samu kurri fiia briefing paper 143 • november 2013 · 2017-03-15 · policy, as well as banking...

Updating the eMU

Samu Kurri Fiia BRieFing papeR 143 • November 2013

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

143

diFFeRentiated econoMic integRation

in the eURopean Union

• Thefinancialandeconomiccrisishasreinforcedthetwo-layereconomicintegrationstructureintheEU.Manyofthenewrulesandstructurescreatedduringthecrisishavefocusedonasolutiontotheeurocrisisandarethuseuroarea-specific.

• Thereislittleevidence,however,thatthesituationwouldhavedramaticallychangedcomparedtotheMaastrichtEMU.AllofthechangesarestillinlinewiththebasicideathatallEUcountrieswilljointheeurowhentheyarereadytodoso.

• Oneofthekeyquestionsinthenearfutureis likelytocentreonthecontoursoftheeuroarea-specificdecision-making,itsrelationshiptotheEUasawhole,anditsinstitutionsandprocedures.

• EveniftheEurogroupremains‘formallyinformal’,ithasmanagedtotransformitselfintoadefactoinstitutionwithintheEU,anditsroleandweightislikelytoincreaseratherthandecrease.

Updating the eMU

FIIA Briefing Paper 143

November 2013

diFFeRentiated econoMic integRation in the eURopean Union

The European Union research programme

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

U L KO P O L I I T T I N EN INS T I T U U T T I

U T R I K E S P O L I T I S K A INS T I T U T E T

THE F I N N I S H I N S T I T U T E OF I N T E R N AT I O N A L AFFA IR S

Samu Kurri

Head of Division, Monetary Policy and Research Department

Bank of Finland

J A N E a n d A ATO S

ERKKO FOUNDATION

PO Box 144, 00101 Helsinki, FINLAND

JANE OCH AATOS

ERKKOS STIFTELSE

PB 144, 00101 Helsingfors, FINLAND

the FinniSh inStitUte oF inteRnational aFFaiRS 3

Introduction1

Asaresultofthecrisis,majorstepshavebeentakenintermsofEuropeaneconomicintegration.Ifthedeepening continues along the lines of the latestproposals, it is likely to increase thepressure forfurther economic and political integration.Thus,thenatureof theEconomicandMonetaryUnion(EMU)isalreadychangingfromamonetaryuniontoamoregenuineeconomicandmonetaryunion,andcouldsubsequentlychangefurthertowardsadeeperpoliticalunion.

IntheMaastrichtTreatyandthetreatiesthathaveensued,theunderlyingideahasbeenthatallcoun-tries,withtheexceptionoftheUKandDenmark,willjointheeurowhentheyareabletodoso.Dur-ingthefinancialandeconomiccrisisthatstartedin2008,thisgoalhasbeenchallenged.

Thequestionraisedinthisbriefingpaperistowhatdegreethecrisishasledtodifferentiatedeconomicintegrationwithin theEU.To thisend, thepaperdiscusses how euro-specific the changes to theinstitutionalset-uphavebeen,andhowpermanentthechangetowardseuroarea-specificintegrationislikelytobe.Insodoing,thepaperalsodiscussesestablishedandemergingdifferentiationinthegov-ernanceoftheEMU.

EMU 1.0: The Maastricht EMU

TheMaastrichtTreaty(1992)transformedtheEuro-pean Community into the European Union.TheobjectiveoftheTreatywastoaddressfivekeygoals:to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of theinstitutions;improvetheeffectivenessoftheinsti-tutions; establish economic andmonetary union(EMU);developtheCommunitysocialdimension;andestablishacommonforeignandsecuritypolicy.2Asmentionedabove,intheMaastrichtTreatyandthetreatiesthathavefollowed,theunderlyingideahasbeenthatallcountries,apartfromtheUKandDenmark,willjointhemonetaryunionwhenthey

1 Theviewsexpressedaretheauthor’sownanddonot

necessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheBankofFinland.

2 Formoreonthis,seeEuropa.SummariesofEUlegislation.

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_

affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm.

arereadytodoso.Thus,the(economic)integrationintheEUhasadoptedatwo-layerstructure.

In the Maastricht Treaty, EMU economic policyconsistedof threecomponents:coordinationandsurveillanceofnationaleconomicpolicies,financialandbudgetarydiscipline,andcommonmonetarypolicy.However, during the Treaty negotiations,the member states were unable to agree on thedeepeningoftheeconomicpartoftheEMU.InsteadofatrueEconomicandMonetaryUnion,theEMUstartedoutmainlyasaMonetaryUnion.Asaresult,theEuropeanCentralBank(ECB)didnothaveafis-calcounterpartyintheinstitutionalset-up.Fiscalpolicy,aswellasbankingsupervisionandresolu-tion,werelefttothememberstates.

TheinstitutionalframeworkoftheEMUon1January1999consistedofthreemainpillars:

• AcommonmonetarypolicyrunbytheEurosystem(formedbytheECBandnationalcentralbanks)

• Astabilityandgrowthpacttoavoidexcessivedeficits

• Ano-bailoutrule

In terms ofEMU governance, the differentiationestablished by the single currency was mainlymanifestedinthefieldofmonetarypolicy,withtheautonomousEuropeanCentralBankatthecentreofmonetarypolicymaking.Althoughithadsomeimplications for the connectedfields of theEU’smacro-economic governance, it did not lead tosignificant spill-overs.Thus, the resulting evolu-tionofdifferentiationintheEU’smacro-economicgovernanceremainedlimitedandnon-linear.3

Nordidthelimiteddegreeofdifferentiationpropela strongeuroarea-specificgovernance structure.Indeed, the limited character of differentiationhas been reflected in part in the legal authorityofECOFIN, rather than in theEurogroup inEMUgovernance.

3 Dyson,Kenneth(2010):‘“Euro”Europe:“Fuzzy”Bounda-

riesand“Constrained”DifferentiationinMacro-Econom-

icGovernance’,inKennethDysonandAngelosSepos(eds)

Which Europe? The Politics of Differentiated Integration,

Palgrave:Basingstoke:215-32.

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm


Economic governance tightened as a result of the crisis

Even in theearly2000s, itbecameclear that themember stateswere lacking thepolitical tools toimplement the stability and growth pact, whilethepolicymakingtoolsavailableattheEUleveltoensurecompliancewereprovinginadequate.Fur-thermore,whenthefinancialandeconomiccrisisthatstartedinautumn2008morphedintothesov-ereigndebtcrisis,thechallengesmultiplied.

Themajorcauseforconcernoverthesovereigndebtcrisisintheeuroareawascontagion,namelythatthecrisiswouldspreadacrosstheregionandtheeurocountrieswouldfalloneaftertheother likedominoes.Therefore,thestepstakenineconomicintegrationhaveconcentratedontheeuroarea.Ontheonehand,thefocushasbeenoncrisispolicies,for example on building “firewalls” to stem thecontagionbetweencountries,orbetweenbanksandsovereigns.

Atthesametime,muchefforthasbeenexertedinthefurtherdevelopmentofeconomicgovernancein order to motivate countries to improve theireconomicpoliciesandstructures,withthegoalofextricatingthemselvesfromthecrisisanddiminish-ingtheprobabilityofoneinthefuture.Thestepstaken so farhave increased thedifferentiation inthe economic integration of euro and non-euroEUcountries.However,itwouldbeprematuretoclaimthatthestepstakenwouldhavechangedtheMaastrichtprincipleofoneEMUasagoal.

ThetighterintegrationisdueinparttoArticles136and137intheLisbonTreaty(2009),whichallowtheeurocountriestoagreeonstricterrulesofeconomicpolicyandto institutionalize theexistenceof theEurogroupasaninformalsub-groupofECOFIN.

Anotheravenuefordeepeningeconomicintegrationhasbeenintergovernmentaltreaties.TheTreatyonStability,ConvergenceandGovernanceisopentoallEUcountries,butisdesignedtobindtheeuromembersinparticular.Thepermanentcrisisfund,theEuropeanStabilityMechanism(ESM),isinturnopenonlytotheeurocountries

Somechangesaffectboththeeuroandnon-eurocountries,evenintheeventthatthelatterdecidenottojointhenewbodyforeconomicgovernance.TheSingleSupervisoryMechanism(SSM)forbank

supervisionisanexampleofthis.TheSSMisopentobotheuroandnon-eurocountries,butonlythelatterhavetheoptionofnotjoining.However,ifacountrythatdecidestostayouthasabankingsec-toroperatinginotherEUcountries(likeSwedishorDanishbankshave inFinlandorEstonia), thesubsidiarywillbesupervisedbytheSSMifitislargeenoughtoposesystemicrelevance.

Thenewlegislationandtreaties,togetherwiththeproposalsunderdiscussion,areshowninChart1.Inthechart,thenewlegislationortreatiesaremappedontoa2x2matrix.Iftheinnovationonlyaffectseuroareacountries(EA)andispartofEUlegislation,itislocatedintheupperleftpanelofthematrix.Iftheinnovationonlyaffectseuroareacountries,butisbasedonanintergovernmentaltreaty,itislocatedin theupper rightpanel of thematrix. Similarly,cases open to all EU countries (EU) are locatedeitherinthelowerleftorlowerrightpanelofthematrix,dependingonwhethertheyarebasedonEUlegislationornot.Agreyzoneinbetweenthefourpanelsindicatesamixedcase.Thedifferentelementsofneweconomicgovernancewillnowbediscussedindetail.

Euro area-specific rules

In addition to Articles 136 and 137 in the TFEU,themostclear-cutexamplesofeuroarea-specificinnovationsare the two-pack legislationand theEuropeanStabilityMechanism.

EU28

EA17

EU legislation Intergovernmental treaties

2-pack

6-pack

SSM, SRM

Euro GroupESM

Euro Plus

TSCG

Chart 1: The 2 x 2 matrix of new economic governance


Thetwo-packlegislation,whichconsistsoftworeg-ulations4,complementsthesix-packlegislation.Thefirstregulationobligesalleurocountriestoprovidemorepreciseandtimelyinformationontheirfiscalpolicyoutlook,especiallyonthebudgetaryprocess.The information requirements increasewhen theeconomicsituationworsens,especiallyifamemberstateisundergoingtheexcessivedeficitprocedure.The second regulation describes the informationrequirementsinasituationwhereamemberstateisinseriousfinancialdifficultiesorisfacingthethreatofsuch.Inthesecases,therequirementsareevengreater.Thetwo-packcameintoforceinMay2013.

The permanent crisis fund, the European Stabil-ityMechanism(ESM),wasinauguratedinOctober2012.5Itisaninter-governmentalfinancialinstitu-tionunderinternationallaw.ThefundingcapacityoftheESMisbasedonequitycapitalandthesharesinthiscapitalarecalculatedusingtheECB’scapitalkey.Asalreadyestablishedabove,onlyeurocoun-triescanbemembersoftheESM.Whenacountryjoinstheeuro,itwillbecomeanESMmemberwithfullrightsandobligations.

AsregardsEUgovernance,oneaspectofthegreyzoneistheroleoftheEurogroup.Itsofficialroleisinformal,whileformaldecision-makingtakesplaceinECOFIN.However,astheEurogroupmeetingsarewellprepared,thegrouphasapresident,andthemeetingsareheldregularlyjustbeforetheECOFINmeetings,itsroleisdefactolarger,especiallywhenit comes to euro-specific issues such asdecidingfinancialsanctions.Itcanalsoplayamajorroleinother(euro-related)issues,asamajorityofcoun-cilmembersarelikelytohavealreadydiscussedatopicandcould,atleastintheory,havereachedaconsensusonit.

EU legislation in the grey zone between euro-specific and EU-wide

ThenewEU legislation in thegreyzonebetweeneuro-specificandEU-wideconsistsofthesix-packlegislationfromDecember2011,andtheproposalsontheSingleSupervisoryMechanism(SSM)andtheSingleResolutionMechanism(SRM).

4 Proposals(2011/821)and(2011/822)foraCouncilRegulation.

5 ESMreplacedthetemporaryfund,theEuropeanFinancial

StabilityFacility(EFSF).

Thefirstmajorstepinimprovingeconomicpolicycoordinationafter thecrisis in theeuroareawasthesix-packlegislation.ItcanbepartiallyseenasatightenedversionoftheSGP,aswellasanewmac-roeconomicimbalancesprocedure,whichwidenstheeconomicsurveillancefrompublicdeficitanddebttoimbalancesinthegeneraleconomy.Thesix-packenteredintoforceon15December2011.

Thenewrulesofthesix-packapplytoallEUcoun-tries. However, the tightened rules in decidingfinancialsanctionsareusedonlyinthecaseofeurocountries.Thus, thenewrules arede factomorebindingfortheeurocountries.

TheSSMandSRMmarktwomajorstepstowardsabankingunion,whichshouldhelpbreaktheviciouscircle between sovereigns and banks.Onemajorlessondrawnfromthecrisishasbeenthedeepandfar-reachinginterconnectednessofsovereignandbankingrisks.Ontheonehand,thecollapseoftheoversizedbankingsectorhasdraggedstatefinancesdownwithit.Ontheotherhand,bankslocatedincountrieswith doubtful economic fundamentalshavebeenknockedoutoftheinterbankmarkets.

TheSSMisopentoallEUcountriesandmembershipofitisaprerequisiteforSRMmembership.Itisasyetunknownhowmanynon-eurocountrieswilljoin.Non-euro countries have voiced concerns abouttheirinfluenceintheSSM.Accordingtotheregula-tion,theeuroandnon-euromemberswillhaveanequalrole(onemember,onevoteinmostcases)inthedecision-makingbody(supervisoryboard),buttheGoverningCounciloftheECBwillexerciseavetoonthatdecision.Moreover,asthecurrentstructureincludes theESM asadirect recapitalization tool,thestructurecouldbeconstruedasbeingdeeperfor theeurocountries,andthereforeas fosteringdifferentiation.

Intergovernmental treaties that affect both euro and EU countries

ThefirststepintheintergovernmentalagreementswastheEuroPlusPact6inMarch2011,whichwas

6 EuropeanCouncil(2011):TheEuroPlusPact–StrongerEco-

nomicPolicyCoordinationforCompetitivenessandConver-

gence.Annex1ontheConclusionsoftheEuropeanCouncil,

24-25March2011.


joinedbythe23EUcountries.Itfocusedonfosteringcompetitivenessandemployment,andoncontrib-utingtothefurthersustainabilityofpublicfinancesandfinancialstability.Althoughstill inexistence,the role of the Euro Plus Pact has diminished asmanyofthetopicsarenowincludedeitherintheEUlegislation(e.g.competitivenessintheMIB)orintheTSCG(e.g.fiscalrules).

In December 2011, the European Council agreedontheTreatyonStability,CoordinationandGov-ernance.TheTSCG isanintergovernmentaltreatybetween 25 EU countries.7 Only theUK and theCzechRepublicdecidedtooptoutoftheTSCG.TheTreatyconsistsofthreemajortitles:IIIFiscalcom-pact,IVEconomicpolicyandcoordination,andVIGovernanceoftheeuroarea.Asarule,itwillapplytoanon-eurocountryonthedayitjoinstheeuro,unlessitdeclaresitselftobefullyorpartiallyboundbyTitles III and IV.Therefore, the Treaty is fullybindingonlyfortheeuromembers.ThegrantingoffinancialassistanceundertheESMisconditionalonratificationoftheTSCG.

Thepurposeof theTSCG is tostrengthentheeco-nomicpillaroftheEMU.Themostimportantpartsofthecontractarethefiscalcompact,whicheffectivelyobligesmember states to add theMedium-TermObjectives(MTOs)tothestabilityorconvergenceprogrammes, aswell as an automatic correctionmechanism to their national legislation should aserious deviation from theMTO occur.TheTSCGalso reinforces the agreement between the eurocountriestouseastrictervotingrulewhendecidingwhetheraeurocountryisbreachingtheexcessivedeficitcriterion.

TheTSCGenteredintoforceon1January2013andtheaimistoincorporatethesubstanceoftheTreatyintoEUlegislationwithinfiveyears.

Upgrading to EMU 2.0 and EU 2.0?

SinceDecember2012tworeportshavesetouttheframework for future reforms of the EMU: the“Towards a Genuine EMU” report by European

7 EuropeanCouncil(2011)TreatyonStability,Coordination

andGovernanceoftheEconomicandMonetaryUnion.Final-

izedversion31January2011.

Council President Herman Van Rompuy8 and “ABlueprintforaDeepandGenuineEMU”byCommis-sionPresidentJoséManuelBarroso.9Theseproposals,whichexplicatethedecisionsthathavebeentakenandsetoutamid-termandlonger-termvisionfortheEU, canbeassessed fromseveralangles.Oneconcernshowdeeptheintegrationneedstobeinorder to ensure that the economic frameworkoftheEMUwillberobustenough.Anotheranglecon-cernsthepoliticalwillofthememberstates.AthirdaspectrelatestowhatcanbeimplementedwithinthecurrentTreatyandwhichproposalsrequireaTreatychange.

Atthesametime,sinceautumn2012,thecurrentcrisishasstartedtoshowsignsofeasing.Whenthemarketpressureeases,governmentshaveoftenbeentemptedtohaltfiscalconsolidationandstructuralpolicies.Thesameislikelytoholdtrueinthefuture.

Thus,thereformoftheEMU is likelytobehaltedif thepressuretoreformweakens. In thiscase,apossible(mid-term)solutioncouldentailupdatingthecurrentinstitutionalset-upwiththechangesalready in the pipeline. Itwould then consist ofthe stronger framework for fiscal governance(six-pack,two-pack,TSCG),thecompletionofthesinglesupervisorymechanism,andtheresolutionauthoritycomplementedbytheharmonizationofthedepositinsurancescheme.TheESMwouldfunc-tionasacrisisfundforsovereignsandasabail-outfundforthebankingsystem.Thesestepsarealreadysubstantial and itmaybeprudent to assess theirfullimpactbeforerushingahead.AthirdandmorestraightforwardjustificationisthatthesestepscanbetakenwithoutaTreatychange.

This set-up could be dubbed EMU 2.0. Its spiritwouldstillbeclosetotheoriginalMaastrichtEMUand,asageneralrule,membercountrieswouldstillberesponsiblefortheirowneconomies,withtheexceptionof supportduring a timeof crisis.Thetightenedandextendedgovernanceandthepartial

8 VanRompuy,H.(inclosecollaborationwithJ.M.Barroso,

J-CJunckerandM.Draghi)(2012):Towards a Genuine

Economic and Monetary Union,5December2012.

9 EuropeanCommission(2012):ABlueprintforaDeepand

GenuineEconomicandMonetaryUnion.LaunchingaEuro-

peanDebate.


removalofbankingandsovereignrisksshouldhelptoaddresstheworstflawsidentifiedinEMU1.0.

EMU 2.0 would imply increasing differentiationwithintheEU,butitwouldalterneitherthecom-mon goal principle nor the current institutionalframework. Itwouldbeopen to allEUmemberstojoin,yetthecriteriawouldlikelybetighterandreflectthereformsoftheEMU.Aseuromembershipwouldcomewithstricterconditionalityandtighterintegration,itcouldraisethebarriertoentryoftheEMU.Asaresult,differentiationmightturnouttobeamorepermanentfeatureoftheEMU.

WhileEMU2.0wouldnotaltertheEU’sinstitutionalset-upperse,thedeepeningintegrationamongtheeurocountrieswouldraisequestionsregardingtherelationshipandpositionofthequasi-institutional-izedeurogroupvis-à-visothermemberstatesandjointEUinstitutions.Aslongasthedecision-makingoftheEurogroupremainslargelyintergovernmen-talincharacter,thedemocraticlegitimacycanbeprovidedbythenationalparliamentsoftheEuro-groupcountries.Shouldtheneedforasubstantialneweuroarea-specificlegislationarise,thethornyquestionofvotingintheCouncilandtheEuropeanParliamentwouldlikelyemerge.

If the Treaty were opened and renegotiated, itwould probably lead to attempts to take biggersteps.ChangingtheTreatyissuchacomplexandlong drawn-out process that if the politicalwillexisted,itmightbeworthwhiletryingtomakeallthe considered changes to facilitate a “quantumleap” in theeconomic (andpolitical) integration.Theseadditionalstepscouldincludeatruebankingunionwithacommondepositinsuranceschemeandaunion-levelfiscalauthority.Thefiscalauthoritywouldbeinchargeofthecoordinationofstructuraland stabilization policies. Itwould have its ownincome(e.g.partofVATcouldbeearmarkedforthefiscalauthority)andhavetherighttoissuecommondebt.

ThespiritoftheUnionwouldbedifferentduetothedeepened political integration, resulting inwhatcould be termed EU 2.0. However, there wouldbe a wide array of options evenwithin this set-up.Onequestionconcernstheextentofthefiscalauthority.Thefiscal authoritydrafted in thevanRompuyreportwouldnotnecessarilybebroadasitisintendedtostabilizeidiosyncraticshocksandto

becostneutralacrosstheeconomiccycle.Inreality,bothoftheseassumptionsarequestionable,how-ever.Historically,economicdownturnsandcriseshavebeenrelativelysynchronized,affectingmorethanjustafewcountries.Shouldthisbethecaseinthefutureaswell,thecommonfiscalauthorityneedstobemorefar-reachingiftherationaleistohavethecapabilitytostabilizeeconomiccycles.Inordertobecredible,thiswouldchangetherelativesizeofthememberstatesconsiderably,aswellascentral authority budgets and the nature of theUnionatlarge.

Thus,deepeningpoliticalintegrationwouldbeanimportantfacetofEU2.0.Forinstance,afar-reach-ingcommonfiscalauthorityneedstobelegitimizedbyimproveddemocraticframeworks.Acommonmacro-economicdecision-makingfacilityinallo-cating common fundswould alsowield politicalratherthantechnicalauthorityandlegitimacy.Thesamewouldapplytoafull-fledgedbankingunion,shouldthesystemfailtoavertasystemiccrisis,andbudgetfundingbedeemednecessaryasalastresorttoovercomethecrisis.

Iftheelementsofdeepeningintegrationenvisagedinthetabledproposalsaffectedonlytheeurocoun-tries,theEU’sinstitutionalframeworkwouldlikelyundergodramaticchanges.Forinstance,theEuro-peanParliament,CouncilandCommissioncouldbedividedintotwoparts,withonepartoverseeingthecore(euro)countries,andtheotherthenon-eurocountries.Thus, thecurrentsituation,wherethedecisionsthatarefinancedbytheeurocountriesaredefactomadebytheEurogroup,wouldoverhaulthecurrentsystem.Asaresult,thedifferencebetweenaeuroandanon-euroEUcountrywouldclearlybemoresignificantthaniscurrentlythecase.

Conclusion

Hasthecrisisservedtoreinforcethetwo-layereco-nomicintegrationstructureintheEU?Theansweris a resounding yes. Many of the new rules andstructurescreatedduring thecrisishave focusedonfindingasolutiontotheeurocrisisandarethuseuroarea-specific.Thecrisismanagementtool,theESM,isonlyopentotheeurocountries.Inaddition,muchoftheneweconomiccoordinationlegislation(partsofthesix-pack,andthetwo-pack)isbasedonArticle136oftheLisbonTreaty,whichallows


eurocountriestoagreeonstricterrulesregardingeconomicgovernance.Forexample,thetwo-packappliestotheeurocountriesonly.Furthermore,thefinancialsanctionsthatarebeingdeterminedinlinewiththetightervotingrulesonlyapplytotheeuroarea.

However,as regards the legislationagreedso far,thereislittleevidenceofdramaticchangecomparedtotheMaastrichtEMU.AllthechangesarestillinlinewiththebasicideathatallEUcountrieswilljointheeurowhentheyarereadyandable.ThepotentialcostsrelatedtoESMcapitalization,forexample,areprobablymakingmembershipappearlessattractiveintheshort term,butas theLithuanianexampleshows,therearestillcountrieswishingtojointheEMU,evenduringthecrisis.Thechangesagreedsofarhavenotchanged theMaastricht spiritof theEMU;theyaremerelyservingtoupgradeittoEMU2.0.

Oneofthekeyquestionsinthenearfutureislikelytoconcernthecontoursoftheeuroarea-specificdecision-making,anditsrelationshiptotheEUasawhole,anditsinstitutionsandprocedures.Evenif thenewreformsaimedatagenuineandstableEMUremainopenforallEUmemberstojoin,cur-renttrendssuggestthatnon-euromemberswillbesidelinedwheremuchoftheeuroareagovernanceisconcerneduntilsuchtimeastheyjoin.EveniftheEurogroupremains‘formallyinformal’,ithasman-agedtotransformitselfintoadefactoinstitutionwithintheEU,anditsroleandweightis likelytoincreaseratherthandecrease.

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samu kurri fiia briefing paper 143 • november 2013 · 2017-03-15 · policy, as well as banking...

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