sassespeech.pdf

8/10/2019 Sassespeech.pdf

1/19


2/19

2 | P a g e

THE PARABLE OF THE PIGEONS

Slide One

There was once a City which was not dissimilar to ours. It was made up of the People and the

Contractors. The city was also home to a flock of pigeons. The Contractors were wasteful and untidy,

and wherever they worked they left scraps of food. The pigeons ate the scraps, and became plump

and multiplied. Over time, the pigeons became bolder, and as well as eating scraps they began to

enter the Contractors premises and take food from kitchens and pantries. Every now and then the

People complained about the pigeons who were taking over the city, causing disease and creating

unpleasant odours. Eventually, there were protests and calls to smite the pigeons. But nothing

happened, and the pigeons became more and more dominant in the city. Sometimes the People and

the pigeons clashed but nothing really changed, and the pigeons became entrenched.

In the year 2010, in the month of November, a man called Robert rose to prominence in the city.

Robert had considered the problem of the pigeons and the costs that they were imposing on the city;

but unlike everybody else, Robert did not advocate the smiting of pigeons. Instead, Robert issued a

simple instruction to the Contractors. He called his instruction the Code. The Code forbade the

Contractors from leaving their food scraps and required them to keep their kitchens and pantries

secure. Contractors who did not comply with the Code were banished from the city. Within weeks,

the pigeons had reduced in number, and were much less bold. Very soon the city became a far more

pleasant place to live.


3/19

3 | P a g e

THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

If you were not aware that Australia has become an extremely costly place to build things, then you

should bethere has been no shortage of credible declamations to this effect:

February 2011 Eco Transit Sydneys North West Rail Link priced at $366 million

per kilometre. This compares with $90 million perkilometre for the Gotthard Base Tunnel1. (That is a

factor of 4)

February 2012 Worcester

Polytechnic

Institute Tunnelling

Study

It is evident that labour costs in general are regarded

as more expensive in Australia 2

March 2012 Martin Ferguson Australia is already a high-cost nation in terms of

delivery of capital projects and we must do everything

we can to maintain our competitiveness3

September 2012 Minerals Council Rising capital costs mean our new projects are alsoless competitive. For example, only five years ago we

could build coal and iron ore projects as cheaply as our

competitors. Capital costs, however, are rising more

rapidly here than in the rest of the world.4

October 2012 BHP Billiton Resource and Energy Sector Construction Wages have

escalated at 16.6% CAGR 2001 - 20125

May 2013 McKinsey The cost of building new LNG projects has increased

tremendously in the past decade and is now 20% - 30%

higher than that of the competition6

October 2013 PWC The Australian construction industry is a laggard,

saved from additional scrutiny only by the productivity

malaise that has beset other Australian industries7

February 2014 SMH Australia one of most expensive places to build8

November 2014 SMH The costs of light rail projects in NSW were about four

times those of Europe9

The fact that we are in this position is no surprisethe Howard Government construction reforms

had, by 20078, delivered a productivity increase to the Australian Construction Industry of more

than 10%10(equivalent to 1% of GDP). The systematic dismantling of those reforms could have no

outcome other than to reverse those gains.

What is both surprising and cause for very serious concern is that there is no recognition of the dire

implications of this position. The fact that we have become the most expensive construction

destination on the planet is nothing short of a national disastera disaster demanding the same

degree of resolute and bipartisan leadership that this country has been able to demonstrate in

responding to a Cyclone Tracey, a Port Arthur or the threat of Islamic extremists.

Let me spell out why the situation is so serious.


4/19

4 | P a g e

The Productivity Commission, in its 2014 Report into Public Infrastructure notes that the efficient

provision of infrastructure, including public infrastructure, is the hallmark of a well-functioning

economy11. That is hard to argue withbut what does it really mean? What happens to an

economy and to its citizens when the provision of infrastructure is costly, inefficient and

characterised by declining productivity?

Firstly, you get less of it. As the price of any item increases, you cantafford as much of it. That

means fewer hospitals that take longer to build. This is not merely an economists theorising this

affects the very quality of life for the people that make up our society. When the Australian Institute

of Health and Welfare reports that 50% of patients waited 36 days or less for elective surgery in

2011-12, an increase from 34 days in 2007-08 and a total of 2.7% waited more than a year12that

is tangible human sufferingsome of which results from inefficiencies in construction procurement

and productivity.

Similarly for schools, nursing homes and sports facilities. Also roads and rail and the associated

economic, social and environmental costs of congestion. In certain classes of infrastructure, it is not

a case of getting lessyou may get none at all. Sydney will never get a second airport unless our

construction industry undergoes a step change in efficiency. The Sydney Morning Heralds report

that Badgerys Creek would cost a mere $2.5 billion13is tragicomic indeed.

Secondly, it is the citizens who pay the priceand it is brutally regressive. Take the infamous

Wonthaggi Desalination Plant. It is estimated that it will cost the State of Victoria $24 billion over 28

years14. Victoria has a population of 5.7 million people. If we assume that one third of those people

are income earners, then each of them will be paying $450 per year over what is an entire working

life. So delivering Wonthaggi (assuming it was ever required) at a 30% discount to its actual cost

would have saved the taxpayer a whole dayswork at average wages for each of 28 years. And if

youreone of the one million or so Victorian taxpayers who earn less than the average then the

opportunity cost of that $4,200 is significant.

So the first point that I want to make is this:

Slide Two

An efficient construction industry is essential for the

provision of sufficient and affordable social

infrastructure. The burden of an inefficientconstruction industry is borne by all of society, but it is

highly regressive. It is the less well-off members of our

community who rely on waiting lists for elective

surgery; who sweat it out on the trains; and for whom

$4,200 is a significant sum.


5/19

5 | P a g e

In my introduction, I referred to the resources sector. The ramifications of poor productivity in

resources construction are even more dire than in the social and transport infrastructure sectors.

This is because capitallove it or loathe itis absolutely mobile. The global asset owner, the

investor or the banker will direct his capital to the development of a resource that offers the best

return for the least risk.

Slide Three

These data15

, from the Minerals Council tell us that in 2007, it cost US$61 in capital expenditure toconstruct an additional tonne of thermal coal capacitya 16.5% advantage compared to the global

competition. By 2012 that cost had increased by 285% to US$176, a 66% disadvantage compared to

the global competition. The figures for iron ore show an increase in cost of 95%, and the relative

disadvantage increasing from 4% to 30%.

Consider that rate of performance in another area of Australias national life:

Slide Four

In 2008, Eamon Sullivan swam 100 metres freestyle in 47.05 seconds16. If his rate of improvement

was comparable to the construction contractors servicing the coal industry, he would have got to 2

minutes and 23 seconds by 2012, and would be on track for 3 minutes and 36 seconds for this year.

In the Pilbara, my own analysis indicates that the average iron ore development project cost blow

out is 45%.

Slide Five

If you find that distressing, consider the LNG sector:

Slide Six


6/19

6 | P a g e

This analysis17shows that the average project cost blow out for Woodsides Pluto Project; Chevrons

Gorgon and Wheatstone Projects; QGCs Curtis Project; Santos Gladstone Project and Inpexs Icthys

Project is a massive 166%. BREE reports the Gorgon Project as running an unprecedented 301% over

budget, and the industry scuttlebutt suggests that there is worse to come.

When you are the most expensive construction destination on the globe, and your track record for

on-time on-budget completion is so far beyond any global benchmark as to be an embarrassment,

what happens? BREE has answered that question for us as well18:

Slide Seven

This shows Australian committed resources and energy investment declining rapidly from more than

$200 billion this year to $125 billion in 2015, to zero in 2018. In 2012, the number was $250 billion.19

It should be noted that committed investment will of course decline as you get further into the


7/19

7 | P a g e

future, but what is abundantly clear is that capital investment in resources is on the decline. BREE

ends its 2014 Report with the sobering statementfuture investment is far from certain and

Australia is facing growing competition from aspiring market entrants for investment dollars.20

Which brings me to my second key point:

Slide Eight

Soif you go back to the Productivity Commissions litmus test of efficient provision of

infrastructure as the measure of a well-functioning economy, then I think its reasonable to conclude

that the nation comprehensively fails the test, and that as a result the strength of our economy and

the well-being of our society has been damaged and there is no reason to assume that things wont

get worse.

Why is our construction industry so comprehensively failing the nation?

1.

Absence of Offshore CompetitionThere is no offshore competition. Manufacturers compete globally and must understand and

manage labour costs and labour productivity from a global perspective. Australia is littered

with examples of industries and employers that were unable to do that. Miners must also

compete globally, though the quality of the deposit can cover many sins. Construction

contractors are not subject to this constraint.

There is, obviously, nothing that can be done about this factbut it does reinforce the point

that the construction industry operates without the competitive and market disciplines that

constrain other industries. Governmentin its dual capacities of regulator and clientmust

recognise this fact.

I have classified the remaining four issues underlying the industrys performance as:

Type I Pattern Bargaining: Union Imposed/Employer Conceded;

Type II Pattern Bargaining: Client Imposed;

Type I Managerial Ineptitude: Contractor Failures; and

Type II Managerial Ineptitude: Client Failures

2. TYPE I PATTERN BARGAINING: Union Imposed/Employer Conceded

I will not presume to lecture this audience on the nature and inefficiencies of pattern

bargaining. The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry provides acomprehensive analysis of the practice and condemns it out of hand21 - recommending that

An efficient construction industry is essential for any economy that

has aspirations to exploit mineral and energy resources. As extractive

operations are increasingly automated, it is the ability to construct

the necessary infrastructure competitively and on program that will

increasingly determine the viability of minerals and energy

developments. The capital that funds these investments is global,

mobile, and averse to cost and program blowouts.


8/19

8 | P a g e

pattern bargaining be outlawed22. Commissioner Coles primary criticism is that pattern

bargaining cannotby definitionresult in productivity trade-offs - It denies to the

employers the capacity for flexibility, innovation and competitiveness in a major aspect of

contract cost. In economic terms, it is inefficient23.

I want to go further than Commissioner Cole. It seems to me that the short term economicinterests of contractors may be enhanced by pattern bargaining. Consider these points:

a. If the pattern bargaining outcome is effective, then there can be no competition

amongst contractors in relation to labour costs and productivity. This eliminates

what otherwise should be a key variable in a competitive bid situation. The

contractor is not concerned as to the absolute cost of labourprovided that he has

properly constructed his bid, then he knows he will recover his costs. If the

contractor is confident that all of his competitors are bidding on the same labour

cost assumptions, then he can also be confident that labour costs and productivity

are eliminated from the competitive mix.

b. Secondly, provided that every contractor is bidding on the same labour rates and

assumptions, then the contractor has a vested interest in higher rates and longer

project durations. A 14 month project will have more profit in it than a 10 month

projectprovided that the bid is properly put together and that all competing bids

are based on comparable labour assumptions. The latter is largely guaranteed

through pattern bargaining.

In a reimbursable or cost plus contract, there is at least moral hazard, if not an

outright incentivefor the contractor to pursue higher labour rates and lower

productivityas the longer the project duration and the higher its costs then the

more margin goes to the contractor.

Over recent times, commentators such as Robert Gottliebsen24have suggested that the

community of interest between construction unions and the large construction contractors

is sufficiently pernicious as to be described as a cartel. If a cartel or comparable arrangement

exists, then the mechanism through which it is given effect is the contractors acquiescence

to the practice of pattern bargaining.

3. TYPE II PATTERN BARGAINING: Client Imposed

The third reason for the plight of the industry rests more on the client side. This failing is

best illustrated by the resources industry. When a construction contractor pre-qualifies for amajor resources project, what generally happens is that the client or his agent issues a very

detailed specification providing for all terms and conditions of employment that will apply

on the project. The document may be badged IndicativeKey Employment Terms or

Employee Relations Information for Contractors. Such documents may include such

marvellous bromides as:

Below are wage rates and all-purpose allowances which have emerged as market rates on

similar works. These rates and conditions take into consideration factors such as local

conditions and forecast trends within this industry and region. These rates are provided to

Employers to aid with the tender process

Of course what is really being said here is you will bid on these rates and conditions; should


9/19

9 | P a g e

your bid be successful you will make a Greenfields Enterprise Agreement giving effect to

those rates and conditions; ..and you will not ask questions.

If you go to the Find an Agreement page of the Fair Work Commissionwebsite, you will find

92 identical Greenfield Agreements, each of which relates exclusively to onshore works at

Chevrons Gorgon Project. Even the font on the title pages is the same for each agreementit is only the identities of the employers and the dates of expiry which vary25. Conveniently,

the master document is available on the website of the WA Branch of the CFMEU under the

heading Gorgon Agreement Jan 201026

The results of this form of pattern bargaining are no less damaging than Type I Pattern

Bargainingthere is not and cannot be any innovation, competition or variation in

contractors industrial instruments.

As an aside, it is almost certain that in the majority of cases where the Fair Work

Commission approves these Greenfields Enterprise Agreements, the contractors already

have Enterprise Agreements that have sufficient scope to cover some or all of the work andalmost certainly existing employees who will be deployed to the project. Some of you will

recall Commissioner Coles criticism of the AIRCpointing out that agreements are often

certified by the AIRC even though the necessary statutory preconditions have not been met

or no evidence is provided to establish that they have been met27.

And of course, each new project starts with the most recent deal as the baseline. I have

been unable to detect any productivity trade-offs in any of the resources sector pattern

agreements over the last two decades. In April this year, Mr Roy KrzywosinskiManaging

Director of Chevron in Australia publicly decried this practice. He is quoted as saying that the

Gorgon project has borne witness to a ratcheting effect where the end point of one project

labour agreement or greenfield agreement, becomes the starting point for the next

28

.

4. TYPE I MANAGERIAL INEPTITUDE: Contractor Failures

The fourth category of failure is sheer managerial ineptitude. Let me contrast three major

Victorian PPP construction projects to illustrate the point:

a. Slide Nine

The Spencer Street Station PPP was completed in 2006 over 24 months late and

resulted in very significant losses for the contractor29. It was renowned for its poor

labour productivity and the number and influence of non-working delegates on the

project. My recollection is that the construction unions at the time referred to the

project as Treasure Islandand that it boasted some 28 non-working delegates. TheAge reported: "It's like Christmas every day," says one senior building industry figure

familiar with the site conditions. "The rates on the project would encourage any

worker on it to hope it lasts for the term of their natural life. Their pockets are so full

of gold, they can't walk properly.30

b. Slide Ten

The EastLink PPP was completed in 2008, some 5 months ahead of schedule31. The

industrial relations strategy for the Project was developed after detailed analysis of

the major productivity barriers on other Victorian projectsnot least Spencer

Street. As a result, the project dispensed entirely with non-working delegates;

eliminated the practice of lock down weekends; refrained from imposing the terms

of the head contractors industrial instrument on sub-contractors; brought


10/19

10 | P a g e

inclement weather practices back to a sensible and safe benchmark; and crucially,

retained the right to manage the project without going through Byzantine

consultative and dispute resolution processes32.

c. Slide Eleven

The Wonthaggi Desalination PPP was completed in September 2012, well over 12months late33and with a loss to the contractor of more than $1 billion34. The

industrial agreement that was developed for the site provided for massive increases

in wages. The Australian reported that the agreement was A union deal that

handed workers (at a Victorian desalination plant) $50 an hour more than their

counterparts at other major projects (and which) threatens to establish a benchmark

for construction projects across the nation35. More importantly, the Wonthaggi

Agreement36overturned every single reform in work practices that had been

achieved on EastLink and it dramatically reduced managerial prerogativenot only

did the Agreement require extensive consultation before the introduction of change,

the disputes resolution procedure created the ability for every managerial decision

to be discussed and reviewed after the event.

In the latter stages of the Project, the unions and Thiess Degrmont were in the

Federal Court in relation to proposed redundancies at Wonthaggi37. This gave rise to

The Age publishing a pithy summary of the Wonthaggi problem: If you are stupid

enough to give away your managerial prerogative, don't come to my court looking to

get it back again.38

In each of these cases, the employers freely signed up to the relevant industrial agreements.

There was no industrial action underwayindeed at the point that the employers signed the

agreements there were no employees. You cannot blame the unions for Spencer Street or

Wonthaggiand you cant credit the unions for EastLink. The same unions and largely the

same officials were around through all three projects.

You cant blame the IR system the Spencer Street agreement was made under the

Workplace Relations Act 1996. The EastLink Agreement was made under the same

legislation and before the Howard Government construction industry reforms. The

Wonthaggi Agreement was made under the Fair Work Act 2009.

The standout variable here is managerial will and managerial capacity.

Regardless of the legal framework, the unions agendas and the composition of the

workplace relations tribunal; Australian industrial relations history suggests that there havebeen strategically astute and technically competent labour relations professionals, and there

have also been the idiots.

The ability to mindlessly sign the going pattern agreement and buy a cappuccino in Carlton,

Northbridge or Bowen Hills does not constitute industrial relations managementin fact it

is not managing anything.

The trouble with the construction industry is that the legacies of the idiots translate into

unnecessary and ongoing burdens on the taxpayer and damage Australias attractiveness to

investors.


11/19

11 | P a g e

5. TYPE II MANAGERIAL INEPTITUDE: Client Failures

The final category of dereliction underlying the construction industrys unsatisfactory labour

productivity are failures on the client side. There are numerous opportunities for clients of

the construction industry to achieve better value for money on their projects. Whilst Type II

Pattern Bargaining might be egregious enough, often even the basic industrial relations

disciplines are absent, including from clients who should know better.

Let me take you back to the Gorgon project. A significant proportion of those Greenfield

Agreements that we discussed earlier have reached their nominal dates of expiry or will

expire over the next four months or so. This means that a number of the Projects

construction contractors and other suppliers are in a position to be subject to lawful

industrial action.

The WA Branch of the AMWU has very helpfully provided an overview of the renewal

process on its website39. The report makes interesting reading.

a.

The AMWU doesnt hide behind euphemisms such as Employee RelationsInformation. It states that the AMWU, CFMEU and ETU conducted mass meetings of

more than 5,000 workers on the 11thand 17thSeptember 2014. At the meetings, the

unions presented an offer that had been put by KJV. KJV is the Kellogg Joint

Venture a JV made up of KBR, JGC, Hatch and Clough40and is the Gorgon Project's

downstream engineering, procurement and construction management contractor41-

generally referred to as an EPCM. It is the EPCM who crafts and issues the

mandatory pattern deals that I referred to earlier.

So lets dispense with any notion that it is the actual employers of the labour force

that are responsible for industrial relations strategy or the content of their

enterprise agreements.The unions certainly have.

As an aside, on Friday 31stOctober, Chevron conducted an investor briefing on its 3rd

quarter results42. In response to a question from an analyst, Chevrons CFO stated

And with regard to the union contract issue in Australia, at this point in time we

know that there has been a downstream agreement reached in principal (sic)with

certain construction unions and that it still needs to be put to a vote by the union

membership. So we have agreement at the leadership level, but we still need a vote

at the union member level43. Well thats true, strictly speaking; but it is markedly

different from saying that the workforce en masse had already rejectedthe KJV

offer. Workplace Express is now reporting the formal rejection of the KJV offer by

individual contractor workforces.

44

b. KJVs offerincluded an increase to wages and allowances of 3% from August 2015

and a further 3% from August 2016. KJV also offered to vary the roster from 26 and

9 to 23 and 9. That means the labour force would work three less days per cycle.

On my calculations, KJVs offer would result in a reduction of 30 hours work per man

per annum (that is about 1.1%) and an increase in the number of cycles from 10 per

annum to 11 (that is a 10% increase). The increase in cycles is important because it

increases travel costs and both safety and productivity suffer when roster cycles end

and begin.

c. The AMWU makes it clear that the unions claim on KJV is for a 20 and 10 roster. If

conceded, the claim would result in a reduction of 220 hours per man per annum


12/19

12 | P a g e

(that is about 8.4%) and an increase in the number of cycles from 10 per annum to

12 (that is a 20% increase)

d. The AMWU then very coyly states The Workers have for the first time on a WA

Major Construction Project got an opportunity to make a substantial change to their

current working situation and they understand that they now have the opportunityto influence their employers for a significant change. The unions are well aware that

they are in a position to take lawful industrial action on the Project in support of

their claims, and their position is bolstered by the fact that KJV already provides its

staff with a 20 and 10 roster.45In its 11 November update, the AMWU quotes the

State Secretary of the ETU as saying that Protected industrial action is always a last

resort for unions.but we may be left with no choice46

Meanwhile, Chevrons CFO went on to advise herinvestors: Frankly there is more

dialogue in the press about challenges -- union-related challenges for us on this project

than there have been reality (sic) on the ground. So the project continues to make good

progress here.47Observers of industrial relations on Barrow Island would probably

disagree with that assessment, and I suspect that KJV is being less than candid as to the

realities of the situation that has been created for Chevron.

As an example of poor industrial relations management, this is stellar. The nations largest,

and most globally prominent construction project has been left exposed to protected

industrial action during its critical path. The ability of the contractors and KJV to withstand

such action is negligible to non-existent. The cost of the claim will depend on how the

working hours are split between ordinary time and overtime, but it will be in the vicinity of

15%. And, as the Managing Director of Chevron Australia has rightfully pointed out,whatever settlement is reached at Gorgon will be the starting point for the next resources

project. I suspect that Chevrons appetite for investment in Australia will be even further

blunted once this entirely avoidable snafu reaches its dnouement.

Slide Twelve

The principal causes of Australias poorly performing construction

industry are:

the major contractors acquiescence to pattern bargaining; client imposed pattern bargaining outcomes; and

managerial ineptitude on the part of contractors and clients


13/19

13 | P a g e

The results of these failings are:

excessively costly social and transport infrastructure, which in turn penalises taxpayers and

citizens, particularly the poor;

damage to Australias reputation as a resources investment destination, which in turn reduces

investment, employment and royalty streams; and a largely irreversible loss of skills.

This last point is important. As on-site construction becomes more expensive, developers, asset

owners and EPCMs look to minimise the labour hours required on-site by utilising pre-fabrication

and modularisation techniques. To an extent this is progress and should be welcomed, but

unfortunately we are not talking about a transfer of jobs from the Australian construction industry

to Australian manufacturing industryalmost all of this work is not only completed off-site but off-

shore. We have no significant heavy fabrication capacity in Australia any more, and the modular

kitchens and bathrooms that are increasingly prevalent in the building industry are more often than

not sourced from overseas. We are therefore not training the apprentices who would become the

skilled trades of the future.

In its October 2014 World Economic Outlook, the IMF points out that Akey priority in many

economies, particularly in those with relatively low efficiency of public investment, should be to raise

the quality of infrastructure investment by improving the public investment process. This could

involve, (among other reforms, better project appraisal and selection that identifies and targets

infrastructure bottlenecks, including through centralized independent reviews, rigorous cost-benefit

analysis, risk costing, and zero-based budgeting principles), andimproved project execution48.

The very pressing challenge for State and Commonwealth Governments is to design and implementa holistic, consistent and effective intervention which delivers much improved project execution by

forcefully addressing the labour productivity and industrial relations issues identified above.

What might that intervention look like?

There is no doubt that we need the reintroduction of the ABCC. The replacement of the ABCC by

FWBC was not so much ensuring that there is always a strong cop on the beat in the building and

construction industry49as the wilful and systematic emasculation of the most effective regulatory

agency Australia has ever seen. The fact that the current Commissioner of FWBC has delivered the

results that he has, given the legislative and funding constraints that he has been lumbered with, is a

great credit to him and to his Chairman. But no regulator or legal framework can deal with stupidity

or ineptitudeCertain things we cannot accomplish by any process of government. We cannot

legislate intelligence. 50

What Government can do is to act like a sophisticated and commercial client of the industry. For

once, we dont turn to the private sector as the modelindeed, as we have noted with respect to

the Gorgon Project, it seems utterly incapable of efficiently procuring built infrastructure.

It is in fact the State of Victoria that has embedded some basic but very obvious disciplines into its

construction procurement methodology. These disciplines are premised on a solid appreciation of

the commercial incentives of the contractors; they are administered and enforced effectively; and

they have delivered outstanding results relatively quickly.


14/19

14 | P a g e

Slide Thirteen

Welcome to the Code.

The notion of a Code of Practice for the building and construction industry goes back to the Hawke

Government. In 1989, then Treasurer Paul Keating asked the Industry Commission to conduct areview of major projects and to identify opportunities to remove inefficiencies. The Report

Construction Costs of Major Projects51- found that a principal source of inefficiency was the

industrial relations practices of the industry, and went on to say that:

Governments can play a significant role as clients of the construction industry. Governments have

bargaining power which could be used to encourage efficient management and labour practices.

With sufficient resolve it should be feasible for Commonwealth and State Governments to introduce

changes on government projects which would lead to codes of practice covering industrial relations

arrangements which might be used as a model by private contractors52

In 1992, the Construction Industry Development Agency was established53. One of its objectives was

to develop, and assist in the implementation of, industry codes and practices54 . However it was

not until 1997 that the National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry55was introduced

and its application was limited to Commonwealth funded projects.

The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry conducted a number of case

studies, including the Alice Springs to Darwin Railway Project. In respect of that Project, the Final

Report concluded that the National Code and its associated Guidelines when effectively

implemented and monitored, results in projects being built on time, on budget with safety and to the

satisfaction of employees.56Commissioner Cole went on to recommend that:

It be a requirement that any person who contracts to work on a building site owned, operated, or

funded, wholly or partly, by the Commonwealth, comply with the National Code and the

Implementation Guidelines, not only in relation to that project, but generally. That is, the

Commonwealth should agree only to do business with those who comply with the National Code and

the Implementation Guidelines on both publicly and privately funded projects57

This recommendation was not implemented until July 200558following representations by key

industry employers highlighting the need to give the industry leeway to extract itself from non-Code

compliant industrial instruments.

The National Codeunder the Coalitions Implementation Guidelines basically reinforces freedom of

association, effectively prohibits project agreements, prevents head contractors coercion of sub-

contractors, and limits right of entry. It was a major, if not the most important driver of the surge in

productivity that the industry experienced under Ministers Abbott and Andrews. Sadly, it too fell to

the Rudd/Gillard Governmentinitially through a significant dilution of the Implementation

Guidelines under Minister Gillard in 200959, and then in 2013 through Minister Shortens codification

of the Code and Guidelines into a legislative instrument under the Fair Work (Building Industry) Act

201260.


15/19

15 | P a g e

When the Baillieu Government came to power in Victoria at the end of 2010, the wage rates and

unacceptable work practices that were born out of the Thiess Degrmont Wonthaggi Agreement61

had flowed across the State of Victoria and beyond62. The previous government had defended the

Thiess Degrmont industrial dealthe then Water Minister being quoted as saying that "Victorian

taxpayers will not pay one extra cent as a result of agreements for workers' pay and conditions on

the desalination project because we agreed to a fixed-price contract.63That may well be true, but

you would think that a Cabinet largely composed of union officials would be well aware of the flow-

on implications of wage deals of this nature.

In response to the Wonthaggi debacle, the incoming State Government implemented a Building

Code which was to apply to State funded construction projects with effect from 1 July 201264. The

Victorian Code emulated the previous National Code but also took a vital further step through the

additional requirement of a Workplace Relations Management Plan. The WRMP adds two critically

important components to the Code. The first is a requirement to complete an IR Risk Assessment,

and the second is to embed labour productivity metrics and initiatives into the WRMP. The WRMP,

once approved, has as much weight as the contract itself. When DTF issued a sanction on McConnell

Dowell in September this year, it was for a failure to comply with its WRMP65.

The Victorian Code of Practice is about preserving value for tax payers. It is the bare minimum that

you would expect from a sophisticated client of the construction industry. It should be emulated by

all Australian governments and administered with the same degree of professionalism and

sophistication as displayed by the Victorian Construction Code Compliance Unit. Further, in order to

rein in the excesses and manifest failures of the resources sector in construction procurement, the

right to exploit and otherwise develop Australias mineral and energy resources should be

contingent on compliance with a construction Code that is based on the Victorian model.

Lets apply some counterfactual thinking. If the Victorian Code had been in place for Spencer Street

and Wonthaggi and it was administered as astutely and as professionally as it is now:

the VBIA would not have applied to Spencer Street;

neither project would have been able to engage non-working delegates;

sub-contractors would not have been coerced into adopting the head contractors industrial

instrument;

there would be no requirement to obtain union consent and/or to consult with unions in

respect of engaging sub-contractors or other labour arrangements;

both Projects would have been required to complete an IR Risk Assessment. That process

would have identified the risks of restrictive rosters, the issues associated with inclement

weather and other matters, and as part of the WRMP process, mitigation steps would have

been inserted into the WRMP.(Remember that compliance with the WRMP is a condition of

the contract); and

where there was unlawful industrial action, the contractor would have been obliged to take

every step to prevent or stop it, and to recover any damages or losses caused by it.

These arrangements would have resulted in markedly different outcomes on both projects, and

markedly different flow on legacies.


16/19

16 | P a g e

For most of us, engagement with the construction industry is limited to a residential building or

renovation experiencewe cannot be expected to know much about construction procurement. But

the State Governments are the construction industrys largest client. If, like the State of Victoria, you

have a $27 billion construction programme66then you want to be reasonably astute when it comes

to managing value for money. If you can achieve a modest 1% lift in productivity from your $27

billion then you have saved $270 millionat $500K67per bedthat is a new 540 bed hospital.

The Code is the means by which a large and multi-sector ongoing consumer of construction services

ensures that it achieves value for money. It is designed to counteract the moral hazard that

contractors may have a vested interest in de facto collusion on labour costs and productivity. It

ensures that unacceptable industrial behaviour meets with appropriate consequences. And it is the

only practical way that inflationary construction costs can be brought under some semblance of

control.

The Victorian Code is a benchmark for the other States and the Commonwealth. The Productivity

Commissions recent report into public infrastructure echoes this view.A sensible starting point is

for all jurisdictions and the Australian Government to deploy the Victorian guidelines (or something

akin to them) for their building codes of practice.68

The right to exploit the nations mineral resources should be contingent on doing so efficiently

certainly as far as the construction phase is concerned. To that end, I would suggest that a Code

approach be taken by the relevant tiers of government and form part of the Development

Assessment and Approval process of minerals and energy projects.

Returning to our Parable..our Citys problem was not the pigeons but the Contractors. By

modifying the behaviours of the Contractors, the pigeons ended up in their proper place.

Unions thrive where there are vacuumsif management abrogates its duty to control its sites and

its workforces, then it is hardly surprising that the unions step into the gap.

If management is unable to contemplate or act on the long term economic implications of 16% per

annum wages inflation69with no productivity trade-offsthen the client needs to step in and ensure

that there is some measure of sobriety in the labour relations performance of the industry. If, as is

evident in the resources sector, the client is simply incapable of strategic industrial relations

management, then the States and the Commonwealth need to protect our national interest and

reputation through the imposition of a Code.

The Code is designed solely to modify contractors behaviours.It exists to protect the short and long

term interests of taxpayers by forcing contractors to take some responsibility for the effective

management of labour productivity and labour costs. The Code is the minimum that one would

expect from a large, informed and sophisticated consumer of construction services. The Code is not

anti-unionrather it is pro-taxpayer, and it is particularly important for the less well-offthose who

rely on public transport and public hospitals and those for whom the outrageous cost of Wonthaggi

is a noticeable impost.


17/19

17 | P a g e

Stephen Sasse has worked in industrial relations for major Australian and multinational companies for 30 years. He has

held senior executive positions in Transfield Construction, John Holland Group and Leighton Holdings. Highlights of his

career include ending the entrenched demarcation issues in the Australian paint manufacturing industry (1990) and

the development of the industrial relations strategy for Melbournes highly successful EastLink Project (2004). Stephen

authored the first employer submission to The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry (2002)

and the John Holland Submission to the Wilcox Review (2008). Stephen consults to public and private sector

organisations in industrial relations strategy, labour productivity improvement, cost reduction, workplace health and

safety and construction procurement strategies.


18/19

18 | P a g e

1Ecotransit Sydney Fact Sheet Tunnelling for Rail: What it Really Costs

http://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/Rail-Tunnelling-Factsheet.pdf2N Efron & M Read Analysing International Tunnel Costs Worcester Polytechnic Institute 2012 p. 303AFR 29thMarch 20124Minerals Council of Australia Opportunity at Risk Regaining Our Competitive Edge in Minerals Resources

September 2012 p. 105Marius Kloppers BHP Billiton Diversification and Delivery in a Cyclical World Brisbane Mining Club 17th

October 20126McKinsey & Company Extending the LNG Boom: Improving Australian LNG Productivity and Competitiveness

May 2013 p.17PWC Productivity Scorecard Reconstructing ProductivityProductivity in the Australian Construction

Industry October 20138Sydney Morning Herald 12thFebruary 20149Sydney Morning Herald 10thNovember 201410John Holland Group Pty Limited Submission Proposed Building and Construction Division of Fair Work

Australia December 200811Productivity Commission Public Infrastructure Inquiry Report No 71. 27 thMay 2014 Volume One p.312http://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/ 13Sydney Morning Herald 15thMay 201414The Age 13thDecember 201115Minerals Council of Australia Opportunity at Risk Regaining Our Competitive Edge in Minerals Resources

September 2012 p. 2616http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivan 17BREE Outlook for Australian Resources and Energy Commodities Annual Research Workshop 2013 18BREE Resources and Energy Major Projects April 2014 p.27 19BREE Outlook for Australian Resources and Energy Commodities Annual Research Workshop 2013 20BREE Resources and Energy Major Projects April 2014 p.27

21The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 5Paragraphs 206 - 21522The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 1

Paragraph 723The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 5

Paragraph 20824For example Voters will make a choice on builder-union cartels Business Spectator 10 October 2014

http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-

cartels25https://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-

agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=

&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_ID =26

http://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdf 27The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 5

Paragraph 3928The Australian 7thApril 201429Auditor-General's Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 2006-07 p.3430The Age 17thJuly 200431Johnson, D and Humffray, H EastLink: Redefining the Possible ACAA Technical Paper 200932Australian Industrial Relations Commission Thiess John Holland Mitcham Frankston Project Construction

Agreement (AWU) Certified Agreement 200533The Age 9thOctober 201234The Herald Sun 10thNovember 201435The Australian 12thMay 201136

Fair Work Australia Thiess Degremont (TD) and AMWU, AWU, CEPU and CFMEU Victorian DesalinationProject Greenfields Agreement 2009
http://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/Rail-Tunnelling-Factsheet.pdfhttp://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/Rail-Tunnelling-Factsheet.pdfhttp://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/http://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/http://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivanhttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttp://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdfhttp://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdfhttp://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdfhttp://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdfhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivanhttp://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/http://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/Rail-Tunnelling-Factsheet.pdf


19/19

19 | P a g e

37Federal Court of Australia: Construction, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and

Allied Services Union of Australia v Thiess Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 102038The Age 13thDecember 201139http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_report 40http://www.kjv.com.au/41http://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.html 42http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148 43Thomson Reuters Street Events Edited Transcript - CVX Q3 2014 Chevron Corp Earnings Call 31 October

2014 p.18http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148 44

http://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=i

nstant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=

Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20pattern 45http://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.html 46

http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_frie

ndly_rosters

47Thomson Reuters Street Events Edited Transcript - CVX Q3 2014 Chevron Corp Earnings Call 31 October2014 p.18http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148 48International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook October 2014 Chapter 3 Is it time for an

infrastructure push? The macroeconomic effects of public investment p.77 49The Hon Julia GillardSecond Reading Speech BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IMPROVEMENT

AMENDMENT (TRANSITION TO FAIR WORK) BILL 2009 Hansard p.7807 13thAugust 200950Griswold, A. W Essays on Education 195451Industry Commission Construction Costs of Major ProjectsReport No. 8 11 March 1991 AGPS Canberra52Industry Commission Construction Costs of Major ProjectsReport No. 8 11 March 1991 AGPS Canberra

p.8853Construction Industry Reform and Development Act 1992 Cth.54Construction Industry Reform and Development Act 1992 Cth. S17(1)(c)

55http://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdf56The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 7 p.7157The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 1

Recommendation 41.58Australian Government Implementation Guidelines for the National Code of Practice for the Construction

Industry September 200559The Australian 10thJuly 200960http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110 61Fair Work Australia Thiess Degremont (TD) and AMWU, AWU, CEPU and CFMEU Victorian Desalination

Project Greenfields Agreement 200962The Australian 12thMay 201163

The Age 22nd

March 201064Department of Treasury and Finance Implementation Guidelines to the Victorian Code of Practice for the

Building and Construction Industry April 201265http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-

McConnell-Dowell66State of Victoria Victorian Budget 2014 2015 Building a Better Victoria67http://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModule 68Productivity Commission Public Infrastructure Inquiry Report No 71. 27 thMay 2014 Volume One p.3369Marius Kloppers BHP Billiton Diversification and Delivery in a Cyclical World Brisbane Mining Club 17th

October 2012
http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_reporthttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_reporthttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_reporthttp://www.kjv.com.au/http://www.kjv.com.au/http://www.kjv.com.au/http://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.htmlhttp://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.htmlhttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModulehttp://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModulehttp://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModulehttp://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModulehttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110http://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.htmlhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_report

sassespeech.pdf

Documents