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    THE PARABLE OF THE PIGEONS

    Slide One

    There was once a City which was not dissimilar to ours. It was made up of the People and the

    Contractors. The city was also home to a flock of pigeons. The Contractors were wasteful and untidy,

    and wherever they worked they left scraps of food. The pigeons ate the scraps, and became plump

    and multiplied. Over time, the pigeons became bolder, and as well as eating scraps they began to

    enter the Contractors premises and take food from kitchens and pantries. Every now and then the

    People complained about the pigeons who were taking over the city, causing disease and creating

    unpleasant odours. Eventually, there were protests and calls to smite the pigeons. But nothing

    happened, and the pigeons became more and more dominant in the city. Sometimes the People and

    the pigeons clashed but nothing really changed, and the pigeons became entrenched.

    In the year 2010, in the month of November, a man called Robert rose to prominence in the city.

    Robert had considered the problem of the pigeons and the costs that they were imposing on the city;

    but unlike everybody else, Robert did not advocate the smiting of pigeons. Instead, Robert issued a

    simple instruction to the Contractors. He called his instruction the Code. The Code forbade the

    Contractors from leaving their food scraps and required them to keep their kitchens and pantries

    secure. Contractors who did not comply with the Code were banished from the city. Within weeks,

    the pigeons had reduced in number, and were much less bold. Very soon the city became a far more

    pleasant place to live.

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    THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

    If you were not aware that Australia has become an extremely costly place to build things, then you

    should bethere has been no shortage of credible declamations to this effect:

    February 2011 Eco Transit Sydneys North West Rail Link priced at $366 million

    per kilometre. This compares with $90 million perkilometre for the Gotthard Base Tunnel1. (That is a

    factor of 4)

    February 2012 Worcester

    Polytechnic

    Institute Tunnelling

    Study

    It is evident that labour costs in general are regarded

    as more expensive in Australia 2

    March 2012 Martin Ferguson Australia is already a high-cost nation in terms of

    delivery of capital projects and we must do everything

    we can to maintain our competitiveness3

    September 2012 Minerals Council Rising capital costs mean our new projects are alsoless competitive. For example, only five years ago we

    could build coal and iron ore projects as cheaply as our

    competitors. Capital costs, however, are rising more

    rapidly here than in the rest of the world.4

    October 2012 BHP Billiton Resource and Energy Sector Construction Wages have

    escalated at 16.6% CAGR 2001 - 20125

    May 2013 McKinsey The cost of building new LNG projects has increased

    tremendously in the past decade and is now 20% - 30%

    higher than that of the competition6

    October 2013 PWC The Australian construction industry is a laggard,

    saved from additional scrutiny only by the productivity

    malaise that has beset other Australian industries7

    February 2014 SMH Australia one of most expensive places to build8

    November 2014 SMH The costs of light rail projects in NSW were about four

    times those of Europe9

    The fact that we are in this position is no surprisethe Howard Government construction reforms

    had, by 20078, delivered a productivity increase to the Australian Construction Industry of more

    than 10%10(equivalent to 1% of GDP). The systematic dismantling of those reforms could have no

    outcome other than to reverse those gains.

    What is both surprising and cause for very serious concern is that there is no recognition of the dire

    implications of this position. The fact that we have become the most expensive construction

    destination on the planet is nothing short of a national disastera disaster demanding the same

    degree of resolute and bipartisan leadership that this country has been able to demonstrate in

    responding to a Cyclone Tracey, a Port Arthur or the threat of Islamic extremists.

    Let me spell out why the situation is so serious.

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    The Productivity Commission, in its 2014 Report into Public Infrastructure notes that the efficient

    provision of infrastructure, including public infrastructure, is the hallmark of a well-functioning

    economy11. That is hard to argue withbut what does it really mean? What happens to an

    economy and to its citizens when the provision of infrastructure is costly, inefficient and

    characterised by declining productivity?

    Firstly, you get less of it. As the price of any item increases, you cantafford as much of it. That

    means fewer hospitals that take longer to build. This is not merely an economists theorising this

    affects the very quality of life for the people that make up our society. When the Australian Institute

    of Health and Welfare reports that 50% of patients waited 36 days or less for elective surgery in

    2011-12, an increase from 34 days in 2007-08 and a total of 2.7% waited more than a year12that

    is tangible human sufferingsome of which results from inefficiencies in construction procurement

    and productivity.

    Similarly for schools, nursing homes and sports facilities. Also roads and rail and the associated

    economic, social and environmental costs of congestion. In certain classes of infrastructure, it is not

    a case of getting lessyou may get none at all. Sydney will never get a second airport unless our

    construction industry undergoes a step change in efficiency. The Sydney Morning Heralds report

    that Badgerys Creek would cost a mere $2.5 billion13is tragicomic indeed.

    Secondly, it is the citizens who pay the priceand it is brutally regressive. Take the infamous

    Wonthaggi Desalination Plant. It is estimated that it will cost the State of Victoria $24 billion over 28

    years14. Victoria has a population of 5.7 million people. If we assume that one third of those people

    are income earners, then each of them will be paying $450 per year over what is an entire working

    life. So delivering Wonthaggi (assuming it was ever required) at a 30% discount to its actual cost

    would have saved the taxpayer a whole dayswork at average wages for each of 28 years. And if

    youreone of the one million or so Victorian taxpayers who earn less than the average then the

    opportunity cost of that $4,200 is significant.

    So the first point that I want to make is this:

    Slide Two

    An efficient construction industry is essential for the

    provision of sufficient and affordable social

    infrastructure. The burden of an inefficientconstruction industry is borne by all of society, but it is

    highly regressive. It is the less well-off members of our

    community who rely on waiting lists for elective

    surgery; who sweat it out on the trains; and for whom

    $4,200 is a significant sum.

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    In my introduction, I referred to the resources sector. The ramifications of poor productivity in

    resources construction are even more dire than in the social and transport infrastructure sectors.

    This is because capitallove it or loathe itis absolutely mobile. The global asset owner, the

    investor or the banker will direct his capital to the development of a resource that offers the best

    return for the least risk.

    Slide Three

    These data15

    , from the Minerals Council tell us that in 2007, it cost US$61 in capital expenditure toconstruct an additional tonne of thermal coal capacitya 16.5% advantage compared to the global

    competition. By 2012 that cost had increased by 285% to US$176, a 66% disadvantage compared to

    the global competition. The figures for iron ore show an increase in cost of 95%, and the relative

    disadvantage increasing from 4% to 30%.

    Consider that rate of performance in another area of Australias national life:

    Slide Four

    In 2008, Eamon Sullivan swam 100 metres freestyle in 47.05 seconds16. If his rate of improvement

    was comparable to the construction contractors servicing the coal industry, he would have got to 2

    minutes and 23 seconds by 2012, and would be on track for 3 minutes and 36 seconds for this year.

    In the Pilbara, my own analysis indicates that the average iron ore development project cost blow

    out is 45%.

    Slide Five

    If you find that distressing, consider the LNG sector:

    Slide Six

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    This analysis17shows that the average project cost blow out for Woodsides Pluto Project; Chevrons

    Gorgon and Wheatstone Projects; QGCs Curtis Project; Santos Gladstone Project and Inpexs Icthys

    Project is a massive 166%. BREE reports the Gorgon Project as running an unprecedented 301% over

    budget, and the industry scuttlebutt suggests that there is worse to come.

    When you are the most expensive construction destination on the globe, and your track record for

    on-time on-budget completion is so far beyond any global benchmark as to be an embarrassment,

    what happens? BREE has answered that question for us as well18:

    Slide Seven

    This shows Australian committed resources and energy investment declining rapidly from more than

    $200 billion this year to $125 billion in 2015, to zero in 2018. In 2012, the number was $250 billion.19

    It should be noted that committed investment will of course decline as you get further into the

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    future, but what is abundantly clear is that capital investment in resources is on the decline. BREE

    ends its 2014 Report with the sobering statementfuture investment is far from certain and

    Australia is facing growing competition from aspiring market entrants for investment dollars.20

    Which brings me to my second key point:

    Slide Eight

    Soif you go back to the Productivity Commissions litmus test of efficient provision of

    infrastructure as the measure of a well-functioning economy, then I think its reasonable to conclude

    that the nation comprehensively fails the test, and that as a result the strength of our economy and

    the well-being of our society has been damaged and there is no reason to assume that things wont

    get worse.

    Why is our construction industry so comprehensively failing the nation?

    1.

    Absence of Offshore CompetitionThere is no offshore competition. Manufacturers compete globally and must understand and

    manage labour costs and labour productivity from a global perspective. Australia is littered

    with examples of industries and employers that were unable to do that. Miners must also

    compete globally, though the quality of the deposit can cover many sins. Construction

    contractors are not subject to this constraint.

    There is, obviously, nothing that can be done about this factbut it does reinforce the point

    that the construction industry operates without the competitive and market disciplines that

    constrain other industries. Governmentin its dual capacities of regulator and clientmust

    recognise this fact.

    I have classified the remaining four issues underlying the industrys performance as:

    Type I Pattern Bargaining: Union Imposed/Employer Conceded;

    Type II Pattern Bargaining: Client Imposed;

    Type I Managerial Ineptitude: Contractor Failures; and

    Type II Managerial Ineptitude: Client Failures

    2. TYPE I PATTERN BARGAINING: Union Imposed/Employer Conceded

    I will not presume to lecture this audience on the nature and inefficiencies of pattern

    bargaining. The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry provides acomprehensive analysis of the practice and condemns it out of hand21 - recommending that

    An efficient construction industry is essential for any economy that

    has aspirations to exploit mineral and energy resources. As extractive

    operations are increasingly automated, it is the ability to construct

    the necessary infrastructure competitively and on program that will

    increasingly determine the viability of minerals and energy

    developments. The capital that funds these investments is global,

    mobile, and averse to cost and program blowouts.

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    pattern bargaining be outlawed22. Commissioner Coles primary criticism is that pattern

    bargaining cannotby definitionresult in productivity trade-offs - It denies to the

    employers the capacity for flexibility, innovation and competitiveness in a major aspect of

    contract cost. In economic terms, it is inefficient23.

    I want to go further than Commissioner Cole. It seems to me that the short term economicinterests of contractors may be enhanced by pattern bargaining. Consider these points:

    a. If the pattern bargaining outcome is effective, then there can be no competition

    amongst contractors in relation to labour costs and productivity. This eliminates

    what otherwise should be a key variable in a competitive bid situation. The

    contractor is not concerned as to the absolute cost of labourprovided that he has

    properly constructed his bid, then he knows he will recover his costs. If the

    contractor is confident that all of his competitors are bidding on the same labour

    cost assumptions, then he can also be confident that labour costs and productivity

    are eliminated from the competitive mix.

    b. Secondly, provided that every contractor is bidding on the same labour rates and

    assumptions, then the contractor has a vested interest in higher rates and longer

    project durations. A 14 month project will have more profit in it than a 10 month

    projectprovided that the bid is properly put together and that all competing bids

    are based on comparable labour assumptions. The latter is largely guaranteed

    through pattern bargaining.

    In a reimbursable or cost plus contract, there is at least moral hazard, if not an

    outright incentivefor the contractor to pursue higher labour rates and lower

    productivityas the longer the project duration and the higher its costs then the

    more margin goes to the contractor.

    Over recent times, commentators such as Robert Gottliebsen24have suggested that the

    community of interest between construction unions and the large construction contractors

    is sufficiently pernicious as to be described as a cartel. If a cartel or comparable arrangement

    exists, then the mechanism through which it is given effect is the contractors acquiescence

    to the practice of pattern bargaining.

    3. TYPE II PATTERN BARGAINING: Client Imposed

    The third reason for the plight of the industry rests more on the client side. This failing is

    best illustrated by the resources industry. When a construction contractor pre-qualifies for amajor resources project, what generally happens is that the client or his agent issues a very

    detailed specification providing for all terms and conditions of employment that will apply

    on the project. The document may be badged IndicativeKey Employment Terms or

    Employee Relations Information for Contractors. Such documents may include such

    marvellous bromides as:

    Below are wage rates and all-purpose allowances which have emerged as market rates on

    similar works. These rates and conditions take into consideration factors such as local

    conditions and forecast trends within this industry and region. These rates are provided to

    Employers to aid with the tender process

    Of course what is really being said here is you will bid on these rates and conditions; should

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    your bid be successful you will make a Greenfields Enterprise Agreement giving effect to

    those rates and conditions; ..and you will not ask questions.

    If you go to the Find an Agreement page of the Fair Work Commissionwebsite, you will find

    92 identical Greenfield Agreements, each of which relates exclusively to onshore works at

    Chevrons Gorgon Project. Even the font on the title pages is the same for each agreementit is only the identities of the employers and the dates of expiry which vary25. Conveniently,

    the master document is available on the website of the WA Branch of the CFMEU under the

    heading Gorgon Agreement Jan 201026

    The results of this form of pattern bargaining are no less damaging than Type I Pattern

    Bargainingthere is not and cannot be any innovation, competition or variation in

    contractors industrial instruments.

    As an aside, it is almost certain that in the majority of cases where the Fair Work

    Commission approves these Greenfields Enterprise Agreements, the contractors already

    have Enterprise Agreements that have sufficient scope to cover some or all of the work andalmost certainly existing employees who will be deployed to the project. Some of you will

    recall Commissioner Coles criticism of the AIRCpointing out that agreements are often

    certified by the AIRC even though the necessary statutory preconditions have not been met

    or no evidence is provided to establish that they have been met27.

    And of course, each new project starts with the most recent deal as the baseline. I have

    been unable to detect any productivity trade-offs in any of the resources sector pattern

    agreements over the last two decades. In April this year, Mr Roy KrzywosinskiManaging

    Director of Chevron in Australia publicly decried this practice. He is quoted as saying that the

    Gorgon project has borne witness to a ratcheting effect where the end point of one project

    labour agreement or greenfield agreement, becomes the starting point for the next

    28

    .

    4. TYPE I MANAGERIAL INEPTITUDE: Contractor Failures

    The fourth category of failure is sheer managerial ineptitude. Let me contrast three major

    Victorian PPP construction projects to illustrate the point:

    a. Slide Nine

    The Spencer Street Station PPP was completed in 2006 over 24 months late and

    resulted in very significant losses for the contractor29. It was renowned for its poor

    labour productivity and the number and influence of non-working delegates on the

    project. My recollection is that the construction unions at the time referred to the

    project as Treasure Islandand that it boasted some 28 non-working delegates. TheAge reported: "It's like Christmas every day," says one senior building industry figure

    familiar with the site conditions. "The rates on the project would encourage any

    worker on it to hope it lasts for the term of their natural life. Their pockets are so full

    of gold, they can't walk properly.30

    b. Slide Ten

    The EastLink PPP was completed in 2008, some 5 months ahead of schedule31. The

    industrial relations strategy for the Project was developed after detailed analysis of

    the major productivity barriers on other Victorian projectsnot least Spencer

    Street. As a result, the project dispensed entirely with non-working delegates;

    eliminated the practice of lock down weekends; refrained from imposing the terms

    of the head contractors industrial instrument on sub-contractors; brought

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    inclement weather practices back to a sensible and safe benchmark; and crucially,

    retained the right to manage the project without going through Byzantine

    consultative and dispute resolution processes32.

    c. Slide Eleven

    The Wonthaggi Desalination PPP was completed in September 2012, well over 12months late33and with a loss to the contractor of more than $1 billion34. The

    industrial agreement that was developed for the site provided for massive increases

    in wages. The Australian reported that the agreement was A union deal that

    handed workers (at a Victorian desalination plant) $50 an hour more than their

    counterparts at other major projects (and which) threatens to establish a benchmark

    for construction projects across the nation35. More importantly, the Wonthaggi

    Agreement36overturned every single reform in work practices that had been

    achieved on EastLink and it dramatically reduced managerial prerogativenot only

    did the Agreement require extensive consultation before the introduction of change,

    the disputes resolution procedure created the ability for every managerial decision

    to be discussed and reviewed after the event.

    In the latter stages of the Project, the unions and Thiess Degrmont were in the

    Federal Court in relation to proposed redundancies at Wonthaggi37. This gave rise to

    The Age publishing a pithy summary of the Wonthaggi problem: If you are stupid

    enough to give away your managerial prerogative, don't come to my court looking to

    get it back again.38

    In each of these cases, the employers freely signed up to the relevant industrial agreements.

    There was no industrial action underwayindeed at the point that the employers signed the

    agreements there were no employees. You cannot blame the unions for Spencer Street or

    Wonthaggiand you cant credit the unions for EastLink. The same unions and largely the

    same officials were around through all three projects.

    You cant blame the IR system the Spencer Street agreement was made under the

    Workplace Relations Act 1996. The EastLink Agreement was made under the same

    legislation and before the Howard Government construction industry reforms. The

    Wonthaggi Agreement was made under the Fair Work Act 2009.

    The standout variable here is managerial will and managerial capacity.

    Regardless of the legal framework, the unions agendas and the composition of the

    workplace relations tribunal; Australian industrial relations history suggests that there havebeen strategically astute and technically competent labour relations professionals, and there

    have also been the idiots.

    The ability to mindlessly sign the going pattern agreement and buy a cappuccino in Carlton,

    Northbridge or Bowen Hills does not constitute industrial relations managementin fact it

    is not managing anything.

    The trouble with the construction industry is that the legacies of the idiots translate into

    unnecessary and ongoing burdens on the taxpayer and damage Australias attractiveness to

    investors.

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    5. TYPE II MANAGERIAL INEPTITUDE: Client Failures

    The final category of dereliction underlying the construction industrys unsatisfactory labour

    productivity are failures on the client side. There are numerous opportunities for clients of

    the construction industry to achieve better value for money on their projects. Whilst Type II

    Pattern Bargaining might be egregious enough, often even the basic industrial relations

    disciplines are absent, including from clients who should know better.

    Let me take you back to the Gorgon project. A significant proportion of those Greenfield

    Agreements that we discussed earlier have reached their nominal dates of expiry or will

    expire over the next four months or so. This means that a number of the Projects

    construction contractors and other suppliers are in a position to be subject to lawful

    industrial action.

    The WA Branch of the AMWU has very helpfully provided an overview of the renewal

    process on its website39. The report makes interesting reading.

    a.

    The AMWU doesnt hide behind euphemisms such as Employee RelationsInformation. It states that the AMWU, CFMEU and ETU conducted mass meetings of

    more than 5,000 workers on the 11thand 17thSeptember 2014. At the meetings, the

    unions presented an offer that had been put by KJV. KJV is the Kellogg Joint

    Venture a JV made up of KBR, JGC, Hatch and Clough40and is the Gorgon Project's

    downstream engineering, procurement and construction management contractor41-

    generally referred to as an EPCM. It is the EPCM who crafts and issues the

    mandatory pattern deals that I referred to earlier.

    So lets dispense with any notion that it is the actual employers of the labour force

    that are responsible for industrial relations strategy or the content of their

    enterprise agreements.The unions certainly have.

    As an aside, on Friday 31stOctober, Chevron conducted an investor briefing on its 3rd

    quarter results42. In response to a question from an analyst, Chevrons CFO stated

    And with regard to the union contract issue in Australia, at this point in time we

    know that there has been a downstream agreement reached in principal (sic)with

    certain construction unions and that it still needs to be put to a vote by the union

    membership. So we have agreement at the leadership level, but we still need a vote

    at the union member level43. Well thats true, strictly speaking; but it is markedly

    different from saying that the workforce en masse had already rejectedthe KJV

    offer. Workplace Express is now reporting the formal rejection of the KJV offer by

    individual contractor workforces.

    44

    b. KJVs offerincluded an increase to wages and allowances of 3% from August 2015

    and a further 3% from August 2016. KJV also offered to vary the roster from 26 and

    9 to 23 and 9. That means the labour force would work three less days per cycle.

    On my calculations, KJVs offer would result in a reduction of 30 hours work per man

    per annum (that is about 1.1%) and an increase in the number of cycles from 10 per

    annum to 11 (that is a 10% increase). The increase in cycles is important because it

    increases travel costs and both safety and productivity suffer when roster cycles end

    and begin.

    c. The AMWU makes it clear that the unions claim on KJV is for a 20 and 10 roster. If

    conceded, the claim would result in a reduction of 220 hours per man per annum

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    (that is about 8.4%) and an increase in the number of cycles from 10 per annum to

    12 (that is a 20% increase)

    d. The AMWU then very coyly states The Workers have for the first time on a WA

    Major Construction Project got an opportunity to make a substantial change to their

    current working situation and they understand that they now have the opportunityto influence their employers for a significant change. The unions are well aware that

    they are in a position to take lawful industrial action on the Project in support of

    their claims, and their position is bolstered by the fact that KJV already provides its

    staff with a 20 and 10 roster.45In its 11 November update, the AMWU quotes the

    State Secretary of the ETU as saying that Protected industrial action is always a last

    resort for unions.but we may be left with no choice46

    Meanwhile, Chevrons CFO went on to advise herinvestors: Frankly there is more

    dialogue in the press about challenges -- union-related challenges for us on this project

    than there have been reality (sic) on the ground. So the project continues to make good

    progress here.47Observers of industrial relations on Barrow Island would probably

    disagree with that assessment, and I suspect that KJV is being less than candid as to the

    realities of the situation that has been created for Chevron.

    As an example of poor industrial relations management, this is stellar. The nations largest,

    and most globally prominent construction project has been left exposed to protected

    industrial action during its critical path. The ability of the contractors and KJV to withstand

    such action is negligible to non-existent. The cost of the claim will depend on how the

    working hours are split between ordinary time and overtime, but it will be in the vicinity of

    15%. And, as the Managing Director of Chevron Australia has rightfully pointed out,whatever settlement is reached at Gorgon will be the starting point for the next resources

    project. I suspect that Chevrons appetite for investment in Australia will be even further

    blunted once this entirely avoidable snafu reaches its dnouement.

    Slide Twelve

    The principal causes of Australias poorly performing construction

    industry are:

    the major contractors acquiescence to pattern bargaining; client imposed pattern bargaining outcomes; and

    managerial ineptitude on the part of contractors and clients

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    The results of these failings are:

    excessively costly social and transport infrastructure, which in turn penalises taxpayers and

    citizens, particularly the poor;

    damage to Australias reputation as a resources investment destination, which in turn reduces

    investment, employment and royalty streams; and a largely irreversible loss of skills.

    This last point is important. As on-site construction becomes more expensive, developers, asset

    owners and EPCMs look to minimise the labour hours required on-site by utilising pre-fabrication

    and modularisation techniques. To an extent this is progress and should be welcomed, but

    unfortunately we are not talking about a transfer of jobs from the Australian construction industry

    to Australian manufacturing industryalmost all of this work is not only completed off-site but off-

    shore. We have no significant heavy fabrication capacity in Australia any more, and the modular

    kitchens and bathrooms that are increasingly prevalent in the building industry are more often than

    not sourced from overseas. We are therefore not training the apprentices who would become the

    skilled trades of the future.

    In its October 2014 World Economic Outlook, the IMF points out that Akey priority in many

    economies, particularly in those with relatively low efficiency of public investment, should be to raise

    the quality of infrastructure investment by improving the public investment process. This could

    involve, (among other reforms, better project appraisal and selection that identifies and targets

    infrastructure bottlenecks, including through centralized independent reviews, rigorous cost-benefit

    analysis, risk costing, and zero-based budgeting principles), andimproved project execution48.

    The very pressing challenge for State and Commonwealth Governments is to design and implementa holistic, consistent and effective intervention which delivers much improved project execution by

    forcefully addressing the labour productivity and industrial relations issues identified above.

    What might that intervention look like?

    There is no doubt that we need the reintroduction of the ABCC. The replacement of the ABCC by

    FWBC was not so much ensuring that there is always a strong cop on the beat in the building and

    construction industry49as the wilful and systematic emasculation of the most effective regulatory

    agency Australia has ever seen. The fact that the current Commissioner of FWBC has delivered the

    results that he has, given the legislative and funding constraints that he has been lumbered with, is a

    great credit to him and to his Chairman. But no regulator or legal framework can deal with stupidity

    or ineptitudeCertain things we cannot accomplish by any process of government. We cannot

    legislate intelligence. 50

    What Government can do is to act like a sophisticated and commercial client of the industry. For

    once, we dont turn to the private sector as the modelindeed, as we have noted with respect to

    the Gorgon Project, it seems utterly incapable of efficiently procuring built infrastructure.

    It is in fact the State of Victoria that has embedded some basic but very obvious disciplines into its

    construction procurement methodology. These disciplines are premised on a solid appreciation of

    the commercial incentives of the contractors; they are administered and enforced effectively; and

    they have delivered outstanding results relatively quickly.

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    Slide Thirteen

    Welcome to the Code.

    The notion of a Code of Practice for the building and construction industry goes back to the Hawke

    Government. In 1989, then Treasurer Paul Keating asked the Industry Commission to conduct areview of major projects and to identify opportunities to remove inefficiencies. The Report

    Construction Costs of Major Projects51- found that a principal source of inefficiency was the

    industrial relations practices of the industry, and went on to say that:

    Governments can play a significant role as clients of the construction industry. Governments have

    bargaining power which could be used to encourage efficient management and labour practices.

    With sufficient resolve it should be feasible for Commonwealth and State Governments to introduce

    changes on government projects which would lead to codes of practice covering industrial relations

    arrangements which might be used as a model by private contractors52

    In 1992, the Construction Industry Development Agency was established53. One of its objectives was

    to develop, and assist in the implementation of, industry codes and practices54 . However it was

    not until 1997 that the National Code of Practice for the Construction Industry55was introduced

    and its application was limited to Commonwealth funded projects.

    The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry conducted a number of case

    studies, including the Alice Springs to Darwin Railway Project. In respect of that Project, the Final

    Report concluded that the National Code and its associated Guidelines when effectively

    implemented and monitored, results in projects being built on time, on budget with safety and to the

    satisfaction of employees.56Commissioner Cole went on to recommend that:

    It be a requirement that any person who contracts to work on a building site owned, operated, or

    funded, wholly or partly, by the Commonwealth, comply with the National Code and the

    Implementation Guidelines, not only in relation to that project, but generally. That is, the

    Commonwealth should agree only to do business with those who comply with the National Code and

    the Implementation Guidelines on both publicly and privately funded projects57

    This recommendation was not implemented until July 200558following representations by key

    industry employers highlighting the need to give the industry leeway to extract itself from non-Code

    compliant industrial instruments.

    The National Codeunder the Coalitions Implementation Guidelines basically reinforces freedom of

    association, effectively prohibits project agreements, prevents head contractors coercion of sub-

    contractors, and limits right of entry. It was a major, if not the most important driver of the surge in

    productivity that the industry experienced under Ministers Abbott and Andrews. Sadly, it too fell to

    the Rudd/Gillard Governmentinitially through a significant dilution of the Implementation

    Guidelines under Minister Gillard in 200959, and then in 2013 through Minister Shortens codification

    of the Code and Guidelines into a legislative instrument under the Fair Work (Building Industry) Act

    201260.

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    When the Baillieu Government came to power in Victoria at the end of 2010, the wage rates and

    unacceptable work practices that were born out of the Thiess Degrmont Wonthaggi Agreement61

    had flowed across the State of Victoria and beyond62. The previous government had defended the

    Thiess Degrmont industrial dealthe then Water Minister being quoted as saying that "Victorian

    taxpayers will not pay one extra cent as a result of agreements for workers' pay and conditions on

    the desalination project because we agreed to a fixed-price contract.63That may well be true, but

    you would think that a Cabinet largely composed of union officials would be well aware of the flow-

    on implications of wage deals of this nature.

    In response to the Wonthaggi debacle, the incoming State Government implemented a Building

    Code which was to apply to State funded construction projects with effect from 1 July 201264. The

    Victorian Code emulated the previous National Code but also took a vital further step through the

    additional requirement of a Workplace Relations Management Plan. The WRMP adds two critically

    important components to the Code. The first is a requirement to complete an IR Risk Assessment,

    and the second is to embed labour productivity metrics and initiatives into the WRMP. The WRMP,

    once approved, has as much weight as the contract itself. When DTF issued a sanction on McConnell

    Dowell in September this year, it was for a failure to comply with its WRMP65.

    The Victorian Code of Practice is about preserving value for tax payers. It is the bare minimum that

    you would expect from a sophisticated client of the construction industry. It should be emulated by

    all Australian governments and administered with the same degree of professionalism and

    sophistication as displayed by the Victorian Construction Code Compliance Unit. Further, in order to

    rein in the excesses and manifest failures of the resources sector in construction procurement, the

    right to exploit and otherwise develop Australias mineral and energy resources should be

    contingent on compliance with a construction Code that is based on the Victorian model.

    Lets apply some counterfactual thinking. If the Victorian Code had been in place for Spencer Street

    and Wonthaggi and it was administered as astutely and as professionally as it is now:

    the VBIA would not have applied to Spencer Street;

    neither project would have been able to engage non-working delegates;

    sub-contractors would not have been coerced into adopting the head contractors industrial

    instrument;

    there would be no requirement to obtain union consent and/or to consult with unions in

    respect of engaging sub-contractors or other labour arrangements;

    both Projects would have been required to complete an IR Risk Assessment. That process

    would have identified the risks of restrictive rosters, the issues associated with inclement

    weather and other matters, and as part of the WRMP process, mitigation steps would have

    been inserted into the WRMP.(Remember that compliance with the WRMP is a condition of

    the contract); and

    where there was unlawful industrial action, the contractor would have been obliged to take

    every step to prevent or stop it, and to recover any damages or losses caused by it.

    These arrangements would have resulted in markedly different outcomes on both projects, and

    markedly different flow on legacies.

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    For most of us, engagement with the construction industry is limited to a residential building or

    renovation experiencewe cannot be expected to know much about construction procurement. But

    the State Governments are the construction industrys largest client. If, like the State of Victoria, you

    have a $27 billion construction programme66then you want to be reasonably astute when it comes

    to managing value for money. If you can achieve a modest 1% lift in productivity from your $27

    billion then you have saved $270 millionat $500K67per bedthat is a new 540 bed hospital.

    The Code is the means by which a large and multi-sector ongoing consumer of construction services

    ensures that it achieves value for money. It is designed to counteract the moral hazard that

    contractors may have a vested interest in de facto collusion on labour costs and productivity. It

    ensures that unacceptable industrial behaviour meets with appropriate consequences. And it is the

    only practical way that inflationary construction costs can be brought under some semblance of

    control.

    The Victorian Code is a benchmark for the other States and the Commonwealth. The Productivity

    Commissions recent report into public infrastructure echoes this view.A sensible starting point is

    for all jurisdictions and the Australian Government to deploy the Victorian guidelines (or something

    akin to them) for their building codes of practice.68

    The right to exploit the nations mineral resources should be contingent on doing so efficiently

    certainly as far as the construction phase is concerned. To that end, I would suggest that a Code

    approach be taken by the relevant tiers of government and form part of the Development

    Assessment and Approval process of minerals and energy projects.

    Returning to our Parable..our Citys problem was not the pigeons but the Contractors. By

    modifying the behaviours of the Contractors, the pigeons ended up in their proper place.

    Unions thrive where there are vacuumsif management abrogates its duty to control its sites and

    its workforces, then it is hardly surprising that the unions step into the gap.

    If management is unable to contemplate or act on the long term economic implications of 16% per

    annum wages inflation69with no productivity trade-offsthen the client needs to step in and ensure

    that there is some measure of sobriety in the labour relations performance of the industry. If, as is

    evident in the resources sector, the client is simply incapable of strategic industrial relations

    management, then the States and the Commonwealth need to protect our national interest and

    reputation through the imposition of a Code.

    The Code is designed solely to modify contractors behaviours.It exists to protect the short and long

    term interests of taxpayers by forcing contractors to take some responsibility for the effective

    management of labour productivity and labour costs. The Code is the minimum that one would

    expect from a large, informed and sophisticated consumer of construction services. The Code is not

    anti-unionrather it is pro-taxpayer, and it is particularly important for the less well-offthose who

    rely on public transport and public hospitals and those for whom the outrageous cost of Wonthaggi

    is a noticeable impost.

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    Stephen Sasse has worked in industrial relations for major Australian and multinational companies for 30 years. He has

    held senior executive positions in Transfield Construction, John Holland Group and Leighton Holdings. Highlights of his

    career include ending the entrenched demarcation issues in the Australian paint manufacturing industry (1990) and

    the development of the industrial relations strategy for Melbournes highly successful EastLink Project (2004). Stephen

    authored the first employer submission to The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry (2002)

    and the John Holland Submission to the Wilcox Review (2008). Stephen consults to public and private sector

    organisations in industrial relations strategy, labour productivity improvement, cost reduction, workplace health and

    safety and construction procurement strategies.

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    1Ecotransit Sydney Fact Sheet Tunnelling for Rail: What it Really Costs

    http://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/Rail-Tunnelling-Factsheet.pdf2N Efron & M Read Analysing International Tunnel Costs Worcester Polytechnic Institute 2012 p. 303AFR 29thMarch 20124Minerals Council of Australia Opportunity at Risk Regaining Our Competitive Edge in Minerals Resources

    September 2012 p. 105Marius Kloppers BHP Billiton Diversification and Delivery in a Cyclical World Brisbane Mining Club 17th

    October 20126McKinsey & Company Extending the LNG Boom: Improving Australian LNG Productivity and Competitiveness

    May 2013 p.17PWC Productivity Scorecard Reconstructing ProductivityProductivity in the Australian Construction

    Industry October 20138Sydney Morning Herald 12thFebruary 20149Sydney Morning Herald 10thNovember 201410John Holland Group Pty Limited Submission Proposed Building and Construction Division of Fair Work

    Australia December 200811Productivity Commission Public Infrastructure Inquiry Report No 71. 27 thMay 2014 Volume One p.312http://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/ 13Sydney Morning Herald 15thMay 201414The Age 13thDecember 201115Minerals Council of Australia Opportunity at Risk Regaining Our Competitive Edge in Minerals Resources

    September 2012 p. 2616http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivan 17BREE Outlook for Australian Resources and Energy Commodities Annual Research Workshop 2013 18BREE Resources and Energy Major Projects April 2014 p.27 19BREE Outlook for Australian Resources and Energy Commodities Annual Research Workshop 2013 20BREE Resources and Energy Major Projects April 2014 p.27

    21The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 5Paragraphs 206 - 21522The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 1

    Paragraph 723The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 5

    Paragraph 20824For example Voters will make a choice on builder-union cartels Business Spectator 10 October 2014

    http://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-

    cartels25https://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-

    agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=

    &ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_ID =26

    http://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdf 27The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 5

    Paragraph 3928The Australian 7thApril 201429Auditor-General's Report on the Annual Financial Report of the State of Victoria, 2006-07 p.3430The Age 17thJuly 200431Johnson, D and Humffray, H EastLink: Redefining the Possible ACAA Technical Paper 200932Australian Industrial Relations Commission Thiess John Holland Mitcham Frankston Project Construction

    Agreement (AWU) Certified Agreement 200533The Age 9thOctober 201234The Herald Sun 10thNovember 201435The Australian 12thMay 201136

    Fair Work Australia Thiess Degremont (TD) and AMWU, AWU, CEPU and CFMEU Victorian DesalinationProject Greenfields Agreement 2009

    http://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/Rail-Tunnelling-Factsheet.pdfhttp://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/Rail-Tunnelling-Factsheet.pdfhttp://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/http://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/http://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivanhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivanhttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttp://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdfhttp://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdfhttp://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdfhttp://www.cfmeuwa.com/files/dmfile/GorgonAgreementnoMemo2.pdfhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttps://www.fwc.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/agreements/find-agreement/results?AGREEMENT_TITLE=barrow+island&STATE=All&INDUSTRY_1=All&sqlsrv_combine=&ABN=&ODN=&AGREEMENT_ID=&OLD_PUB_CODE=&PRINT_IDhttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttp://www.businessspectator.com.au/article/2014/10/10/politics/voters-will-make-choice-builder-union-cartelshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eamon_Sullivanhttp://www.aihw.gov.au/haag10-11/hospital-performance-elective-surgery-wait/http://www.ecotransit.org.au/ets/files/Rail-Tunnelling-Factsheet.pdf
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    37Federal Court of Australia: Construction, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and

    Allied Services Union of Australia v Thiess Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 102038The Age 13thDecember 201139http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_report 40http://www.kjv.com.au/41http://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.html 42http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148 43Thomson Reuters Street Events Edited Transcript - CVX Q3 2014 Chevron Corp Earnings Call 31 October

    2014 p.18http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148 44

    http://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=i

    nstant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=

    Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20pattern 45http://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.html 46

    http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_frie

    ndly_rosters

    47Thomson Reuters Street Events Edited Transcript - CVX Q3 2014 Chevron Corp Earnings Call 31 October2014 p.18http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148 48International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook October 2014 Chapter 3 Is it time for an

    infrastructure push? The macroeconomic effects of public investment p.77 49The Hon Julia GillardSecond Reading Speech BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IMPROVEMENT

    AMENDMENT (TRANSITION TO FAIR WORK) BILL 2009 Hansard p.7807 13thAugust 200950Griswold, A. W Essays on Education 195451Industry Commission Construction Costs of Major ProjectsReport No. 8 11 March 1991 AGPS Canberra52Industry Commission Construction Costs of Major ProjectsReport No. 8 11 March 1991 AGPS Canberra

    p.8853Construction Industry Reform and Development Act 1992 Cth.54Construction Industry Reform and Development Act 1992 Cth. S17(1)(c)

    55http://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdf56The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 7 p.7157The Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry Final Report March 2003. Volume 1

    Recommendation 41.58Australian Government Implementation Guidelines for the National Code of Practice for the Construction

    Industry September 200559The Australian 10thJuly 200960http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110 61Fair Work Australia Thiess Degremont (TD) and AMWU, AWU, CEPU and CFMEU Victorian Desalination

    Project Greenfields Agreement 200962The Australian 12thMay 201163

    The Age 22nd

    March 201064Department of Treasury and Finance Implementation Guidelines to the Victorian Code of Practice for the

    Building and Construction Industry April 201265http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-

    McConnell-Dowell66State of Victoria Victorian Budget 2014 2015 Building a Better Victoria67http://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModule 68Productivity Commission Public Infrastructure Inquiry Report No 71. 27 thMay 2014 Volume One p.3369Marius Kloppers BHP Billiton Diversification and Delivery in a Cyclical World Brisbane Mining Club 17th

    October 2012

    http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_reporthttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_reporthttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/amwu_gorgon_reporthttp://www.kjv.com.au/http://www.kjv.com.au/http://www.kjv.com.au/http://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/kellogg-joint-venture-gorgon.htmlhttp://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber+email&utm_content=read+more&utm_term=Gorgon%20workers%20rebuff%20agreement%20with%20new%20roster%20patternhttp://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.htmlhttp://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.htmlhttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModulehttp://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModulehttp://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModulehttp://www.capital.dhs.vic.gov.au/capdev/ProjectProposals/Benchmarking/HospitalCapitalModulehttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Infrastructure-Delivery/Construction-code-compliance/Exclusion-sanction-on-McConnell-Dowellhttp://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014C00110http://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://www.apcc.gov.au/ALLAPCC/APCC%20PUB_DOLAC%20national%20code%20of%20Practice%201997.pdfhttp://investor.chevron.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=130102&p=irol-EventDetails&EventId=5170148http://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://www.manufacturingmatters.net.au/workers_reject_gorgon_construction_ea_and_demand_family_friendly_rostershttp://www.kjv.com.au/careers/advanced-search/58.htmlhttp://www.workplaceexpress.com.au/nl06_news_selected.php?act=2&nav=10&selkey=52882&utm_source=instant+email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=subscriber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