater authority within Selangor.177 The trial and the executions effectively

revealed the fate of anak rajah piracy within Malaya, the British authorities showed their

new authority within the region.

177 Cowan, Nineteenth-Century Malaya, 189-191; Swettenham, British Malaya, 183; Swettenham’s description of the sultan’s reaction showed the disparity in regard for piratical actions between British and Malay authorities.

100

The trial, however, was less about justice as much as the imposition of British

authority and perspective on piracy or other trade obstructions. The trial gave Kudin

more power by showing the extent of his British backing and protected British interests

by opening up trade while protecting certain assets. The trial certainly gave Clarke an

opportunity for a show of force and weakened his Malay political opponents. Frank

Swettenham later discovered that the executed defendants were likely innocent because

the witness probably never saw the faces of the assailants during the chaos in the dark of

night of the attack. Swettenham also noted that despite the injustice regarding the

executions the general populace understood the main point of the trial, suppressing piracy

on the Selangor coast and consolidating Kudin’s power.178 Raiding was the chief

expression of antagonism against British authority in the region for decades, but the

breaking of the power of the chiefs and anak rajahs decreased organized sea-raiding

within the region.

Conclusion

The conflict with the raiders required native allies willing to assist the Straits

Settlements and therefore Great Britain’s power grew often at the expense of other native

powers, sometimes weakening opponents through military action. Nicholas Tarling

argued that Malay marauding was the political remnant to the old empires of the Malay

world and that British influence in the region came about through the suppression of

suspected pirates, along with Great Britain being the greatest power in the region.179 The

complications of native Malay politics made distinctions between various factions

difficult for foreigners to fully comprehend because of its decentralized nature. The

178

? Swettenham, British Malaya, 183-184.179 Tarling, Piracy and Politics, 19, 20.

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Temenggong of Johor assisted British forces weaken piracy particularly from 1843 to

1848 thus earning the support of Straits Settlements Governor Butterworth. Malay

pirates rarely attacked large European vessels, doing so usually in calm weather or

sneaking aboard while in harbor, but an overwhelming majority of vessels composed of

native victims.180 Great Britain employed a variety of means, not just military, to ensure

safe trade throughout the Straits of Melaka regardless of the nationality or ethnicity of the

traders. While protecting peaceful traders while weakening the inhibitors of trade such as

pirates, raiders, and local chiefs imposed the contemporary British ideals regarding trade

and politics, while making various alliances with anglophile chiefs to support their own

influence.

The Malay sea-raiders gave the native rulers the farthest reach of power over any

other of their assets, posing the greatest threat to the security of the British colonies and

their trade. Breaking the power of the sea-raiders was the first step for British authorities

to gain considerable influence with local rulers who usually relied on the support of local

chiefs. The European and Chinese merchants of Singapore led the demands for

intervention in Malay politics particularly by the 1870s.181 Piracy prompted further

involvement by British authorities. For instance, a piratical incident in July 1874 resulted

in Swettenham advising Sultan Abdul Samad by August. The relationship between the

sultan and Swettenham went well enough that the sultan paid $1,000 a month for

Swettenham’s expenses, while allowing Swettenham to manage import and export

180

? Mills, “British Malaya,” 214, 221, 223.181

? One estimate by Chinese merchants placed losses to piracy at 2% of the total trade or $15,000 to $20,000 a year, but the actual losses were probably much higher. One incident of piracy of a sampan resulted in a loss of cargo worth $10,000. The underestimation was likely to hide the true costs of piracy to avoid paying higher taxes to British authorities. Anderson, “Piracy in the Eastern Seas,” 94-95.

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duties.182 Despite the stronger relationship with the native rulers, piracy continued around

Singapore with attacks in 1884 and 1909,183 but piracy no longer posed the threat as it did

earlier in the 19th century because the British counter-piracy and opposition to raiding

proved effective. British authorities broke the power of the indigenous chiefs and

weakened the Chinese secret societies through conducting anti-piracy operations making

Great Britain the most powerful political force in Malaya.

Great Britain employed a variety of military and non-military strategies for the

‘suppression of piracy’ in the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea. The military

strategies relied heavily on the Royal Navy and private flotillas to patrol sea lanes and

attack suspected pirate havens. Technology gave Great Britain a large advantage over the

sea-raiders through faster deployments and various tactical advantages. Although British

campaigns often dispersed marauders, completely destroying them was virtually

impossible because large numbers usually slipped away into the cover of trees or in a

maze of estuaries. British authorities employed political, economic, and judicial

strategies to protect the interests of British subjects. Employing the resident system,

British authorities centralized the native Malay political system by taking power away

from the chiefs and placing it in nominal hands of the sultan but the administration really

fell to British administrators. More control of the coastland made piracy more difficult

because the leadership no longer supported it in any significance. Economic

development through tin mining, infrastructure projects, and non-indigenous agricultural

goods such as rubber shifted attention away from marauding as an income for many

living in Malaya. The development of an education system demilitarized the youth of 182

? Wythe, The Impact of Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya, 172-173, 188.183

? Mills, “British Malaya,” 234-235.

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Malaya and imbued them with sympathy toward Great Britain. Legal systems within

Malaya became more effective in convicting suspected pirates, deterring others from

partaking in raids. The strategies employed by British authorities weakened the power

and impact of the sea-raiders of the Malay Peninsula.

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Conclusion

In the time since the end of 19th century few historians wrote about the sea-raiders

of Malaya for the sake of better understanding them in a socio-economic context because

the sea-raiders themselves left few known historical records regarding their profession.

Instead, more historians focused on the attempted eradication of piracy within the Straits

of Melaka and the South China Sea by British, Dutch, French, and Spanish authorities

during the 19th century. Historians wrote generally about the sea-raiders of Malaya in the

context of the increased role of Europeans throughout Southeast Asia as imperial powers.

Sea-raiding as a profession was important to the history of Southeast Asia and Europe

colonialism because sea-power was a critical component of political power and economic

wealth. Malaya’s inhabitants of lesser means employed sea-raiding as a survival

technique that revealed an important aspect of their lives as perpetrators, while victims

lost their lives or freedom as slaves in some faraway land.

A variety of factors contributed to the prevalence of sea-raiding during the 19th

century around the Malay Peninsula stemming from often uncooperative and

decentralized authorities, a largely maritime economy, along with a tradition of maritime

raiding. Raiding at sea became particularly prevalent during years of warfare when

commerce stalled and people found their way-of-life threatened with destruction.

Although natural disasters pushed individuals toward sea-raiding, the flexibility of Malay

society absorbed the shock to an extent that did not make sea-raiding inevitable. War and

internal conflict contributed more to the danger for fishing and merchant vessels more

than any single natural factor. The sea-raiders came from a variety of backgrounds from

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throughout society including humble fishermen, maritime traders, and retainers of the

sultan.

The sea-raiders acted as the first line of defense against the onslaught of western

imperialism by challenging directly their power and indirectly through attacking Asian

traders who traded in the Straits Settlements. The defense may not have been conscious

because the sea-raiders were often primarily businessmen, but the native Malay state also

deployed raiders for naval patrols and tax collectors. Early raids on British settlements

revealed the vulnerability of the settlements to local sea-raiders because a lack of

adequate defenses and the sheer number of raiders. Piracy and state-sponsored sea-

raiding threatened the Straits Settlements during its early years by siphoning away the

maritime trade the colonies needed to survive. The sea became the most disputed space

between the sea-raiders and the British authorities in the early years of the British

presence in Malaya.

The attributes of the native political system contributed to piracy while making

commerce more difficult for the merchants and financiers of the Straits Settlements. To

increase exports from Malaya, British authorities weakened the power of the chiefs to

sever the connections between the chiefs and the sea-raiders. Required payment of

arbitrary tolls and other taxes set by chiefs from one fiefdom to the next made developing

industrial infrastructure for large-scale exports extremely difficult. Furthermore,

intermittent internal struggles between various factions throughout Malaya in part caused

by disputes over tin revenue made internal and external trade more difficult and less

profitable. Raiders as agents of the native state or other factions attacked vessels in

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contradiction to the interests of the Straits Settlements because of decreased trade and

increased shipping costs suffered by the colony.

The development of a two-part counter-piracy strategy included the suppression

of suspected pirates by military force and the weakening of pirates through non-military

means. The Royal Navy and the counter-piracy navies of the Straits Settlements attacked

suspected pirates and their vessels. Squadrons attacked the suspected operating bases of

sea-raiders, conducted sea patrols, and defended British interests. British authorities

weakened the Malays’ sea-power through the destruction of their maritime vessels at the

guns of the Royal Navy and private navies loyal to the Straits Settlements. The

devastation of the Malay maritime society through British armed forces was insufficient

to break the power of the native and Chinese sea-raiders, because the abundant numbers

of seafarers possessed enough vessels and equipment for the continuation of sea-raiding.

Sea-raiders had plenty of places to hide from the patrols of British warships throughout

Malaya. Therefore, the British authorities needed a nonmilitary solution to break the

power of the sea-raiders.

The development of civil infrastructure and other economic projects enhanced

the power of the colonial government making piracy more difficult. The political and

economic development on the mainland potentially dissuaded those contemplating piracy

to find work in a different profession. The growing economy of Malaya through the

development of the mining and agriculture industries made investing in more peaceful

enterprises more rewarding and less-risky than sea-raiding. The importation of seeds to

Malaya for agricultural development in plantations by colonial authorities eventually

became important to the accumulation of wealth in Malaya. The rubber and palm oil

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industries drew labor from other industries and locations while giving immense returns

on investment. The colonial government encouraged economic growth in Malaya

through a variety of successful programs making sea-raiding a much less relevant

industry by the 20th century.

British-Malay public education brought more people in Malaya under British

influence. British policy placed particular attention toward educating the children of the

elite to be sympathetic to Great Britain through an education system, which eventually

taught them the English language. The public education system taught Malays English

Industrial Age values to become more productive members of a colonial society without

learning too much to become troublesome to British authorities. The values emphasized

increased economic growth while maintaining the social structure of Malaya despite its

inherent contradictions. The schools reinforced loyalty to the colonial system while

placing control over the students’ lives dissuading them from violence including a life of

sea-raiding.

British authorities pressured native Malay rulers to end support for sea-raiders and

punish them when caught. British officials signed treaties with Malay rulers sometimes

within sight of a British warship forbidding the support of piracy or the harboring of

pirates. Close relationships between the Straits Settlements and some Malay states such

as Johor and Pahang prior to an official annexation by Great Britain convinced the states

to deny safe haven to sea-raiders. Straits Settlements officials and investors backed

Malay leaders friendly to foreign investment and British authority in Malaya. Diplomacy

and political pressure convinced leaders of Malay states to end their support for sea-

raiding to avoid the displeasure of British authorities.

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The development of an English-style legal system weakened the impact of the

sea-raiders while maintaining good relations with the merchant community through the

perception of fairness and equality under the law. The Straits Settlements legal system

separated the activities of sea-raiders from merchants of Singapore who supplied the

piratical voyages. The implementation of a legal system assured merchants of the

protection their property from sea-raiders without the infringement upon their rights.

Failure to respect the merchants might send their business elsewhere in the region and

therefore the Straits Settlements needed a relatively fair legal system for the separation of

sea-raiders and peaceful businessmen. The success of the Straits Settlements legal

system increased the costs of sea-raiding, which decreased the seafarers’ and merchants’

participation in sea-raiding.

Great Britain’s use of military force, civic reform, and economic growth reduced

the impact of piracy and sea-raiding on the Straits of Melaka and the South China Sea.

The erosion of sea-raiding as an institution among other events broke the power of the

native chiefs who once possessed great control over their people and land. Their

traditions were incompatible with 19th century British ideals regarding trade and politics,

which made the breaking of the chiefs’ power necessary before further significant

investment. Sea-raiding was an important expression of the chiefs’ power because it was

an important source of income. British authorities saw all sea-raiders as pirates, who

threatened the interests of Great Britain in the region. The strategy to weaken the sea-

raiders required the assistance of reliable Malay chiefs who opposed sea-raiding, but the

strategy required the compliance of many Malay leaders along the straits rather than a

few. Therefore the weakening of sea-raiders required decades of combat operations,

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negotiations with local leaders, economic development, and institution building by

British authorities.

The extent of sea-raiding decreased during periods of leadership and cooperation

but sea-raiders never fully disappeared during years of effective authority. Decentralized

political systems with little or no cooperation placed little check on marauders. Future

studies could investigate the effect of the relationship between the indigenous rulers of

Malaya and the merchants or their relationship with the orang laut. Studies could also

examine the impact of British colonialism on the maritime cultures of Malaya in great

depth. Malaya possessed a tradition of the sea-raiding that considered it an honorable

profession. Many societies in the region required seafaring skills of many of its

inhabitants, which provided the labor for increases of sea-raiding, whereas wars and

leadership disputes provided the spark for periods of rampant piracy and sea-raiding.

British authorities severely weakened the sea-raiders not only through destroying them at

sea, but also by controlling the land from which pirates operated often through non-

military means.

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Glossary:

anak rajah: child descendants of sultan; younger members of ruling class

apilans: wooden bulwarks on Malay vessels to provide cover from projectiles

bendahara: chancellor; prime minister; a high degree of independent power [Sanskrit]

dato: chief; lord; not related to nobility

drakha: treason; punishable by death

kampong: basic administrative unit; large house; compound [Malay]

kakap: a Malay skiff with one mast

kerah: mandatory labor for commoners

kris: sword found in Malaya; prized possession of its owner [Malay and Javanese]

laksamana: admiral; in charge of the fleet; important minister in sultan-era Melaka

maharaja lela: military general [Sanskrit]

mandulika: governor; sent tribute to the sultan

mantri: adviser; secretary of state; administrator for executive [Malay]

nakhoda: master of a vessel; supercargo; owner or owners’ representative [Malay]

orang kaya besar: treasurer [Malay]

orang laut: sea people; resided in Riau archipelago in the southern Straits of Melaka

paduakan: a relatively large single mast Malay vessel

penghulu: basic administrator; headman; ancient position of leadership [Malay]

penghulu bendahari: secretary for the sultan

penjajap: a long sailing vessel with two masts

perompak: pirate; someone acting without consent of sultan

prahus: Malay sailing vessel; also spelled proa, perahus, prahu [Malay]

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rajah: ruler; leader [Sanskrit]

raoyat: commoner; possessed few rights by 19th century [Sanskrit]

rajah muda: heir apparent; required consent of chiefs before becoming sultan

sampan: Asian boat often used for fishing

shahbandar: harbormaster; important minister in sultan-era Melaka [Persian]

sultan: leader of the state; king; emerged with adaptation of Islam

temenggong: chief of police; chief judge; maintained peace and order [Malay]

tengku: prince; used for Malay royalty

yang-di-pertuan besar: leader of the confederacy of Negri Sembilan

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