-

:

..-..c:Y- -'-'.>;:.v-

::-.

:

:a-: -^"--,- ;>*;?>

S33

Gforoell UttiwtsJtg

ptotg

BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME PROM THE

SAGE

ENDOWMENT FUNDTHE GIFT OF

HeutQ W. Sage1891

'UZ3.&.6..

////2/{..f.#..%5474

Oti,

fi

Oit

*

- 6 38

JUL- 9 1947

Cornell University Library

B821 .S33Humanism; philosophical essays, by F.C.S

3 1924 029 012 171olin

The

original of this

book

is in

the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright

restrictions intext.

the United States on the use of the

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31 92402901 21 71

HUMANISM

BV THE SAME A UTHOR

RIDDLES OF THE SPHINXA STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVOLUTIONSECOND EDITION

LONDON SWAN SONNENSCHEIN AND:

CO.

PERSONAL IDEALISMPHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS BY EIGHT MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORDEdited by

HENRY STURB

CONTAINING

AXIOMS AS POSTULATESBy:

F. C. S.

SCHILLER, M.A.CO., Ltd.1902

LONDON MACMILLAN AND

HUMANISMPHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

^'

~o

^/'c

a

BY

F? C.

S.

SCHILLER,

M.A.

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD

ILottfcon

MACMILLAN ANDNEW YORK:

CO.,

Limited

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

I903

wAll rights reserved

h,\-\z\^C

TO MY DEAR FRIEND

THE HUMANEST OF PHILOSOPHERS

WILLIAM JAMESWITHOUT WHOSE EXAMPLE

AND UNFAILING ENCOURAGEMENTTHIS BOOK

WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN WRITTEN

PREFACETheusual

appearance of

this

volume demands more than theFor the philosophicits

amount of apology.

public,

which makes upseverity of

for the scantiness of

numbers by the

its criticism, might justly have expected me to up the apparently novel and disputable position I had taken up in my contribution to Personal Idealism

follow

with a systematic treatise on the logic of

'

Pragmatism.'

And no

doubt

if it

had rested with me to transform wishesrestrictions

into thoughts

and thoughts into deeds withoutI

of time and space,

should willingly have expandedfull

my

sketch in Axioms as Postulates into a

account of the

beneficent simplification of the whole theory of knowledge

which must needsI

result

from the adoption of the principles

had ventured

to enunciate.

But the work of a college

tutor lends itself

more

easily to the conception than to thetreatise,

composition of a systematic

and so

for the present

the philosophic public will have to wait.

Thefeasible

general public, on the other hand,to

it

seemed more

please

by an altogether smaller and moreviz.,

practicable undertaking,

by republishing from various

technical journals, where conceivably the philosophic public

had already read them, the essays which compose the bulkof this volume.toI

have, however, taken the opportunityessays, partly because they

add several new

happened

to be available, partly because they

seemed to be needed

viii

HUMANISMAndthe old material

to complete the doctrine of the rest.

also has been thoroughly revised

and considerably aughopesthat

mented.collection,

So

that

I

am

not

without

the

though discontinuous

in form, will

be found to

be coherent in substance, and to present successive aspectsof a fairly systematic body of doctrine.it

To me

at least

has seemed that,

when thus taken

collectively,

these

essays not only reinforced

my

previous contentions, but

even supplied the ground for a further advance of thegreatest importance.It is

clear to all

pulse of thought that

who have kept in touch with the we are on the brink of great eventswhich a time-honouredworld.satireintelligible

in those intellectual altitudes

has

described

as

the

The

ancientderi-

shibboleths encounter opension.

yawns and unconcealed

The

rattling

of dry bones no

longer fascinates

respect nor plunges a self-suggested horde of fakirs in

hypnotic stupor.

The

agnostic maunderings of impotent

despair are flung aside with a contemptuous smile

by the

young, the strong, the

virile.

And

there

is

growing up a

reasonable faith that even the highest peaks of speculation

may

prove accessible to properly-equipped explorers, while

what seemed so unapproachable was nothing but a cloudland of confused imaginings.

Among the more marked symptoms that the times are growing more propitious to new philosophic enterprise, I would instance the conspicuoussuccess of Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belief; the magnifi-

!

cent series of William James's popular works, The WillBelieve,

to

Human Immortality,;

and

Tlie Varieties of Religious

Experience

James Ward's important Gifford Lectures on Naturalism and Agnosticism ; the emergence from Oxford, where the idealist enthusiasm of thirty years ago longseemedto

have

fossilised into sterile

logic-chopping or to

have dissolved into Bradleian scepticism, of so audacious amanifesto as Personal Idealism; and most recently, but not

PREFACEleastfull

ix

of future

promise, the work of the energeticIt

Chicago School headed by Professor Dewey. 1therefore not impolitic,

seemed

and even imperative, to keep up

the agitation for a

more hopeful and humaner view ofan

metaphysics; and at the same time to herald the comingof what will doubtless be

epochmaking work,

viz.,

William James's promised Metaphysics.

II

Theobscure,

origin of great truths, as of great men,

is

usually

and by the time that the world has becomeIt

cognizant of them and interested in their pedigree, they

have usually grown

old.

is

not surprising therefore

that the central thought of our present Pragmatism, to wit

the purposivenesscharacter ofits

of our thought and

the

teleological

methods, should have been clearly stated

by Professor James so long ago as 1879. 2 Similarly I| was surprised to find that I had all along been a pragmatist myself without knowing it, and that little but the

name was

lacking to

my own3

advocacy of an essentiallyhas by

cognate position in 1892.

But Pragmatismthis

is'

no longer unobservedStrike, but hear

;

it

time reached thethe

me

! '

stage,

and

as

misconceptions due

to

sheer unfamiliarity are

refuted or

abandoned

it

will

rapidly enter on

the era

of profitable employment.

It

was

this latter probability

which formed one of1

my

chief motives for publishing

of articles in the Decennial Publications of Logical Theory are announced, but have not yet reached me. Though proceeding from a different camp, the works of Dr. J. E. MacTaggart and Prof. G. H. Howison should also be alluded to as adding to For while ostensibly (and indeed ostentatiously) employing the salutary ferment. the methods of the old a priori dogmatism they have managed to reverse its I have on purchief conclusions, in a charming but somewhat perplexing way. but in France pose confined this enumeration to the English-speaking world and even in Germany somewhat similar movements are becoming visible. 2 in Mind, O.S. No. 15. In his Sentiment of Rationality 3 Cp. pp. 119-121. In Reality and Idealism.'

They have published a number;

the University

their Studies in

;

'

'

'

xtheseessays.

HUMANISMThearepractical

advantagesthefield

of the pragto

matist methodis

so

signal,

be

covered

so

immense, and the reforms to be effected are soI

sweeping, that

would

fain

hasten

the acceptance of

so salutary a philosophy, even at the risk of prematurelyflinging these informal essays, as forlorn

hopes, against

the strongholds of inveterate prejudice.therefore thatI

It is in the

hope

may encourageI will

others to co-operate and

to cultivate a soil which promises such rich returns of

novel truth, that

indicate a

problems which seem to

me

urgently to

number of important demand treatment

by pragmatic methods.I will put first the reform of Logic. Logic hitherto has attempted to be a pseudo-science of a non-existent and im-

I

/[

possible process called pure thought.

Or

at least

we have

been ordered

in its

name

to

expunge from our thinking

\

every trace of feeling, interest, desire, and emotion, asthe most pernicious sources of error.It

has not been thought worthy of consideration thatall

these influences are the sources equally ofall-pervasive inlogic has been

truth and

our thinking.

The

result has

been that

rendered nothing but a systematic misIt

representation of our actual thinking.abstract

has been

made

and wantonly

difficult,

an inexhaustible source

of mental bewilderment, but impotent to train the mind,

by being assiduously kept apart from the psychology ofconcretethinking.

fAnd

yet a reverent

study of the

actual procedures of the

mind might have been a most

precious aid to the self-knowledge of the intellect^justify infull

To

detail

these grave strictures (from which

a

modern logicians, notably Professors Sigwart and Wundt, and Mr. Alfred Sidgwick, 1 can be more or less exempted) would be a long and arduousfewonlyof1

Whose

writings,

by reason perhaps of the ease of

their style,

have not

received from the experts the attention they deserve.

PREFACEundertaking.will sufficiently indicate the sort of difference

xi

Fortunately, however, a single illustration

Pragmatism

would introduce into theLet usfamiliar,

traditional maltreatment.

consider a couple of actual,reasoning,;

and probablyis

modes ofmust

(i)

The worldworldis

so

bad

that there

be a better

(2) thewill

so

bad that

there cannot

be a better.

It

probably be admitted

that both of these are

commonreach'

forms of argumentation,force,

and that neither

is

devoid of logicalit

even though

in neither case does

demonstration.'

And

yet

the two reasonings flatly contradict each other.

Now

my

suggestion

is

that

this contradiction

is

not verbal,

but deep-rooted in the conflicting versions of the natureof thought which they severally exemplify.

The secondto be strictly

argument alone'

itit

would seem could claim

logical.'

For

alone conforms to the canons of the

logical tradition

which conceives reasoning as the productvolition.all

of a

'

pure

'

thought untainted byreflections

And

as in

our

theoretical

we can

disregard

the

psychological conditions of actual thinking to the extent

of selecting examples in whichas examples,

we are interested merely we can appreciate its abstract cogency. In arguing from a known to an unknown part of theuniverse,it

is

'

logical

'

to

be guided by the indications

given by the former.the whole,

If the

known

is

a

'

fair

sample

'

of

sound

how can the conclusion be otherwise than At all events how can the given nature of the known form a logical ground for inferring in the unknown?

a complete reversal of

its

characteristics

?

Andof an

yet

this

is

preciselythis

what the

first

argumentIt

called for.

Must not

be called the

illogical capriceis

irrational

desire?

By no

means.

the

intervention of an emotionalfirstits

postulate which takes the

step in the acquisition of

new knowledge.

But

for

beneficent activity

we should have

acquiesced in our

xii

HUMANISMBut once an unknown transfiguration of theit

ignorance.actualis

desired,

can be sought, and

so, in

manya'

cases,

found.

The

passionless

concatenations

ofstill

pure

thought never could have reached, andjustified,

less

have

our conclusion

:

to attain

it

our thought needsvolition

to be impelled

and guided by the promptings of

and

desire.

NowIndeed

that such

ways of reasoning are not infrequentwill,I

and not unsuccessful,if

fancy, hardly beit

denied.

matters were looked into

might easily turn

out that reasonings of the second type never really occurin

actual knowing,failed

and that when they seemto pretend to bee.g.,

to

do

so,

we have only

to detect the hidden interest'

whichIn

incites the reason

dispassionate.'

the example chosen,

it

may have beenstupidityin

a pessimist's

despair that clothed itself in the habiliments of logic, orit

may haveit

been

merely

and

apathy,

a

want of imagination and enterpriseBut,

questioning nature.

may bewhatis

said,

the

question of the justificationstill

de jure of

done de facto

remains.

The votary

of an abstract logic

may?

indignantly exclaim

'

Shall Iis

lower

my

ideal of pure

thought because thereI

little

or no pure thinkingeternal, sacred

Shall

abandon Truth, immutable,and sanction asofis?

Truth,

as unattainable,

her

substitute

a

spurious

concretionit

practical

ex-

perience,

on the degrading plea that andall

what we needShallI,

to live

by,

we need

to live

by

in

other words, abase myself?

NoI

!

Perish the thought

Perish the phenomenalof

embodiment of Pure Reason outpopularly term "myself")

Time and Place (which

rather

than that the least abatement should be

made!

from the rigorous requirements of

my theoryare

of Thought

Strong

emotional

prejudices

always

hardis

to

reason with, especially when, as here, their naturefar

so

misconceived that they are regarded as the revelations

PREFACEof Pure

xiii

Reason. Still, in some cases, the desire for knowledge may prove stronger than the attachment to habitual modes of thought, and so it may not be whollyfruitless

to point out (i) that our objections are in'

no

wise disposed of by vague charges of a

confusion of

psychology and

logic

'

;

(2)

that the

canons

of right

Thought must, even from the most narrowly logical of standpoints, be brought into some relation to the pro-|cedures of actual thinking;

(3) that in point of fact thelatter;

former are derived from thefirst

(4) that if so, our

mode

of reasoning must receive logical recognition,

because (5) it is not only usual, but useful in the 'discovery of Truth (6) that a process which yields' '

;

valuable resultsthat, conversely,

mustIn

in

some sense be

valid,is

and (7)realis-

an ideal of validity whichshort,

not

able

is

not valid.to

how canof thought

a

logicset

whichasif

professesirrelevantit

be

the

theory

aside

a normal feature of our thinking?is it

And

when reformed by Pragmatism, it must assume a very different complexion, more natural and clearer, than while its movements were impeded by the conventions of a strait-laced Intellectualism ?cannot,

not evident that,

Secondly,exhaustible

Pragmatismfield

would

findinin

anthe

almostsciences,

in-

of

exploration

by

examining the multifarious wayshave

which

their

'

truths

come

to

be

established,

and

showing how. thehas acceleratedit

practical value of scientific conceptions

and determined

their acceptance.

And

is

not over-

sanguine to suppose that a clearer consciousness of theactual procedure of the sciencescritical rejection

would

also lead to the

of conceptions which are not needed, andfacilitate the

are not useful,

and would

formation of

new

1 conceptions which are needed.1

Most opportunely

scientific ideas

for my argument the kind of transformation of our which Pragmatism will involve has received the most copious and

admirable illustration in Professor Ostwald's great Naturphilosofhie.

Professor

b

xiv

HUMANISMIn the field of Ethics Pragmatism naturally

demands

to

know what

is

the actual use of the ethical

'

principles

which are handed on from one text-book to another. But it speedily discovers that no answer is forthcoming.

Nextvery

to nothing:

is

known aboutis

the actual efficacy of

ethical principleslittle

Ethics

a dead tradition which has

relation to the actual facts ofis

moral sentiment.

And

the reason obviously

that there has not been a

sufficient desire to

know

to lead to the proper researches

into the actual psychological nature

and distribution ofis

the

moral

sentiments.

Hencefor

there

implicit

in

Pragmatism a demandsterile

an inquiry to ascertain theIn the end this

actual facts, and pending this inquiry, for a truce to the

polemic about ethical principles.

seems not unlikely toIffinally

result in a real revival of Ethics.

we

turn

to

a

region

which

the the

vestedturbid

interests

of

time-honoured

organisations,

complications of emotion, and a formalism that too often

mergesto

in hypocrisy,

must always render hard of accessconsider

a sincere

philosophy, and

the attitude oflife,

Pragmatism towards thefind

religious

side of

we

shall

once morein principle

that

it

has a most important bearing.antithesis

For

Pragmatism overcomes the oldItall'

of Faith and Reason.'

shows on the one hand that

Faith

'

must underlieWithout

Reasonis

'

and pervadethere'

it,

nay,

that at bottom rationality itself

the supremest postulate

of Faith.

Faith, therefore,'

can be no

Reason, and

initially the

demands of Faith

must be asenables

legitimate and essentially as reasonable as those of the'

ReasonFaith.'

'

they pervade.

On'

the other hand,

it

us to draw the line between a genuine and a spurious'

The

spurious

faith,'

which

too oftento,is

is

all

theologiansOstwaldlikely

take

courage;

to

aspire

merely the

is not a professional philosopher at all, but a chemist, and has very never heard of Pragmatism but he sets forth the pragmatist procedure of the sciences in a perfectly masterly way.

PREFACEsmoothing over of an unfaced scepticism, orpallid

xvat

best a

fungus that, lurking in the dark corners of the

mind, must shun the light of truth and warmth of action.In contrast withit

a genuine faithItis

is

an ingredient

in

the growth of knowledge. the knowledge thatfurther conquests.it

ever realising itself in

needs and seeks

to help

it

on to

It

aims at

its

natural completion intrue or verification,

what weandbelieve.

significantly call the

making

in default of this

must be suspected as mere make-

method in Science and more fundamental than their difference. Both rest on experience and aim at its interpretation both and both require their anticipaproceed by postulationso the identity of

And

Religion

is

far

:

;

tions to

be

verified.

The

difference lies only in the:

mode

and

extent of their verifications

the former must doubtless;

differ

according to the nature of the subject

the latter

has gone

much

further in the case of Science, perhaps

merely because there has been soin

much

less

persistencereligious

attempts at

the

systematic verification of

postulates.Ill

It

is

clear,

therefore,

that

Pragmatism

is

abletois

to

propound an extensive programme of problems worked out by its methods. But even Pragmatismthe final term of philosophic innovationgreater andlists:

benot

there

is

yet a

more sovereignit

principle

now

entering the

of which

can only claim to have been the foreThis principle also has long beenof men,

runner and vicegerent.

working

in

the

minds

dumb, unnamed andripe

unavowed.

But the time seemsto let itfire.

nowit

formally to

nameitsI

it,

and

loose in order that

maythe

receive

baptism ofpropose,

accordingly,

to

convert

to

use

ofj

philosophic terminology a word which has long been

xvi

HUMANISMin

/famedi

history

and

literature,

and

toI

denominate

Humanism

the attitude of thought which

know

to be

habitual in William

James and

in myself,

which seems to

be sporadic and inchoate indestined,I

many

others,

and which

is

believe, to

win the widest popularity.were

There

would indeed be no flavour of extravagance and paradoxaboutthis last suggestion,it

not that the professional

study of Philosophy has so largely fallen into the handsof recluses

who have

lost

all

interest

in

the

practical

concerns of humanity, and have rendered philosophy like

unto themselves, abstruse,

arid, abstract

and

abhorrent.

But

in

itself

there

is

no reason why

this

should be thelife

character of philosophy.to be every man's concern,

Theand

finalif

theory of

oughttobe.

we caninterest,

dispel the notion

that

the

tiresome technicalities

of philosophy leadit

nothing of the least practical

yet

may

There

is

ground, then, for the hope that the study of aleast as profitableletters.

humaner philosophy may prove at enjoyable as that of the humaner'

and

'

In'Years

all

butI

name Humanism has long beendescribed one oftoits

in existence.

ago

most precious

texts,

William James's Willpassions

Believe} as a " declaration of the

independence of the concrete whole of

man

with

all

his

and emotions unexpurgated, directed against the cramping rules and regulations by which the Brahminsof the academic caste are tempted to impede thefree

expansiondoctrineto

of

human

life,''

andbiped

as

"

a

mostto

salutary

preach

to

a

oppressed

by manyallay his

'-ologies,' like

modern man, and calculated

growing doubts whether he has a responsible personality and a soul and conscience of his own, and is not a merephantasmagoria of abstractions, atransient'

complex ofnot reallyp.

shadowy formulas that ScienceIts

calls

the laws of nature.' "

great lesson was,1

I

held, that "there areOctober 1897 (N.S. No. 24,

In reviewing

it

for

Mind in

548).

PREFACEanyeternal

xvii

and non-human truthsbeliefs

to prohibit us from,

adopting the

we need

to live by, nor

any

infallible'

a priori

tests of truth to screen us

from the consequences"

of our choice."

Similarly Professor James, in reviewing

Personal Idealism}

pointedis

out

that

a

re-anthropoits

morphised universesophy."

the general outcome of

philo-

Only

for re-anthropomorphised'

we should'

hence-

forth read re-kumanised.

Anthropomorphismit it is

is

a term ofprove

disparagementdifficult to alter.

whose dyslogistic usage2

may

Moreover,

clumsy, and can hardlyI

be extended so as to cover what

mean by Humanism.it

There

is

no need to disclaim the truth of whichbut

is

the

adumbration, and a non-anthropomorphic thoughtabsurdity;

is

sheer

still

what we need

is

something wider andwith the greatalii

more

vivid.I

Similarly

would not disclaim

affinitiesis

saying of Protagoras, thatthings.

Manis

the

Measure of

Fairly interpreted, this

the truest and

most!

important thing that any thinker ever has propounded.It is

only in travesties such asto;

it

suited Plato's dialectic

purpose

circulatein reality

thatit

it

can

be said

to

tend

to

scepticism

urges Science to discover

how

Man mayhis

measure, and by what devices

measures with those of his fellow-men.

make concordant Humanismmore

therefore need not cast about for any sounder or

convenient starting-point.

Forgranted.

in

every philosophy

we must take some

things forit

Humanism,

like

Common

Sense, of which

may Man

fairly

claim to be the philosophic working out, takes

for

granted as he stands, and the world of man'sit

experience as

has come to seem to him.

This

is

thein

only natural starting-point, from whichevery direction,1

we can proceed

and to which we mustv.

return, enrichedButI

Mind forI tried to

2

January 1903 (N.S. No. 45, p. 94). do this in Riddles of the Sphinx, ch.

6-9.

now

think

the term needs radical re-wording.

xviii

HUMANISM

and with enhanced powers over our experience, from all the journeyings of Science. Of course this frank, thoughnot therefore'uncritical,'

acceptance of our immediate

experience and experienced self will seem a great deal to

be granted

'

by those addicted to abstruser methods. They have dreamt for ages of a priori philosophies without presuppositions or assumptions,' whereby Being might be conjured out of Nothing and the sage mightBut no obscurityin

penetrate the secret of creative power.

of verbiage has in the end succeeded

concealing the

utter failure of such preposterous attempts.

The a prioriin

philosophies have

all

been found out.all

And whatall

is

worse, have they not

been detected?

doing what they pretended to disclaimtake surreptitiously for granted

Do

they notnature

the

human

they pride themselves ontrying to solveIt is true that in

disavowing?with

Are they notfaculties?

human problemssuperhuman.

human

form they claim to transcend our nature,

or to raiseto exaltfor the

it

to the

But while they professit

human

nature, they are really mutilating!

all

kingdom of Abstraction's sake

their professed starting-points,

Purelife

For what are

Being, the Idea, the

Absolute, the Universal

I,

but pitiable abstractions from

experience, mutilated shreds of

humanis

nature,easily

whose

real

value for the understanding of

outweighed

by the

living experience of

an honest

man ?are

All these theories then

de facto start from the im-

mediateofit,

facts of

our experience.

Only theyit

ashamed

and assume without inquiry that

is

worthless as a

principle of explanation,

and that no thinker worthy ofThus, so far from assum-

the

name canless

tolerate the thought of expressly setting

out from anything so vulgar.ing

than the humanist, these speculations really mustgreatto

assume aaddition

deal

more.

They mustnature,their

assume,

in

ordinary

human

own

met-

PREFACEempiricalstarting-points

xixcorrectness

and

the

(always

more than dubious)'

of the deductions

whereby they have

de facto reached them.

Do you

propose then to accept as sacrosanct theconceptions of crudeall

gross unanalysed

Common?'

Sense,I

and to exempt them from

criticism

No,

only

propose to start with them, and to try and see whether

we could not get as far with them as far as we may want to get.

as withI

any

other, nay,

have

faith

that the

process of experience that has brought us to our present

stand-point has not been wholly error and delusion, and

may onright

the whole be trusted.

Andother,

I

am

quite sure that,it

or wrong,

we have noof

and that

is

e.g.

grotesque extravagance to imagine that we can put ourselves at

the

standpoint

the

Absolute.'

I

wouldof

protest, therefore, against every

form of a priori metaresults'

physical

criticism

'

that

condemns the'

our

experience up to date as an illusorytrial.

appearance

without

For

I

hold that the only valid criticism they canin,

receiveis

must comewhere and

and through,

their actual use.

It

just

fail

to

work

common-sense assumptions that we are theoretically justified, andin so far as

practically compelled, to

modify them.

But;

in

each such

case sufficient reasons must be

shown

it

is

not enough

merely to show that other assumptions can be made, and

couched

in

technical

language,

and that our data are

abstractly capable of different arrangements.I

There

are,

am

aware,

infinite

possibilities

of

conceptualis

re-

arrangement, but their discovery and construction

but

a sort of intellectual game, and has no real importance.In point of method, therefore,to vindicateitself,

Humanism

is

fully ableit

and so we can now define

as the

philosophic attitude which, without wasting thought upon

attempts to construct experience a priori,take

is

content to

human

experience as the clue to the world of

human

xx

HUMANISMManonhis

experience, content to takeas heis

own

merits, just

to start with, without insisting that he

must

first

be disembowelled of his interests and have his individuality

evaporated

and translated into technical jargon,

before he can be

deemed deserving of

scientific

notice.i.e.

To remember

that

Man

is

the measure

of all things,if

of his whole experience-world, and that

our standard;

measure be provedto

false all

our measurements are vitiatedis

remember

thathis

Man

the

maker of the sciences;

which subserve

human purposesits

to

remember

that an

ultimate philosophy which analyses us

awayits

is

thereby

merely exhibiting

failure

to achieve

purpose, that,

and more that might be stated to the sameroot ofIt

effect, is

the real

Humanism, whenceit,

all its

auxiliary doctrines spring.if

is

a natural consequence, for instance, that," real

the

facts

require

possibilities,

real

indeterminations,

real beginnings, real ends, real evil, real crises, catastrophes

and escapes, a

real

God and

a real moralthings,

life,

just

asin

commonhumanism

sense conceivesas conceptions'

these

may remainx

which philosophy gives up the'

attempt either to

overcome

or to reinterpret."

And

whether or not

Humanismall

will

have to recognise theradical'

ultimate reality of

the gloomier possibilities of James'ssafely be predicted that its'

enumeration,empiricism'

it

may

will grant to the possibilities of 'pluralism

a

more

careful

and unbiassed inquiry than monistic prea social beingnatural that

conceptions have as yet deigned to bestow upon them.

For seeing that man

is

it

is

Humanismuniverseit

should be sympathetic to the view that theultimately 'a joint-stockaffair.'

is

Andis

again,

will

receive with appropriate suspicion

all

attempts tothe formal

explain

away

the

humanfinal

personality which

and1

efficient

andto

causeix.).

ofI

all

explanation,

andfor

James,

Will

Believe

(p.

have substituted

humanism

empiricism.

PREFACEwill

xxiundistorted'

rather

welcome

it

in

its

unmutilated,

immediacy

as (though in an uncongenial tongue) theall

a

priori condition of

knowledge.''

And

so

it

will

approve

of that 'personal idealismspiritual values

which

strives to

redeem the

an

idealistic

absolutism has so treacher-

ously sold into the bondage of naturalism.

With

'

Common

Sense

'

it

will ever

keep

in

touch by

dint of refusing to value or validate the products of merely

speculative analyses, void of purpose

and of

use,

whichtheits

betoken merely a power to play with verbal

phrases.all

Thus Humanismdoctrines whichattitude.

will derive,

combine and include

may

be treated as anticipations of

For Pragmatism

itself is in

the

same case with PersonalItis

Idealism, Radical Empiricism and Pluralism.reality only the application of

in

Humanism to the theory of if human nature as a whole, be the clue to the theory of all experience, then human The purposiveness must irrigate the arid soil of logic.knowledge.If the entire

man,

facts of our thinking, freedsions,will

from

intellectualistic perver-

clearly

show

that

we

are

not

dealing withprocesses,

abstract concatenations

of purely intellectual

but with the rational aims of thinkers.as will be the value

Great therefore,

we must claim

for

Pragmatism as a

method, we must yet concede that

any method he has made, and thatinterpretit.

man is greater than our Humanism must

IVIt is

a well-known fact that things are not only

knownthe

by

their affinities but also

by

their opposites.for

And

fitness of the

term

Humanismbe

our philosophic purpose

could

hardlyits

better

displayed

than

by the ready

transfer of

old associations to a novel context.is

A

humanist philosopher

sure to be keenly interested

xxiiin

HUMANISMhuman thought andsentiment,facts for the

the rich variety of

and unwilling to ignore the actualbolstering

sake of

theory of what

up the narrow abstractions of some a prion 'all men must' think and feel under penalty

of scientific reprobation.

The humanist,

accordingly, will

tend to grow humane, and tolerant of the divergences of attitude which must inevitably spring from the divergentidiosyncrasies

of men.

Humanism,

therefore, will

still

remain opposed to Barbarism.itself in

But Barbarism may show

philosophy in a double guise, as barbarism of

temper and as barbarism ofdefects

which to

this

Both are human style. day remain too common amongdisplays itself in the inveteratein spite of

philosophers.

The former

tendency to sectarianism and intolerance,discredit

theit.

which the history of philosophy heaps uponto

For what could be more ludicrous thanpretence thatall

keep up the

and

must own the sway of some absolute unquestionable creed ? Does not every page ofan unique and personal achievementanother'ssoul

every philosophic history teem with illustrations that aphilosophic systemis

of which not even the servilest discipleship can transfusethefull

flavour

into

?

Why

should

we

therefore blind ourselves to the invincible individuality of

philosophy, and

behold realityit ?

deny each other the precious right to each at the peculiar angle whence he sees

others cannot and will not see as we we lose our temper and the faith that the heavenly harmony can only be achieved by a multitudinous symphony in which each of the myriad centres of experience sounds its own concordant note ? As for barbarism of style, that too is ever rampant,do, should

Why, when

even thoughattained

it no longer reaches the colossal heights by Kant and Hegel. If Humanism can restore

against such forces the lucid writing of the older Englishstyle, it will

make Philosophy once more

a subject gentle-

PREFACEmencan read with pleasure.

xxiii

And

it

can at least contend

that most of the technicalities which disfigure philosophic

writings

are

totally

unneeded, andis

that

the

stringing

together of abstractions

both barbarous and dangerous.it

Pedagogicallystudent,

it

is

barbarous, because

nauseates the

and because abstract ideas need to be illuminedillustrations to fix

by concreteallyit

them

in the

mind

:

logic-

is

dangerous, because

abstractions

mostly take

the form of worn-out metaphors which are like sunken

rocks in navigation, so that thereof error and

is

no more

fatal

cause

deception than the trust in abstract dictareal

which by themselves mean nothing, and whoselies in

meaning

the applications, which are not supplied.

In history, however, the great antithesis has been be-

tween Humanism and Scholasticism.easily

This also weits

mayFori

adopt, withoutis

detracting

from

force.

Scholasticism

one of the great

facts in

human

nature,

and a fundamental weakness of the learned world.as ever,it

Now,spirit

is

a spirit of sterilising pedantry that avoidslife

beauty, dreads clearness and deteststhat grovels infutile

and grace, a

muddy

technicality,

buries itself

in

theit-

burrowings of valueless researches, and conceals

self

from human insight by the dust-clouds of desiccatedit

rubbish which

raises.

Unfortunately the

scholastic

temper

is

one which

their

mode

of

life

induces in proit

fessors as easily as indigestion,

and frequently

rendersis

them the worst enemies of

their subjects.it

This

de-

plorable but might be counteracted, were

not thought

essential to a reputation for scientific profundity at least

to seem scholastic.

Humanism

therefore has before

it

an

arduous fight with the Dragon of Scholasticism, which,asit

were, deters

men from approaching

the golden applesin

that cluster on the tree of knowledge

the garden of

the Hesperides.

And

lastly,

may we

not emphasise that the old associ-

xxivations of the

HUMANISMword would?

still

connect withshall

Humanismit

a

Renascence of Philosophy

And

we not accept?

this

reminiscence as an

omen

for the futurestill

For

is

clear,

assuredly, that Philosophy has

to be born again tostill

enter on her kingdom, and that her votaries must

be

born again to purge their systems of theinveterate

taint

of an

barbarism.

verge, perhaps,

upon the

fanciful

But some of these suggestions it suffices to have shown:

that

Humanism makesand that

a goodin

name

for the

viewsits

I

seek

to label thus,its

such extension of

meaning

old associations lose no force but rather gain a subtler

flavour.

Toit

claim that in

its

philosophic useis

Humanism maydeny thatvain,

retain its old associations

not, however, toIt

must enter

also into

new

relations.

would be

for instance, to

attempt concealment of the fact that toits

Naturalism and Absolutism Naturalismtracingis

antagonismuseful as a

is

intrinsic.

valid

enough and

method of

the

connexions that permeate reality from the:

lowest to the highest level

but when taken as the last

word of philosophy it subjects the human to the arbitrament of its inferior. Absolutism, on the other hand,cherishes ambitions to attain the

superhuman

;

but, rather

than admititself

its

failure,

it

deliberately prefers to delude

with shadows, and to reduce concrete reality to the

illusory

adumbration of a phantom Whole.that whereas Naturalismit is

The

difference

thus

is this,

worthy of respect

for the

honest work

does, and has a real use as a partial

methoduse,

in subordination to the whole,its

Absolutism has noillusion.

and

explanatory valuewithit

is

nothing butwill

As comparedmiddle path;

these,

Humanism

pursue

the

will

neither reject ideals because theyit

are not realised, nor yet despise the actual because

can

conceive ideals.

It willit

not think the worst of Nature,its

but neither will

trust

an Absolute beyond

ken.

PREFACEI

xxv

pagesof

am well aware that the ideas of which the preceding may have suggested the barest outline are capable endless working out and illustration. And though Imade noassertion that could notrealiseif assailed, I

believe myself to have

be fully vindicated

most keenly that

a complete statement of the Humanist position far transcends, not only

my own

powers, but those of any singleto

man.

But

I

hoped that those who were disposed

sym-

pathy and open-mindedness would pardon the defects andoverlook the gaps in this informal survey of a gloriousprospect, while to thosein

who

are too imperviously encased

habit or in sloth, or too deeply severed fromI

me byoffence,

an alien idiosyncrasy,bringconviction,little,

knew

that

I

could never hope to

however much, nor to avoidsay.sail

however

I

might try to

Andits

so

I

thought the

good ship Humanism might

on

adventurous quest

for the Islands of the Blest with the lighter freight of these

essays as safely and hopefully as with the heaviest cargo.F. C. S.

SCHILLER.

Oxford, August

1903.

CONTENTSESSAYI.

PAGE

The Ethical

Basis of Metaphysics

'

.

i

II.

'Useless' Knowledge

1844.

III.

Truth

.

IV. Lotze's

Monism

.

.

.

62

V.

Non- Euclidean Geometry and the Kantiana Priori. .

85"

VI.VII.

The Metaphysics of the Time-Process.Reality and 'Idealism'. .

95

.110128157 166

VIII.IX.

Darwinism and Design

The Place of

Pessimism in Philosophy

X.

Concerning Mephistopheles

XI.

On Preserving Appearancesand Substance.

.

183.

XII. Activity

204 228

XIII.

The Desire for Immortality

.

XIV. The Ethical Significance of Immortality

250

XV. Philosophy and the Scientific Investigationof a Future Life. .

266

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSARGUMENTThe Place'

1

of Conduct in Philosophy (a) The absolutist reduction of Conduct to appearance ; (6) the pragmatist reaction which makes conduct primary and thought secondary. Is Pragmatism irrationalism ? No, but it explains it by exposing the inadequacy of intellectualism. Ways of reaching Pragmatism (i) by justification of 'faith' against 'reason,' (2) historical, (3) evolutionary. The definition of Pragmatism. Its relation to psychological teleology. The supremacy of ' Good over True and ' Real.' Kant's Copernican Revolution, and the complication of the question of reality with that of our knowledge. A further similar step necessitated by the purposvieness of actual knowing. The function of:

'

'

'

'

the will in cognition.

'

Reality

'

as the response to a will toaction.

know, andI)

quasi-personal ; (3) metaphysics quasi-ethical ; (4) Pragmatism as a tonic the venture of faith and freedom ; (5) the moral stimulus of Pragmatism.it:

therefore dependent in part cannot be indifferent to us ;

on our

Consequently

(

*

reality

(2) our relations to

has Philosophy to say of Conduct? Shall it high or low, exalt it on a pedestal for the adoration of the world or drag it in the mire to beplaceit1 This essay, originally an Ethical Society address, appeared in the July It is now reprinted with a 1903 number of the International Journal of Ethics. few additions, the chief of which is the long note on pp. n-12. Its title has of course been objected to as putting the cart before the horse. To which it is easy to reply that nowadays it is no longer impracticable to use a motor car for the removal of a dead horse. And the paradox implied in the title is, of course, intentional. It is a conscious inversion of the tedious and unprofitable disquisitions on the metaphysical basis of this, that, and the other, which an erroneous conception of philosophical method engenders. They are wrong in method, because we have not de facto a science of first principles of unquestionable truth from which we can start to derive the principles of the special sciences. The converse of this is the fact, viz. that our principles are postulated by the needs, and slowly first secreted by the labours, of the special sciences, or of such preliminary exercises of our intelligence as build up the common-sense view of life. And so what my title means is, not an attempt to rest the final synthesis upon a single science, but rather that among the contributions of the special'

What

'

'

'

and must have,

sciences to the final evaluation of experience that of the highest, decisive weight.

viz. ethics,

has,

B

2

HUMANISM

i

Shall it equate trampled on by all superior persons ? Philosophers it with the whole or value it as nought? have, of course, considered the matter, though not perhaps with as great success, or as carefully as they ought.

And

so the relations of the theory to the practice of life, of cognition to action, of the theoretical to the practical reason, form a difficult and complicated chapter in the that history one fact, however, stands out clearly, viz. that the claims on both sides are so large and so insistent that it is hardly possible tohistory of thought.1

From

compromise between them.ofhis

The philosopher

is

not on

the whole a lover of compromise, despite the solicitations

man

lower nature. He will not, like the ordinary of sense, subscribe to a plausible platitude like, e.g.

Matthew Arnold's famous dictum that Conduct is threeMatthew Arnold was not a philosopher, fourths of Life. and the very precision of his formula arouses scientific suspicions. But anyhow the philosopher's imperiouslogic does not deal in quarters

Ccesar aut nullus ;

naught.

it is prone to argue aut Conduct be not the whole life, it is Which therefore shall it be ? Shall Conduct be:

if

the substance of the All, or the vision of a

Now,

it

alternativeinevitable.'

dream ? would seem at first that latterly the second seems to have grown philosophically almost For, under the auspices of the Hegelizing

Philosophy has uplifted herself once more to contemplation of the Absolute, of the unique Whole in which all things are included and transcended. Now whether this conception has any value for metaphysics is a moot point, on which I have elsewhere expressed a decided opinion 2 but there can hardly be a pretence of denying that it is the death of morals. For the ideal of the Absolute Whole cannot be rendered compatible with the antithetical valuations which form the vital atmosphere of human agents. They are partial appreciations, which vanish from the standpoint of the Whole. Without the distinctions of Goodidealists,'

a metaphysical

;

1

Cp.

the

essay on

'

Useless

'

Knowledge2

Aristotle.

for its treatment by Riddles of the Sphinx, ch. a.

Plato

and

i

ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSEvil,

3

and

Right and Wrong, Pleasure and Pain, Self and

Then and Now, Progress and Decay, human life would be dissolved into the phantom flow of an unmeanothers,

ing mirage.must, like

Absolute all moral distinctions be swallowed up and disappear. The All is raised above all ethical valuation and moral criticism it is beyond Good and Evil it is timelessly perfect, and therefore incapable of improvement. It transcends all our antitheses, because it includes them. And so to the metaphysician it seems an easy task to compose the perfection of the whole out of the imperfections of its parts he has merely to declare that the point of view of human action, that of ethics, is not and cannot be final. It is an illusion which has grownin theall

But

others,

'

:

'

;

:

transparent to the sage.ethics wanes.

And

so,

in

proportion as his

insight into absolute reality grows clearer, his interest inIt must be confessed, moreover, that metaphysicians no longer shrink from this avowal. The typical leader of this philosophic fashion, Mr. F. H. Bradley, never attempts to conceal his contempt for ethical considerations,

nor omits a sneer at the pretensions of practice to

" Make the be heard in the High Court of Metaphysics. 1 " and then realise moral point of view absolute," he cries, your position. You have become not merely irrational, but you have also broken with every considerable

religion."

And"ButThataI

this is

how heI

dismisses the appeal to practice, 2

if so,

what,3

may

be asked,not

is

the result in practice?;

reply at onceprejudice

is

my

business

"

it is

merely

" hurtful

" if " irrelevant

appeals to practical

allowed to make themselves heard." Altogether I can conceive nothing more pulverising to ethical aspiration than chapter xxv. of Mr. Bradley'sresults are

Appearance and Reality.^1

3is

Appearance and Reality, pp. 500-501. But does not this "hurtful" reaffirm the

2 Ibid. p.

450.

ethical valuation

which Mr. Bradley

trying to exclude ? * If in any one's mind any lingering doubts have survived as to the purport of this philosophic teaching, he has only to turn to the ingenious but somewhat

4

HUMANISMAndthe worst ofit all

'

ethics follows logically

is that this whole treatment of and legitimately from the general method of philosophising which conducts to the meta-

physical assumption of the Absolute.

Fortunately, however, there appears to be a natural tendency when the consequences of a point of view have been stated without reserve, and become plain to the meanest intelligence, to turn round and try something fresh. By becoming openly immoralist, metaphysic has And so, created a demand for its moral reformation.quite recently, there has

become

noticeable a

movement

which repudiates the assumptions and reverses the conclusions of the metaphysical criticism of ethics which we have been considering. Instead of regarding contemplation of the Absolute asin a diametrically opposite direction,

the highest form oftrivial

human

activity,

it

sets

it

aside as

and unmeaning, and puts purposeful action above Instead of supposing that Action purposeless speculation. is one thing and Thought something alien and other, and that there is not, therefore, any reason to anticipate that the pure contemplations of the latter will in any way relate to or sanction the principles which guide the former, it treats Thought as a mode of conduct, as anintegral part of activeresults as irrelevant,itlife.

Instead of regarding practical

Practical Value an essential And so far from admitting determinant of theoretic truth. the claim to independence of an irresponsible intelligence, it regards knowledge as derivative from conduct and as

makes

involving distinctively moral qualities and responsibilities in

a perfectly definite and traceable way.

In short, instead

of being reduced to the nothingness of an illusion, Conduct is reinstated as the all-controlling influence in every

department of life. Now, I cannot but believe that all effective ethical effort ultimately needs a definite basis of assumptions concerning the nature of life as a whole, and it is becauseflippant

and prolix exposition of the same doctrine in Mr. A. E. Taylor's Problem of Conduct. To Mr. Taylor the real problem of Conduct would appear to be why any one should continue to hanker after so manifest an absurdity as a

rule of conduct.

i

ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSam

5

I

willI

convinced that this new method of philosophising supply such a basis in an almost perfect way, that venture to avow myself its earnest advocate. If I

am

asked for

its

name,

I

can only say that

it

has been

called

Pragmatism by the chief author of its importance, Professor William James, whose recent book, The Varieties

of Religious Experience, soof philosophicliterature

many

others besides the readers

have been enjoying. But the name in this case does even less than usual to explain the meaning, and as the nature of Pragmatism has been greatly misunderstood, and even writers of intelligence and repute have conspicuously failed to grasp it, I musttry to putit

in a clearer light.I shall

a few be reached, before explaining how it should, in my opinion, be defined. For a considerable prejudice against it has arisen in some minds by reason of the method by which Professor James has approached it. Professor James first unequivocally advanced the pragmatist doctrine in connection with what he calls the Will to believe.' : Now this Will to believe was put forward as an intellectual right (in certain cases) to decide between alternative views, each of which seemed to make a legitimate appeal to our nature, by other than purely intellectual considerations, viz. their emotional interest

And

perhapsin

best begin

by mentioning

of the

ways

which Pragmatism

may

'

and

practical

value.

Although Professor James

laid

down

a

number

of conditions limiting the applicability of

which was the willingness and to abide by the results of to take the risks involved subsequent experience, it was not perhaps altogether astonishing that his doctrine should be decried as rankhis Will-to-believe, the chief of

irrationalism.

Irrationalism seemed a familiar and convenient labelfor the1

new

doctrine.

For irrationalism

is

a permanent

had, however, laid the foundation of his doctrine as long ago as 1879 Mind. And, though the name is new, in some form or other the Indeed, it recognition of the thing runs through the whole history of thought. would be strange if it had been otherwise, seeing that, as we contend, the actual procedure of the human mind has always been (unconsciously) pragmatist.

He

m

an

article in

6or

HUMANISM

i

continually recrudescent phenomenon of the moral consciousness, the persistent vogue of which it has always

been hard to explain.at the present

It is ably and brilliantly exemplified day by Mr. Balfour's Foundations of Belief, and, in an extreme and less defensible form, by Mr. Benjamin Kidd. And if, instead of denouncing it, we try

to

understand

it,

we

shall

not find thatit

it

is

entirely

absurd.

At bottom indeed

indicates

little

more than a

defect in the current rationalism, and a protest against the rationalistic blindness towards the non- intellectualfactors in the foundation of beliefs.

Sense such has always shown a certain sympathy what is called the pure protests against the pretensions of It intellect to dictate to man's whole complex nature.withall

And Common

has always

felt

that there are

'

reasons of the heart of

which the head knows surpasses mere understanding, and that these possess a higher rationality which a narrow intellectualism has failed to comprehend. Now if one had to choose between Irrationalism and Intellectualism, there would be no doubt that the former would have to be preferred. It is a less violent departure from our actual behaviour, a less grotesque caricature of Like Common Sense, therefore, our actual procedure. Pragmatism sympathises with Irrationalism in its blind revolt against the trammels of a pedantic Intellectualism. But Pragmatism does more it not only sympathises, it;

nothing,' postulates of a faith that

explains.

It

vindicates the rationality of Irrationalism,;

without becoming itself irrational it restrains the extravagance of Intellectualism, without losing faith in the intellect. And it achieves this by instituting a fundamental analysis of the common root both of the reason and of the emotional revulsion against its pride. By showingthe 'pure' reason to be a pure figment, and a psychologicalimpossibility,to

and the real structure of the actual reason be essentially pragmatical, and permeated through and through with acts of faith, desires to know and wills toto

believe,

possible,

disbelieve and to make believe, it renders nay unavoidable, a reconciliation between a

i

ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSis

7

reason which

humanised and a

faith which is rationalised in

the very process which shows their antithesis to be an error.

That, however, Pragmatismintervening in

should

have

begun

by-

the ancient controversy between Reason

and Faith was something of an accident. In itself it might equally well have been arrived at by way of a moral revolt from the unfruitful logic-chopping and aimless quibbling which is often held to be the sum total ofphilosophy.

Orcritical

again,

it

might be reached, most

instructively,

by a

consideration ofLotze,1

many

historic views, notably those

and of the unsolved problems which they leave on our hands. Or, once more, by observing the actual procedure of the various sciences and their motives for establishing and maintaining the truth ofof''

Kant and

their various propositions,

we may comewhatin

to realise that

what worksaccept as'

in

practice

is

actual

knowing we

true.'

is

But to me personally the straightest road to Pragmatism one which the extremest prejudice can scarce suspect Instead of truckling to the encroachments of theology. of saying like Professor James, so all-important is it to'

secure the right action that (in cases of real intellectualit is lawful for us to adopt the belief most congenial with our spiritual needs and to try whether our

alternatives)

faith will not

make

it

come

true,' I

should rather say 'the

traditional notion

of beliefs determined by pure reason

For how can there be such is wholly incredible. How, that is, can we so a thing as " pure " reason ? separate our intellectual function from the whole complex of our activities, that it can operate in real independence I cannot but conceive the of practical considerations ? reason as being, like the rest of our equipment, a weaponalone.in

a means of achieving must follow that the practical use, which has developed it, must have stamped itself upon its inmostthe struggle for existence andIt

adaptation.

done

Or, as Professor James suggested, and as Prof. A. W. Moore has actuallyin the case of Locke (see his Functional versus the Representational Theory of Knowledge), by a critical examination of the English philosophers.1

8structure, even ifit

HUMANISM

i

has not moulded it out of pre-rational instincts. In short, a reason which has not practical value for the purposes of life is a monstrosity, a morbid aberration or failure of adaptation,

which natural selection mustI

sooner or later wipe away.'It is in

some such way

that

should prefer to pave theit

way for an appreciation Hence I may now venturerecognition

of what we mean by Pragmatism.to define

as the thorough

that the purposive character of mental life generally must influence and pervade also our most re-

motely cognitivetheory oflife

activities.it is

1

In other words,

a conscious application to the of the psychological facts of cognition as

In the light they appear to a teleological Voluntarism. of such a teleological psychology the problems of logic and metaphysics must appear in a new light, and decisive weight must be given to the conceptions of Purpose

and End.

Or

again,

it

is

a systematic protest against

the practice of ignoring in our theories of

Thought and

our actual thinking, and the relation of all our actual realities to the ends of our practical life. It is an assertion of the sway of human valuations over every region of our experience, and a denial that such valuation can validly be eliminated from theReality the purposiveness ofall

contemplation of any reality

we know.teleological valuationis

And inasmuch

as such

also

the special sphere of ethical inquiry, Pragmatism

may

be

1 This is wider, and I think more fundamental, than any of the definitions in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy (ii. pp. 321-322), for the reason that the logical development of pragmatist method in my essay on Axioms as Postulates came out (in Personal Idealism) too recently to be available for the purposes of the Dictionary. I think, however, that intrinsically also neither Peirce's, nor James's, nor Baldwin's accounts are quite adequate. In Peirce's sense, that a conception is to be tested by its practical effects, the principle is so obvious as to be comparatively unimportant, and, perhaps, as he says, is somewhat a matter of youthful buoyancy. James's definition, that the whole meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, does not emphasise the essential priority of action to thought, and does not explicitly correlate it with his own will to believe.' Baldwin tries to confine it to the genetic sphere and to deny that it yields a philosophy of reality. But his own subsequent account (s.v. Truth) of the psychology of the truth-valuation seems inconsistent with this and far more satisfactory. He fails, moreover, to explain how he can get at reality withoat knowing it, and how our estimations of what truth is can disregard and become nd ependent of our modes of establishing it.' ''

i

ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICSAta blowit

9

said to assign metaphysical validity to the typical

method

of ethics.of

awards to the ethical conception

Good supreme authority over the logical conception of True and the metaphysical conception of Real. The Good becomes a determinant both of the True and of the Real. For from the pursuit of the latter we may nevereliminate the reference to the former. Our apprehension of the Real, our comprehension of the True, is alwayseffected by beings who are aiming at the attainment of some Good, and it seems a palpable absurdity to deny that this fact makes a stupendous difference. I should confidently claim, therefore, that by Pragmatism a further step has been taken in the analysis of our experience which amounts to an important advance in

that self-knowledge on which our knowledge of the world depends. Indeed, this advance seems to me to be of a

magnitude comparablethat which gave to

with,

and no

less

momentous

than,

the epistemological question priority

over theIt is

ontological.

generally recognised as the capital achievement of modern philosophy to have perceived that a solution

What is Reality? is not has been decided how Reality can come within our ken. Before there can be a real for us at all, the Real must be knowable, and the notion of an unof the ontological questionpossible untilit

knowable

reality

is

useless,

because

it

abolishes

itself.

The

true formulation therefore of the ultimate question of

metaphysics must become What can I know as real? thus the effect of what Kant called the Copernican revolution in philosophy is that ontology, the theory of Reality, comes to be conditioned by epistemology, the theory of our knowledge. But this truth is incomplete until we realise all that is involved in the knowledge being ours and recognise the Our knowing is not the real nature of our knowing.

And

mechanical operation of a passionless which

'

pure

'

intellect,

And

Grinds out Good and grinds out 111, has no purpose, heart, or will.

io

HUMANISM;

i

Pure intellection is not a fact in nature it is a logical which will not really answer even for the purposes of technical logic. In reality our knowing is driven and guided at every step by our subjective interests and These preferences, our desires, our needs and our ends.fiction

form the motive powers also of our intellectual life. Now what is the bearing of this fact on the traditional dogma of an absolute truth and ultimate reality existing It would for themselves apart from human agency? utterly debar us from the cognition of Reality as it is in if such a thing there itself and apart from our interests' '

were.

impose the conditions under which Only such aspects of alone Reality can be revealed. Reality can be revealed as are not merely knowable but as are objects of an actual desire, and consequent attempt, to know. All other realities or aspects of Reality, which there is no attempt to know, necessarily remain unknown, and for us unreal, because there is no one to look for them. Reality, therefore, and the knowledge thereof, essentially presuppose a definitely directed effort to know. And, like other efforts, this effort is purposive

For our

interests

;

it is

necessarily inspired

by the conception of some good

which it aims. Neither the question of Fact, therefore, nor the question of Knowledge can be raised without raising also the question of Value. Our Facts when analysed turn out to be Values,' and the conception of 'Value' therefore becomes more ultimate than that ofat'' ' '

Fact.'

Our

valuations thus pervade our whole experience,'

consent to recognise.

whatever knowledge we is no knowing without valuing, if knowledge is a form of Value, or, in other words, a factor in a Good, Lotze's anticipation 1 has been fully realised, and the foundations of metaphysics have actually been found to lie in ethics.

and

affect

whatever

fact,'

'

'

If,

then, there

In

this

becomes what ?

What'

way'

theis

ultimate

question

for

philosophy

Real

Reality for one aiming at knowing means, real for what purpose ? to what1

Metaphysics (Eng. Tr.

),

ii.

p. 319.

i

ETHICAL BASIS OF METAPHYSICS

n

end?

in what use ? And the answer always comes in terms of the will to know which puts the question. This at once yields a simple and beautiful explanation of the different accounts of Reality which are given in the

various sciences and philosophies.

The purpose

of the

questions being different, so

is

their purport,

and so must

be the answers. For the direction of our effort, itself determined by our desires and will to know, enters as a necessary and ineradicable factor into whatever revelation of Reality we can attain. The response to our questions is always affected by their character, and that is in our power. For the initiative throughout is ours. It is for usto consult the oracle of Nature or to refrain to formulate our;

it is

for us

demands and

to put our questions.

If

Nature will not respond, and we must try again. But we can never be entitled to assume either that our action makes no difference or that nature contains no answer to a question we have never thought

we

question

amiss,

to put.1

1

That the Real has a determinate nature which the knowing reveals but does so that our knowing makes no difference to it, is one of those sheer assumptions which are incapable, not only of proof, but even of rational defence. It is a survival of a crude realism which can be defended only, in a fragmatist manner, on the score of its practical convenience, as an avowed fiction. On this ground and as a mode of speech we can, of course, have no quarrel with it. But as an ultimate analysis of the fact of knowing it is an utterly gratuitousnotaffect,

interpretation.in the act of'

The

plain fact'

is

that

we come

into contact with reality only

knowing or experiencing it. As unknowable, therefore, the Real The situation therefore in no wise is nil, as unknown, it is only potentially real. the assumption that what the Real is in the act of knowing, it is also sanctions One might as well argue that because an orator is outside that relation. eloquent in the presence of an audience, he is no less voluble in addressing himself. The simple fact is that we know the Real as it is when we know it ; we know nothing whatever about what it is apart from that process. It is

And I can see meaningless therefore to inquire into its nature as it is in itself. no reason why the view that reality exhibits a rigid nature unaffected by our treatment should be deemed theoretically more justifiable than its converse, a travesty of Pragmatism which that it is utterly plastic to our every demand The actual situation is of course has attained some popularity with its critics. a case of interaction, a process of cognition in which the subject and the 'object' determine each the other, and both 'we' and 'reality' are involved, There is no warrant therefore for the assumption and, we might add, evolved. that either of the poles between which the current passes could be suppressed What we ought to say is that when the mind knows without detriment. reality both are affected, just as we say that when a stone falls to the ground both it and the earth are attracted. are driven, then, to the conviction that the determinate nature of reality It is merely does not subsist outside or beyond the process of knowing it. a lesson of experience that we have enshrined in the belief that it does so subsist.

'

'

'

We

'

'

'

'

'

12It is

HUMANISM

i

no exaggeration therefore to contend, with Plato, that in a way the Good, meaning thereby the conception of a final systematisation of our purposes, is the supreme controlling power in our whole experience, and that in abstraction from it neither the True nor the Real can exist. For whatever forms of the latter we may have

some purposive activity, some conception of a good to be attained, was involved as a condition of the discovery. If there had been no activity on our part, or if that activity had been directed to ends other than itdiscovered,

was, there could not have been discovery, or that discovery. must discard, therefore, the notion that in the

We

constitution of the world

we count

for

nothing, thatis

itis,

matters not what

wedo.

do, because RealityIt is true

what

it

whateveractionis

we mayessential

on the contrary that our

and indispensable, that to some extent the world (our world) is of our making, and that without To what extent and us nothing is made that is made. in what directions the world is plastic and to be mouldedThings behave in similar ways in their reaction to modes of treatment, the From this we have chosen to differences between which seem to us important. infer that things have a rigid and unalterable nature. It might however have been better to infer that therefore the differences must seem unimportant to the things.

The truth is that the nature of things is not determinate but determinable, like that of our fellow-men. Previous to trial it is indeterminate, not merely for ourignorance, but really and from every point of view, within limits which it is our business to discover. It grows determinate by our experiments, like human character. all know that in our social relations we frequently put questions which are potent in determining their own answers, and without the putting would leave their subjects undetermined. 'Will you love me, hate me, trust me, help me?' are conspicuous examples, and we should consider it absurd to argue that because a man had begun social intercourse with another by knocking him down, the hatred he had thus provoked must have been a pre-existent reality which the blow had merely elicited. All that the result entitles us to assume is a capacity for social feeling variously responsive to various modes of stimulation. Why, then, should we not transfer this conception of a determinable indetermination to nature at large, why should we antedate the results of our manipulation and regard as unalterable facts the reactions which our ignorance and blundering provoke ? To the objection that even in our social dealings not all the responses are indeterminate, the reply is that it is easy to regard them as having been determined by earlier experiments. In this way, then, the notion of a fact-in-itself might become as much of a philosophic anachronism as that of