sarah jones v. thedirty.com - combined amicus briefs

8/13/2019 Sarah Jones v. TheDirty.com - Combined Amicus Briefs

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/sarah-jones-v-thedirtycom-combined-amicus-briefs 1/139



ii

subsidiary or affiliate of any publicly held corporation, and no other publicly held

corporation has a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation by virtue of its

participation.

LinkedIn Corp. states that it does not have a parent corporation and that no

publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of LinkedIn stock. LinkedIn Corp. is

not a subsidiary or affiliate of any publicly held corporation, and no other publicly

held corporation has a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation by virtue of

its participation.

Microsoft Corp. states that it does not have a parent corporation and that no

publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of Microsoft stock. Microsoft Corp.

is not a subsidiary or affiliate of any publicly held corporation, and no other

publicly held corporation has a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation by

virtue of its participation.

Tumblr, Inc. states that its parent corporation is Yahoo! Inc., which does not

have a parent corporation, and that no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more

of Yahoo! Inc.’s stock. Tumblr is not a subsidiary or affiliate of any other publicly

held corporation, and no other publicly held corporation has a financial interest in

the outcome of the litigation by virtue of its participation.

Twitter, Inc. states that it does not have a parent corporation and that no

publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of Twitter stock. Twitter, Inc. is not a

Case: 13-5946 Document: 006111887635 Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 3 (8 of



iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .......................................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... v

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .............................................................................. 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................. 4

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 7

I. SECTION 230 BROADLY IMMUNIZES O NLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS

FROM LIABILITY FOR CONTENT PROVIDED BY THIRD PARTIES ......................... 7

II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION

230 IS ERRONEOUS ......................................................................................... 11

A. The District Court Applied the Wrong Standard ................................ 12

B. The Factors on Which the District Court Relied Do NotEstablish a Basis for Losing Section 230 Immunity ........................... 17

III. THE PREVAILING I NTERPRETATION OF SECTION 230 PROMOTES

ITS PURPOSES AND HAS BEEN CRITICAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT

AND GROWTH OF THE I NTERNET ..................................................................... 20

A. Section 230 Promotes Free Speech and OnlineCommerce ........................................................................................... 20

B. Section 230 Immunity Gives Service Providers Room ToSelf-Regulate ....................................................................................... 24

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 29

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE




v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page(s)

Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ............................................................................................. 15

Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn.2013) .............................................................................................................. 10

Barrett v. Rosenthal , 146 P.3d 510 (Cal. 2006) ....................................................... 11

Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) ....................................... 8, 20, 21, 22

Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980

(10th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................................... 9

Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) .............................. 10, 15, 16

Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) ........... 18, 20, 25

Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.

craigslist, Inc., 519 F. 3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008) ........................................... 9, 16

Courtney v. Vereb & Angie’s List, Inc., 2012 WL 2405313 (E.D. La.

June 25, 2012) .................................................................................................. 9 Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d , 2007 WL

217865 (3d Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................... 9

Doe v. America Online, 783 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 2001) ............................................. 11

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007) ................................. 9

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) ................................................. 8

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Tex. 2009) ................................ 15

Eckert v. Microsoft Corp., 2007 WL 496692 (E.D. Mich. 2007) ............................ 10

Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC , 521 F.3d 1157(9th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................5, 12, 13, 14, 19, 28

FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009) ....................................... 16




vi

Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 ............................................................. 18

Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17,2008) .............................................................................................................. 28

Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ...................... 9, 15

Green v. America Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003) .............................. 9, 28

Hill v. StubHub, 727 S.E.2d 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) ........................................... 10

Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) ........................................... 8, 16, 28

Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC

2013 WL 4068780 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2013) ................ 11, 12, 17, 18, 24, 27

Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC840 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012) ..................................11, 12, 17, 18, 19

Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (E.D. Cal. 2010) ................................. 15

Klayman v. Zuckerberg , 910 F.Supp.2d 314 (D.D.C. 2012) ..................................... 9

Murawski v. Pataki, 2007 WL 2781054 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ........................................ 9

Nemet Chevrolet Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250

(4th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................... 8, 15, 17, 18

Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003),aff’d , 2004 WL 602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004) ............................................ 9

Parisi v. Sinclair , 774 F.Supp.2d 310 (D.D.C. 2011) .............................................. 17

Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2006) ................................... 9

Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC , 728 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2013) ...................................... 10

Shiamili v. The Real Estate Group of New York , 952 N.E.2d 1011(N.Y. 2011) .................................................................................................... 10

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) ....................................................................... 24




vii

Universal Communications Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413(1st Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 9

Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) .......................... passim

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1) ............................................................................................. 11

47 U.S.C.§ 230(a)(3) ..................................................................................................... 21§ 230(a)(4) ..................................................................................................... 21§ 230(b)(2) ..................................................................................................... 21§ 230(b)(2) ..................................................................................................... 17§ 230(c)(1) .............................................................................................. passim

§ 230(c)(2) ..................................................................................................... 27§ 230(e) ............................................................................................................ 6§ 230(e)(3) ....................................................................................................... 8§ 230(f)(3) .............................................................................................. 5, 7, 12§ 941 .............................................................................................................. 11

LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS

H.R. Rep. No. 107-449 (2002) ................................................................................. 11

S. Rep. No. 104-230 (1996) ..................................................................................... 24

141 Cong. Rec. 22,046 ............................................................................................. 25

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Booz & Co., The Impact of U.S. Internet Copyright Regulations on

Early-Stage Investment (2012), available at http://www.booz.com/global/home/what-we-think/reports-white-papers/article-display/impact-internet-copyright-regulations-early-2 ................................. 23

eBay, How to Report inappropriate buying and selling , available at http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/ report-trading.html#wont .......................... 27

eBay, When eBay may remove or adjust Feedback , available at http:// pages.ebay.com/help/policies/feedback-removal.html .................................. 27




viii

Facebook Community Standards, available at https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards .............................................................................. 26

Facebook, Report a Violation, available at https://www.facebook.com/help/263149623790594/ ........................................................................ 26

Google Terms of Service, available at https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ ........................................................................................... 26

LinkedIn Professional Community Guidelines, available at http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/34593 ........................................ 27

LinkedIn User Agreement, available at http://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement ...................................................................................... 26

LinkedIn, Complaints Regarding Content Posted on the LinkedInWebsite, available at http://www.linkedin.com/legal/copyright-

policy#pri-2 .................................................................................................... 26

Microsoft Code of Conduct, available at http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-live/code-of-conduct .................................................... 26

The Twitter Rules, available at http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules# ................................................................................ 26

Tumblr Community Guidelines, available at http://www.tumblr.com/ policy/en/community ..................................................................................... 26

Twitter, I’m reporting an abusive user , available at https://support.twitter.com/forms/abusiveuser ...................................................................... 26

YouTube Reporting and Enforcement Center, available at http://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/ reporting.html ................................. 26




2

platforms had more than 110 million active users, and its payments platforms had

more than 120 million active registered accounts. Collectively, in 2012, eBay

enabled $175 billion of global commerce.

Facebook, Inc. provides a free Internet-based social media service that

enables its more than one billion users to connect with their friends and family, to

discover what is going on in the world around them, and to share what matters to

them and to the people they care about.

Google Inc. offers a suite of web-based products and services to billions of

people worldwide—most notably, its eponymous search engine, as well as other

products such as its video-sharing service, YouTube, the Google Play store,

Google Maps, Blogger, and its social networking product, Google+.

LinkedIn Corp. is the world’s largest professional network on the Internet

with more than 259 million members.

Microsoft Corp. is a worldwide leader in software, services, and solutions

that help people and businesses realize their full potential. These include the Bing

search engine and the Windows 8 and Windows Phone 8 app stores.

Tumblr, Inc. was founded in 2007 by its CEO David Karp in New York

City, and is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Yahoo! Inc. Tumblr’s mission is to

serve creators by providing the best products and services, on all platforms, to

enable them to create and distribute their work online to the audience that they




3

deserve. Tumblr is home to nearly 150 million blogs and over 65 billion posts,

which reach an audience of hundreds of millions of people worldwide each month.

Twitter, Inc. is a global platform for public self-expression and conversation

in real time. Twitter has more than 230 million monthly active users creating

approximately 500 million Tweets every day.

Zynga Inc. develops, markets, and operates online social games as live

services played over the Internet and on social networking sites and mobile

platforms. Zynga is a leading online social game developer with approximately

133 million average monthly active users for the three months ending September

30, 2013.

Each of the Amici has a substantial interest in the rules governing whether

providers of interactive computer services may be liable for unlawful online

content generated by third parties. Because they serve as platforms for the online

communications and transactions of hundreds of millions of users, Amici have

been and/or inevitably will be parties to controversies in which they must raise

Section 230 immunity. The vitality of online discourse and commerce made

possible by these companies’ interactive services depends in part on their ability to

avoid the burdens of litigation and potential liability in cases in which it is alleged

that one or more of their users has misused their services to create and disseminate

tortious or otherwise unlawful content. As discussed herein, aspects of the district




4

court decision in this case significantly depart from the settled interpretation of

Section 230 and, if adopted by this Court, would not only contravene Congress’s

policies as declared in the statute, but also introduce substantial uncertainty

regarding a law that has been a pillar for the growth and success of America’s

Internet industry.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici urge this Court to join the overwhelming consensus of other courts

that have interpreted Section 230 as providing interactive computer services with

broad immunity against liability for content provided by third parties. The

protection afforded by Section 230 has been and remains critical to the

development and robustness of the Internet and interactive services such as those

provided by Amici. The district court, perhaps in reaction to the particular facts of

this case, interpreted Section 230 narrowly and in a manner contrary to the

established case law. If upheld, that interpretation would significantly undermine

the immunity afforded by Section 230 and undercut Congress’s express intentions

when passing the statute.

Since Section 230’s enactment in 1996, courts throughout the nation have

consistently held that 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) provides interactive computer service

providers with broad protection from liability for unlawful content created or

developed by their users or other third parties. In particular, as these courts have




5

recognized, Section 230 bars a claim whenever (i) the defendant asserting

immunity is an interactive computer service provider, (ii) the particular

information at issue was provided by “another information content provider,” and

(iii) the claim seeks to “treat” the defendant as a “publisher or speaker” of that

information.

The district court’s decision focused on the second element of Section 230

immunity. Specifically, it addressed the question of what activity by a service

provider is sufficient to make it also an “information content provider” of content

originating from a third-party user, thereby forfeiting its statutory protection from

liability. Under the express terms of the statute, the answer to this question turns

on whether the service provider was “responsible, in whole or in part, for the

creation or development” of the content at issue. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Clearly,

Section 230 provides no protection for content a service provider itself authors.

Thus, in this case, Section 230 would not apply to claims that the “taglines”

created by the defendants were themselves tortious.

But the district court went much farther. It held that a service provider is an

“information content provider” merely if it “encourages” the submission of a

particular type of content. That conclusion is contrary to the case law, including

what the district court itself characterized as the principal authority on which it

relied, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Fair Housing Council v.




6

Roommates.com, LLC , 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). As that court recognized,

such an interpretation would undermine the immunity afforded by Section 230. So

long as the service provider does not itself participate in creating or developing the

particular content alleged to be unlawful—which did not occur here with respect to

the allegedly tortious material submitted by users of appellants’ website—and does

not otherwise require or force users to submit unlawful content (as happened in

Roommates but not here), the language of Section 230 and case law establish that

the service provider is immune from claims arising from content provided by a

third party.2

As Congress intended, and as Amici can attest from experience, the broad

protection provided by Section 230(c)(1) has served as a foundational underpinning

for the development and growth of the Internet as a medium for free expression and

commerce. It has enabled innumerable online platforms and services through which

users can engage in vibrant online speech and interactions. If Section 230’s

protection were narrowed, many service providers likely would have to curb such

services (e.g., by offering only moderated services) and often would have little

choice but to yield to a “heckler’s veto” whenever someone complains that

particular content is tortious or unlawful in order to avoid the risk of liability.

2 Section 230 provides several express exceptions to this immunity, such as

for claims under intellectual property laws, but none of those is applicable here.See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).




7

The Internet also has enabled new and innovative forms of commerce,

including online marketplaces. Again, consistent with Congress’s declared

policies, the prevailing interpretation of Section 230(c)(1) allows myriad service

providers, ranging from start-ups to established companies with household names,

to operate services that support these virtual marketplaces. Such services likely

would exist only in much more limited forms if they were faced with a constant

threat of litigation and liability for every fraudulent, misleading, or otherwise

unlawful listing that any one of their millions of users might post.

Amici cannot emphasize enough the degree to which the protection afforded

by Section 230(c)(1), as consistently interpreted by courts, has played a critical

role in fostering the development and growth of interactive services that both

empower users and encourage innovation and self-regulation. Amici therefore

respectfully urge this Court to embrace the settled interpretation of Section 230 and

to reject the undue limits that the district court decision would place upon it.

ARGUMENT

I. SECTION 230 BROADLY IMMUNIZES ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS FROM

LIABILITY FOR CONTENT PROVIDED BY THIRD PARTIES

The plain language of Section 230 bars suits against web sites and other

interactive service providers predicated on content that was “creat[ed] or

develop[ed]” by third parties and not by the provider. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). The

key provision of Section 230 states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive




8

computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information

provided by another information content provider.” Id. § 230(c)(1). Section

230(e)(3) further provides that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no

liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this

section.” Under Section 230, “[s]tate-law plaintiffs may hold liable the person

who creates or develops unlawful content, but not the interactive computer service

provider who merely enables that content to be posted online.” Nemet Chevrolet

Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009).

Even as long as decade ago, the Ninth Circuit noted a “consensus developing

across other courts of appeal that § 230(c) provides broad immunity for publishing

content provided primarily by third parties.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th

Cir. 2003). That consensus has since hardened, with each of the eight United

States Courts of Appeal that has considered the question interpreting Section 230

as broadly insulating interactive service providers from liability for third-party

content. See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The majority

of federal circuits have interpreted the CDA to establish broad federal immunity to

any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information

originating with a third-party user of the service.”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d

413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Courts have construed the immunity provisions in § 230

broadly in all cases arising from the publication of user-generated content”); Zeran




9

v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Section 230 … plainly

immunizes computer service providers like AOL from liability for information that

originates with third parties”); Green v. America Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471

(3d Cir. 2003) (“By its terms, § 230 provides immunity to AOL as a publisher or

speaker of information originating from another information content provider”);

Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984-985 (10th

Cir. 2000) (§ 230 “creates a federal immunity to any state law cause of action that

would hold computer service providers liable for information originating with a

third-party”); Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st

Cir. 2007) (“[W]e too find that Section 230 immunity should be broadly

construed”); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.

craigslist, Inc., 519 F. 3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that “[a]n interactive

computer service ‘causes’ postings only in the sense of providing a place where

people can post” and such a role cannot give rise to liability given Section 230).3

3 Numerous district courts have likewise held that Section 230 broadly

immunizes interactive services from liability for third-party content. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg , 910 F.Supp.2d 314, 318 (D.D.C. 2012) (“By its plainterms, then, the CDA immunizes internet computer service providers from liability

for the publication of information or speech originating from third parties.”);Courtney v. Vereb & Angie’s List, Inc., 2012 WL 2405313, at *4-6 (E.D. La., June25, 2012); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2009);

Murawski v. Pataki, 2007 WL 2781054, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Doe v.

MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 851-852 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Parker v. Google,

Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500-501 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Dimeo v. Max, 433 F. Supp.2d 523, 530-531 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d , 2007 WL 217865 (3d Cir. 2006); Noah v. AOL




10

This Court too has recognized the protection afforded by Section 230. In a

case involving the interactive computer service TripAdvisor, this Court noted that,

while the case generally concerned content provided by the service itself, “if the

complaint or proposed amended complaint had alleged that TripAdvisor’s users’

statements are defamatory, TripAdvisor cannot be held liable for its users’

statements under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).”

Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC , 728 F.3d 592, 598 n.8 (6th Cir. 2013).4

Numerous state appellate and trial-level courts similarly have concluded that

Section 230 broadly immunizes providers of interactive computer services from

liability for third-party content. For example, the Court of Appeals of New York

has explained that “we follow what may fairly be called the national consensus and

read section 230 as generally immunizing Internet service providers from liability

for third-party content wherever such liability depends on characterizing the

provider as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of objectionable material.” Shiamili v. The

Real Estate Group of New York , 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (N.Y. 2011); see also Hill

v. StubHub, 727 S.E.2d 550, 561 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (StubHub entitled to

Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538-540 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d , 2004 WL

602711 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 2004); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50-52(D.D.C. 1998).4 District courts within the Sixth Circuit also have applied Section 230 to barclaims against interactive service providers. See, e.g., Eckert v. Microsoft Corp.,2007 WL 496692, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 2007); see also Backpage.com, LLC v.

Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 824-825 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (enjoining state statute because it likely was preempted by Section 230).




11

immunity even if it “encouraged the posting of ‘market-based’ prices on its

website or was cognizant of the risk that tickets sold on its website would be priced

in excess of face value” in contravention of state anti-scalping laws); Barrett v.

Rosenthal , 146 P.3d 510, 522-523 (Cal. 2006) (Section 230 “broadly shield[s] all

providers from liability for ‘publishing’ information received from third parties”);

Doe v. America Online, 783 So. 2d 1010, 1018 (Fla. 2001).

Congress has twice ratified this substantial body of case law by enacting

follow-on legislation extending the protections of Section 230 into new areas. See

47 U.S.C. § 941 (extending Section 230 protections to new class of entities); 28

U.S.C. § 4102(c)(1) (providing that U.S. courts “shall not recognize or enforce”

foreign defamation judgments that are inconsistent with Section 230); see also

H.R. Rep. No. 107-449, at 13 (2002) (“[t]he courts have correctly interpreted

section 230(c)”); Barrett , 146 P.3d at 523 n.17 (statements in H.R. Rep. No. 107-

449 “reflect the Committee’s intent that the existing statutory construction … be

maintained in a new legislative context”).

II. THE DISTRICT COURT’S NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 230 IS

ERRONEOUS

The district court incorrectly interpreted this established body of Section 230

jurisprudence as establishing a vague protection that vanishes whenever the service

provider merely “encourage[s]” the content at issue. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t

Recordings, LLC , 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (“ Jones I ”); Jones




12

v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC , 2013 WL 4068780, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Aug.

12, 2013) (“ Jones II ”). This unprecedented standard is inconsistent with the plain

language of Section 230 and contrary to the case law. Indeed, the very case that

the district court characterized as “[t]he principal precedent” on which it relied5

warned that “close cases … must be resolved in favor of immunity” to avoid

“forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off claims that

they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly assented to—the illegality of third

parties.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174.

A. The District Court Applied the Wrong Standard

The text of Section 230 deprives a service provider of statutory protection

only where it is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development ”

of the particular alleged unlawful content that is at issue—not where the provider

merely “encourage[s]” content provided by a third party. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)

(emphasis added). The district court’s standard would expand the meaning of

“development” to the point of negating the very protection that Congress intended

to erect. Virtually every website includes features that invite and encourage users

to enter particular types of content. For example, online marketplaces generally

include functions for a third-party seller to set a price for an item, to state whether

the item is new or used, to categorize the nature or use of the item, and a variety of

5 Jones II , 2013 WL 4068780, at *1; Jones I , 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1010.




13

other information designed to help other users search for items in which they may

be interested and to learn more about those items. Likewise, a site devoted to

reviews of restaurants or other businesses might well have specific language

explaining the value and importance readers place on “negative” reviews and

soliciting users to submit details of their negative experiences with a business.

Under the district court’s standard, however, a website could lose Section

230 immunity on the theory that such characteristics meant that the site

“encouraged” the submission of particular third-party content. That is not a

reasonable interpretation of the terms “creation” or “development.” Indeed, the en

banc decision in Roommates.com specifically cautioned that “the broadest sense of

the term ‘develop’ could include … just about any function performed by a

website,” but that “to read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of section

230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section otherwise

provides.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167. The standard conjured by the

district court here would have exactly that effect.

In addition, the trial court’s standard has no basis in Section 230 precedent.

In Roommates.com, the en banc court adopted a far narrower standard for what

constitutes “creation or development” of user content. It held that “development”

refers “not merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materially

contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.” 521 F.3d at 1167-1168 (emphasis




14

added). The court explained that a web site does not “materially contribute” to the

unlawfulness of third-party content where it merely provides “a framework that

could be utilized for proper or improper purposes” by the user. Id. at 1169, 1172.

Rather, Roommates.com held only that the website operator was not entitled

to immunity with respect to allegedly unlawful content that it effectively required

its users to submit. In that case, as a condition for using an online roommate-

finding service, each user seeking to offer living space had to create a profile

describing his/her desired roommate and, in doing so, was “require[d] … to

disclose his sex, sexual orientation and whether he would bring children to a

household” and to “describe his preferences in roommates with respect to the same

three criteria.” 521 F.3d at 1161 (emphasis added). The site also designed its

search functions to “steer” users to listings based on users’ answers to the

discriminatory questions posed by the site. Id. at 1167. In those circumstances,

the Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com had “materially contributed” to the

content at issue because it “force[d]” users to answer “discriminatory questions”

allegedly in violation of housing discrimination laws. Id. at 1166-1167. In other

words, that specific discriminatory content was the direct and necessary result of

the site operator’s own discriminatory questions.

Courts have consistently interpreted Roommates.com as recognizing “only a

narrow exception” to Section 230’s broad grant of immunity, applicable only




15

where the service provider materially contributed to the content that is alleged to

be unlawful by requiring the user to provide that specific content. Goddard , 640 F.

Supp. 2d at 1198. In Nemet Chevrolet , for example, the Fourth Circuit expressly

distinguished Roommates.com on this ground, refusing to strip a website operator

of immunity based on a claim that the operator had “structured its website and its

business operations to develop” third-party complaints about businesses, even

where the operator was alleged to have solicited and asked questions about the

complaints and revised or redrafted user content. 591 F.3d at 257.

Other courts have held, since Roommates.com, that a search engine provider

retains its immunity where the provider offers a tool that suggests keywords to

potential advertisers—even when those keywords allegedly contributed to fraud—

because the tool “does nothing more than provide options that advertisers may

adopt or reject at their discretion.” Goddard , 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1198; see also

Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (same); Doe v.

MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (E.D. Tex. 2009) ( Roommates.com “not

applicable” because “users of MySpace.com are not required to provide any

additional information to their profiles” (emphasis added)); Atlantic Recording

Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).6

6 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, also illustrates how the district

court’s “encouragement” standard is contrary to longstanding Section 230 precedent. There, the Internet service provider AOL had contracted with the




16

The district court’s reliance on FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th

Cir. 2009), was similarly misplaced. In that case, the website offered to provide

users with detailed telephone records for any phone number and then paid

“researchers” to obtain those records. Id. at 1199. The court held the website was

not entitled to immunity because acquisition of such confidential telephone records

is inevitably unlawful (e.g., because federal law generally prohibits telephone

companies from disclosing such information). Id. at 1200. Once again, the site

required the dissemination of content that was necessarily unlawful.7

author of an online gossip column, Matt Drudge, to carry the column on its onlineservice; paid Drudge substantial royalties; promoted him as a “Runaway GossipSuccess” and his column as a source for “gossip and rumor”; and reserved (but didnot exercise) the right to edit Drudge’s content. Id. at 51. Notwithstanding thesefacts—which go well beyond those at issue here—the court found that AOL wasnot an “information content provider” of allegedly defamatory content in thecolumn written by Drudge. The court held that AOL was immune under Section230 because Congress had made a “policy choice” in Section 230 to “provid[e]immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, evenaggressive role in making available content prepared by others.” Id. at 52.7 The district court’s also erroneously relied on Johnson, 614 F.3d 785, and

Chicago Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F. 3d 666. In those cases, the courts held thatSection 230 immunized the service providers from liability. Both courts noted insupport of those holdings that the providers had done nothing that could even besaid to induce unlawful content. Johnson, 614 F.3d at 792; Chicago Lawyers’

Comm., 519 F.3d at 671-672. But neither court held that such inducement coulddeprive a service provider of immunity—indeed, given the absence of any factssuggesting such inducement, neither court was even faced with that question.




18

The only relevant question under the statute is whether the website operator

was responsible for the “creation or development ” of the allegedly tortious content.

See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003)

(key issue is whether service provider “created or developed the particular

information at issue”); Nemet , 591 F.3d at 260 (affirming dismissal where plaintiff

failed to show defendant “was responsible for the creation or development of the

allegedly defamatory content at issue ” (emphasis added)); Gentry v. eBay, Inc.,

121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717 n.11 (“The critical issue is whether eBay acted as an

information content provider with respect to the information that appellants claim

is false or misleading.”).

By definition, remarks that a website operator adds in response to a third-

party post are made after that post has been created and developed and therefore

cannot have played a role in that post’s creation or development. To the extent the

court below was suggesting that the site operator’s own remarks could encourage

future unlawful postings, as discussed above, such encouragement—even assuming

it exists—is a far cry from the “creation or development” of any such postings.

The same is true of the name of the site, which the court below also cited as a

factor that encouraged submission of unlawful content. Jones I , 840 F. Supp. 2d at

1012; Jones II , 2013 WL 4068780, at *3. However distasteful the site at issue here

may be, gossip posted on the site is not necessarily unlawful (e.g., it may be true),




19

and, unlike the facts in Roommates.com, nothing about the site operator’s own

remarks in any way required or forced users to post unlawful content. If a service

provider were at risk of losing the protection of Section 230 based on speculation

that the name of its site, some features of its service, or some content it originated

could be interpreted to have indirectly encouraged unlawful content, service

providers would, as the Ninth Circuit warned, “face death by ten thousand duck-

bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly

assented to—the illegality of third parties.” Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174.

The court below also pointed to several editorial considerations that it

suggested should deprive a service provider of the protections of Section 230,

noting in particular that the defendant selects which submissions will be posted,

“reviews the postings but does not verify their accuracy,” and decides whether a

posting should be removed in response to an objection. Jones I , 840 F. Supp. 2d at

1012. But, as discussed below, Congress intended Section 230 to encourage

precisely these forms of self-regulation. If service providers were to face the threat

of losing Section 230 immunity by reviewing third-party content and deciding

whether to remove it when someone objects to it, the provider would have a

perverse incentive simply to eschew all review and ignore all objections. It was

exactly this incentive that Congress sought to eliminate by enacting Section 230.

See infra pp. 24-26. Moreover, the case law is clear that service providers do not




20

lose the protections of Section 230 for engaging in routine editorial functions such

as selecting what third-party content to post or remove. As the Fourth Circuit

explained, under Section 230 “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for

its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding

whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.” Zeran, 129

F.3d at 330. The court in Batzel likewise held:

Nor do [defendant’s] minor alterations of [an] e-mail prior to its posting or his choice to publish the e-mail (while rejecting other e-

mails for inclusion in the listserv) rise to the level of ‘development.’As we have seen, a central purpose of the Act was to protect fromliability service providers and users who take some affirmative stepsto edit the material posted. Also, the exclusion of ‘publisher’ liabilitynecessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of

publishers to choose among proffered material and to edit the material published while retaining its basic form and message.

333 F.3d at 1031.

III. THE PREVAILING INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 230 PROMOTES ITS

PURPOSES AND HAS BEEN CRITICAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH

OF THE INTERNET.

A. Section 230 Promotes Free Speech and Online Commerce

Congress enacted Section 230 both to protect free speech on the Internet and

to foster the growth of online marketplaces and exchanges free from state laws and

regulations that, if applied to online intermediaries, would threaten to cripple

vibrant discourse and commerce on the Internet. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122

(Section 230 enacted “to promote the free exchange of information and ideas over




21

the Internet”); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (Congress enacted Section 230 to promote

“freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium” by eliminating

the “threat [of] tort-based lawsuits” against interactive services for injury caused

by “the communications of others”); Batzel , 333 F.3d at 1018 (Section 230

intended to “promote the development of e-commerce”).

Congress expressly found that the Internet and interactive computer services

offer “a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for

cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity,” 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(a)(3), and that such services “have flourished, to the benefit of all

Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.” Id. § 230(a)(4). Congress

further stated that it is “the policy of the United States … to preserve the vibrant

and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other

interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” Id .

§ 230(b)(2) (emphasis added). As the Fourth Circuit explained in Zeran,

The imposition of tort liability on service providers for thecommunications of others represented, for Congress, simply anotherform of intrusive government regulation of speech. Section 230 wasenacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of Internetcommunication and, accordingly, to keep government interference in

the medium to a minimum.

129 F.3d at 330.

Courts have repeatedly recognized that Congress’s enacted policy

declarations support a broad reading of Section 230(c)(1). The Ninth Circuit




22

explained that “making interactive computer services … liable for the speech of

third parties would severely restrict the information available on the Internet.”

Batzel , 333 F.3d at 1027. Given the “staggering” volume of third-party content

that they carry, and “[f]aced with potential liability for each message republished

by their services,” see Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331, such services likely would be

forced, absent Section 230’s protection, to restrict or abandon many of the features

that enable the dissemination of third-party content. Moreover, to avoid risks of

litigation and liability, service providers often would have little choice but to

remove third-party content claimed by anyone to be tortious or unlawful,

effectively creating a “heckler’s veto” of a kind that courts have routinely

recognized is antithetical to free speech values. Thus, as the Fourth Circuit

recognized, “[t]he specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would

have an obvious chilling effect.” Id.; see also Batzel , 333 F.3d at 1028

(Section 230 was passed “to prevent lawsuits from shutting down websites and

other services on the Internet”).

Under the protection of Section 230—and consistent with Congress’s

intent—interactive computer services that allow users to speak, interact, and

transact have experienced tremendous growth in the 17 years since the statute’s

enactment. The Amici are now household names with hundreds of millions of

users, and collectively they serve as platforms for billions of dollars in transactions




23

among users annually and innumerable communications in the forms of postings,

tweets, blogs, comments, and other third-party expression. Some or all of the

Amici might have to change their business models or curtail their services in

significant ways if the prevailing interpretation of Section 230 were narrowed.8

The district court’s “encouragement” standard, for example, would blur the line

between content provided by third parties and content created or developed by the

service provider itself, opening the door to burdensome litigation and possibly

crushing liability based merely on factors such as a site’s name or features designed

to facilitate third-party content submission. Even the threat of such litigation and

liability would chill service provider offerings and steer them away from innovative

or controversial subjects—the opposite of what Congress intended.

8 Indeed, several of the Amici have done just that when operating onlineservices in countries that lack the equivalent of Section 230 protection. Forinstance, some Amici remove content from non-U.S. services based on allegationsof defamation by businesses subject to critical reviews, even though Amici are notin a position to determine whether those reviews are truthful. This undoubtedlyleads to the blocking of valuable speech. Additionally, removing liability

protection could significantly curtail investment in interactive service providers.See, e.g., Booz & Co., The Impact of U.S. Internet Copyright Regulations on

Early-Stage Investment 21 (2012) (finding, in the copyright context, that 81% ofangel investors would prefer to invest under current U.S. liability rules with a weakeconomy than under a regime with increased liability even with a strong economy),available at http://www.booz.com/global/home/what-we-think/reports-white-

papers/article-display/impact-internet-copyright-regulations-early-2.




24

B. Section 230 Immunity Gives Service Providers Room To Self-

Regulate

The court below erroneously suggested that a broad interpretation of Section

230 would undermine the statute’s purposes, apparently on a supposition that it

would discourage service providers from blocking or removing offensive content.

See Jones II , 2013 WL 4068780 at *2-3. But just the opposite is true. Congress

specifically enacted Section 230 to address the perverse effects of applying pre-

existing liability regimes, such as the common law of defamation, to online

intermediaries. Those effects were exemplified by a 1995 court ruling, Stratton

Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,

1995), which held that, under traditional common law doctrine, the provider of an

electronic message board service was potentially liable for its user’s defamatory

message specifically because it had engaged in voluntary self-policing of the third-

party content available through its service. One purpose of Section 230 was to

overturn this precedent, which created disincentives for online intermediaries to

engage in self -regulation. S. Rep. No. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (“One of the specific

purposes of [Section 230] is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other

similar decisions … .”); see also, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“Another important

purpose of § 230 was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the

dissemination of offensive material over their services. In this respect, § 230

responded to [Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy].”).




25

Congress concluded that service providers may voluntarily and

constructively self-regulate so as to restrict the availability of objectionable third-

party material in ways that are appropriately tailored to the nature, design, and

user-base of their services. Congress sought to achieve this goal by “encourag[ing]

service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their

services.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; Carafano 339 F.3d at 1122 (Congress enacted

Section 230 “to encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene

material”); 141 Cong. Rec. 22,046 (Section 230 was designed to give interactive

service providers “a reasonable way to … help them self-regulate themselves

without penalty of law”) (statement of Rep. Barton).

Congress recognized that a legal regime in which liability may accrue when

a service provider has notice of allegedly unlawful content but fails to act would

perversely “reinforce[] service providers’ incentives to … abstain from self-

regulation,” for fear of being held liable for anything a jury determines they should

have uncovered in the course of their efforts to monitor their services. See Zeran,

129 F.3d at 333 (“Any efforts by a service provider to investigate and screen

material posted on its service would only lead to notice of potentially defamatory

material more frequently and thereby create a stronger basis for liability.”). By

enacting Section 230, Congress freed service providers to adopt robust self-

regulatory regimes, experiment with different approaches to self-regulation,




26

implement novel technical solutions, and otherwise respond to the demands of the

marketplace and the possibilities of technology without fear that by doing so they

would expose themselves to liability.

This is precisely what these Amici and many other service providers have

done. For example, many service providers take steps such as

• supplying links, e-mail addresses, flagging and “report abuse” buttons,

and other mechanisms for users to report complaints about particular

content;9

• specifying and enforcing “community guidelines,” terms of service, and

other rules and standards for third-party content;10

9 See, e.g., Twitter, I’m reporting an abusive user (form for filing complaint

about, among other things, threats, abuse, and posting of private information),available at https://support.twitter.com/forms/abusiveuser; LinkedIn, Complaints

Regarding Content Posted on the LinkedIn Website (describing mechanisms forsubmitting complaints), available at http://www.linkedin.com/legal/copyright-

policy#pri-2; Facebook, Report a Violation, available at https://www.facebook.com/help/263149623790594/; YouTube Reporting and Enforcement Center,available at http://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/ reporting.html.10

See, e.g., Facebook Community Standards, available at https://www.face book.com/communitystandards; Google Terms of Service (“We may suspend or

stop providing our Services to you if you do not comply with our terms or policiesor if we are investigating suspected misconduct.”), available at https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/; Microsoft Code of Conduct, available at http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-live/code-of-conduct; The Twitter Rules,available at http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules#; TumblrCommunity Guidelines, available at http://www.tumblr.com/policy/en/community;LinkedIn User Agreement (containing list of “DOS and DON’Ts”), available at




27

• employing technological means to detect and remove or block particular

kinds of content, such as child pornography; and

• monitoring message boards, chat rooms, and other areas with third-party

content; responding to complaints; and removing third-party content for

violations of law or the service’s rules or policies.11

Thus, the district court’s apparent supposition that a broad reading of the scope of

Section 230(c)(1)’s protections would cause service providers to eschew self-

policing of their services is demonstrably wrong.

At the same time, the district court’s suggestion that Section 230 protects

only “those who remove offensive content,” Jones II , 2013 WL 4068780 at *3,

finds no support in the statutory language or case law.12

To the contrary, service

providers have repeatedly been held immune under Section 230 even when they

allegedly received notice of the offending content and failed to remove it. See,

http://www.linkedin.com/ legal/user-agreement; LinkedIn Professional CommunityGuidelines, available at http://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/34593.11 See, e.g., eBay, When eBay may remove or adjust Feedback (describingcertain circumstances under which eBay will remove third-party), available at http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/feedback-removal.html; eBay, How to Report

inappropriate buying and selling , available at http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/

report-trading.html#wont.12

Section 230 contains a separate immunity provision that generally protectsservice providers from liability for actions “voluntarily” taken in good faith toremove unlawful or objectionable content. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasisadded). But nothing in that immunity provision or elsewhere in Section 230requires service providers to take such actions in order to retain the protection ofsection 230(c)(1).




28

e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331-332; Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169 n.24

(immunity extends to claims “based on a website operator’s passive acquiescence

in the misconduct of its users”); Green, 318 F.3d at 471 (ISP not liable for failing

to monitor, screen, or delete allegedly defamatory third-party content); Johnson,

614 F.3d at 791 (“The district court, following majority circuit precedent, held that

§ 230(c)(1) blocks civil liability when web hosts and other ISPs refrain from

filtering or censoring the information that third parties created on their sites.”);

Goddard v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 5245490, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008)

(“[E]ven if a service provider knows that third parties are using such tools to create

illegal content, the service provider’s failure to intervene is immunized.”).

In sum, Congress created a regime that removed legal disincentives to self-

regulation of objectionable content, while at the same time declining to impose

government regulation imposing particular steps a service provider must take to

remove third-party content. The prevailing interpretation of Section 230

implements Congress’s policy choice; the district court’s interpretation would

undermine it.





I certify that the foregoing brief complies with the type-volume limitation

provided in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B). The foregoing brief

uses Times New Roman (14-point) proportional type, and contains 6,924 words,

exclusive of exempted portions.

/s/ Patrick J. CaromePATRICK J. CAROME





I certify that on November 19, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing

Brief for Amici Curiae AOL Inc., eBay Inc., Facebook, Inc., Google Inc., LinkedIn

Corp., Microsoft Corp., Tumblr, Inc., Twitter, Inc., and Zynga Inc. with the Clerk

of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit using the

Court’s CM/ECF System. Counsel for all parties are registered CM/ECF users and

will be served with the foregoing document by the Court’s CM/ECF system.

/s/ Samir C. JainSAMIR C. JAIN




Case No.13-5946

INTHEUNITEDSTATESCOURTOFAPPEALS

FORTHESIXTHCIRCUIT

SARAHJONES

P l a i n t i f f/Appellee,

v s .

DIRTYWORLDENTERTAINMENTRECORDINGS LC

e t a l .

Defendants/Appellants

On pp eal from h e United S t a t e s D i s t r i c t Court

f o r t h e E a s t e r n D i s t r i c t of entuckyCase No. 9-CV-219-WOB i s t r i c t Court Judge William O. ertelsman

AMICUSCURIAEBRIEFBYONLINESERVICEPROVIDERS

BRUCE .H.JOHNSON

JAlV~S C.GRANT

~ 1 . 1 V I B I K A K.DORAN

DAVISWRIGHTTREMAINELLP

1201 Third Avenue, u i t e 2200

S e a t t l e Washington 98101

T e l : (206) 22-3150

Fax: (206) 57-7700

THOMAS .BURKE


505 Montgomery t r e e t S u i t e 80 0

San r a n c i s c o C a l i f o r n i a 94111

T e l : (415) 76-6500

Fax: (415) 76-6599

JOHN .GREINER

NICHOLAS . ZIEPFEL

GRAYDON HEAD ITCHEYLLP

1900 i f t h Thi rd Center

511 Wal nut t r e e t

C i n c i n n a t i OH 5202-3157

T e l : (513) 29-2731

Fax: (513) 51-3836

JAMESROSENFELD

DAMSWRIGHTTREMAINELLP

1633 Broadway, 7th Floor

New ork,NY 0019

T e l : (212) 89-8230

Fax: (212) 89-8340

Attorneys o r Amici Curiae Advance u b l i c a t i o n s I n c . Amazon.com, n c .

Awo n c . Buzzfeed, n c . Cable News etwork, n c . Curbed.com LLC

Gawker Media,LLC agazine u b l i s h e r s of merica, n c .

T h e McClatchy Company, he e p o r t e r s Committee o r Freedom of h e P r e s s

TripAdvisorLLC ahoo n c . and Yelp n c .

1

Case: 13-5946 Document: 006111887614 Filed: 11/19/2013 Page: 1



CORPORATEDISCLOSURESTATEMENT

Pursuant o S i x t h C i r c u i t Rule 2 6 . 1 Amici Advance P u b l i c a t i o n s n c .

Amazon.com, n c . Awo n c . Buzzfeed, n c . Cable News Network, n c .

Curbed.com LLC awker Media,LLC agazine P u b l i s h e r s of America, n c .

The McClatchy Company, The R e p o r t e r s Committee f o r Freedom of h e P r e s s

T r i p A d v i s o r LLC ahoo n c . and Yelp I n c . m a k e t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c l o s u r e s :

Adv a n c e u b l i c a t i o n s n c . ; Awo n c . ; Buzzfeed, n c . ; Cu r bed.com LLC;

G a w k e r Media,LLC; a g azin e Publishers of America, n c . ; Th e Reporters

Commit t ee for F r e e dom of the P r e s s ; Yahoo n c . ; a n d Yelp Inc.

1 . I s s a i d p a r t y a s u b s i d i a r y o r f f i l i t e of a p u b l i c l y owned c o r p o r a t i o n ? No .

2 . I s t h e r e a p u b l i c l y owned c o r p o r a t i o n n o t a p a r t y t o t h e a p p e a l t h a t has a

f i n a n c i a l i n t e r e s t i n t h e outcome? Not o t h e knowledge of a i d p a r t y .

Amazon.com, nc.

1 . I s s a i d p a r t y a s u b s i d i a r y o r f f i l i t e of a p u b l i c l y owned c o r p o r a t i o n ?

Amazon.com, n c . i s a p u b l i c l y owned c o r p o r a t i o n .

2 . I s t h e r e a p u b l i c l y owned c o r p o r a t i o n n o t a p a r t y t o t h e a p p e a l h a t has a


2




The McClatchy ompany

I s s a i d p a r t y a u b s i d i a r y o r a f f i l i a t e of u b l i c l y owned o r p o r a t i o n ? The

McClatchy Company s a u b l i c l y owned o r p o r a t i o n .

2 . I s t h e r e a u b l i c l y owned o r p o r a t i o n not a a r t y t o t h e a p p e a l t h a t has a


Cable News Network n c .

1 . I s s a i d p a r t y a u b s i d i a r y o r a f f i l i a t e of u b l i c l y owned o r p o r a t i o n ? Yes.

Cable News etwork n c . i s a wholly owned u b s i d i a r y of Turner r o a d c a s t i n g

System n c . which s a wholly owned u b s i d i a r y of Time Warner n c . a u b l i c l y

t r a d e d c o r p o r a t i o n .



TripAdvisorLL

I s s a i d p a r t y a u b s i d i a r y o r a f f i l i a t e of u b l i c l y owned o r p o r a t i o n ?

Yes. T r i p A d v i s o r LL s a u b s i d i a r y of r i p A d v i s o r n c . T r i p A d v i s o r I n c . i s

p u b l i c l y t r a d e d .



j




TABLEOFCONTENTS

Page

I . INTERESTOFAMICICURIAE 1

I I . AUTHORITYTO ILE 1

I I L INTRODUCTION ND L ~ ` v I l V I A R Y OF RGLJIVMENT 1

IV. ARGUMENT 4

A. Congress Intended S e c t i o n 230 o Promote Free Speech o n h e

I n t e r n e t and Encourage Online S e r v i c e Providers o P o l i c e

C o n t e n t 4

B. S e c t i o n 230 Provides Broad Immunit y o Online S e r v i c e Providers

f o r Claims Based on Third- P a r t y Content 6

C . The i s t r i c t Court i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d P r i o r Cases o I n t e r p r e t

S e c t i o n 230 Immunity More e s t r i c t i v e l y Than Any ther o u r t . . . . . .9

D The i s t r i c t C o u r t s I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Threatens to S t r i p Online

S e r v i c e Providers of e c t i o n 230 Immunity Based on Common

and Laudable r a c t i c e s 1 6

1 . Exercising T r a d i t i o n a l E d i t o r i a l Functions 16

2 . Failing o Remove l l e g e d l y Unlawful Content f t e r Notice..17

3 . Focus on n t i r e Website Rather than S p e c i f i c C o n t e n t 18

4 . Website Name 21

S . I n c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h CommonLaw efamation 22

6 . I m p l i c i t l y Adopting Third Part y Content . 23

E. The i s t r i c t C o u r t s Unprecedented n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e c t i o n 230

Threatens Speech Across the n t e r n e t 24

i




Federal TNade Commission v . Accusearch,

570 F.3d 1187 10th C i r . 2009 p a s s i m

Gentry . Ebay, n c . ,

99 al. App. th 816, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703 002) 19

Global o y a l t i e s , L t d . v . Xcentric V e n t u r e s , LLC,

544 F. Supp. 2d 929 D. Ariz. 2008) 22

Goddard . Google, n c . ,

640 . Supp. 2d 1193(N.D. Cal. 2009) 13

GW quity LLC . X c e n t r ~ i c VenturesLLC,

2009WL 2173 N.D. Tex. an. 009 22

Hill . StubHub, n c . ,

727 S.E.2d 550 N.C. App. 2012) 8, 15,20

Johnson v . Aden,

614 .3d 785(8th C i r . 2010) 7, 10

Jones . Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, L.L.C.

766 F. Supp. 2d 828 E.D. Ky. 011) 9, 17, 19

Jones . Duty World Entertainment Recordings, L.L.C.,

840 F. Supp. 2d 1108(E.D.Ky. 012) p a s s i m

Jones . Dirty World Entertainment ecordings, L.L.C.,

2013WL 068780 E.D. Ky. u g . 12,2013) p a s s i m

L e v i t t v . Yelp n c . ,

2011 WL 079526 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26,2011) 26

M.A. . V i l l a g e Voice Media Holdings,LLC,

809 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D.Mo. 011) 17

Nemet h e v r o l e t , Ltd. . Consumeraffairs.com, n c . ,

591 F.3d 250 4th C i r . 2009) 6,8

Parisi . S i n c l a i r ,

774 F. Supp. 2d 310 D.D.G 2011) 24

i i i




Other Authorities

S. Conf. Rep. No . 104-230 1996) 4

E- o~R E NTENTLAw .05 L L D S i i ] 9

u




what Congress chose t o d o . The c o u r t s u g g e s t e d t h a t a w e b s i t e can be i a b l e j u s t

b e c a u s e i t s e l e c t s p o s t s t o p u b l i s h , does not e r i f y t h e i r a c c u r a c y , and a i l s t o

remove them upon o t i c e . But h e s e a r e a l l p u b l i s h e r f u n c t i o n s w i t h i n S e c t i o n

230's s c o p e . The c o u r t a l s o found a w e b s i t e may be i a b l e merely b e c a u s e o f t s

n a m e and t e n o r , b u t t h e c a s e law p r o h i b i t s h o l d i n g a p r o v i d e r l i a b l e f o r i m p l i c i t l y

encouraging o n t e n t . U l t i m a t e l y , t h e c o u r t c o n c l u d e d S e c t i o n 2 3 0 only

provides] r o t e c t i o n f o r s i t e owners w h o l l o w p o s t i n g s by h i r d p a r t i e s w i t h o u t

s c r e e n i n g them and t h o s e w h o remove o f f e n s i v e c o n t e n t . 2 0 1 3 W 068780, t

*3 Aug. 2 , 2013). But h i s i s n o t what e c t i o n 2 3 0 a y s . T h i s s t a n d a r d d i r e c t l y

c o n t r a v e n e s C o n g r e s s ' s i n t e n t , and i f t i s u p h e l d , p r o v i d e r s w i l l have t h e p e r v e r s e

i n c e n t i v e n o t o review t h i r d- p a r t y c o n t e n t a t a l l f o r f e a r o f i a b i l i t y .

Eight i r c u i t s have e n f o r c e d t h e s e c o r e S e c t i o n 2 3 0 r o t e c t i o n s . This Court

n o w has an o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e i n f o r c e t h e same l e a r g u i d a n c e about h e l a w ' s b r o a d

immunity. At bottom, h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n upends h a t g u i d a n c e ,

imposing i n s t e a d t h e n e b u l o u s view t h a t i f a udge o r u r y f i n d s a w e b s i t e i s

s o m e h o w o f f e n s i v e and e n c o u r a g e s u s e r s t o submit o n t e n t , t h e w e b s i t e p r o v i d e r

l o s e s immunity. This would t h r e a t e n o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s a c r o s s t h e I n t e r n e t

and s i g n i f i c a n t l y c h i l l o n l i n e s p e e c h . S e c t i o n 2 3 0 e q u i r e s u s t t h e o p p o s i t e .




IV. ARGUMENT

A. Congress Intended S e c t i o n 230 to Promote Free Speech on the

Internet and Encourage Online Service Providers to o l i c e Content.

In e n a c t i n g S e c t i o n 230, ongress had two e x p r e s s g o a l s . F i r s t , t sought o

encourage t h e u n f e t t e r e d and u n r e g u l a t e d development of r e e speech on h e

I n t e r n e t , and o promote h e development of -commerce. Batzel . Smith,333

F.3d 1018, 1027 9th C i r . 2003); ee also Ben zra, Weinstein, o. . Am

Online n c . , 206 F.3d 980, 85 . 3 (10th C i r . 2000) S e c t i o n 230 s meant t o

promote freedom of peech ) ; 47 U.S.C.§ 3 0 ( b ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) S e c t i o n 230 s i n t e n d e d

t o p r e s e r v e t h e v i b r a n t and c o m p e t i t i v e f r e e market h a t p r e s e n t l y e x i s t s f o r t h e

I n t e r n e t . ) . Second, t hoped o encourage s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s t o s e l f-r e g u l a t e t h e

d i s s e m i n a t i o n of f f e n s i v e m a t e ri a l over h e i r s e r v i c e s . Z e r ~ a n v Am n l i n e , I n c . ,

129 F.3d 327,331 (4th C i r . 1 9 9 7 ) ; see a t z e l , 333 F.3d a t 1028 c i t i n g 47 U.S.C.

§ 3 0 ( b ) ( 4 ) , and 141 Cong. ec. H8469- 7 0 ) .

Congress made h e s e g o a l s m a n i f e s t i n o v e r r u l i n g S t r a t t o n Oakmont, n c . v .

Prodigy e r v i c e s Co., 1995 WL 23710 N.Y. Sup. t . May 4, 9 9 5 ) , a a s e

h o l d i n g o n l i n e s e r v i c e Prodigy i a b l e f o r defamatory comments o s t e d by a s e r t o

one of t s b u l l e t i n b o a r d s . See S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230 1996) e x p r e s s i n g i n t e n t

t o o v e r r u l e S t r a t t o n Oakmont and any t h e r s i m i l a r d e c i s i o n s ) . Because Prodigy

a c t i v e l y s c r e e n e d and e d i t e d b u l l e t i n board messages o p r e v e n t o f f e n s i v e c o n t e n t ,

t h e c o u r t a p p l i e d common aw p u b l i s h e r ( r a t h e r than d i s t r i b u t o r ) p r i n c i p l e s ,




meaning h a t Prodigy c o u l d be l i a b l e f o r p o s t s even f t d i d not know o r have any

r e a s o n t o know h e y were d e f a m a t o r y . I d . a t *5.

By v e r r u l i n g t h i s r e s u l t , Congress e l i m i n a t e d t h e grim choice such a u l e

would p r e s e n t t o o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s , . e . t h o s e t h a t v o l u n t a r i l y f i l t e r c o n t e n t

would be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l p o s t s , w h i l e p r o v i d e r s t h a t bury h e i r heads n t h e

sand and g n o r e p r o b l e m a t i c p o s t s would e s c a p e l i a b i l i t y a l t o g e t h e r . Fair

Housing Council o f a n F e r nan d o V a l l e y v . R o o m m a t e s . c o m LLC 21 F . 3 d 1157,

1 163 9 t h C i r . 2008) en b a n c ) ; see a l s o B a t z e l , 333 F.3d a t 1029 If f f o r t s t o

review and omit h i r d- p a r t y d e f a m a t o r y , obscene o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e m a t e r i a l make a

computer s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r o r u s e r l i a b l e f o r p o s t e d s p e e c h , , h e n w e b s i t e o p e r a t o r s

and n t e r n e t s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s a r e l i k e l y t o abandon f f o r t s t o e l i m i n a t e such

m a t e r i a l from t h e i r s i t e [ s ] . ( c i t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ) .

S e c t i o n 230 e c o g n i z e s t h e I n t e r n e t ' s pr a c t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . I n t e r a c t i v e

computer s e r v i c e s have m i l l i o n s o f s e r s [and h e ] am ou n t o f n f o r m a t i o n

communicated . . . i s . . . s t a g g e r i n g . Zeran, 129 F.3d a t 331. I t i s simply

i m p o s s i b l e f o r o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s t o s c r e e n a l l o f h e i r u s e r c o n t e n t . I d .

S e c t i o n 230 h e r e f o r e sought o p r e v e n t l a w s u i t s from s h u t t i n g d ow n w e b s i t e s and

o t h e r s e r v i c e s o n h e I n t e r n e t , B a t z e l , 333 F.3d a t 1028, and t d i d so by b a r [ r i n g ]

s t a t e- l a w p l a i n t i f f s from h o l d i n g i n t e r a c t i v e computer s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s l e g a l l y

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n f o r m a t i o n c r e a t e d and developed by h i r d p a r t i e s , Ne m e t

5




ChevNOlet, Ltd. v . Consume~affai~s.com, n c . , 591 F.3d 250,254 4th Cir. 2009).

The p e c t e r o f o r t l i a b i l i t y in a n area o f such p r o l i f i c sp eech wou l d h a v e an

obvious c h i l l i n g e f f e c t , because faced with p o t e n t i a l l i a b i l i t y f o r e a c h message

republished . . . , providers mig ht choose to severely r e s t r i c t t h e n u m b e r a n d type o f

messages posted. Z e r a n , 129 F.3d a t 331.

Section 230 l s o r e f l e c t s t h e r e a l i t y t h a t some aterial posted on h e I n t e r n e t

m i gh t b e offensive or harmful. But ongress made choice t h a t , while i n j u r e d

p a r t i e s may ue t h e users who reated the content, t h e y may ot sue t h e i n t e r a c t i v e

compu ter s e r v i c e t h a t enabled users to publish the content. See, e . g . , Doe .

M y S p a c e , n c . , 528 F.3 d 413,419 5th C i r . 2008) finding s o c i a l networking s i t e

immune or claims p r emised o n sexual a s s a u l t r e s u l t i n g f r o m online meeting);

C a~afano v . Met~osplash, n c . , 339 .3 d 1119, 1123 (9th C i r . 2003) m a t c h m a k i n g

website immune r o m claims s t e m m i n g f r o m fake p r o f i l e t h a t led to t h r e a t s made

against the p l a i n t i f f , whom user h a d impersonated); Ze~an, 129 F.3 d a t 331(AOL

immune or publishing f a l s e advertisements created b y users a n d f a i l i n g to r e m o v e

t h e m p r omp tly e v e n t h ough p l a i n t i f f received death t h r e a t s as a r e s u l t ) .

B. Section 230 r o v i d e s Broad Immunity o O n l i n e Service P r o v i d e r s for

C l a i m s Ba s e d on T h i r d-Part y C ont en t .

Section 230 t a t e s : No rovider or user o f a n n t e r a c t i v e c o m p u t e r s e r v i c e

s h a l l be t r e a t e d as the publisher or speaker o f a n y information provided b y another

information content provider. 47 . S . C .§ 30(c)(1). Courts h a v e i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s

D




language t o c r e a t e a t h r e e - p a r t t e s t , under which a d e f e n d a n t i s imm u n e i£ (1) t i s

a p r o v i d e r . . . of an n t e r a c t i v e computer e r v i c e , (2) h e p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m t r e a t s i t

a s t h e p u b l i s h e r o r s p e a k e r of n f o r m a t i o n , a n d (3) h a t i n f o r m a t i o n i s p r o v i d e d

by a n o t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t p r o v i d e r . S e e B a t z e l , 333 F.3d a t 1037; U n i v e r s a l

Comm'n y s . , I n c . v . Lycos, n c . , 478 F.3d 413,418 1 s t C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) .

There i s n o d i s p u t e i n t h i s c a s e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s s a t i s f i e d t h e f i r s t t wo

p a r t s of h i s t e s t . I n s t e a d , t h e p l a i n t i f f a r g u e d , a n d t h e c o u r t a g r e e d , t h a t t h e

d e f e n d a n t s were t h e m s e l v e s i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t p r o v i d e r [ s ] f o r t h e a l l e g e d l y

d e f a m a t o r y p o s t s . S e c t i o n 230 d e f i n e s i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t p r o v i d e r a s a n y

p e r s o n o r e n t i t y t h a t s r e s p o n s i b l e , n whole o r i n p a r t , f o r t h e c r e a t i o n o r

development of n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d t h r o u g h t h e I n t e r n e t o r any o t h e r i n t e r a c t i v e

computer s e r v i c e . 47 U.S.C.§ 300(3).

C o n s i s t e n t w i t h C o n g r e s s ' s i n t e n t , [ t ] h e m a j o r i t y of e d e r a l c i r c u i t s have

i n t e r p r e t e d t h e CDA o e s t a b l i s h b r o a d f e d e r a l immunity o any c a u s e of c t i o n t h a t

would make e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s l i a b l e f o r i n f o r m a t i o n o r i g i n a t i n g w i t h a t h i r d - p a r t y

u s e r of h e s e r v i c e . Johnson v . A r d e n ,614 F.3d 785, 791 8 t h C i r . 2010) i n t e r n a l

q u o t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ; Lycos,478 F.3d a t 418 c o u r t s t h a t have a d d r e s s e d t h e s e

i s s u e s have g e n e r a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d S e c t i o n 230 immunity b r o a d l y ) . Perhaps

more m p o r t a n t h e r e , n t r e a t i n g S e c t i o n 230 immunity a s q u i t e r o b u s t , c o u r t s

have a d o p t [ e d ] a e l a t i v e l y e x p a n s i v e d e f i n i t i o n of i n t e r a c t i v e computer e r v i c e '




and a e l a t i v e l y r e s t r i c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n content r o v i d e r . ' Carafano,

339 F.3d a t 1123 § 230(c) rovides broad immunity o r p u b l i s h i n g c o n t e n t

provided p r i m a r i l y b y h i r d p a r t i e s ) . 5

To a t e , s o m e 300 e p o r t e d d e c i s i o n s have construed S e c t i o n 230, and [ a ] 1 1

but a handful . . f i n d t h a t t h e website s e n t i t l e d t o immunity from i a b i l i t y . H i l l

v . StubHub, n c . , 727 S.E.2d 550, 558 N.C. A p p . 2012). Eight i r c u i t c o u r t s have

found o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s exem p t f rom l i a b i l i t y under S e c t i o n 230 n a l l but

t w o cases d i s c u s s e d below). The S i x t h C i r c u i t has t a t e d t h a t S e c t i o n 230 r o t e c t s

websites from i a b i l i t y f o r u s e r c o n t e n t , Seaton v . T r i p A d v i s o r , LLC 28 F.3d 592,

599 6th C i r . 2013), but has not e t a p p l i e d t h e law, ee Doe . SexSearch.com,551

F.3d 412, 15 6th C i r . 2008) d e c l i n i n g t o reach h e q u e s t i o n of hether the

[CDA] r o v i d e s [defendant] wi th immunity from s u i t ) . H o w e v e r , i s t r i c t c o u r t s

in h i s C i r c u i t have recognized h e [ n ] e a r -unanimous case l a w n f o r c i n g S e c t i o n

230 immunity o r o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s a g a i n s t s u i t s seeking o hold t h em i a b l e

f o r t h i r d- p a r t y c o n t e n t . E cker t . Microsoft Copp., 2007W 96692, t *3 E.D.

5 Moreover, e c t i o n 230 r e a t e s an immunity rom u i t r a t h e r than a m er e defense

to i a b i l i t y and t i s e f f e c t i v e l y l o s t i f a case s e r r o n e o u s l y p e r m i t t e d t o g o o t r i a l .

N e m e t h e v r o l e t , 591 F.3d a t 254 i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ; emphasis n

o r i g i n a l ) ; Roommate s.c om, 521 F.3d a t 1 175 Section 230 mu s t be n t e r p r e t e d t o

p r o t e c t w e b s i t e s not merely from u l t i m a t e l i a b i l i t y , but from having to f i g h t c o s t l y

and p r o t r a c t e d l e g a l b a t t l e s . ) . Thus, o u r t s should apply S e c t i o n 230 at h e

e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e s t a g e of h e c a s e . . . . N e m e t h e v ~ ^ o l e t , 591 F.3d a t 255.




Mich. Feb. 13, 007); ee also Energy Automation y s . , Inc. . Xcent~ic V e n t u r e s ,

LLC, 007WL 557202, t * 2 n.6(M.D. enn.May 5, 007).

C. The i s t r i c t Court Mischaracterized Prior Cases to Interpret Section

230 mmunityMore estrictively Than Any ther Court.

The i s t r i c t court departed s i g n i f i c a n t l y from t h i s c l e a r precedent,finding

i n s t e a d t h a t the defendants did not have immunity under Section 230 o r a l l e g e d l y

defamatory user posts becaus e they helped develop o n t e n t . 6 I n so finding, he

court appl[ied] a standard for eva lua ting development h a t [ i s ] broader than a ny

c i r c u i t court has ever recognized. 3 -C o l v I l V i E R C B &INTERNETLAw

3 .05 3]D]i i ] Jones . . l i k e l y would have been decided d i f f e r e n t l y by other

c o u r t s . . . . )

The i s t r i c t court s s e r t e d t h a t i t s r u l i n g represents the weight o f u t h o r i t y ,

2 0 1 3 WL 068780, t * , but h a t i s simply not r u e . For example, t c i t e d cases

from the Seventh and Eighth C i r c u i t s t h a t upheld Section 230 mmunity, but

focused on h e i r d i c t a . More i g n i f i c a n t l y , the court misconstrued a sta tement in

6 The ourt declined to apply Section 230 mmunity four times. See Jones . Dirty

World Entertainment ecordings, . L . C . , 7 6 6 F. Supp. d 828,836 E.D.Ky.

2011) denying motion o d i s m i s s ) ; 840 F. upp. d 1 008 2012) denying motion

f o r summary udgment); Case No. :09- c v -00219-WOB-CJS, kt. 188 Apr. 18,

2013) denying second summary udgment o t i o n ) ; and 2013 WL 068780 Aug.

12, 013) post t r i a l supplemental o p i n i o n denying e f e n d a n t s ' motion o r

judgment as a a t t e r o f aw under Fed. . Civ.P. 0 ) .

e e , e . g . , 2013 WL 068780, t * ( d i s c u s s i n g Chicago Lawyers'Comm. og

C i v i l R i g h t s Under Law, 1 9 F.3d 666, 71 7th C i r . 2008), n which h e Seventh

E




the Tenth C i r c u i t ' s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v . Accusea~ch,570 F.3d

1187, 1199 10th C i r . 2009), h a t to be ` r e s p o n s i b l e ' for the development o f

o f f e n s i v e c o n t e n t , o n e must be m o r e than a n e u t r a l conduit f o r t h a t c o n t e n t . T h e

d i s t r i c t court read i n t o t h i s quote a r~equi~ement h a t an o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ' s

conduct be neutral to r e t a i n Section 230 immunity, t a t i n g t h a t a provider can

a v a i l i t s e l f o f Section 2 30 only if i t s ] conduct was n e u t r a l with respect to the

o f f e n s i v e n e s s o f h e c o n t e n t . 2013 W 068780, t 2 emphasis added) quoting

Accusea~ch,570 F.3d a t 1199).

Until now, o c o u r t has ever held t h a t a website must be a purely n e u t r a l

conduit for t h i r d - p a r t y content and l o s e s Section 230 mmunity i f t s e l e c t s ,

reviews, d i t s or f a i l s t o r e m o v e o f f e n s i v e c o n t e n t . This i s p r e c i s e l y the r e s u l t

Congress sought o avoid. Secti on 230 r o t e c t s and encourages o n l i n e s e r v i c e

providers to review, d i t , and block c o n t e n t . S e e Zeran, 129 F.3d a t 330 lawsuits

seeking to hold a s e r v i c e provider l i a b l e f o r i t s e x e r c i s e o f a p u b l i s h e r ' s t r a d i t i o n a l

e d i t o r i a l functions —suc h as deciding whether t o publish, withdraw, postpone or

a l t e r content —are barred ) ; see also Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d a t 986; a t z e l , 3 3 3 F.3d a t

C i r c u i t held C r a i g s l i s t immune or a l l e g e d l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y housing ads, bu t

focusing o n the c o u r t ' s c o m m e n t h a t [n]othing in the s e r v i c e c r a i g s l i s t o f f e r s

induces anyone t o post any p a r t i c u l a r l i s t i n g or express a p r e f e r e n c e f o r

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ); d . a t 2 discussing Johnson v . Aden, 1 4 F.3d a t 792, and

acknowledging t h a t the Eighth C i r c u i t upheld . . . immunity, but focusing o n i t s

comment h a t [ t ] h e record c o n t a i n s n o evidence t h a t [the I n t e r n e t s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ]

designed i t s website to be a p o r t a l f o r defamatory c o n t e n t ) .

10




1031. See also 47 .S.C. § 30(c)(1) p r o h i b i t i n g treatment o f nline s e r v i c e

provider as publisher o f nformation provided b y a h i r d p a r t y ) .

To i n d o t h e r w i s e , the d i s t r i c t court e l i e d a l m o s t n t i r e l y o n m i s a p p l i c a t i o n s

o f he N in t h a n d Tenth C i r c u i t s d e c i s i o n s in R o o m m a t e s . c o m , 521 F.3d 1157, a n d

Accusea~ch,570 .3d 1187, ee 840 F. Supp. 2 d a t 1 0 1 0-11; 2 0 1 3 WI, 068780, t

- 2 , the only c i r c u i t court cases d e c l i n i n g to apply Section 2 3 0 i m m u n i t y o n the

b a s i s t h a t o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n developing unlawful c o n t e n t .

Bu t he f a c t s a n d holdings o f hese cases d o n o t support the c o u r t s conclusion.

R o o m m a t e s . c o m concerned a website designed to m a t c h p r o s p e c t i v e

r o o m m a t e s . One o r t i o n o f he s i t e r e q u i r e d u s e r s to a n s we r questions b y m a k i n g

s e l e c t i o n s f r o m d r o p- d o w n m e n u s , ncluding q u e r i e s a b o u t h e i r gender, exual

o r i e n t a t i o n , a n d whether they w o u l d bring c h i l d r e n i n t o the household.

R o o m m a t e s . c o m , 521 F.3d a t 1160. T h e s i t e a l s o r e q u i r e d u s e r s to s p e c i f y whether

they w o u l d p r e f e r t o l i v e with s o m e o n e based o n the s a m e c r i t e r i a a n d c r e a t e d

p r o f i l e pages s e a r c h a b l e b y the c r i t e r i a . I d . Two o u s i n g g r o u p s sued

R o o m m a t e s . c o m , rguing t did o n l i n e w h a t a e a l e s t a t e agent could n o t lawfully

d o n person, . e . f a c i l i t a t e the r e n t a l o f o u s i n g b a sed o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y f a c t o r s .

R o o m m a t e s . c o m argued t h a t Section 2 3 0 provided i m m u n i t y f r o m these

claims, bu t the Ninth C i r c u i t disagreed because, t found, s to c e r t a i n o f t s

f e a t u r e s , t h e s i t e w a s responsible . . . f o r the c r e a t i o n o r development o f he

11




a l l e g e d l y u n l a w f u l c o n t e n t . See 47 U.S.C.§ 300(3). The o u r t h e l d t h a t a

w e b s i t e h e l p s t o d e v e l o p u n l a w f u l c o n t e n t , and h u s f a l l s w i t h i n t h e e x c e p t i o n t o

S e c t i o n 230, f t c o n t r i b u t e s m a t e r i a l l y t o t h e a l l e g e d i l l e g a l i t y o f h e c o n t e n t .

I d . a t 1 168 emphasis d d e d ) . Roommates.com d i d t h i s , t h e c o u r t found, e c a u s e i t

a u t h o r e d q u e s t i o n s d e s i g n e d t o e l i c i t d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r e f e r e n c e s and r e q u i r e d u s e r s

t o answer them. I d . a t 1166. By e q u i r i n g s u b s c r i b e r s t o p r o v i d e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n

a s a o n d i t i o n of c c e s s i n g i t s s e r v i c e , and by p r o v i d i n g a i m i t e d s e t of r e -

p o p u l a t e d a n s w e r s , t h e c o u r t w r o t e , Roommate becomes m u ch more than a

p a s s i v e t r a n s m i t t e r of n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d by t h e r s ; t becomes h e d e v e l o p e r , a t

l e a s t i n p a r t , of h a t i n f o r m a t i o n . I d . (emphasis a d d e d ) .

As h e Ninth C i r c u i t emphasized, h e c r u x of t s d e c i s i o n was h e s i t e ' s

Yequirement h a t u s e r s submit l l e g e d l y u n l a w f u l c o n t e n t t o i t s s i t e . $ Courts

a p p l y i n g Roommates.com have i n t e r p r e t e d i t t h e same w ay—as c a r v [ i n g ] out n l y

a narrow e x c e p t i o n t h a t t u r n e d e n t i r e l y on h e w e b s i t e ' s d e c i s i o n t o f o r c e

s u b s c r i b e r s t o d i v u l g e p r o t e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r e f e r e n c e s a s a

See, . g . , 521 F.3d a t 1167 Roommate d e s i g n e d i t s s e a r c h s y s t e m . . . based on

t h e p r e f e r e n c e s and p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t h a t Roommate t s e l f f o r c e s

s u b s c r i b e r s t o d i s c l o s e . ) ; i d . a t 1 170, . 2 6 i t i s Roommate h a t f o r c e s u s e r s t o

e x p r e s s a p r e f e r e n c e and Roommate h a t f o r c e s u s e r s t o d i s c l o s e t h e i n f o r m a t i o n

t h a t can form t h e b a s i s of i s c r i m i n a t i o n by t h e r s . ) ; i d . a t 1 172 Roommate does

not merely p r o v i d e a framework h a t c o u l d be u t i l i z e d f o r p r o p e r o r improper

p u r p o s e s ; r a t h e r , Roommate's work n d e v e l o p i n g t h e d i s c r i m i n a t o r y q u e s t i o n s ,

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y answers and d i s c r i m i n a t o r y s e a r c h mechanism i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o

t h e a l l e g e d i l l e g a l i t y of h e s i t e . ) .

12




c o n d i t i o n of s i n g i t s s e r v i c e s . Goddard . Google, n c . , 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193,

1201-02 N.D. a l . 2 0 0 9 ) ; see a l s o A t l a n t i c Recording Corp. . P r o j e c t P l a y l i s t ,

I n c . , 603 F . Supp. 2d 690, 01 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) f i n d i n g Roommates.com r e a d i l y

d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e b e c a u s e i t was based s o l e l y on h e f a c t t h a t t h e c o n t e n t on h e

w e b s i t e t h a t was i s c r i m i n a t o r y was u p p l i e d b y Roommates.com t s e l f ' ) ; oe .

MySpace, n c . , 629 F. Supp. 2d 663,665 E.D. Tex. 2009) d i s t i n g u i s h i n g

Roommates. om b e c a u s e [ t ] h e Ninth C i r c u i t r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d . . . t h a t t h e

Roommates.com w e b s i t e required t s u s e r s t o p r o v i d e c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n a s a

c o n d i t i o n of t s u s e . . . . (emphasis a d d e d ) ) .

At h e same i m e , t h e Roommates. om c o u r t emphasized h a t c o u r t s must not

r e a d t h e term develop so b r o a d l y a s t o s a p S e c t i o n 230 of t s meaning: I t ' s t r u e

t h a t t h e b r o a d e s t s e n s e of h e term ` d e v e l o p ' c o u l d i n c l u d e . . . j u s t about any

f u n c t i o n performed b y a w e b s i t e . But o r e a d t h e term so b r o a d l y would d e f e a t t h e

p u r p o s e s of e c t i o n 230 by swallowing up v e r y b i t of h e immunity h a t t h e

s e c t i o n o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e s . I d . a t 1 167.

E v e n more e l e v a n t h e r e , t h e Ninth C i r c u i t found Roommates.com was

immunerom c l a i m s stemming from a i f f e r e n t p a r t of t s w e b s i t e , a e c t i o n f o r

u s e r s t o p r o v i d e A d d i t i o n a l Comments. Roommates.com was not e s p o n s i b l e ,

i n whole o r i n p a r t , f o r t h e development of h i s c o n t e n t , b e c a u s e t h e w e b s i t e could

not review e v e r y p o s t , making t p r e c i s e l y t h e k i n d of i t u a t i o n f o r which s e c t i o n

13




230 was designed o provide immunity. I d . The l a i n t i f f s contended h e s i t e

e n c o u rag e d u b s c r i b e r s t o make i s c r i m i n a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e Additional

Co m m e n ts i e l d because t r e q u i r e d t h e s e l e c t i o n o f i s c r i m i n a t o r y p r e f e r e n c e s i n

t s r e g i s t r a t i o n p r o c e s s . I d . a t 1174. The Ninth C i r c u i t r e j e c te d t h i s argument an d

emphasized h a t t h e o r i e s o f i m p l i c i t encouragement woul d gut e c t i o n 230:

[T]here w i l l always b e l o s e c a s e s where a l e v e r lawyer could argue

t h a t something h e website o p e r a t o r d i d encouraged h e i l l e g a l i t y .

Such c l o s e c a s e s , we e l i e v e , must be e s o l v e d i n favor o f mmunity,

l e s twe

ut h e h e a r t out o f e c t i o n 230 b y o r c i n g w e b s i t e s t o f a c ed e a t h b y e n thousand d uck- b i t e s , f i g h t i n g off laims h a t they

p r o m o t e d o r encouraged — or t l e a s t t a c i t l y a s s e n t e d — o t h e i l l e g a l i t y

o f h i r d p a r t i e s . Whe r e t i s very c l e a r t h a t t h e website d i r e c t l y

p a r t i c i p a t e s i n developing h e a l l e g e d i l l e g a l i t y — as t i s c l e a r here

with e s p e c t t o Roommate's u e s t i o n s , answers and h e r e s u l t i n g

p r o f i l e pages — i mmun ity i l l b e o s t . ut n c ases o f nhan c e m e n t

b y m p l i c a t i o n o r d e v e l o p m e n t by inference —such as wit h e s p e c t t o

the Additional Co m m e n ts e r e — s e c t i o n 230 must b e n t e r p r e t e d t o

protect e b s i t e s not merely fr om u l t i m a t e l i a b i l i t y , but fr om having o

f i g h t c o s t l y and r o t r a c t e d l e g a l b a t t l e s .

I d . a t 1 174-75 emphasis added) . Contrary o the Ninth C i r c u i t ' s holding n

Roommates. o m , h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t decided h a t a e b s i t e can b e i a b l e a s a o n t e n t

developer merely because t i m p l i c i t l y encourages s e r s t o post f f e n s i v e c o n t e n t .

In A ccusea~ch, h e defendant p e r a t e d a website h a t o f f e r e d t o s e l l

i n d i v i d u a l s ' p r i v a t e telephone r e c o r d s , a l l e g e d l y i n v i o l a t i o n or unlawful

circumvention o f h e Telecommunications Act. 570 F.3d t 1 192. Accusearch

invoked S e c t i o n 230, arguing h a t t o b t a i n e d the e c o r d s fr om h i r d- p a r t y

r e s e a r c h e r s t h i r e d , but h e Tenth C i r c u i t r e j e c t e d t h i s argument. I d . a t 1191.

1 4




Alluding to Roommates. om, t found h a t [b]y paying t s r e s e a r c h e r s t o a c q u i r e

telephone r e c o r d s , kn ow i n g the c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f he records was p r o t e c t e d b y law,

i t c o n t r i b u t e d m i g h t i l y to the unlawful conduct. I d . a t 1200. At he h e a r t o f he

c o u r t ' s decision was t s f i n d i n g t h a t [ a ] c q u i s i t i o n o f h i s information w o u l d almost

i n e v i t a b l y r e q u i r e someone to v i o l a t e the [law]. I d . a t 1192. See also H i l l , 727

S.E.2d a t 561 (reading Roommates.com and Accusea~ch to r e q u i r e t h a t an o n l i n e

provider e f f e c t i v e l y c o n t r o l the content posted b y . . t h i r d p a r t i e s or take o t h e r

a c t i o n s which e s s e n t i a l l y ensure the c r e a t i o n o f unlawful m a t e r i a l t o l o s e Section

230 immunity); Shiamili v . Real Estate G r o u p o fNew York, n c . , 17 N.Y.3d 281,

290,952 N.E.2d l ol l (N.Y. 2011) r e f u s i n g t o i n t e r p r e t Accusea~ch to c r e a t e an

exception to immu n i t y where defendants created and ran a Web i t e which

i m p l i c i t l y encouraged u s e r s to post n e g a t i v e comments ) .

The d i s t r i c t court here ignored the holding o f ccusea~ch and mistakenly

l a t c h e d o n to one t a t e m e n t : We h e r e f o r e conclude h a t a e r v i c e provider s

` r e s p o n s i b l e ' for h e development o f f f e n s i v e content only f t in some way

s p e c i f i c a l l y encourages the development o f what s o f f e n s i v e about the c o n t e n t .

840 F. Supp. 2 d a t 1011 (quoting Accusearch,570 F.3d a t 1 1 9 9 ) . The court

i n t e r p r e t e d t h i s t o mean h a t a website s be y o n d Section 230 r o t e c t i o n s i f the s i t e

i s o f f e n s i v e and encourages u s e r s t o post c o n t e n t . That s n o t h a t Accusea~ch

15




h e l d , t i s not what S e c t i o n 230 t a t e s , and n o c o u r t has e v e r a d o p t e d such a

sweeping e x c e p t i o n t o S e c t i o n 230 immunity.

D The D i s t r i c t Court's I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Threatens t o S t r i p Online S e r v i c e

Providers o f e c t i o n 230 Im m u n i t y Based o n Common n d Laudable

P r a c t i c e s .

I n i t s o p i n i o n s , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p o i n t e d t o s e v e r a l f a c t o r s t h a t p u r p o r t e d l y

e s t a b l i s h e d t h e d e f e n d a n t s encouraged f f e n s i v e c o n t e n t and t h u s were n o t

e n t i t l e d t o S e c t i o n 230 immunity. In t s o r d e r denying d e f e n d a n t s ' motion f o r

judgment s a m a t t e r o f aw, t summarized:

T h i s Court h o l d s by r e a s o n o f h e v e r y n a m e o f h e s i t e t h e ma n n e r n

which t i s managed, and t h e p e r s o n a l c o m m e n t s o f e f e n d a n t R i t c h i e ,

t h e d e f e n d a n t s have s p e c i f i c a l l y encouraged development o f what s

o f f e n s i v e about h e c o n t e n t o f h e s i t e .

840 F. Supp. 2d a t 1012. T h i s i l l - d e f i n e d encouragement e s t i s based o n a c t o r s

t h a t c a n n o t d e f e a t S e c t i o n 230 immunity and would undermine t s v e r y p u r p o s e .

1 . Exercising T r a d i t i o n a l E d i t o r i a l Functions.

The d i s t r i c t c o u r t concluded t h a t d e f e n d a n t s a r e c o n t e n t p r o v i d e r s b a s e d o n

t h e man ne r n which t h e w e b s i t e ] was managed, x p l a i n i n g :

R i t c h i e a c t s a s e d i t o r o f h e s i t e and s e l e c t s a m a l l p e r c e n t a g e o f

s u b m i s s i o n s t o be p o s t e d . He dds a t a g l i n e . . . . He e v i e w s t h e

p o s t i n g s but does n o t v e r i f y t h e i r a c c u r a c y . . . . I f s o m e o n e o b j e c t s t o

a p o s t i n g , he d e c i d e s i f t s h o u l d be removed.

840 F. Supp. 2d a t 1012.

But, s d i s c u s s e d above, Con gress e x p r e s s l y i n t e n d e d S e c t i o n 230 o

p r e s e r v e and promote o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s ' r i g h t s t o e x e r c i s e t h e s e t r a d i t i o n a l

1 6




e d i t o r i a l f u n c t i o n s . See supra S e c t i o n IV.C. In s e l e c t i n g , reviewing, d i t i n g , an d

deciding whether o i n c l u d e c o n t e n t , w e b s i t e s a c t a s p u b l i s h e r s and x p r e s s l y have

immunity under S e c t i o n 230 w h e n doing s o . S e c t i o n 230, by t s terms, r e c l u d e s

t r e a t i n g o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s as a publisher or speaker o f h i r d- p a r t y c o n t e n t .

47 .S.C. § 30(c)(1) emphasis added); see Ze~an, 129 F.3d a t 330.

2 . Failing o Remove llegedly Unlaw ful Content f t e r N o t i c e .

The i s t r i c t c o u r t a l s o r e p e a t e d l y noted h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f complain ed about

p o s t s but e f e n d a n t s did not remove them. See 840 F. Supp. 2d t 1009 After

i n i t i a l l y r e c e i v i n g a response s t a t i n g t h a t t h e web s i t e w o u ld remove h e p o s t ,

p l a i n t i f f w a s o l d t h a t the post w o u ld not be remov ed. ) , i d . a t 1010 A g a i n

p l a i n t i f f emailed h e w eb s i t e r e q u e s t i n g t h a t t h e p o s t s be removed, but her e q u e s t s

were g n o r e d . ) ; see l s o 766 F. Supp. 2d t 830- 3 1 .

To h e e x t e n t the d i s t r i c t c o u r t viewed h e f a i l u r e t o remove p o s t s a s a a s i s

f o r denying S e c t i o n 230 mmunity, t again e r r e d . As h e F i r s t C i r c u i t s t a t e d , [ i ] t

i s , by n o w , ell s t a b l i s h e d t h a t n o t i c e o f h e unlawful a t u r e o f he information

provided s not enough o m a ke t t h e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ' s own peech. Lycos, 478

F.3d a t 420; ee l s o Ze~an ,l 29 F.3d a t 333; M.A. . V i l l a g e Voice Media

Holdings, LLC 09 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1051 E.D. Mo. 011), [E]ven f a e r v i c e

p r o v i d e r k n o w s h a t t h i r d p a r t i e s a r e p o s t i n g i l l e g a l c o n t e n t , h e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ' s

f a i l u r e t o i n t e r v e n e i s immunized. i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n o m i t t e d ) ) .

i ~ J




N o t i c e - b a s e d l i a b i l i t y a l s o r u n s d i r e c t l y c o u n t e r t o t h e p u r p o s e s of e c t i o n

230. I f h e law r e q u i r e s p r o v i d e r s e i t h e r t o remove u n l a w f u l c o n t e n t o r r i s k

l i a b i l i t y , n o t i c e of o t e n t i a l l y u n l a w f u l c o n t e n t would r e q u i r e a e g a l judgment . .

and an on-t h e - s p o t e d i t o r i a l d e c i s i o n whether o r i s k l i a b i l i t y by a l l o w i n g t h e

c o n t i n u e d p u b l i c a t i o n of h a t i n f o r m a t i o n , g i v i n g p r o v i d e r s a n a t u r a l i n c e n t i v e

simply t o remove messages upon n o t i f i c a t i o n , whether h e c o n t e n t s were

[ u n l a w f u l ] o r n o t . Zeran, 129 F.3d a t 3 3 3 . 9

3 . F ocu s on EntiYe Website Rather than S p e c i f i c C o n t e n t .

The d i s t r i c t c o u r t a l s o c o n s i s t e n t l y f o c u s e d on t s view t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s

c r e a t e d , d e v e l o p e d , o r m a t e r i a l l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o d e v e l o p i n g t h e c o n t e n t of

TheDirty.com w e b s i t e a s a whole, a t h e r t h a n t h e s p e c i f i c p o s t s t h e p l a i n t i f f

c h a l l e n g e d . See, . g . , 840 F. Supp. 2 d a t 1011 The p r i n c i p a l c o n t e n t of t h e

d i r t y . c o m ' web i t e i s not o n l y o f f e n s i v e but o r t i o u s . ) ; d . a t 1012 [T]he

d e f e n d a n t s . . . ` s p e c i f i c a l l y encourage development of what s o f f e n s i v e about h e

c o n t e n t ' of t h e d i r t y . c o m ' web i t e . ) ; 2013 W 068780, t *3 [ D ] e f e n d a n t s

h e r e r e c e i v e d p o s t i n g s on h e i r w e b s i t e which would be a c t i o n a b l e even by a u b l i c

f i g u r e , . e . , t h a t t h e y were knowingly a l s e o r i n r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e t r u t h .

) .

n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n s put n l i n e p r o v i d e r s i n a Catch 22. I f a

p r o v i d e r reviews and b l o c k s u s e r c o n t e n t , t can be h e d e v e l o p e r of h a t c o n t e n t .

But f t f a i l s t o t a k e d o w n c o n t e n t a f t e r someone c o m p l a i n s , h a t t o o makes t a

developer u t s i d e S e c t i o n 2 3 0 r o t e c t i o n s .




This approach c o n t r a d i c t s e s t a b l i s h e d law holding t h a t o n l i n e s e r v i c e

p r o v i d e r s can be l i a b l e only f o r d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n c r e a t i n g , r e q u i r i n g , o r

developing the p e c i f i c content that s unlawful. For example, n S . C. v . Dirty

World, LLC, 012WL 335284(W.D.Mo. a r . 12,2012), n o t h e r f e d e r a l d i s t r i c t

c o u r t dismissed defamation claims a g a i n s t TheDirty.com under S e c t i o n 230,

d i s t a n c e [ d ] i t s e l f ' f rom t h e Jones c o u r t ' s narrow i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o fCD

immunity, a n d h e l d t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f could not h a l l e n g e t h e w e b s i t e as a whole

because the CD ocuses o n h e s p e c i f i c post a t i s s u e . I d . a t *4. I t found: As

m a t t e r o f law, a n d even i f r u e , merely encouraging defamatory p o s t s i s not

s u f f i c i e n t t o d e f e a t CDA mmunity . I d . ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . See a l s o Whitney

I n f o . Network v . X c e n t r ~ i c V e n t u r e s , LLC, 008 WL 50095, t * 2(M.D. l a . Feb.

15,2008) T h e i s s u e . . . i s whether Defendants a r e r e s p o n s i b l e , i n whole or i n

p a r t , f o r t h e c r e a t i o n or development o f he a r t i c u l a r postings e l a t i n g t o

[ P l a i n t i f f ) t h a t a r e t h e s u b j e c t o f h i s l a w s u i t . (emphasis a d d e d ) ) ; Ca~afano, 339

F.3d a t 1125 noting t h e key i s s u e i s whether t h e o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r c r e a t e d

or developed the p a r t i c u l a r i n f o r m a t i o n a t i s s u e ) ; Gentry Ebay, n c . , 99 a l .

A p p . 4th 816,833, . l 1 , 121 C a l . R p t r . 2d 703 2002) T h e c r i t i c a l i s s u e i s

whether eBay a c t e d as an i n f o r m a t i o n content p r o v i d e r with r e s p e c t to t h e

information t h a t a p p e l l a n t s claim i s f a l s e o r m i s l e a d i n g . )

[ L ~




Likewise, n H i l l v . Stubhub, 727 S.E.2d a t 550, a r i a l c o u r t held t h a t t h e

t i c k e t exchange website Stubhub was not e n t i t l e d t o S e c t i o n 230 immunity because

t found t h e w e b s i t e as a w h o l e promoted t i c k e t s c a l p i n g . But h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t

r e v e r s e d , concluding t h a t t h e ` e n t i r e w e b s i t e ' approach w a s a t a l l y flawed.

Indeed, both c a s e s the d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r i n c i p a l l y r e l i e d u p on — Roommates. o m and

Accusearch —make l a i n t h a t o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s l o s e S e c t i o n 230 r o t e c t i o n s

only i f they d i r e c t l y c r e a t e or develop t h e s p e c i f i c content a l l e g e d t o b e unlawful.

See Roommates .com, 521 F.3d a t 1174 immunity i s l o s t w h er e the website

d i r e c t l y pa r t i c i p a t e s i n developing t h e a l l e g e d i l l e g a l i t y ) ; Accusea~ch, 570 F.3d a t

1 199 provider i s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r u s e r c o n t e n t only i f t . . . s p e c i f i c a l l y encourages

t h e dev el opment o f what s o f f e n s i v e about h e c o n t e n t )

In t h i s c a s e , as t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t noted, h e p l a i n t i f f u l t i m a t e l y d e c l i n e d t o

pursue [ t h e ] t a g l i n e [added b y defendant R i t c h i e , s t a t i n g Why r e a l l high school

t e a c h e r s f r e a k s i n the sack? ] as an independently a c t i o n a b l e s t a t e m e n t . . . . 2013

W 068780, t *4. Rathe r th an focus o n whether h e content R i t c h i e a d m i t t e d l y

c r e a t e d was defamatory (o r p r o t e c t e d opinion or h e t o r i c ) , t h e c o u r t mistakenly

analyzed whether d e f e n d a n t s ' website a s a w h o l e w a s o f f e n s i v e .

This e n t i r e l y s u b j e c t i v e approach no t only c o n t r a d i c t s t h e law, t puts a l l

o n l i n e p r o v i d e r s a t r i s k f o r allowing or encouraging p r o v o c a t i v e , c o n t r o v e r s i a l , or

n e g a t i v e c o n t e n t , s u b j e c t t o the v a g a r i e s o f hether a u dge or jury w i l l d e e m t h e

20




s i t e o r some of t s c o n t e n t o f f e n s i v e . Yet, s t h e long h i s t o r y of h e F i r s t

Amendment e a c h e s , speech cannot be e s t r i c t e d simply because t i s u p s e t t i n g or

a r o u s e s contempt. Snyder . P h e l p s , 131 S. t . 1207, 1219, 179 L. d. d 17 2

(2011). Quite h e o p p o s i t e , i m p o r t a n t p r i n c i p l e s a r e born from speech h a t some

may o n s i d e r shabby, f f e n s i v e , o r even g l y . U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Playboy n t .

Group, n c . , 529 U.S. 803, 2 6 2000).

4 . W e b s i t e Name.

The i s t r i c t c o u r t concluded h a t t h e name of h e s i t e i n and of t s e l f

[TheDirty.com] encourages h e p o s t i n g only of d i r t , t h a t i s m a t e r i a l which s

p o t e n t i a l l y defamatory o r a n n v a s i o n of h e s u b j e c t ' s p r i v a c y . 840 F. upp. d a t

1012; see l s o 2013 W 068780, t *3 t h e evidence c o n c l u s i v e l y d e m o n s t r a t e s

t h a t t h e s e p o s t i n g s and o t h e r s l i k e them w e r e i n v i t e d and encouraged by h e

d e f e n d a n t s b y s i n g t h e name D i r t y . c o m ' ) . But o u r t s have r e p e a t e d l y r e j e c t e d

c l a i m s a g a i n s t w e b s i t e s whose na mes might l l e g e d l y i n v i t e n e g a t i v e c o n t e n t , such

a s PissedConsumer.com, ipoffReport.com, Badbusinessbureau.com, nd even

TheDirty.com.

In S.C. . D u t y W o r l d , LLC , 0 1 2 W 335284, h e c o u r t r e j e c t e d t h i ssame

argument with r e s p e c t t o TheDirty.com because t h e CD o c u s e s on h e s p e c i f i c

c o n t e n t a t i s s u e and not h e name of e b s i t e . I d . See l s o A s c e n t i v e , LLC .

Opinion C o p p . , 842 F. Supp. d 450, 7 5-76 E.D.N.Y. 0 1 1 )

21




(PissedConsumer.com was not i a b l e f o r u s e r review, even though t i n v i t e d o t h e r s

t o submit and prominently d i s p l a y e d n e g a t i v e reviews, which s not n l i k e t h e

t a r g e t e d s o l i c i t a t i o n of d i t o r i a l m a t e r i a l engaged i n b y a narrow genre of

p u b l i s h e r s ) ; W quityLLC . X c e n t r i c V e n t u r e s LLC 009WL 2173 N.D.

Tex. a n . 9, 2009) g r a n t i n g s u m mar y judgment o r i p o f f r e p o r t . c o m an d

badbusinessbureau.com f o r claims premised on u s e r reviews, even though s i t e s

r e q u i r e d u s e r s t o s e l e c t category f o r p o s t s , i n c l u d i n g one f o r corrupt companies ) ;

Global o y a l t i e s , L t d . v . Xcent~ic V e n t u r e s , LLC 44 F. Supp. 2d 929 D. r i z .

2008) same f o r r i p o f f r e p o r t . c o m ) ; Whitney nformation Network, n c . , 2008 WL

450095 same).

5 . Inconsistency w i t h CommonLaw efamation.

T he d i s t r i c t c o u r t opined t h a t p e r m i t t i n g defendants o invoke S e c t i o n 230

immunity would allow t t o be used t o s u b v e r t t h e law of efamation which has

e x i s t e d a t common aw f o r c e n t u r i e s , a s well a s t h e laws p r o t e c t i n g t h e r i g h t of

p r i v a c y . . . . 2013WL 068780, t *3. The c o u r t c l e a r l y was n f l u e n c e d b y

common aw p r i n c i p l e s t h a t make t l i b e l o u s t o impute u n c h a s t i t y t o a woman, or

s t a t e t h a t a woman s sexually promiscuous. 840 F. Supp. 2d a t 1011.

But Congress n t e n t i o n a l l y abrogated t h e common aw i n S e c t i o n 230. At

common aw, u b l i s h e r s could be held i a b l e f o r r e p u b l i c a t i o n of defamatory

s t a t e m e n t s , whether or not they knew they were defamatory. Congress recognized

22




t h i s r u l e was unworkable o r t h e v a s t amounts of s e r c o n t e n t on h e I n t e r n e t and

would d e s t r o y t h e r o b u s t flow of nformation and n n o v a t i o n o n l i n e . I t made a

p o l i c y choice to provide immunity o r e n t i t i e s t h a t host h i r d- p a r t y c o n t e n t , and t

i s not o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , h i s Court, or any t h e r c o u r t t o s u b s t i t u t e a i f f e r e n t

c h o i c e . See Doe . MySpace, n c . , 528 F.3d a t 419; Ca~afano, 3 9 F.3d a t 1 123.

See also supra S e c t i o n IV.A.

6 . I m p l i c i t l y Adopting Thud-Party Content.

F i n a l l y , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t concluded h a t d e f e n d a n t s were not n t i t l e d to

Section 230 mmunity bec ause they r a t i f i e d and adopted the c o n t e n t t h e p l a i n t i f f

c h a l l e n g e d . 2013 W 068780, t *4 [T]he a l i e n t p o i n t about i t c h i e ' s t a g l i n e

i s not h a t t was defamatory t s e l f and thus o u t s i d e CDA mmunity, ut a t h e r t h a t

t e f f e c t i v e l y r a t i f i e d and adopted h e t h i r d - p a r t y p o s t . ) ; see a l s o 840 F. Supp. 2d

a t 1012 a s s e r t i n g t h a t a ury could c e r t a i n l y i n t e r p r e t R i t c h i e ' s t a g l i n e , Why r e

a l l high school e a c h e r s f r e a k s i n t h e sack? as adopting the preceding a l l e g e d l y

defamatory comments concerning p l a i n t i f f ' s ] s e x u a l a c t i v i t y ) .

T h e i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n t o p r e c l u d e S e c t i o n 230 mmunity based on t s

views h a t d e f e n d a n t s i m p l i c i t l y adopted] an f f e n s i v e posting and thereby

e f f e c t i v e l y r a t i f i e d and adopted h e p o s t , 2013 W 068780, t *2 emphasis

added), dangerously e s t r i c t s t h e scope and a v a i l a b i l i t y of e c t i o n 230 immunity

and c r e a t e s an ambiguo us and unworkable t a n d a r d . Any ebsite or n l i n e

23




p l a t f o r m t h a t h o s t s u s e r c o n t e n t r e l a t e d to speech t h a t s omeone might f i n d

o b j e c t i o n a b l e — whether p o l i t i c a l commentary, consumer reviews, e l e b r i t y g o s s i p ,

or c o u n t l e s s o t h e r t o p i c s —would r i s k l i a b i l i t y o n t h e theory t h a t t has

enco uraged unlawful c o n t e n t . See P a r i s i v . S i n c l a i r , 774 F. Supp. 2d 310,316

(D.D.C. 2011) i t would be c o n t r a r y t o t h e purpose o f h e CDA . . to r e q u i r e a

f a c t-based a n a l y s i s o f f and w h e n a defendant ` a d o p t e d ' p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e m e n t s and

revoke immunity o n t h a t b a s i s ) . Websites allowing g i v e -and- t a k e about u s e r -

submitted views and c omments a r e [ t ] h e p r o t o t y p i c a l services] u a l i f y i n g f o r

[Section 230] t a t u t o r y immunity . . . . Accusea~ch, 570 F.3d a t 1195. And, s the

Ninth C i r c u i t held i n Roommates.com, o u r t s should r e j e c t t h e o r i e s o f development

b y i m p l i c a t i o n or . . . i n f e r e n c e , or t h a t a website t a c i t l y a s s e n t e d t o c o n t e n t ,

because otherwise we u t the h e a r t out o f e c t i o n 230. 521 F.3d a t 1174.

E. The i s t r i c t Court's Unprecedented I n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Section 23 0

Threatens Speech Across the Internet.

C i r c u i t c o u r t s have c a r e f u l l y d e l i n e a t e d t h e boundaries o f e c t i o n 230

immunity c o n s i s t e n t with Congress's i n t e n t , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t in l i m i t e d

circumstances, o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s may develop a c t i o n a b l e c o n t e n t i f they

r e q u i r e u s e r s to submit t or r e t a i n t h i r d p a r t i e s t o c r e a t e i t This Court now as the

o p p o r t u n i t y to c o n s i d e r t h e i s s u e , and t l i k e w i s e should i n t e r p r e t S e c t i o n 230

c o n s i s t e n t with t s aims and e s t a b l i s h e d case law.

24




I f h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s u n p r e c e d e n t e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e c t i o n 230 s

a c c e p t e d , t h e p r e d i c t a b i l i t y t h a t S e c t i o n 230 now p r o v i d e s w i l l be o s t .

p r o v i d e r w i l l know whether someone might u b j e c t i v e l y d e t e r m i n e i t s s e r v i c e i s

o f f e n s i v e o r i m p l i c i t l y "encourages" f f e n s i v e u s e r c o n t e n t . The e f f e c t s of uch

u n c e r t a i n l y would be a r-r a n g i n g , a s u s e r c o n t e n t i s a e n t r a l f e a t u r e of o u n t l e s s

o n l i n e s e r v i c e s , n c l u d i n g ones o p e r a t e d by Amici. O n l i n e p r o v i d e r s r e l y on h e

p r o t e c t i o n s of e c t i o n 230 o manage h e i r s e r v i c e s and p r o v i d e v i b r a n t forums o r

s p e e c h and commerce. Th e i s k s of h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s a r e p e r h a p s a s

v a r i e d a s t h e b r e a d t h of h i r d c o n t e n t t s e l f but Amici f f e r some examples.

F i r s t , i f o n l i n e p r o v i d e r s a r e s u b j e c t t o l i a b i l i t y f o r "encouraging" o n t e n t b y

e x e r c i s i n g e d i t o r i a l d i s c r e t i o n and d e c i d i n g t o d e l e t e some p o s t s b u t not t h e r s ,

every p r o v i d e r t h a t r e v i e w s and e d i t s u s e r c o n t e n t i s a t r i s k of o s i n g immunity.

B u t e b s i t e s a c r o s s t h e I n t e r n e t do u s t t h a t . For example, h e review w e b s i t e

yelp.com o p e r a t e d by Amicus Yelp I n c . ) has e c e i v e d more h a n 47 i l l i o n

reviews about o c a l b u s i n e s s e s , government e r v i c e s , and o t h e r e s t a b l i s h m e n t s

from t s u s e r s , and u s e s automated o f t w a r e t o d e c i d e which of h e s e reviews o

r ecommend o t h e p u b l i c i n an e f f o r t t o weed o u t r e v i e w s t h a t m a y b e a k e , o v e r l y

o f f e n s i v e , o r o t h e r w i s e u n h e l p f u l . See e v i t t v . Yelp n c . , 2011 W 079526

(N.D. a l . O c t . 26,2011) f i n d i n g Yelp immune o r t h e s e a c t s b e c a u s e e x p o s u r e t o

l i a b i l i t y c o u l d c a u s e i t t o r e s i s t f i l t e r i n g out a l s e/ u n r e l i a b l e r e v i e w s . . . o r t o

25




immediately remove l l n e g a t i v e reviews about which b u s i n e s s e s complained ) .

A m i c u s T r i p A d v i s o r LLC i s p l a y s m i l l i o n s of s e r c o m m e n t s a b o u t h o t e l s a nd

t r a v e l s e r v i c e s , a n d Amicus Am azon.com p r o v i d e s m i l l i o n s of customer reviews

about books an d o t h e r p r o d u c t s . These s i t e s l i k e c o u n t l e s s o t h e r s , r e s e r v e r i g h t s t o

remove, c r e e n , a n d e d i t u s e r- g e n e r a t e d c o n t e n t , a nd t o e x e r c i s e t h e e d i t o r i a l

d i s c r e t i o n t o remove s o m e p o s t s w h i l e a l l o w i n g o t h e r s t o remain p o s t e d . U n d e r

t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , such e f f o r t s c o u l d c o n t r i b u t e t o l i a b i l i t y r a t h e r

t h a n p r o t e c t a g a i n s t t . I f h i s i s t h e r u l e , o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s a r e b e t t e r o f f not

r e v i e w i n g , e d i t i n g , o r b l o c k i n g c o n t e n t — a e s u l t t h a t woul d b e e x a c t l y c o n t r a r y t o

S e c t i o n 2 3 0 ' s i n t e n t t o e n c o u r a g e s e l f- p o l i c i n g .

A d di t i o n a l l y , i f w e b s i t e s l o s e S e c t i o n 230 i m m u ni t y b a s e d on a d e c i s i o n t h a t

e i t h e r t h e s i t e o r s o m e of t s c o n t e n t i s o f f e n s i v e , o n l i n e p r o v i d e r s

u n d e r s t a n d a b l y w i l l f e a r even coming c l o s e t o t h i s l i n e . 1 0 For example, A m i c u s

Ga w k er M e d i a LLC p e r a t e s a w e b s i t e c a l l e d Def amer

(www.defame r.gawker.com), which p o s t s c o n t e n t about c e l e b r i t i e s . T h e w e b s i t e

r e d d i t . c o m p r o v i d e s i t e m s p o s t e d b y u s e r s , ranked a c c o r d i n g t o v o t e s b y o t h e r

t os h e Supre m e Court a s r e c o g n i z e d , where p a r t i c u l a r s p e e c h f a l l s c l o s e t o t h e

l i n e s e p a r a t i n g t h e l a w f u l and t h e u n l a w f u l , h e p o s s i b i l i t y of i s t a k e n f a c t f i n d i n g

— i n h e r e n t i n a l l l i t i g a t i o n —will r e a t e t h e danger t h a t t h e l e g i t i m a t e u t t e r a n c e w i l l

b e p e n a l i z e d , f o r [ t ] h e m a n w h o k n o w s h a t he m u s t r i n g f o r t h proof a nd

p e r s u a d e a n o t h e r of h e l a w f u l n e s s of i s conduct e c e s s a r i l y m u s t t e e r f a r wider

of h e u n l a w f u l z o n e . S p e i s e r v . R a n d a l l , 357 U.S. 513,526 1 9 5 8 ) .




u s e r s and o r g a n i z e d by v a r i o u s c a t e g o r i e s , i n c l u d i n g f o r i t e m s t h a t a r e

c o n t r o v e r s i a l . And a g a i n , many w e b s i t e s d i s p l a y r e v i e w s of u s i n e s s e s o r

p r o f e s s i o n a l s , i n c l u d i n g Amici Amazon.com, r i p A d v i s o r , Awo nd Yelp.

Anytime o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s i n v i t e i n p u t t h a t mayb e o n t r o v e r s i a l o r c r i t i c a l

someone may o n s i d e r something o f f e n s i v e . But r o v i d e r s a r e p r o t e c t e d by

S e c t i o n 230 and h e y s h o u l d b e , b e c a u s e open and r e e speech on h e I n t e r n e t i s

what Congress meant o f o s t e r .

I f w e b s i t e s a r e s u b j e c t t o l i a b i l i t y f o r f a i l i n g t o remove h i r d- p a r t y c o n t e n t

whenever someone o b j e c t s , t h e y w i l l be s u b j e c t t o t h e h e c k l e r ' s v e t o , g i v i n g

anyone w h o complains u n f e t t e r e d power o c e n s o r s p e e c h . See Reno v . Am. i v i l

L i b e r t i e s Union,521 U.S. 844, 880 1997). For example, Avvo.com h o s t s u s e r

reviews of t t o r n e y s (www.avvo.com) nd would r i s k l i a b i l i t y i f t d i d not remove

c l i e n t comments and reviews whenever a d i s g r u n t l e d a t t o r n e y d i d not i k e them.

T h e same would be r u e f o r Amazon.com i f an a u t h o r o b j e c t e d t o r e v i e w s of e r

work, r TripAdvisor.com i f a o t e l d i s l i k e d r e v i e w s from t s g u e s t s . Under h e

d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , any w e b s i t e t h a t r e c e i v e s a o m p l a i n t about h i r d -

p a r t y c o n t e n t would have i t t l e c h o i c e but o remove t and h e c a n d i d exchange of

i n f o r m a t i o n would s u f f e r a s a e s u l t .

F i n a l l y , i f o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s adopt r r a t i f y u s e r c o n t e n t merely

by e s p o n d i n g t o p o s t s o r adding comments h a t a r e not a c t i o n a b l e , t h a t c o u l d

27




d i s s u a d e w e b s i t e s from i n t e r a c t i n g w i t h u s e r s a l t o g e t h e r . For example, news

w e b s i t e s t h a t s o l i c i t c i t i z e n j o u r n a l i s m about u b l i c e v e n t s , c r i m e t i p s , o r u s e r s '

e x p e r i e n c e s (such a s Amicus CNN's r e p o r t . c o m ) , o f t e n e n c o u r a g e c o n v e r s a t i o n s

between u s e r s and e d i t o r s about e v e l o p i n g news v e n t s . S i m i l a r l y , Amicus

Gawker b e l i e v e s t h a t i n t e r a c t i o n among u b m i t t e r s and e d i t o r s i s i n t e g r a l t o f i n d i n g

and p u b l i s h i n g a c c u r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o p i n i o n s o f f e r no l e a r

g u i d a n c e about when an o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r ' s ow n p u t h a s adopted r

r a t i f i e d a r g u a b l y o f f e n s i v e c o n t e n t , n e c e s s a r i l y c a u s i n g them t o be more e t i c e n t

about r o v i d i n g any feedback o r comments, e g a r d l e s s of h e v a l u e of o i n g s o .

I t i s not Amici's p l a c e i n t h i s c a s e t o condone o r condemn d e f e n d a n t s '

w e b s i t e o r c o n d u c t . C e r t a i n l y , an o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r m a y o s e S e c t i o n 230

immunity f t c r e a t e s o r d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p at e s i n a u t h o r i n g u n l a w f u l c o n t e n t . Bu t

t h e l i n e s s h o u l d be c l e a r , a s o n l i n e s e r v i c e p r o v i d e r s a c r o s s t h e I n t e r n e t need t o

u n d e r s t a n d and r e l y on h e p r o t e c t i o n s of e c t i o n 230 h a t Congress i n t e n d e d . T h i s

Court should be c a r e f u l not o d e s t r o y t h e l a w ' s broad immunity and d e f e a t t s v e r y

p u r p o s e s b y r e a t i n g t h e o r i e s of i m p l i c i t encouragement r a d o p t i o n , a s t h e

d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o u n d .




Respectfully submitted t h i s 19th day of Novemb er, 2013

BRUCE .H.JOHNSON

JAMES .GRANT

AMBIKAK DOR N

Co-counsel og ami ci


1241 Third Avenue, u i t e 2200

S e a t t l e Washington 98101

Tel: 206)622-3150

Fax: 206)757-7700

THOM S BURKE

Co-counsel og amid

D MSWRIGHTTREMAINELLP

505 Montgom er y S t r e e t S u i t e 800

San Francisco, a l i f o r n i a 9 4 1 1 1

Tel: 415)276-6500

Fax: 415)276-6599

s/John C. G~eine~

JOHN .GREINER 0005551)

NICHOLAS . ZIEPFEL 0086584)

Co-counsel or ami ci

GR YDONHE D ITCHEYLLP

1900 i f t h T h i r d C e n t e r

511 Walnut S t r e e t

C i n c i n n a t i OH 5202-3157

T e l : 513)629-2731

Fax: 513)651-3836

JAMESROSENFELD

Co-counsel og amid

D MSWRIGHTTREMAINELLP

1633 Broadway,27th Floor

New ork,NY 0019

T e l : 212) 89-8230

Fax: 212)489-8340

29




CERTIFICATEOFCOMPLIANCE

This b r i e f complies w i t h t h e type-volu me l i m i t a t i o n o f ed. R. App. P.

29 d) 7) and 3 2 a ) 7 ) B ) i ) because t c o n t a i n s 6,849 words o f e x t a s c a l c u l a t e d b y

t h e w o r d- p r o c e s s i n g program used t o p r e p a r e i t e x c l u d i n g t h e p a r t s o f h e b r i e f

ex emp t ed b y Fed. R. A p p . P. 2 a ) 7 ) B ) i i i ) and i r . R. 2 b ) 1 ) .

This b r i e f complies w i t h t h e t y p e f a c e r e q u i r e m e n t o f ed. R. A p p . P.

3 2 a ) 5 ) and t h e t y p e - s t y l e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f ed. R. A p p . P. 2 a ) 6 ) because t has

b e e n p r e p a r e d i n a p r o p o r t i o n a l l y spaced t y p e f a c e u s i n g M i c r o s o f t W o r d 2011 i n

14- p o i n t T i m e s NewRoman o n t .

s/Jo h n C. Greiner

John C . r e i n e r 0005551)

30




CERTIFIC TEOFSERVICE

I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t a copy of h e foregoing was served on a l l counsel of

r e c o r d , t h i s 1 9 t h day of November, 2013, b y means of he C o u r t s e l e c t r o n i c f i l i n g

system.

s/John C. G~eine~

John C . Greiner 0005551)

31




__________________________________________________________________

No. 13-5946

__________________________________________________________________

United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit

DIRTY WORLD ENTERTAINMENT, et al.

Defendants-Appellants

v.

SARAH JONES

Plaintiff-Appellee

_________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky __________________________________________________________________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

OPINION CORP. SUPPORTINGAPPELLANTS AND URGING REVERSAL

Marc J. Randazza

RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP

3625 S. Town Center Drive,

Suite 150

Las Vegas, Nevada 89135

(702) 420-2001

Attorney for Amicus Curiae

November 19, 2013




6CA-18/08 Page 1 of 2

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Disclosure of Corporate Affiliationsand Financial Interest

Sixth CircuitCase Number: Case Name:

Name of counsel:

Pursuant to 6th Cir. R. 26.1,Name of Party

makes the following disclosure:

1. Is said party a subsidiary or affiliate of a publicly owned corporation? If Yes, list below theidentity of the parent corporation or affiliate and the relationship between it and the namedparty:

2. Is there a publicly owned corporation, not a party to the appeal, that has a financial interestin the outcome? If yes, list the identity of such corporation and the nature of the financialinterest:


I certify that on _____________________________________ the foregoing document was served on allparties or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not,by placing a true and correct copy in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to their address of record.

s/

This statement is filed twice: when the appeal is initially opened and later, in the principal briefs,immediately preceding the table of contents. See 6th Cir. R. 26.1 on page 2 of this form.

13-5946 Dirty World v. Jones

Marc J Randazza

Opinion Corp.

No

No

November 19, 2013

Marc J Randazza




i

Table of Contents

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ..................................................................1

STATEMENT OF SOURCE OF AUTHORITY TO FILE BRIEF..........................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................................................................1

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................5

I. SECTION 230 EXPRESSES A CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO

PROVIDE BROAD IMMUNITY FOR WEBSITE OPERATORS............5

II. COURTS CONSTRUE SECTION 230 IMMUNITY BROADLY TO

EFFECTUATE ITS SPEECH-PROTECTIVE PURPOSE. ........................6

III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S “ENCOURAGEMENT” STANDARD

CONTRAVENES SECTION 230’S LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE. .....10

IV. NON-DEFAMATORY RESPONSES ARE NOT PART OF

DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS AND DO NOT EFFECT IMMUNITY.

....................................................................................................................12

V. THERE IS NO EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY ANALOGOUS TO

CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW.....13

VI. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SECTION 230 IMMUNITY

BECAUSE THEY DID NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN

CREATING OR DEVELOPING THE DEFAMATORY POSTS. ...........14

CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................15




ii

Table of Authorities

Cases

Almeida v. Amazon.com, 456 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2006) ...................................6, 7

Batzel v. Smith, 333 F. 3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) ........................................................6

Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, (D. D.C. 1998) ..........................................6

Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed 2d 1263 (1980) ..............11

Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d

666 (7th Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................................13

Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC , 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)

……………………………………………………………………………..8, 9, 15

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009)...............9

First Am. Title Co. v. Devaugh, 480 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2007)................................11

Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC , 544 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Az.

2008).................................................................................................................9, 10

Green v. America Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 2003)....................................7

Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) ...................................................6, 7

Nemet Chevorlet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009)

............................................................................................................................7, 8

S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC , 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118297 (W.D. Mo., March 12,

2012).....................................................................................................................10

Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y. 3d 281 (2011).................12, 13

Universal Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007)..................7

Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F. 3d 980 (10th Cir. 2000) ...............7

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (1997)..............................................5, 7, 10




iii

Statutes

47 U.S.C. § 230 ............................................................................................... passim




2

Section 230, which immunizes website operators and other interactive service

providers from causes of action or liability based on content originating with third

parties. The immunity provided by Section 230 is unique because, unlike other

media providers, an interactive service provider cannot be found to have published

illegal material on its website that it did not “create,” “author,” or “develop.”

In conformity with the Congressional policy reflected in Section 230, an

overwhelming majority of courts interpret Section 230 immunity to bar claims

based on any information originating with a third party and not substantially

altered by the interactive service provider. Under this near consensus rule,

immunity is not forfeited unless the interactive service provider actively

participates in the creation or development of the specific illegal content posted by

the third party. No Circuit Court has ever held that a website operator can forfeit

immunity under Section 230 by using a certain name for its site, opening a forum

on a specific subject, or posting after-the fact and non-defamatory responses.

In this case, the District Court ignored and/or misapplied this standard by

holding that Section 230 immunity is lost where a name or subject of a website

generally “encourages” defamatory material. In this regard, the District Court

decision is the furthest outlier decision on this matter, and is clearly inconsistent

with virtually all other precedent on the issue, and is completely inconsistent with

the Congressional intent enshrined in Section 230.




3

Appellants Dirty World, LLC Hooman Karamian a/k/a Nik Richie

(“Richie”) (collectively, “Appellants”) operate a website known as “thedirty.com”

where visitors may post information on any subject. (R. 76, Order on Motion for

Summary Judgment, Page ID # 2, R. 64-2, Richie Affidavit, Page ID # 3.)

In 2009, a visitor to thedirty.com posted a message stating that Appellee, a

teacher and Cincinnati Ben-Gals cheerleader, had “slept with every” Bengal

player. (R. 76, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Page ID #’s 2-3.) A

second post was made on thedirty.com, which implied that Appellee had sexually

transmitted diseases. (R. 76, Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Page ID

#3.)

Appellants did not create or alter the posts about Appellee, and all of the

material in the posts originated with a third party or third parties. (R. 64-2, Richie

Affidavit, Page ID # 6.) However, Richie did post a response to this post, which

stated, “Why are all high school teachers freaks in the sack? – nik.” (R. 76, Order

on Motion for Summary Judgment, Page ID # 3.)

Appellee sued Appellants for defamation based on the third-party posts. (R.

22, Second Amended Complaint.) Appellee initially argued that Richie’s “freaks

in the sack comment” was actionable. This comment could theoretically, result in

liability – as it was at least authored by the defendant, but this claim was

withdrawn. (R. 177, Motion for Summary Judgment, Page ID # 3, 16.)




4

The District Court twice denied motions by Appellants asserting Section 230

immunity, holding that immunity was forfeited because Appellants “encouraged”

and “ratified” the defamatory posts “by reason of the very name of the site, the

manner in which it is managed, and the personal comments of defendant Richie . . .

.” 1 (R. 64-1, 76, Page ID #10, 177, 210, Page ID #’s 10-11 Motions for Summary

Judgment and Orders thereon.)

The District Court’s holding contravenes the plain language of Section 230,

which forbids website operators from being treated as a “publisher or speaker” of

content originating from third parties. Congress simply did not provide an

exception for merely generally encouraging illegal (as well as legal) content.

In addition, the District Court’s “encouragement” standard transforms

Section 230 analysis into a content-based analysis of a website’s name and subject.

This approach is contrary to Section 230’s speech-protective purposes and will

chill website operators from using open forums on controversial subjects.

Similarly, the District Court’s “adoption” exception for non-defamatory responses

to third-party posts also violates Section 230. The statutory language simply does

not allow an exception to immunity for after-the-fact responses that cannot

logically be considered part of an already completed post by a third party.

1 The two motions were different because the first motion was filed prior to

Appellee withdrawing any claim based on Richie’s “freaks in the sack” comment.

(R. 177, 210 at Page ID # 11, Orders on Motion for Summary Judgment.)




5

The District Court’s reliance on Seventh Circuit dicta analogizing

contributory copyright infringement to “encouraging defamation” is also

misplaced. Unlike defamation claims, copyright claims are exempt from Section

230 and protect affirmative rights. By contrast, Section 230 is a statutory

immunity that encourages the broadest possible prohibition on claims.

Because the District Court misapplied Section 230, its Orders denying

Summary Judgment should be reversed.

ARGUMENT

I. SECTION 230 EXPRESSES A CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO

PROVIDE BROAD IMMUNITY FOR WEBSITE OPERATORS.

In enacting Section 230, Congress expressed a clear intent to protect the free

flow of information on the internet by “preserv[ing] the vibrant and competitive

free market that presently exists for the Internet . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3).

Section 230 achieves this goal by carving out a sphere of immunity from suit for

providers of interactive computer services in connection with content on their

websites created by others. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (1997).

Specifically, 47 U.S.C. Section 230(c)(1) provides:

No provider or user of an interactive computer serviceshall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any

information provided by another information content

provider.




7

for information originating with a third party user of the service.” See e.g.,

Almeida v. Amazon.com, 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (Section 230

immunity applied to right to publicity claim); see also Zeran, supra, 129 F. 3d at

329, 334, 335 (immunity applied to third party defamatory material); Ben Ezra,

Weinstein & Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F. 3d 980, 984-985 (10th Cir. 2000)

(immunity applied where information originated with a third party); Green v.

America Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 468, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) (immunity applied

where provider declined to take action against alleged hacker); Universal Comm.

Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) (immunity applied to

website that allegedly made it easier to post allegedly illegal material); Johnson v.

Arden, supra, 614 F.3d at 792 (immunity applied to third party defamatory

statements). The courts’ broad interpretation of Section 230 immunity is

consistent with Congress’ recognition of the chilling effect that “the specter of tort

liability would otherwise pose to interactive computer service providers given the

prolific nature of speech on the Internet.” Nemet Chevorlet, Ltd. v.

Consumeraffairs.com, 591 F.3d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 2009).

Applying these principles, courts nearly uniformly hold that Section 230

immunity is applicable unless the provider is an active participant in the specific

post that is alleged to be illegal. For example, in Nemet , an automobile dealership

alleged that the website consumeraffairs.com “developed” allegedly fraudulent




8

posts about it by soliciting negative comments from users about businesses, then

contacting them to encourage participation in class action litigation. 591 F.3d at

256. The court held that the legal activity of soliciting participation in class action

lawsuits did not destroy Section 230 immunity because the website did not actually

contribute to the illegal nature of the posts. Id . at 258.

The court in Nemet distinguished the Ninth Circuit case of Fair Housing

Council v. Roommates.com, LLC , 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), on which the

District Court relies. In Roommates, the court held that Section 230 immunity was

lost where an internet roommate matching service actively participated in

potentially illegal posts by providing a questionnaire to participants that asked

discriminatory questions, then requiring answers as a condition of posting the

users’ classified ads. Id . at 1166. In short – the users were corralled into specific

responses, which were themselves discriminatory. This is a narrow holding, which

has logically defied expansion. Significantly, the court expressly limited its

holding to situations where the website “contributes materially to the alleged

illegality” of the third party’s post. Id . at 1168. This is because the term

“development,” as used by Section 230, refers “not merely to augmenting the

content generally, but . . . materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness.” Id.

at 1167-68. Thus, under Roommates, a website loses Section immunity only if it

“directly participates in developing the alleged illegality . . .” and not simply by




10

that calling a website “Ripoff Report” encourages defamatory content, which may

be ethically wrong, but that unless Section 230 is amended, immunity must apply

where the material is “unequivocally provided by another party.” Id . at 933.

In S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC , 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118297 ** 3 (W.D.

Mo., March 12, 2012), the plaintiff sued Appellants in this case, alleging they were

liable for an alleged defamatory third-party post on the dirty.com that referred to

her as “slut.” The court held that Section 230 plainly applied because the post was

“unilaterally drafted and submitted by a third party.” Id. at **1.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S “ENCOURAGEMENT” STANDARD

CONTRAVENES SECTION 230’S LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE.

By expressly forbidding any service provider from being treated “as the

publisher or speaker” of any content “provided” by someone else, the statute could

not be clearer in precluding liability for information originating with a third party.

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. Thus, the District Court has

essentially re-written the statute by holding that immunity is lost by mere

“encouragement” of defamatory material.

The District Court’s expansion of Section 230 also conflicts with the well-

recognized canon statutory construction known as expressio unius est exclusio

alterius, which provides that “the mention of one thing” in a statute “implies the

exclusion of another.” See First Am. Title Co. v. Devaugh, 480 F.3d 438, 453 (6th




12

at the mercy of litigation brought by companies seeking to silence all criticism.

This is the precise result Congress sought to avoid in enacting Section 230. The

more prudent rule is the bright-line majority rule, which holds that a website

operator remains immune from liability for defamatory content posted on its

website by third parties unless it is shown that the website operator actively

participated in the “creation” or “development” of the specific defamatory post.

IV. NON-DEFAMATORY RESPONSES ARE NOT PART OF

DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS AND DO NOT EFFECT IMMUNITY.

In Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of N.Y., Inc., 17 N.Y. 3d 281, 285 (2011), a

third-party user posted a defamatory comment about the plaintiff’s business on the

defendant’s website. The defendant reposted the comments and accompanied it

with a distasteful, but non-defamatory, illustration of the plaintiff. Id . In applying

Section 230 immunity, the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that the non-

defamatory illustration did not “develop” or “materially contribute” to the alleged

illegality of the third-party content. Id . at 292-293.

The court’s holding in Shiamili is consistent with Section 230, which does

not provide an exception for after-the-fact statements that contain no defamatory

material. To the contrary, one becomes an information content provider only

through the “creation” or “development” of the defamatory content. Naturally, one

cannot “create” or “develop” a complete statement that has already been posted by




13

someone else. Thus, as set forth in Shiamili, after-the-fact posts by website

operators cannot be held to constitute active participation in the illegal activity.

V. THERE IS NO EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY ANALOGOUS TO

CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW.

The District Court’s opinion also erroneously relies upon (and attempts to

expand upon) Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist,

Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008). In Chicago Lawyers, the court held that Section

230 precluded the plaintiffs from holding craigslist.org liable as a publisher of the

allegedly discriminatory third party housing ads. Id . at 671. In dicta, the court

noted that “information content providers” could be liable for contributory

copyright infringement if their system is designed to help people steal music or

other material in copyright. Id .

Chicago Lawyers is an outlier in terms of its narrow construction of Section

230 immunity. Further, the Seventh Circuit’s analogy to contributory copyright

infringement collapses upon an examination of Section 230’s statutory language.

Section 230(e)(2) provides that Section 230 shall not “be construed to limit or

expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” By excluding intellectual

property claims -- whether based on direct or contributory infringement --

Congress clearly expressed a policy favoring copyright rights over Section 230

immunity. By contrast, Congress specifically provided that where a provider is not




14

“responsible” for the creation of the third party content “no liability may be

imposed” for claims based on state law. By the same token, there is no exclusion

for merely “contributing” to, rather than “creating” or “developing” content that

might violate state law. Thus, in defamation cases, it is irrelevant that a website

operator does not enjoy Section 230 immunity for contributory copyright

infringement because, unlike defamation, a website never enjoys Section 230

immunity from any type of liability for copyright infringement.

In addition, the Copyright Act grants affirmative rights to pursue claims to

enforce rights held by authors. Thus, it makes sense to broadly interpret the rights

of copyright holders against alleged infringers, including imposing liability for

indirect or contributory infringements. Conversely, because Section 230 provides

protection from liability by expressly excluding vicarious liability, it makes sense

to broadly interpret the protection to provide immunity unless the website operator

is directly involved in the creation or development of the illegal content.

VI. APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO SECTION 230 IMMUNITY

BECAUSE THEY DID NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN CREATING

OR DEVELOPING THE DEFAMATORY POSTS.

It was critical to the District Court’s ruling below that Appellants named

their site “thedirty.com” and encourages posts on salacious topics. However, this

evidence demonstrates only that Appellants were generally encouraging the

discussion of provocative information – be it true or false. There is no evidence




15

that Appellants specifically requested information about Appellee, let alone that it

specifically requested false information.

It was undisputed below that Appellants did not create or edit the

defamatory posts. Appellants simply “encourag[ed] visitors to provide something

in response to a prompt” and did not “directly participate” in what is illegal about

the posts, which is that the false accusations against Appellee. See Roommates,

521 F.3d at 1174, 1175. Accordingly, Appellee failed to demonstrate that

Appellants were responsible for the “creation” or “development” of the posts.

The fact that Richie posted non-defamatory responses to the defamatory

third party statements does not alter this result. This is because what is defamatory

about the posts has already been fully “created” and “developed.” Thus, the

responses are irrelevant to Appellants Section 230 immunity.

CONCLUSION

This court should reverse the District Court because it misconstrued Section

230 in holding that Appellants were not immune from claims based on defamatory

statements created and posted by third parties on their website.

/s/ Marc J. Randazza

Marc J. RandazzaRANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP

3625 S. Town Center Drive, Suite 150


(702) 420-2001


Dated: November 19, 2013




16


1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure 29(d) and 32 (a)(7)(B) because it consists of 3,400 words,

excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

32(a)(7)(B)(iii).

2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5)(A) because it has been prepared in a proportionally

space typeface using Microsoft Word 2011 in 14-point Times New Roman font.

/s/ Marc J. Randazza______________

Marc J. Randazza

RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP

3625 S. Town Center Drive, Suite 150


(702) 420-2001


Dated: November 19, 2013




(i)

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CASE NO. 13-5946

SARAH JONES APPELLANT

v.

DIRTY WORLD ENTERTAINMENTRECORDINGS, LLCDIRTY WORLD, LLC

NIK LAMAS-RICHIE APPELLEES

DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS

AND FINANCIAL INTEREST

In accordance with 6th Cir. R. 26.1, Amici makes the following disclosures:

1. Are said parties subsidiaries or affiliates of a publicly owned corporation?

No.

2. Is there a publicly owned corporation, not a party to the appeal, that has afinancial interest in the outcome?

No.

s/ Junis L. Baldon Date: 11/19/13Junis L. BaldonCounsel for Amicus Curiae,

American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky




(ii)

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .............................................. 3 INTERESTS OF AMICI ............................................................................................ 4 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 7

A. Section 230 Broadly Immunizes Content Providers AgainstLiability for Information Created by Others ......................................... 7

B. A Broad Application of Section 230 Immunity Is ConsistentWith Congressional Intent ..................................................................... 9

C. The District Court Erred In Refusing to Extend Section 230Immunity to Appellants ....................................................................... 13 1. The District Court Misapplied Relevant Case Law in

Determining that Appellants Developed Unlawful Material .... 14 2. The District Court’s Application of an “Encouragement

Test” Was an Error of Law ....................................................... 18 3. The District Court’s Application of a “Neutrality Test”

Was an Error of Law ................................................................. 23 4. The District Court Should Have Determined the

Applicability of Section 230 at the Earliest Possible Stage ...... 24 D. The District Court Opinion Threatens Other Online Platforms

That Make Available a Wide Range of Divergent and ValuableSpeech.................................................................................................. 25

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 29




(iv)

Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010) .......................................... 8, 22, 25

Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 766 F. Supp. 2d828 (E.D. Ky. 2011) .......................................................................................3, 13

Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp.2d 1008 (E.D. Ky. 2012) .................................................................. 3, 15, 18, 19

Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC , Civil Action No. 09-219-WOB, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2013 WL 4068780 (E.D.Ky. Aug. 12, 2013) ..................................................................... 4, 12, 15, 22, 23

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) ...............................................19

Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250

(4th Cir. 2009) ........................................................................................... 8, 9, 25

Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833 (3d Cir. 2007) ......................................... 9

S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC , No. 11-CV-00392-DW, 2012 WL 3335284,at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) ........................................................................20

Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC , 728 F.3d 592 n.8 (6th Cir. 2013) .................................. 8

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., Trial IAS Part 34,1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. May 24, 1995) ...................................... 10, 11

Universal Communication Systems, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413(1st Cir. 2007) ..................................................................................................8, 9

Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) ........................ 8, 9, 11

STATUTES 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) .....................................................................................................17

47 U.S.C. § 230 ................................................................................................ passim

R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) ....................................................10

OTHER AUTHORITIES 141 CONG. R EC. at H8469-H8470; H8471 ..............................................................11




INTRODUCTION

In this case, Appellants were improperly held liable for publishing on their

website defamatory statements written by a third party. In denying Appellants’

repeat claims for immunity under federal law, the district court misapplied Section

230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”) and

erroneously permitted this case to proceed to trial. If upheld, the district court’s

ruling would be an outlier among the federal courts and could have a profound

chilling effect on other providers of online services, threatening the broad diversity

of protected speech on the Internet.

As passed by Congress and uniformly applied by courts across the country,

Section 230 immunizes online service providers — such as broadband providers,

hosting companies, and website operators like Appellants from liability based on

material authored by users. Notwithstanding this protection, the district court

found that Appellants effectively transformed their website into one unprotected by

Section 230’s blanket immunity through a series of actions unrelated to the

creation of specific defamatory content: inviting users to submit gossipy material,

commenting in reaction to such material, and naming the website “The Dirty.”

The district court’s interpretation of Section 230 is contrary to the plain language

of the statute and at odds with virtually every court to consider its application.




3

judgment below and to preserve the broad speech-protective immunity intended by

Congress and regularly applied nationwide.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Appellee Sarah Jones sued Appellants Dirty World, LLC, operator of the

website TheDirty.com, and Appellant Nik Richie, a blogger who serves as its

editor-in-chief and publisher, claiming that they published defamatory material

about her.2 The complaint made no allegation that Appellants had themselves

created or developed any actionable content.3

Accordingly, Appellants moved for

dismissal and summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to immunity

under Section 230 of the CDA. Section 230 provides immunity to website

operators and other online providers for content created by third parties unless

plaintiffs can show that the operators themselves created or developed the content

at issue. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3).

The district court denied Appellants immunity on the basis that they

“encouraged” defamatory content from third parties. Jones v. Dirty World

Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 829 (E.D. Ky. 2011)

(“ Jones I ”); Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d

1008, 1012 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (“ Jones II ”). A jury ruled in favor of Jones, and

awarded her $338,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. The district court

2 Second Am. Compl., RE 22, Page ID# 74-81, ¶9.3 See id .




5

question originates with a third party. EFF supports a broad interpretation of

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act because this statute has played a

vital role in allowing millions of people to create and disseminate user-generated

content through the Internet, enriching the diversity of offerings online. EFF has

participated in a significant number of cases addressing the interpretation of this

statute.

The Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”) is a non-profit public

interest and Internet policy organization. CDT represents the public's interest in an

open, decentralized Internet reflecting constitutional and democratic values of free

expression, privacy, and individual liberty. CDT has litigated or otherwise

participated in a broad range of Internet free expression cases, and works to protect

the ability of websites and other service providers to offer new opportunities for

online speech unfettered by government regulation or censorship.

The Digital Media Law Project (“DMLP”) is an unincorporated association

hosted by the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. The

DMLP is an academic research project that studies challenges to online journalism

and networked communication and responds with publicly accessible tools and

legal resources. The DMLP frequently appears as amicus curiae in cases where the

application of law will have a significant effect on the use of digital media to

inform the public.




6

The Public Participation Project (“PPP”) is a national non-profit

organization dedicated to protecting citizens from lawsuits designed to chill their

ability to speak out on issues of public interest. Because many states still do not

provide sufficient protections for such speech and petitioning activities, PPP is

working to pass federal anti-SLAPP legislation. PPP also assists in efforts to pass

similar legislation in individual states, and it monitors SLAPP developments in

legislatures and courts across the country. Consistent with its support for

legislation that protects against SLAPPSs, PPP supports Section 230 of the

Communications Decency Act. Defendants “SLAPPed” in retaliation for online

speech often invoke the protections of Section 230. Section 230 is essential to

ensuring that free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment are upheld in

the digital age. PPP is very concerned about the precedent that this case could set

for Internet content providers that publish user generated content on their sites.

Wendy Seltzer is a Fellow with the Berkman Center for Internet & Society

at Harvard University. She founded and developed the Chilling Effects

Clearinghouse, a public resource providing a database of “cease and desist”

communications sent regarding Internet content. Adam Holland is a Project

Coordinator at the Berkman Center, and the Project Coordinator for Chilling

Effects. Chilling Effects gathers submissions from online service providers, users

of online services, and copyright holders and makes those submissions available




7

with annotations and categorization for review and study by scholars and interested

members of the general public through its website, www.chillingeffects.org.

ARGUMENT

The district court’s decisions in this case denying Appellants immunity are

in direct conflict with the text of Section 230 and relevant case law. Section 230

provides that no Internet provider may be held liable for content it hosts unless it is

itself “responsi ble, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of [such]

information.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). Federal courts have consistently held that

website operators may be held responsible for developing unlawful material only if

the facts demonstrate that the operator unambiguously solicited or induced content

that is itself unlawful. No such facts have been found in this case.

A. Section 230 Broadly Immunizes Content Providers Against

Liability for Information Created by Others.

Under 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c), “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer

service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by

another information content provider.” See also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3) (“The term

‘information content provider’ means any person or entity that is responsible, in

whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through

the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”). The statute thus

immunizes Internet providers from liability for material provided by third parties,

i.e., other “information content provider[s].” See Seaton v. TripAdvisor LLC , 728




9

Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008). Such a

waiver does not happen easily, however. “Congress . . . established a general rule

that providers of interactive computer services are liable only for speech that is

properly attributable to them.” Nemet Chevrolet , 591 F.3d at 254. The statute

“precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service

provider in a publisher’s role.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. This means that “lawsuits

seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional

editorial functions — such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or

alter content —are barred.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.

Thus, Section 230 broadly immunizes a website operator from state law

claims if the claim “would treat [the website provider] ‘as the publisher or speaker’

of that [information].” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422; see also Parker v. Google, Inc.,

242 F. App’x 833, 838 (3d Cir. 2007); Green, 318 F.3d at 471. Because

Appellants’ role as publisher was precisely the source of liability in the judgment

below, it must be reversed as inconsistent with Section 230.

B. A Broad Application of Section 230 Immunity Is Consistent With

Congressional Intent.

A principal goal of the Communications Decency Act was to “remove

disincentives” for Internet users and providers to screen objectionable material




10

from their services. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).5 Congress accomplished that objective

as part of a comprehensive legislative package that preserved the Internet’s

dynamic nature. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(1)-(2) (noting congressional intent “to

preserve the vibrant and competitive free market” on the Internet “unfettered by

Federal or State regulations”). Congress established powerful structural

protections to guide the Internet’s development: service providers would be

uniformly protected from suit based on user s’ behavior, and if service providers

voluntarily removed objectionable content, they could do so without fear of legal

consequences. These protections are enshrined in Section 230.

The specific impetus for Section 230 was a critical question regarding how

the Internet would develop: could service providers be held responsible as common

law “publishers” for content on their websites?6 In the mid-1990s, courts struggled

to apply traditional common law doctrines to this new technology. One federal

court took the view that common law republication liability could not be used

against a website that republished content generated entirely by a third party. See

5 As discussed more fully below, these “disincentives” were created by legal

opinions holding Internet providers liable for third-party content because they hadchosen to filter out other content. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services

Co., Trial IAS Part 34, 1995 WL 323710, at *4 (N.Y. Supr. Ct. May 24, 1995).6 R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977) specifies the circumstances inwhich a republisher of third- party content will be liable for defamation: “[e]xcept

as to those who only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person,one who repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to liabilityas if he had originally published it.”




11

Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)

(recognizing that because websites obtain and share information instantaneously, it

is impossible for a website operator to verify the truthfulness of all republished

content). Another court found a website operator liable under the republication

doctrine for hosting a bulletin board that included an allegedly defamatory post

from a third party. Stratton Oakmont , at *4 (relying on fact that website operator

controlled third party content on the website through the use of screening and

moderators that enforced decency guidelines).

Congress enacted Section 230 to eliminate the uncertainty with which the

providers in Cubby and Stratton Oakmont grappled. The two competing opinions

were explicitly cited during congressional debates over the statute’s language,

which effectively reversed Stratton Oakmont . 141 CONG. R EC. at H8469-H8470

(statement of Rep. Cox); see also id . at H8471 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“We

are talking about something that is far larger than our daily newspaper. We are

talking about something that is going to be thousands of pages of information

every day, and to have that imposition [republication liability] imposed on them is

wrong.”); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“Congress enacted § 230 to remove the

disincentives to selfregulation [sic] created by the Stratton Oakmont decision.”).

Citing a Seventh Circuit decision, the district court in this case suggested

“that [Section 230] does not provide a ‘grant of comprehensive immunity from




12

civil liability for content provided by a third party.’” Jones III at *1 (quoting

Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,

519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008)). The district court’s overbroad reading of

Craigslist to determine that Appellants were categorically ineligible for Section

230 immunity was inconsistent with the clear judicial consensus regarding the

statute. While the Seventh Circuit described Section 230’s immunity provision as

a definitional clause, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is functionally consistent with

other federal courts interpreting Section 230. Craigslist , 519 F.3d at 670

(quotation omitted). Craigslist merely reinforces what the majority of federal

courts already agree upon —that “[w]hat § 230(c)(1) says is that an online

information system must not ‘be treated as the publisher or speaker of any

information provided by’ someone else.” Id . at 671. In other words, if a cause of

action derives from treating a website operator as the “publisher” of content

provided by another, then immunity is available.

At heart, Congress sought to minimize government regulation of the Internet

by declining to apply the republication doctrine to the fast-developing Internet

world. The district court’s attempt to carve out an exception to this broad grant of

immunity based on collateral (and ultimately legally irrelevant) considerations

such as broadly inviting users to engage in disparaging (though certainly not

necessarily actionable) speech or subsequently commenting on that speech




13

squarely conflicts with Congress’ attempt to protect intermediaries from liability in

such disputes. The District Court’s analysis must be rejected.

C. The District Court Erred In Refusing to Extend Section 230

Immunity to Appellants.

Appellants did not author, create, or develop the defamatory content at issue

in this case; instead, they provided a platform on which others posted their own

material.7 Indeed, nothing makes that plainer than the text of Jury Instruction No.

3 from the second Jones trial: it states that Appellants “had the same duties and

liabilities for re- publishing libelous material as the author of such materials.”8 The

instruction flatly conflicts with the text of Section 230 and directed jurors toward a

finding prohibited by law. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(3); see also Green, 318 F.3d at 471.

Accordingly, the jury instruction alone constitutes prejudicial and reversible error.

Hurt v. Coyne Cylinder Co., 956 F.2d 1319, 1324 (6th Cir. 1992).

Nonetheless, the district court ruled that the application of liability was

proper because Appellants were ineligible for immunity under Section 230. The

court held that although they did not create unlawful content, Appellants implicitly

developed unlawful content posted by others by encouraging a generally critical

7 The record reflects that while Richie commented on the defamatory material and

added “taglines,” he did not alter the original content and posted it as submitted,

adding his editorial comments at bottom. “[T]he exclusion of ‘publisher’ liabilitynecessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers tochoose among proffered material and to edit the material published while retainingits basic form and message.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).8 Jury Instructions, No. 3, RE 207, Page ID# 3120.




14

and ribald environment. Specifically, the court pointed to factors such as the

website’s name (TheDirty.com) and Appellant Richie’s encouragement of Internet

commenters’ negative commentary as proof that Appellants were responsible for

developing the specific defamatory content at issue in this case. The district court

was incorrect. This holding is in direct conflict with the purpose of the CDA, the

text of Section 230, and relevant case law.

1. The District Court Misapplied Relevant Case Law in

Determining that Appellants Developed Unlawful Material.

The key question before this Court is whether Appellants themselves created

or developed the defamatory content at issue, removing themselves from Section

230’s protection. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (defining a content provider as one

“responsible . . . for the creation or development of information.”). The district

court ruled Appellants ineligible for Section 230 immunity based on the erroneous

conclusion that they “developed” the content in question. Specifically, the court

held:

[T]hese postings and others like them were invited andencouraged by the defendants by using the name“Dirty.com” for the website and inciting the viewers of

the site to form a loose organization dubbed “the Dirty

Army,” which was urged to have “a war mentality”against anyone who dared to object to having theircharacter assassinated.




15

Jones III , at *3; see also Jones II , 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-13. The district

court’s conclusion was incorrect.

Section 230 does not define the terms “responsible” or “development.” See

Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162. In Jones II , the district court correctly cited

Roommates.com and Accusearch as seminal opinions in which federal circuit

courts have defined — and found — liability based on a website operator’s

“development” of unlawful content.9 Jones II , 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1010. Both the

Ninth and Tenth Circuits were careful to limit development-based liability to

parties that actively, knowingly, and materially participate in the unlawful aspect of

actionable content. The district court’s analysis, on the other hand, dramatically

expands possible avenues for development-based liability in a manner that poses

risks for any website that encourages critical — though not unlawful — speech.

Both appellate decisions addressed materially different conduct than that at

issue here. Roommates.com involved a website designed to “match people renting

out spare rooms with people looking for a place to live.” Roommates, 521 F.3d at

1161. Before individuals could use the website, they were required to provide

information about themselves and their housing preferences — including their sex,

9 While the Accusearch opinion separately parsed out the definition of the words“responsible” and “development,” 570 F.3d at 1198-99, this brief cites thatdecision’s final holdings in determining when a user is responsible for developing content. This brief refers to that analysis, taken as a whole, as “development-basedliability.”




17

Accusearch involved a similar allegation against an online provider hosting

unlawful material. The website in Accusearch sold personal data, including

confidential records protected under the Telecommunications Act, 15 U.S.C. §

45(a), to customers who paid an “administrative search fee.” Accusearch, 570

F.3d at 1191-92. The website retained researchers to find personal data, and in

turn provided that confidential information to requesting customers. Id . As in

Roommates.com, the website claimed Section 230 immunity. Id . at 1195.

Analyzing whether the website was responsible for the development of legally-

protected information, the Tenth Circuit explained that “a service provider is

‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content only if it in some way

specifically encourages development of what is offensive about the content .” Id . at

1199 (emphasis added).11

The Accusearch court found that the website operator knew “that its

researchers were obtaining the information through fraud or other illegality,” id .,

and that it directly encouraged that illegality “[b]y paying its researchers to acquire

telephone records, knowing that the confidentiality of the records was protected by

law . . . .” Id . at 1200. Thus, by knowingly paying for illegal content — when that

11 The Accusearch opinion uses the word “offensive” as synonymous with

“actionable.” Cf. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1199-1200. As there is little doubt thecontent on TheDirty.com is colloquially offensive, it is important to note that the Accusearch opinion never suggested that liability could attach to any speech thatwas distasteful but not specifically unlawful.




18

content was the website’s “raison d’être”— the website in Accusearch specifically

“developed” the unlawful aspects of the content, preventing Section 230 immunity.

Id.

Both opinions condition the loss of Section 230 immunity on an online

service provider ’s direct and intentional participation in unlawful acts. In

Roommates.com, the website could not be used without the provision of unlawful

content. In Accusearch, the consumer product was only available due to the

website’s knowing payment for content obtained illegally. No comparable

requirements or behavior exist here. While TheDirty.com may host distasteful and

potentially actionable content, it does not require or request the submission of

unlawful material.12

While some of the material hosted on its site may be

offensive, and while some of A ppellants’ actions (such as subsequently

commenting about offensive content) may be unseemly, they are neither

independently unlawful nor sufficient to trigger the loss of Section 230 immunity.

2. The District Court’s Application of an “Encouragement

Test” Was an Error of Law.

In its opinions applying Section 230, the district court erred in two distinct

ways. In its first order, Jones II, the district court relied largely on an

“encouragement” theory of liability, 840 F.Supp. 2d at 1012-13; in Jones III , it also

12 On the contrary, the Appellants took steps to prevent it: in order to accessTheDirty.com, users must agree not to post any defamatory or otherwise unlawfulmaterial.




19

found Appellants’ “ratification” of unlawful content made them ineligib le for

immunity. See Jones III , at *4. These analyses both constitute errors of law.

In Jones II , the district court engaged in its first significant analysis of

A ppellants’ claim for immunity. Specifically, the court held:

This Court holds by reason of the very name of the site, the manner inwhich it is managed, and the personal comments of defendant Richie,the defendants have specifically encouraged development of what isoffensive about the content of the site. One could hardly be moreencouraging of the posting of such content than by saying to one’sfans (known not coincidentally as “the Dirty Army”): “I love how theDirty Army has war mentality.”

Jones II , 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-1013. In so holding, the court relied on two

authorities: a law review article and a dissent. Id. at n.5. This is unsurprising, as

no other case has extended development-based liability so far.

The flaw in the Jones II logic is that no factor found dispositive by the

court — the name of the site (TheDirty.com), the manner in which it is managed

(selecting posts and reacting to users’ comments), nor the comments of Appellant

Richie ( per se non-defamatory postings and encouragement of the site’s

commenters’ “war mentality,” Jones II , 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1012-13) — is tethered

to any illegality. “Dirt” is gossip, not per se defamation. See, e.g., Milkovich v.

Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990) (explaining constitutional limits on

defamatory content, and noting requirements of both factual falsity and fault).

Reacting to user comments is the very nature of the Internet, not to mention the

precise behavior distinguished by the Accusearch opinion as the “prototypical”




20

activity qualifying for Section 230 immunity.13

And Richie’s encouragement of

reactive criticism by the sites’ users (“war mentality”) reflects no inherent

illegality. Section 230 immunity cannot and does not depend on the extent to

which users exceed the scope of any specific encouragement of a service provider

and independently engage in actionable behavior themselves.

The specific factors cited by the district court do not alter the conclusion that

Section 230 immunity must apply. The website name “TheDirty.com” and

Appellant Richie’s non-defamatory musings both constitute protected speech and

provide no support for undermining their statutory immunity. See, e.g ., Global

Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC , 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz.

2008) (“[T]here is no authority for the proposition that [the website title] makes the

website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the ‘creation or development’

of every post on the site.”). Indeed, website operators routinely receive immunity

under Section 230 despite providing instructions for third party posts and

supplementing those posts with captions, titles, comments, and metadata.14

13 “The prototypical service qualifying for this statutory immunity is an onlinemessaging board (or bulletin board) on which Internet subscribers post commentsand respond to comments posted by others.” Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1195(quotation omitted). As Section 230 covers Internet providers and users alike, thedistrict court’s analysis here could equally (and problematically) be applied to a

bulletin board commenter who reacts favorably to another’s unlawful speech.14 See, e.g., S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC , No. 11-CV-00392-DW, 2012 WL 3335284,at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 12, 2012) (comments by website operator on third-party(footnote continued on following page)




22

Id . at 1174. The portion of the Roommates.com website that was held ineligible for

immunity did more than merely encourage unlawful content; it required users to

input unlawful content in order to access the site. Id . at 1166-67. Similarly, the

website in Accusearch developed unlawful content by knowingly paying

researchers to engage in illegal conduct. Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1200.

The court below made no findings that Appellants required or solicited

unlawful content. The facts relied on by the district court —the website’s name and

creation of comment sections where users may post critical commentary — are the

sort of passive encouragement the Ninth Circuit explicitly anticipated and held

non-actionable in Roommates.com. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (“[T]ext

prompt with no direct encouragement to perform illegal searches or to publish

illegal content” is “entirely immune from liability”); see also Accusearch, 570 F.3d

at 1195.15

The gravamen of the district court’s finding is that Appellants’ web presence

is insulting and critical. Without a specific solicitation or requirement that third

15 The District Court pointed to Arden, in which the Eighth Circuit suggested indicta that a website operator could lose immunity if it “designed its website to be a portal for defamatory material or [did] anything to induce defamatory postings.” Jones III at *2, citing 614 F.3d at 792. But nothing in Arden, which found thedefendants eligible for CDA immunity, suggested the court was deviating from thedevelopment-based liability analysis laid out in Accusearch, on which it relied, 614F.3d at 791, and which require website operators to be directly responsible for theillegal nature of actionable content to defeat immunity.




23

parties find and submit defamatory content about Appellee, Richie and

TheDirty.com were not legally responsible for the defamatory content and cannot

qualify as information content providers. As such, the district court’s initial

Section 230 analysis is wrong as a matter of law, has no support in circuit case law,

and should be overturned by this Court.

3. The District Court’s Application of a “Neutrality Test”

Was an Error of Law.

In Jones III , the court expanded its erroneous Section 230 analysis by

finding that A ppellant Richie’s “adoption” of actionable comments prevented

Section 230 immunity. In reaching its conclusion, the district court cited a single

line from Accusearch: “That is, one is not ‘responsible’ for the development of

offensive content if one's conduct was neutral with respect to the offensiveness of

the content.” Jones III , at *2 (quoting Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199). The district

court relied on this statement to conclude that in “add[ing] his own comments to

the defamatory posts,” Jones III , at *2, Richie “effectively ratified and adopted the

defamatory third- party post” and was therefore not “neutral.” Id . at *4. This

separate line of the district court’s reasoning is also erroneous and must be

reversed.

In essence, the district court adopted a “neutrality” test independent of actual

development: if a website reacts to actionable material in a favorable way, it is not

“neutral,” and thus directly liable for the third par ty’s speech. The district court,




24

while relying on Accusearch, neglected to follow the rule enunciated just three

sentences later in the opinion: “We therefore conclude that a service provider is

‘responsible’ for the development of offensive content only if it in some way

specifically encourages development of what is offensive about the content.”16

Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1199 (emphasis added). Accusearch provides no support

for the district court’s rule that an after -the-fact reaction to an actionable post can

in any way have “specifically encouraged” the illegality of the pr ior post.

There is no support in Section 230 for a holding that reactive speech, not

itself defamatory nor instructing others to engage in actionable behavior, can

retroactively develop the comment it is reacting to. That analysis defies case law

and common sense. As with the “encouragement” analysis, the court makes its

distaste for Appellants clear. But the law requires more: a specific finding that

Appellants knowingly, specifically, and intentionally developed the defamatory

posts that third parties placed on TheDirty.com. That finding has not been made in

the court below, and the judgment should therefore be reversed.

4. The District Court Should Have Determined the

Applicability of Section 230 at the Earliest Possible Stage.

Because Section 230 provides broad, robust immunity from tort liability, the

District Court should have “aim[ed] to resolve the question of § 230 immunity at

the earliest possible stage of the case because that immunity protects websites not

16 See supra n.10.




25

only from ‘ultimate liability,’ but also from ‘having to fight costly and protracted

legal battles.’” Nemet Chevrolet , 591 F.3d at 255.

Tellingly, the Second Amended Complaint in this case cites Appellants’

republication of content as the basis for liability, noting only that TheDirty.com

and Richie “publish[ed] an article about the Plaintiff.”17

Once again, there are no

facts suggesting Appellants created or developed defamatory content. In the

absence of such facts, Appellants enjoyed Section 230 immunity that should have

been granted at the earliest opportunity. See, e.g., DiMeo v. Max, 248 F. App’x

280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming case dismissal because plaintiff did not allege

that the website operator created or developed the posts on the website); see also

Arden, 614 F.3d at 791 (finding immunity when it was undisputed that damaging

material originated from third party); Green, 318 F.3d at 470 (same). As the

complaint cited no evidence that Appellants were information content providers

under Section 230, immediate dismissal of all claims would have been the proper

action.

D. The District Court Opinion Threatens Other Online Platforms

That Make Available a Wide Range of Divergent and Valuable

Speech.

Amici file this brief not only to reiterate the legal standard that should govern

this case but also to underscore that the district court’s opinion, if upheld, would

17 Second Am. Compl., RE 22, Page ID# 74-81, ¶9.




26

undermine intermediary immunity for other sites, threatening the existence of

platforms that welcome undeniably legal though critical speech.

It is crucial for this Court to distinguish between the explicit solicitation of

actionable information from users, and the general solicitation of information that

might turn out to be actionable, or simply damaging to particular individuals or

businesses. Revoking a website’s protection under Section 230 because the site

solicits “negative” content in the abstract would threaten a wide variety of specific

sites and projects that serve undeniably important public purposes by leaving them

vulnerable to precisely the kind of expensive legal challenge that followed here.

Like Appellants, the following websites: (1) solicit and encourage users to

provide truthful content damaging to businesses or individuals; (2) collect,

aggregate, and display the content submitted by their users; and (3) rely on, and

react to, this user-generated data in providing services to the public. Any legal test

that turned on these websites’ “encouragement” of disparaging content or their

“adoption” of users’ claims would eviscerate the certainty of protection they

currently enjoy under Section 230.

Chilling Effects (http://chillingeffects.org) collects cease and desist notices

relating to online speech from a wide variety of sources and compiles them in a

searchable online database. This database allows researchers to identify how such




27

notices are used in certain contexts and the effect of these notices on freedom of

expression online.

Fraud.org (http://fraud.org) collects thousands of consumer complaints and

actively shares them with a network of more than ninety law enforcement

organizations that have partnered with the organization. Id . This large database

allows law enforcement to identify “patterns of fraud,” an essential element of

stopping online fraud. Scam FAQs, Fraud.org, http://fraud.org /learn/faqs (last

visited Nov. 13, 2013).

Frack Check WV (http://www.frackcheckwv.net) asks West Virginians to

re port their experiences with fracking in their communities in order to “provide[]

readers with information to help influence public policy decisions” on fracking, to

describe negative “environmental impacts [that] can result from Marcellus shale

gas well dr illing,” and to “document what’s happening locally” and “organize

accordingly.” Your Report, Frack Check WV, http://www.frackcheckwv.net/your-

report/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).

The Brian Lehrer Show: Are You Being Gouged?

(http://www.wnyc.org/shows/bl/2007/sep/24/are-you-being- gouged). In 2007,

The Brian Lehrer Show on NPR affiliate WNYC Radio asked listeners to report

online the cost of milk, beer, and lettuce at their local grocery stores and based on

user comments, built a map showing the most and least expensive places to




28

purchase the items. The show was awarded a Peabody Award for excellence in

journalism, in part because of its innovative use of citizen participation.

Clear Health Costs (http://clearhealthcosts.com) brings transparency to the

health care market in the United States using an online database providing users

with data on the cost of medical procedures at different health care providers.

Some of this data comes from users, who submit information on what they paid for

medical services. See Clear Health Costs, FAQ, http://clearhealthcosts.com/faq

(last visited Nov. 15, 2013). It would be extremely difficult to create a comparable

database of healthcare costs without relying on user contributions. See generally

U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Health Care Price Transparency: Meaningful

Price Information is Difficult for Consumers to Obtain Prior to Receiving Care

(2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-791.

The Bed Bug Registry (http://www.bedbugregistry.com) is a public database

containing user-submitted reports of bed bugs in public spaces throughout Canada

and the United States. According to its home page, in the last several years “the

site has collected about 20,000 reports covering 12,000 locations.” As businesses

are very unlikely to volunteer information about bed bug infestations on their

property, the user-generated nature of the registry enables this public service.

All of the providers listed above rely upon third parties to contribute content

to their platforms and specifically invite them to contribute potentially damaging




29

content. In response to such invitations, it is possible that users may submit

information that is actionable. And in turn, websites like those above assume the

truthfulness of user-submitted content and “adopt” users’ damaging speech by, for

example, creating their own content (such as blogs or reports) relying on the

accuracy of user-submitted data, reporting user complaints to law enforcement, or

developing tools or databases incorporating user content as true. These websites,

in seeking speech that is inherently damaging about others, provide a public

service — even if some of that damaging speech should turn out to be defamatory.

The existence of this type of user-generated watchdog site is made possible

by Section 230, under which the responsibility for any actionable postings falls

squarely on the individuals who contributed them and not on the platform

providers themselves. Absent such protection, providers such as these will likely

refrain from such groundbreaking contributions that are unquestionably in the

public interest, undermining one of Congress’ explicit policy priorities. See 47

U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (“The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a

forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural

development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”).

CONCLUSION

The district court’s refusal to dismiss this action was a clear error of law.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act was passed precisely to protect




30

website operators from being constantly hauled into court over the speech of their

users. This Court should reverse and remand with an order of dismissal.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Junis L. BaldonJunis L. BaldonMark A. FloresBrandon W. GearhartFROST BROWN TODD LLC400 West Market Street, 32nd FloorLouisville, KY 40202(502) 589-5400

(502) 581-1087 (FAX) [email protected]@fbtlaw.com

[email protected] ACLU of Kentucky Cooperating Attorneys

William E. SharpACLU OF K ENTUCKY 315 Guthrie Street, Suite 300Louisville, KY 40202(502) 581-9746(502) 589-9687 (FAX)[email protected] Attorney for amicus curiae

ACLU of Kentucky

Lee RowlandAMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES U NION 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor

New York, NY 10004(212) 549-2500(212) 549-2654 (FAX)[email protected] Attorney for amicus curiae ACLU

Matthew ZimmermanELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION 815 Eddy Street

San Francisco, CA 94109(415) 436-9333(415) 436-9993 (FAX)[email protected] Attorney for amicus curiae EFF

Emma J. LlansóCENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY 1634 I Street NW, Suite 1100

Washington, DC 20006(202) 637-9800(202) 637-0968 (FAX)[email protected] Attorney for amicus curiae CDT




31

Jeffrey P. HermesAndrew F. SellarsDIGITAL MEDIA LAW PROJECT BERKMAN CENTER FOR I NTERNET &

SOCIETY Harvard University23 Eerett St., 2nd FloorCambridge, MA 02138(617) 495-7547(617) 495-7641 (FAX)[email protected]

Christopher T. BavitzCYBERLAW CLINIC BERKMAN CENTER FOR I NTERNET &

SOCIETY Harvard Law School23 Everett St., 2nd FloorCambridge, MA 02138(617) 495-7547(617) 495-7641 (FAX)[email protected]

Attorneys for amicus curiae Digital Media Law Project





I hereby certify that on November 19, 2013, I electronically filed the

foregoing with the Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit through

the CM/ECF system, which will send a Notice of Electronic Filing to registered

CM/ECF participants.

s/ Junis L. BaldonJunis L. Baldon

Mark A. FloresBrandon W. GearhartFROST BROWN TODD LLC400 West Market Street, 32nd FloorLouisville, KY 40202(502) 589-5400(502) 581-1087 (FAX)

[email protected]@fbtlaw.combgearhart@fbtlaw com


sarah jones v. thedirty.com - combined amicus briefs

Documents