P A U L S C H W E I Z E R

M O M E N T A R Y C O N S C I O U S N E S S A N D

B U D D H I S T E P I S T E M O L O G Y

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N

One of the basic tenets of Buddhist philosophy is the doctrine of momentariness (ksanikavdda), the view that the world is not materially preserved from one moment to the next, but rather consists of a series of discrete 'instants' (ks.an. as) of existence, followed by complete annihilation before the next instant begins. This startling and powerful critique of the apparent stability and continuity of material objects serves as the basis for a number of important ancillary positions, including those concerned with the 'naturelessness' of all phenomena and the intrinsic negative aspect of being. The merely apparent continuity and temporal duration of objects is explained by appeal to the principle of dependent origination (pratityasarnutpdda), whereby it is held that there is a relation of strict causal dependence between the moments of existence, even though there is not an underlying material cause which is preserved in the effect. The principle of dependent origination explains the perceived fact that the world evolves accord- ing to an orderly and coherent pattern, rather than as a series of arbitrary and chaotic transitions from one moment to another. Depen- dent origination thus countermands the logical possibility that anything can arise from anything else, and it is this constraining principle of dependency which accounts for the appearance of continuity over the discrete instants of existence.

In the present paper, I wish to put forward the argument that the doctrine of momentariness, when applied to consciousness, serves directb7 to undermine the epistemological basis for the principle of dependent origination. This is not intended as an interpretive or exegetical claim, but rather as a philosophical response to one of the main theoretical features of a fairly general Buddhist position. The philosophical claim I wish to make is that if consciousness is held to be truly momentary, then this aspect of perceptual awareness and

Journal of Indian Philosophy 22:81--91, 1994. �9 1994 KluwerAcadernic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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memory is in fact logically compatible with the unconstrained possi- bility that anything can arise from anything else. Hence the doctrine of momentary consciousness is compossible with the claim that the world moves in a series of chaotic and completely unrelated jumps, wherein there is no pattern and no order.

Given this possibility, which will be developed at greater length below, our perception of apparent order can be taken as a reliable indication of an actual dependency relation only if the principle of dependent origination is presupposed to obtain with respect to the series of conscious moments. But this leads to circularity, since it is the perceived order in the world which serves as the empistemological basis for the causal principle of pratityasamutpdda. So if consciousness is indeed momentary, then the principle of dependent origination, which was initially introduced to account for the apparent relation of coherence between successive instants of external existence, is now needed to support the logically prior notion that there is a relation of systematic dependence between the internal moments of conscious- ness. Therefore, I wish to put forward the view that if the principle of dependent origination is accepted, on the criterion that it is required in order to explain the facts revealed by experience, then this in turn implies that either the reasoning involved is circular, or else that human consciousness lies outside the momentary realm.

2. P A T T E R N S I N F L U X

At the heart of Buddhistic thought lies a vision of the world as a shifting and transitory array of particles, which lacks any underlying material 'substrate' to serve as the common thread holding the moments of existence together. The world is seen as an evanescent flux, where real existence is construed simply in terms of the potency to bring about a subsequent momentary effect. Not only is the apparent material stability of ordinary objects denied, but their more abstract stability as genuine 'wholes' (avayavin) is also rejected. The commonplace objects of daily life, which appear as unitary and enduring things, are analysed as mere aggregates or collocations (skandha), which possess no reality outside the sum of their basic elements (dhdtu). Thus the universe is conceived as an ontologically

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fragmentary and discontinuous string of moments, where real existence at each moment is granted only to the basic elements. These elements form temporary collocations or macroscopic compounds, which, when viewed as a series, give the appearance of integral and continuous wholes.

According to this analysis, even though the elementary "stuff" of the world is created and destroyed every instant, there is nonetheless a relation of causal dependency which governs the transitions between ksagas, and this dependency is responsible for the coherent patterns which are preserved over time. It is not the case that the transitions from instant to instant are arbitrary, and hence it is not the case that anything can arise from anything else. This would be a case of 'haphazard origination,' which is clearly refuted by empirical evidence. There is a strong, systematic interdependence between moments, and this observed coherence is enshrined in the causal principle of dependent origination (DO), which enjoins a law-like pattern con- necting the separate instants of being. And, in turn, this law-like pattern is precisely what sustains the illusion of real continuity, and, under the assumption of momentariness, it is the appearance of continuity which thus forms the epistemological basis for the principle of dependent origination. If the evolution of the world did not proceed in an orderly and regular fashion, then there would be no reason to posit a relation of causal dependency.

The appearance of continuity between moments is therefore explained by the similarity (but numerical non-identity) which obtains between instantaneous collocations of elements. Even though each instantaneous member of a series is ultimately a distinct existence, they are related by a pattern which obtains between members. Objects appear stable and unchanging only when the degree of similarity between moments is sufficiently great that we do not notice the underlying non-identity. In this case, a homogeneous series (sajdtiya sam. tati) creates the impression of stasis. And when the difference between instantaneous manifestations becomes sufficiently pronounced to warrant detection, then we perceive a process of change, a hetero- genous series (vijdtiya samtati). But both apparent stability and apparently smooth change are mere macroscopic approximations, which mask the underlying discreteness of momentary being. On this

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account, reality is comparable to a motion picture film, which consists of a series of distinct frames, but where there is nonetheless a coherent pattern preserved across frames, so that when played at high speed, these still and discrete images merge into a vision of continuity and orderly transformation.

The doctrine of momentariness, in combination with the principle of dependent origination, forms a very central pillar of traditional Buddhist metaphysics. Of course, initially, these principles were not primarily of metaphysical or speculative interest, but rather were soteriological in nature, and formed an integral feature of the explana- tion of human suffering and the path to liberation. The overall pattern revealed from moment to moment is that dissolution is the way of all macroscopic compounds, and this essential impermanence is directly linked to the suffering inherent in existence. According to the familiar Buddhist teachings, liberation can be gained only by breaking the chain of dependently originating phenomena which lead to misery and bondage. Thus the notion of causation expressed in the principle of dependent origination is a very analytical and pragmatic one, and is meant to account for the regularities and law-like patterns which govern the world, without adverting to an unobservable substrate in which perceived qualities are supposed to inhere. It is a fundamentally descriptive principle, founded on the operational maxim 'this being, that appears.' But as will be argued below, this empirical orientation is directly undermined by the widely held Buddhist view regarding the momentary nature of human consciousness. And this point is concep- tually significant, because the initially soteriological tenets have long since taken on a theoretical life of their own, and their metaphysical and epistemological ramifications possess a genuine philosophical dimension, which is not itself tied to the somewhat more pragmatic motivations underlying the genesis of these tenets.

3. T H E P L A C E OF C O N S C I O U S N E S S

The early Buddhist position rigorously and quite naturally applied the momentary analysis of all phenomena to consciousness and human identity. Accordingly, it was held that there is no permanent and unitary self, no vedic dtman which persists over time and which

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constitutes the ultimate identity of the individual. The perceived self is just another momentary existence, which is annihilated and comes into being anew with each instant. Indeed, anti-substantialism with regard to the self was one of the primary points of contention between Buddhist thinkers and adherents of orthodox Hindu schools, and it provided a locus for dialectical development and refinement through centuries of debate.

Polemical opponents of the Buddhist system, in particular the advo- cates of the Nyfiya school, argued that the recognition of continuity over time disproves the doctrine of momentariness. An initial version of this type of Nyfiya objection to the Buddhist view held that recog- nition of the same object over time refutes momentariness, since recognition purportedly proves duration with respect to the object recognized. But this somewhat naive objection is easily turned via appeal to the principle of dependent origination (DO). It is not numerically the same object which is recognized, replies the Buddhist, but rather a sameness or resemblance between different momentary objects in a homogeneous series. Thus patterns of resemblance are manifested over time, while objects themselves are not, and the patterns of resemblance which obtain between ontologically discon- tinuous moments are sufficient to explain recognition.

The next logical step in the dialectical progression is to move from external considerations to internal ones, and accordingly the Ny~ya philosophers argued that if all tIfings were momentary, including consciousness, then there would be no stable observer, relative to which the foregoing patterns of resemblance could be recognized. A non-momentary consciousness is required in order to detect the patterns which are said to persist over time, since this type of recog- nition will require comparison between the present moment and past moments, and such comparisons can only be made from a conscious vantage point which lies outside the momentary realm. So this is an argument to the effect that the phenomenon of recognition at least proves the stability of consciousness, because even though the recogni- tion of the 'same' object at different moments may not refute the momentariness of the external object (if DO is brought in to explain recognition via patterns of resemblance), nonetheless, consciousness cannot be momentary, for it would then be impossible to recognize

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the patterns which are said to be manifested o v e r discrete instants. To recognize patterns extended over different instants requires a perspec- tive of awareness which is likewise extended over the instants, and hence which is non-momentary.

To this vital objection, the Buddhist thinker Ratnakirti answers that a permanent observer which exists outside the momentary flux is still not entailed by the fact that patterns of dependence are recognized. Instead, knowledge of the preceding moment is re-created in the succeeding moment, and this instantaneous re-creation of perceptual memory is itself sufficient to account for the experience of personal continuity and conscious duration, and the attendant ability to recognize patterns. Thus there is no need to posit a stable and on- going awareness in order to explain perception of the regularities which characterize the series of moments. Instead, recognition of these patterns is explained by the fact that the moments of consciousness are each created with an instantaneous memory of the past, and it is this instantaneous memory which makes recognition possible. In this manner, the nature of perceptual experience is able to logically cohabitate with the doctrine of momentary consciousness, and the Buddhist position is secured against the attempted counter-argument.

Ratnaldrti's reply is a very attractive and theoretically harmonious response to the Nyfiya objection, and is clearly the natural move for defenders of the doctrine of momentary consciousness. As part of conscious experience, memory must also be an instantaneous feature, and phenomenological continuity is then explained by constantly re- incorporating knowledge of the past into each new moment of awareness. In this manner, the no-longer-existent past is stored in the momentary present, and the self-contained present is then able to account for the impression of unbroken continuity with the series of past moments. This in turn allows recognition of both the external regularities manifested over the series of material objects, as well as the internal regularities which characterize the 'stream of conscious- ness.' The experience-based knowledge of the sentient observer is thereby harmoniously encompassed in the overall series of momentary events which constitute the world.

On this picture, an observed external object, for example an apparently static tree, consists in a homogeneous series of instan-

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taneous and highly similar 'tree collocations' t~, h, t3, �9 . . , where the DO relation governs the transition from ti to ~+ 1- Moreover, the observer of the tree consists in a corresponding series of momentary conscious states, cl, c2, c3, � 9 where the conscious state c~ includes a direct perception of the tree state tk, and it also includes an instan- taneous memory of the perceptions of tree states t# experienced by past conscious states cj, for j" < k. Thus the instantaneous conscious state ck is sufficient to explain the recognition of the homogeneous series tl, t2, t 3 , . . . , t~ (which underlies the impression of an enduring tree), since it includes within itself the memory of the perceptions of previous collocations in the series, which were enjoyed by the respec- tively simultaneous conscious moments cl, c2, c3, . . �9 % And it is precisely the homogeneous nature of the perceived series tl, t2, t3,. �9 �9 t k which supports the claim that there is a relation of dependency between the various moments of existence.

But even though Ratnakirti's version of the Buddhist position answers the immediate objection, it suggests yet a further step in the dialectical development. The foregoing defense against the Nyfiya critique tacitly assumes that the transitions from conscious states ci to ci+~ are likewise governed by the DO relation. For if there is not such a coherency constraint which binds the sequence of conscious moments, then it is quite possible that each conscious moment is entirely unrelated to the previous one, and hence that a radical principle of 'haphazard origination' (HO) governs the transitions. This radical possibility of HO is compatible with the impression of conscious continuity and internal coherence, precisely because of the fact that memory is held to be instantaneous. The momentary conscious state ck comes complete with a 'memory' of 'past' states cj, which yields the internal impression of an orderly and continuous series of states q, % c 3 , . . . , % This series in turn is utilized to explain the recognition of the external pattern of moments tl, t2, t3, . . . , t~, which comprise the apparently static tree, and from which the principle of DO is first inferred. But unless DO is now utilized to guarantee the desired regularity between internal states c i and ci+l, it is quite possible that such transitions are arbitrary, and that the instantaneous memory from moment-to-moment is both entirely self- contained and diachronically disjoint. In other words, coherence is

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preserved only within each conscious moment, and there is no corresponding regularity which obtains across moments.

On the radical HO scenario, the instantaneous conscious state c i comes complete with its attendant 'remembered' states Cl, c2, % . . . , ci_l, where q, c2, c 3 , . . . , ci-1 plus c i form a self-consistent series, i.e.

one which manifests the familiar patterns of similarity which we ordinarily interpret as caused by an enduring object. State c i could then be followed by conscious state ci+ i, which again comes complete with its self-consistent series of 'memory' states c~, c2, c3, . . . , cl, and where the series c~, c'2, c'3, . . . , c~ plus ci+l forms a coherent pattern. But it is now compatible with the doctrine of instantaneous conscious- ness that c~ r q , c' 2 ~ % c 3 r % . . . , c~ ~ c i. Thus ci+ 1 is completely unrelated to % and the associated memory series are diachronically inconsistent, although they are each synchronically coherent. So state ci+ 1 could then be succeeded by the totally unrelated state ci+2, which comes complete with 'memory' states c~, c'~, c~, . . . , c7+ 1 which again form a coherent pattern with ci+2, but where c7 r c~, c 2 r c2, c 3 r c 3 , . . . , C7+ 1 # Ci+ 1.

On this picture, no moment has access to any other moment, and thus diachronic inconsistency is not able to intrude upon the internal coherence of any single point in the sequence. Instantaneous perception is still veridical, while instantaneous memory is not, and hence this hypothetical situation is compatible with the general Buddhist position that direct perception is a means of valid knowledge (pramdn. a) while memory is not. On the HO model, there simply is no homogeneous series of actual events tl, t2, t 3 , . . , corresponding to a given instan- taneous memory sequence, but rather there is a chaotic series of momentary phenomena tl, t;, t3, �9 �9 �9 where the various t's in this string have no relation to each other and manifest no regularity, but where each is verdically perceived by the corresponding conscious moment Cl, c;, c ~ , . . . Thus there is no relation of dependent origina- tion between external or internal moments, and the illusion of regularity upon which the DO principle is inferred derives solely from the self-consistent but radically discontinuous nature of instantaneous memory. DO then becomes a false projection, stemming from the synchronic coherence manifested within the various instantaneous memory structures. But on this weakened reading of DO, the principle

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cannot apply across moments, and hence looses its intended signifi- cance as a causal principle obtaining between moments, and instead becomes merely a coherence constraint applying within each instant.

To rule out this distasteful HO scenario would require a causal principle of regularity between conscious moments, to the effect that memory of each moment c i (complete with its associated instan- taneous memory) is reproduced within the instantaneous memory of the succeeding moment ci+ 1. In this manner the instantaneous memory sequence would be cumulative over successive moments, and the patterns of dependence supported by this cumulative memory would then correspond to actual regularities manifested in the world (since direct perception is veridical). According to such a principle the instantaneous memory of q is included in c2, instantaneous memory of c 2 (and hence of q) is included in c3, instantaneous memory of c 3 (and hence of ca, c2) is included in c4, etc. Indeed, this seems to be the intuitive picture behind Ratnakirti's reply to tile Nyfiya objection, and would be an adequate principle to explain the recognition of genuine external regularities on the assumption of momentary consciousness.

However, this intuitive picture places crucial reliance upon the assumption that memory content of each conscious moment is dependent upon the past conscious moment, and this is a principle of internal dependent origination, which cannot be inferred from experi- ence, precisely because of the HO possibility that each conscious moment comes complete with a self-contained but specious memory of the past, as detailed above. This self-contained memory could then create the impression that the transition between moments is non- arbitrary, and this impression serves as the epistemological justification for the initial principle of causal dependency. Thus the external DO principle can be inferred from experience only if an analogous internal principle is presupposed to obtain with respect to momentary con- sciousness. But then there is no possible evidence which could confirm the principle as applied to conscious moments, and so the line of reasoning in support of the dependency principle becomes viciously circular. So, according to the argument advanced in the present paper, either the original principle of pratityasarnutpdda must be abandoned as empirically unconfirmable, or else consciousness must be held to be non-momentary.

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The former option is by far the least attractive of the two, since the principle of haphazard origination would undermine the basic regular- ities and law-like patterns by which the world is made comprehensible and predictable. The HO principle includes a paralyzing form of temporal solipsism, in which each moment is rendered metaphysically independent of its predecessors, and appeal to empirical knowledge and the data of experience is therefore useless. The experienced continuity of the present with the past becomes merely an illusion of instantaneous memory, and epistemology becomes an essentially hopeless enterprise. To avoid this solipsistic paralysis requires acceptance of the alternative conclusion that consciousness is non- momentary, and therefore non-momentary consciousness becomes a precondition for the possibility of knowledge based on experience. If this precondition is embraced, then DO can be seen as a valid descriptive principle with a sound epistemological basis, and the traditional analysis of external objects as evanescent can be main- tained. Recognition is explained via appeal to external DO patterns as in the Buddhist response to the first Nyfiya objection given above, but these patterns must now be cognized from the outside perspective of a continuous awareness.

The foregoing line of argumentation indicates that the pragmatic Buddhist methodology of logical analysis and experiential confirma- tion, in combination with the doctrine of ksanikav(Ma, lead eventually to the conclusion that consciousness is stable and persists over time, since denial of this conclusion undermines the possibility of experience as a valid source of knowledge. But it then becomes quite natural to characterize the momentary world in terms of mfiyft or prakrti, and, in contrast, to view consciousness as an independent and enduring substance. Thus already present in the basic tenets of Buddhistic thought lay the logical seeds of the later Idealistic versions of the movement, such as the Yoggtcfira school, which embrace the essentially Upanisadic position that Consciousness (Vijfidna) is ultimately real.

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MarliN, B. K. and R. Evans (1986). Buddhist Logic and Epistemology. Dordrecht, Reidel.

Raju, P. T. (1985). Structural Depths of Indian Thought. State University of New York Press.

Shastri, D. N. (1976). The Philosophy of Nydya-Vai~esika and its Conflict with the Buddhist Digndga School. Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, New Delhi.

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University of Edinburgh Centre For Cognitive Science United Kingdom