sartreterminologyinhisownterms.files.wordpress.com… · web view) "atheistic...

85 pages Sartre: Existential Anguish&Bad Faithother Files

Terms: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U-Z

Existentialism, Tr. by Bernard Frechtman,............................................N.Y., Philosophical Library, 1947..................................................

[Original translation modified by Sartrean term clarifications].....................................4

Existentialism...................................................................................................4ExistenceI precedes essence (Ex15-18)...................................................................4

10-14Exis Being and Nothingness, Tr. by Hazel Barnes,........................................ New York, Philosophical Library, 1956......[Original translation modified by

Sartrean terms and their clarification].............................................................................5Meaning in BN as constitutedBN through freelyBNlived determineddial [‘that is, as

limitation/negation’] projectsI (index)..............................................................6Sartre and R. D. Laing: Existential phenomenology studies ‘being-in-the-

world’........................................................................................................8Existential_psychoanalysisI as ‘moral description releasing the ethical

meaningI of humanI projectsI’ (Conclusion, BN625-8).......................................9

10-14Exis Search for a Method, Tr. by Hazel Barnes,............................................. N.Y., Vintage, 1968. [Original translation modified by Sartrean terms and their

clarification] 12Sartre rejects the term existentialismI...............................................................13PsychoanalysisI, protohistoryI, existentialismI (SM58-63, CDR17-8, 3 pages)..............13

10-14Exis The Progressive-Regressive Method (SM84-166)............................17The given2neg (SM100)...........................................................................................17ProjectsI have no contents: ‘OurI roles are always future’ (SM105-12)............19Find ‘regressiveI tension expanding from objectivitylived to objectivityI’ (SM143-47)

.................................................................................................................20If ‘the dialectical movementdial does not find its true point of departureI it will

never reach its goal’ (SM147)......................................................................22ExistentialistI ‘approach as regressive-progressiveposited and analytic-

syntheticposited method’ (SM148, BN460)...........................................................23Existential_psychoanalysisI looks for originalI humanI project (SM150-2)...........25Vertical disengagement of regressiveposited from progressiveposited (BN457-8)...........29

1

10-14Exis Existentialism’s founding of anthropologyI: SM Conclusion (68-9, 167-177) 31There ‘is no doubt that the principle of sociological research is often a masked

idealismI’ (SM 68-70).................................................................................31ExistentialismI ‘positsI to itself the questionI of its fundamental relationsok [of

three degrees]posited&posited as 1neg&2neg with the disciplines of anthropologyI’ (SM167-8).................................................................................................................33

ExistentialI ‘human_reality eludes direct knowledge [savoir]posited to the degree that it makes itself ’ (SM169).......................................................................34

Indirect ‘knowledge—the result of reflection on existenceI—is presupposed by all the conceptsconcept of anthropologyI’ (SM171-3)........................................35

AnthropologyI should ‘replace the study of human objectsposited with the processes of becoming-an-object’ (SM174)................................................38

10-14Angu Anguish.....................................................................................................39

10-14Angu BN Part One, Chapter One: The Origin of Nothingness, section V (SM28-45, out of sequence from Sartre\Negation-IV. The Phenomenologicalposited ConceptI of NothingnessI (SM16-45)............................................................................................39It ‘is in anguish that ... being[-there] is in questionI for itself’ (BN28-9)................39Fearlived ‘is fear of being[there] in the world whereas anguish is anguish before

myself’: ‘the one is born in the destruction of the other’ (BN29-34)...........40Anguish witnesses possible selfI-change and unjustifiability (BN34-5)...............43How ‘can we explain the rarity of the phenomenonlived of anguish’ (BN35-7)......43Everyday ‘morality is exclusive of ethicalI anguish’ (BN37-8)............................45Anguished apprehension mediates the world’s possible projects (BN39-40).......46Page 44 out of sequence at Sartre\Ontology-Transcendence in immanence...........................49

10-14Angu Heidegger’s anxious nothingness in What Is Metaphysics, Basic Writings ed. David Ferrell Krell, Harper & Row, 1977..............................49Ancient’s unformed matter: Hegel’s being and nothing as the same..............50Anxiety reveals the nothing, not to you or I, but to DaseinI............................50Anxious nothingness as DaseinI facing finite being: Nihilation repels in retreat

.................................................................................................................51Rarity of anxiety and boredomI as self-deception............................................52

10-14Hege Kierkegaard: ‘That singular individual’ from paper delivered to UNESCO, 1964, from Between Existentialism and Marxism (Gallimard, 1972) Tr. by John Mathews, N.Y., Pantheon, 1974, (p. 141-169)...................54

2

Kierkegaard has to demonstrate his irreducibility...........................................54HegelI ‘neglects the unsurpassable opaqueness of lived experience’ (SM9-12). .56

10-14Angu Alienation...............................................................................................57AlienationI of our objectificationlived as being-outsideI in the thing (SM47, 99,

CDR227, index)...............................................................................................57AlienationI as success in life (NE99, 120-22).........................................................61

10-14Badf Bad Faith...................................................................................................63Self-deception (index)......................................................................................63Refusing or allowing [An ethics of honesty] (index)..............................................64

10-14Badf BN Part One, Chapter Two: Bad Faith (BN47-70).................................65I. Bad Faith’s intention is hidden: Falsehood’s deception is intended (BN47-52)65II. Patterns of Bad Faith...................................................................................68

Refusing his sexual advances, she recognizes only his admiration (BN55).................................................................................................................68Performance of the café waiter (BN58)......................................................71Sadness as intentional, not constitutiveBN modality (BN60, 65-6, 92)............72

Consciousness ‘of the is what it is not’ (BN61)...................................................74pages 65-6 out of sequence Herein-Sadness as intentional, not constitutiveBN modality (60)........76III. The ‘Faith’ of Bad Faith (BN67-70)................................................................76

Mediate ‘and immediate are one and the same being[-there]’ (BN68)..........77Good faith arousal in being[there] what one isI; bad faith arousal fleesI beingI (BN69)..............................................................................................78

‘Belief and nonbelief are the same thing: ‘to believe is only to believe’.........79Doubtlived (BN156)..................................................................................................80

11-14Exis,Angu,Badf Appendix.....................................................................................81Sartre\Index of Terms-NATURE ........................................................................81

3

Sartre: Existential Anguish&Bad Faith 4

Sartre: Existential Anguish&Bad Faith 5

Sartre: Existential Anguish&Bad Faith

E N D O F T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

10-14Exis Existentialism, Tr. by Bernard Frechtman,N.Y., Philosophical Library, 1947.

[Original translation modified by Sartrean term clarifications]

10-14Exis ExistentialismSartre\Index of Terms-EXISTENTIALISM ; not hyperlinked in this document;

cf. existenceSartre\Freedom-Freedom in Existentialism (1946)

10-14Exis ExistenceI precedes essence (Ex15-18)Sartre, Existentialism (p. 15P) "...there are two kind of existentialist; first,

those who are Christian, among whom I would include Jaspers and Gabriel Marcel, both Catholic; and on the other hand the atheistic existentialists, among whom I class Heidegger, and then the French existentialists and myself. What we have in common is e... that existence_precedes_essence**, or, if you prefer, that subjectivity must be the starting point.

(p. 16P, Catholic view) [O]ne can not postulate a man who produces a paper-cutter but does not knowFr=? what it is used for. Therefore, let us say that, for the paper-cutter, essencelivedc—that is, the ensemble of both the production routines and the properties which enable it to be both produced and defined—precedes existencee..."

(p. 17P, for example) "e...the individual man is the realizationontology [as doubly ontological project1neg and situation2neg] of a certain conceptontology/1neg in the divine intelligenceontology/2neg."

(p. 18P) "Atheistic existentialism, which I represent, is more coherent. It states that if God does not exist, there is at least one being[-there] in whom existence_precedes_essence, a being who existsI before he can be defined by any conceptI, and that this being is man, or, as Heidegger says, human_reality. What is meant here by saying that existence_precedes_essence? It means that, first of all, manI existsI, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself. If man, as the existentialist conceives him, is indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only afterward will he be something, and he himself will have made what he will be..."

6


(p. 20c) "If, on the other hand, existence precedes essence, and if we grant that we exist and fashion our image at one and the same time, the image is validdial/lived for everybody and for our whole age."

BN (p. lvc) "e...Since consciousness is not possibleI before being[-there], but since its beingI is the source and condition of all possibilitylivedc, its existence I implies its essencee..."

(p. lvic) "...The ontological error of Cartesianc rationalism is not to have seen that if the absoluteontologyc is defined by the primacy of existence over essence, it cannot be conceived as a substance..."

(p. lxiic, Fr. 28) "Thus we have left pure appearance and arrived at full being[-there]. Consciousness is a beingI whose existence posits ok its essence , and inverselyok it is consciousness of a beingI, whose essence I implies its existence ; that is, in which appearanceI lays claim to beingI..."

Notebooks for an Ethics (p. 32P) "In Historyconcept/1negc, too, existence_precedes_essence. For the representation of HistoryI enters into play as an active factor in the determination [‘that is, as limitation’] of HistoryI. HistoryI is what one makese..."

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-EXISTENCE PRECEDES ESSENCE ; 6 hits all copied above; cf. existence

10-14Exis Being and Nothingness, Tr. by Hazel Barnes, New York, Philosophical Library, 1956.

[Original translation modified by Sartrean terms and their clarification]Sartre\Freedom-FreedomBN in Existentialism (1945)Sartre, The War Diaries (p. 324) "...Heidegger [showed] me that there was

nothing beyond the projectontology/1neg through which human_reality realizedontology/1neg itselfontology/2neg..."

Sartre’s formidable early critique of empirical versus existential_psychoanalysis is in BN (p. 568-575)

Laing, The Divided Self (1959, p. 17) "Existential phenomenologyposited attempts to characterize the nature of a person’s experience of his world and himself. It is not so much an attempt to describe particular objects of his experience as to set all particular experiences within the context of his whole ‘being-in-the-world’**."

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-BEING-IN-THE-WORLD ;

7


BN: (p. 17c) "...We know [sait] that for Heidegger the beingI of human_reality is defined as ‘being-in-the-world lived c.’ The worldlivedc is a syntheticdial complex of instrumentallivedc realities inasmuch as they point one to another in ever widening circles, and inasmuch as man makes himself announce what he is in terms of this complex.

(p. 245c) "...And we know [sait] that the ‘in’ [of ‘being-in-the-world’] must be understoodok in the sense of colo [till, cultivate], habito, [dwell, live, stay, reside] not of insum [implied in, contained it]; to-be-in-the-worldlived is to haunt the world, not to be ensnared in it; and it is in my ‘being-in-the-world lived ’ that the other determines [‘that is, as limitation’] me...";

(p. 318c) "...my being-in-the-world lived , by the sole factlived that it realizeslived/1neg&2neg a worldlived/2neg, causeslived

ok itself to be indicated to itself as a being-in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived by the worldI which it realizesI... [I]t is necessaryBNontology that I lose myself in the worldI in order for the worldlived/2neg to exist and for me to be able to transcendlived/1neg&2neg it...";

Sartre\Phenomenology-RInstrumentality; coefficient of adversity; body extends across tool utilized;

The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert’s School Years-RAt ‘ease in the world ... is only the least possibleI degree of being "ill at ease"’: ‘I come to myself "from other horizons"’

-------------------------------------------------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-BEING-IN-THE-MIDST-OF-THE-WORLD lived; [Heidegger’s neologism];

BN: (p. 60c) "...I can not say either that I am here or that I am not here, in the sense that we say ‘that box of matches is on the table;’ this would be to confuse my ‘being-in-the-world’ with a ‘being-in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived...":

The Other-RI ‘exist for-myself not abstractly but engaged’: ‘being-in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived which comes to the other through me is a real being’;

Sartre\Phenomenology-RInstrumentality; coefficient of adversity; body extends across tool utilized;

10-14Exis Meaning in BN as constitutedBN through freelyBNlived determineddial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] projectsI (index)

Sartre\Index of Terms-MEANING [ BN ] lived; [sens]; cf. meaningCDRlived found little difference.

Sartre\Freedom-Cause, motive, act, and end as simultaneous in for-itself’sontology transcendencelived/1neg

8


Sartre\Negation-R Crescent moon’s dialectical lack, lacking, lacked (BN86-7, out of sequence), with BN (p. 87c) "...It is in the being[-there]ontology/1neg of the existing, as the correlate of a human transcendencelived/1neg, to lead outside itself to the being which it is notontology/2neg—as to its meaningBNlived."

Sartre\Temporality-RFor the being of the present we must ask ‘to what the present is presence and who or what is present’

-RTennis court consciousness exists as internal_connectionsdial/lived [of interior structures of consciousness] to the future [futur]

BN (p. 36c) "...the whole work which I wish to produce is the meaning of the sentence...";

(p. 37c) "...only by positing the book as the existing basis on which my present, existingI sentenceI emerges, can I confer a determined [‘that is, as limitation’] meaningBNlived upon my sentenceI.";

(p. 38c) "...Rather from the momentdial of their arising in the world they are thrown into a pattern of behavior the meaningBNlived of which is respectability. Thus respectability acquires a being[-there]...";

(p. 181P ) "The very meaning BN lived of the for-itselfontology is outside in being[-there]...";

(p. 438c) "...the motive, the act, and the end are all constitutedBN in a single upsurge. Each of these three structuresdial/lived claims the two others as its meaning BN lived..."

Heidegger: Heidegger\Lifework-RCaputo: Leibniz’ Principle of Sufficient Ground: Descartes’s and Kant’s objects, with "‘Philosophy’ from the time of Descartes on is, according to Heidegger, the name for the attempt of human subjectivity to prescribe to things their nature and meaning."

Foucault: Foucault\Genealogy-Genealogy seeks hazardous dominations, not anticipatory meanings;

-Foucault’s rejection of phenomenology and existentialism;-RStructuralism/Eventilization as different orders: Problem is to

distinguish among events, with (1977, p. 56c) "The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a language, relations of power, not relations of meaning.";

Foucault\Politics-Caputo: Constructions leave outside spaces for recovering differences. [Foucault’s recovered differences overcome constructed meanings];

Foucault\Subjectivity&Problemization-From repressive hypothesis to subjects of a sexuality

9


10-14Exis Sartre and R. D. Laing: Existential phenomenology studies ‘being-in-the-world’

Sartre, "Americans and their myths," The Nation [1947], cited from www.Sartre_ORG. "When a friend tries to explain our character and unravel our motives, when he relates all our acts to principles, prejudices, beliefs, and a conceptionconcept of the world which he thinks to find in us, we listen uneasily, unable either to deny what he says or entirely accept it. Perhaps the interpretation is true, but what is the truth that is being interpreted? We miss the intimate warmth, the life, the way one is always unpredictable to oneself and also tiresomely familiar, the decision to get along with oneselfI, the perpetual deliberations and perpetual inventions about what one is, and the vow to be ‘that’ and nothing else—in short, the liberty... But when we walk about New York, on Third Avenue, or Sixth Avenue, or Tenth Avenue, at that evening hour which, for Da Vinci, lends softness to the faces of men, we see the most pathetic visages in the world, uncertain, searching, intent, full of astonished good faith, with appealing eyes, and we know that the most beautiful generalizations are of very little service: they permit us to understandFr=? the system but not the people."

Laing, The Divided Self (1959, p. 17) "Existential phenomenologyR attempts to characterize the nature of a person’s experience of his world and himself. It is not so much an attempt to describe particular objects of his experience as to set all particular experiences within the context of his whole ‘being-in-the-world’."

(p. 19-20) "The words of the current technical [psychiatric] vocabulary either refer to man in isolation from the other and the world, that is, as an entity not essentially ‘in relation to’ the other and in a world, or they refer to falsely substantialized aspects of this isolated entity. Such words are: mind and body, psyche and soma, psychological and physical, personality, the self, the organism. All these terms are abstracts. Instead of the original bond of I and you, we take a single man in isolation and conceptualize his various aspect into ‘the ego’, the superego’, and ‘the id’... We all know through personal experience that we can be ourselves only in and through our world... Unless we begin with the concept of man in relation to other men and from the beginning ‘in’ the world, and unless we realize that man does not exist without ‘his’ world nor can his world exist without him, we are condemned to start our study of schizoid and schizophrenic people with a verbal and conceptual splitting that matches the split up of the totality of the schizoid being-in-the-world... (p. 20) psycho-physical, psycho-somatic, psycho-biological-psycho-pathological, psycho-social, etc., etc."

(p. 20-1) "Man’s being (...) can be seen from different points of view and one or other aspect can be made the focus of study. In particular, man can be seen as

10


person or thing. Now, even the same thing, seen from different points of view, gives rise to two entirely different descriptions, and the descriptions give rise to two entirely different theories, and the theories result in two entirely different sets of action. The initial way we see a thing determines all our subsequent dealings with it. Let us consider an equivocal or ambiguous figure: In this figure, there is one thing on the paper which can be seen as a vase or as two faces turned towards each other. (p. 21) There are not two things on the paper: there is one thing there, but, depending on how it strikes us, we can see two different objects..."

(p. 22) "The two accounts ... are each the outcome of one’s initial intentional act; each intentional act leads in its own direction and yields its own results. One chooses the point of view or intentional act within the overall context of what one is ‘after’ with the other. Man as seen as an organism or man as seen as a person discloses different aspects of the human reality to the investigator..."

Max Charlesworth, "Sartre, Laing, and Freud" (p. 23) "...the anti-psychiatrists** have emphasized first that any psychic state, whether it be pathological or not, is symbolic. It signifies something beyond itself. Thus a neurotic is trying to tell us something by his apparently bizarre behavior, and the psychiatrist’s task is to try and decipher the meaning of that behavior. In this sense, madness is not irrational behavior for it is charged with meaning. Further, madness is not to be seen as a malfunctioning of the psyche as physical illness is a malfunctioning of the body. Madness is rather a way of coping with an impossible situation or environment, a way of making an unlivable situation livable. And finally, the therapist and his so-called patient must have a person-to-person relationship. The therapist must give up his professional and expert role and must cease treating his patient as a kind of object-to-be-cured."** See Pol...\Child Development&Violence-Winnicott/Sass/Laing: Borderline schizophrenic states and modernism, and sub-topic.

10-14Exis Existential_psychoanalysisI as ‘moral description releasing the ethical meaningI of humanI projectsI’ (Conclusion, BN625-8)

Sartre, BN (p. 625-6, Fr. 673, page 617 out of sequence at Sartre\Ontology-For-itselfontology and in-itselfontology are not cognitive internal relations) "Ontologyc itself can not formulate ethical precepts. It is concerned solely with what is, and we can not possibleI derive imperatives from ontology’sI indicatives. It does, however, allow us to catch a glimpse of what sort of ethicsR will assume its responsibilities when confronted with a human_reality in situation. (BNp. 626) OntologyI has revealed to us, in fact, the origin and the nature of valuelivedc; we have seen that value2neg is the lackdial/lived in connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1neg&2neg to which the for-itselfontology determinesdial [‘that

11


is, as limitation/negation’] its being[-there]lived/1neg as a lackI. By the very factlived that the for-itselfI exists, as we have seen, valueI arises to haunt its being-for-others. It follows that the various tasks of the for-itselfI can be made the objectposited of an existential_psychoanalysis**, for they all aim at producing the missing synthesisdial/lived of consciousness and beingI in the form of valueI or self-cause. Thus existential_psychoanalysis is moral R ok description, for it releases to us the ethical meaning BN lived of various human projects . It indicates to us the necessityBNlived of abandoning the psychology of interest along with any utilitarian interpretation of humanI conduct—by revealing to us the ideal meaningI of all humanI attitudes. These meaningsBNI are beyond egoismok and altruism, beyond also any behavior which is called disinterested. Man makes himself man in order to be God, and selfness considered from this point_of_viewdouble connection of 1st&2neg can appear [paraître] to be an egoismok; but precisely because there is no common measure between humanitylived/2neg and the selfI-causelived/1neg which it wants to be, one could just as well say that manlived/2neg loses himself in order that the selfI-causelived/1neg may exist. We will consider then that all humanI existence is a passion, the famous selfI-interestlivedc being[-there] only one way freelyBN chosen among others to realizeontology [as doubly ontological project1neg and situation2neg] this passion."

(BNp. 626, Fr. 674) sartre¶"But the principal result of exis tential_psychoanalysis c must be to make us repudiate the spirit of seriousness***. The spirit of seriousness has two characteristics: it considers valuesI as transcendentlived/1neg givens2neg inde-pendent of humanI subjectivity, and transfers the quality ‘desirable’ from the ontologicalc structuredial/lived of things to their simple material constitutionBN. For the spirit of seriousness, for example, bread is desirable because it is necessaryBNlived to live (e...) and because bread is nourishing. The result of the serious attitude, which as we know [sait] rulesI the world, is to causelived

ok the symbolic valuesI of things to be drunk in by their empirical idiosyncrasy as ink by a blotter; it puts forward the opacity of the desired objectI and posits it in itself as a desirable irreducible. Thus we are already on the moralI plane but concurrently on that of bad faith, for it is an ethics which is ashamed of itself and does not dare speak its name. It has obscured all its goals in order to freeI itself from anguish. Man pursues being[-there] blinded by hiding from himself the freeI projectI which is this pursuit. He makes himself such that he is waited for by all the tasks placed along his way. ObjectsI are mute demands, and he is nothing in himself but the passive obedience to these demands. Copied Sartre\Flaubert’s Constitution-man is a useless passion

(BNp. 626-7, Fr. 674) "Existential_psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man the real goal of his pursuit, which is beingI as a syntheticdial fusion of the in–itself with the for-itselfontology; existential_psychoanalysis is going to acquaint man with his

12


passion. In truth there are many men who have practiced this psychoanalysis on themselves and who have not waited to learn its principles in order to make use of them as a means of deliverance and salvation. (BNp. 627) Many men, in fact, know [savent] that the goal of their pursuit is being[-there]; and to the extent that they possess this knowledge [connaissance], they refrain from appropriating things for their own sake and try to realizeontology the symbolicI appropriationsontology/1neg of their being-in-itselfontology. But to the extent that this attempt still shares in the spirit of seriousness and that these men can still believe that their mission of effecting the existence of the -for-itselfontology is written in things, they are condemned to despair; for they discoverdial/lived at the same time that all humanI activities are equivalent (for they all tend to sacrifice man in order that the selfI-cause may arise) and that all are on principle doomed to failurelived. Thus it amounts to the same thing whether one gets drunk alone or is a leader of nations. If one of these activities takes precedence over the other, this will not be because of its real goal but because of the degree of consciousness which it possesses of its idealI goal; and in this case it will be the quietism of the solitary drunkard which will take precedence over the vain**** agitation of the leader of nations.

(BNp. 627, Fr. 675) "But ontologyI and existential_psychoanalysis (or the spontaneous and empirical application which men have always made of these disciplines) must reveal to the moralI agent that he is the being[-there] by whom valuesI exist. It is then that his freedomI will become conscious of itself and will reveal itself in anguishI as the unique source of valueI and the nothingness by which the world existsI..."

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-EXISTENTIAL_PSYCHOANALYSIS ;

BN: (p. 599c) "...The goal of existential_psychoanalysis is to rediscoverdial/lived through these empirical, concrete projects the original way in which each man has chosen his being[-there]...";

(p. 626c) "But the principal result of exis tential_psychoanalysis must be to make us repudiate the spirit of seriousnessc..."

Search for a Method: Herein-Existential_psychoanalysis looks for original human project;

-------------------------------------------------*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SERIOUSNESS [sérieux];

BN: The only BN hits as of 12-10 are in the above sub-topic; and implied in Herein-Performance of the café waiter;

The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert’s Personalization-ROstracizing laughter unifies and purifies collective intersubjectivity;

13


-RLaughter banishes intersubjective contamination: Talk radio;-RGustave’s pre-teen mean-spirited laughter;

-------------------------------------------------**** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-VANITY , [vanity];

BN: (p. 141c, Fr. 177) "e...Before itself, behind itself: never itself. This is the very meaningI of the two ekstasis Pastconcept

ok and Futureconcept [Futur]ok, and this is why valuelivedc in itself is by nature self-repose, non-temporalityBNlived! The eternity which man is seeking is not the infinity of duration, of that vain pursuit after the selfI for which I am myself responsible; man seeks a repose in selfI, the atemporalityI of the absolute coincidence with himself."

(p. 290-1c) "...But prideI—or vanity—is a feeling without equilibrium, and it is in bad faithI. In vanity I attempt in my capacity as objectposited to act upon the other. I take this beauty or this strength or this intelligence which he confers on me—in so far as he constitutesBN me as an objectI—and I attempt to make use of it in a return shock so as to affectI him passively with the feeling of admiration or love. But at the same time I demand that this feeling as the sanction of my being-as-object should be entertained by the otherI in his capacity as subject—i.e., as a freedomBNI. This is, in fact, the only way of conferring an absoluteontology objectI-ness on my strength or on my beauty.

The Family Idiot: (3:21, Fr. 2:1125) "...Even if the children did not yet feel the gravity of scholarly confrontations and the reality hidden by the system, for the boy who—through vanity, ambition, paternal demands—held onto his place in the ranks, his comrades, whoever they were, represented a permanent danger. But this objectivelived and abstractposited structuredial, which defined them by discord, was tempered by concrete allegiances..."

(3:49, Fr. 2:1153) "...Therefore grumbling and cursing at teachers and fellow students, he cannot help valuing that first place so vainly coveted, even if a surreptitiously deliberate ‘laziness’ continually sabotages his work..."

10-14Exis Search for a Method, Tr. by Hazel Barnes, N.Y., Vintage, 1968.

[Original translation modified by Sartrean terms and their clarification]

Sartre\Lifework-The ‘conceptionconcept of "lived experience" marks my change since L’Etre et Le Néant’ (IT41)

10-14Exis Sartre rejects the term existentialismI

14


Sartre, (source unknown) "I do not like to talk about existentialism. It is the nature of an intellectual quest to be undefined. To name it and to define it is to wrap it up and tie the knot. What is left? a finished, already outdated mode of culture, something like a brand of soap..."

Sartre, "Self-Portrait at Seventy," (p. 60P): Do you still maintain that existentialism is autonomous within Marxism, as you said in 1957?

Yes, completely.So you still accept the label of ‘existentialist’?The word is ridiculous. Besides, as you knowFr=?, it wasn’t I who chose it: they

stuck it on me and I accepted it. These days I wouldn’t. But no one calls me ‘existentialist’ any more except in textbooks, where it doesn’t mean anything.

As far as labels go, do you prefer ‘existentialist’ to ‘Marxist’?If a label is absolutely necessary, I would like ‘existentialist’ better.

10-14Exis PsychoanalysisI, protohistoryI, existentialismI (SM58-63, CDR17-8, 3 pages) ISartre, Search for a Method (p. 28c) "...Psychoanalysis**, after a spectacular beginning, has stood still. It knows [connaissances] a great many details, but it lacksdial/lived any firm base..."

Sartre, "The Itinerary of a Thought" (p. 43c [1969]) "...In fact, everyone knows and everyone admits, for instance, that psychoanalysis and Marxism should be able to find the mediation necessaryCDRdial/lived to allow a combination of the two..."

Sartre, CDR (p. 17-8, Ftn 6, Fr. 137, out of sequence from Sartre\Dialectic-1. Dialectic MonismI (CDR15-18, SM99-100)) "...In my opinion, what psychoanalysts lackdial/lived is opposition, at least in certain respects (for there is dialectical conflict between the id, the super-ego, and the egook). (CDRp. 18) They have nonetheless constructed a rationality and what might be called a logic of ambiguity—which would scandalize poor Kierkegaard. This logic is non-Aristotelian (because it expresses the joining [liaison] between factsconcept and attitudes which surpass1neg one another, meet again, and struggle against each other and because, in the last analysis, it is applicable to neuroses, that is to say, to circular beings***), but this logic [of ambiguity] is not necessarilyI [fait] Hegelian either, since it preoccupies itself with reciprocity of conditioning rather than with totalizationlived. (Fr. 138) However, to the same measure at which, for such a logic, a defined conduct is an expression of the circularity of conditions and of the individual history, the analyzed subject appears [apparaît] as a true wholedial. The truth, is, however, that his being[-there] is passivity, at least in ‘classical’ psychoanalysis. It is of little import, in effect, that Freudian analysts have been led to attribute an importance more and more considerable to the functions of the Meconcept [Moi]. The simple fact that Anna Freud (following so many

15


others) can define these functions as ‘defence mechanisms’ imprints upon the work of the Egoconcept an a priori inertia. In the same way, physics speaks of ‘forces’ and of ‘work’ without ever abandoning the terrain of exteriority."

Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 58P, Fr. 54) "e...If Flaubert reasons and feels as a bourgeois, this is because he has been made such at a period when he could not even comprehendok the meaningCDRlivedc of the gestures and the roles which were imposed upon him. Like all families, this family was particular. The mother was related to the nobility, the father was the son of a village veterinarian; Gustave’s older brother, superficially more gifted became very early the objectposited of Gustave’s hatredI [détestation]. It is, then, inside the particularitydial of a history, through the peculiar contradictions of this family, that Gustave Flaubert unwittingly served his class apprenticeship. Chance does not exist or, at least, not in the way that is generally believed. The child becomes this_or_that because he lives the universal as particular. This child lived, in the particular, the conflict between the religious ceremonies of a monarchist regime which was claiming a renascence and the irreligion of his father, a petit bourgeoisI intellectual and son of the French Revolution.

(SMp. 59-60P, Fr. 55) sartre¶ "e...His aspirations toward nobility and especially toward faith were continually beaten down by the analytical mind of his father. Consequently there was set up inside him this overwhelming father who did not cease, even after death, to destroy God, his principal adversary, nor to reduce the impulses of his son to bodily humors. The small Flaubert, however, livedI all this though in darkness—that is to say, without gaining any real awareness, but in panic, flight, bewilderment, and within the limits of his material circumstances as a bourgeois child, well nourished, well cared for, but helpless and separated from the world. It was as a child that he livedI his future [future] condition through the professions which would be offered to himI

e... The explosive mixture of naive scientism and religion without God which constitutedI Flaubert, and which he tried to overcome by his love of formal art, can be explained if we comprehendok that everything took place in childhood; that is to say, in a condition radicallyontology distinct from the adult conditions. (SMp. 60) It is childhood which sets up unsurpassable1negc prejudices, it is childhood which, in the violence of training and the frenzy of the tamed beast, makes us experienceFr=? the factI [l’appartenance] of our belonging to our environment as a singular event.

(SMp. 60-1P, Fr. 56) sartre¶ Today psychoanalysis alone enables us to study the procedure by which a child, groping in the dark, is going to attempt to play, without comprehendingok it, the social personagelivedc which adults impose upon him. Only psychoanalysis will show us whether he stifles in his role, whether he seeks to

16


escape it, or is entirely assimilated into it. PsychoanalysisI alone allows us to find again the entire man in the adult; that is to say, not only his present determinationsdial

[‘that is, as limitation’] but also the weight of his historye... (SMp. 61) [But] Psychoanalysis has no principles, it has no theoretical foundation; and this is quite all right if it accompanies—as in the work of Jung and in certain works of Freud—a completely innocuous mythology. In fact, it is a method which is primarily concerned with establishing the way in which the child livesI his family relation interior to a given2neg society. And this does not say that it raises any doubts as to the priority of institutions. Quite the contrary, its objectposited itself depends on the structuredial/lived of a particular family, and this is only a certain singularization of the family structureI appropriate to such and such a classI under such and such conditions. Thus psychoanalytic monographs—if it were always possibleI to have them—would by themselves throw light upon the evolution of the French family between the eighteenth and the twentieth century, which in its turn would express in its own way the general evolution of the connectionok [of three degrees]1neg&2neg of production.

(SMp. 62P, Fr. 57) "Today’s MarxistsI are concerned only with adults; reading them, one would believe that we are born at the age when we earn our first wages. As we read them, everything seems to happen as if men experienceontology [éprouvaient] their alienationc and their reification [the primary psychoanalytic notions of Karl Marx] first in their own work, whereas in actually each one livesI it first, as a child, in his parents’ worke... Existentialism e... believes that it can integrate the psychoanalytic method which discoversdial/lived the point of insertion for man and his classI—that is, the singular family—as a mediationlivedI between the universal, classI and the individuallived. The family in fact is constituteddial by and in the general movementdial/lived of Historyconcept, but is experience [vécue], on the other hand, as an absoluteontology in the depth and opaqueness of childhood."

(SMp. 63P, Fr. 58) "But we must be careful. Each one livesI his first years, distractedc or bewildered, as a profound and solitary reality. Here the interiorization of exteriority is an irreducible factlived

e... Flaubert’s ‘fixation’ on his father is the expression of a group structuredial/lived, and it is his hatredposited of the bourgeoisI, his ‘hysterical’ crises, his monastic vocation. Psychoanalysis, working interiorI to a dialectical totalization [in course]lived, refers on the one side to objectivelived structuresI, to material conditions, and on the other to the actionI upon our adult life of the childhood we never wholly surpass1negc

e..."(SMp. 65P, Fr. 59) "e...ExistentialismI, aided by psychoanalysis, can study today

only situations in which man has been lost since childhood, for there are no others in a society founded on exploitation.5"

17


(SMp. 84P , Fr. 71) "...But, without a movementdial/lived, without a real effort at totalizationI, the givens2neg of sociology**** and of psychoanalysis will sleep side by side and will not be integrated into ‘Knowledge [Savoir]concept’..."

-------------------------------------------------SMFtn. 5, (p. 65, Fr. 59) "Nevertheless, one question arises: MarxistsI hold that the social conduct of an individualI is conditioned by the general interests of his classI. These [Marxist]I interestsI—at first abstract—become, through the dialecticalI movementI , concreteI forces which fetter us. It is these [concrete forces] which limit our horizon; it is these which are expressed by our own mouth and which hold us back when we would like to comprehendok our acts through and through, when we try to wrench ourselves out of our milieu. Is this [MarxistI interestsI] thesis incompatible with the [Sartrean] idea of a conditioning of our present conduct by our childhood? I do not believe so. It is easy to see, on the contraryI, that the [Marxist]I analyticalposited mediation does not change anything. Of course, our prejudices, our ideas, our beliefs, are for the majority of us unsurpassable1neg because they have been experienced [éprouve]ontology first in childhood; it is our childish blindness, our prolonged panic which accounts—in part—for our irrational reactions, for our resistance to reasonc

ok. But precisely what was this unsurpassableI childhood, if not a particular way of living the general interestsI of our surroundings? Nothing is changed; on the contraryI, tenacity, mad and criminal passion, even heroism, all recover their true density, their roots, their pastlived. Psychoanalysis, conceived as a mediation, does not bring to bear any new principle of explanation. It is careful not to deny the direct, present relationok [of three degrees]1neg&2neg of the individuallived/1neg to his environmentlived/2neg or to his classIlived/2neg; it reintroduces historicitylived and negativity [seeking to deny lack] in the very way in which the person realizes himself as a member of a determineddial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] social stratum."Ref Sartre\Flaubert's Constitution-protohistory

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PSYCHOANALYSIS ;

BN: Herein-Existential_psychoanalysis;Sartre\Freedom-RPsychoanalytic vs. unconscious methodology:

Inferiority as a bad faith project, and sub-topic; -RResistance to see the project while curing the symptoms that come

and go;The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert’s Personalization-passivity, for its

psychoanalytic characteristics;Psychoanalytic cures can take place even with obvious resistances. See Sartre,

BN (p. 474-5)

18


-------------------------------------------------*** See ‘circular spiral movement,’ Sartre\Flaubert’s Personalization-Stress: Nonassimilable elements generate impounding antagonistic counterparts in our personalization**** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SOCIOLOGY ; see Search for a Method (pp. 71-76, 82)

10-14Exis The Progressive-Regressive Method (SM84-166)Herein-regressive-progressive; regressive; progressive

10-14Exis The given2neg (SM100)Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 100-1P, Fr. 82) "The given**2neg, which we

surpass1neg at every instant by the simple fact of living it, is not reduced to the material conditions of our existence; we must make it enter, as I have said, our own childhood. What was at once an obscure apprehension of our class, of our social conditioning by way of the family group, and a blind surpassing1neg, an awkward effort to wrench ourselves away from all this, at last ends up inscribed in us in the form of character***. (SMp. 101) At this level are found the learned gestures (bourgeois gestures, socialist gestures) and the contradictory roles which compose us and which tear us apart (e.g., for Flaubert, the role of dreamy, pious child, and that of future [futur] surgeon, the son of an atheistic surgeon). At this level also are the traces left by our first revolts, our desperate attempts to surpass1neg a stifling reality, and the resulting deviation and distortions. To surpass1neg all of this is also to preserve it. We shall think with these original deviations, we shall act with these gestures which we have learned and which we want to reject. By projecting ourselvesI toward our possible so as to escape the contradiction of our existence, we disclose them, and they are revealed in our very actionI although this actionI is richer than they are and gives us access to a social world in which new contradictionsI will involve us in new conduct. Thus we can at once say that we constantly surpass1neg our classI and that our classI realityI is made manifest by means of this very surpassing1neg. The realization of the possibleI necessarilyCDRdial/lived results in the productionposited of an objectposited or an event in the social world; this realizationlivedI is then our objectificationlived, and the original contradictionslivedIc which may be reflected [reflétent] there, testify to our alienationc."

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-GIVEN 2neg [donné]; negation2; in-itself2neg

19


The Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 62-3c, Fr. 46-7) "Now my hatredposited does appear [apparaît] to me at the same time as my expérience of repugnance. But it appearsI [apparaît] through this expérienceI. It is given2neg precisely as not being[-there] limited to this expérienceI. (p. 63) my hatredI was given2neg in and by each movementdial/lived of disgust, of repugnanceI, and of anger, but at the same time it is not any of them. my hatredI escapes from each of them by affirming its permanence..."

Psychology of Imagination: (p. 3c) "It is necessary to repeat at this point what has been known [sait] since Descartes: that a reflective [réflexive] consciousness delivers us absolutelyontologyc certain givens2neg..."

BN: Sartre\Freedom-RSince ‘freedom is not a given2neg nor a property, it must be by choosing itself’;

(p. 492c) "(1) I must be able to escape what I am and to nihilate it in such a way that what I am, although it is existed, can still be revealed as the term of a connectionok [of three degrees]lived/lived as 1neg&2neg. This connectionI is immediately given 2cog ..."

-------------------------------------------------***Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-CHARACTER [caractère]; caractériser and caractéristique are not Sartrean]; interiorI; cf. personalization as growth subsequent to childhood.

Search for a Method: phrase above bookmark "...an awkward effort to wrench ourselves away from all this, at last ends up inscribed in us in the form of character..."

The Family Idiot: (1:62c) "... Indeed, what is called character is purely a structuraldial/lived distinction and presents itself as a slight gap between the person’s modes of behavior and the objectivelived behavior prescribed for him by his milieu..."

(2:5c, Fr. 1:655) "...In this case, neurosis is stress as much as character disorder...";

Sartre\Flaubert’s Personalization-RActors materialize character by unrealizing symbolic analogon, with (2:12c) "...The actor preserves the suppressed certainty of not being[-there] Hamlet at the very momentdial he publicly displays himself as Hamlet and, in order to display his character, has to convince himself that he is Hamlet... "

10-14Exis ProjectsI have no contents: ‘OurI roles are always future’ (SM105-12)Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 105-6, Fr. 85) "e...we must remember that we

live our childhood as our future [futur]. Our childhood determines [‘that is, as limitation’] gestures and roles in the perspective of what is to come. This is not a matter of the mechanical regeneration of montages. Since the gestures and roles are inseparable

20


from the projectR which transforms them, they are relationsok [of three degrees]1st&2neg independent of the terms which they unite and which we must find at every momentdial of the human enterprise. Surpassed1neg and maintained they constituteI what I shall call the internalok coloration of the projectI. In saying this I distinguish them as much from motivations as from specifications. The motivationI of the enterprise is one with the enterprise itself; the specification and the projectI are one and the same reality. (SMp. 106) Finally the projectI never has any content, since its objectiveslived are at once united with it and yet transcendentlived/1neg. But its coloration—i. e., subjectivity, its taste; objectivelyI, its style—is nothing but the surpassing1neg of our original deviations. This surpassingI is not an instantaneous movementI , it is a long work; each momentdial of this work is at once the surpassing1neg and, to the extent that it is posited for itself, the pure and simple subsistence of these deviations at a given2neg level of integration. For this reason, a life develops in spirals; it passes again and again by the same points but at different levels of integration and complexity."

(SMp. 107, Fr. 86) sartre¶"e...Flaubert consents to study law; in order to be sure of being[-there] different from [his brother] Achille, he decides to be inferior to him. He will hateposited his future [futur] career as the proof of this inferiority; he will launch into an idealist overcompensation and finally, faced with becoming an attorney, will get himself out of it by attacks of ‘hysteria.’ This third momentdial is an enrichment and a further restriction of the initial condition. Each phase, isolated, seems to be a repetition; the movementdial/lived proceeding from childhood to nervous breakdowns is, on the contrary, a perpetual surpassing1neg of these givensI. The end product is Gustave Flaubert’s commitment to literature.

(SMp. 107-8, Fr. 86) sartre¶ But at the same time that these givens2neg are a pastlivedc-surpassedI, they appear [apparaissent] in every operationdial/lived as a pastI-surpassingI—that is to say, as a future [avenir]. Our roles are always future [futur] . They appearI [apparaissent] to each one as tasks to be performed, ambushes to be avoided, powers to be exercised, etc. It may be that ‘paternity’ is a role—as certain American sociologists claim. It may also be that such a young married man hopes to become a father in order to be identified with or to substitute himself for his own father, or on the other hand, to freeBN himself of his father by assuming his father’s ‘attitude.’ In any case, this pastI relationok with his parents (e...) manifests itself to him only as the line of flight in a new enterprise. Paternity opens to him a life until his deathc. If it is a role, it is a role which one invents, which one does not cease to learn again under circumstances always new and which one hardly knows [sait] until the momentdial

ok of deathIc. (SMp. 108) Complexes, the style of life, and the revealing of the pastI-surpassing1neg as a future [avenir] to be created are one and the same reality.

21


It is the projectI as an oriented life, as man’s affirmationdial through action. And at the same time it is that mist of irrationality which cannot be located, which is reflected [refléte] from the future [futur] in our childhood memory and from our childhood in our rational choices as mature men." Ref Pol...\The Self-Performance narratives-Index

(SMp. 112P, Fr. 89) "e...It must be comprehendedok that whatever an ideologicalc projectI may be in appearance, its ultimate goal is to change the basic situation by taking awareness of its contradictions. Sprung from a singular conflict which expresses the universality of class and condition, it aims at surpassing1neg it in order to disclose it, to disclose it in order to make it manifest to all, to manifest it in order to resolve ite..."

-------------------------------------------------Ref Sartre\Footnotes-Susan Butler, et. el: Sartre’s contradictory positions on the contents of consciousness-Index

10-14Exis Find ‘regressiveI tension expanding from objectivitylived to objectivityI’ (SM143-47)

Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 143-5P, Fr. 109) "At this [regressive] levelok, we study the early childhood as a way of living general conditions without clearly understandingI or reflecting on them; consequently, we may find the meaningCDRlived of the lived experiencec [vécu] in the intellectual petite bourgeoisie, formed under the Empire, and in its way of livingI the evolution of French society. Here we pass over into the pure objectivelived; that is, into the historical_totalizationlived. (SMp. 144) It is Historyconcept/1negc itself which we must question—the halted advance of family capitalism, the return of the landed proprietors, the contradictions in the government, the misery of a still insufficiently developed Proletariat. But these interrogationsok are constitutingI in the sense in which KantianR conceptsI are called constitutiveI ’; for they permit us to realizeontology/1neg&2neg concrete synthesesontology/1neg where we had as yet only abstract, general conditions. Beginning with an obscurely livedI childhood, we can reconstruct the true character of petit bourgeoisI families. We compare Flaubert’s with the family of Baudelaire (at a more ‘elevated’ social level)e... [w]e study the real relationsok between scientists and practitioners (the father Flaubert) and industrialists (the father of his friend, Le Poittevin). In this sense the study of the child Flaubert, as a universality livedI in particularitydial enriches the general study of the petite bourgeoisieI in 1830. By means of the structuresdial/lived presiding over the singular family group, we enrich and make concrete the always too general characteristics of the class considered... (SMp. 145) Here again a systematic cross-reference is established between the singular anecdotes which

22


clarify these vague contradictionsI (because the stories gather them together into a single exploding wholedial) and the general determination [‘that is, as limitation’] of livingI conditions which allows us to reconstruct Progressively (because they have already been studied) the material existence of the groups considered..."

(SMp. 145, Fr. 110) sartre¶"The sum total of these procedures—regression and cross-reference—has revealed what I shall call the profundity of the livedI..."

(SMp. 146, Fr. 111) "At this levelok in our research we have still not succeeded in revealingI anything more than a hierarchy of heterogeneous signification: Madame Bovary, Flaubert’s ‘femininity,’ his childhood in a hospital building, existing contradictionsI in the contemporary petite bourgeoisieI, the evolution of the family, of property, etc. Each significationI clarifies the other, but their irreducibility creates a veritable discontinuity between them. Each serves as an encompassing framework for the preceding [property frames family, which frames petite bourgeoisie], but the included [latter] significationI is richer than the including [former] significationI. In a word, we have only the outline for the dialectical movementdial/posited, not the movementdial/lived itself.

(SMp. 146-7P, Fr. 111) "It is then and only then that we must employ the progressive method. (SMp. 147) The problem is to recover the totalizinglived movementI of enrichment which engenders each momentdial in terms of the prior momentI, the impulse which starts from livedI obscurities in order to arrive at the final objectificationlived—in short, the project by which Flaubert, in order to escape from the petite bourgeoisieI, will launch himself across the various fields of possibility toward the alienated objectificationI of himself and will constitutedial himself inevitably and indissolubly as the author of Madame Bovary and as that petit bourgeoisI which he refused to be. This projectI has a meaningCDRlivedc, it is not the simple negativity [seeking to deny lack] of flightlivedc; by it a man aims at the production of himself in the world as a certain objectiveI totalitydial/lived. It is not the pure and simple abstract decision to write which makes up the peculiar quality of Flaubert, but the decision to write in a certain manner in order to manifest himself in the world in such a way; in a word, it is the singular significationI—within the framework of the contemporary ideology—which he gives to literature as the negation of his original_condition** and as the objectivelived solution to his contradictionsI. To rediscoverdial/lived the meaningCDRI of the ‘wrenching away from toward . . .’ we shall be aided by knowing [connaissance] all the signifying planes which he has traversed, which we have interpretedc as his footprints, and which have brought him to the final objectificationI. We have the series: as we move back and forth between materialI and social conditioning and the work, the problem is to find the tension extending from objectivity lived to objectivity I, to discoverI the law of

23


expansion which surpasses1neg one significationI by means of the following one and which maintains the second in the first. [continued same paragraph below]

-------------------------------------------------See Sartre\Flaubert’s Constitution-Why ‘the choice of Flaubert?’: Sartre, ‘With him, I am at the border, the barrier of dreamsI’** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-ORIGINAL_CONDITION ; 1 hit.

BN: cf. original_projectlived

CDR: 1 hit; cf. fundamental_projectlived; initial_projectlived;The Family Idiot: cf. original_belieflived

10-14Exis If ‘the dialectical movementdial does not find its true point of departureI it will never reach its goal’ (SM147)

Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 147, Fr. 112, continuing, my paragraph break) sartre¶In truth the problem is to invent a movementdial, to re-create it, but the hypothesis is immediately verifiablec; the only validdial/posited one is that which will realize within a creativeR movementIdial/lived the transverse unity of all the heterogeneous structuresdial/lived.

(SMp. 148, Fr. 112) "Nevertheless, the project is in danger of being deviated e... by the collective instruments; thus the terminal objectificationlived perhaps does not correspond exactly to the original_choicec. We must take up the regressive analysis again, making a still closer study of the instrumentalI field so as to determinedial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] the possibleI deviationse..."

The Family Idiot (1:44-5c) "...The dialectical understandingpositedFr=? can certainly

build closer and closer to the last momentsdial of a life; but it begins arbitrarily with the first date mentioned in the records, that is, it is based on the incomprehensibleFr=?. (1:45) And that obscurity, surpassed1neg but preserved, remains its permanent limit and internal_negationlivedc. If the dialectical movement dial does not find its true point of departure, it will never reach its goal ..."10-14Exis ExistentialistI ‘approach as regressive-progressive and analytic-syntheticconcept method’ (SM148, BN460)

Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 148-9P, Fr. 112) "e...We shall define the method of the existential approach as a regressive-progressive**a and analytic-synthetic**bconcept method. It is at the same time an enriching cross-reference between the objectposited (which contains the wholedial period as hierarchized signification) and the period (which contains the objectI in its totalization [in course]lived

In fact when the objectI is rediscovered in its profundity and its singularity, then instead of remaining exterior to the totalizationI (e...), it enters immediately into

24


contradiction with it. (SMp. 149) In short, the simple inert justification of the period and the objectI makes way abruptly to an living conflict."

Sartre, BN (p. 460, Fr. 504, out of sequence from Sartre\Freedom-When ‘we yield to fatigue, we are conscious of all the implications’) "e...Every project is comprehensibleok as a projectI of itself toward a possible. It is comprehensibleI

ok first in so far as it offers a rationalc content which is immediate grasping [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg]—I place my knapsack on the ground in order to rest for an instant.*** This means that we immediately grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the possibilityIR which it projectsI and the end at which it aims. In the second place it is comprehensibleI

ok in that the possibleI under consideration refers to other possiblesI, these to still others, and so on to the ultimate possibilityI which I am. The comprehensionok is effected in two inversec senses: by a regressive psychoanalysis one ascends back from the considered act to my ultimate possibleI; and by a synthetic****dial/lived progression one redescends from this ultimate possibleI to the considered actI and grasps [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] its integration in the total formlived/1neg."

-------------------------------------------------Ref Sartre\Language&Comprehension-If ‘my companion suddenly starts toward the window, I comprehend his gesture’**a&b Sartre\Index of Terms-REGRESSIVE-PROGRESSIVE [dialectical but not 3 degrees consciousness]; [régressif, progressif] and ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC concept; regressive is structuraldial; progressive is historicallived;

The Emotions: (p. 94c) "...The various disciplines of psychology are regressive, and yet the term of their regressionI is for them a pure ideal. Those of pure phenomenology are, on the contrary, progressive..."

BN: (pp. 133, 143-7) and Search for a Method (p. 51-2) credits Henri Lefebvre, a contemporary French historian and Marxist philosopher, with mapping the vertical and horizontal complexification of regressive and progressive methods of study;

Search for a Method: (p. 106c) "...a life develops in spiralsc; it passes again and again by the same points but at different levels of integration and complexity."

CDR: (p. 15c) "...If one wishes in effect to workout the detail of an analytic-syntheticconcept and regressive-progressive method, it is necessaryCDRdial/lived to convince oneself that a negation of negation can be an affirmation, that conflicts—within a person or a grouplivedc—are the motive force of Historconcept, that each momentdial of a series is comprehensiblelived

ok on the basis of the initial momentdial, though irreducible to it, that HistoryI continually effects totalizationslived totalizationsI, and so on.";

Sartre\Political Scarcity-RDialectic ‘of precious metals in the Mediterranean worldI transforms praxisI into antipraxisI—praxisI without an

25


author’ (CDR166);Herein-RThe Progressive-Regressive Method (SM 84-166)

-------------------------------------------------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms- REGRESSIVE [dialectical but not 3 degrees consciousness];

Search for a Method: Herein-RThe Progressive-Regressive Method (SM 84-166)

CDR: (CDRp. 68, Fr. 182) sartre¶"Thus, dialectical expérience in its regressive momentdial will revealconcept to us no more than the static condition of the possibility of a totalization [in course]lived, that is to say, of a Historyconcept..."

Sartre\Dialectic-RAt ‘this level ... the regressive expérience has reached bedrock’;

The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert&Father in Vol. I-RA. Return to Regressive Analysis (1:174-88)

-------------------------------------------------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PROGRESSIVE [dialectical but not 3 degrees consciousness];

Search for a Method: Herein-RThe Progressive-Regressive Method (SM 84-166)

CDR: Sartre\Dialectic-RAt ‘this level ... the regressive expérience has reached bedrock’;

(CDRp. 124c, Fr. 236) sartre¶ "In the progressive momentI of our expérience we shall study the problem of the contingency of Historyconcept..."

The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert’s Constitution-RTransition ‘to Progressive Synthesis’

Sartre\Flaubert&Father in Vol 1-RB. ‘Progressive Synthesis’-------------------------------------------------

*** Copied Sartre\The Other-The other’s lookontology/1neg denies my distance by unfolding theirs**** Ref Sartre/Index of Terms-SYNTHETIC dial/ [synthesis]; cf. synthetic_totalitydial/lived

synthetic as exclusively dialecticSartre\Dialectic-Analytical Reasonconcept as syntheticdial/lived transformation of its

livedI dialectic precursorsynthetic dial/lived Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 44) "...But the factlived remains that we are in the

presence of a synthesisdial of two consciousnesses, one of which is consciousness of the otherI . Thus the essential principle of phenomenologyposited, ‘all consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_something’ is preserved..."

Search for a Method: (p. 108c, Fr. 87) "e...a single act can be evaluated at more and more complex levels ande... consequently it is expressed by a seriesI of very

26


diverse significationse... The superimposed significationsI are isolated and enumerated by analysisposited. The movementdial/lived which has joined them together in life is, on the contrary, syntheticdial/lived..."

CDR: (p. 144c) "...interrogations of Historyconcept are constitutingdial as they permit us to realize concrete synthesesdial/lived/1neg there where we had as yet only abstract, general conditionslived/2neg..."

synthetic dial/posited CDR (p. 59c): "...Thus the sciences of Natureconcept/1negc are analyticalposited with

respect to their content, whereas scientific thought is at once analyticalposited in its particular procedures and synthetic dial/posited through its profound intentions."

The Family Idiot: (1:536c, Fr. 1:554) "...across the infinite variety of analytic judgments, logic is limited to repeating indefinitely the principle of identity and is incapable of producing and combining synthetic dial/posited judgments in a rigorous way...";

10-14Exis Existential_psychoanalysisI looks for originalI humanI project (SM150-2)Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 150-2P, Fr. 114) "3. Man defines himself by his

project** [projet]. This material being[-there] perpetually surpasses1neg the condition which is made for him; he revealslivedc and determinesdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] his situation by transcendinglived/1neg it in order to objectifylived himself—by work, action, or gesture. The project must not be confused with the will, which is an abstract entity, although the project can assume a voluntary form under certain circumstances. This immediate relationok [of three degrees] as 1st & 2neg with the Otherconcept

ok than oneselflived/2neg, beyond the given2neg and constituteddial elements, this perpetual production of oneselfI by work and praxis, is our peculiar structuredial/lived. (SMp. 151) It is neither a willI nor a needdial/lived nor a passion, but our needsI—like our passions or like the most abstractI of our thoughts participate in this structureI. They are always outside of themselves toward . . . This is what we call existence***1, and by this we do not mean a stable substance which rests in itself, but rather a perpetual disequilibrium, a wrenching away from itself with all its body. As this impulse toward objectificationlived assumes various figures [formes] according to the individual, as it projects us across a field of possibilities, some of which we realizeontology/1neg&2neg to the exclusion of others, we call it also choice or freedomCDRRc. But it would be a mistake to accuse us of introducing the irrational here, of inventing a ‘first beginning’ unconnected to the world, or of givingI man a freedomI-fetish. This criticism, in fact, could only issue from a mechanistic philosophy; those who would direct it at us do so because they would like to reduce praxis, creation, and invention, to the simple reproduction of the elementary given of our life. It is

27


because they would like to explain the work, the act, or the attitude by the factors which condition it; their desire for explanation is a disguise for the wish to assimilate the complex to the simple; to deny the specificity of structuresI , and to reduce change to identity. This is to fall back again to the level of scientistic determinism. The dialectical method, on the contrary, refuses to reduce; it follows the reverse procedure. It surpasses1neg by conserving, but the terms of the surpassedI contradiction cannot account for either the surpassingI itself or the subsequent synthesisdial/lived; on the contraryI, it is the synthesisI which clarifies them and which enables us to comprehendok them. For us the basic contradictionIc is only one of the factors which delimit and structuredial/lived the field of possibilities; it is the choice which must be interrogated if one wants to explain the possibilitiesI in their detail, to reveal their singularity (that is, the singular aspect in which in this case generality is presented), and to comprehendok how they have been lived. (SMp. 152) It is the work or the act of the individual which revealsI to us the secret of his conditioninge..."

(SMp. 152P, Fr. 115) "Man is, for himself and for othersok, a signifyinglivedc being[-there], since one can never comprehendok the slightest of his gestures without surpassing1neg the pure present and explaining it by the future [avenir]. He is a creator of signs to the degree that—always ahead of himself—he employs certain objectsposited to designate other absent or future [futur] objectsI. But bothok operationsdial/lived are reduced to a pure and simple surpassingI. To surpass1neg presentI conditions toward their later change and to surpassI the presentI objectI toward an absence are one and the same thing. Man constructs signsI because in his very reality he is signifyingI; and he is signifyingI because he is a dialectical surpassing1neg

of all that is simply given2neg. What we call freedomCDR is the irreducibility of the cultural order to the natural order."

-------------------------------------------------Ref Herein-existential_psychoanalysis** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PROJECT [projet]; [projetant=projecting, projeté -e=projected]

The War Diaries (p. 324c, no ce) "...Heidegger showed me that there was nothing beyond the projectc through which human_reality realizesontology/1neg&2neg itself..."

Search for a Method: (p. 171c) "...Whatever the discipline considered, its most elementary notions would be incomprehensibleok without the immediate comprehensionok [1] of the project which underlies them, [2] of negativity [seeking to deny lack] as the basis of the project, [3] of transcendencelived/1neg as the existence outside-of-itself in relationok [of three degrees]posited&posited as 1st & 2neg with the Otherconcept/2neg

ok-than-itself and the OtherI

ok-than-man, [4] of the surpassing1neg as a mediation between

28


the given2neg that is simply there and the practical signification, [5] of needdial/lived, [6] finally, as the being-outside-itself-in-the-world on the part of the practical_organismc... NeedIc, negativityIc, surpassing1negc, project, transcendenceIc, form in effect a synthetic_totalitydial/livedc...";

Herein-RProjects have no contents: ‘Our roles are always future’;Sartre\Negation-RNegation1 of the negated2 given2neg (SM 91-3, out of

sequence)CDR: (p. 60c, Fr. 175) sartre¶"The transparenceontology/1negc of praxis (let us say, for the

instantok of individual praxisI) has its origin in the indissoluble joiningok between negation2c (which totalizeslived&2neg in situation what it denies) and a projectlived/1neg [projet] which defines itself through connectionok [of three degrees]1neg&2neg with an abstract and still formallivedc wholedial which the practical_agency projects, pro-jette] into the future [avenir] and which appears [apparaît] as the reorganized unity of the denied2neg situationI. In this sense, the very temporalizationCDRlivedc of the undertaking is accessible since it can be comprehendedok on the basis of the future [avenir] which conditions it (that is to say of the wholeontology/2neg through the praxisontology/1neg as having to be realizedontology/1neg&2neg)...";

(p. 238c) "...For if the demands are lived as categorical_imperativesc, then what defines a man as a real being[-there] is not his ‘fundamental_project,’ but the ‘material conditions (which) characterize the man and color the project’...";

The Family Idiot: (1:18c) "Indeed, no human animalc—I will even say no mammal—whether it speaks or not, can live without entering into the dialectical movementdial/lived of the signifier and the signifiedc. For the simple reason that meaningCDRlivedc is born of the project."

(1:104c) "For every project is also a flightlivedc...";(4:45c) "...The project as transcendencelived/1neg cannot disappearI—since it

is existence itself...";-------------------------------------------------

***1 Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-EXISTENCE [existence, exister=to exist, existe=in existence]; cf. Sartrean ideology, existence_precedes_essence

Existence:BN: (p. 245-6c) "...it is in my ‘being-in-the-world’ that the other determines

[‘that is, as limitation/negation’] me. (BNp. 246) Our relationok [of three degrees]1st & 2neg is not a frontal opposition but rather an oblique interdependence. In so far as I make a world exist as a complex of instruments which I use for the ends of my human_reality, I causelived

ok myself to be determinedI in my being[-there] by a being[-there] who makes the world exist as a complex of instrumentsI for the ends of his reality..."

29


(p. 518c) "Afterwards, it will be permissible to discoverdial/lived abstract operationaldial/posited analytic_schemataposited which will be depicted as the legal truth of the sentence: the dialectic_schemalivedc—the schemaI of the national language—the linguistic schemaI in general. But these schemas, far from preexisting the concrete sentence are affected in themselves with Unselbstndigkeit [see selbstndig] and exist always only incarnated and sustained in their very incarnationI by a freedomBN."

Sartre\Ontology-RConsciousness ‘(of) pleasure is constitutiveBN of pleasure as its own existence’;

Sartre\Freedom-RFreedom can not determine its existence from the end which it positsI;

-RCause, motive, act, and end as simultaneous in a for-itself’sontology transcendencelived/1neg, with (p. 438c) How then are we to describe an existence which perpetually makes itself and which refuses to be confined in a definition?;

Sartre\The Other-RConclusion to III: Discoverydial/lived of oneself and others in the cogitoontology

Sartre\Phenomenology-RBN phenomenologyposited converts dualisms of interior/exterior, being/appearance, and potency/act to that of the ‘infinite in the finite’

Search for a Method: (p. 167-8c) "...Second, because he is characterized as the existent which we are. (p. 168) In this case the questioner finds himself to be precisely the questioned, or, if you prefer, human_reality is the existent whose being[-there] is in question in its being[-there]I..."

(p. 151c, above) "...[projects] are always outside of themselves toward . . . This is what we call existence ... a perpetual disequilibrium, a wrenching away from itself ... toward objectificationlived ... across a field of possibiities...";

(p. 170c) "This ideologyI [of existence], in fact, considers that human_reality eludes direct knowledge [savoir]livedc to the degree that it makes itself...";

(p. 174c) "...The true role of ‘ideologiesIc of existence’ is not to describe an abstract ‘human_reality’ which has never existed, but constantly to remind anthropologyR of the existential dimension of the processes studied. AnthropologyI studies only objectsposited. Now man is the being[-there] by whom becoming-an-objectI

comes to man. AnthropologyI will deserve its name only if it replaces the study of human objectsI by the study of the various processes of becoming-an-objectI.

The Family Idiot: Sartre\Flaubert’s Constitution-RAn animal-like child: Sartre’s poignant passive constitutionCDR/dial/group of Gustave;

-RLove’s ‘absence is made known as a defect of being’, with (1:141c) "...in itself existence is lackdial/lived, it is thatI singular lack which defines this existence

30


and which is not a lackI of anything in particular. This easily comprehendsok itself as the lackI of loveI; when it is presentI, the dough of the spirits rises, when absent, it sinks...";

(4:45c) "...The project as transcendencelived/1neg cannot disappearI—since it is existence itself..."

Also (p. 55 and 74) with Sartre\Negation-nothingness.

10-14Exis Vertical disengagement of regressive from progressive [dialectical but not 3 degrees consciousness] (BN457-8)

Sartre, BN (p. 457, Fr. 501, out of sequence from Sartre\Freedom-When ‘we yield to fatigue, we are conscious of all the implications’) "e...the way in which my companion suffers his fatigue necessarilyBN demands—if we are to comprehend [comprise] it—that we undertake a regressive analysis which will lead us back to an initial_project. Is this projectI we have outlined finally selbstndig? Certainly—and it can be easily proved to be so. In fact by going further and further back we have reached the original connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1neg&2neg which the for-itselfontology chooseslived/1neg

with its facticitylived/2neg and with the worldlived/2neg. But this original connectionI [rapport] is nothing other than the for-itself’sI being-in-the-world inasmuch as this being-in-the-world is a choice—that is, we have reached the original type of nihilation by which the for-itselfI has to be its own nothingness. No interpretation of this can be attempted, for it would implicitly suppose the being-in-the-world of the for-itselfI just as all the demonstrations attempted by Euclid’s Postulate implicitly suppose the adoption of this postulate.

"Therefore if I apply this same method to interpret the way in which I suffer my fatigue, I shall first apprehend in myself a distrust of my body—for example—, a way of wishing not, ‘to have anything to do with it.’ wanting not to take it into account, which is simply one of the numerous possible modesok in which I canok exists myontology/2neg bodyI

e... Hence my fatigue instead of being[-there] suffered ‘flexibly’ will be apprehended ‘sternly’ as an importunate phenomenonlivedc which I want to get rid of—and this simply because it incarnates my bodyI and my brute contingency in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived at a time when my projectI is to preserve my bodyI and my presence in the world by means of the looksontology/2neg of others. I am referred to myself as well as to my original projectI; that is, to my being-in-the-world in so far as this beingI is a choice.

(BNp. 457-8, Fr. 502) "We are not attempting to disguise how much this analysis leaves to be desired. This is because everything remains still to be done in this field. The problem indeed is to disengage the [regressiveI] meaningsBN implied by an act—by every actI—and to proceed from there to richer and more profound

31


meaningsI until we encounter the meaningI which does not imply any meaningI and which refers only to itself. This ascending dialectic is practiced spontaneously by most people; it can even be established that in knowledge [connaissance] of oneself or of another there is given2neg a spontaneous comprehensionok of this hierarchy of interpretations. A gesture refers to a Weltanschauung and we sense it. But nobody has attempted a systematic disengagement of the meaningBNlived implied by an actI. (p. 458) There is only one school which has based its approach on the same original evidencedial/lived as we, and that is the Freudian. For Freud as for us, an actI can not be limited to itself; it refers immediately to more profound structuresdial/lived. And psychoanalysis is the method which enables us to make these structuresI explicit. Freud, like us, asks: under what conditions that this particular person has performed this particular actI? Like us he refuses to interpret the actionI by the antecedent momentdial—i.e., to conceive of a horizontal psychic determinism. The actI appears to him symbolic; that is it seems to him to express a more profound desire which itself could be interpretedc only in terms of an initial determination [‘that is, as limitation’] of the subject’s libidoe... To be sure, a particular symbolicI actI expresses an underlying, contemporaneous desireI just as this desireI manifests a more profound complex and all this within the unity of a single psychicI process. It is the pastlived which has constitutedBN it such as it is and in accordance with the classic connectionsI , transfer, condensation, etc., which we find mentioned not only in psychoanalysisI but in all attempts at a deterministicI reconstruction of the psychic_life. Consequently the dimension of the future [futur] does not exist for psychoanalysise..."

10-14Exis Existentialism’s founding of anthropologyI: SM Conclusion (68-9, 167-177)

10-14Exis There ‘is no doubt that the principle of sociological research is often a masked idealismI’ (SM 68-70)

Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 68-70P) "No doubt that the principle of sociological research is often a masked idealism. Take LewinR H3-12 [Prussian born psychologist Kurt Lewin, 1890-1947], for example (as with all the gestaltists), there is a fetishism of the totalizationlived; instead of seeing in it the real movementdial/lived of Historyconcept, Lewin hypostasizes it and realizesontology/1neg&2neg totalization in already made totalitiesdial/lived. He writes: ‘it is necessaryI to consider the situationI , with all its socialI and culturalI implications, as a dynamic, concreteI wholeI.’ Or again ‘...The structuralI properties of a dynamic totalityI are not the same as those of its [analytically_schematic] partsI .’ On the other hand, they [The structural properties of the

32


analytically_schematicI parts] toss and turn in a synthesisdial/lived of exteriority: to this given2neg totalitydial/lived the sociologistI also resides in the exteriorI. He wants to keep the benefits of teleology [teleological_structure and teleological_intention] to remain at home with positivism that is to say wholly suppressing or disguising the ends of human activity. At this instant sociologyI is posited for itself and opposes itself to Marxism not by affirming the provisional autonomy of its method—which would give on the contrary, the means of it’s integration—but by affirmingdial the radicalc autonomy of its objectposited. Ontological autonomy: no matter what precaution one takes, one cannot prevent the group, thus conceived, from being[-there] a substantial unity—even and especially, if out of a desire for empiricism, one defined its existence by a simple function. (SMp. 69) Methodological autonomy: [Lewin, Sociology, and PositivismI] substitutes actual totalitiesposited for the movementI of dialectical totalizationlived. This naturally implies a refusal of the dialecticI and of Historyconcept precisely to the measure that the dialecticI is not first taken up as the real movementdial/lived of a unity full of energy making itself, and not the [positivisticI] study, even the ‘functional’ and ‘dynamic’ study, of a unity already madee... (p. 70) Reciprocal I autonomy , finally, of the experimenter and of the experimental group: where the sociologist is not situated, or if he is, concrete precautions will suffice to desituate him. He may try to integrate himself into the group, but this integration is provisional; he knows [sait] that he will disengage himself, that he will record his observations objectivelylived; in short, he resembles those movie detectives proposed as models who win the confidence of a gang so the gang may be better able to give up; even if the sociologistI and the detective participateI in a collective action, wherever they put their actI, it goes in itself placed between parentheses as gestures made for the benefit of a ‘higher interest.’

Peter Caws, Sartre (p. 105) "...Sartre is at pains to dismiss the scientific approach to the body, in anatomy and physiology, as irrelevant to the subject-other relation ... the body of the other becomes a corpse ‘if it ceases to be simultaneously revealed and hidden by the transcendence-transcendedlived/2neg (BN 348).’"

(p. 106) "...we act directly in the world, rather than using the body as an intermediary, a tool from which we are in some way distinct—I am my hand as I write, I do not observe my actions as I observe those of other people..."

"The question of the relation of subjectivity to the body is nevertheless a complex one, and Sartre is undoubtedly right when he insists that for the most part the physical body, like the physical sign (the materiality of words, for example) is ‘surpassed toward meaning’ (BN 330). We are not, in other words, aware of our bodies as we go about our daily business in the world, any more than we are aware

33


of language as we use it for ordinary communication; our intentionalities reach through the body or the word to their proper objects..."

Howard Gardner, The Quest for Mind (p. 29-30) "The Gestalt psychologists—notably Wolfgang Kohler and Max Wertheimer—employed the controlled experimental procedures ... to demonstrate that the mind actively constructs the world it perceives, that it naturally and inevitably confers meaning upon stimuli, shapes them and gives them coherent form ‘Gestalt’ meaning ‘form’ or ‘configuration’... [T]hey insisted on the priority of the whole over its parts, and stressed the relations among elements rather than the elements themselves... The Gestaltists sought Laws of the Mind’s Organization in order to elucidate the mental faculties and structures governing perception and intellectual processes."

-------------------------------------------------See Herein-Sense object must appear all at once as figure to ground

10-14Exis ExistentialismI ‘positsI to itself the questionI of its fundamental relationsok [of three degrees]posited&posited as 1neg&2neg with the disciplines of anthropologyI’ (SM167-8) Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 167-8P, Fr. 124) "e...within this vibrant universe, man occupies, for us, a privileged place. First, because he is able to be historicallived1

that is to say, he can continually define himself by his own praxis by means of changes suffered or provoked and their interiorization, and then by the very surpassing1neg of the interiorized relationok [of three degrees]1st & 2neg. Second, because he is characterized as the existentc which we are. (SMp. 168) In this case the questionerR finds himself to be precisely the questionedI, or, if you prefer, human_reality is the existentI whose being[-there] is in questionI in its being[-there]I. It is evidentI that this ‘being-in-questionI’ must be taken as a determination [‘that is, as limitation’] of praxis and that the theoretical questioningI [contestation] comes in only as an abstract momentdialc of the total process. Moreover, knowing [connaissance] is inevitably practical; it changes the known [connu]. Not in the sense of classical rationalismI . But in the way that an expérienceposited in microphysics necessarilyCDRdial/lived transforms its objectposited.**

(SMp. 168P, Fr. 124) "In choosingI [se réservant] as the objectI of our study, within the ontological sectorok, that privileged existentI which is man (privileged for us) it is evident that existentialism posits to itself the question of its fundamental relations ok [of three degrees ] posited&posited as 1neg&2neg with the ensemble I of disciplines which are grouped I under the general heading of anthropology ***. And—although its field of application is theoretically larger—existentialism is anthropology too insofar as anthropology seeks to give itself a foundation. Let us note, in effect, that the

34


problem is the same one which Husserlc defined apropos the sciences in general: classical mechanics, for example, uses space and time as beingI each one a homogeneous and continuous milieu, but it never interrogates itself about time or spaceI or motion. In the same way, the sciences of man do not interrogate themselves about man; they study the development and the relationsok [of three degrees]concept&concept as 1neg&2neg of human factsconcept, and man appears [apparaît] as a signifying milieu (determinable by signification) in which particular factsI are constitutedI (such as the structures of a society or a group, the evolution of institutions, etc.). Thus if we take it for granted that expérience will give us the complete collection of factsconcept concerning any group whatsoever and that the anthropological disciplines will bind together these factsI by means of objectiveconcept, strictly defined connectionsok [of three degrees]concept&concept as 1neg&2neg, then ‘human_realitylived’ as such will be no more accessible for us than the spaceI of geometry or mechanics—for this fundamental reasonok, that our research is not aimed at disclosing but at constitutingdial laws and at bringing to light functional relationsok [of three degrees]posited&posited as 1st & 2neg or processes."

-------------------------------------------------SMFtn. 1, "Man should not be defined by historicitylivedc—since there are some societies without history—but by the permanent possibility of living historically the breakdowns which sometimes overthrow societies of repetition [cyclical_processdial]. This definition is necessarilyCDRdial/lived a posteriori; that is to say, it arises at the heart of a historicalI society, and it is in itself the result of social transformationsI. But it goes back to apply itself to societies without historyI in the same way that Historyconcept itself returns to them to transformI them—first through the exteriorI and then in and through the interiorization of exteriority."

-------------------------------------------------** See Sartre\Sartre\Language&Comprehension-Action, ‘in the course of its accomplishment, provides its own clarification: ‘The experimenter is part of the experimental system’*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-ANTHROPOLOGY ;

Search for a Method: (p. xxxivc) "...if such a thing as a Truthconcept/1negc can exist in anthropology, it must be a truth that has become, and it must make itself a totalization [in course]lived..."

Herein-RIndirect ‘knowledgeontology/2neg—the result of reflection on existence—is presupposed by all the concepts of anthropology’;

-Anthropology should ‘replace the study of human objectsposited with the processes of becoming-an-object’

35


CDR: Sartre\Dialectic-R The problem of necessityCDRdial/lived: Interiorization of number, quantity, Natureconcept: The threat of being a robot (CDR72), with CDR (p. 72c) "...the fundamental problem of anthropology, that is, to the relationsok [of three degrees]lived&lived of practical_organismlivedc to inorganic_matterlived...;

10-14Exis ExistentialI ‘human_reality eludes direct knowledge [savoir]posited to the degree that it makes itself ’ (SM169) Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 169-70P, Fr. 125) "This task of integration would be easy if one could bring to light some sort of human essence; that is to say, a fixed ensemble of determinationsdial [‘that is, as limitation’] in terms of which one could assign a definite place to the objectsposited studied. But the majority of anthropologists agree that the diversity of groups—considered from the synchronic [‘ensemble of the present’] point_of_viewdouble connection of 1st&2neg—and the diachroniclived [‘in its human depth’] evolution of societies forbid us to found anthropology upon a conceptualconcept knowledge [savoir]livedc. It would be impossible to find a ‘human_natureposited’ which is common to the Murians, for example, and to the historical man of our contemporary societies. (SMp. 170) But, inversely, a real communication and in certain situations a reciprocal comprehensionok are established or can be established between existents thus distinct (for example, between the ethnologist and the young Murians who speak of their gothul.) It is in order to take into account these two opposite characteristics (no common nature but an always possible communication) that the movementdial/posited of anthropologyI once again and in a new form gives rise to the ‘ideology’ of existence.

(SMp. 170P, Fr. 126) "This ideologyI [of existencec], in effect, considers the human_reality, through the measure to which it makes itself eludes to the direct knowledge [savoir]positedc. The determinationsdial [‘that is, as limitation/negaation’] of the person appear [apparaissent] only in a society which constantly constructs itself by assigning to each of its memberslived/1neg a specific work, a connectionok [of three degrees]1st&2neg to the productlived/2neg of his work, and relationok [of three degrees]1st & 2neg of productionlived/2neg with the other memberslived/1neg—all of this in a never-ceasing movementdial/lived of totalization [in course]lived. But these determinationsI are themselves sustained, interiorized and lived (whether in acceptance or refusal) by a personalI project which has two fundamental characteristics: first, it cannot under any circumstances be defined by conceptsI; second, as a human projectI it is always comprehensibleok (theoretically if not in fact). To make this comprehensionI

ok explicit does not by any means [1] lead us to discoverdial/lived abstract notionslivedc, the combination of which could put the comprehensionI

ok back into conceptualI Knowledge [Savoir]concept; rather [2] it reproduces the dialectic movementdial/lived which

36


starts from simply existingI givens2neg and is raised to signifying activitylived/1neg. This comprehensionok, which does not distinguish itself from praxis, is at once immediate existence (since it is produced as the movementI of action) and the foundation of an indirect knowing [connaissance] of existenceI (since it comprehendsI

ok the existenceI of the other)." Copied Sartre\Language&Comprehension-valences; See Sartre\Language&Comprehension-If ‘my companion suddenly starts toward the window, I comprehend his gesture’

10-14Exis Indirect ‘knowledge—the result of reflection on existenceI—is presupposed by all the conceptsconcept of anthropologyI’ (SM171-3) Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 171-2P, Fr. 126) "Through indirect knowledge [connaissance] we are together obliged to make the ensemble the result of reflection [ réflexion ] on existence . This knowledge [connaissance] is indirect in this sense—that it is presupposed by all the concepts concept of anthropology R, whatever they may be, without being itself made the objectposited of conceptsI. Whatever the discipline considered, its most elementary notions would be incomprehensibleok without the immediate comprehensionI

ok [1] of the projectc which underlies them, [2] of negativity [seeking to deny lack] as the basis of the projectI, [3] of transcendencelived/1neg as the existence outside-of-itself in relationok [of three degrees]posited&posited as 1st & 2neg with the Otherconcept

ok-than-itself and the OtherIok-than-man, [4] of the surpassing1neg as a

mediationlivedc between the given2neg that is simply there and the practical significationlivedc, [5] of needdial/lived, [6] finally, as the being-outside-itself-in-the-world on the part of the practical_organismc [synthetic_totality, below].3 It is useless to try to disguise this by a mechanistic positivismc, a materialist ‘Gestaltismc.’ It remains, and it supports the discussion. The dialectic itself—which could not be made the objectI of conceptsI because its movementdial/lived engenders and dissolves them all—appears [apparaît] as Historyconcept and as historical Reasonconcept

ok only upon the foundation of existence; for it is through itself the development of praxis, and praxisI is in itself inconceivable without needI, transcendencelived/1neg, and the projectIc. The very employment of these vocables to designate existenceI in the structuresI of its disclosure indicate to us that it is capable of denotation [below]. But the connectionok [of three degrees]1neg&2neg of the sign or signified cannot be conceived of here in the form of an empirical significationI. (SMp. 172, Fr. 127) The signifyingI movementdial/lived—inasmuch as languagelivedR1 is at once an immediate attitude of each [person] in connectionok [of three degrees]1st&2neg to all and a human projectI—is itself a projectI. This signifiesI that the existential projectI will be in the wordR1 which will denote [above] it, not as the signifiedIR—which on principle is outside—but as its original foundation and its very structuredial/lived. And without doubtI the very wordI

37


‘language’positedR3 has a conceptualI significationI; one part of the languageI can designate the wholedial conceptuallyconcept. But languagelivedR3 is not in the word as the reality providing the form for all nominalismc; the contrary is true, and every wordI is the whole languageI. The word ‘projectI’ originally designates a certain humanI attitude (one ‘makes’ projectsI) which supposes as its foundation the pro-ject, an existentialI structuredial/lived. And this wordI, as a wordI, is itself possible only as a particular effectuation of human_reality inasmuch as it is a pro-jectI. In this sense the word by itself manifests the projectI from which it derives, only in the way in which the piece of merchandise retains in itself and passes on to us the humanI work which has produced it.4

(SMp. 172-3P, Fr. 127) "Yet what is involved is an entirely rational process. In effect the word, although it regressively designates its act, refers to the fundamental comprehensionok of human_realityI in each one and in all. This comprehensionI

ok, always actual, is given2neg in all praxis (individual or collective) although not in systematic form. Thus words—even those which do not try to refer regressivelyI to the fundamental dialectical act—contain a regressiveI indication referring to the comprehensionI

ok of that act. And those which try to disclose the existential structuresdial/lived explicitly, are limited to denoting regressivelyI the reflexive [réflexif] act inasmuch as it is a structureI of existence and a practical operationdial/livedc which existenceI effects upon itself. (SMp. 173) The original irrationalism of the Kierkegaardian attempt disappears [disparaît] entirely to make place for anti-intellectualism. The conceptconcept, in effect, aims at the objectI (whether this objectI be outside man or in him), and precisely for this, it is an intellectual Knowledge [Savoir]concept.5 In languageIR4, in other words, man designates himself insofar as he is the objectI of man. But in the effort to recover the source of every sign and consequently of all objectivity\, languageI turns back upon itself to indicate the momentsdial of a comprehensionok forever in process, since it is nothing other than existence itself. In givingI wordsR2 to these momentsI, one does not transform them into Knowledge [Savoir]concept—since this [giving words] concerns the inert, and what we shall call the ‘practico-inerte [totality]lived.’ But one stakes out the comprehensiveI

ok actualization by means of indications which refer simultaneously to reflective [réflexive] practice and to the content of comprehensiveI

ok reflection [réflexion]. NeedIc, negativity [seeking to deny lack]c, surpassing1negc, projectIc, transcendencelived/1negc, form in effect a synthetic_totality**dial/lived in which each one of the momentsdial designated contains all the others. Thus the reflective [réflexive] operationI—as a singular dated actI—can be indefinitely repeated. Through the same, the dialectic engenders itself indefinitely and whollydial in each dialecticI process, whether it be individual or collective. [continued]

38


-------------------------------------------------Ftn. 3, out of sequence at Sartre\Negation-It ‘is through need that the first negation of the negation and the first totalization [in course] appears in matter’Ftn. 4, "In our society this must first take the form of fetishizing the word."Ftn. 5 , Fr. 127) "It would be an error to believe that comprehensionlivedc

refers to the subjective. For subjectiveI and objectivelived are two opposedposited and complementary characteristics of manposited as an objectposited of knowledge [savoir]. In fact, the question concerns action itself qua actionI; that is, distinct on principle from the results (objectiveI and subjectiveI) which it engenders."

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SYNTHETIC_TOTALITY dial/lived; cf. synthetic; synthetic ensemble;

BN: (p. 3c) "...The concretelivedc can be only the synthetic totalitydial/lived of which consciousness, like the phenomenonlivedc, constituteBN only momentsdial..."

Search for a Method: bookmark above.10-14Exis AnthropologyI should ‘replace the study of human objectsposited with the processes of becoming-an-object’ (SM174)

Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 174P, Fr. 128, continuing) "But this reflective [réflexive] operationdial/livedc would not need to be repeated and would be transformed into a formal knowledge [savoir]ok if its content could exist by itself [in the study of anthropology] and be separated from concrete, historical actions, strictly defined by the situationok. The genuine role of ‘ideologiesc of existencec’ is not to describe an abstract ‘human_reality’ which has never existedI, but constantly to remind anthropologyR of the existential dimension of the processes studied. AnthropologyI studies only objectsposited. Now man is the being[-there] by whom becoming-an-objectI

comes to manI. Anthropology I will deserve its name only if it replaces the study of human objects I by the study of the various processes of becoming-an-object I . Its role is to found its knowledge [savoir] on rationalposited and comprehensiveok non-knowledgec [non-savoir]Ilived; that is to say, the historical_totalizationlived will be possible only if anthropologyI comprehendsI

ok itself instead of ignoring itself. To comprehendI

ok itself, to comprehendIok the other, to exist, to actI, are one and the

same movementdial/lived which grounds [fondes] direct knowledge [connaissance]ok upon indirect comprehensibleI

ok knowledge [connaissance]*** but without ever leaving the concrete—that is, Historconcept/1negc or, more precisely, the one who comprehendsI

ok what he knows [sait] lived This perpetual dissolution of intellectionc in comprehensionI

ok and, inversely, the perpetual re-descent which introduces comprehensionok into intellectionposited as a dimension of rationalI non-knowledgeI [non-savoir]Ilived at the heart of Knowledge [Savoir]concept is the very ambiguity of a

39


discipline [anthropology] in which the questioner, the questionI, and the questionedI are one."

(SMp. 176P, Fr. 129) "e...we must beware here of a confusion heavy with consequences. In effect, in the order of Knowledge [Savoir]concept/1negR, the knowledges [connaissances]livedR of principle or the foundations of a scientificR edifice, even when it has come—as is ordinarily the case—later than the empirical determinations [‘that is, as limitation’], is set forth first; and one deduces from it the determinationsI of Knowledge [Savoir]concept in the same way that one constructs a building after having secured its foundations. But this is because the foundation is itself a knowing [connaissance]; and if one can deduce from it certain propositions already guaranteed by expérience, this is because one has induced it in terms of them as the most general hypothesis. In contrast, the foundation of Marxism, as a historical, structuraldial/lived anthropologyI, is man himself inasmuch as humanI existence and the comprehensionok of the humanI are inseparablee..."

10-14Angu AnguishPol...\Horneyan Therapy-Reactive anxieties: Emptiness rebounds as

omnipotent strengthSartre\Index of Terms-ANGUISH [angoisse]; , as BN (p. 39c) "...Anguish then is

reflective [réflexive] apprehension..."Sartre\Freedom-RMan in choosing himself, chooses all of humanitySartre\Negation-RHeidegger’s pre-ontological comprehension of beingI as

anguished apprehension of nothingnessI (BN16-17)Sartre, Hope Now (p. 55c) "I have never known anguish. That was a key

philosophical notion from 1930 to 1940. It also came from Heidegger. It was one of the notions we made use of all the time, but to me it meant nothing. Of course, I knew grief or boredom or misery, but—"

BN (p. 378P ) "The more he tries to taste his objectivitylived, the more he will be submerged by the consciousness of his subjectivity—hence his anguish."

The Family Idiot (1:130c) "...I mean that this objectivelived negation penetrates him [Gustav Flaubert] as organiclived misery and a kind of ingratitude at the core of experience Fr=?. Not anguish, he has no reason to feel abandoned. Or alone. As soon as a wish is felt, it is instantly gratified..."

10-14Angu BN Part One, Chapter One: The Origin of Nothingness, section V (SM28-45, out of sequence from Sartre\Negation-IV. The Phenomenologicalposited ConceptI of NothingnessI (SM16-45)

40


10-14Angu It ‘is in anguish that ... being[-there] is in questionI for itself’ (BN28-9)Sartre BN (p. 28-9, Fr. 63) "But someone doubtless will believe that he can use

against us here an objection which we have frequently raised ourselves: If the nihilationc of consciousness exists only as consciousness of nihilationI, we ought to be able to define and describe a constant modeok of consciousness, present qua consciousness, which would be consciousness of nihilationI. (BNp. 29) Does this consciousness existI? Behold a new question has been raised here: If freedomBN is the being[-there] of consciousness, consciousness ought to existI as consciousness of freedomI. What form does this consciousness of freedomI assume? In freedomI the human being[-there] is his own pastlivedc (as also his own future [avenir]) in the form of nihilationI. If our analysis has not lead us astray, there ought to existI for the humanI

being, in so far as he is conscious of being a certain way of standing in face of his pastI and his future [avenir], as being[-there] this pastI and this future [avenir] and as not beingI them. We shall be able to furnish an immediate reply to this question; it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his freedomI, or if you prefer, anguishI is the modeok of beingI of freedomI as consciousness of beingI; it is in anguish I that freedom BN I is, in its being [-there] , in question for itself .

(BNp. 29, Fr. 64) "Kierkegaard describing anguish in the face of what one lacks, characterizes it as anguishI in the face of freedomI. But Heidegger, whom we know [sait] to have been greatly influenced by KierkegaardI, considers anguishI on the contrary as the grasping [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] of nothingness. These two descriptions of anguish do not appear [paraissent] to us contradictory; on the contraryI

ok the one implies the other." [continued-1]-------------------------------------------------

See Herein-[Heidegger] Anxiety reveals the nothing, not to you or I, but to DaseinRef Pol...\The Self-Questioning-Index

10-14Angu Fearlived ‘is fear of being[there] in the world whereas anguish is anguish before myself’: ‘the one is born in the destruction of the other’ (BN29-34)

Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics (p. 102) "By this anxiety we do not mean the quite common anxiousness, ultimately reducible to fearfulness... We become afraid in the face of this or that particular being that threatens us... Fear in the face of something is also in each case a fear for something in particular... [F]ear possesses this trait of being ‘fear in the face of’ and ‘fear for’... (p. 102-3) "[But] ... a peculiar calm pervades [anxiety]. Anxiety is ... not in the face of this or that thing. Anxiety in the face of ... is always anxiety for ... but not for this or that. The indeterminateness

41


... is no mere lack of determination [‘that is, as limitation’] but rather the essential impossibility of determiningI it..."

Sartre, BN (p. 29-30, Fr. 64, continuing-1) "First we must acknowledge that Kierkegaard is right; anguish is distinguished from fearlivedR in that fear is fear of being [-there] in the world whereas anguish I is anguish I before myself . Vertigo** is anguish to the extent that I am afraid not of falling over the precipice, but of throwing myself over. A situation provokes fearI if there is a possibility of my life beingI changed from without; my being[-there]I provokes anguishI to the extent that I distrust myself and my own reactions in that situationI. The artillery preparation which precedes the attack can provoke fearlived in the soldier who undergoes the bombardment, but anguish is born in him when he tries to foresee the conduct with which he will face the bombardment, when he asks himself if he is going to be able to ‘hold up.’ Similarly the recruit who reports for active duty at the beginning of the war can in some instances be afraid of death, but more often he is ‘afraid of beingI afraid;’ that is, he is filled with anguishI before himself. Most of the time dangerous or threatening situationsI present themselves in facets; they will be apprehended through a feeling of fearIc or of anguish according to whether we envisage the situationI as action on the man or the manI as actingI on the situationI. The man who has just received a hard blow—for example, losing a great part of his wealth in a crash—can have the fearI of threatening poverty. He will be in anguishI an instant [angoissera l’instant] later when nervously wringing his hands (a symbolic reaction to the action which is imposed but which remains still wholly undetermined), he exclaims to himself: ‘What am I going to do? But what am I going to do?’ (BNp. 30) In this sense fearI and anguish are exclusive of one another since, fearI is unreflective apprehension of the transcendentlived/1neg and anguishIc is reflective [réflexive] apprehensionIc of the self; the one is born in the destruction of the other. The normal process in the case which I have just cited is a constant transition from the one to the other. But there exists also situationsI where anguish appears pure; that is, without ever being[-there] preceded or followed by fearI. If, for example, I have been raised to a new dignity and charged with a delicate and flattering mission, I can feel anguishI at the thoughtlivedc that I will not be capable perhaps of fulfilling it, and yet I will not have the least fearI in the world of the consequences of my possible failurelived."

(BNp. 33-4, Fr. 68) "It would be vain to object that the sole condition of this anguish is ignorancelived of the underlying psychological determinismc. According to such a view my anxiety would come from lack of knowing [connaître] the real and effective incentives which in the darkness of the unconscious determinedial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] my action. In reply we shall point out first that anguishI has not

42


appearedI to us as a proof of human freedomBN; freedom was given to us as the necessaryBNlived condition [for of possibility] for the question. We wished only to show that there existsI a specific consciousness of freedomI, and we wished to show that this consciousness is anguishI. This means that we wished to establish anguishI in its essential structuredial/lived as consciousness of freedomI. Now from this point of view the existence of a psychological determinismI could not invalidate the results of our description. Either indeed anguishI is actually an unrealized ignorancelived of this determinismIc—and then anguishI apprehends itself in fact as freedomI—or else one may claim that anguishI is consciousness of being[-there] ignorantI of the real causeslived

ok of our acts. (BNp. 34) In the latter case anguishI would come from that of which we have a presentiment, a screen deep within ourselvesI for monstrous motivesR which would suddenly release guilty actsI. But in this case we should suddenly appearI to ourselvesI as things in the world; we should be to ourselvesI our own transcendentlived/1neg situationI. Then anguishI would disappearI to make place to fear, for fearI is a syntheticdial apprehension of the transcendentI as dreadful."

(BNp. 34, Fr. 69) "This freedomI which revealsI [manifests] itself to us in anguishI can be characterized by the existence of that nothing which insinuates itself between motivesI and actI. It is not because I am freeI that my act is not subject to the determination [‘that is, as limitation’] of motivesI; on the contraryok, the structuredial/lived of motivesI as ineffective is the condition of my freedomI

e... In short, as soon as we abandon the hypothesis of the content of consciousness, we must recognize that there is never a motiveI in consciousness; motivesI are only for consciousness. And due to the factlived that the motive can arise only as apparitionok, it constitutesBN itself as ineffective. Of course it does not have the exteriorityI of a temporal-spatial thing; it always belongs to subjectivity and it is apprehended as mine. But it is by nature transcendence_in_immanencelivedc, and consciousness is not subject to it because of the very factI that consciousness posits it; for consciousness has now the task of conferring on the motiveI its meaningBNlived and its importance. Thus the nothingI which separates the motiveI [‘nothing which insinuates itself between motivesI and act’] from consciousness characterizes itself as transcendence_in_immanenceIc: it is by producing itself as immanencelivedc that consciousness nihilatesc the nothing2neg which makes consciousness existI for itself as transcendencelived/1neg..."

-------------------------------------------------See Pol...\Horneyan Therapy-Miller: Distinguishing countertransference from transference. Countertransference is anguished anxiety, transference is fear. cf.Herein-[Heidegger] Rarity of anxiety and boredom as self-deception** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-VERTIGO ;

43


BN: (p. 378) "...masochism is characterized as a species of vertigo, vertigo not before a precipice of rock and earth but before the abyss of the other’s subjectivity..."

10-14Angu Anguish witnesses possible selfI-change and unjustifiability (BN34-5)Sartre, Existentialism (p. 34c) "Forlornness implies that we ourselves choose

our being[-there]. Forlornness and anguish go together."Sartre, BN (p. 34-5, Fr. 69-70) "e...freedomBN, which manifests itself through

anguishI, is characterized by a constantly renewed obligation to remake the Selflivedc [Moi] e... (BNp. 35, Fr. 70) The gambler who must realize anew the syntheticdial apperception of a situation which would forbid him to play, must rediscoverdial/lived at the same stroke [du même coup] the selfontology/1neg which can appreciate that situationI, which ‘is the situationI.’ This selflivedc with it’s a priori and historical content is the essence of man. AnguishI as the manifestation of freedomI in the face of selfI means that man is always separated by a nothingness from his essenceI. We should refer here to Hegel’sc statement: ‘Wesen ist was gewesen ist.’ EssenceIc is what has been. EssenceI is everything in the human being[-there] which we can indicate by the words—that is. Due to this factI it is the totalitydial/lived of characteristics which explain the act. But the actI is always beyond that essenceI; it is a humanI actI only in so far as it surpasses1negc every explanation which we can give of it, precisely because the very application of the formula ‘that is’ to man causeslived

ok all that is designated, to have-been. Man continually carries with him a pre-judicative comprehensionok of his essenceI, but due to this very factlived he is separated from it by a nothingness. EssenceIc is all that human_reality grasps [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] in itself as having been. It is here that anguishI appears [apparaît] as grasping [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the self inasmuch as it exists in the perpetual modeok of detachment from what is; better yet, in so far as it makes itself existI as such. For we can never grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] an Erlebnislived as a living consequence of that naturelivedc which is ours. The overflow of our consciousness progressively constitutesBN that natureI but it [our consciousness] remains always behind us and it dwells in us as the permanent objectposited of our retrospective comprehensionok. It is in so far as this natureI is an exigency without beingI a recourse that it is graspedI in anguishI."

"In anguishI freedomBN is anguishedI before itself inasmuch as it is instigated and bound by nothing. Someone will say, freedomI has just been defined as a permanent structuredial/lived of the human being; if anguishI manifests it, then anguishI ought to be a permanent state of my affectivity. But, on the contrary, it is completely exceptional. How can we explain the rarity of the phenomenon lived of anguish I .

44


9-15Angu How ‘can we explain the rarity of the phenomenonlived of anguish’ (BN35-7)

Sartre, BN (p. 35, Fr. 70) "We must note first of all that the most common situation of our life, those in which we apprehend our possibilitieslived/2neg as such by means of activelylived/1neg realizinglived/1neg&2neg them, do not manifest themselves to us through anguish because their very structuredial/lived excludes anguishedI apprehension. AnguishI in fact is the recognition of a possibilityI as my possibilityI

e..."(BNp. 36, Fr. 71) "e...The consciousness of man in action is unreflective [irréfléchi]

consciousness. It [consciousness] _is_consciousness_(of)_something and the transcendentlived/1negc which discoversdial/lived itself to consciousness is of a particularFr=? nature; the transcendentlived/1neg is a structuredial/lived of exigencylived/2negc in the world which correlatively discoversI in the structureI of exigencyIlived/1neg complex connectionsok [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1st&2neg of instrumentalitylived/1neg. In the act of tracing the letters which I write, the whole sentence, still unachieved, is revealedlivedc as a passive exigencyI to be written. The whole sentence is the very meaningBN of the letters which I form, and its appeal is not put into question, precisely because I can not write the words without transcendingI them toward the sentence and because I discoverdial/lived it [the sentence] as the necessaryBNlived conditions for the meaningI of the words which I am writinge..."

(BNp. 36-7, Fr. 71) sartre¶"Of course in every act of this kind, there remains the possibility of putting this actI into question—in so far as it refers to more distant, more essential ends—as to its ultimate meaningsI and my essential possibilitiesI. For example, the sentenceI which I write is the meaningI of the letters which I trace, but the whole work which I wish to produce is the meaningIc of the sentenceI. And this work is a possibilityI in connectionI [à propos] with which I can feel anguish; and I do not know [sais] whether I will continue it tomorrow; tomorrowlived/1neg in connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1st&2neg to my freedomlived/2neg can exercise its nihilating power. (BNp. 37) But that anguishI implies the apprehension of the work as such as my possibilityI. I must place myself directly in the face of it and realize my connectionI [rapport] to it. This means that I ought not only to raise with reference to it objectivelived questions such as, ‘Is it necessaryI to write this work?’ for these questions refer me simply to wider objectiveI significations, such as, ‘Is it opportune to write it at this momentdial? Isn’t this just a repetition of another such book? Is its material of sufficient interest? Has it been sufficiently thought through?’ etc.—all significationsI which remain transcendentI and give themselves as a multitude of exigenciesI in the world.

45


See Sartre\Language&Comprehension-SentencesI pre-existsI wordsI as their lived totalizationlived (IT 51c, BN 514)

(BNp. 37, Fr. 72) sartre¶"In order for my freedomI to be anguished in connectionI [à propos] with the book which I am writing, this book2neg must appear in connectionok [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1st&2neg with me1neg. On the one hand, I must discoverdial/lived my essence as what I have been—I have been ‘wanting to write this book,’ I have conceived it, I have believed that it would be interesting to write it, and I have constitutedBN myself in such a way that it is not possible to comprehendlived [comprendre] me without taking into account the factlived that this book has been my essential possibilityI. On the other hand, I must discoverdial/lived the nothingness which separates my freedomI from this essenceI: I have been ‘wanting to write,’ but nothingI, not even what I have been, can compel me to write it. Finally, I must discoverI the nothingness which separates me from what I shall be: I discoverI that the permanent possibilityI of abandoning the book is the very condition of the possibilityontology of writing it and the very meaningI of my freedomI. It is necessaryBNlived that in the constitutionBN of the book as my possibilityI, I apprehend my freedomI as being[-there] the possibleI destroyer in the present and in the future [avenir] of what I am. That is, I must place myself on the plane of reflection [réflexion]posited. So long as I remain on the plane of action, the book to be written is only the distant and presupposed meaningI of the actI which reveals my possibilitiesI

to me. The book is only the implication of the actionI; it is not made an objectposited and posited for itself; it does not ‘raise the question;’ it is conceived neither as necessaryBNlived nor contingent. It is only the permanent, remote meaningI in terms of which I can comprehend [comprendre] what I am writing in the presentI, and hence, it is conceived as being[-there]I; that is, only by positingI the book as the existing basis on which my presentI, existingI sentenceI emerges, can I confer a determineddial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’] meaningBNlived upon my sentence."

-------------------------------------------------See Herein-[Heidegger] Rarity of anxiety and boredom as self-deception

10-14Angu Everyday ‘morality is exclusive of ethicalI anguish’ (BN37-8)Sartre, BN (p. 37-8, Fr. 72) sartre¶"e...The alarm which rings in the morning refers

to the possibility of my going to work, which is my possibilityI. But to apprehend the summons of the alarm as a summons is to get up. (BNp. 38) Therefore the very act of getting up is reassuring, for it eludes the question, ‘Is work my possibilityI?’ Consequently it does not put me in a position to apprehendI the possibilityI of quietism, of refusing to work, and finally the possibilityI of refusingI the world and the possibilityI of death. In short, to the extent that I apprehendI the meaningBNlived of

46


the ringing, I am already up at its summons; this apprehension guarantees me against the anguished intuition that it is I who confer on the alarm clock its exigency—I and I alone.

(BNp. 38, Fr. 73) sartre¶"In the same way, what we might call everyday morality is exclusive of ethical anguish I . There is ethicalI anguishI when I consider myselflived/1neg in my original connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1neg&2neg to valueslived/2negR. Values actually are demands which lay claim to a foundatione... [They] can be revealed only to an active freedomBN which makes it exist as valuelived by the sole factlived of recognizing it as such. It follows that my freedomI is the unique foundation of valuesI and that nothing, absolutely nothingI, justifies me in adopting this_or_that particular valueI, this_or_thatI scale of valuesI. As a being[-there] by whom valuesI existI, I am unjustifiable. my freedomI is anguished at beingI the foundation of valuesI while itself without foundation. It is anguishedI in addition because valuesI, due to the factI that they are essentially revealedI to a freedomI can not disclose themselves without beingI at the same stroke ‘put into question,’ for the possibilityI of overturning the scale of valuesI appears complementarily as my possibilityI. It is anguishI before valuesI which is the recognition of the ideality of valuesI.

"Ordinarily, however, my attitude with respect to valuesI is eminently reassuring, In fact I am engaged in a world of values. The anguishedI apprehension of valuesI as sustained in beingI by my freedomI is a secondary and mediated phenomenalived. The immediate is the worldI with its urgency; and in this world where I engage myself, my acts causelived

ok valuesI to spring up like partridges. My indignation has given2neg to me the antivalue ‘baseness,’ my admiration has givenI the positive valueI ‘grandeur.’ Above all my obedience to a multitude of tabus, which is real, reveals these tabus to be as existingI in factlived. The bourgeois who call themselves ‘respectable citizens’ do not become respectable as a result of contemplating moralI valuesI. Rather from the momentdial of their arising in the world they are thrown into a pattern of behavior the meaningBNlivedc of which is respectability. Thus respectability acquires a beingI; it is not put into question. ValuesI are sown on my path as thousands of little real demands, like the signs which order us to keep off the grass. [continued]

-------------------------------------------------Ref Pol...\Institutional Religion-Index; Nietzsche\Morality-Index

10-14Angu Anguished apprehension mediates the world’s possible projects (BN39-40)

Sartre, BN (p. 39, Fr. 74, continuing) "Thus, in what we shall call the world of the immediate, which delivers itself to our unreflective [irréfléchi]livedc consciousness, we

47


do not first appear [apparaissons] to ourselves, to be thrown subsequently into enterprises. Our being[-there] is immediately ‘in situationc;’ that is, it arises in enterprises and knows [connait] itself first in so far as it is reflected [refléte] in those enterprises. We discoverdial/lived ourselvesI then in a worldontology/2neg peopled with demands, in the heart of projectsontology/1neg ‘in the course of realizationontology/1neg&2neg.’ I write. I am going to smoke. I have an appointment this evening with Pierre. I must not forget to reply to Simon. I do not have a right to conceal the truth any longer from Claude. All these trivial passive expectations of the real, all these commonplace, everyday valueslivedR, derive their meaningBNlived from an original projection of myself which stands as my choice of myself in the worldI. But to be exact, this projectionI of myself toward an original possibility, which causeslived

ok the existence of valuesI, appeals, expectations and in general a world, appears [apparaît] to me only beyond the worldI as the meaningI and the abstract, logical signification of my enterprises. For the rest, there existI concretely alarm clocks, signboards, tax forms, policemen, so many guard rails against anguish. But as soon as the enterprise is held at a distanceI [s éloigne] from me, as soon as I am referred to myself because I must await myself in the future [avenir], then I discoverdial/lived myself suddenly as the one who gives its meaningI to the alarm clock, the one who by a signboard forbids himself to walk on the flower bed or on the lawn, the one from whom the boss’s order borrows its urgency, the one who decides the interest of the book which he is writing, the one finally who makes the valuesI existI in order to determine his action by their demands. I emerge alone and in anguishI confronting the unique and original projectI which constitutesBN my beingI. Nothing can ensure me against myself, cut off from the world and from my essence by this nothingness which I am. I have to realizeontology/1neg&2neg the meaningI of the worldontology/2neg and of my essenceI; I make my decision concerning them—without justification and without excuse.

(BNp. 39-40, Fr. 74) "Anguishlivedc then is reflective [réflexive] apprehension of freedomBN by itself. In this sense it is mediation***, for although it is [‘that is, as limitation’] immediate consciousness of itself, it arises from the negation of the appeals of the world. It appearsI at the momentdial that I disengage myself from the world where I had been engaged—in order to apprehendI myself as a consciousness which possesses a pre-ontological**** comprehensionok of its essence and a pre-judicative***** sense of its possibilities. AnguishI is opposed to the mind of the serious man who apprehends valueslived in terms of the world and who resides in the reassuring, materialistic substantiation of valuesI. In the seriousI mood I define myself in terms of the objectposited by pushing aside a priori as impossible all enterprises in which I am not engaged at the momentdial, the meaningI which my

48


freedomI has given2neg to the worldI, I apprehendI as coming from the world and constitutingBN my obligations. (p. 40) In anguish I apprehendI myself at once as totally freeI and as not beingI able to derive the meaningBNlived of the worldI except as coming from myself."

(BNp. 92c) "I should prefer that my suffering would seize me and flow over me like a storm, but instead I must raise it into existence. I cannot grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] it. I find only myself, myself who moans, myself who wails, myself who in order to realizeontology/1neg&2neg this suffering which I am, must play without respite the drama of suffering...

-------------------------------------------------See Sartre\Flaubert’s School Years-At ‘ease in the world ... is only the least possible degree of being "ill at ease"’: ‘I come to myself "from other horizons"’Ref Sartre\Being-there-The Family Idiot: ‘Reflection shapes lived experience according to its own ends’

-------------------------------------------------*** Sartre\Index of Terms-MEDIATION ;

Althusser states, ‘Sartre is the philosopher of mediations par excellence.’BN (p. 178c) "...Immediacy is the absence of any mediator; that is obvious, for

otherwise the mediatorI alone would be known [connu] and not what is mediatedI...";Search for a Method: (p. 99c) "Only the project, as a mediation between two

momentsdialok of objectivitylived, can account for Historyconcept/1neg that is, for human

creativity...";(p. 171c) "...Whatever the discipline considered, its most elementary

notions would be incomprehensibleok without the immediate comprehensionok ... of the surpassing1negc as a mediation between the given2neg that is simply there and the practical significationlived/1neg..."

CDR: (p. 46c, parts and whole) "...Thus totalization [in course] has the same status as the totalitydial/livedR through the multiplicities, it continues that syntheticdial labour which makes each part a manifestation of the wholedial, and which relates the wholeI to itself through the mediation of the partsI...";

Sartre\Groups&Reciprocity-RMarx's and Sartre's formalism: Man mediates things to the extent that things mediate manI

The Family Idiot: (4:47c) "...it is the position of non-beingc to be realized as the mediated term of an oriented temporalizationCDRlived..."

-------------------------------------------------**** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PRE-ONTOLOGICAL ; early works; Sartre\Footnotes-Hubert L. Dreyfus and Piotr Hoffman: CDR’s unobjectifiable need replaces BN’s abstracted consciousness;

49


BN: Sartre\Temporality-RIII. Original_temporality, psychic_temporality, psychological_duration, universal_time;

(p. lxiiic) "...The phenomenalived of being[-there], like every primary phenomenonI, is immediately disclosed to consciousness. We have at each instant what Heidegger calls a pre-ontological comprehensionI of it; that is, one which is not accompanied by a fixing in concepts and elucidation...";

(p. 17c) "...There is a meaningBNlived of being which must be clarified; there is a ‘pre-ontological comprehensionok of being which is involved in every kind of conduct belonging to ‘’ i.e. in each of its projects...";

(p. 156c) "...Doubtlivedc appears [paraît] on the foundation of a pre-ontological comprehensionI

ok of knowing [connaître] and of requirements concerning truth...";(p. 245c, Fr. 283) "...He [Heidegger] writes, Daseinc ist je meines [for gosh sakes, its

mine!]!’ It is by making explicit the pre-ontological comprehensionok which I have of myself that I apprehend being-with-others as an essential characteristic of my being.

-------------------------------------------------***** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PRE-JUDICATIVE ; early works only.

BN: (p. 7c) "...If I question the carburetor, it is because I consider it possible that ‘there is nothing there’ in the carburetor. Thus my question by its nature envelops a certain pre-judicative comprehensionok of non-being; it is in itself a relationok [of three degrees]1st & 2neg of being[-there] with non-being, on the basis of the original transcendencelived/1neg; that is, in a relationI

ok of beingI with being[-there].";(p. 66c, Fr. 101) "...Sincerity ... aims at making me pass from one modeok

of being[-there] to another modeok of beingI. This second modeok of beingI, the ideal of sincerity, I am prevented by natureI from attaining, and at the very momentdial when I struggle to attain it, I have a vague pre-judicative comprehensionok that I shall not attain it..."

Page 44 out of sequence at Sartre\Ontology-Transcendence in immanence

10-14Angu Heidegger’s anxious nothingness in What Is Metaphysics, Basic Writings ed. David Ferrell Krell, Harper & Row, 1977

Sartre\Heidegger&Sartre-IndexSartre\Negation-RnothingnessRüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger (p. 45) Rudolf Carnap’s argument

against Heidegger’s philosophy of the Nothing.

10-14Angu Ancient’s unformed matter: Hegel’s being and nothing as the same

50


Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics (p. 109) "For a long time metaphysics has expressed the nothing in a proposition clearly susceptible of more than one meaning: ex nihilo nihil fit—from nothing, nothing comes to be. Ancient metaphysics conceives the nothing in the sense of nonbeing, that is, unformed matter, matter which cannot take form as an in-formed being that would offer an outward appearance or aspect (eidos). To be in being is to be a self-forming form that exhibits itself as such in an image as a spectacle. The origins, legitimacy, and limits of this conception of Being are as little discussed as the nothing itself. On the other hand, Christian dogma denies the truth of the proposition ex nihilo nihil fit and thereby bestows on the nothing a transformedificance, the sense of the complete absence of beings apart from God: ex nihilo nihil fit—ens creatum (From nothing comes—created being). Now the nothing becomes the counterconcept to being proper, the summum ens, God as ens increatum..."

(p. 110) "‘Pure Being and pure Nothing are therefore the same.’ This proposition of Hegel’sc is correct. Being and nothing do belong together, not because both—from the point of view of the Hegelian concept of thoughtI —agree in their indeterminateness and immediacy, but rather because Being itself is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which is held out into the nothing."

10-14Angu Anxiety reveals the nothing, not to you or I, but to DaseinI

Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics (p. 103) "We ‘hover’ in anxiety. More precisely, anxiety leaves us hanging because it induces the slipping away of beings as a whole. This implies that we ourselves—we men who are in being—in the midst of beings slip away from ourselves. At bottom therefore it is not as though ‘you’ or ‘I’ feel ill at ease; rather it is this way for some ‘one.’ In the altogether unsettling experience of this hovering where there is nothing to hold onto pure Da-sein is all that is still there." cf. Herein-It ‘is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself’

(p. 104) "The nothing reveals itself in anxiety—but not as a being. Just as little is it given as an object. Anxiety is no kind of grasping of the nothing. All the same, the nothing reveals itself in and through anxiety, although, to repeat not in such a way that the nothing becomes manifest in our malaise quite apart from beings as a whole. Rather we said that in anxiety the nothing is encountered at one with beings as a whole. What does this ‘at one with’ mean?

"In anxiety beings as a whole become superfluous. In what sense does this happen? Beings are not annihilated by anxiety, so that nothing is left. How could they be, when anxiety finds itself precisely in utter impotence with regard to beings

51


as a whole? Rather the nothing makes itself known with beings and in beings expressly as a slipping away of the whole."

10-14Angu Anxious nothingness as DaseinI facing finite being: Nihilation repels in retreat

Heidegger, What Is Metaphysics (p. 105) "e...Dasein in anxiety, is the essence of the nothing: nihilation. It is neither an annihilation of beings nor does it spring from a negation. Nihilation will not submit to calculation in terms of annihilation and negation. The nothing itself nihilates.

"Nihilation is not some fortuitous incident. Rather, as the repelling gesture toward the retreating whole of beings, it discloses these beings in their full but heretofore concealed strangeness as what is radically other—with respect to the nothing.

"In the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises; that they are beings—and not nothing. But this ‘and not nothing’ we add in our talk is not some kind of appended clarification. Rather it makes possible in advance the revelation of beings in general. The essence of the originally nihilating nothing lies in this, that it brings Da-sein for the first time before beings as such.

"Only on the ground of the original revelation of the nothing can human existence approach and penetrate beings. But since existence in its essence relates itself to beings—those which it is not and that which it is—it emerges as such existence in each case from the nothing already revealed.

"Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing."Holding itself out into the nothing, DaseinI is in each case already beyond

beings as a whole. This being beyond beings we call ‘transcendence...’" Ref Heidegger\Lifework-Index of Terms-transcendence

(p. 106) "Without the original revelation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom."

(p. 107) "What testifies to the constant and widespread though distorted revelation of the nothing in our existence more compellingly than negation? But negation does not conjure the ‘not’ out of itself as a means for making distinctions and oppositions in whatever is given, inserting itself, as it were, in between what is given. How could negation produce the not from itself when it can make denials only when something deniable is already granted to it? But how could the deniable and what is to be denied be viewed as something susceptible to the not unless all thinking as such has caught sight of the not already? But the not can become manifest only when its origin, the nihilation of the nothing in general, and therewith

52


the nothing itself, is disengaged from concealment. The not does not originate through negation; rather is grounded in the not that springs from the nihilation of the nothing. But negation is also only one way of nihilating, that is, only one sort of behavior that has been grounded beforehand in the nihilation of the nothing."

"In this way the above thesis in its main features has been proven: the nothing is the origin of negation, not vice versa. If the power of the intellect in the field of inquiry into the nothing and into Being is thus shattered, then the destiny of the reign of ‘logic’ in philosophy is thereby decided. The idea of ‘logic’ itself disintegrates in the turbulence of a more original questioning.

"No matter how much or in how many ways negation, expressed or implied, permeates all thoughtI , it is by no means the sole authoritative witness for the revelation of the nothing belonging essentially to DaseinI. For negation cannot claim to be either the sole or the leading nihilative behavior in which DaseinI remains shaken. by the nihilation of the nothing. Unyielding antagonism and stinging rebuke have a more abysmal source than the measured negation of thoughtI

. Galling failure and merciless prohibition require some deeper answer. Bitter privation is more burdensome."

(p. 108) "Being held out into the nothing—as DaseinI is—on the ground of concealed anxiety makes man a lieutenant of the nothing. We are so finite that we cannot even bring ourselves originally before the nothing through our own decision and will. So profoundly does finitude entrench itself in existence that our most proper and deepest limitation refuses to yield to our freedom."

Barnes, "Introduction," BN (p. xxvP ) "...Sartre criticizes Heidegger for restricting his experience of Nothingness to special crises and ignoring the host of everyday situations in which it figures..."

-------------------------------------------------See Sartre\Negation-DaseinI’s groundlessnessI: ‘We are shown a negatingI activity and there is no concern to groundI this activityI upon a negativeI being[-there]I’

10-14Dase Rarity of anxiety and boredomI as self-deceptionHeidegger, What Is Metaphysics (p. 106) "...If Dasein can relate itself to

beings only by holding itself out into the nothing and can exist only thus; and if the nothing is originally disclosed only in anxiety; then must we not hover in this anxiety constantly in order to be able to exist at all? And have we not ourselves confessed that this original anxiety is rare? But above all else, we all do exist and relate ourselves to beings which we may or may not be—without this anxiety. Is this not an arbitrary invention and the nothing attributed to it a flight of fancy?

53


"Yet what does it mean that this original anxiety occurs only in rare moments? Nothing else than that the nothing is at first and for the most part distorted with respect to its originality. How, then? In this way: we usually lose ourselves altogether among beings in a certain way. The more we turn toward beings in our preoccupations the less we let beings as a whole slip away as such and the more we turn away from the nothing. Just as surely do we hasten into the public superficies of existence.

"And yet this constant if ambiguous turning away from the nothing accords, within certain limits, with the most proper significance of the nothing. In its nihilation the nothing directs us precisely towards beings. The nothing nihilates incessantly without our really knowing of this occurrence in the manner of our everyday knowledge."

(p. 108) "...The saturation of existence by nihilative behavior testifies to the constant though doubtlessly obscured manifestation of the nothing that only anxiety originally reveals. But this implies that the original anxiety in existence is usually repressed. Anxiety is there. It is only sleeping. Its breath quivers perpetually through DaseinI, only slightly in those who are jittery, imperceptibly in the ‘Oh, yes’ and ‘Oh, no’ of men of affairs; but most readily in the reserved, and most assuredly in those who are basically daring. But those daring ones are sustained by that on which they expend themselves—in order thus to preserve a final greatness in existence."

Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (p. 78) "...In the end we do not want to know of it [boredom], but constantly seek to escape it. If we constantly seek to escape from it in this way, we ultimately have a bad conscience in so doing, we cling to the excuses associated with such bad conscience, and are consoled by persuading ourselves and proving to ourselves that we do not know of it—therefore it is not there." See Annex\Heidegger\Boredom-Passing the time encounters ‘being bored by’ undisguised

-------------------------------------------------See Herein-Fearlived ‘is fear of being[there]I in the world whereas anguish is anguish before myself’: ‘the one is born in the destruction of the’ (BN29-34)

10-14Hege Kierkegaard: ‘That singular individual’ from paper delivered to UNESCO, 1964, from Between Existentialism and Marxism (Gallimard, 1972) Tr. by John Mathews, N.Y., Pantheon, 1974, (p. 141-169)

Heidegger\Dasein-RThe turning point: Kierkegaard’s ‘moment’ as Heidegger’s ‘Time of Being’

54


Archives\Misc. Authors-KierkegaardPol...\The Self-RThe self did not exist prior to Socrates’ ironic cross-

questioning of othersSartre\Index of Terms-KIERKEGAARD ; [1813-1855]Sartre\Flaubert’s Constitution-RAnother’s love as the foundation and

guarantee of our own value and mandate, where Kierkegaard’s neurosis is mentioned.

Sartre\Lifework-RI. Beyond Failurelived [contradiction of hope and failure; ‘We must believe in progress’] (HN53-66)

‘That Single Individual,’ Kierkegaard requested be inscribed on his grave.Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 166c) "...The Hegel-Kierkegaard conflict finds

its solution in the factlived that man is neither signified nor signifyingI but at once (e...) both the signifiedI-signifyingI and signifyingI-signifiedI."

"Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript... ‘The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and thereby transforms existence into something indifferent’ (Robert Solomon, In the Spirit of Hegel (p. 120, Ftn. 31)."

Søren Kierkegaard, "Who is it that has lured me into this and now leaves me there?... How did I come into the world? Why was I not consulted... Why should I have an interest in it?... And if I am compelled to take part in it, where is the director?... Whither shall I turn with my complaint?" Quoted in Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful (p. 78).

10-14Exis Kierkegaard has to demonstrate his irreducibilitySartre, ": The Singular Universal," (p. 144) "...Kierkegaard knew that he

already had his place within the system. He was familiar with Hegel’s thoughtI , and he was aware of the interpretation it conferred in advance on the movementsI of his life. He was trapped and held in the beam of the HegelianI projector; he either had to vanish into objectivelived knowledgeFr=? or demonstrate his irreducibility..."

(p. 145) "Søren identified with the problem because he was conscious of it. He knew that HegelI, in pointing to him as a momentdial of universal Historyconcept vainly posed for itself, attained him in the being which he suffered as a analytic_schemaposited to be accomplished in the course of his life, and which he called his Untruth** or the error that he was at the start of his life, as a truncated determination [‘that is, as limitation’]. But this was the point: Hegel’sI designation attained him like the light from a dead star [i.e., could not penetrate Kierkegaards’s command of his own life]. The untruth had to be lived; it too belonged to his subjectivity. And so he could write, in the Fragments: ‘My own Untruth is something I can discover

55


only by myself, since it is only when I have discovered it that it is discovered, even if the whole world knew of it before.’ But when it is discovereddial/lived, my Untruth becomes, at least in the immediate, my Truthconcept. So subjectiveI truth exists. It is not knowledge (savoir) but self-determinationdial [‘that is, as limitation/negation’]; it can be defined neither as an extrinsic relationFr=? [of three degrees]1st & 2neg of knowledge (connaissance) to being[-there], nor as the internal imprint of a correspondence, nor as the indissoluble unity of a system. ‘TruthI,’ he said, ‘is the act of freedom.’ I would not know how to be my own truthIc even if its premisses were given2neg in me in advance: to reveal it means to produce it or to produce myself as I am; to be for myself what I have to be."

Sartre, CDR (p. 24c) "But that is not all. For HegelIc, as we have seen, the apodicticity of dialecticalc knowledge [connaissance] implied the identity of Beingconcept, Actionconcept and Knowledge [Savoir]concept. Marxc, however, began by positing that material existence was irreducible to knowledge [connaissance], that praxis outstrips Knowledge [Savoir]concept in its real efficacy. Needless to say, this is my own position..."***

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-UNTRUTH ; precursor to nonknowledge;

Sartre\Flaubert’s Neurosis-Ideology as nonknowledge through differential reciprocalI language, and sub-topic.

BN (p. 49c, Fr. 83) "It can not be the same for bad faith if this, as we have said, is indeed a lie to oneself. To be sure, the one who practices bad faithI is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truthI a pleasing untruth. Bad faithI then has in appearance the structuredial/lived of falsehoodI.

-------------------------------------------------*** [The intuition that existence and things are irreducible to knowledge was first claimed by Kierkegaard [1813-1855] before Marxc [1818-1883] and Nietzschec [1844-1900] who employed this revelation throughout his moral debunkings.]

10-14Exis HegelI ‘neglects the unsurpassable opaqueness of lived experience’ (SM9-12)

Sartre, Search for a Method (p. 9P, Ftn. 6, Fr. 23) "e...What KierkegaardR opposes in HegelR is the factI that for HegelI the tragedy of a life [vie] is always surpassed1neg. The lifeI fades away into knowledge [savoir]. HegelI talks to us of the slave and his fear of death... What KierkegaardI complains of in HegelianismI is that it neglects the unsurpassable opaque ness of the lived experience [vecu] . The dis-agreement is not only and not primarily at the level of concepts but rather has to do with the critique of knowledge [savoir] and the delimitation of its scopee..."

56


(SMp. 10-11P, Fr. 23-5) "In the face of HegelI, KierkegaardI scarcely seems to count. He is certainly not a philosopher; moreover, he himself refused this title. In fact, he is a Christian who is not willing to let himself be enclosed in the system and who, against Hegel’sI ‘intellectualism,’ asserts unrelentingly the irreducibility and the specificity of what is lived. There is no doubt, as Jean Wahl has remarked, that a HegelianI would have assimilated this romantic and obstinate consciousness to the ‘unhappy consciousness,’ a momentdial which had already been surpassed1neg and known [connu] in its essential characteristics. But it is precisely this objectivelived knowledge [savoir]ok** which KierkegaardI challenges. For him the surpassingI of the unhappy consciousness remains purely verbal. The existing man cannot be assimilated by a system of ideas. Whatever one may say or think about suffering, it escapes knowledge [savoir] to the extent that it is suffered in itself, for itself, and to the degree that knowledge [savoir] remains powerless to transformI it. ‘The philosopher constructs a palace of ideasI and lives in a hovel.’ Of course, it is religion which KierkegaardI wants to defend. HegelI was not willing for Christianity to be ‘surpassed1neg,’ but for this very reason he made it the highest momentdial of human existence. KierkegaardI, on the contrary, insists on the transcendencelived/2negc of the Divine; between man and God he puts an infinite distancee... (SMp. 11, Fr. 24) He searches everywhere for weapons to aid him in escaping from the terrible ‘mediation’; he discoversdial/lived within himself oppositions, indecisions, equivocations which cannot be surpassed1negc; paradoxes, ambiguities, discontinuities, dilemmas, etc. In all these inward conflicts, HegelI would doubtless see only contradictions in formation or in process of development—but this is exactly what KierkegaardI reproaches him for: even before becoming aware of them, the philosopher of Jena would have decided to consider them truncated ideasI. In fact, the subjective life, just insofar as it is lived, can never be made the objectposited of a knowledge [savoir]c. On principle it escapes knowing [connaissance], and the connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1neg&2neg of the believerlived/1neg to transcendencelived/2negIc can only be conceived of in the form of a surpassing1neg. This inwardness, which in its narrowness and its infinite depth claims to affirm itself against all philosophy, this subjectivity rediscovereddial/lived beyond language as the personal adventure of each man in the face of others and of God—this is what KierkegaardI called existenceI.

(SMp. 11-12P, Fr. 24) "We see that KierkegaardI is inseparable from HegelI, and that this vehement negation of every system can arise only within a cultural field entirely dominated by HegelianismI. The Dane feels himself hemmed in by conceptsI, by Historyconcept, he fights for his life; it is the reaction of Christian romanticismI against the rationalist humanizationI. It would be too easy to reject this work as simply subjectivismI ; what we ought rather to point out, in placing it

57


back within the framework of its period, is that e... (SMp. 12) grief, needdial/lived, passion, the pain of men, are brute realities which can be neither surpassed1negc nor changed by Knowledge[Savoir]concept

ok*** e... KierkegaardianI existenceI is the work of our inner life—resistances overcome and perpetually reborn, efforts perpetually renewed, despaired, surmounted, provisional failures and precarious victories—and this work is directly opposed to intellectual knowing [connaissance]. KierkegaardI was perhaps the first to point out, against HegelI and thanks to him, the incommensurability of the real and Knowledge [Savoir]concept

oke..." Copied and see Sartre\Language&Comprehension-Words usurping reality (index)

-------------------------------------------------See Sartre\The Other-Hegel’s idealism makes me depend on the other reflectivelyRef Archives\Hegel-Robert Solomon, Merleau-Ponty: Hegel as ‘an existentialist of sorts’

10-14Angu AlienationSartre\Index of Terms-ALIENATION posited or ontology?;Pol...\Defense Mechanisms-RLaing: Defense mechanismsI as socially adopted

but irreversible alienatingI forcesSartre\Groups&Reciprocity-RReciprocity, alienationI, and reificationI as not

totalizingSartre\Political Scarcity-2. Worked_MatterI as AlienatedI Objectification

of Individual and collectiveI Praxis-Index

10-14Angu AlienationI of our objectification as being-outsideI in the thing (SM47, 99, CDR227, index)

Notebooks for an Ethics (p. 121c) "...the fate of man is to be an interiority that comes to knowFr=? itself in exteriority. Hence from the very beginning he has an alienated image of himself..."

BN (p. 376P , Fr. 416) "Each one is alienated only to the exact extent to which he demands the alienationI of the otherlivedc.";

Search for a Method (p. 47, Fr. 48) "e...restating what everybody has always known [su]: the consequences of our acts always end up by escaping us, since every concerted enterpriselived/1neg, as soon as it is realized, enters into relationok [of three degrees]1st & 2neg with the entire universelived/2neg, and since this infinite multiplicity of connectionsok [of three degrees]1st&2neg surpass1neg our intentionlived/2neg

e..."(SMp. 99P, Ftn. 4, Fr. 81) "e...(3) In the world of alienation, the historical

agent never entirely recognizes himself in his actI. This does not mean that

58


historians should not recognize him in it precisely as an alienatedI man. However this may be, alienation is at the base and at the summit; and the agent never undertakes anything which is not the negation of alienationI and which does not fall back into the alienatedI world. But the alienationI of the objectifiedlived result is not the same as the alienationI at the point of departure. It is the passage from the one to the other which defines the person."

(SMp. 101c) "...The realizationontology of the possible ... is then our objectificationlived, and the original contradictionsc which are reflected there testify to our alienation."

CDR (p. 124c) "...man has to struggle not only against Natureconcept, and against the social environment which has produced him, and against other men, but also against his own actionI as it becomes other. This primitive type of alienationI occurs within other forms of alienationI, but it is independent of them, and, in fact, their foundation. In other words, we shall reveal, through it, that a permanent antipraxisc

is a new and necessaryCDRdial/lived momentdial of praxis...";(CDRp. 227, Fr. 336, out of sequence from Sartre\Freedom-3. Necessity as a New

Structure of Dialectical Experience) sartre¶ "Should we describe this as alienation: Certainly, we should, in that he returns to himself as Otherconcept e... [T]he original connectionok [of three degrees]1st&2neg between praxis as totalization [in course]lived/1neg and materialitylived/2neg as passivityok obligesok manc to objectifylived himself in a milieu which is not his own, and to present an inorganic-totalitydial/lived; as his own objectivelived reality. It is this connection [rapport]1st&2neg [of three degrees] between interiority and exteriority which originally constituteddial/group praxisI as a relationok [of three degrees]1st &

2neg of the organismlived/1neg to its material environmentlived/2neg; and there can be no doubt that as man begins to designate himself not as the mere reproduction of his life, but as the ensemble of products which reproduce his life, he discoversdial/lived himself as Otherconcept/1negc in the world of objectivityI [matter acting on man] ; worked_matter, as inert objectificationI [man acting on matter] perpetuated by inertiaI, is in effect non-human or even anti-human. All of us pass our lives engraving our chosen maleficent image on things, and it fascinates and bewilders usI if we try to understandposited

ok ourselves through it [the image], although we are ourselvesI the totalizing movementdial/lived which results in this objectificationI..."68

(CDRp. 227, Ftn. 68, Fr. 336) "It is necessaryCDRdial/lived for the practical_agent** to discoverdial/lived himself in the organized inorganiclived_as_a_material being[-there], and this necessaryCDRIdial objectificationI as grasping [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] himself through the world and outside himself in the worldI, which makes man into what Heidegger names ‘a beingI of distancesI [lointains].’ But it is very important to notice that he first discoversdial/lived himself as

59


the real objectposited of his praxis in a milieu which is not that of his practical life, so that his knowledge [connaissance] of himself is knowledge [connaissance] of himself as inertia stamped with a seal*** (whereas, in fact, he is the movementdial/lived by which he transcendslived/1neg material conditioning through the act of placing his seal on the inorganiclived/2neg). Thus the practical_agentlived is an organismI transcendingI himself by an actionI, and his objectiveposited perception of himself presents him as an inanimate objectposited, the result of an operationdial/posited, whether it is a statue, a machine or his particular interest. For those who have read Being and Nothingness, I can describe the foundation of necessityBNlivedc as practice: it is the For-itselfconcept

ok, as agent, itself initially as inertI or, at best, as practico-inert [totality]lived, in the milieu of the In-itselfconcept/1negc. This, one might say, is because the very structuredial/lived of actionI as the organization of the unorganized primarily relatesI [renvoie] the for-itselfontology

ok to its alienated being[-there] as Beingconcept

ok in itself [no hyphen]. This inertI materialityI of man as the foundation of all knowledge [connaissance] of himself is, therefore, an alienationI of knowledge [connaissance] as well as a knowledgeI [connaissance] of alienationI. NecessityCDRdial/lived, for man, is conceiving oneself originally as Otherconcept

ok than one is and in the dimension of alteritylived. (p. 228, Ftn. 68) Certainly, praxis gives itself through its light, that is to say it is always conscious of itself. But this non-theticlived consciousness counts for nothing against the practical affirmationdial that I [je]c am what I [j’ai] have done (and which eludes me while constitutingdial melived/2neg right away as an OtherI concept). It is the necessityI of this fundamental relationok [of three degrees]lived&lived as 1st & 2neg which explains why, as I have said, man projects himself in the milieu of the In-Itself-For-Itselfconcept

okRc.

Fundamental alienation does not derive, as Being and Nothingness might mislead one into supposing@, from some prenatal choice: it derives from the unilateral connection [rapport] [of three degrees]1neg&2neg of interiorityI which unites manlived/1neg as a practical_organismc with his environmentlived/2neg."

(CDRp. 228, Fr. 337, out of sequence from Sartre\Freedom-The necessity of living these constraints: Oppressed woman in the shampoo factory) "In the momentdial where we reach the apodictic structuresdial/lived of dialectical expérience, still in its most abstract form, the discoverydial/lived by the agent of the alienation of his praxis is accompanied by the discoverydial/lived of his objectificationlivedc as alienatedI. This means in fact that through a praxisI which effaces itself before an inert, alienatedI objectivitylived, he discoversI his being-outside-in-the-thing as his fundamental truth and his reality. And this being-outsideI constitutesdial/group itself (or is constitutedI) for him as practico-inert_matterR; either he himself, as a particularitydial, is roughly conditioned in exteriority by the wholedial universe, or, alternatively, his being[-there] awaits him from outside, prefabricatedc by a conjunction of exigencies. In either case, human

60


praxisI and its immediate aims can appear [apparaître] at this level only in subordination: humanI praxisI is subordinated to the direct and lifeless exigencyI of a materialI ensemble, and is the means of fulfilling this exigencyI, the immediate aims appearingI [apparaissent] as the means of initiating praxis..." Ref Sartre\Language&Comprehension-Comprehension vs. geometrical proofI (CDR 61-4)

-------------------------------------------------The Family Idiot (2:172P ) "...bourgeois gentlemen like all such bourgeoisI,

comfortably and smartly dressed, with inscrutable, empty faces like everyone else, an easy courtesy, affability, all very reassuring; particular signs: nothingness. As for their present concerns, they are those of all bourgeoisI: money, family, job, an affair perhaps, and of course a car. All the equipment for passing unnoticed."

(3:25c) "...Gustave, suffering from a new and incomprehensibleFr=? alienation, for competitive serialization makes him indirectly dependent on others."

-------------------------------------------------** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-PRACTICAL_AGENT who experiences practical_unity;

[cf. practical_field as exteriority revealing the subject's objectification versus the practical_agent's transparency to themself.]* CDR: See Sartre\DialecticR-Technician sees wholedial from future functioning towards pastlived obstruction

(p. 75c) Now dialectical intelligibility is, as we have seen, defined by the degree of transparency of the totalization [in course]lived and the practical_agent can temporalizeCDRlived an intelligibleI evidencedial/lived only in so far as, situated interior to this totalizationI, he is himself totalizinglived and totalized...";

The Family Idiot: (1:574c) "...[T]he plunge into hell can be experienced Fr=? in a passivec agent only in the form of a sudden loss or muscular power—whereas it could be an inner determination [‘that is, as limitation’] of a practical_agent who has decided out of rebellion to rejoin the unfathomable depths of the self...";

(2:25c) "...if the child is a practical_agent to even the slightest degree, he will undoubtedly be familiar with the daze and distress, but he will break out of it—for good or ill—by playing the mother against the father, that is, by endeavoring to become his own truth... Gustave’s misfortune is that he hasn’t the means to be his own truthI and thereby to affirm himself against his lord and accuse him of felony...";

(2:206c) "...because [Flaubert] is not a practical_agent he skips to the momentdial when the enterprise is achieved without passing through the various momentsI ... the same passivityI allows him neither to accede to [the enterprise] nor to conceive of it with any precision..."

61


(4:47) at Sartre\Flaubert’s Last Spiral-TeleologicalI original_belief of practical_agentI: Active=transcendencelived/1neg; passiveI=immanence

-------------------------------------------------*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SEAL ; inaccessable except FI (1:582) below

CDR: Sartre\Groups&Reciprocity-Violence of impotence actualizes exteriorized process of practico-social field, with (p. 304c) "...Thus the unity of the gatheringR, far from beingI organiclived or practical, manifests itself with all the characteristics of sealed materiality; in other words, inorganic_materialitylivedc comes to the gatheringI as such from its inert (or practico-inert [totality]lived) unification by the interiorization of the seal of its common_object..."; Sartre\Dialectic-RAnti-dialectic of passivity as permanent seal of the inert

The Family Idiot: (5:285c) "...[as] real property ... a syntheticdial act seals an inorganic_materialitylived and unifies it negatively by the imperative: ‘No entry’..."

10-14Angu AlienationI as success in life (NE99, 120-22)Sartre, Notebooks for an Ethics (p. 99P) "Thus the oldest son of a patriarchal

family is engendered as the necessaryBNlived means of prolonging his family. But in springing up within the world, he adopts just this end that engendered him. Hence he engenders himself or, if you will, he experiences Fr=? himself as necessaryBNIlived. And, unlike an objectposited, he does not pursue his existence as a passive permanence but rather has himself to prolong his existenceI (in practical terms: hygiene, needsdial/lived, prudence, food—in terms of Erlebnislived, as consciousness that motivates itself): he is perpetually an ought-to-be for himself. He maintains his essence and his necessityBNlived in his freedomBN." Ref Sartre\Freedom-NecessaryBNlived second-order ends-as-means for human valuation

(NEp. 120P) "...the boss is supposed to set a good example by providing the image of a hierarchical family, wherein we discoverdial/lived marital and paternal authority as the symbol of the hierarchy of freeI wills. And if authority precedes effective realizationlived/1neg&2neg as a form of power, it is because the choiceposited/1neg precedes the operationdial/lived.

"For example, for the oldest son of the boss, who will inherit the factory and knowsFr=? it, authoritarianismc is a signlivedc of predestination that he plays at. And he does so emptily and without hope (the anger, scenes, and imperious attitudes of a child) as a formal, preparatory exercise of what later will be a concrete function..."

(NEp. 121P) "...the fate of man is to be an interiority that comes to knowFr=? itself in exteriority. Hence from the very beginning he has an alienated image of himself.

"But beyond this, his work has to be recognized and given a valuelived by the Otherconcept

Fr=?. In reality, it takes place through and for the other. The other’s

62


agreement is necessaryBNontology, if only to confer its exteriorityI on it. But the otherI is an unpredictable freedomI. He creates everything he touches. So if I solicit his recognition, I incline him toward creation. If I fully succeed, that is, if I do incline the otherI freedomsI to take up my project and make it objectivelived, I have totally failed because I no longer recognize my projectI. It is entirely alienated from me and comes back to me as the figureFr=? the othersI have conferred upon it. And since my work is me, it is just me that I alienate in succeeding... my actontology/2neg is stolen from me and I must claim it such as it is. And since my character is nothing other than the actual relationFr=? [of three degrees]1st & 2neg of my choicelived/1neg to my worklived/2neg, the other’sontology/1neg theft is the theft of my character.

(NEp. 121-2P) "Hence my undertaking is above all else the total risk of myself. I actontology/2neg in order to be swallowed up in the other’sontology/1neg and in order to rediscoverdial/lived myself in the otherI. Naturally, I can next decide what meaningBNlived this otherI than I am has for me, this enemy to myself. But this signifies that I have become a situation for myselfontology/2neg. In this way, I am my character and my work. Beginning from the situationI lived/2neg that is not-meI in relationFr=? [of three degrees]1st & 2neg to melived/1neg, I have transformed it into me. But with the same stroke I have alienatedI myself from myself. Hence my meontology/2neg has become not-meI [the other] to the extent that the not-meontology/1neg becomes meontology/2neg.** (NEp. 122) my work is subjective/objectivelivedc, wholly mine and wholly escaping me. To say that I am a situationI for myself is to say that my work becomes me in the form of an objectiveI necessityBNlived; that is, that I belong to myself in the form of destiny. By throwing me into the dimensions of the for-others, my choiceontology/2neg becomes a destinyI for itself, it brings me back to myself as my destinyI... A finality that acts in imitation of causality is precisely what we call fatality or destinyI..."

-------------------------------------------------** Copied Sartre\Dialectic-dialectical_circularity

10-14Badf Bad FaithNietzsche\Morality-Political party ideology as bad faithSartre\Index of Terms-BAD FAITH ; cf. good faith

[Mauvaise foi = dishonesty, falsehood, double-dealing. Foi as faith is misleading. I prefer bad hope]; cf. good faith;

* Sartre\Flaubert&Father in Vol 1-Not praxisI with comprehension but passivityI in its bad faith comprehensionI

Sartre\Freedom-RBad faith projectsI vs. Adler’s censor, repression, and unconscious symptoms, with BN: (p. 473c) "...(2) It seems to us that the

63


concept of bad faithlivedc—as we established in Part One—should replace those of the censor, repression, and the unconsciousc which Adler uses..."

Sartre, BN (p. 260c) "...In this sense and since I am what I am not and since I_am_not_what_I_amI—I can not even define myself as truly being[-there] in the process of listening at doors. I escape this provisional definition of myself by means of my transcendencelived/1neg. There as we have seen is the origin of bad faith..."

10-14Badf Self-deception (index)Pol...\The Self-Neuroses qualitatively differs from normality: The divided

selfSartre\Index of Terms-SELF-DECEPTION [tromperie OX89];Robert Solomon, The Passions (p. 402c, 1st edition) "Sartre’s solution [to

consciousness’s both knowing and not knowing its self-deception] is to replace this ‘knowing and not knowing’ ... [with] behavior... [We] act as if the intolerable fact were not true... We refuse to reflect upon embarrassing or painful information, to articulate it ... to ourselves..."

Daniel Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple, Truths: The Psychology of Self-Deception, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 1986.

William Fischer, "Self-Deception," in Giorgi, ed., Phenomenology and Psychological Research. Herbert Fingarette’s Self-deception, which Robert Solomon calls a ‘now classic study’ is reviewed by Fischer.

Fridlund, Human Facial Expression (p. 75) "...it is axiomatic in contemporary ethology that displays and vigilance for them coevolve. (p. 143) "...it is generally considered by botanists and zoologists that deception inexorably coevolves with displayc."

10-14Badf Refusing or allowing [An ethics of honesty] (index)Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-REFUSAL [refus, refuser];

BN: (p. 11c) "...For negation is a refusal of existence. By means of it a being[-there] (or a way of beingI) is posited, then thrown back to nothingness...";

(p. 158c) "...But pure reflectionc [réflexion] still discoversdial/lived temporalityBNlived only in its own original non-substantiality, in its refusal to be in-itselfontology

e...";Herein-RRefusing his sexual advances, she recognizes only his

admirationSartre\Bad Faith-RUnconscious

64


Robert Solomon, The Passions (p. 405c, 1st edition) "repression is better interpretedc as refusal..."

Notebooks for an Ethics: (p. 489c) "Whatever I do, in effect, my historical presence calls into question the ‘course of the world’ and a refusal to call it into question is still a calling into question and an invented answer..."

Search for a Method: (p. 92c) "...In connectionok [of three degrees]1st&2neg to the objectposited/1negMay 21, 2016 aimed at, praxislived/2neg is positivityc, but this positivityI opensok [découche] into the ‘non-existentc,’ to what has not yet been. A flight and a leap ahead, all together a refusal and a realization, the projectlived/1neg retains and discloses the surpassedlived/1neg realitylived/2neg which is refused by the very movementdial/livedc which surpassesI it. Thus knowing [connaissance] is a momentdial of praxis, even its most fundamental one; but this knowing [connaissance] does not partake of an absolute Knowledge [Savoir]concept. Defined by the negation2c of the refused realityI in the namec

of the realityI to be produced1neg [negation1], it [connaissance] remains the captive of the action which it clarifies, and disappears along with it..."

Sartre, "The Burgos Trial": (p. 168c) "...an effective open-ended strike which was inspired by the real thinking of the group—the unconditional refusal to be exploited. This decision ... shows that when the masses begin to act, they inevitably go even farther than the agitators dare hope..."

The Family Idiot: (1:88c) "...one refuses to lie to one’s equal for the double reason that equality is based on truth and a lie gives the liar an abject, momentary superiority veiling a permanent inferiority—fine..."

(1:408c) "...passive vengeance, passed over in silence; the bitter determination [‘that is, as limitation’] to push to its worst conclusion what was done to him without the least concession; destiny invented by ill-will and the permanent refusal to be consoled—this is resentmentc..."

(4:42c) "...his passiveI obedience robs him of any possibility of refusing the activity his father imposes on him, but this increasingly difficult passivityI, and his basic distaste for the future beingI prepared for him, succeed in making it impossible. Impossible to obey, impossible to refuse obedience..."

-------------------------------------------------Ref Groups&Reciprocity-reciprocity; Sartre\Lifework-REthics (index)

10-14Badf BN Part One, Chapter Two: Bad Faith (BN47-70)

10-14Badf I. Bad Faith’s intention is hidden: Falsehood’s deception is intended (BN47-52)

65


Sartre. BN (p. 47, Fr. 81) "The human being[-there] is not only the being by whom négatitésc are disclosed in the world; he is also the one who can take negativeok attitudes with respect to himself. In our introduction we defined consciousness as ‘a beingI such that in its beingI, its beingI is in question in so far as this beingI implies a beingI other than itself.’ But now that we have examined the meaningBNlived of ‘the question,’ we can at present also write the formula thus: ‘Consciousness is a beingI the naturelivedc of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its beingI.’ In a prohibition or a veto, for example, the humanI beingI denies a future [futur] transcendencelived/1neg. But this negationok is not explicative. My consciousness is not restricted to envisioning a négatité. It constitutesBN itself in its flesh as the nihilation of a possibility which another human_reality project as its possibilityI. For this reason it arises in the world as a Not; it is as a Not that the slave first apprehends the master, or that the prisoner who is trying to escape sees the guard who is watching him. There are even men (e.g., caretakers, overseers, goalers) whose social reality is uniquely that of the Not; who will live and die, having forever been only a Not upon the earth. Others, so as to make the Not a part of their very subjectivity, establish their humanI personality as a perpetual negation. This is the meaningBNI and function of what Scheler calls ‘the man of resentmentR’—in realityI, the Not. But there exist more subtle behaviors, the description of which will lead us further into the inwardness of consciousness. Irony is one of these. In irony a man annihilates what he posits within one and the same act; he leads us to believe in order not to be believedI; he affirms to deny and deniesI to affirm; he creates a positive objectposited but it has no being[-there] other than its nothingness. Thus attitudes of negation toward the self permit us to raise a new question: What are we to say is the beingI of man who has the possibilityI of denying himself? But it is out of the question to discuss the attitude of ‘self-negation’ in its universality. The kinds of behavior which can be ranked under this heading are too diverse; we risk retaining only the abstract form of them. (BNp. 48) It is best to choose one determined [‘that is, as limitation’] attitude which is essential to human_reality and which is such that consciousness instead of directing its negation outward, turns it toward itself. This attitude, it seems to me, is bad faith (mauvaise foi).

(BNp. 48, Fr. 82) "Frequently this is identified with falsehoode... The liar intends to deceive and he does not seek to hide this intention from himself nor to disguise the translucency of consciousness: on the contraryok, he has recourse to it when there is a question of deciding secondary behavior. It explicitly exercises a regulatory control over all attitudese..."

66


(BNp. 49, Fr. 83) "It can not be the same for bad faith if this, as we have said, is indeed a lie to oneself. To be sure, the one who practices bad faithI is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truthI a pleasing untruthc. Bad faithI then has in appearance the structuredial/lived of falsehoodI. Only what changes everything is the factlived that in bad faithI it is from myself that I am hiding the truthI. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not existI here. Bad faithI on the contraryI implies in essence the unity of a single consciousness. This does not mean that it can not be conditioned by the Mit-Seinc like all other phenomenalived of human_reality, but the Mit-seinI can call forth bad faith only by presenting itself as a situation which bad faithI permits surpassing1neg; bad faithI does not come from outside to human_realityI. One does not undergo his bad faithI; one is not infected with it; it is not a state. But consciousness affects itself with bad faithI. There must be an original intuition and a projectI of bad faith; this projectI implies a comprehension of bad faithI as such and a pre-reflectivec apprehension (of) consciousness as affectingI itself with bad faithI. It follows first that the one to whom the lie is told and the one who lies are one and the same person, which means that I must know [savoir] in my capacity as deceiver the truthI which is hidden from me in my capacity as the one deceived. Better yet I must know [savoir] the truthI very exactly in order to conceal it more carefully—and this not at two different momentsdial

e..." (BNp. 50, Fr. 84) "To escape from these difficulties people gladly have recourse

to the unconscious**. In the psychoanalyticR interpretation, for example, they use the hypothesis of a censor, conceived as a line of demarcation with customs, passport division, currency control, etc., to establish the duality of the deceiver and the deceived. Here instinct or, if you prefer, original drives and complexes of drives constitutedBN by our individual history, make up realitye..."

(BNp. 50-1, Fr. 85) sartre¶"By the distinction between the ‘id’ and the ‘ego,’ Freud has cut the psychic whole into two. I am the ego but I am not the ide... For example I am the impulse to steal this_or_that book from this bookstall. (BNp. 51) I am an integral part of the impulse; I bring it to light and I determine [‘that is, as limitation’] myself hand-in-hand with it to commit the theft. But I am not those psychic_factslived, in so far as I receive them passively and am obliged to resort to hypotheses about their origin and their true meaningBNlived

e..."(BNp. 51-2, Fr. 86) "e...Freud in effect reports resistancec when at the end of the

first period the doctor is approaching the truth. (BNp. 52) This resistance is objectivelived behavior grasped [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] from without: the patient shows defiance, refuses to speak, gives fantastic accounts of his dreams, sometimes even removes himself completely from the psychoanalytic treatmente... Are we to say that

67


the patient is disturbed by the daily revelations which the psychoanalystI makes to him and that he seeks to remove himself, wholly pretending in his own eyes to wish to continue the treatment? In this case it is no longer possible to resort to the unconscious to explain bad faith; it is there in full consciousness, with all its contradictionse..."

-------------------------------------------------Robert SolomonR, The Passions (p. 402-5, 1st edition) "Sartre’s solution [to

consciousness’s both knowing and not knowing its self-deception] is to replace this ‘knowingc and not knowing’ ... [with] behavior ... [We] act as if the intolerable fact were not true... We refuse to reflect upon embarrassing or painful information, to articulate it ... to ourselves..."

(p. 403) "[There] is motivated avoidance of certain facts, treating them as if they were irrelevant [when reflection would find them relevant]..."

(p. 405c) "Repression is better interpretedc as refusalRc..."-------------------------------------------------

** Sartre\Index of Terms-UNCONSCIOUS [inconscient]; cf non-being, refusal, bad faith.

Pol...\Defense Mechanisms-Freud-Karen Horney’s ‘unconscious’ as gut feeling not reaching awareness;

Erich Fromm’s ‘unconscious’ represses knowledge of truth; Robert Solomon’s displacement as self-deception

Sartre\Freedom-Psychoanalytic vs. unconscious methodology: Inferiority as a bad faith project

-RBad faith projects vs. Adler’s censor, repression, and unconscious symptoms, with BN: (p. 473c) "...(2) It seems to us that the concept of bad faithlivedc

—as we established in Part One—should replace those of the censor, repression, and the unconsciousc which Adler uses..."

Sartre\Lifework -R The ‘conception of "lived experience" marks my change since L’Etre et Le Néant’ (IT41)

-Pure reflection ‘must be won by a sort of katharsis’: From, ‘I am angry because it is hateful’ to, ‘I find it hateful because I am angryI’

10-14Badf II. Patterns of Bad Faith

10-14Badf Refusing his sexual advances, she recognizes only his admiration (BN55)

Sartre, BN (p. 55, Fr. 89) "e...[In] reply to the question we raised at the outset: ‘What must be the being[-there] of man if he is to be capable of bad faith?’

68


(BNp. 55-6) "Take the example of a woman who has consented to go out with a particular man for the first time. She knows [sait] very well the intentions which the man who is speaking to her cherishes regarding her. She knows [sait] also that it will be necessaryBNlived sooner or later for her to make a decisionontology/1neg. But she does not want to realizeontology/1neg&2neg the urgency; she concerns herselfI only with what is respectful and discreet in the attitude of her companion. She does not apprehend this conduct as an attempt to achieve what we call ‘the first approach;’e... The qualities thus attached to the person she is listening to are in this way fixed in a permanence like that of things, which is no other than the projection of the strict presence of the qualitiesI into the temporalBNlived flux. This is because she is not aware of what she wants. She is profoundly aware of the desire which she inspires, but the desireI cruel and naked would humiliate and horrify her. Yet she would find no charm in a respect which would be only respect. In order to satisfy her, there must be a feeling which is addressed wholly to her personality—her full freedomBN

—and which would be a recognition of her freedomI. But at the same time this feeling must be wholly desireI; that is, it must address itself to her body as objectposited. This time then she refuses to apprehend the desireI for what it is; she does not even give the desireI a name; she recognizes desireI only to the extent that desireI transcendslived/1negR1 itself toward admiration, esteem, respect and that it is wholly absorbed in the more refined forms which it produces, to the extent of no longer figuring anymore as a sort of warmth and density. But then suppose he takes her hand. This act of her companion risks changing the situation by calling for an immediate decision. To leave the hand there is to consent in herselfI to flirt, to engage herselfI. To withdraw it is to break the troubled and unstable harmony which gives the hour its charm. The aim is to postpone the momentdial of decision as long as possible. We know [sait] what happens next; the young woman leaves her hand there, but she does not notice that she is leaving it. (BNp. 56) She does not notice because it happens by chance that she is at this momentI all intellect. She draws her companion up to the most lofty regions of sentimental speculation; she speaks of Life, of her life, she shows herselfI in her essential aspect—a personalityI , a consciousness. And during this time the divorce of the bodyI from the soul is accomplished; the hand rests inert between the warm hands of her companion—neither consenting nor resisting—a thing.

(BNp. 56, Fr. 90) "We shall say that this woman is in bad faith. But we see right away [aussitôt] that she uses various procedures in order to maintain herselfI in this bad faithI. She has disarmed the actions of her companion by reducing them to being[-there] only what they are; that is, to existing in the mode of the in-itselfontology. But she permits herselfI to enjoy his desireI, to the extent that she will apprehend it

69


as not beingI what it is [is and is notontology], will recognize its transcendencelived/1negR. Finally while sensing profoundly the presence of her own bodyI—to the degree of beingI disturbed perhaps—she realizesontology/1neg&2neg herselfontology/1neg as not being her own bodyontology/2neg, and she contemplatesposited it as though from above, as a passive objectI to which events can happen but which can neither provoke them nor avoid them because all its possibilities are outside of it. What unity do we find in these various aspects of bad faith? It is a certain art of forming contradictory concepts** which unite in themselves as an idea2neg and the negation1neg of that ideaI. The basic conceptI

which is engendered, utilizes the double property of the human beingI, to be a facticitylivedc and a transcendencelived/1neg. These two aspects of human_reality are and ought to be capable of a validdial/lived coordination. But bad faithI does not wish either to coordinate them nor to surmount them in a synthesisdial/lived. Bad faithI seeks to affirm the identitylivedc of [facticitylivedc and transcendenceI] while preserving their differences. It must affirmdial facticityIlived/2neg as being transcendencelived/1neg and transcendencelived/2neg as being facticitylived/1neg, in such a way that at the instantok when one grasps [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the onelived/2neg, he can find himself abruptly faced with the otherlived/1neg."

(BNp. 57, Fr. 91) "We can see, in effect, the use which bad faith can make of these judgments which all aim at establishing that I am not what I am. If I were only what I am, I could, for example, seriouslyI consider an adverse criticism which someone makes of me, question myself scrupulously, and perhaps be compelled to recognize the truth in it. But thanks to transcendencelived/1neg, I am not subject to all that I am. I do not even have to discuss the justice of the reproach. As Suzanne says to Figaro, ‘To prove that I am right would be to recognize that I can be wrong.’ I am on a plane where no reproach can touch me since what I really am is my transcendenceI. I flee from myself I escape myself, I leave my tattered garment in the hands of the fault-finder. But the ambiguity necessaryBNlived for bad faith comes from the factlived that I affirm here that I am my transcendenceI in the modeok of being[-there] of a thing. It is only thus, in fact, that I can feel that I escape all reproaches. It is in this sense that our young woman purifies the desireI of anything humiliating by beingI willing to consider it only as pure transcendenceI, which she avoids even naminge... [T]he respect, the esteem manifested by the actions of her admirer are already on the plane of the transcendentI. But she arrests this transcendenceI, she glues it down with all the facticitylived of the presentI; respect is nothing other than respect, it is an arrested surpassingc which no longer surpassesI itself toward anything.

(BNp. 57-8, Fr. 92) "But although this metastable conceptI of ‘transcendencelived/1neg&2neg-facticityI’ is one of the most basic instruments of bad faith,

70


it is not the only one of its kind. We can equally well use another kind of duplicity derived from human_reality which we will express roughly by saying that its being-for-itselfontology implies complementarily a being-for-others. Upon any one of my conducts it is always possible to converge two looks, mine and that of the other. The conduct will not present exactly the same structuredial/lived in each case. But as we shall see later,*** as each lookI perceives it, there is between these two aspects of my being[-there] [the two looksI], no difference between appearance and beingI—as if I were to myself the truthI of myself and as if the otherI possessed only a deformed image of me. (BNp. 58) The equal dignity of beingI possessed by my being-for-others1neg and by my beingI for myself permits a perpetually disintegrating synthesisdial/lived and a perpetual game of escape from the for-itselfontology to the for-othersontology and from the [being]-for-othersI to the for-itselfI. We have seen also the use which our young lady made of our being-in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived—i.e., of our inertI presence as a passive objectI among other objectsI—in order to relieve herselfI suddenly from the functions of her being-in-the-world—that is, from the beingI which causeslived

ok there to be a world by projecting itself beyond the worldI toward its own possibilitiesI

e..."-------------------------------------------------

cf. Sartre\Flaubert&Father in Vol. I-Flaubert flip-flops ‘all gets worse,’ ‘all are base,’ vs. his mystic ecstasies (1:427);

-Vacillating an interiorizing alien will vs. mechanistic decomposition** Internal reference posited&posited as a possible consciousness.*** BN: (p. 258c) "...to perceivelivedc is to look atontology/1neg, and to apprehendontology/2neg a lookontology/2neg ... is to be conscious of being[-there] looked atontology/2neg;

6-14Badf Performance of the café waiter (BN58)Sartre, BN (p. 58-9, Fr. 93) "If man is what he is, bad faith is for ever

impossible and candor ceases to be his ideal and becomes instead his being[-there]. But is man what he is? And more generally, how can he be what he is when he exists as consciousness of being. (BNp. 59) If candor or sincerity** is a universal valuelived, it is evident that the maxim ‘one must be what one is’ does not serve solely as a regulating principle for judgments and concepts by which I express what I am. It posits not merely an ideal of knowing [connaître] but an ideal of beingontology/2neg; it proposes for us an absolute equivalence of being with itself as a prototype of being. In this sense it is necessaryBNontology that we make ourselvesontology/2neg what we are. But what are we then if we have the constant obligation to make ourselvesI what we are?

(BNp. 59, Fr. 94) sartre¶"Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movementdial/lived is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes toward the

71


patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly; his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customere... All his behavior seems to us a game. He applies himself to chaining his movementsI as if they were mechanisms, the one regulating the other; his gestures and even his voice seem to be mechanisms; he gives himself the quickness and pitiless rapidity of things. He is playing, he is amusing himself. But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café. There is nothing there to surprise us. The game is a kind of marking out and investigation. The child plays with his body in order to explore it, to take inventory of it; the waiter in the café plays with his condition in order to realizeontology/1neg&2neg [as doubly ontological project1neg and situation2neg] ite..."

(BNp. 60, Fr. 95, Sartre takes the first person) "e...Yet there is no doubt that I am in a sense a café waiter—otherwise could I not just as well call myself a diplomat or a reporter? But if I am one, this can not be in the mode of beingI [no hyphen] in-itselfontology. I am a waiter in the mode of beingI what I am not."

"e...Perpetually absent to my bodyI, to my acts, I am despite myself that ‘divine absence’ of which Valéry speaks. I can not say either that I am here or that I am not here, in the sense that we say ‘that box of matches is on the table;’ this would be to confuse my ‘being-in-the-world’ with a ‘being-in-the-midst-of-the-worldlived’e..."

Hope Now (p. 59c) "Benny Levy: ‘Is there not, in this working toward society, the expression of desire that is at least as basic as the desire to be (of the café waiter), which you talk about in Being and Nothingness?’ Sartre: Yes, but I think it must be defined. If you like, I thinkI there is a modality other than the primary modality of the spirit of seriousness. It’s the ethical modality ... that we stop wanting to have being[-there] as our goal, we no longer want to be God, we no longer want to be ens causa sui (our own cause)..."

-------------------------------------------------Ref Pol...\Defense Mechanisms-performance narratives** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-SINCERITY [sincérité]; Nowhere else than on BN pages 47-70 is the term sincerity used in this context.

(p. 59c) "...It posits not merely an ideal of knowing [connaître] but an ideal of being; it proposes for us an absolute equivalence of being[-there] with itself..." cf. seriousness

6-14Badf Sadness as intentional, not constitutiveBN modality (BN60, 65-6, 92)Sartre, BN (p. 60-1, Fr. 95) "But take a modeok of being[-there] which concerns

only myself: I am sad. One might think that surely I am the sadness in the modeok of being what I am. (BNp. 61) What is the sadness, however, if not the intentional unity

72


which comes to reassemble and animate the totalitydial/lived of my conduct? It is the meaningBNlived of this dull lookontology/1neg with which I view the world, of my bowed shoulders, of my lowered head, of the listlessness in my whole body. But at the very when I adopt each of these attitudes, do I not know [sais] that I shall not be able to hold on to it? Let a stranger suddenly appear and I will lift up my head, I will assume a lively cheerfulness. What will remain of my sadness except that I obligingly promise it an appointment for later after the departure of the visitor?e... [B]eing sad is not a ready-made beingI which I give to myself as I then give this book to my friend. I do not possess the property of affecting myself with being. If I make myself sad, I must continue to make myself sad from beginning to end. I cannot treat my sadness as an impulse finally achieved and put it on file without recreating it, nor can I carry it in the manner if an inert bodyI which continues its movementdial/lived after the initial shock. There is no inertiaI in consciousness. If I make myself sad, it is because I am not sad—the being[-there] of the sadness escapes me by and in the very act by which I affectI myself with it [is and is notontology]. The being-in-itselfontology of sadness perpetually haunts my consciousness (of) being[-there]I sad, but it is as a valuelived which I can not realize; it stands as a regulative meaningBNI of my sadness, not as its constitutiveBN modality."

(BNp. 65-6, Fr. 100, out of sequence at Herein-III. The ‘Faith’ of Bad Faith (67-70)) "...Thus the essential structuredial/lived of sincerity does not differ from that of bad faith since the sincere man constitutesBN himself as what he is in order not to be ite... Total, constant sincerity as a constant effort to adhere to oneself is by nature a constant effort to dissociate oneselfI from oneselfI. One freesBN himself from himself by the very actI by which he makes himself an objectposited for himself. To draw up a perpetual inventory of what one is means constantly to redeny oneselfI and to take refuge in a sphere where one is no longer anything but a pure, freeI regard. The goal of bad faith, as we said, is to put oneselfI out of reach; it is an escape. Now we see that we must use the same terms to define sincerity. What does this mean?"

(BNp. 66, Fr. 101) "e...Sincerity does not assign to me a way of beingI or a particular quality, but in relationI [à propos] to that qualityI it aims at making me pass from one modeok of beingI to another modeok of beingI. This second modeok of beingI, the ideal of sincerity, I am prevented by naturelivedc from attaining, and at the very momentI when I struggle to attain it, I have a vague pre-judicativec comprehensionok that I shall not attain ite..."

(BNp. 92, Fr. 128, out of sequence from Sartre\Ontology-III. The For-Itself and the Being of Values (84-95)) "e...The suffering which I experienceI [ressens], on the contrary, is never adequate suffering, due to the factlived that it nihilatesc itself as inok itselfok by the very actI by which it founds itself. It escapes as suffering toward the consciousness

73


of suffering. I can never be surprised by it, for it is only to the degree that I experienceI [ressens] it. I should prefer that my suffering would seize me and flow over me like a storm, but instead I must raise it into existence. I cannot grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] it. I find only myself, myself who moans, myself who wails, myself who in order to realizelivedc this suffering which I am, must play without respite the drama of suffering. I wring my hands, I cry in order that being-in-itselfsontology, their sounds, their gestures may run through the world, ridden by the suffering-in-itselfontology which I can not be. Each groan, each facial expression of the man who suffers aims at sculpturing a statue-in-itselfI of suffering. But this statue will never existI save through others and for otherse... It is for [his] eyes that [I] am ‘crushed’ with sufferinge..." See Sartre\Emotions-Sartre’s experimental phenomenologyposited vs. epiphenomenalI psychology (Em8-23, BN87)

Gabriel Marcel’s criticism, "Existence and Human Freedom" (p. 69) "...sincerity ... is a virtue only as the necessary condition of a certain inward effort at self-mastery... I mean that when I admit that I have this or that defect, I place myself in a new position in which the overcoming of that defect may perhaps be possible." [This is not sincerity but honesty. Sartre states that the sincerity he is critiquing ‘presents itself as a demand,’ which I take to mean a social compulsion, a fulfillment of social niceties. Sartre portrays a person, whose sadness is interrupted, making an appointment for a future re-introjection of that sadness when the interruption terminates. But this is acquired through the ‘cultural display rules’ not to provoke others with our sadness.] See Gabriel Marcel’s critique in The Philosophy of Existentialism (p. 64-67); See Sartre\Freedom-We are condemned to be free: Our unrelenting responsibility for what befalls us

6-14Badf Consciousness ‘of the is what it is not’ (BN61)Sartre, BN (p. 61-2, Fr. 96, out of sequence from Sartre\Bad Faith-Sadness as intentional, not

constitutiveBN modality) "e...as Husserl clearly understoodI , my consciousness appears originally to the otherok as an absence [perpetual question, below]. It is the objectposited always present as the meaningBNlived of all my attitudes and all my conduct—and always absent [absent-presence]c for it gives itself to the intuition of an_otherI as a perpetual question—still better, as a perpetual freedomBN**. When Pierre looks at me I know [sais] of course that he is lookingI at me. His eyes, things in the world, are fixed on my body, a thing in the worldI—that is the objectivelived factlived of which I can say: it is. But it is also a factI in the world. The meaningIc of this lookontology/1neg is not a factI in the world, and this is what makes me uncomfortable. (BNp. 62) Although I make smiles, promises, threats, nothing can get hold of the approbation, the freeI judgment which I seek [from Pierre]. I know [sais] that it is always beyond. I sense it in my very conduct, which is no longer the character that the worker maintains toward things, which is no longer for myself, the measure in which I link

74


[through things] to the other, but are rather mere presentations; they await being[-there] constitutedBN as graceful or uncouth, sincere or insincere, etc., by my apprehension which is always beyond my efforts to provoke, an apprehensionI which will be provoked by my efforts only if, of itself, my apprehensionI lends my reactions its force (that is, only in so far as apprehensionI makes itself provoked from the outside), which is its [apprehension’sI] own mediator with the transcendencelived/1neg. Thus the objectivelived factI of the being-in-itselfontology of my consciousness of the other is posited in order to disappear in negativity [seeking to deny lack] and freedomI: consciousness of the otherI is as non-being; its being-in-itselfI ‘here and now’ is not-to-be.

"Consciousness of the other is what it is not .***"Furthermore the being[-there] of my own consciousness does not appearI to me

as the consciousness of the otherI. It is because it makes itself, since its beingI is consciousness of beingI [consciousness_is_consciousness_(of)_something]. But this means that making sustains beingI; consciousness has to be its own beingI, it is never sustained by beingI; it sustains beingI in the heart of subjectivity, which means once again that it is inhabited by being[-there]I but that it is not being[-there]I: consciousness is not what it is."

-------------------------------------------------See Sartre\Ontology-RConsciousness ‘is born supported by a being which is not consciousness’Ref Sartre\Freedom-We are condemned to be free: Our unrelenting responsibility for what befalls us, and cross-references** Cashiers: (Fr. p. 483c) "...freedomBN as comprehensionFr=? of the human_condition implying the freedomI of all..."

-------------------------------------------------*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-IS AND IS NOT [est ce qu’elle n’est pas]; also be_and_not_be [soit et ne soit]; also not to be what he is and to be what he is not.

BN: Sartre/Negation-R2To ‘what’ being[-there] is the for-itselfontology presence?’ (BN180-4, 189-90 out of sequence)

(p. 151c) "...Thus it is necessaryI [faut] at once that the reflexive [réflexif] be_and_not_be the reflected_on [réfléchi]livedc..." [as both terms can be , this relation could reverse.];

(p. 187c) "...The perception of white is the consciousness of the impossibility on principle for the for-itselfontology to exist as color—that is, by being[-there] what it is..."

(p. 283c) "e...If in general there is an Otherconceptok, it is necessaryBNontology

above all that I be_the_one_who_is_not the other, and it is in this very negation

75


effected by me upon myself that I make myself to be[-there] and that the other arises as the other. This negationI which constitutesBN my being[-there] and which, as Hegel said, makes me appear [apparaître] as the Sameconcept/1negc

ok confronting the Otherconceptok,

constitutesBN me on the terrain [terrain] of a non-theticlived selfness as ‘Myselfconceptok’e..."

(p. 292P ) "...he is for me the one who I have to not-be..."Herein-Mediate ‘and immediate are one and the same being[-there]’ (BN68)Sartre\Temporality-RKnower-known as phenomenonlived of ‘is and is

not’;Sartre\Ontology-RFor-itselfontology and in-itselfontology are radicallyontology

distinct modes of being[there] (BN617-24), with BN (p. 622c) "...What definition indeed are we to give, in effect to an existent which as in-itselfontology would be what it is and as for-itselfontology would be what it is not?..."

CDR: (p. 92c) "...establishing alteritylived in each part at once as what it is and as what it is not, as that which it possesses and as that by which it is possessed."

The Family Idiot: (2:155c) "...In every collectivity individuals share a certain representation of the human character that is born of institutions, customs, and history and defines what they are by what they ought to be, and what they ought to be by what they are...";

Flaubert’s Personalization-RChoice ‘of the unreal’: ‘Not to be what he is and to be what he is not’

-R The ‘wildest phantasmagoria has as its indispensable correlative the most absolute immobility’ (2:253)

pages 65-6 out of sequence Herein-Sadness as intentional, not constitutiveBN modality (60)

6-14Badf III. The ‘Faith’ of Bad Faith (BN67-70)Sartre, BN (p. 68, Fr. 103) "Bad faith does not hold the norms and criteria of

truth as they are accepted by the critical_thought** of good faith. What it decides first, in fact, is the nature of truthI

ok. With bad faithI a truthI appearsok, a method of thinking, a type of being[-there] which is like that of objectsposited; the ontological characteristic of the world of bad faithI with which the subject suddenly surrounds himself is this: that here beingI is what it is not, and is not what it is. Consequently a singularok type of evidencedial/lived appearsI

ok; non-persuasive evidenceI. Bad faithI grasps [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] evidenceI but it is resigned in advance to not beingI fulfilled by this evidenceI, to not beingI persuaded and transformed into good faith. It makes itself humble and modest; it is not ignorant, it says that faith is decision and that after each intuition, it must decide and will what it is. Thus bad faithI in its primitive project and in its coming into the world decides on the exact nature of its

76


requirements. It stands forth in the firm resolution not to demand too much, to count itself satisfied when it is barely persuaded, to force itself in decisions to adhere to uncertain truthsI. This original_project of bad faith is a decision in bad faithI on the natureI of faith. Let us understandposited

ok clearly that there is no question of a reflective [réfléchie], voluntary decision, but of a spontaneous determination [‘that is, as limitation’] of our beingI. One puts oneself in bad faithI as one goes to sleep and one is in bad faithI as one dreams. Once this modeok of beingI has been realizedontology/1neg&2neg [as doubly ontological project1neg and situation2neg], it is as difficult to get out of it as to wake oneselfI up; bad faith is a type of being-in-the-world, like waking or dreamingI, which by itself tends to perpetuate itself, although its structuredial/lived is of the metastableI type. But bad faithI is conscious of its structureI, and it has taken precautions by deciding that the metastable*** structureI is the structureI of being[-there] and that non-persuasion is the structureI of all convictions. It follows that if bad faithI is faith and if it includes in its original_projectI its own negation (it determinesI itself to be not quite convinced in order to convince itself that I am what I am not), then to start with, a faithI which wishes itself to be not quite convinced must be possible. What are the conditions of the possibilityontology of such a faithI?

-------------------------------------------------** Sartre\Index of Terms-CRITICAL_THOUGHT ; only hit*** Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-METASTABLE ; 3 hits;

BN: 3 hits all in above sub-topic: Hazel Barnes, "Introduction" (p. 50, Ftn 2) "Sartre’s own word, meaning subject to sudden changes or transitions. Tr.";

The Family Idiot: 1 hit: Sartre\Flaubert’s Last Spiral-Clairvoyance, ‘the methodoal and immediate transmutation of experience’ (195)

6-14Badf Mediate ‘and immediate are one and the same being[-there]’ (BN68)Sartre, BN (p. 68-9, Fr. 104) sartre’s¶ "I believe that my friend Pierre feels

friendship for me. I believeI it in good faith. (BNp. 69) I believeI it but I do not have for it any self-evident intuition, for the nature of the objectposited does not lend itself to intuitionIc. I believeI it; that is, I allow myself to give in to all impulses to trust it; I decide to believeI it in, and to maintain myself in this decision; I conduct myself, finally, as if I were certain of—and all this in the syntheticdial unity of one and the same attitude. This which I define as good faith is what HegelR would call the immediate. It is simple faith [cherbonnier]. HegelI would demonstrate right away [aussitôt] that immediate calls for mediation and that belief by becoming beliefI for itself, passes to the state of non-beliefe... But the nature of consciousness is such that in it the mediate I R and the immediate are one and the same being [-there] . To believelivedR is to know [savoir] that one believesI, and to knowI [savoir] that one

77


believesI is no longer to believeI. Thus to believeI is not to believeI any longer because that is only to believeI—this in the unity of one and the same non-theticlived consciousness. To be sure, we have here forced the description of the phenomenonlived by designating it with the word to know [savoir]; non-theticIc consciousness is not to knowI [savoir]. But it is in its very translucency at the origin of all knowing [savoir]. Thus the non-theticlived consciousness (of) believingI is destructive of beliefI. But at the same time [simultaneity in three_degrees] the very law of the pre-reflectivec cogitolivedc implies that the beingI of believingI ought to be the consciousness of believingI.

(BNp. 69, Fr. 104) sartre¶"Thus beliefI is a being[-there] which questions its own beingI, which can realizeontology/1neg&2neg itself only in its destruction, which can manifest itselfontology/2neg to itselfontology/1neg only to deny itself. It is a beingI for which to be is to appear [paraître] and to appearI is to denyI itself. To believeI is not-to-believeI. We see the reason for it; the being[-there]I of consciousness is to exist by itself, then to make itself be and thereby to surmount itself. In this sense consciousness is perpetually escaping itself, beliefI becomes non-beliefI the immediate becomes mediation, the absolute becomes relative, and the relative becomes absolute. [continued same paragraph below]See Herein-is and is not

10-15Badf Good faith arousal in being[there] what one isI; bad faith arousal fleesI beingI (BN69)

Sartre, BN (p. 69-70, Fr. 105, continuing, my paragraph break) sartre¶The ideal of good faith (to believeR what one believesI) is, like that of sincerity (to be what one is), an ideal of being-in-itselfontology. Every beliefI is a beliefI that falls short; one never wholly believesI what one believesI. Consequently the primitive project of bad faith is only the utilization of this self-destruction of the factlived of consciousness. If every beliefI in good faith is an impossible beliefI, then there is a place for every impossible beliefI. My inability to believeI that I am courageous will not discourage me since every beliefI involves not quite believingI. I shall define this impossible beliefI as my beliefI. To be sure, I shall not be able to hide from myself that I believeI in order not to believeI and that I do not believeI in order to believeI. (BNp. 70) But the subtle, total annihilation of bad faithI by itself can not surprise me; it exists at the basis of all faith. What is it then? At the momentdial/lived when I wish to believeI myself courageous I know [sais] that I am a coward. And this certitudeok would come to destroy my beliefI. But first, I am not any more courageous than cowardly, if we are to understandposited

ok this in the mode of being[-there] of the in-itselfontology [is and is notontology]. In the second place, I do not know [sais]livedc that I am

78


courageous; such a view of myself can be accompanied only by beliefI, for it surpasses1neg pure reflective [réflexive] certitude. In the third place, it is very true that bad faithI does not succeed in believingI what it wishes to believeI. But it is precisely as the acceptance of not believingI what it believesI that it is bad faithI. Good faith wishes to flee the ‘not-believingI-what-one-believesI’ by finding refuge in beingI. Bad faithI flees beingI by taking refuge in ‘not-believingI-what-one-believesI.’ It has disarmed all beliefsI in advance—those which it would like to take hold of and, by the same stroke, the others, those which it wishes to flee. In willing this selfI-destruction of beliefI, from which science escapes by searching for evidenceposited, it ruins the beliefsI which are opposed to it, which reveal themselves as beingI only beliefsI. Thus we can better comprehend [comprendre] the original phenomenonlived of bad faith.

(BNp. 70, Fr. 105) "In bad faithI there is no cynical lie nor knowing [savante] preparation for deceitful concepts. But the first act of bad faithI is to flee what it can not flee, to flee what it is. The very projectI of flight revealsI to bad faithI an inner disintegration in the heart of being[-there], and it is this disintegration which bad faith wishes to be. In truth, the two immediate attitudes which we can take in the face of our beingI are conditioned by the very natureontology of this being2neg and its immediate connectionok [of three degrees] as 1neg&2neg with the in-itselfontology/1neg. Good faith wishes to flee the inner disintegration of my beingI in the direction of the in-itselfI which it should be and is not [is and is notontology]. Bad faithI seeks to flee the in-itselfI by means of the inner disintegration of my beingI. But it denies this very disintegration as it deniesI that it is itself bad faithI...9 If bad faithI is possibleI , it is because it is an immediate, permanent threat to every projectI of the human beingI; it is because consciousness conceals in its beingI a permanent risk of bad faithI. The origin of this risk is that consciousness is at once to be what it is not and not to be what it is [is and is notontology]. In the light of these we can now approach the ontological study of consciousness, not as the totalitydial/lived of the humanI beingI, but as the instantaneous nucleus of this being[-there]I."

-------------------------------------------------BNFtn. 9, "If it is indifferent whether one is in good or in bad faithI, because bad faithlivedc reapprehends good faith and slides to the very origin of the project of good faith, that does not mean that we can not radicallyontology escape bad faithI. But this supposes a self-recovery of being[-there] which was previously corrupted. This selfI-recovery we shall call authenticity, the description of which has no place here."Ref Sartre\Lifework-Authentic ‘good faith’? (index)

6-14Badf ‘Belief and nonbelief are the same thing: ‘to believe is only to believe’

79


The Family Idiot (2:16-7c) "...—the absence of the power to affirm and to deny reduced him to believing, to believing in himself. And we know [sait] that belief and nonbelief are the same thing [ is and is not ontology ] : to believe is only to believe . The objectposited of the belief is therefore perceived as an unstable being[-there] that can at any momentdial pass from the real to the illusory, so that its reality is exposed by its very presence as a virtual illusion; inversely, illusionc, for lack of being deniedI, is always presentI in his eyes as capable of being believed and thus containing, to whatever degree, a virtual realityI. (2:17) Gustave does not always have the means to establish a clear-cut difference between the two."

-------------------------------------------------Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-BELIEF ;

BN Herein-RGood faith arousal in being[there] what one is; bad faith arousal fleesI beingI (BN69)

R-Mediate ‘and immediate are one and the same being[-there]I’, with (p. 69c) "...To believelivedR is to know [savoir] that one believesI, and to knowI [savoir] that one believesI is no longer to believeI. Thus to believeI is not to believeI any longer because that is only to believeI—this in the unity of one and the same non-theticlived consciousness..."

(p. 74-5c) "...Originally then the cogitolived includes this nullifying characteristic of existing for a witnessposited, although the witness for which consciousness existsI is itself. Thus by the sole factlived that my beliefIlived is apprehended as beliefI, it is no longer only belief; that is, it is already no longer belief, it is troubled beliefposited. (BNp. 75) Thus the ontological judgment ‘beliefI is consciousness (of) beliefI’**b can under no circumstances be taken as a statement of identity; the subject [belieflived] and the attribute [troubled beliefposited] are radicallyontology different though still within the indissoluble unity of one and the same being[-there]."

Sartre\Ontology-RSartre’s ‘first condition of all reflection [réflexivité] is a pre-reflectiveI cogito’;

The Family Idiot: (1:38c) ‘...Unable to accomplish the act that is intellectionlivedc

—definite evidencedial/lived on which to base our certainties—he is reduced to belief..."(1:538c) "...to believelived is to doubtposited ... the objectsposited of belief are

defined by their radicalontology absence; to doubtI is to believe, since the objectsI one doubtsI are precisely the same as those to which faith is attached..."

4-16Temp Doubtlived (BN156)Sartre, BN (p. 156, Fr. 191) "e...I doubtlived** therefore I [je] am, said Descartes.

But what would remain of methodical doubtconcept if it could be limited to the instant? A suspension of judgment, perhaps. But a suspension of judgment is not a doubtlived;

80


it is only a necessaryBNlived structuredial of doubt. In order for doubtlived to exist, it is necessaryI that this suspension be motivated by an insufficiency of reasons for affirmingdial or for denyingok—which refers to the pastlived—and that it be maintained deliberately until the intervention of new elements—which is already a project of the future [avenir]. Doubtlived appearsFr=? on the foundationc of a pre-ontologicalc comprehensionok of to know [connaître]livedcR and of requirements concerning truth. This comprehensionI and these requirements, which give all its meaningBNlived to doubtlived, engage the totality of human_realitylived and its being[-there] in the world... It is then a related conductc which doubts lived the objectposited, a conductI which represents one of the modes of being-in-the-worldlived of human_realityI. To discoverdial/lived oneself doubtinglived is already to be ahead of oneselfI in the future [futur], which conceals the end, the cessation, and the meaningI of this doubtlived, and to be behind oneselfI in the pastI, which conceals the constituentlived motivationsok of the doubt lived and its stages of development, and to be outside of oneselfI in the world as presenceI

to the objectI which one doubtslived."-------------------------------------------------

Ref Sartre\Index of Terms-DOUBT lived [doute];Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 64c) "...It is certain that Peter is repugnant to

me. But it is and always will remain doubtfullived that I hateposited him. Indeed, this affirmationdial infinitely exceeds the power of reflection [réflexion]...";

BN: (p. 157c, Fr. 192, sub-topic below) "...When I say, ‘I read, I doubtlived, I hope, etc.’ as we have shown, I reach beyond my presentI toward the pastI. Now I cannot in any of these cases be mistaken. The apodicticity of reflection [réflexion] allows no doubtlived in so far as it apprehends the pastI exactly as it is for the consciousness reflected on [réfléchi] which has to be it..."See Herein-belief, which makes doubt clearer;

-------------------------------------------------Wittgenstein (cited from, Priest, Theories of the Mind (p. 60c) "I know I am in

pain’ adds nothing to ‘I am in pain’ [‘I am in pain’ is a pre-reflective awareness]... It makes sense to talk of knowledge only when there is room for doubt or error. It does not make sense to talk about doubting whether one is in pain—in one’s own case—so it does not make sense to talk of knowing that one is in pain either. Ironically, it is the possibility of doubt rather than the fact of absolute certainty that allows the use of ‘to know.’"

11-14Exis,Angu,Badf Appendix

81


11-14Badf Sartre\Index of Terms-NATURE [nature]See below: nature and natural as relating to consciousness.nature and natural relating to natural things outside us;Nature capitalizednature and ‘ natural italicized

-------------------------------------------------nature and natural as relating to consciousness, i.e., ‘not to be what he is and to be

what he is not’The Psychology of Imagination: (p. 7c) "...But this consciousness is an

actual and concrete nature, which existsI in and for itself and which can always give itself to reflection [réflexion] without any intermediary...";

(p. 14c) "...the imaginativeposited consciousness of tree, aims at a tree, that is, a body which is by nature exterior to consciousness; consciousness rises out of itself, transcendslived/1neg itself..."

The Emotions: (p. 16c, Fr. 16) "e...For the phenomenologist... every human factconcept is, in essencelivedc, significative. If you remove the significationI, you remove its nature as humanI factI...";

BN: (p. 7c) "...If I questionI the carburetor, it is because I consider it possible that ‘there is nothing there’ in the carburetor. Thus my question by its nature envelops a certain pre-judicativec comprehensionok of non-being; it is in itself a relationok [of three degrees]1st & 2neg of being[-there]lived/1neg with non-beingIlived/2neg on the basis of the original transcendencelived/1negc; that is, in a relationI

ok of beingIlived/1neg with beingIlived/2neg." [‘being with being’ as explained on (p. 180c) "...We shall define transcendencelived/1neg as that inner and realizing negation which reveals the in-itselfontology while determiningdial [‘that is, as limitation’]/negation the beingI of the for-itselfontology."];

(p. 35c) "...For we can never grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] an Erlebnislived as a living consequence of that nature which is ours. The overflow of our consciousness progressively constitutesBN that nature, but our consciousness remains always behind us and it dwells in us as the permanent objectposited of our retrospective comprehensionok. It is in so far as this nature is an exigency without being[-there] a recourse that it is graspedI in anguish.";

(p. 47c) "...Consciousness is a beingI the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothingness of its beingI...";

(p. 66c, Fr. 101) "...Sincerity ... aims at making me pass from one modeok of being[-there] to another mode of beingI. This second mode [the in-itself-for-itself] of beingI, the ideal of sincerity, I am prevented by nature from attaining, and at the very momentdial when I struggle to attain it, I have a vague pre-judicative comprehensionok that I shall not attain it...";

82


(p. 317c) "...these rules of the apparitionok should not be considered as subjective and psychological. They are strictly objectivelived and derive from the nature of things. If the inkwell hides a portion of the table from me, this does not stem from the nature of myontology/2neg senses but from the nature of the inkwell and of light...";

The Family Idiot: (1:375c, Fr. 387) "...Can nature manipulate a person like this, inflame his greed, crush him with impotence, and so push him to such extreme unhappiness? No—this marvelous economy leaves no room for chance..."

-------------------------------------------------nature and ‘natural relating to the natural things outside us.

Transcendence of the Ego: (p. 66c, in Emotions) "...But an electric current or a fall of water are also forces to be reckoned with: does this diminish one whit the passivityI and inertia of their nature? Is it any less the case that they receive their energy from the outside?..."

BN (p. 517c) "Thus we can grasp [transformslived/2negtolived/1neg] the clear distinction between the event ‘sentenceI’ and a natural eventI. The factlived of nature is produced in conformity to a law which it manifests but which is a purely exterior rule of production of which the considered factI is only one example...";

CDR: (p. 59c, Fr. 175) "But if totalizationlived exists, it would be wrong to believe that organizing and creative thought could be in itself an unintelligibleposited factI about the humanI species, nor would I say some kind of unconscious activity discovereddial/lived only through the methods and the knowledges [connaissances] of the naturalposited sciences..."

The Family Idiot: (1:4c) "...At first the family blamed nature, later they accused the child of ill will...";

(1:134c, Fr. 1:141) "...It is obvious that life, taken in its naked form, ‘natural,’ considered only as the pure flow of organiclived impressions, would not offer humanI meaningI—which does not mean that an animal or a man could not experience Fr=? it in itself as sinngebendlived, that is, a reality invested with meaningCDRlived..."

(1:138c) "...a shadow of distance separates life from itself, renders nature less natural...";

(1:88c) "...This dirty trick is striking; that it should seem so spontaneous, that the younger son should find it so natural, indicates that it must have been routine practice...";

(1:514c) "...he believed in the propositions of the naturalposited sciences...";

-------------------------------------------------

83


concept Nature capitalized CDR (p. 58c) "...Thus the sciences of Nature concept are analyticalposited with respect

to their content..."(p. 72c) "...Thus, the history of man is an adventureok of Natureconcept..."(p. 181c, Ftn. 56, Fr. 291) "...we have called the materialist dialectic from

the outside [de dehors]. It, too, begins with Beingconcept/1negcok (Natureconcept without alien

addition) and ends up with man; it too regards knowledge-reflection [connaissance]-[reflet] as ‘an opening to Beingconcept

-------------------------------------------------nature posited and ‘ natural posited italicized

The Psychology of Imagination: (p. 16c) "...concepts and knowledge [savoir], posit the existence of naturesposited (universal essences) constitutiveBN of connectionsok [of three degrees]posited&posited as 1neg&2neg and are indifferent to the ‘flesh and bone’ existenceI of objectsposited..."

Search for a Method (p. 170c) "...It is in order to take into account these two opposite characteristics (no common nature but an always possible communication) that the movementdial/lived of anthropology once again and in a new form [forme] gives rise to the ‘ideology of existence’..."

CDR: (p. 27c in Diale) "...For this universal_dialectic ... everything must always refer to the totalitydial/lived of naturalposited Historyconcept of which humanI history is one specificatione..."

(p. 58c) "...thoughtlivedc must make itself a thing and govern itself in exteriority to become the natural milieu in which the objectposited under consideration defines itself in itself, as conditioned in exteriorityI..."

The Family Idiot: (1:137c, ce, a dog’s nature) "...This manifest verbal power which is denied to them [dogs as pets] cuts through them, settles within them as the limit of their powers, it is a disturbing privation which they forget in solitude and which deprecates their very natures when they are with men..."

(1:140c) "...The fugitive momentdial of clarity that pass through him [Gustave] seem to have no recognizable function, for the momentdial, except to present his nature to him as inadequate—culture makes him feel deprived...";

(1:141c) "...Gustave, even in that fundamental ‘pour-soi [for-itselfontology]c,’ labors under a frustration: his presence_to selfI is the intuition of a lesser being[-there]—as nature, in comparison to the culture as indecipherable and superior."

(5:228c) "...Since everyone has nature, that is to say organiclived life and needsdial/lived, in common, the distinguishing factor can be only the denial of those common servitudes, if one were initially distinquishedI by talent...";

84


(5:229c) "...[for the distinguished] the proletariat represents pure nature. Not human_natureposited [‘fixed and given’] but animalposited in its pure inhumanity. To be sure, distinction says nothing of this: it is not an idea but a practice; yet its meaningCDRlived is to construct culture as the pure negation of nature..."

85

sartreterminologyinhisownterms.files.wordpress.com… · web view) "atheistic...

Documents