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SCENARIOS AND VARIANTS:

FAST CARRIERSBurning Questions and Secret Ships

by Chistopher PerlebergThe 'fast" in Fast Carriers is not to be takenas a literal description of its intricate routineof play. Undaunted by its complexities, Mr.Perleberg presents us with a critical overview,some historical translations, and someinteresting revisions to make that routine alittle more complex. Just to snap things up abit, you see. -RAS

Fast Carriers presents nine scenarios, fromPearl Harbor (a solitaire slaughter) to ahypothetical carrier action in the North Sea.But the real "heart" of the game is the groupof scenarios dealing with the four "classic"actions of World War Two: Coral Sea,Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz.It is in these four scenarios that the tacticalmap is used; only here does all that strategicmaneuvering end with the actual attacksby the dive and torpedo bombers, and thedefensive efforts of the CAP and AA fire. Inthe modern scenarios, the tactical sequenceis nicely abstracted; the different weaponssystems involved necessitate it. This abstractprocess, however, can't match the satis-faction of diving your very own Dauntless,with your sights on Akagi. This article willexamine these four scenarios, offering first abrief description of the game, and thendiscussing some ways in which the rules canbe changed to add to it.

The game operates on three levels: strategic,operational and tactical. The strategic phase,played on one of several strategic maps onthe game sheet, involves the movement oftask forces, their efforts to search out theenemy, and the resolution of surface combat.This surface combat is slightly abstractedand occurs mostly in-you guessed it-theGuadalcanal hex. Braver souls may try tointegrate CA into the game, but it probablyisn't worth it; it would take too much fromthe later carrier actions. The searchprocedure is especially well handled; eachPlayer must allocate so many of his aircraftto the different search patterns to try to spotthe Enemy task forces. This procedure issimple enough, but the complications arisethrough the use of dummies and "searcheffectiveness" chits. Every time his taskforces are spotted by the Enemy Player, theOwning Player picks one of these chits foreach task force spotted. The chits includeresults from "Report True" to "ReportFalse" (everybody's favorite), and includevarious levels of approximation. The OwningPlayer then tells the other Player, within theguidelines of the chit draw, what has beenspotted. Because the draw may allow him tolie about or exaggerate the composition ofthe spotted force, neither Player can ever becompletely sure about which force containswhich ships until an attack is committed; it is

not unusual to launch a full strike against anEnemy carrier force, only to find a dummytask force, or a mere CVL.

The operational level is played on separatecards, one card for each task force. It is herethat each Player allocates his aircraft assetsto the missions of strike, search or combat airpatrol (CAP). The individual carriersportray three status levels for their aircraft:their planes may be in dead storage in thehangar, being armed and fueled, or on theflight deck, awaiting take-off. Where theseaircraft are at any given time is important;being caught with aircraft on the flight deckor in arm and fuel lowers the DefenseStrength of the carrier and makes it easier tosink, so each Player must constantly attemptto anticipate the other's actions-althoughthe radar rules make this task far easier forthe U.S. Player.

The operational display also involves thecreation of strikes. Each strike is formed intowaves; the more waves in a strike, the morechance there is of making contact with thetarget, but then there is also more chance oryour attack force arriving piecemeal andbeing downed in detail. In addition, there arerange limitations to be considered. The F4FWildcat, for instance, can only stay aloft forthree operational turns (3 hours of real time)and can only hit targets two hexes away andreturn safely. If still in the air when its timeruns out, it "splashes" and is lost. The rangelimitations are handled simply, and provideyet another consideration each Player mustweigh.

The World War Two scenarios include atactical sequence on the mapsheet's tacticaldisplay [one hex 1000 yards; oneTac-Turn = 40 seconds], where the actualforces, represented by counters for eachindividual ship and each group of six planes,maneuver for position and attack. Each typeof weapon must be used characteristically:torpedo bombers must come in low, in astraight line at least three hexes in length,and attack "anvil" style from the front. Divebombers must enter the target hex from thestern and dive from high altitudes with theirweapon. Level bombers, like the B-17, mustmove six hexes in a straight line at highaltitude to attack (it's pretty worthless,though, for they never seem to hit anything).Damage is taken in the familiar DI-D4sequence, with D3 representing dead-in-water and D4, sunk. Aircraft counters aredouble-sided, and aircraft require only a D2for destruction, taking a Dl result byflipping over to half-strength.

Appropriately, there is an incredible amountof luck in this sequence. Waves may arrive

one at a time or not at all. The attackers mayenter the map from the wrong direction andhave to fly through heavy doses of CAP andAA defenses to attack. Because of the search-effectiveness system, they may not even findanything to attack! Best of all, the CRT is setso that a roll of "1" at the highest possibleodds results in a "no effect." This can be, tosay the least, quite a break for the defenderand a disaster for the attacker; it can be hardenough to launch one such attack persequence. But that's the nature of carrierwarfare!

There are other elements to Fast Carriers, ofcourse, but those are the basics: search,commit and attack. The game also includesland airbases, shore bombardment, weather,night Turns, and coast-watchers. In themodern scenarios, there are submarines andlong range interceptions.

One can really learn a lot from the game, ifone is willing to take the time. Fast Carriersis a long game; some scenarios have takenfive to six hours to play. The game can be"long hours of boredom followed by a fewminutes of sheer terror," to paraphrase acontemporary fighter pilot, if a Playerdoesn't pay strict attention to the game andlets things happen by chance. The game alsorequires a lot of space; each Player can haveup to eight task forces, and each TF requiresits own operational card. My advice is to picka space where you can carryon unseen byyour opponent and where you can lock outthe cat: mine once took to batting Zuikakuabout the room, something that neverhappened at the Coral Sea. It helps the gamesome if you make two copies of the strategicmap involved, so that each Player can planhis moves in advance without giving hisintentions away through fingerprints on themapsheet. It is possible to Xerox sections,and then each Player can draw and makenotes right on the copy, away from hisopponent and in front of his operationalcards. [It's also possible to cut up theStrategic Maps using a straightedge andrazor. This alleviates the space problem.-RAS]

There are, however, some flaws in the gameat each level. In the following sections I'd liketo consider what they are and offer simpleways to correct them, and by doing soimprove the game.

Let us first consider the famous divebombing attack at Midway in game terms.The three Japanese carriers, Akagi, Kagaand Soryu are caught Game-Turn ThreeDay Two, with aircraft in both Arm & Fueland Flight Deck Boxes, due to Nagumo'sindecision over which target to strike. In

game terms, their Defense Strengths arereduced to zero. The first wave of the U.S.attack, 6 TBD units, has made its run andhas been slaughtered, obtaining no hits. OneTBD unit.escapes. All the Japanese CAP hasbeen pulled down to low altitude,and so is unready for the next two waves ofdive bombers, which arrive simultaneously.Three SBD units, Leslie's from Yorktown,attack Soryu, making (in game terms) twooptimum attacks of +6 and +3. The proba-bility of results is as follows: No effect - 11%;Dl - 41%; D3 - 13%; and D4 - 18%. Histori-cally, the Soryu takes three hits and sinks onGame-Turn Five of the same day.

The Kaga and Akagi are attacked at thesame time; McClusky's 6 SBD unitsbreaking up into two roughly equal groups tomake their attacks. Japanese AA fire isincredibly light, and the CAP is still strainingfor altitude. Both carriers are attacked at thesame odds as Soryu, Kaga taking four hitsand sinking on Game-Turn Five, and Akagi,attacked by slightly fewer aircraft, takesthree hits and is abandoned by Nagumo atthe end of Game-Turn Three and sinks onGame-Turn One, Day Three.

The point is that, historically, all threecarriers sank, an event that has about a .05%chance of happening in the game. Imentioned earlier that Fast Carriers requiresa lot of good luck to win, but in readingaccounts of the battle, one sees that thesinkings were not all that lucky; the real luckcame in the lack of fighter cover and AAdefenses, and in the way in which the carrierswere caught with all that ordnance on thedeck, factors that were already present in ourrecreation. Yet it is next to impossible torecreate this epic attack in the game.Something is clearly wrong.

at's missing here is a rule regarding fire.three ships burned furiously after the

mbings. Kaga and Akagi probablyreceived D3 results from the attacks, and the

_'U probably suffered a D2. But the fireswere ignited finished them off, as

• pened to the Lexington at Coral Sea.e, there is an attempt made to reflect thisr; this is why Defense Strength ised by aircraft units in Arm & Fuel and

-=-_ t Deck Boxes. But while these rules mayunt for the greater initial damage, theyt provide for the lingering danger of fireclaimed so many carriers.

• se the following changes in the gamero account for this effect:& 13.72) (Change) This reduction

place only when attacked by dive

(Addition) After all attacks have been=!!C£: for that Operational Game-Turn, a die

to determine the appearance andof fire. [See Fire Appearance Table).

~~ is rolled once for each carrier thatred any kind of damage in thatSequence. One is subtracted fromII if the carrier has at least one unit& Fuel Box; one is subtracted if

- at least one unit in the Flight Deck

Box. If the result is a "no effect," there is nofire and no further die rolling. If the result is"Fire," make a note of the unit. At thebeginning of every Operational Game-Turn,the die must be rolled for each unit on fire.Subtract one if the current damage level isD2; subtract two if the current damage levelis D3. If the result is "Controlled," the fire isconsidered out, and no further die rolls arenecessary. If the result is "No effect," the diemust be rolled on the next Turn. If the resultis "Dl," the damage level of the carrier goesup one level, and the die must be rolledagain on the next Turn.

This rule will allow for the lingering effects offire, and will make the dive bomber a morelethal weapon against carriers. After CoralSea, the U.S. should not subtract from thedie roll when using the Fire AppearanceTable; this will simulate the improved firecontrol systems on U.S. carriers, where C02was flushed through fuel lines when anattack was picked up on radar.

[13.74) FIRE APPEARANCE TABLE

DieRoll Result-1 Fireo Fire1 Fire2 Fire3 No Effect4 No Effect5 No Effect6 No Effect

Subtract 1 if air units in Arm & Fuel;subtract 1 if air units in Flight Deck. See textfor explanation of results.

[13. 74) FIRE RESULTS TABLEDieRoll Result-1 D1o D11 Dl2 No Effect3 No Effect4 Controlled5 Controlled6 Controlled

Subtract 1 if current damage is D2; subtract2 if current damage is D3. See text forexplanation of results.

As can be seen, the U.S. Player, with hishigher complement of dive bombers andimproved fire control, benefits most fromthese changes. The U.S. Player should bethrown a corresponding handicap to eventhings out.

As the game stands, it's hard to understandwhy there aren't more TBD's or TBF'saboard each U.S. carrier; unit for unit theyare twice as lethal as SBD's or SBU's.Historically, this was just not the case. TheAmerican torpedo, with its magnetic pistol,was notoriously unreliable, and had a habitof running too low or exploding beforehitting the target. After the battle of Santa

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Cruz, the Americans couldn't even scuttlethe stationary Hornet with torpedoes; theJapanese had to do the job later with two oftheirs. This situation wasn't taken care ofuntil early 1944, when the magnetic pistolwas removed. The following rules portraythis effect:[13.57] Whenever U.S. torpedo planesattack, a die must be rolled to determinetheir effective Attack Strength. The die isrolled for each unit for that attack. If the unitis a TBD, subtract one from the die roll. Ifthe unit is half-strength, a roll of 1 or 2 givesan effective Strength of 1, etc. A half-strength TBD subtracts two from its die roll.Note that the effective Attack Strength of theTBD can drop to zero.

This rule effectively recreates the unreli-ability of American torpedoes, and theineffectiveness of the TBD (as if a DefenseStrength of "2" isn't enough). The U.S.Player can still use the torpedo bombers, buthe can't count on them, and the dive bomberwill become his main weapon. It's too badhe can't use his TBF's for recon work.

As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Playerbenefits from radar in the later scenarios.The effects of radar are simple, essentiallyallowing the U.S. Player an OperationalTurn's advance warning of an impendingstrike, allowing him to "clear the decks" foraction. While it is the case that, as the rulesmention, long range interception had not yetbeen perfected, using radar, the U.S. couldmake contacts at least 35 miles out, as theydid at Eastern Solomons. I suggest a minorchange in the radar rules that would affectthe Tactical Stage and that would moreclosely simulate the use of radar and CAP:[19.11) (Addition) The Japanese Player mustalso state the altitude status of his units.

[19.14) (Addition) In the Tactical gameset-up, the U.S. Player deploys any units onCAP after the Japanese wave arrival andplacement procedure. Each subsequentJapanese wave arrival (if any) occurs on theFifth Tactical Turn during the Attacker AirMovement Phase, although the Japaneseunits so placed may not move until the FirstTactical Turn of the next Sequence. Notethat this gives the U.S. Player two AirMovement Phases to prepare to intercept. Ifall the Japanese uriits in a wave aredestroyed before Turn Five, the interveningTactical Turns still take place, and the nextwave is still placed on Turn Five during theAttacker Air Movement Phase. (Note: Thisprocedure changes that of Cases 11.2 and11.3.)

These rules add to the U.S. radar advantageby giving him the entry location of theJapanese Player. Play is affected slightly,with the net result being that the Japanesemust work harder to attack. One mightexperiment with rules allowing torpedobombers to "slip in low," or allow a kind of"long range intercept" rule, where U.S. CAPmay enter the entry/exit hexes and interceptaccording to a die roll, and, if no interceptionis made, requiring another die roll to re-enter

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the map, but this is probably complicatingthings too much. The rules presented seem tobe more historically accurate.As far as AA fire for both sides is concerned,I add two hexes in range when the target is athigh altitude. This appears to accentuate thedifferent hazards to dive and torpedobombers, and allows the dive bombers afighting chance to attack. Remember, theyhave to stick around through a Flak AttackPhase before attacking.The damage key on the last page seems tocontradict the text of the rules. Case 9.48, forexample, implies that air units may land on acarrier with a D2 damage result, but the lastpage says no. I say air units land (only) on aD2 carrier, but each unit is "attacked" at +2odds on the Anti-Air CRT. For airbases,units which land on a D3 airbase are"attacked" at +2, and units landing on a D4airbase, at +3. (This changes rule 15.71.)This would simulate the hazards of landingon a landing strip of swiss cheese. If fire rulesare used, air units are prohited from landingon a burning carrier. Another change in thedamage results that seems appropriate wouldbe to declare "sunk" destroyers and CL'swith D2 results. Destroyers especially wereusually unarmored, as were oilers, etc. andtheir predominant defense, speed, is alreadyrepresented by their Defense Strength.

The final problem in the Tactical Phaseinvolves the air bombardment of airbases. Asit stands now, it is next to impossible todamage an airbase through bombing; thepower just isn't there. An attempt is made togive B-I7's more anti-base strength, but thenet result is that every aircraft unit is justabout the same for bombardment purposes:three TBF's affect an airbase exactly thesame as 15 B-I7's. The B-17 can be 160/0better in the unlikely event one manages tomaneuver three, intact units over the airbasesimultaneously, which seldom happens. Thebest solution seems to be to proceed with thetactical routine, but total all the bombard-ment points attacking each hex, and thencon:1ucting three attacks on each hex as onedoes with shore bombardment. This willallow air units to have some effect onairbases without changing the game toomuch.

Most of the above rules changes affect thethird, Tactical Routine in the four majorscenarios. The Operational Phases are fine,although in reading accounts of the battles,one finds discrepancies between the accountsand the flight deck capacity given for thecarriers in the game. This is probably aminor point and not worth changing; anywayI have this thing against changing countervalues. It would, however, prove useful torequire air units to be armed with a specifickind of ordnance: anti-base or anti-ship.This would be noted at the appropriateCarrier Status Display Phase, and wouldaccount for the Japanese actions at Midway.Torpedo planes armed with torpedoes maynot attack land airbases, and dive bombersattacking ships with anti-base weapons getno attack benefit for air units in the Arm &

Fuel Boxes of carriers attacked (the bombsexplode on impact and don't penetrate theFlight Deck). Such a rule can be added withlittle increase in complexity.

The big omission in the operational rulesseems to be the inability of air units to fly aircover missions, or, as they are called inSolomons Campaign, another SPI game,area CAP missions. Land-based aircraft canfly CAP only for the task force that includestheir carrier. This reduces airbases, landbases especially, to a much moreunimportant role. In a game of air/navalaction, there should be some way of usingfighters for a covering force:[9.52] (Change) Fighters, only, may fly CAPfor task forces or bases other than their own.Air units from a carrier may fly CAP for anyTF in the same or adjacent hexes. Air unitsfrom land airbases may fly CAP to the limitof their strike range (Endurance-I). Duringthe Take-off Segment of any daylightOperational Game-Turn, air units may takeoff from their base and be placed in the CAPBox of the appropriate task force or base.(Alternatively, for land-based aircraft flyingCAP at long range, the air units could beplaced in the Strike Box, and EnduranceTracks set, so that the units must "fly" totheir station. This adds complications.) Theair units then function as normal CAP units,subject to range attenuation. If the base fromwhich these units originate is attacked, theseunits are unavailable. Land-based units,only, may switch stations between task forcesin the same hex at any time; however, theymay only engage in the active defense of onetask force or base. They are, in effect, flyingarea CAP as in Solomons Campaign. Allother CAP rules apply.

[9.53] (Addition) Air Cover CAP suffersattenuation to reflect the shuttling of the airunits involved. [See Table.] Simply take thenumber of air units involved, cross-referencewith the range, and arrive at the effectivestrength of the CAP for that target. Forexample, 10 Zekes from Rabaul (hex 0602)are flying Air Cover CAP for a task force in

hex 0605, three hexes away. If attacked, fiveair units would be present for defense. Theother five units may not be used for any otherpurposes. Note that U.S. units at a range oftwo, and Japanese Zekes at a range of threeor four, subtract one from printed AttackStrength.These rules will mostly aid the Japanese, asin most scenarios Rabaul is the only majorairbase. Still, these rules will make the areasurrounding a land airbase or carrier saferfor Friendly units, and present more realisticpossibilities for each Player.On the Strategic Level, in three of thescenarios there arises the problem of theinability of the Japanese to make "slot runs."They can try, of course, but they wind upbeing attacked at least four times, or untilthe U.S. Player runs out of aircraft atHenderson. The research on this point ispuzzling; everybody agrees that the Japanesewould start high speed runs before dark fromjust within range of of the SBD's fromHenderson. Everybody agrees that the rangewas about 200 miles. But everybody alsoagrees that the SBD had an operationalrange of 1000 miles, as reflected by theEndurance Level in the game. Where are themissing 600 miles? Even if the 1000 milefigure represents unloaded range, somethingis still amiss. I have to assume that problemslike fuel shortages are operating here, but nosource I found deals with this problemdirectly. The only solution I can come upwith, for those who desire to make "slotruns," is to limit the endurance of all aircraftfrom Henderson to 2 (in the EasternSolomons and Santa Cruz scenarios only),and allow Japanese DD, CA, CL and BCunits to make a two hex move from eitherhex 1004 or 0905 on Turn Six, and anothertwo hex move to either of those two hexes onTurn One. This is admittedly an abstraction,as the Japanese ships weren't all that fast,but here, as in Solomons Campaign, a specialrule seems to be the only way to deal with"slot runs." One could perhaps justify it bynoting that night falls about 1830 around theequator in August, and Turn Five should

2 3 6 6 7 7

[9.54] AIR COVER ATTENUATION TABLEDistancein hexes Number of air units on CAP

0,1 0,1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

-1122334455

Cross-reference range in hexes for the appropriate nationality with thenumber of air units involved. The number given is the actual number ofunits that would be placed on the Tactical Display in the event of anattack. Note that Japanese units at a range of 3 or 4, or U.S. units at arange of 2 subtract one from their Anti-Air Strength. The British Seafireunits in Case 25.6 may fly Air Cover CAP in the same hex only.

really be a night turn, but this would leaveone, so to speak, with too few hours left in theday.

It's not complicating things too much to addwind into the game. Wind direction isdetermined by the roll of the die at thebeginning of the Plot Phase on Game-TurnOne, and applies throughout the CampaignDay. The scatter pattern in Case 20.2 is usedto determine direction. Wind has two effects:it "regularizes" storm movement, and puts arestriction on taking off and landing aircraft.

[20.21] (Change) Storms move in the generaldirection of the wind. A roll of one or two andthe storm moves one hex to the left of thewind direction; a roll of three or four and thestorm moves one hex in the direction of thewind; a roll of five or six and the storm movesone hex to the right of the wind direction.Roll the die for each storm. .

[20.5] (Addition) Aircraft carriers whicheither launched or landed aircraft in thepreceding Operational Turns may not moveaway from the wind during that StrategicNaval Movement Phase. They may stay inposition or move into the wind. Away fromthe wind is defined as the direction oppositethe wind direction, and the two directionsadjacent to that direction. Landing aircraftrefer to strike aircraft.

These rules account for the fact that carriersmust sail into the wind to launch or retrieveaircraft, a factor which will present morereasons for maneuvering in the game. Therules also make it possible for a Player to tryto follow a storm if he wishes, to stayconcealed. Regardless of popular belief, theweather is not all that random.

The biggest problem with the strategic gameis not the fault of the game itself, but one ofthe "fog of war." The search effectivenessprocedure goes a long way towardencompassing this factor, but it cannot solvethe larger problem: each Player knows whathe is searching for. At Midway, Nagumofigured the U.S. had, at most, two carriers.They had three. At Coral Sea, Takagi thoughhe had run into one American carrier, theSaratoga. Instead, he ran into theYorktown and the Lexington. In FastCarriers, each Player spends time searching,but he knows what he is searching for, it isonly a question of where.

Offered below, for each of the four majorscenarios, is a means to vary the forcesinvolved. Each Player rolls the die secretlybefore play starts, and chooses theappropriate force level. This selection is keptsecret from the other Player. (Note: Thesuperior American intelligence sets-up thesituation of each scenario; the U.S. Playerstill does not get to know the exactcomposition of the opposing force.) In somecases, the Player must tell the opposingPlayer something, but it will be noted thatthis does still not give away the exact compo-sition. Some of the scenario variants may beunbalanced, but I have tried not to crippleeither side too much.

Play begins with each Player entering themap on Turn One. In the Midway scenario,the U.S. Player enters on the east edge, andthe Japanese Player on the west edge. In thescenarios using the South Pacific map, theU.S. starts from the south edge, and theJapanese Player from the north edge or fromRabaul (hex 0603). The task forces may beallocated in any way desired (exception: seeCase 25.36). In scenarios which have adefinite time limit, add one day to the totaltime of play to allow for the extramaneuvering.These variants will allow for that vitaluncertainty that characterized the fourcarrier battles of World War Two. Theserules, as with the others presented above, areintended to be simple additions, addingrealism at little cost in complexity. Playersmay decide which rules they want to use, andwhich they want to ignore, at no cost to theover-all feel of the game. This article, ofcourse, does not discuss the tactics involvedin play; each Player must learn the value ofthe first strike, successive strikes, strategicmaneuvering, etc., for himself. Or he canstudy accounts of the actual battles; whatworked there will work in Fast Carriers, ifone is lucky. For, when one gets' right downto it, the winner in Fast Carriers is the onewho knows his die and plays the"percentages;" a Player can plan and planand have his strikes miss, or find dummies orfail to inflict damage. So it's not to say thatthe game is all luck. Fast Carriers can teach alot about carrier warfare in World War Twoif one takes the time to learn and play it well.If one uses the rules above, a little "spice"can be added to the game by adding moreconsiderations for each Player. The four"classic" scenarios in Fast Carriers make thegame a good simulation of history.

[25.27] Coral Sea Variants: Japanese PlayerDieRoll Force Additions and Subtractions1 Add Hiryu(505), 4(Zeke), 3(Val), 4(Kate);

Tone(546), Mogami(537), 3 DD's(587-589), from start.

2 Add Junyo(515), 3(Zeke), 3(Val), 3(Kate);4 DD's(587-589), from start.

3 Add Junyo, as above; subtract Zuikaku(501), add 10(Betty) to Rabaul, fromstart.

4 Standard O.B.5 Standard O.B.6 Standard O.B.

(1) represents an increased Japanese effort.(2) represents an increased effort in the SouthPacific, with a decrease in the later AleutianCampaign. (3) represents a decreased navaleffort, but an increased land-based supportforce. (4), (5) and (6) are the historical levels.(Note: Add one complete Campaign Day toJapanese objectives, see 25.21).

[25.27] Coral Sea Variants: U.S. PlayerDieRoll Force Additions and Subtractions1 Standard O.B.

7

2 Standard O.B.

3 Standard O.B. Saratoga not torpedoed11/1/42.

4 Add Saratoga(006), 3(F4F), 6(SBD),2(TBD), (not torpedoed); San Diego(047),2 DD's (071-072),1 DD(057), fromstart.

5 Add Enterprise(004), 4(F4F), 6(SBD),2(TBD); Nashville(041), Northampton(029),2 DD's(071-072). Enter Turn One,Day Two, east edge.

6 Add Victorious(401), 5(F4F), 2(Alba),2(Swdf), from start.

(1) and (2) are the historical situations. (3) isthe historical situation, but postulates thatthe Saratoga was not torpedoed, but was stillunavailable. (4) postulates Saratoga nottorpedoed and available. (5) represents theEnterprise arriving directly from the DolittleRaid. (6) postulates a British carrier pulleddown to the South Pacific. (Note: The U.S.Player must state whether or not theSaratoga has been torpedoed. Add oneCampaign Day to Japanese objectives, see25.21.)

[25.37] Midway Scenario Variants:Japanese Player

DieRoll Force Additions and Subtractions1 Subtract Hiryu(505), Tone(546), Mogami

(537), 3 DD's(581-583).2 Standard O.B.3 Standard O.B.4 Standard O.B.5 Standard O.B. No Aleutian Campaign.6 Subtract Akagi(503), Kaga(504), Haruna

(521), Kirishima(522), 9 DD's(581-589).Add Junyo(515), 4(Zeke), 2(Kate), 3(Val);Ryujo(514), 3(Zeke), 4(Kate). No Aleu-tian Campaign. From start.

(1) postulates (1) in Coral Sea Variants. (2),(3) and (4) represent historical levels. (5)postulates no Aleutian Campaign, but nocharge in force. (6) postulates the Japanesebreaking up their carriers even more thanthey did. No Aleutian Campaign bringsJunyo and Ryujo south. (Note: JapanesePlayer must inform U.S. if there is noAleutian Campaign.)

[25.37] Midway Scenario Variants:U.S. Player

DieRoll Force Additions and Subtractions1 Saratoga(006), 5(F4F), 3(TBF), 2(SBD),

2(SBU), San Diego(047), 3 DD's(057-059). Force enters from west edge, TurnOne, Second Day. Subtract 2(SBD),2(SBU) from Midway; add 3(B-17),l(F4F), 2(TBF).

2 Subtract Yorktown(003), add Saratoga(006), with air complement above to U.S.forces, from start.

3 Subtract Yorktown(003). Add its aircomplement to Midway, plus 3(F4F),2(TBF), 3(B-17).

4 Standard O.B.

8

5 Standard O.B.6 Standard O.B.

(1) postulates earlier arrival of repairedSaratoga. Historically, she arrived on thescene about June 8. (2) postulates loss ofYorktown at Coral Sea, and quicker repair oftorpedoed Saratoga. (3) represents loss ofYorktown at Coral Sea, with Saratogaunavailable. (4), (5) and (6) representhistorical situation. (Note: Saratoga's aircomplement in (1) represents primarily thecounter mix; although the TBF was avail-able. The U.S. Player must tell the JapanesePlayer if Yorktown is not used.)

[25.47] Eastern Solomons Variants:Japanese Player

DieRoll Force Additions and Subtractions1 Add Hiryu(505), 5(Zeke), 5(Val), 3(Kate);

Mogami(537), Mikuma(538), 4 DD's(621-624), from start.

2 Add Junyo(515), 4(Zeke), 2(Kate),3(Val); from start. Add 6(Betty) toRabaul.

3 Subtract Ryujo(514), 4 DD's(607-609,611). Add 6(Betty) to Rabaul.

4 Standard O.B.5 Standard O.B.6 Standard O.B.(1) postulates an early Japanese withdrawalat Midway, with no second day's attacks. (2)simulates an increased Japanese effort. (3)simulates a decreased naval effort, but moreland-based support. (4), (5) and (6) are thehistorical situations. (Note: Add oneCampaign Day - 6 Game-Turns - to Japaneseobjectives, in 25.42.)

[25.47] Eastern Solomons Variants:U.S. Player

DieRoll Force Additions and Subtractions1 Subtract Wasp(008) and total task force

designated to start in hex 1409 in 25.43.Add 6(P-39) to Henderson. May not go toHigh Altitude.

2 Standard O.B.3 Standard O.B.4 Add 6(P-39) to Henderson. May not use

High Altitude.5 Add Yorktown, 6(F4F), 3(TBF), 6(SBD);

San Diego(047), Vincennes(028), 3 DD's(055-057), from start.

6 Standard O.B. Yorktown not sunk.(1) actually is the historical situation, asWasp as refueling during the battle. (2) and(3) represent the carriers available at the dateof the battle. (4) represents an increasedfighter commitment to Henderson. The P-39here, as in (1), are P-400, an American-madeP-39, which was shipped to the British. Allthese aircraft are equipped with British,hence unusable, oxygen equipment. (5) simu-lates Yorktown not having been sunk atMidway. Note that the U.S. Player must use6(P-39), 6(B-17) and 3(TBD) in this variant,due to the counter mix. It is stronglyrecommended that these "ersatz" counters be

used in "non-visible roles," like search andCAP to avoid giving the variant away. (6)represents the Yorktown not sunk, butunavailable. (Note: The U.S. Player must t~llthe Japanese Player if the Yorktown was notsunk).

[25.56] Santa Cruz Variant: Japanese PlayerDieRoll Force Additions and Subtractions1 Add Hiryu(505), 3(Zeke), 4(Val), 3(Kate);

subtract these aircraft from thosestationed at Rabaul. Hiryu has a flightdeck capacity of 5 for this variant only.Force available at start.

2 Add Hosho(513). l(Zeke), l(Kate), atstart.

3 Standard O.B. Hiryu not sunk atMidway.

4 Standard O.B.5 Standard O.B.6 Add Hiryu(505), 4(Zeke), 4(Val), 4(Kate);

subtract these aircraft from Rabaul,when appropriate. Subtract Zuiho(512).From start.

(1) postulates that Hiyo, sister ship to Junyo,had not suffered a mechanical failure whichrequired it to be withdrawn, and its aircraftsent to Rabaul. (2) represents a (slight)increase in the Japanese effort. Hoshoprobably to be used as a decoy carrier, afavorite Japanese tactic. (3) is the historicalforce, but the Hiryu was not sunk at Midway.(4) and (5) are the historical situations. (6)allows for the Hiryu to make an appearance.(Note: The Japanese Player must tell the U.S.Player if the Hiryu is not sunk.)

[25.56] Santa Cruz Variants: u.s. Player

DieRoll Force Additions and Subtractions1 Standard O.B. Wasp not sunk.2 Standard O.B.3 Standard O.B.4 Add 3(SBD), 3(P-39) to Henderson.5 Add Wasp(008), 4(F4F), 5(SBD), 2(TBF),

at start.6 Add 4(F4F), 5(SBD), 3(P-39) to

Henderson.(1) represents historical scenario, with Waspnot torpedoed 15/9/42, but unavailable. (2)and (3) are the historical situations. (4) and (6)represent increased air commitment toHenderson Field. (5) simulates Wasp not sunkand available at the battle. (Note: U.S. Playermust tell the Japanese Player if the Wasp isnot considered sunk.)