sd b3 other correspondence fdr- 4-30-04 jones day letter re staff statement 5 and saudi binladin...

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V 1 JONES D A Y I 51 LOUISIANA AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20OO1-21I3 : STEPHEX J . BROGAN TELEPHONE: 202-879-3939 L i MANAC3ING PARTNER FACSIMILE: 2O2-626-17OO WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER: , , 202-879-3926 April 30, 2004 Thomas H. Kean, Chairman National ommiss ion on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 301 7th Street, S.W. Room 5125 Washington, D C 20407 R e: Correction of Staff Statement No. 5 on Diplomacy Dear Chairman Kean: I represent th e Saudi Binladin Group ("SBG") an d certain members of the Binladin family in litigation currently part of a multi-district litigation proceeding pending in the United States District for the Southern District of New York. I a m writing regarding a statement recently appearing in your commission's Staff Statement No. 5 on Diplomacy. While th e admissibility of comments contained in the Comm ission' s reports will no doubt be litigated in the future, th e prestige and visibility of the Commission makes th e accuracy of such statements unusually important. The staff document states that during a follow-up visit to Saudi Arabia in January 2000, a U.S. delegation on terro rism financi ng "concentrated on tracing B in Ladin 's assets an d access to h is family's money, exchanges that led to further, fruitful work." l Though I do not believe it was the Commission's intent, this statement could someday be read to imply ~ or used to argue unfairly that Osama B in Laden ("OBL") ha d access to family funds, erhaps a s late as January 2000. This is, of course, not true. As detailed below, it is widely known that OBL has not had access to his family's assets since at least June 1993, when he was formally removed as a shareholder in the family businesses. The Binladin family publicly condemned Osama in February 1994, at the same time that his citizenship was revoked by the Saudi government. W e a re confident that these facts, a nd others discussed below, would be confirmed by the relevant United States authorities. We ask that your final report be amended so as to reflect correctly these facts. SBG is one of the largest and most highly regarded engineer ing and construction firms in th e Islamic world. SBG's predecessor, th e Mohammed Binladin Organization, w as founded b y "Diplomacy: Staff Statement No. 5," National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon th e United States (March 2 3 , 2004) at 10-11. ATLANTA BEIJING BRUSSELS CHICAGO CLEVELAND COLUMBUS DALLAS FRANKFURT HONG KONG HOUSTON IRVINE LONDON LOS ANGELES MADRI D MENLO PARK MILAN MUMBAI MUNICH NEW DELHI NEW YORK PARIS PITTSBURGH SAN FRANCISCO SHANGHAI SINGAPORE SYDNEY TAIPEI TOKYO WASHINGTON

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8/14/2019 SD B3 Other Correspondence Fdr- 4-30-04 Jones Day Letter Re Staff Statement 5 and Saudi Binladin Group 792

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8/14/2019 SD B3 Other Correspondence Fdr- 4-30-04 Jones Day Letter Re Staff Statement 5 and Saudi Binladin Group 792

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JONES DAY

Chairman Thomas H. KeanApril 30,2004

Page 2

Mohammed Binladin in 1931. Following Mohammed's death on September 4,1967, ownership

of the family businesses passed to his many children, including OBL who was thenapproximately 10 years old. As one of the heirs to Mohammed, between September 4, 1967 and

1993, OBL received dividends, rent, distributions of stock, real estate, and other assets, valued at

approximately $28 million.2 U.S. government officials (among others) have recognized thatOBL received no more than that amount.3 The distributions to which OBL had been entitled by

virtue of his ownership interests ceased entirely, however, in 1993 when the Binladin familysevered ties with himbecause of his expressed views and avowed hostility toward the

government of Saudi Arabia, his own family, the Saudi royal family, and the U.S.'s leadershiprole in the Gulf War of 1990-91.

Because of OBL's attitude and conduct, on June 16,1993, both SBG and the Mohammed

Binladin C ompany passed resolutions disassociating themselves from OBL by removing him asa shareowner. The value of these shares, estimated by company accountants to amount to about$9.9 million, was placed in an account that is and has been under the control of the governmentof Saudi Arabia.5 OBL has never had access to these funds.

The Binladin family also publicly condemned OBL in February 1994 in a statement by

Bakr Binladin, the head of SBG. At about the same time, OBL's citizenship was revoked by the

Saudi government, which froze OBL's accounts and assets in the Kingdom.6 The Binladinfamily's statement was widely reported at the time it was made in 1994,7 as have been all of the

family's condemnations of OBL's conduct since that time.8 In an August 1996 release, the U.S.

Letter from Shafiq Binladin to Richard New comb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (July

27, 2000), attached as Exhibit 1.

3 See "The Root of All Evil," U.S. News & World Report (Dec. 3, 2001) (reporting th at officials at theTreasury Department have indicated that OBL receive d only approximately $2 7 million before being cut out of thefamily business in 1993); "Terror Money Hard to Block, Officials Find," The New York Times (Dec. 10, 2001)(stating that government officials have concluded that OBL inherited approximately $25 million, not $300 million aswas once erroneously estimated).

4

Attached as Exhibit 2 are Resolutions of the partners owning the Saudi Binladin G roup and theMohammed Binladin C ompany am ending the Articles of Association to strip OBL of his share own ership interests.Pursuant to Saudi law, the amendments to the Articles of Association w ere approved by the Secretary of Commerceand the Shariah court. All approvals were received and the amendments w ere final as of Decem ber 15,1993.

See Letter from Shafiq Binladin to Richard New comb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control(July 27,2000), attached as Exhibit 1.

6 See "Saudis Strip Citizenship From Back ers of Militants," The New York Times (April 10,1994). A U.S.State Department release in 1996 stated that OBL's citizenship was revoked in February 1994. See U.S. StateDepartment Factsheet on Usama Bin Ladin (Aug. 14, 1996).

See, e.g., "Bakr B inladen: We Condemn and Denounce Osama's Behavior," A l-Madina Al-MunawwaraNewspaper (Feb. 1 9, 1994); "Bakr Binladen: All Family Members C ondemn O sama Binladen's Behavior," Al-Nadwah (Feb. 20, 1994); "Osama Bin Laden Ostracised By His Family," Saudi Gazzette (The Associated Press)(Feb. 20,1994). These articles, the first two of w hich contain Bakr's statement, are attached as Exhibit 3.

Q

See, e.g., "Bin Laden's Half-Brother Condemns US Attacks," Agence France Presse (Sept. 12 , 2001)(OBL 's half-brother, Yeslam, states, "I would like to express my deepest feelings of s o r r o w . . . All life is sacred and

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JONES DAY

Chairman Thomas H. Kean

April 30, 2004

Page 3

State Department noted that "Bin Ladin has not responded to condemnation leveled against him

in March 1994 by his eldest brother Bakr Bin Ladin, who expressed, through the Saudi media,his family's 'regret, denunciation, and condemnation' of Bin Ladin's extremist activities."9

By taking aggressive, well-publicized steps against a member of their own family as early

as 1994, the Binladin family sought to do what it could to limit the influence of OBL and his

followers. Indeed, the Binladin family disowned OBL well before the U.S. began to respond to

th e threat that he and his followers represent. For years after the family separated themselves

from OBL, he was nowhere mentioned on the U.S. list of terrorist individuals and

organizations.10 hi fact, OBL was not placed on the U.S. list of terrorists until August 20,

1998.11

hi addition, SBG has a clear record of support for and cooperation with the U.S.government. This relationship goes back to the first Gulf War. SBG strongly supported the

presence of the U.S. military in Saudi Arabia (which became the focus of OBL's attack on the

Saudi government), providing to it both construction and telecommunications assistance. The1*)

Binladin family companies were commended for these efforts by the U.S. Central Command.

Among other things, SBG participated in the construction of the King Abdul Aziz Air Base from

which U.S. forces operated. On October 31, 1998, the U.S. military again commended SBG for

completing the residential housing and the recreation center in Eskan Village, a housing complex

in Saudi Arabia for the U.S. soldiers who are stationed at the Riyadh Air Base.13 The

commendation came after the United States correctly placed responsibility on OBL for the

August 1988 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 81 people, including

11 Americans.

Given the Binladin family's longstanding cooperation with the U.S. government, United

States officials requested interviews with members of the Binladin family, after they began to

(continued...)

I condemnall killing and all attacks against liberty an d human values ...M y thoughts an d profound sympathy arewith the victims, their families and the American people."); "Osama bin Laden Is DenouncedBy His Family," Th eAssociated Press (Sept. 15 , 2001) (OBL's uncle, Abdullah Binladin, states, "The family has previously announced

its position (to distance itself) from Osama and condemned his acts. All the family members condemnall violent

and terrorist acts, even if Osama is behind them."); "Bin Laden Taint Hurts Family Empire," Th e Guardian

(London) (Sept. 21 , 2001) (Abdullah Binladin expresses "the strongest denunciationand condemnationof this sad

event" andstresses that

theBinladin

family"has

noconnection with [OBL's] works

andactivities.").

9

U.S. State DepartmentFactsheet on Usama Bin Ladin (Aug. 14 , 1996).

10 See Exec. Order No. 12947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5,079 (Jan. 25,1995).

1' SeeExec. Order No. 13099, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 (Aug. 25, 1998).

Certificates of achievement that the Binladin family companies received from the U.S. militaryareattached as Exhibit 4.

A letter of appreciation from Lt. Colonel Larry Simpson is attachedas Exhibit 5.

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JONES DAY

Chairman Thomas H. Kean

April 30 , 2004Page 4

become aware of the threat posed by OBL and his terrorist network. The family readily agreed

to the interviews, conducted with officials from U.S. government agencies, including the FBIand the Office of Foreign Assets Control, during the period from 1997 to 2000 after the U.S. ha d

determined to capture or kill OBL. The extent an d thoroughness of the exchanges between the

family and the U.S. has been widely reported in the media. For example, according to TheWashington Post:

Intensive investigations by the FBI and other law enforcementagencies over thepast two years have failed to turn up any

evidence of financial ties between the Binladin G roup and Osama,according to Wyche Fowler, U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabiafrom 1996 to earlier this year. Fowler said that the bin Laden

family had 'cooperated fully' with U.S. efforts to trace Osama'sbank accounts and other sources of funding in the wake of the1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, which werewidely attributed to al Qaeda.14

Perhaps most significantly, in a series of actions reflec ting the fairness and concern o f theUnited States, the U.S. government helped a group of family mem bers leave the country in theimmediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, so as to m inim ize the chances that innocent individualswould be harmed solely because of their surname. In fact, former W hite Hou se aide RichardClarke, who was the National Coo rdinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, an d Counter-Terrorism at the time of the 9/11 attacks, testified b efore Congress on September 3 , 2003 that the

decision to allow members of the Binladin family to fly out of the country "was a consciousdecision with com plete review at the highest levels of the State Depa rtment an d the FBI and theWhite House," and that the list of individuals who were allowed to leave "was reviewed by ...

and signed off by the FBI."15 During his March 24, 2004 testimony before your commission,Clarke added,

I was very well aw are of the m embers of the bin Laden family andwhat they were doing in the United States. And the FB I wasextraordinarily well aware of what they were doing in the UnitedStates. And I was informed by the FBI that none of the membersof the bin Laden family, this large clan, were doing an ything in thiscountry that was illegal or that raised their suspicions. An d I

believe the FBI had very good information and good sources of

14 "A Fugitive's Splintered Family Tree," The Washington Post (Sept. 30,2001).

Testimony of Richard Clarke, Hearing on Terrorism First Responders, Subcommittee on Technology,Terrorism and Government Information, Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 3, 2003).

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JONES DAY

Chairman Thomas H. Kean

April 30,2004

Page 5

nformation on what the members of the bin Laden family were

doing.16

Since Clarke's testimony, your commission has confirmed that the flight carrying members of

the Binladin family out of the U.S. "was investigated by the FBI and dealt with in a professional

manner prior to its departure."17 According to your commission's Staff Statement No. 10 on

Threats and Responses in 2001, "The FBI has concluded that nobody was allowed to depart on

these six flights who the FBI wanted to interview in connection with the 9/11 attacks, or who the

FBI later concluded had any involvement in those attacks."18 As such, the FBI has never asked

to interview any of the family members who left the U.S.19 Thus, at a time when the U.S.

government was understandably aggressively arresting and detaining anyone even remotely

suspected of being involved with terrorist activities, it had sufficient confidence in the Binladin

family's lack of involvement to give affirmative assistance to members of the family to leave theU.S.

Even following the 9/11 attacks, officials of the U.S. government offered repeated

recognition of the good character of SBG and the Binladin family.20 For example, on September

30, 2001, the U.S. Consul General in Jeddah wrote that "[t]he Saudi Bin Ladin Group is well-

and favorably-known to the United States Consulate General in Jeddah," that "the Saudi Bin

Ladin Group and senior members of the Bin Ladin family have repeatedly disassociated

themselves from [OBL] and his activities," and that the Consulate had no reason to believe that

Testimony of Richard Clarke, Eighth Public Hearing, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Uponthe United States (March 24 , 2004).

"Threats and Responses in 2001: Staff Statement No. 10," National Commission on Terrorist Attacks

Upon the United States (April 13 , 2004) at 12.

18 Id.

1 9Richard Clarke's testimony affirmed this, "I have asked since, were there any individuals on that flight

that in retrospect the FBI wishes they could have interviewed in this country, and the answer I've been given is no,that there was no one left on that flight who the FBI now wants to interview." Testimony of RichardClarke, EighthPublic Hearing, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (March 24 , 2004).

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government in various ways had already demonstrated its confidencethat the Binladin family was not involved in OBL's terrorist activities. For instance, in November 1998 and January

2000, former president George H.W. Bush traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with the Binladinfamily. "A StrangeIntersection of Bushes, BinLadens,"The Plain Dealer (Cleveland) (Nov. 11, 2001). Another example involvesPtech, Inc., a Quincy, Massachusetts software company that called the State Department in March 2000 to see if itwas permissible to sell their software to a member of the Binladin family. "They laughed at us," said OussamaZiade, Ptech's CEO. "They told us there is no problem with selling to the (Saudi) Binladin Groupor the family."

"Quincy Firm Sold Software to Osama's Half Brother," Th e Boston Herald (Jan. 21 , 2003).

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JONES DAY

Page 6

Chairman Thomas H. Kean

April 30, 2004

there are any connections between OBL and SBG.21 The British Consulate General's Office

wrote a similar letter on October 9,2001,22

After the 9/11 attacks, the Binladin family also received an overwhelming amount of

support from numerous organizations that came to their defense, obviously conscious of

significant problems that might be caused by their association with the family of the world's

most reviled terrorist. The following entities are among those that strongly stood by their

relationship with the Binladin family at that critical juncture: Harvard University;23 Tufts

University;24 WMC Communications;25 General Electric;26 Citigroup;27 Nortel;28 ABNAmro

Holding NV;29 Motorola;30 Tellabs;31 ITEP International;32 and WorldCare. The chief executive

21 Letter from Richard L. Baltimore, U.S. Consul General in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (Sept. 30, 2001),attached asExhibit 6. See also Letter from David Rundell, Commercial Attache in the American ConsulateGeneral's Office in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (O ct. 7, 2001), attached as Exhibit 7.

Letter from Andrew Henderson, British Consul General in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (O ct. 9, 2001), attachedas Exhibit 8.

23 See "The New World of Islamic Legal Studies," Harvard Law B ulletin (Spring 2002) (Frank Vogel,director of the Islamic Legal Studies P rogram at Harvard Law School, said, "People began to realize that theBinladins are not to blame, that they are an impressive and upstanding family and they've been dealt a very severeblow by the events."); "Endowments From Bin Ladens Prove Awkward," The New York Times (Oct. 3, 2001);"Boston a Home for Bin Ladens," The Los Angeles Times (Sept. 17,2001).

24 See "Endowments From Bin Ladens Prove Awkw ard," The New York Times (Oct. 3, 2001).

See "Bin Laden Group Seeks PR Help," www .mediaguardian.co.uk (Nov. 22, 2001) ("We have hadmeetings with the Bin Laden Group and we have checked them out and they have no links with terrorism.").

26 See "Bin Laden Is 'Black Sheep' of a Blue-Chip Family," The Wall Street Journal (Sept. 19,2001) ("Weare satisfied the Saudi Binladin G roup is fully separated from Osama bin Laden.").

See id. (A Citigroup spokeswoman stated that SB G "denounced and completely disowned O sama binLaden.").

28See id. ("If we had any reason to believe this comp any had or could have any link to terrorist activities,

we would cease doing business with them immediately.").

29See id.; "ABN Amro Says Bin Laden Fam ily a Client, But No Ties to Osama Bin Laden," AFX News

(Sept. 20,200 1) ("The family behind the com pany Saudi Binladin Group has publicly announced on several

occasions that it has broken all its ties w ith the terrorist O sama b in Laden,' ABN Am ro said in a statement. 'This issupported by the fact that the Saudi Binladin Group is not listed on the US Treasury Department's list of foreigncompanies and individuals engaging in undesirable activities.'").

See "Saudi Conglomerate: Family Firm Denies Any T ie to Bin Laden," Chicago Tribune (Sept. 20,2001).

31 See id.

See "Ties to Bin Laden Family Damage French Construction Firm, Agence France Presse (Sept. 21,2001).

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JONES DAY

Chairman Thomas H. KeanApril 30, 2004

Page?

of WorldCare, Nasser Menhall, explained that the Binladin family has disowned OBL and "does

not deserve to be guilty by association in any way."33

It is difficult to imagine a more serious and dam aging charge than any suggestion ofcomplicity with, or support for, the terrorists who committed the 9/11 attacks. The Binladin

family has done everything possible to keep its name and its businesses from being unfairlylinked in any way to OBL and his fiendish acts.

For all the foregoing reasons, I hope that your staff can amend the statement referred to inthe beginning of this letter and make the record clear that, long before he was recognized as aterrorist by the United States, OBL was denounced and deprived of support by SB G and theBinladin family.

Please let me know if the Commission has any remaining questions or concerns a bout theBinladin family or their businesses, as we would be anxious to cooperate. I hope that you willinclude this letter as part of y our official public record.

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Brogan

Attachments

cc: Philip Zelikow

(w/ Attachments)

10,2001)."Family Business Bin Ladens Have C lose Ties to Bay State M edical Industry," Th e Boston Globe (Oct.