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Safety engineering guidelines
_HB_Safety_030408_en.qxp 03.04.2008 13:41 Uhr Seite 1
Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
Simple and helpful: In the
second part of the brochure, you
can find sample circuit diagrams
for the most common safety
functions related to pneumatic
drives and the associated prod -
uct combinations from Festo.
These can be used to solve many
safety functions.
If you have further requirements,
our specialists worldwide will be
happy to help.
At Festo, quality has many
aspects – one of these is hand-
ling ma chines safely. This is the
reason behind our safety-orien-
tated automation technology. It
gives you the certainty that your
workplace is as safe as possible.
This brochure is intended as a
guide.
It covers the core questions
relat ing to safety-orientated
pneumatics:
• Why use safety-orientated
pneumatics?
• How can I identify the risk
posed by a system or machine
to the operator or user?
• Which standards and
directives apply?
• What safety measures are
derived from these?
• What are the most common
safety measures?
Your partner in safety
2
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
In general, the simpler the safety
engineering used in the appli -
cation, the more efficient it is.
The complexity of safety en -
gineering is in the variety of
state combinations and tran -
sitional states.
As a result, it would seem al -
most impossible to implement
standardised safety engineering
concepts.
Due to their flexible application,
pneumatic drive systems from
Festo need to be included in the
risk analysis and assessment for
each machine, depending on the
application.
Festo provides solutions on the
basis of risk analyses and
assessments for the most com-
mon applications. This ensures
that the electrical safety func-
tions for your pneumatic
system’s controllers are en -
hanced with the appropriate
safety concepts.
5
Simple – but safe!
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
10
Risk assessment
Directives and standards de-
scribe the process of risk assess-
ment. Every manufacturer is
obliged to carry out a risk
assessment. This is followed
by a risk evaluation and, if
necessary, suitable meas ures
for reducing risk have to be
implemented.
Focusing on risk reduction
This guide is primarily concerned
with the area of risk reduction in
the form of technical safety
measures. We assume that all
pos sible design measures for
reducing risk have already been
explored.
Source: EN 1050, Section 5ISO 14121 Source: EN ISO 12100; 5.2
Source: EN ISO 12100; 5.3
Source: EN 1050, Section 6ISO 14121
Source: EN 1050, Section 7ISO 14121
Determination of the limits of the machinery
Start
Hazard identification
Risk estimation
Specification of the machinelimits• Use limits• Space limits• Time limits
Determining/defining states & transitional states
Source: EN 1050, Appendix B
• Preliminary hazard analysis(PHA)
• WHAT-IF method• Failure mode and effects
analysis, failure effects analysis (FMEA)
• Failure simulation for con-trol systems
• MOSAR procedure• Fault tree analysis (FTA) –
DELPHI-Technique• Human interaction during
whole life cycle• Possible states of the
machine• Unintended behaviour of
the operator or reasonablyforeseeable misuse
Risk evaluation of safety
design measures – Is themachine
safe?
no
yes
Source: Directive 2006/42/EC, Appendix I, 1)
All possible instructive measures
used
End
no
yes
Riskevaluation
of technical safetymeasures–
Is the machinesafe?
no
yes
Ris
k as
sess
men
tS
ourc
e: E
N I
SO
105
0/14
121
Ris
k an
alys
isS
ourc
e: E
N I
SO
121
00, 3
.14
Ris
k ev
alua
tion
Sou
rce:
EN
IS
O 1
2100
-1, 5
.3
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
11
When estimating the risk and
identifying the required perfor-
mance level, the degree of risk
reduction is established.
Whether or not the required
risk reduction level has been
achieved for technical safety
measures depends on the follo-
wing parameters:
1) Control architecture
2) Mean Time To Failure (MTTFd)
3) Diagnostic coverage (DC)
4) Common Cause Failure (CCF)
In all cases, the performance
level (PL) must be equivalent to
at least the required PLr.
Source: DIN EN ISO 13849-1, 4.2 Figure 3
Source: EN 12100-2, Section 4
Design measurese.g. inherent safety
Technical safety measures and supplementary safety measures
Identify the safety function to be performed
For each safety function specify the required characteristics
Determining the required PLr
Design and technical implementation of the safetyfunction
Determining the PL
Category MTTFd DC CCF
User information on the machine and in the usermanual
PL PLr
yes
no
Source: EN 12100-2, Section 6
For
all
safe
ty f
unct
ions
Ris
k re
duc
tion
Sou
rce:
EN
IS
O 1
2100
-1, 5
.4
≤
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
10–8 ≤ PFHd < 10–7
12
Evaluating technical safety measures – determination of the performance level
The figure shows the simplified
procedure for determining the
performance level (PL) of a safe-
ty function. The PL is a function
of categories B to 4, diagnostic
coverage “none to high”, various
MTTFd areas and the common
cause failure.
The PL can be assigned to a spe-
cific SIL level. However, it is not
possible to infer the PL from the
SIL. Apart from the average pro-
bability of a dangerous failure
per hour, other measures are
needed to achieve a specific PL.
Risk graph: Which performance level isrequired? PL a to e
Designated architectures: How is thecontrol chain or safety function structured? Cat B to 4
Quality of components in the control chain. Determining the MTTFd for the entire process chain – from sensors toactuators
Diagnostic coverage: Which dangerous failures are identified?
Common cause failure (CCF): measuresto reduce CCF
Determination of the MTTFd = mean time to failure (dangerous)
Det
erm
inat
ion
th
e P
L =
Per
form
ance
Lev
el
Det
erm
inat
ion
of
the
SIL
= S
afet
y In
tegr
ity
Leve
l
a
b
c
d
e
Cat 2
60% ≤ DC < 90%
low
90% ≤ DC < 99%
medium
90% ≤ DC < 99%
medium
Cat 3
60% ≤ DC < 90%
low
Cat 4
99% ≤ DChigh
DIN EN ISO 13849-1Chapter 4.5.4
Cat 1
DC < 60%none
Cat B
CCF not relevant CCF 65%
DC < 60%none
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
Evaluation
Low
Medium
High
Source: DIN EN ISO 13849-1, Chapter 4.5.2
MTTFd
3 years ≤ MTTFd < 10 years
10 years ≤ MTTFd < 30 years
30 years ≤ MTTFd ≤ 100 years
10–5 ≤ PFHd < 10–4
3 x 10–6 ≤ PFHd < 10–5
10–6 ≤ PFHd < 3 x 10–6
10–7 ≤ PFHd < 10–6
≤
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
18
Control architecture of category 2
I im imL O
im
m
TE OTE
Category Summary of requirements System behaviour
2 • Requirements of B and the well-tried safety principles shall apply
• Safety-related parts of control systems must check safety functions
at suitable intervals by the machine control system: when the machi-
ne starts up and before a hazardous situation arises, e.g. the start of
a new cycle; at the start of other movements and/or periodically
during operation, if the risk assessment and the operation mode
show that this is necessary.
• Fault tolerance: zero, but the
loss of the safety function is
detected by the check
• The occurrence of a fault can
lead to the loss of the safety
function between the checks
• Testing at suitable intervals
(test frequency must fulfil one
hundred times the requirement
rate (safety function))
• Mainly characterised by structure
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
19
Safety function
Exhausting
Example*
Entire control chain = cat. 2
Hardware structure Wiring
*The example shows the schematic representation of a specific category. Depending
on the safety relay, the wiring may be different and the connections may have
different designations. A fault examination has to be carried out for each concrete
application.
EM
ERGENCYS T O P
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
30
Reducing pressureand force
Exhausting
Reversing a movement
Tamper-proof, prevention ofunexpected starting up
Free of forces Stopping, holding and blocking a movement
Reducing speed
Maintainingpressure
Two-handoperation
Pressurising
Set-up and service operation
Normal operation
Initial position, standstill
Emergency operation
4 operation modes – 10 safety functions
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Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
31
During the risk assessment, the
hazardous situation also has to
be determined and, sub -
sequently, the risks have to be
evaluated. This applies to a
machine’s entire service life.
The following four operating
modes in particular are used for
operating a machine:
• Initial position/standstill
• Normal operation
• Set-up and service operation
• Emergency operation
Specific safety functions can be
derived from these operation
modes:
• Pressurising of machines
• Maintaining pressure
• Reducing pressure and force
• Exhausting of machines
• Two-hand operation
• Tamper-proof
• Reducing speed
• Free of forces
• Stopping, holding and blocking
a movement
• Reversing a movement
You can find these safety func-
tions both in the suggested cir-
cuits and in the products and
solutions. The information spe -
cified always refers to very spe-
cific safety functions.
This will enable you to quickly
de cide whether the information
is relevant to your current task,
both in the sample circuits and
in the products.
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
The varying requirements and areas of application for installations mean that the results of risk
analyses are very variable – as are the solutions for them. Here we present some important examples.
Power-driven interlocking
guards
Safety measures
1. Prevention of unexpected
start-up, as per EN 1037
2. Single-channel for safety func-
tion exhausting, as per
EN 13849-1
3. Stop category “1” as per
EN 60204-1
32
Examples of safety-orientated pneumatics
Picking & Placing discrete
goods
Safety measures
1. Prevention of unexpected
start-up, as per EN 1037
2. Two-channel stop, as per
EN 13849-1
3. Stop category “1” as per
EN 60204-1
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample
Function Description (max. possible)
Control architecture Cat. 2
Number of channels 1
Diagnostic coverage Medium
Performance level d
CCF > 65%
Part no. Identifier Type Product designation
3527 WV1 ZSB-1/8 Control block for
two-hand start
6817 WV2 SV-3-M5 Front panel valve
6817 WV3 SV-3-M5 Front panel valve
9270 DR VD-3-PK-3 Pressure sequence valve
Description
The control block for two-hand
start ZSB 1/8 is a pneu matic
AND gate. If inputs 11 and 12
are pressurised within a
max. of 0.5 s of each other, the
assembly switches through and
there is an output signal at
port 2.
The system is controlled by two
external 3/2-way push-button
valves. If both push-button
valves are activated, outlet
port 2 is pressurised. If one or
both pushbuttons are released,
outlet port 2 is unpressurised.
The system exhausts from 2 to 3.
Note
All the information that relates
to standards is identified with
“max. possible”. Whether the
values are reached does not only
depend on the pneumatics.
It is only possible to assess
whether a specific function is
achieved or not by observing
the complete system. The design
of the electrical engineering,
mechanics, hydraulics and pneu-
matics all play a role.
34
Sample circuit diagram – two-hand control block
Safety function
Two-hand operation
Control chain
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Festo
Safety Engineerin
g Guidelin
es - Reading Sample