saving lives through protective design

Tod Rittenhouse, PETod Rittenhouse, PE

Weidlinger Associates, Inc.Weidlinger Associates, Inc.

For For

Urban Hazards ForumUrban Hazards Forum

New York, NYNew York, NYJanuary 23, 2002January 23, 2002

Saving Lives through Protective DesignSaving Lives through Protective Design

www.wai.comNew York • Cambridge • Los Altos • Los Angeles • Washington, DC • Princeton

Weidlinger Associates IncWeidlinger Associates Incwww.www.waiwai.com.com

Outline of Discussion TopicsOutline of Discussion Topics

uu History of Terrorist Attacks History of Terrorist Attacks –– Need for ProtectionNeed for Protection

uu Current facilities incorporating Protective DesignCurrent facilities incorporating Protective Design

uu Defining Blast LoadingDefining Blast Loading

uu Perimeter ProtectionPerimeter Protection

uu Facades and GlazingFacades and Glazing

uu Progressive CollapseProgressive Collapse

uu Structural HardeningStructural Hardening

uu RetrofittingRetrofitting

uu ConclusionsConclusions


Terrorist Attacks & Technology TimelineTerrorist Attacks & Technology Timeline

U.S. Embassy, U.S. Embassy, Beirut, LebanonBeirut, Lebanon

March 1983

KhobarKhobar TowersTowersDhahran, Saudi ArabiaDhahran, Saudi Arabia

November 1996

MurrahMurrah Fed. Bldg.Fed. Bldg.Oklahoma City, OKOklahoma City, OK

February 1995

U.S. EmbassiesU.S. EmbassiesKenya & TanzaniaKenya & Tanzania

July 1998

US Dept of US Dept of State State

GuidelinesGuidelines

World Trade CenterWorld Trade CenterNew York, NYNew York, NYFebruary 1993

Military Military TechnologiesTechnologies

Progressive Progressive CollapseCollapse

Curtain Wall Curtain Wall Testing & Testing & AnalysisAnalysis

Major Recent EventsMajor Recent Events

Technical AdvancesTechnical Advances

Domesticated Domesticated Protective Protective Design and Design and

Reverse Reverse EngineeringEngineering

Initial Initial Implementation of Implementation of

GSA GuidelinesGSA Guidelines


U.S. Embassies U.S. Embassies -- (Worldwide (Worldwide -- DOS/FBO)DOS/FBO)

uu Lessons LearnedLessons Learned

uu Need for Mitigation of Terrorist AttacksNeed for Mitigation of Terrorist Attacks

uu Vulnerability of Embassies and Sensitive Vulnerability of Embassies and Sensitive

Structures to Such an AttackStructures to Such an Attack

uu Urgent Need for a Systematic and Urgent Need for a Systematic and

Comprehensive Solution to the Vulnerability of Comprehensive Solution to the Vulnerability of

StructuresStructures

U.S. Embassy, LebanonU.S. Embassy, Lebanon

U.S. Embassy, KuwaitU.S. Embassy, Kuwait


World Trade CenterWorld Trade CenterNew York, NYNew York, NY

uu Internal Explosion EffectsInternal Explosion Effects

uu Reinforced Concrete Slab BehaviorReinforced Concrete Slab Behavior

uu Steel Column BehaviorSteel Column Behavior

At approximately 12 noon on February 26, At approximately 12 noon on February 26,

1993, a massive explosion rocked the 1993, a massive explosion rocked the

World Trade Center in New York City, World Trade Center in New York City,

causing millions of dollars in damage ...causing millions of dollars in damage ...


MurrahMurrah Federal Building, Oklahoma CityFederal Building, Oklahoma CityPrimary Lessons LearnedPrimary Lessons Learned

uu Architectural Architectural –– Protective Design ConflictsProtective Design Conflicts

uu Collateral Damage/Injury from Glazing FailureCollateral Damage/Injury from Glazing Failure

uu Progressive Collapse of StructureProgressive Collapse of Structure

uu Sympathetic Building DamageSympathetic Building Damage

uu 253 Sustained Minor Damage253 Sustained Minor Damage

uu 21 Sustained Structural Damage21 Sustained Structural Damage

uu 10 Collapsed 10 Collapsed


Collateral Damage Collateral Damage -- Lower ManhattanLower Manhattan


U.S. Embassies U.S. Embassies -- Engineering GuidelinesEngineering GuidelinesTechnical AdvancesTechnical Advances

U.S. Embassy, NicosiaU.S. Embassy, Nicosia

U.S. Embassy, SingaporeU.S. Embassy, Singapore


GSA Projects GSA Projects –– Protective DesignProtective Design

Brooklyn GPO Brooklyn GPO CourthouseCourthouse

Oklahoma CityOklahoma City

Brooklyn Federal Brooklyn Federal CourthouseCourthouse

Las Vegas Las Vegas CourthouseCourthouse


Client ShiftClient Shift

uu Private Sector Security Private Sector Security

Requirements Requirements –– Sept. 11thSept. 11th


Design ThreatDesign Threat

uu ExplosivesExplosives

uu Tractor Trailer Tractor Trailer up to 30,000 lbs.up to 30,000 lbs.

uu TruckTruck 5,000 lbs.5,000 lbs.

uu VanVan 1,500 lbs.1,500 lbs.

uu CarCar 500 lbs.500 lbs.

uu Loading Dock PackageLoading Dock Package 100 lbs.100 lbs.

uu Lobby PackageLobby Package 50 lbs.50 lbs.

uu LetterLetter 5 lbs.5 lbs.

uu Vehicle ImpactVehicle Impact 10,000 lbs. @ 50 MPH10,000 lbs. @ 50 MPH


Threat = Explosion + StandoffThreat = Explosion + Standoff


GarageGarageGarage

GarageGarageGarage

Sallyport

Loading DockSallyportSallyport

Loading Dock

Loading Dock

Perimeter ProtectionPerimeter Protection

Proper LightingProper LightingProper Lighting

SurveillanceCameras toMonitor Facility

SurveillanceSurveillanceCameras toCameras toMonitor FacilityMonitor Facility

Stationary Anti-RamBollards to GuaranteeStand-Off Distance

Stationary AntiStationary Anti--RamRamBollards to GuaranteeBollards to GuaranteeStandStand--Off DistanceOff Distance

Operable BollardsOperable BollardsOperable Bollards

Guard Booth forActive Access ControlGuard Booth forGuard Booth forActive Access ControlActive Access Control

Roll Up Garage Doorfor Off Hour ProtectionRoll Up Garage DoorRoll Up Garage Doorfor Off Hour Protectionfor Off Hour Protection


Package Or Letter BombPackage Or Letter BombIn PreIn Pre--Screened AreaScreened Area

Lobby InteriorLobby Interior

Security Office Protected WithBullet Resistant Glazing toMonitor Lobby & Building Activity

Security Office Protected WithSecurity Office Protected WithBullet Resistant Glazing toBullet Resistant Glazing toMonitor Lobby & Building ActivityMonitor Lobby & Building Activity

Windows & Walls Exposed to Lobby Threat Need tobe Strengthened

Windows & Walls Windows & Walls Exposed to Lobby Exposed to Lobby Threat Need toThreat Need tobe Strengthenedbe Strengthened

Turnstiles in LobbyTurnstiles in LobbyTurnstiles in Lobby

Magnitomiter toScreen All Persons,Visitors and Employees

Magnitomiter toMagnitomiter toScreen All Persons,Screen All Persons,Visitors and Visitors and EmployeesEmployees

X-ray Machine toScreen All PackagesXX--ray Machine toray Machine toScreen All PackagesScreen All Packages

Columns Within Pre-Screened Areas Needto be Strengthened

Columns Within PreColumns Within Pre--Screened Areas NeedScreened Areas Needto be Strengthenedto be Strengthened


WIDESPREAD DAMAGE to CONVENTIONAL GLAZINGWIDESPREAD DAMAGE to CONVENTIONAL GLAZINGBLAST EFFECTS ON BUILDINGSBLAST EFFECTS ON BUILDINGS

Courtesy G.C. Mays and P.D. SmithCourtesy G.C. Mays and P.D. Smith


Design SolutionsDesign Solutions

uu Heat Strengthened GlassHeat Strengthened Glass

uu Laminated GlassLaminated Glass

uu Balanced Window DesignBalanced Window Design

uu Match Capacity of Glass to Mullions and anchoragesMatch Capacity of Glass to Mullions and anchorages

uu Retrofit Existing BuildingsRetrofit Existing Buildings

uu Energy Absorbing Materials/DesignsEnergy Absorbing Materials/Designs


Wall SectionWall Section

Window of ProtectedSpaces May Be Bullet Resistant

Window of ProtectedWindow of ProtectedSpaces May Be Bullet Spaces May Be Bullet ResistantResistant

Strengthened Façade to Hold Window in Place and Prevent Wall Failure

Strengthened Façade to Strengthened Façade to Hold Window in Place and Hold Window in Place and Prevent Wall FailurePrevent Wall Failure

Strengthened Mullion SystemMust Be Stronger Than GlassTo Hold Fractured Window InPlace

Strengthened Mullion SystemStrengthened Mullion SystemMust Be Stronger Than GlassMust Be Stronger Than GlassTo Hold Fractured Window InTo Hold Fractured Window InPlacePlace

Window Adhered to the FrameWith Structural Silicone Sealantto Keep Fractured Window in Frame

Window Adhered to the FrameWindow Adhered to the FrameWith Structural Silicone SealantWith Structural Silicone Sealantto Keep Fractured Window in Frameto Keep Fractured Window in Frame

Insulated Glazing WithLaminated Inner LiteInsulated Glazing WithInsulated Glazing WithLaminated Inner LiteLaminated Inner Lite

Strong Attachmentto Secure MullionStrong AttachmentStrong Attachmentto Secure Mullionto Secure Mullion


FLEX Finite Element AnalysesFLEX Finite Element AnalysesARPAL 9.85ARPAL 9.85

uu First Principles Finite First Principles Finite

Element Analysis.Element Analysis.

uu Interaction Between Interaction Between

Various Window Various Window

Components.Components.

uu Model Calibrated to Test Model Calibrated to Test

DataData


Conventional Window ProtectionConventional Window Protection

uu 62” x 86” Rough Opening Laminated Annealed Glass62” x 86” Rough Opening Laminated Annealed Glass

BeforeBefore AfterAfter


Curtain WallsCurtain Walls

uu The ChallengeThe Challenge

uu Increase the Blast Worthiness for Curtain Increase the Blast Worthiness for Curtain

WallsWalls

uu Reduce Load Transfer to Supporting Reduce Load Transfer to Supporting

Structural ElementsStructural Elements

uu Better Understanding Gained Through Better Understanding Gained Through

Computational Simulation and Computational Simulation and

ExperimentationExperimentation

Computer ModelComputer Model

Blast TestBlast Test


Failure of Masonry WallFailure of Masonry Wall

uu InIn--fill masonry walls are fill masonry walls are

vulnerable external blastsvulnerable external blasts

uu Analytical simulation can helpAnalytical simulation can help

uu Structural design Structural design

uu Understanding of the behavior of Understanding of the behavior of

the structurethe structure

uu Possible retrofit schemesPossible retrofit schemes

uu Interior concrete panelInterior concrete panel

uu Use of composite materialUse of composite material

Exterior ViewExterior View

Interior ViewInterior View


Exterior UpgradeExterior Upgrade

uu High Consequence Facility Glass and Wall UpgradeHigh Consequence Facility Glass and Wall Upgrade


Progressive CollapseProgressive Collapse

uu Progressive CollapseProgressive Collapse

uu “The spread of an initial local “The spread of an initial local

failure from element to element failure from element to element

resulting, eventually, in the resulting, eventually, in the

collapse of an entire structure or collapse of an entire structure or

a disproportionately large part of a disproportionately large part of

it.” it.” -- ANSI/ASCE 7ANSI/ASCE 7--95 95


Ronan Point CollapseRonan Point Collapse

uu May 16, 1968 May 16, 1968 -- Collapse of the Flats at Ronan Point, EnglandCollapse of the Flats at Ronan Point, England


Automobile Collision LoadingAutomobile Collision Loading


Examples Of Progressive CollapseExamples Of Progressive Collapse

uu Typical Reinforced Concrete Flat Plate StructureTypical Reinforced Concrete Flat Plate Structure


Below Grade ConcernsBelow Grade Concerns

Exposed Columns ShouldBe Protected Against ThreatExposed Columns ShouldExposed Columns ShouldBe Protected Against ThreatBe Protected Against Threat

Slabs & Walls Between ThreatAnd Occupied Spaces Are to Be Hardened

Slabs & Walls Between ThreatSlabs & Walls Between ThreatAnd Occupied Spaces Are to And Occupied Spaces Are to Be HardenedBe Hardened

Beams & Frame DesignedAgainst Progressive CollapseBeams & Frame DesignedBeams & Frame DesignedAgainst Progressive CollapseAgainst Progressive Collapse

Loading DockLarge PackageBomb

Loading DockLoading DockLarge PackageLarge PackageBombBomb

Restricted ParkingSurreptitiously PlacePackage Bomb

Restricted ParkingRestricted ParkingSurreptitiously PlaceSurreptitiously PlacePackage BombPackage Bomb

Slabs Reinforced to PreventCollapse From BlastSlabs Reinforced to PreventSlabs Reinforced to PreventCollapse From BlastCollapse From Blast

Column Beam & BeamGirder Joints Reinforcedto Prevent ProgressiveCollapse

Column Beam & BeamColumn Beam & BeamGirder Joints ReinforcedGirder Joints Reinforcedto Prevent Progressiveto Prevent ProgressiveCollapseCollapse

Mail RoomSmall PackageBomb

Mail RoomMail RoomSmall PackageSmall PackageBombBomb

Public ParkingCar Bomb, ifParking Permitted

Public ParkingPublic ParkingCar Bomb, ifCar Bomb, ifParking PermittedParking Permitted


Above Grade CutawayAbove Grade Cutaway

Slabs Reinforced to PreventCollapse From BlastSlabs Reinforced to PreventSlabs Reinforced to PreventCollapse From BlastCollapse From Blast

Column Beam & Beam GirderJoints Reinforced to PreventProgressive Collapse

Column Beam & Beam GirderColumn Beam & Beam GirderJoints Reinforced to PreventJoints Reinforced to PreventProgressive CollapseProgressive Collapse

Structural Frame DesignedAgainst Progressive CollapseThrough Redundancy & Ductility

Structural Frame DesignedStructural Frame DesignedAgainst Progressive CollapseAgainst Progressive CollapseThrough Redundancy & DuctilityThrough Redundancy & Ductility

Columns Exposed to Threat ofMail Room, Loading Dock Or LobbyHardened Against Blast

Columns Exposed to Threat ofColumns Exposed to Threat ofMail Room, Loading Dock Or LobbyMail Room, Loading Dock Or LobbyHardened Against BlastHardened Against Blast

Columns Along BuildingPerimeter Hardened Against BlastColumns Along BuildingColumns Along BuildingPerimeter Hardened Against BlastPerimeter Hardened Against Blast Structural Frame Designed to

Resist Blast Base ShearStructural Frame Designed toStructural Frame Designed toResist Blast Base ShearResist Blast Base Shear


NonNon--structural Components (NSC)structural Components (NSC)

uu Unsecured Unsecured

NonNon--

structural structural

Components Components

Are One of Are One of

the Main the Main

Sources of Sources of

Injuries in a Injuries in a

Blast EventBlast Event

Unsecured Fallen Bookshelves


Renovation of Existing StructuresRenovation of Existing Structures

U.S. Embassy U.S. Embassy -- StockholmStockholmU.S. Embassy U.S. Embassy -- LondonLondon

U.S. Embassy U.S. Embassy -- CopenhagenCopenhagen U.S. Embassy U.S. Embassy –– AthensAthens


Special Structures Special Structures -- TunnelsTunnels

uu Particularly Susceptible to Particularly Susceptible to

blast pressuresblast pressures

uu Not designed for the Not designed for the

“expansion” of the tunnel “expansion” of the tunnel

walls which might occur walls which might occur

from blast eventfrom blast event

uu Soil based tunnels vs. Rock Soil based tunnels vs. Rock

based tunnelsbased tunnels

uu Susceptible to Car/Truck Susceptible to Car/Truck

BombsBombs


Special Structures Special Structures -- AirportsAirports

uu Importance of security precautionsImportance of security precautions

uu Interaction between Architects, Interaction between Architects,

Engineers and Security officials.Engineers and Security officials.

uu Vulnerability to Satchel BombsVulnerability to Satchel Bombs

uu Large Glazing surfacesLarge Glazing surfaces

uu Open spacesOpen spaces

uu Large crowdsLarge crowds


Special Structures Special Structures -- BridgesBridges

uu Easy AccessEasy Access

uu Cars / TrucksCars / Trucks

uu Floating TankersFloating Tankers

uu Susceptible to accidental Susceptible to accidental

explosionsexplosions

uu Structural systemStructural system

uu Less redundancyLess redundancy

uu exposed main structural exposed main structural

elementselements


Optimal Blast DesignOptimal Blast Design

uu Protection Keyed to Protection Keyed to

Criticality of FacilityCriticality of Facility

uu Mission CriticalMission Critical

uu High Consequence EventHigh Consequence Event

uu Balance Cost of Protection Balance Cost of Protection

vs. Cost of Regret.vs. Cost of Regret.

uu Site Protection Site Protection

uu Facility ProtectionFacility Protection

uu Structural ProtectionStructural Protection

uu Façade ProtectionFaçade Protection


Levels of ProtectionLevels of Protection

uu Level of Protection (cost Level of Protection (cost

of that protection) can of that protection) can

be tailored to individual be tailored to individual

clientsclients

uu Must balance need for Must balance need for

protection with protection with

functionality of facility functionality of facility

being designedbeing designed


Bottom LineBottom Line

uu We as design professionals can provide We as design professionals can provide

reasonable levels of protection for reasonable levels of protection for

building occupants while maintaining building occupants while maintaining

the aesthetics and programmatic the aesthetics and programmatic

requirements of the facilityrequirements of the facility

saving lives through protective design

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