sea power and maritime affairs lesson 12: naval strategy and national policy, 1919-1941

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Sea Power and Maritime Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

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Page 1: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Sea Power and Maritime AffairsSea Power and Maritime Affairs

Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy,

1919-1941

                                             

Page 2: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

So there I was…So there I was…

Page 3: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Monkey Watch, Gibraltar 2003Monkey Watch, Gibraltar 2003

Page 4: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Monkey Watch, Gibraltar 2003Monkey Watch, Gibraltar 2003

Page 5: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Learning ObjectivesLearning Objectives Comprehend the principal points of controversy among the

great powers at Versailles and the main shortcomings of the treaty finally produced.

Know the reasons for the U.S. not joining the League of Nations and the reasons for the League’s ultimate failure to keep the peace.

Know the results of the naval treaties resulting from the Washington Naval Conference and the subsequent changes in naval technology and strategy.

Comprehend the ways in which changes in American society affected foreign policy and the development and employment of the U.S. Navy during this period.

Page 6: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

German High Seas FleetGerman High Seas Fleet Armistice of 11 November 1918:

– High Seas Fleet undefeated in battle.

– Germany must surrender most of its ships to Allies.

High Seas Fleet interned at Scapa Flow. Fleet scuttled by German naval officers on 21 June 1919

due to fear of resumption of war.– During negotiations of Treaty of Versailles.

Great Britain and France require Germany to relinquish control of the rest of its Navy.

Page 7: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

German Battleship German Battleship BayernBayernScuttled at Scapa Flow Scuttled at Scapa Flow

- 21 June 1919- 21 June 1919

Page 8: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

German Battle Cruiser German Battle Cruiser HindenburgHindenburgScuttled at Scapa FlowScuttled at Scapa Flow

Page 9: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941
Page 10: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Treaty of Versailles -- 1919Treaty of Versailles -- 1919

U.S. President Woodrow Wilson– Attempts to use U.S. power to ensure peace in Europe.

Germany– Forced to follow military limitations and pay reparations.

Wilson's “Fourteen Points”– Second Point

Freedom of the seas and illegality of blockades. British opposition.

– Self-Determination for European peoples.– League of Nations: Republican U.S. Senate rejects due to

isolationist sentiments.

Page 11: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

The British Royal NavyThe British Royal Navy

Several desires for the Royal Navy:– Maintain naval predominance in the face of the challenge

from the U.S. Navy.

– Avoid a naval construction race with the U.S. Navy.

– Destruction of the German High Seas Fleet.

Opposed Wilson's principle of freedom of the seas.– Advantage of dominant fleet would be relinquished.

Attempted to deter the U.S. from adopting a large building program.

Page 12: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

The Japanese Imperial NavyThe Japanese Imperial Navy

Seized German Pacific possessions early in WW I.– Island groups in central Pacific.

– Chinese port facilities.

Engaged in a major naval building program. – Designed to give Japan naval dominance in the western

Pacific to protect expansion.

Cannot afford an arms race with U.S.– Insufficient resources and capabilities.

Page 13: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

The U.S. NavyThe U.S. Navy Woodrow Wilson

– Opposes British rejection of Second of the Fourteen Points. Major naval building program begins - 1919.

– Naval Act of 1916 continued and expanded.– Emphasis back on capital ships.– Need for a large fleet to protect both coasts.– Construction planned to rival and eclipse the Royal Navy.

American people seek a “Return to Normalcy”. – Do not support a Navy “second to none”.– Republican Congress supports disarmament.– Republican President Warren G. Harding elected in 1920.

Wilson’s building program disapproved.

Page 14: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Washington Naval Conference -- 1921-22Washington Naval Conference -- 1921-22

Issues for U.S.– Security of possessions in the Pacific.

Dislike of Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. (Potential threat to U.S. interests in the Far East)

– End to the naval arms race. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes

– Dramatic proposal for disarmament: Immediate 10-year “Holiday” on construction of new capital ships. Scrapping of ships already commissioned.

– Designed for appeasement of Congress.(Determined to cut military spending after WW I)

Page 15: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Washington Naval ConferenceWashington Naval Conference

Page 16: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Five Power Naval Limitation TreatyFive Power Naval Limitation Treaty U.S., Britain, Japan,

France, Italy Capital ship tonnage ratio

of 5-5-3-1.7-1.7 Limits on displacement

and caliber of guns on capital ships.

No limit to cruisers, destroyers, submarines

Non-fortification of Pacific possessions.

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Page 17: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Effects of the Five Power TreatyEffects of the Five Power Treaty

Page 18: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Effects of the Five Power TreatyEffects of the Five Power Treaty

Page 19: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Other TreatiesOther Treaties Four-Power Pact

– U.S., Great Britain, Japan, and France.– Terminates the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902.– Respect Far Eastern possessions of other countries.– Mutual consultation in crisis.

Nine-Power Treaty– U.S., Great Britain, Japan, France, Italy, China, Belgium,

the Netherlands, and Portugal.– Guarantees “Open Door” in China.

Freedom of trade for all countries.

Page 20: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Treaty Implications to U.S.Treaty Implications to U.S. Negative

– Japanese angered by limits on their expansion.– Smaller classes of ships not included.– Did not recognize that U.S. and Great Britain were no longer

rivals.

Positive– Ensure “Open Door” in China.– Naval limitations realistically accepted congressional budget

limitations.– U.S. Navy able to develop new technology.

Page 21: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Technological ImprovementsTechnological Improvements Battleship Backbone of the Fleet- very Mahanian! Conversion from coal to oil fuel source for engines:

– Underway replenishment much easier to accomplish. Aircraft carriers: Attack and fighter aircraft developed.

– Slow integration into the fleet. Army General Billy Mitchell: Navies are obsolete. Carriers still seen as support for battleships. Lexington and Saratoga - Converted battle cruisers. Ranger - 1934 - First carrier built from the keel up.

Modern radio communications. Submarines - Ability to fire torpedoes submerged. Aluminum and plastic reduce weight and increase speed.

Page 22: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Collier Conversion Aircraft Carrier

Page 23: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

USS USS LangleyLangley (CV 1) (CV 1)- First U.S. Navy aircraft carrier.

Page 24: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

General John A. LejeuneGeneral John A. LejeuneCommandant of the Marine Corps

1920-1929

Page 25: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

U.S. Amphibious DoctrineU.S. Amphibious Doctrine Focus on Japanese-controlled island groups in the Pacific. Major Earl H. “Pete” Ellis, USMC:

– Assigned by General Lejeune to develop plans for Marine operations in support of War Plan Orange.

– “Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia” approved 1921. Necessary to seize and defend advanced naval bases. Need the ability to perform opposed amphibious assaults.

– Special landing craft and heavy weapons needed. Incorporated lessons from Gallipoli on proper planning.

– Ellis is killed on Palau in 1923 while studying islands. General Lejeune:

– Marine Corps exists to perform missions with the fleet.

Page 26: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Geneva Conference of 1927Geneva Conference of 1927

U.S. hopes to extend 5-5-3 ratio to cruisers.

Different types of ships:

– U.S. -- fewer, bigger cruisers.

– Britain -- more, smaller cruisers.

Britain, France and Japan oppose limits.

No agreement is reached.

Page 27: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

London Conference of 1930London Conference of 1930

Cruisers reclassified:– Heavy > 6.1” guns.– Light < 6.1” guns.

U.S., Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. Results:

– U.S.-British parity in all types of vessels.– Increased Japanese ratio in cruisers and destroyers to 10:10:7.– Japanese parity in submarines.– France and Italy do not participate.– Ban on new capital ships extended until 1936.

Page 28: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Fascism in EuropeFascism in Europe

Mussolini - “Il Duce”: 1922– Invasion of Ethiopia - 1935

Hitler - “Fuhrer”: Chancellor of Germany - 1933– Nazi Third Reich replaces Weimar Republic.– Promise of German economic recovery.– Beginnings of the Holocaust.– German rearmament begins.

Spanish Civil War - 1930’s– Generalissimo Francisco Franco supported by fascists.

Agreement permits Germany to rebuild Navy - 1935. Remilitarization of the Rhineland - 1936

– German rejection of the Treaty of Versailles.

Page 29: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

FascismFascismGeneral traits:

– Rejection of individualism.– Rejection of representative government.– Idealization of war.– Disallowance of the class struggle (anti-communist).– Unity and indivisibility of the nation.– Military build-up.– Territorial expansion.

Rome-Berlin Axis - 1936Tripartite Pact: Germany, Italy, Japan - 1940

– Mutual support if one party is attacked by a power not already involved -- Soviet Union.

Page 30: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

““Il Duce”Il Duce”Benito Mussolini

Page 31: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Adolf HitlerAdolf Hitler“Fuhrer”

Page 32: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

RomeRome

Berlin Berlin

Page 33: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941
Page 34: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Japanese ImperialismJapanese Imperialism

Expansion - Natural Resources– Formosa (Taiwan) - Annexed: 1895– Korea- Protectorate: 1905, Annexed: 1910– Invasion of Manchuria – 1931

Non-recognition” doctrine-President Hoover Beginning of Japanese expansion into China,

leading to WWII

Page 35: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

HirohitoHirohitoEmperor of Japan

World War II

Page 36: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941
Page 37: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Other ConferencesOther Conferences Geneva Conference of 1932

– Complete failure.– Japan resists.

Invasion of Manchuria.

– France resists. Hitler and Nazi party emerging in Germany.

Second London Naval Conference of 1936– Britain already allows Germany 35% of tonnage and parity in

submarines - 1935 agreement.– Mild limitations on size of naval craft proposed.– Italy and Japan do not sign.– Effective end of naval limitations.

Page 38: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Depression and the U.S. NavyDepression and the U.S. Navy Strong support of isolationism in U.S. public and Congress. Neutrality Acts 1935-37

– Renounce U.S. neutral rights: (1812, 1917) 1935: Sale or transport of munitions prohibited. 1936: Loans prohibited. 1937: “Cash and carry” policy enforce. 1939: Embargo lifted, but President can prohibit American

ships from entering “danger zones”.

1936 U.S. budget cuts - Reductions in naval spending. Japanese Imperial Navy -- Large build-up begins in 1936.

– Stress on importance of aircraft carriers to the fleet.

Page 39: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

War Plan Orange – Rainbow PlansWar Plan Orange – Rainbow Plans Scenario: U.S. and Japan at war in the Pacific.

– Attempt to hold Philippines.– Build up naval forces in Hawaii.– Offensive across the Pacific.

Amphibious operations to seize advanced naval bases.

– Defeat Japanese Navy in a fleet engagement. Recapture Philippines.

– Threaten Japanese “Home Islands” with naval forces. Open Door -- Maintain territorial integrity of China. Guam and Philippines -- remain relatively unfortified.

– 1922 Five Power Naval Limitation Treaty Japanese Islands: Marshalls, Marianas, and Carolines.

Page 40: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

U.S. FleetU.S. FleetMajority of U.S. Fleet based in the Pacific.

– Pacific Fleet moves to Pearl Harbor - 1940

Battleships - Capital ships of the fleet.Aircraft Carriers - Fleet Exercises demonstrate potential.

– USS Lexington (CV 2)– USS Saratoga (CV 3)– USS Ranger (CV 4)– USS Yorktown (CV 5)– USS Enterprise (CV 6)– USS Wasp (CV 7)– USS Hornet (CV 8)

Submarines

Page 41: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Japanese Imperialism in AsiaJapanese Imperialism in Asia Undeclared War with China - 1937

– “Shanghai Incident” – USS Panay sunk on Yangtze River.– Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung.– Occupation of French Indochina - 1940

Embargo of oil and other natural resources - July 1941.– U.S., Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

General Tojo: Military government installed - October 1941.

Page 42: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

USS USS Panay Panay IncidentIncidentYangtze River Patrol, ChinaSunk by Japanese naval aircraft on 12 December

1937.

Page 43: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

U.S. OptionsU.S. Options

Military interventionEconomic sanctionsJoint military and economic moves with

BritainIndirect response

Page 44: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

U.S. ResponseU.S. Response

FDR’s quarantine speech called for “positive endeavors to preserve peace.”– Not effective:lack of popular support– Did not impose Neutrality Act

Hurt China more than Japan

– No joint action with Britain: disagreements– Indirect response:

1938 Naval Expansion Act-ships not avail until 40-41 Lesson: A COUNTRY CANNOT EXERT FORCE WITHOUT

THE MILITARY FORCE TO BACK IT UP!

Page 45: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Force Level of U.S. Fleet 1937Force Level of U.S. Fleet 1937

Manning– Navy officers and enlisted: 113,617– Marine officers and enlisted: 18, 223

Fleet Battleships: 15 Aircraft Carriers: 3 Heavy cruisers: 17 Light cruisers 10 Destroyers: 196 (162 overage) Subs: 81 (50 overage)

Page 46: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Force Level of U.S. Fleet 1937Force Level of U.S. Fleet 1937

Strategic disposition Pacific Coast: Main U.S. battle fleet at Pearl Atlantic: Training squadron Asia: Asiatic fleet 2-CAs, 13-DDs, 6-SS, 10

gunboats Panama: Service squadron 1-DD, 2 gunboats, 6-SS Europe: 1-CA, 2-DD

Most probable enemy: Japan– strategy, War Plan Orange

Page 47: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Retreat Toward Hemispheric DefenseRetreat Toward Hemispheric Defense

Impracticality of War Plan Orange Lack of forward bases Crisis in far east over shadowed Army-Navy conflicts European Commitments U.S. fleet divided between Atlantic and Pacific Revisions to strategic planning The Rainbow War Plans

Page 48: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Navy’s Ability to Carry out PlansNavy’s Ability to Carry out Plans

Enough capital ships Insufficient aircraft carriers Barely sufficient cruisers Submarines 40% below war strength Aircraft Landing Craft Manpower Bases Marine Corps Conclusion: Not fully prepared!!!

Page 49: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Europe’s EventsEurope’s Events

German annexation of Austria (Anschluss) - March 1938. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - August 1939

– Non-aggression treaty between Soviet Union and Germany. Munich Crisis - September 1938.

– Czechoslovakia’s German-speaking Sudetenland. Appeasement of Hitler by Western leaders. British Prime Minister Chamberlain: “Peace in our time.”

German occupation of Czechoslovakia - March 1939. Italian occupation of Albania - April 1939. Guarantee of protection of Poland: Britain and France.

– March 1939 (Also Holland and Belgium.)

Page 50: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

JosefJosefStalinStalin

Secretary General

of the

Communist Party

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics

World War II

Page 51: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

War in EuropeWar in Europe Invasion of Poland: Blitzkrieg - September 1939

– Tanks and Stuka dive bombers.– Soviet occupation of eastern Poland.

Denmark and Norway - April 1940. May 1940 - Invasion of Netherlands, Belgium, and France.

– Maginot Line proves ineffective to maneuver warfare. Battle of Britain - Summer 1940.

– Operation Sea Lion - planned German invasion of England. Soviet annexation of Baltic States: June 1940. Soviet invasion of Finland - November 1940. German invasion of Soviet Union - June 1941.

– Operation Barbarossa

Page 52: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

WinstonWinstonChurchillChurchill

Prime Minister

of

Great Britain

World War II

Page 53: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

“we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender”

Winston Churchill- June 4, 1940

Page 54: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Unterseeboote -- “U-boat”

Page 55: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

German Commerce RaidingGerman Commerce Raiding Ineffective until German invasions of Norway, Denmark, and

France.– Allows German access to Atlantic ports.

German “surface raiders” target Allied shipping.– Battle of the River Plate - December 1939

Admiral Graf Spee scuttled.

– Bismarck sunk - May 1941. U-boats

– Commanded by Admiral Karl Donitz.– HF Radio used to organize “Wolfpacks” - groups of U-boats that

attack Allied convoys.

Page 56: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Naval Action 1939-1941Naval Action 1939-1941 Royal Navy blockades Germany. German invasion of Norway - April 1940.

– Avoid Royal Navy mining of lines of communication. Dunkirk (Dunkerque) - May, June 1940

– Royal Navy evacuates 337,000 Allied soldiers from France. British destroy Vichy French fleet at Oran- July 1940. U.S. Navy Neutrality Patrols become the Atlantic Fleet.

– Admiral Ernest J. King in command.– Undeclared naval war in the Atlantic against U-boats.

Destroyers escort convoys. Anti-submarine patrol aircraft used to locate U-boats.

Page 57: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Battle of Cape MatapanBattle of Cape MatapanMarch 1941March 1941

Royal Navy escorts troop convoys to Greece.– Italian Navy attempts to intercept.– Ultra - British able to read German encrypted messages.

British Mediterranean Fleet– Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham in command.– Aircraft carriers used to attack Italian fleet.

Italian fleet defeated.– BUT German land-based air power forces British to

retreat.

Page 58: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Battle of the Atlantic - 1941Battle of the Atlantic - 1941 Britain dependent on merchant shipping for food supply.

– Importance of maintaining lines of communication between Great Britain and the U.S.

Increased number of U-boats and ease of transit to Atlantic.– “Wolfpacks” used to attack Allied convoys.– Gap in anti-submarine aircraft coverage south of Greenland.

“Happy Time” for German U-boats.– Heavy losses of Allied merchant ships 1940 - 1941.

Britain acquires more escorts and better ability to break the secret “Ultra” code used by the German armed forces.

– U.S. participates in convoy escort.

Allied losses begin to decrease in late 1941.

Page 59: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

War in Europe, Sept 1939War in Europe, Sept 1939Effects on U.S.Effects on U.S.

Neutrality Patrols Britain made facilities available: Bermuda, St. Lucia,

Trinidad Four Neutrality Act (1939)- Shift from isolationism The Deceleration of Panama New opportunities for Japan The Fall of France and isolation of Britain Rearmament: Authorize 2 ocean Navy

Page 60: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

War in Europe, Sept 1939War in Europe, Sept 1939Effects on U.S. Effects on U.S.

All aid to Britain short of War Destroyers for bases deal

– 50 overage destroyers for 99-year leases on bases in Bahamas, Jamaica and Newfoundland

Lend-Lease to Britain and Russia American Occupation of Greenland/Iceland American escort of convoy and eventual co-op in hunting

down U-boats– Torpedoing of the Greer, Kearney and Reuben James

Page 61: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

FranklinFranklinDelanoDelano

RooseveltRoosevelt

President

of the

United States

World War II

Page 62: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Preparations for war in the Preparations for war in the PacificPacific

Rainbow II U.S. fleet kept in Pearl as deterrent to Japan U.S. refuse to send forces to Singapore Shift in Strategy from Rainbow II to “Atlantic First”

– Strong offensive in Atlantic, Defensive in Pacific– Defeat Germany and Italy first, then Japan– Support Brit forces in East Indies, and defend Midway,

Johnson, Palmyra, Samoa, and Guam. – Defend Philippines as long as possible

Page 63: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Political Developments Political Developments Leading to the War in the Pacific:

– 26 Jul 1940: embargo on aviation fuel– Sept 1040: Japan joins Axis– 13 Apr 1941: Japan signs 5 year neutrality treaty with Russia– Jun 1941: Japan forces French to turn over bases in S. Indochina– 26 Jul 1941: U.S. freezes all Jap assets and cuts of oil– Oct 1941: Tojo/War party takes political control of gov’t– Japan sends “last proposals”– 26 Nov 1941: U.S. responds with demand for Jap withdrawal of China

and Indochina– 6 Dec 1941: Roosevelt personally appeals to Emp Hirohito for

withdrawl. Answered 0755 next morning: Pearl Harbor

Page 64: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Learning ObjectivesLearning Objectives Comprehend the principal points of controversy among the

great powers at Versailles and the main shortcomings of the treaty finally produced.

Know the reasons for the U.S. not joining the League of Nations and the reasons for the League’s ultimate failure to keep the peace.

Know the results of the naval treaties resulting from the Washington naval Conference and the subsequent changes in naval technology and strategy.

Comprehend the ways in which changes in American society affected foreign policy and the development and employment of the U.S. Navy during this period.

Page 65: Sea Power and Maritime Affairs Lesson 12: Naval Strategy and National Policy, 1919-1941

Discussion…Discussion…

Next time: War in the Atlantic, North Africa, and the Next time: War in the Atlantic, North Africa, and the Mediterranean, 1935-1945Mediterranean, 1935-1945